Obesity Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides broad nondiscrimination protection for
individuals with disabilities. However, to be covered under the statute, an individual must first
meet the definition of an individual with a disability. Questions have been raised as to whether
and to what extent obesity is a disability under the ADA and whether the ADA protects obese
individuals from discrimination. This report provides background regarding how obesity is
covered under the ADA and its supporting regulations. It also discusses some of the ways in
which courts have applied the ADA to obesity discrimination claims.

Backgr ound ..................................................................................................................................... 1
The ADA and Related Guidance on Obesity...................................................................................1
Selected Obesity Discrimination Decisions....................................................................................3
Cook v. Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals....................3
Francis v. City of Meriden.........................................................................................................4
EEOC v. Watkins.......................................................................................................................5
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................5

Obesity is a condition that has been deemed an epidemic in the United States.¹ Results of a survey
by the National Center for Health Statistics found that in the years 2003 to 2004, an estimated ²
66% of U.S. adults were either overweight or obese. The American Obesity Association
estimates that approximately 127 million adults in the United States are overweight, 60 million ³
obese, and 9 million severely obese. It has been argued that obese individuals have been the
targets of discrimination.
There is no federal law that specifically prohibits obesity discrimination. However, some obese
individuals have argued that their weight can be considered a disability for purposes of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and, therefore, they ⁴
have legal protection against weight discrimination. Courts have evaluated numerous claims of ⁵
obesity discrimination brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.

Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for ⁶
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. The ADA prohibits
discrimination based on disability in the areas of employment, public services, public
accommodations, and services operated by private entities, transportation, and ⁷
telecommunications. In order to prevail in a discrimination case, the plaintiff must prove, among
other things, that he or she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA. The ADA defines
“disability” with respect to an individual as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual [such as walking, or
working]; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an

¹^Se^e^For^e^w^o^r^d^Fr^om^t^h^e^S^u^r^g^e^oⁿ^G^e^ne^r^a^{l, 2}⁰⁰¹^Re^por^t^on^O^v^e^r^w^e^ight^a^{nd O}^b^e^s^ity^{, U}^.^S.^D^e^pa^r^t^m^eⁿ^t^of^H^e^a^{lth a}^nd
^H^u^m^a^{n Se}^r^v^ic^es^{. O}^b^e^s^ity^is^o^f^te^{n m}^e^a^s^ur^e^d^us^ing^a^b^ody^m^a^s^s^inde^x⁽^B^MI⁾^,^w^h^ic^{h is}^a^num^be^r^c^a^l^c^u^la^te^{d us}ⁱⁿ^g^aⁿ
ⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vi^du^al^{’s h}^eⁱ^g^h^t^an^{d w}^eⁱ^g^h^t^.^{A BM}^{I o}^f^o^v^{er 30}ⁱ^s^con^sⁱ^d^ered^o^b^ese.^F^o^{r i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^on^cal^cu^l^a^tⁱ^{ng BM}^I,^{see Cen}^t^ers
^f^o^r^Dⁱ^s^e^a^s^e^C^ontr^o^{l a}ⁿ^d^P^r^e^v^eⁿ^tio^{n, B}^M^I^—^B^ody^Ma^s^s^I^nde^x^:^A^{bout B}^M^I^f^o^r^A^dults^,^at^htt^p^://w^ww^.^c^dc^.g^ov^/nc^c^dph^p/
^dnpa^/^b^m^i/a^dult_B^M^I/^a^bout^_a^du^lt^_BMI.^h^tm^#D^ef^initio^n.
²^Na^tiona^{l Ce}ⁿ^t^e^r^f^o^{r He}^a^{lth Sta}^tis^tic^s,^P^r^e^v^a^l^eⁿ^c^e^of^Ove^r^w^e^ig^{ht a}^{nd Obe}^s^ity^Am^ong^A^{dults: Unite}^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 20}^03-
²⁰⁰^4,^at^htt^p^://w^ww^.c^dc^.g^ov^/ⁿ^c^h^s/pro^duc^ts/^p^u^b^s/pu^bd^/^h^e^s^ta^ts/obe^se^03_^04/^ov^e^r^wg^ht_a^dul^t_^03.^htm^.
³^Ameri^can^Ob^esi^t^y^Asso^ci^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^F^act^S^h^eet^,^at^htt^p^://w^ww^.obe^sit^y^.org^/subs/f^a^s^t^f^a^c^t^s/^obe^sity^_US.shtm^l.
⁴^Sta^t^e^a^nd^loc^a^l^dⁱ^sa^bility^la^w^s^ha^v^e^a^f^f^o^rde^d^som^e^le^g^a^{l prote}^c^tion^f^o^{r ov}^e^r^we^ig^{ht w}^o^rke^r^s.^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^Mⁱ^chⁱ^g^an^’s
^Elliott^-L^a^r^s^e^{n Civ}^{il Rig}^h^ts^A^c^{t of 19}^77,^A^c^{t 162,}^P^u^blic^A^c^ts^of¹⁹^{77. T}^itle^V^II^of^the^Civ^{il Rig}^h^ts^A^c^{t o}^f¹⁹⁶^{4 is}
^a^nothe^r^a^v^e^nue^t^h^a^t^p^l^aⁱ^ntif^f^s^ha^ve^pur^s^u^e^d^f^o^r^brⁱⁿ^gⁱ^ng^o^b^e^s^ity^dis^c^rⁱ^mⁱ^na^{tion c}^l^aⁱ^m^s^.^Se^e^ge^ne^r^a^lly^{, K}^a^te^Sa^blos^k^y^,
^A^r^tic^le^:^Probativ^e^“W^eⁱ^ght^{”: Re}^-^t^hinkⁱ^ng^Ev^ideⁿ^tⁱ^ary^St^an^dar^{ds in}^Title^VII^Se^x^Disc^riminati^oⁿ^Cas^e^s^,³⁰^N.^Y.^U^.^Rev.
^L^.^&^Soc^.^Chaⁿ^g^e³^{25 (}²⁰⁰⁶⁾^{. T}^h^{is re}^port^doe^s^not^a^ddre^{ss T}^itle^V^I^{I c}^l^aⁱ^m^s^.
⁵^{For a}^dditi^ona^l^disc^ussi^on^of^obe^s^ity^disc^ri^mⁱ^na^{tion a}ⁿ^{d d}ⁱ^sa^bility^la^w^,^se^e,^e.^g^.^,^S^ONDRA^S^O^L^OVA^Y^,^T^I^P^P^I^{NG T}^H^E
^S^C^A^{LES O}^F^J^US^T^I^C^E^{162 (}²⁰⁰⁰⁾^(e^v^a^lua^ting^,^a^m^ong^othe^{r thi}ⁿ^g^s^{, c}^e^r^taⁱⁿ^is^s^u^e^s^t^h^a^t^a^r^is^e^w^{ith us}^ing^dⁱ^s^a^bility^lawⁱⁿ
^s^itua^tio^ns^of^obe^s^ity^dis^c^rⁱ^mⁱ^na^tion)^.
⁶^{42 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹²¹⁰¹⁽^b)⁽¹⁾^.
⁷^Am^e^r^ic^aⁿ^s^w^{ith Disa}^bilitie^{s A}^c^{t, 42 U.}^S.C.^§§¹²¹^01-¹²²¹^{3. F}^o^{r a}^m^o^re^in-de^p^th^disc^ussioⁿ^of^the^ADA^,^se^e^CRS
^R^e^por^{t 98-}⁹²^1,^T^h^{e America}ⁿ^s^wi^th^Disa^b^ilit^{ies Act (}^A^{DA): S}^t^a^t^u^t^o^r^{y La}ⁿ^g^u^a^g^e^aⁿ^d^Recen^{t Issu}^es^{, b}^y^N^a^nc^y^L^e^e
^J^one^s^.

impairment.”⁸ The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has promulgated ADA
regulations that give insight as to what constitutes an impairment within the meaning of the term ⁹
“disability,” as well as what is considered to be “substantially limit[ing] a major life activity.”
The ADA regulations have been used by the courts in determining the validity of obesity
discrimination claims.
Obesity discrimination cases have also been brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.¹⁰
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act states that “no otherwise qualified individual ... shall, solely
by reason of her or his disability, ... be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity ¹¹
receiving Federal financial assistance.” Courts have often applied the same standard when ¹²
deciding cases arising under the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Also, the
standards for determining employment discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act are identical ¹³
to those used in title I of the ADA.
The ADA regulations address whether obesity can be an impairment that qualifies as a disability
under the ADA. In general, the regulations suggest that the ADA offers limited protection to
obese individuals. The ADA regulations state that
^te^m^p^o^r^ar^y^,ⁿ^oⁿ^-^c^h^r^oⁿⁱ^cⁱ^m^p^a^ir^m^eⁿ^t^{s o}^f^s^h^o^r^{t d}^u^r^a^tioⁿ^,^wⁱ^th^li^{ttle o}^rⁿ^o^loⁿ^g^ter^m^o^r
^p^e^r^m^aⁿ^eⁿ^{t i}^m^p^{act, ar}^{e u}^s^u^a^ll^yⁿ^o^{t d}ⁱ^sab^{ilities. S}^u^c^hⁱ^m^p^a^ir^m^eⁿ^t^s^m^a^yⁱⁿ^cl^u^d^{e, b}^u^{t ar}^{e n}^o^t
^li^m^{ited to, brok}^en^li^m^b^s^,^s^p^rain^{ed j}^oⁱⁿ^ts^[an^d^{] con}^c^u^s^sⁱ^ons^....^Similar^l^{y, except in r}^a^r^e¹⁴
^ci^r^c^um^s^t^ances^{, obes}ⁱ^t^yⁱ^s^not^consⁱ^d^er^{ed a di}^s^ablⁱⁿ^{g i}^m^pai^r^m^ent^.
The EEOC has expounded on how obesity is to be covered under the ADA. In its ADA
compliance manual, the EEOC states that
^b^eⁱ^{ng o}^v^e^r^w^eⁱ^g^ht^,ⁱⁿ^aⁿ^d^o^fⁱ^t^s^e^l^f,^ge^ne^r^a^l^l^yⁱ^s^no^t^aⁿⁱ^m^p^aⁱ^r^meⁿ^t^.^Oⁿ^t^h^e^o^t^he^r^ha^nd^,^se^ve^r^e
^obesⁱ^t^y^,^w^hⁱ^c^h^h^a^s^been^de^fⁱⁿ^e^{d as}^body^w^eⁱ^g^h^t^m^o^{re t}^h^aⁿ^100%^ov^{er t}^h^eⁿ^o^r^mⁱ^s^cl^earl^y^aⁿ
ⁱ^m^p^a^ir^m^eⁿ^t^{. I}ⁿ^ad^d^itioⁿ^,^{a p}^e^r^s^oⁿ^wⁱ^th^o^b^e^sit^y^m^a^y^h^a^v^e^an^uⁿ^d^er^l^yⁱⁿ^g^o^r^r^e^su^ltan^t
^phy^si^ol^ogⁱ^cal^di^s^o^{rder, s}^u^c^h^a^s^hy^pert^eⁿ^si^on^{or a}^t^h^y^r^oi^{d di}^s^o^{rder. A}^phy^si^ol^ogⁱ^cal^di^s^o^rder¹⁵
^{is an}ⁱ^m^p^a^ir^m^eⁿ^t^.
Based on the ADA regulations and EEOC guidance, it may be difficult for an obese plaintiff to ¹⁶
successfully bring a discrimination claim. Still, courts have found some plaintiffs entitled to
protection under the ADA.

⁸^{42 U}^.^S.C^.^§^§¹²¹^{01 e}^t^s^e^q^.^T^h^e^m^e^aⁿ^ing^of^“^phy^sⁱ^c^a^lⁱ^m^pa^ir^m^e^nt”ⁱ^s^de^fⁱ^ne^{d in t}^h^e^A^D^A^r^e^g^u^la^tions^,^a^s^“^aⁿ^y
^phy^sⁱ^olog^ic^a^l^dis^o^r^d^e^r^{, or}^c^oⁿ^d^iti^{on, c}^o^s^m^e^tic^dis^fⁱ^g^ur^em^eⁿ^{t, or}^aⁿ^a^t^om^ic^a^l^los^s^af^f^e^c^ting^one^or^m^o^r^e^of^the^f^o^llowⁱ^ng
^body^s^y^s^t^em^s^:^ne^urolog^ic^a^l^{, m}^u^s^c^ulos^k^e^le^ta^{l, s}^p^e^cⁱ^a^l^s^e^ns^e^org^a^ns^,^re^s^p^ira^t^ory^{..., c}^a^r^diov^a^s^c^u^la^{r, re}^p^r^od^uc^tiv^e^,
^dig^e^s^tiv^e^,^g^e^nito-^u^rⁱ^na^r^y^{, he}^mⁱ^c^{and ly}^m^pha^tic^{, s}^k^{in, a}^{nd e}ⁿ^doc^rⁱ^ne^.”^{29 C}^.^F.R^.^§¹⁶³⁰^.2(^h⁾⁽¹⁾^.
⁹^Se^e²⁹^C^.^F^.^R^.^§§¹⁶³⁰^et^seq^.
¹⁰^Se^e^,^e^.^g.^{, C}^o^ok^v^.^R^h^o^d^e^I^s^la^nd,^D^e^{pt. of}^M^e^{ntal H}^e^a^lth^{, Re}^tar^dati^on^an^{d H}^o^s^p^ita^ls^,¹⁰^F.^3d¹⁷⁽¹^st^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹³⁾^.
¹¹^{29 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁷⁹⁴⁽^a⁾^.
¹²^S^{ee E}^.^E^.^O.^C^.^v.^T^exa^{s B}^u^{s L}ⁱⁿ^e^s^,⁹²^{3 F}^.^Su^pp^{. 9}⁶⁵^,⁹⁷⁵^(S.D^{. T}^e^x^{., 19}⁹⁶⁾^.
¹³^{29 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁷⁹⁴⁽^d)^.
¹⁴^{29 C}^.^F.R^.¹⁶³⁰^A^{pp. (}²⁰⁰⁶⁾⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d)^.
¹⁵^Se^e^Equa^l^Em^ploy^m^e^{nt O}^p^p^o^r^t^uⁿ^ity^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^{on C}^o^m^p^lia^nc^e^Ma^nua^{l (}¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^,^at^htt^p^://w^ww^.e^e^o^c^.^gov^/polic^y^/
^co^m^p^lⁱ^aⁿ^ce.^h^t^m^l^.
¹⁶^Se^e^,^e^.^g.^{, Sm}^aw^v^.^C^o^m^m^onw^e^a^lt^{h of}^Vir^gⁱⁿⁱ^a^,⁸⁶^{2 F.}^Su^pp^{. 1}⁴⁶⁹^,¹⁴⁷^{5 (E}^.D^.^V^a^.¹⁹^{94) (“}^.^{.. t}^h^e^re^g^u^la^tio^ns^...^p^oⁱⁿ^t
^uⁿ^r^el^en^tⁱⁿ^g^l^y^t^o^t^h^{e con}^c^l^u^si^on^t^h^at^{a cl}^ai^m^b^a^sed^oⁿ^o^b^e^si^t^yⁱ^sⁿ^o^t^lⁱ^k^el^y^t^o^su^cceed^uⁿ^d^e^{r t}^h^{e A}^D^A^.^”).

Both state and federal courts have considered whether the ADA or Section 504 applies to obesity
and have used varying (and sometimes conflicting) lines of reasoning and conclusions. Courts
have disagreed on issues such as (1) whether a plaintiff must have a physiological disorder in ¹⁷
order for the plaintiff’s morbid obesity to be covered under the ADA and (2) whether a ¹⁸
plainitiff’s obesity can cause a “substantial limitation of a major life activity.” The following
cases include some of the different arguments that courts have used in finding that a plaintiff is ¹⁹
eligible or non-eligible for ADA or Section 504 protection.
One of the first appellate decisions to address weight discrimination as a disability was Cook, ²⁰
which established that an obese plaintiff can be considered disabled. In Cook, the plaintiff
applied for a position she had previously held as an institutional attendant. At the time Cook
applied, she was five feet two inches tall and weighed 320 pounds. The institution refused to
rehire Cook, claiming that Cook’s weight compromised her ability to evacuate patients in an
emergency situation and increased her chances of developing aliments that could lead to Cook to
be out of work or claim workers’ compensation.
Cook brought a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as well as certain state
statutes, claiming that the failure to hire her was based on an unlawful perceived disability—
although she was fully able to perform the job, the institution considered her physically impaired.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Cook. However, the court acknowledged that ²¹
Cook could also prevail because she had an actual physical impairment. The court pointed to the
fact that Cook had admitted that she was morbidly obese, and had presented expert testimony that
morbid obesity is a physiological disorder, a dysfunction of the metabolic system. The institution
argued that Cook’s claims failed because her weight was a condition that was both “mutable” and
“voluntary.” The court rejected the institution’s arguments and noted that nowhere in the
Rehabilitation Act, nor in the regulations implementing the act, was there a mention of either
characteristic disqualifying a claim.
The court also discussed whether Cook’s weight “substantially limited one or more [of Cook’s]
major life activities.” The court pointed to evidence introduced by the institution demonstrating

¹⁷^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^E^E^O^{C v.}^W^a^t^kⁱⁿ^s^,⁴⁶³^F^.^3d⁴³⁶⁽⁶^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾^;^C^oⁿ^nor^v^.^M^c^D^onald’^s^Re^s^t^aur^ants^,¹⁴^A^m^{. Disa}^bilitie^s
^C^a^s^.⁽^B^N^A⁾^{204 (}^D^{. C}^oⁿⁿ^{. 2}⁰⁰³⁾^.
¹⁸^Se^e^,^e^.^g.^{, C}^o^ok^v^.^R^h^o^d^e^I^s^la^nd,^D^e^{pt. of}^M^e^{ntal H}^e^a^lth^{, Re}^tar^dati^on^an^{d H}^o^s^p^ita^ls^,¹⁰^F.^3d¹⁷⁽¹^st^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹³⁾^;^Ri^dge
^v^.^C^ape^El^iz^abe^t^h^Sc^ho^{ol D}^e^p^a^r^t^m^e^nt^{, 7}⁷^F.^S^upp^{. 2}^d¹⁴^{9 (}^D^.^Me^.¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^.
¹⁹^I^t^s^h^o^u^l^d^be^note^d^t^h^a^t^w^h^ile^the^c^a^s^e^s^dis^c^us^s^e^{d in this}^r^e^por^t^a^{ll a}^lle^g^e^{d em}^ploy^m^e^{nt dis}^c^rⁱ^mⁱ^na^{tion, c}^o^v^e^r^e^{d u}^nde^r
^T^itle^{I of}^the^A^D^A^,^c^{ourts m}^a^y^c^onside^r^o^b^e^s^ity^disc^rimⁱ^na^{tion c}^a^s^e^s^un^de^{r T}^itle^{s II a}^{nd III}^of^A^D^A^a^s^w^e^ll.^S^{ee e.}^g^,^th
^T^o^rca^s^{io v.}^Mu^rra^y^{, 57 F.3}^d¹³⁴⁰⁽⁴^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁵⁾⁽⁴⁶⁰^-^p^ou^nd^pr^is^oⁿ^inm^a^te^br^oug^{ht s}^u^{it a}^g^aⁱ^ns^{t pr}^is^oⁿ^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^unde^r
^T^itle^{II of}^the^A^D^A^a^{nd the}^Re^ha^bilita^ti^{on A}^c^{t, c}^l^aⁱ^mⁱ^ng^tha^t^the^pr^{ison f}^a^ile^{d m}^a^ke^m^odifⁱ^c^a^ti^{ons to}^{its f}^a^c^ilit^y^{in orde}^r
^t^o^acco^mm^o^d^a^t^e^hⁱ^{s si}^ze).
²⁰^C^ook^v^.^Rh^ode^I^s^l^and^{, D}^e^pt.^of^M^e^{ntal H}^e^alt^h^{, Re}^t^a^r^d^atioⁿ^an^d^H^o^s^p^ita^ls^,¹⁰^F.^3d¹⁷⁽¹^st^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹³⁾^,^aff’^g⁷⁸³^F.
^Sup^p^{. 15}⁶⁹^(D^{.R.I. 19}⁹²⁾^.
²¹^Id^.^a^t^11-¹²^.

that Cook was not hired because the institution believed that her morbid obesity interfered with
her ability to undertake physical activities such as walking, lifting, or bending. On this basis
alone, the court stated, a jury could find that the institution perceived the plaintiff’s impairment to
interfere with a major life activity. In addition, the court explained that the plaintiff could be
found substantially limited, without having to seek out other jobs that she was qualified to
perform. The court stated that “denying an applicant ... a job that requires no unique physical
skills, due solely to the perception that the applicant suffers from a physical limitations that would
keep her from qualifying for a broad spectrum of jobs, can constitute treating an applicant as if ²²
her condition substantially limited a major life activity, viz., working.” The First Circuit also
concluded that there was no evidence that Cook could not perform the job, and it upheld the ²³
district court’s decision for Cook.
The Second Circuit in Francis also examined claims of obesity discrimination under disability ²⁴
law. In this case, the City of Meriden disciplined Francis, a firefighter employed by the city, ²⁵
after he failed to meet certain weight guidelines. Francis claimed that this discipline was
discrimination based on a perceived disability in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
The court found that Francis’ claims failed because Francis only alleged that the city disciplined
him for not meeting a weight standard, not because he suffered from an impairment within the
meaning of the disability statutes.
In its analysis, the court discussed the applicability of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act to
obesity. The Second Circuit stated that Francis’s claim failed because “obesity, except in special
cases where obesity relates to a physiological disorder, is not an impairment within the meaning
of [the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act].” The court also pointed out, in dicta, that a cause of action
may exist against an employer who discriminates against an employee based on the perception ²⁶
that the employee is morbidly obese. Still, the court concluded that simply failing to meet ²⁷
weight guidelines was insufficient for ADA protection.

²²^Id^.^at²⁶^.
²³^Id^.^a^t³¹^.^S^ee^a^l^so^E^E^{OC v.}^T^{exas Bu}^{s L}ⁱⁿ^e^{s In}^T^exa^{s Bu}^s^Lⁱⁿ^e^sⁱⁿ^w^h^ic^{h the}^{EEOC f}^ile^{d sui}^t^oⁿ^be^ha^lf^of^A^r^a^z^e^lla
^M^aⁿ^u^e^l^,^al^l^e^giⁿ^g^t^h^at^t^h^e^b^u^s^c^o^mp^an^y^vi^o^l^at^ed^t^h^{e A}^D^A^w^h^enⁱ^t^dⁱ^d^no^t^hⁱ^{re M}^a^nu^el^{as bu}^{s d}^rⁱ^v^{er becau}^{se sh}^e^w^a^s
^m^o^rbidly^obe^se^{. During}^a^re^qu^ire^d^p^h^y^s^ic^a^l^e^x^a^m^ina^{tion, the}^phy^sicⁱ^aⁿ^not^ic^e^d^tha^t^Maⁿ^u^e^l^ha^d^dif^fⁱ^c^u^lty^ge^tting^out^of
^h^e^{r seat in}^t^h^{e w}^a^itin^g^{area, an}^d^t^h^{at sh}^{e “w}^ad^d^l^ed^{” to}^th^{e ex}^amⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^ro^o^m^{. Becau}^{se o}^f^th^{e resu}^{lts o}^f^th^{e ex}^a^mⁱⁿ^atioⁿ^,
^the^b^u^s^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^y^{did no}^{t hir}^e^he^r^.^T^h^e^EEO^C^a^r^g^u^e^d^tha^t^t^h^e^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^y^w^r^ongf^ully^r^e^lie^{d on the}^r^e^s^u^l^t^s^of^this
^e^x^a^m^ina^{tion in v}ⁱ^ola^tio^{n of}^the^A^D^A^.^T^h^e^c^{ourt f}^oun^{d t}^h^a^t^t^h^e^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^y^’^{s re}^lia^nc^e^{on the}^lim^ite^{d f}ⁱⁿ^d^ing^s^of^the
^m^e^dic^a^l^e^x^a^m^ina^{tion de}^m^onstra^t^e^d^tha^t^the^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^yⁱ^m^pr^ope^rly^re^g^a^rde^d^Ma^nue^{l a}^s^ha^vⁱ^ng^a^substa^ntia^lly^lim^iting
^im^pa^ir^m^e^{nt, a}^{nd de}ⁿⁱ^e^d^s^u^m^m^a^r^y^judg^m^e^{nt to t}^h^e^b^u^s^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^y^.
²⁴^Fr^anc^is^v^.^C^ity^of^M^e^rⁱ^deⁿ^,¹²⁹^F^.^3d²⁸^{1 (}²^nd^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^.
²⁵^Fr^anc^is^,¹²⁹^F^.^3d^at²⁸²^-⁸³^.^T^h^{e f}^act^{s o}^f^t^h^{e case st}^at^{e t}^h^at^F^r^an^ci^{s’ maxi}^m^u^m^ac^cep^t^a^b^l^{e w}^eⁱ^g^h^t^f^o^{r h}ⁱ^{s j}^o^b^w^a^{s 1}⁸⁸
^pou^nds^{, a}ⁿ^d^Fr^aⁿ^cⁱ^s^’^w^e^ig^{ht f}^l^uc^tua^t^e^d^be^tw^e^eⁿ²¹^{7 a}ⁿ^{d 2}⁴⁷^p^o^uⁿ^d^s^.
²⁶^Se^e^C^oⁿ^nor^v^.^M^c^D^onal^d’^s^Re^s^t^a^u^r^ants^{, 1}⁴^A^m^{. D}ⁱ^s^a^bilitie^s^Ca^s^.^(BN^A^{) 204 (D}^{. Co}ⁿⁿ^{. 2}⁰⁰³⁾⁽^c^iti^ng^Fr^anc^is^{, 12}⁹
^F.3^d^a^t²⁸⁶⁾⁽^m^or^bi^dly^obe^s^e^plaⁱⁿ^tif^f^did^not^ha^v^e^{to ha}^v^e^p^h^y^s^iologⁱ^c^a^l^dis^o^r^d^e^rⁱⁿ^or^de^r^t^o^s^t^a^t^e^a^c^l^aⁱ^m^unde^r^the
^AD^A)^.
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^not^de^m^ons^tr^a^t^e^tha^t^de^f^e^nda^{nt s}^c^hoo^{l de}^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt pe}^r^c^eⁱ^v^e^{d he}^r^to^ha^v^e^aⁿ^im^pa^ir^m^e^{nt tha}^t^s^ubs^taⁿ^tⁱ^a^lly^li^m^ite^{d a}
^m^a^{jor lif}^e^a^c^tiv^it^y⁾^;^Ha^zel^dⁱⁿ^{e v.}^B^evera^g^e^Medⁱ^a^,⁹⁵^{4 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.⁶⁹⁷^,⁷⁰^{4 (}^S^.^D^.^N^.^Y^.¹⁹⁹⁷⁾⁽^o^b^e^{se p}^l^aⁱⁿ^tⁱ^f^f^f^aⁱ^l^e^d^t^o
^p^r^esen^t^evi^d^en^{ce t}^h^at^d^e^f^eⁿ^d^aⁿ^t^r^e^gard^ed^h^e^{r as d}ⁱ^sab^l^ed^,^o^r^s^ubsta^ntia^lly^lim^ite^{d in he}^{r a}^b^ili^ty^{to w}^o^rk^{; pla}ⁱ^ntif^f^w^a^s
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

In 2006, the Sixth Circuit took up the issue of obesity discrimination in EEOC v. Watkins.²⁸ In
Watkins, the EEOC claimed that the defendant company violated the ADA when it discharged a
morbidly obese employee after the employee sustained an injury on the job. The employee,
whose weight fluctuated between 340 and 450 pounds during his employment, was injured during
a routine job activity. The employee claimed he was unaware of any physiological or
psychological cause for his heavy weight. After taking a leave of absence following his injury, the
employee’s personal doctor cleared him to work. However, a company doctor found that the
employee weighed more than 400 pounds, had a limited range of motion, and shortness of breath
after a few steps. The doctor determined that even though the employee met the Department of
Transportation’s standards for truck drivers, the employee could not safely perform the
requirements of his job. The employee was terminated as a result.
The EEOC argued under a “regarded as” theory, claiming that although the employee had an
actual impairment, the impairment was erroneously regarded as an inability to perform his job. In
its analysis, however, the Sixth Circuit did not focus on how the company regarded the employee,
but instead on whether morbid obesity qualified as an ADA impairment. The court cited the ADA ²⁹
regulations stating that an impairment is defined in relevant part as “any physiological disorder
or condition.” The court interpreted this definition to require evidence of a physiological cause of
morbid obesity in order for an impairment to exist under the ADA. Because the EEOC did not
produce any evidence that the employee suffered from a physiological condition, the Sixth Circuit ³⁰
affirmed summary judgment for Watkins.
It is likely that courts will continue to look at obesity discrimination under the ADA. Based on the
various ways in which courts have interpreted the act and its supporting regulations, the outcome
of these cases will remain an open question.
^J^eⁿⁿⁱ^fe^r^St^a^m^aⁿ
^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e A}^t^torn^e^y
^j^s^ta^m^aⁿ^@^cr^s.lo^c.g^o^v^{, 7-}²⁶¹⁰

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
ⁿ^o^t^dⁱ^sab^l^ed^b^ecau^{se, am}^oⁿ^g^o^t^h^e^{r th}ⁱⁿ^g^s^{, sh}^{e w}^a^{s ab}^{le to}^en^g^a^g^eⁱⁿ^activ^{ities th}^{at all}^o^w^e^d^h^e^{r to}^“c^arr^y^oⁿ^h^e^r^d^a^ily
^lif^e^”⁾^;^Fre^d^re^{gill v}^.^Nati^onwi^d^e^A^g^ribusiⁿ^e^{ss Ins. C}^o^.⁹⁹^{2 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.¹⁰⁸^{2 (}^S^.D^{. I}^o^w^a¹⁹⁹⁷⁾⁽^c^our^t^s^t^a^t^e^d^tha^t^“^[^o^]^be^s^ity
^a^l^one^{is g}^e^ne^ra^lly^{not a}^disa^bi^lity^”⁾^.
²⁸^{EEOC v}^.^W^a^tk^ins^,⁴^{63 F.3}^d⁴³^{6 (}⁶^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.
²⁹^{29 C}^.^F.R^.^§¹⁶³⁰^.2(^h⁾⁽¹⁾^.
³⁰^Se^e^als^o^M^e^r^k^e^r^v^.^Mⁱ^am^i-^D^ade^C^oun^ty^Florⁱ^d^a^{, 2}⁰⁰⁷^U^.^S^.^Dⁱ^s^t^.^L^E^X^I^{S 3}³⁶⁴⁵^(S.D^.^Fla^.^A^p^{r. 2}⁶^,²⁰⁰^{7) (c}^o^u^rt
^relⁱ^e^{s o}ⁿ^{cases su}^ch^as^W^a^tk^ins^aⁿ^{d f}ⁱ^nds^t^h^a^t^A^D^A^lia^bility^f^o^{r dis}^c^rimⁱ^na^{tion ba}^s^e^d^on^obe^s^ity^is^pos^sⁱ^ble^oⁿ^ly^unde^r
^“sp^eci^al^ci^rcu^m^st^an^ces”).