Navy Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress

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The Navy wants to modernize 84 Aegis cruisers and destroyers over a period of more than 20
years at a total cost of billions of dollars. The modernizations are intended to ensure that the ships
can be operated cost-effectively throughout their entire intended service lives. The program poses
several potential issues for Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Backgr ound ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers..................................................................................................1
Major Contractors for Navy Surface Combatants.....................................................................1
Purpose of Modernization.........................................................................................................2
Planned Modernization Work....................................................................................................2
Cost ........................................................................................................................................... 2
Schedule .................................................................................................................................... 3
Shipyards Performing The Work...............................................................................................3
Potential Issues for Congress...........................................................................................................4
Total Estimated Cost Of Modernization Program.....................................................................4
Overall Vision Behind Modernization Plan..............................................................................4
Shipyards For DDG-51 Modernizations...................................................................................4
Sequence For DDG-51 Modernizations....................................................................................5
Scope of DDG-51 Modernizations............................................................................................5
Service Life Extension to 40 Years...........................................................................................5
Aegis Open Architecture...........................................................................................................5
Legislative Activity for FY2009......................................................................................................6
FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5658/S. 3001)........................................................6
FY2009 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329)...............................................6
Table 1. Funding for Aegis Ship Modernization.............................................................................3
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................7

The Navy’s current cruisers and destroyers are called Aegis ships because they are equipped with
the Aegis combat system—an integrated combination of sensors, weapons, computers, software,
and display systems that was named for the mythological shield carried by Zeus. The Aegis ships
are multi-mission ships for conducting missions such as air defense (which the Navy calls anti-air
warfare), ballistic missile defense (BMD), anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, naval
surface fire support for forces ashore, and Tomahawk cruise missile strikes.
The Navy’s Aegis ships include Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)
class destroyers. A total of 27 CG-47s were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and FY1988;
the ships entered service between 1983 and 1994. The first five, which were built to an earlier
technical standard, were judged by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were removed
from service in 2004-2005. The Navy plans to keep the remaining 22 ships in service to age 35.
A total of 62 DDG-51s were procured for the Navy between FY1985 and FY2005; the first ^nd
entered service in 1991, 52 were in service as of the end of FY2007, and the 62 is scheduled to
enter service in 2011. The Navy until recently had planned to keep them in service to age 35, but
is now considering extending their service lives to 40 years.
Between 2011, when the 62^nd DDG-51 enters service, and 2021, when the first of the 22
remaining CG-47s reaches age 35, the Navy plans to maintain a force of 84 Aegis ships—22
cruisers and 62 destroyers. These 84 ships equate to about 27%, or more than one-quarter, of the ¹
Navy’s planned total force of 313 ships. Aegis ships are to account for the majority of the Navy’s
cruiser-destroyer force until about 2032, and the last of the 84 ships are to remain in service into
the 2040s.
The builders of the 84 Aegis ships are General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath,
ME (7 CG-47s and 34 DDG-51s), and the Ingalls shipyard of Pascagoula, MS, that forms part of
Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, or NGSB (15 CG-47s and 28 DDG-51s). Several U.S.
shipyards maintain and repair Aegis ships, with much of the work done under multi-ship/multi-
option (MSMO) contracts. Under a MSMO contract, a shipyard is responsible for conducting
depot-level maintenance work on several ships in a class.
The primary contractor for the Aegis system is Lockheed Martin’s Maritime Systems & Sensors
division of Moorestown, NJ. Lockheed and the firms that previously owned the Moorestown
facility have been the primary Aegis contractor since the 1970s. Other makers of Navy surface
ship combat systems include Raytheon, the maker of, among other things, the combat system for

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the Navy’s new DDG-1000 class destroyers, and General Dynamics, the maker of the combat ²
system for the General Dynamics version of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
A primary objective of the Aegis ship modernization effort is to improve the ships’ combat
capabilities so that the ships will remain mission-effective to the end of their intended service
lives. A second major objective is to make the ships less expensive to operate, maintain, and
modernize over the remainder of their lives. The modernization itself is not intended to extend the
ships’ expected lives from 35 years to some higher figure, such as 40 years. Additional
maintenance work would be needed to extend the ships’ lives to 40 years or some other higher
figure.
The Navy’s Aegis ship modernization plan includes modernization of the ships’ basic hull,
mechanical, and electrical (HM&E) equipment, and modernization of their combat systems. In
both areas, the Navy plans to install new systems or components that are more capable than the
ones they are to replace. Some of the planned changes are intended to permit the ships to be
operated with a smaller crew, thereby reducing their annual operation and support (O&S) costs.
Planned changes to the ships’ combat systems are intended to, among other things, begin shifting
their Aegis computers and software to a more open architecture (OA), meaning, in general terms,
an arrangement that uses non-proprietary computers and software. The Navy believes that
moving to an Aegis open architecture will permit the Aegis system to be updated over the
remainder of the ships’ lives more easily and less expensively, using contributions from a variety
of firms.
In August 2008, it was reported that the Navy has decided to expand the scope of the DDG-51
modernization program to include the installation of a BMD capability, so that all DDG-51s
would eventually be BMD-capable, and that the Navy has not committed to similarly expanding ³
the scope of the CG-47 modernization program due to financial constraints. Equipping all DDG-

51s with a BMD capability would significantly expand the previous program of record for sea-

based BMD platforms, which called for a total of 18 Aegis ships (3 CG-47s and 15 DDG-51s) to ⁴
be BMD-capable.
The Navy estimated in 2007 that modernizing the first 8 CG-47s would cost an average of about
$221 million per ship. Table 1 shows annual funding for the Aegis ship modernization program
for FY2005-FY2009.

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Table 1. Funding for Aegis Ship Modernization
^{(millions of then-year}^doll^ars;^{totals ma}^{y not a}^dd^{due to rounding)}
^FY05^{FY06 FY07}^{FY08 FY09}
^{Aegis cru}^iser^s
^{RDT&EN 0}^13.6^7.7^4.7^4.8
^OPN⁰^124.^{5 231.}²^216.^{0 232.}⁴
^{WPN 0}^5.3^18.4^23.4^45.2
^{OMN 0}^41.2^86.7^101.⁴^111.⁴
^Cruiser^subtotal⁰^{184.6 344.0}^{345.5 393.8}
^{Aegis destroye}^rs
^{SCN 49.8}^49.3⁰⁰⁰
^{OPN 0}^3.0^32.0^52.7^165.⁵
^OMN⁰^{10.0 3.9}^{20.9 39.9}
^Destroyer^subtotal^49.8^{62.3 35.9}^{73.6 205.4}
^TOTAL^49.8^246.^{9 379.}⁹^419.^{1 599.}²
^Source:^Navy^{data provided to CRS on May 20,}²⁰^08.
^{Notes: RDT&EN}^{is the Research, Development, Test and}^Evalu^{ation, Navy app}^{ropriation accoun}^t;^SCN^{is the}
^{Shipbuilding and Conversion, Nav}^{y account;}^OPN^{is the Ot}^{her Pr}^ocurement,^{Navy accou}^nt;^WP^N^{is the}
^{Weapon Procure}^{ment, Nav}^{y acc}^{ount, and}^OMN^{is the O}^peratio^{n and}^Maintena^{nce, Navy a}^ccount^{. RDT&EN}
^{funds a}^{re for t}^{he s}^{hip p}^{rogram only, and do not include fu}^{nds for}^{Aegis Weapon System developm}^ent.
Under the Navy’s plan, the oldest cruisers and destroyers would be modernized first, followed by
progressively younger ships. The Navy wants to divide the modernization work for each ship into
two shipyard periods—one for HM&E work, the other for combat system work. The first cruiser
HM&E upgrade began in FY2006, and the first cruiser combat system upgrade was to begin in
FY2008 (specifically, February FY2008). Two fully modernized cruisers per year are to be
delivered in FY2009 and FY2010, and three per year are to be delivered starting in FY2011. The
Navy wants each destroyer to receive its combat system modernization two years after its HM&E
modernization. The Navy wants to begin the first two destroyer HM&E modernizations in
FY2010 and its first two destroyer combat system modernizations (on the same two ships) in
FY2012. The Navy reportedly wants to increase the rate to three ships per year in FY2013-⁵
FY2015, and to nine ships per year starting in FY2016.
The Navy plans to use competitively awarded MSMO contracts for executing the Aegis
modernizations. Under the Navy’s plan, all U.S. shipyards would be eligible to compete for the
contracts. Navy policy calls for modernizations lasting longer than six months to be competed on

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a coast-wide basis, meaning that competitions would be open to all yards located along the same
coast where the Aegis ships in question are homeported.

One potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the total estimated cost of the Aegis ship
modernization program: What is the Navy’s total estimated cost, and how was this figure affected
by the Navy’s reported decision in 2008 to expand the scope of the DDG-51 modernization
program to include the installation of a BMD capability?

Some industry sources question the Navy’s logic behind the Aegis ship modernization program,
arguing that the Navy lacks a sufficiently thought-through overall vision—a desired end-point—
for the surface combatant force, and that in the absence of such a vision, the Navy is planning to
spend money on Aegis ship modernizations in a scattershot manner, without knowing whether
this will lead to the best-possible future surface fleet for the Navy. These sources argue that,
before spending money on Aegis ship modernizations, the Navy should develop a more fully
considered overall vision for the future of the surface fleet that looks at the surface force and the
Navy as a whole as parts of a larger network of defense capabilities involving other U.S. military
forces. One potential alternative to the Navy’s plan would be to forego some or all of the Aegis
ship modernizations, accelerate the planned procurement of new cruisers and destroyers, and ⁷
replace the unmodernized Aegis ships with the accelerated replacement ships.
Some industry sources propose allocating all the DDG-51 modernizations to GD/BIW and
NGSB, with each firm receiving one-half of the ships. These sources argue that this would reduce
the cost of the DDG-51 modernizations by permitting the two firms to achieve sustained learning-
curve benefits in the program, and also support the shipbuilding industrial base by providing
additional work to the two yards that have built all Navy cruisers and destroyers procured in
recent years. Competitive pressure on GD/BIW and NGSB, these industry sources argue, can be
maintained by using Profit Related to Offer (PRO) bidding, under which the two yards would bid
prices for performing the modernizations allocated to them, with the lower bid winning a higher
profit margin.

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Some industry sources argue that the Navy should begin the DDG-51 modernizations with DDG-
51s currently under construction, followed by whatever DDG-51s are scheduled for depot-level
maintenance. Others argue that the Navy should upgrade the combat systems on younger DDG-
51s when they come into yards for periodic overhaul and repair work, while modernizing older
DDG-51s at the same time.
Some industry sources have suggested expanding the scope of the DDG-51 modernizations in
various ways to further increase the ships’ capabilities or further reduce their crew sizes and
operating costs. One proposal would add some electric-drive propulsion equipment to the ships’
existing mechanical-drive propulsion systems to more fully interconnect the mechanical-drive ⁸
components, which could reduce the ships’ fuel use and create other operational advantages.
Another potential option for the Aegis ship modernization program would be to expand its scope
to include work that would be needed to extend the service lives of the Aegis ships from 35 years
to a higher number, such as 40 years. Extending the Aegis ships’ service lives to 40 years could
permit the Navy to maintain higher numbers of cruisers and destroyers in future years. The
Navy’s report on its FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan, submitted to Congress in early February

2008, incorporates a new assumption that the service lives of all 62 Aegis destroyers will be ⁹

extended from 35 years to 40 years. Subsequent to the submission of this report, however, a
Navy official was quoted as stating that the Navy had not yet officially approved the idea of ¹⁰
extending the service lives of those ships.
Some observers have expressed concerns about the Navy’s plan for moving to an open
architecture (OA) on the Aegis system, arguing that it will not shift the Aegis ships to a truly open ¹¹
architecture, or do so quickly enough. For firms that make Navy surface ship combat systems,
or parts of them, the issue of how to implement open architecture on Aegis ships and other Navy
surface ships has potentially very large business implications. Potential candidates for the basis of
an eventual common open-architecture combat system for Navy surface ships include (but are not
necessarily limited to) a modularized version of Lockheed’s Aegis system, Raytheon’s Total Ship
Computing Environment Infrastructure, or TSCEI (the core of the combat system being

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developed for the DDG-1000 destroyers), and the Core Mission System developed by General
Dynamics and Northrop for the General Dynamics version of the LCS.
On September 22, 2008, Raytheon filed a protest with the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) for lack of competition in the Navy’s plan to award a sole-source contract to Lockheed for ¹²
modernizing the Aegis combat systems on the fleet’s cruisers and destroyers. On December 22, ¹³

2008, GAO denied Raytheon’s protest.

The Senate Armed Services Committee discussed the Aegis destroyer modernization program on
pages 79-80 of its report (S. Rept., 110-335 of May 12, 2008) on S. 3001. The committee stated
that it views the Navy’s plan to extend DDG-51 service life to 40 years as “very high risk,”
questioned whether the Navy has fully evaluated the option of performing the DDG-51
modernizations in the yards where the ships were built, and directed the Navy to submit a report
on this option and on the Navy’s plan to perform the work through MSMO contracts. The report
discussed the Navy’s plan to move toward an Aegis open architecture on pages 121-123. The
committee expressed concern regarding the Navy’s rate of progress in achieving this goal, and
directed that no more than 50% of FY2009 funding authorized for certain Navy research and
development work on surface ship combat systems may be obligated “until 30 days after
submission by the Secretary of the Navy of a detailed program plan for implementing OA for the
Aegis combat system. The program plan shall be included in subsequent quarterly reports to the
congressional defense committees on Naval Open Architecture, and shall include methodology
and scheduling for incrementally opening the Aegis combat system.”
/
The FY2009 defense appropriations bill became Division C of H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329 of
September 30, 2008, a consolidated appropriations act. The bill approves the Navy’s OPN
funding request for Aegis destroyer modernization, reduces the Navy’s OPN funding request for
Aegis cruiser modernization by $66.7 million, and reduces the Navy’s WPN funding request for
Aegis cruiser modernization by $15.1 million.

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^Sp^{ecialist i}ⁿ^Nav^a^l^A^f^f^a^ir^s
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