Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Employment: Analysis of H.R. 3685, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

H.R. 3685, passed by the House on November 7, 2007, would prohibit certain adverse
employment actions taken against an individual because of that individual’s actual or perceived
sexual orientation. Referred to as the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007 (ENDA), the
bill also explicitly prohibits employment discrimination against an individual based upon the
sexual orientation of persons associated with that individual, but does not permit disparate impact
claims of sexual orientation discrimination. A substantial minority of states have enacted their
own prohibitions against sexual orientation employment discrimination. Some instances of sexual
orientation employment discrimination may also be prohibited by existing protections under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, despite the fact that Title VII’s definition of sex does not
encompass sexual orientation. H.R. 3685 would also appear to exempt religious organizations as
defined under Title VII.

Overvi ew ....................................................................................................................... .................. 1
Employment Practices Prohibited by ENDA..................................................................................1
Perceived sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited........................................................1
Associational rights are protected.............................................................................................2
Disparate sexual orientation impact claims are disallowed.......................................................2
Sex vs. Sexual Orientation..............................................................................................................2
Sexual harassment.....................................................................................................................3
Sex stereotypes..........................................................................................................................3
Religious Organizations Under ENDA...........................................................................................4
The “ministerial exception”......................................................................................................4
Statutory exemptions.................................................................................................................5
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................5

On November 7, 2007, the House passed H.R. 3685, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of ¹

2007 (ENDA). Apparently modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

ENDA, if enacted, would create the first federal prohibition against sexual orientation ²
discrimination by private employers. ENDA appears to represent one half of an earlier bill
introduced by Representative Frank, which would have additionally prohibited employment ³
discrimination on the basis of gender identity. This report will discuss issues relating to
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and specific provisions of ENDA.

For the most part, the types of employment actions prohibited by ENDA dovetail with Title VII’s ⁴
prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion.
Notwithstanding this overall similarity, the text of ENDA does go beyond Title VII’s text in two
main ways: (1) prohibiting discrimination on perceived characteristics; and (2) textually creating
associational rights under the act. That is not to say, however, that the protections of ENDA
appear uniformly at least as extensive as Title VII’s protections, as the bill explicitly disallows ⁵
victims of sexual orientation discrimination from pursuing a disparate impact claim. Each of
these three differences is discussed in detail below.
ENDA prohibits discrimination on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation.⁶ The text of
Title VII contains no comparable prohibition against discrimination on the basis of the perceived
race, color, sex, national origin, or religion of a person. The Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), however, does include in its definition of disability “being regarded as having a [physical ⁷
or mental impairment].” The semantic similarity between “perceived” and “regarded” suggests
that existing judicial interpretation of that language in the ADA may be instructive for courts,
agencies or employers attempting to interpret what is meant by “perceived sexual orientation.” In

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¹¹⁰^C^o^ngr^e^s^s^{, by}^Edw^a^{rd C. L}ⁱ^u.
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⁷^{42 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹²¹⁰²⁽²⁾⁽^C⁾^.

other words, to the extent that “being regarded” as disabled under the ADA has been held to
require an examination of an employer’s subjectively held beliefs, courts may interpret ENDA to ⁸
require the same.
H.R. 3685 prohibits adverse employment actions taken against an individual on the basis of the ⁹
actual or perceived sexual orientation of a person who associates with that individual. Although
Title VII contains no analogous text, associational rights under Title VII have been recognized by ¹⁰
federal courts in the context of interracial marriage.
Section 4(g) of ENDA disallows disparate impact claims on the basis of sexual orientation.
Therefore, whereas a Title VII claim could proceed where the plaintiff showed that a particular
job requirement disproportionately impacted one racial or religious group, ENDA does not appear
to allow a plaintiff to show that a particular job requirement disproportionately impacts one ¹¹
sexual orientation over another.

ENDA defines sexual orientation as “homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality.”¹² In
contrast, Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex has consistently been ¹³
interpreted to exclude discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. However, courts have
held that the fact that a victim of discrimination is homosexual or bisexual does not preclude a
claim under Title VII. In some cases, victims of treatment that would arguably also qualify as
sexual orientation discrimination, may be able to successfully assert that they were victims of
sexual harassment or sex stereotyping under Title VII.

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^Disabilit^ie^{s Ac}^{t (}^A^{DA): The}^De^fin^ition^of^Disab^ility^,^by^N^a^ncy^L^e^e^J^one^s^.
⁹^H.^R^.³⁶⁸⁵^§⁴⁽^e)^.
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^Du^{ke Po}^{wer Co}^.^,⁴^{01 U}^.^S.⁴²^{4 (}¹⁹⁷¹⁾^.
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^m^ilita^r^y^{. 10 U.S.C.}^§⁶⁵^4(f⁾⁽²⁰⁰^{7). A}^m^ong^the^sta^t^e^s^tha^t^do^pr^ohi^bit^disc^rimⁱ^na^tion^{on t}^h^e^ba^sis^of^se^x^u^a^l^orie^nta^tio^n,
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In the context of sexual harassment, recent court decisions have been guided by the Supreme ¹⁴
Court’s decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services. In that case, a male employee
suffered physical abuse of a sexual nature, but his claims of sexual harassment were initially
denied by Fifth Circuit precedent which held that same-sex sexual harassment is not actionable
under Title VII. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in cases of alleged sexual harassment,
the gender of the victim and harasser are not dispositive, but rather the critical question is whether ¹⁵
the harassment occurred “because of sex.” The Court also recognized that an inference that
harassment is “because of sex” is not obvious where the harasser and the victim are of the same ¹⁶
sex, but provided three examples of how such an inference could be established: (1) if the
harasser sexually desired the victim; (2) if the harasser was hostile to the presence of one sex in
the workplace; or (3) if comparative data showed that the harasser targeted only members of one ¹⁷
sex. The Ninth Circuit appears to have further held, in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, that
harassment “which targeted body parts clearly linked to [a person’s] sexuality” constituted sexual ¹⁸
discrimination prohibited by Title VII. Even though the victim believed he was harassed
because of his sexual orientation, the court held that “whatever else those attacks may, or may ¹⁹
not, have been ‘because of’ has no legal consequence.” Although the plaintiff in Rene prevailed,
the holding of the Ninth Circuit may contradict the Supreme Court’s earlier holding in Oncale. As
the dissent in Rene noted, the Ninth Circuit relied in large part on Doe v. City of Belleville, in
which the Seventh Circuit argued that evidence of physical abuse of a sexual nature alone could ²⁰
lead to an inference that the victim was targeted because of his gender. That judgment, however, ²¹
was vacated and remanded to the Seventh Circuit after the Court’s decision in Oncale. The text
of the opinion in Oncale also seems to require more than conduct of a sexual nature in order to ²²
give rise to an inference that it was “because of sex.”
Based upon the Supreme Court’s opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, victims of sexual
orientation discrimination may also prevail under Title VII, where the facts also indicate the ²³
presence of discrimination for failure to conform to sex stereotypes. In Price Waterhouse, a
female employee was denied partnership in an accounting firm, despite the fact that she was

¹⁴^Oⁿ^c^a^le^v^.^Su^nd^ow^ne^r^O^ffs^h^o^r^e^S^e^r^v^ic^e^s^{, 523 U}^.^S.⁷⁵⁽¹⁹⁹⁸⁾^.
¹⁵^Id^.^a^t⁷⁷^{, 8}¹^.
¹⁶^T^h^e^C^our^t^didⁿ^o^te^,^how^e^v^e^r^{, tha}^t^{in t}^h^e^r^e^la^te^{d c}^o^nte^x^{t of}^r^a^cⁱ^a^l^di^s^c^rⁱ^mⁱ^na^{tion i}^t^ha^s^ne^v^e^r^pr^e^s^um^e^d^t^h^a^t^me^mb^e^r^s
^o^f^oⁿ^e^{race w}^{ill n}^o^t^dⁱ^scrimⁱⁿ^a^{te ag}^ain^s^{t o}^t^h^e^{r m}^e^m^b^{ers o}^f^th^{e sa}^{me race.}^Id^{. a}^t⁷⁸^.
¹⁷^Id^{. a}^t^80-⁸¹^{. T}^h^is^dis^c^us^sⁱ^on^of^On^ca^le^is^{not m}^e^aⁿ^{t to im}^ply^tha^t^se^x^u^a^l^orie^nta^tioⁿ^ha^ra^ss^m^e^{nt is o}ⁿ^ly^pe^rpe^t^ra^te^d
^by^pe^r^s^ons^of^the^s^a^m^e^se^x^a^s^the^vⁱ^c^tⁱ^m^{, but m}^e^r^e^l^y^{to s}^u^g^g^e^s^t^tha^t^aⁿ^e^m^plo^y^e^r^’^s^a^s^se^r^{tion t}^h^a^t^ha^r^a^s^s^m^e^{nt oc}^c^u^r^r^e^d
^so^l^e^l^y^b^ecau^{se o}^f^sexu^al^o^rⁱ^eⁿ^t^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^aⁿ^dⁿ^o^t^sex,^m^a^{y b}^e^ref^u^t^e^d^b^y^t^h^e^m^e^t^hods^of^pr^o^o^f^of^f^e^r^e^{d in}^On^ca^le^.
¹⁸^Re^ne^v^.^M^G^M^G^r^{and H}^o^te^l^{, 30}^{5 F.3}^d¹⁰⁶¹^{, 10}^{66 (}⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰²⁾^.^Iⁿ^th^is^c^a^s^e^,^the^c^our^{t f}^oun^{d t}^h^a^t^t^h^e^s^e^x^u^a^l^na^tur^e
^o^f^t^h^{e h}^a^{rassers’ at}^t^acks,^w^hⁱ^c^h^{were d}ⁱ^rect^ed^at^t^h^{e vi}^ctⁱ^m^{’s cro}^t^ch^an^d^anu^s^,^readⁱ^l^y^{gave ri}^{se t}^o^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^f^e^ren^{ce t}^h^at^h^e
^w^a^{s t}^a^rget^ed^b^ecau^{se o}^f^hⁱ^{s sex.}^Id^{. a}^t¹⁰^65.
¹⁹^Id^.^a^t¹⁰⁶⁴^{, 1}⁰⁶⁶^.
²⁰^Id^{. a}^t¹⁰⁶⁶^(c^iting^Doe^v^.^City^of^Be^lle^v^ille^,¹¹⁹^F.^3d⁵⁶^3,⁵⁸^{0 (}⁷^th^{Cir. 1}⁹⁹⁷^)).
²¹^City^of^Be^lle^v^ille^v^.^Doe^,⁵²^{3 U}^.^S^.¹⁰⁰¹⁽¹⁹⁹⁸⁾^.
²²^“[^T^h^{e p}^l^aiⁿ^tⁱ^f^f^]^m^u^st^al^w^a^{ys p}^r^{ove t}^h^at^t^h^{e con}^d^u^c^t^atⁱ^ssu^{e w}^a^{s n}^o^t^m^e^rel^y^tⁱⁿ^ged^wⁱ^t^h^o^f^f^eⁿ^sⁱ^v^{e s}^e^xu^al
^c^onn^ota^tio^ns^.”^On^cale^,⁵²^{3 U.}^S^.^at⁸¹^.
²³^Pr^ic^e^W^a^te^r^hous^e^v^.^H^opk^ins^,⁴⁹⁰^U^.^S.²^{28 (}¹⁹⁸⁹⁾^.

regarded as a high performer.²⁴ Furthermore, partners in the firm had instructed her to act more ²⁵
femininely in order to be considered for a partnership in the future. The Court held that Price
Waterhouse was applying standards for partnership in a prohibited sexually disparate manner, in
that Title VII did not permit an employer to evaluate female employees based upon their ²⁶
conformity with the employer’s stereotypical view of femininity.
Relying on Price Waterhouse, the Third Circuit held, in Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
that harassment of an individual for failure to conform to sex stereotypes could constitute ²⁷
harassment “because of sex” consistent with Oncale. Furthermore, the court held that
harassment for failure to conform to gender stereotypes is still “because of sex” even if the
animosity towards nonconformance is caused by a belief that such behavior indicates ²⁸
homosexuality.
Therefore, based upon the decisions in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel and Bibby v. Coca Cola, one
could conclude that certain types of sexual orientation discrimination are currently prohibited ²⁹
under Title VII. However, one should not take this to mean that ENDA does not purport to
prohibit conduct not already prohibited by Title VII. For example, were an employer simply to
require job applicants to state his or her sexual orientation on a job application, and consequently
refused to hire applicants that indicated they were homosexuals, it is not clear that this would be
prohibited by Title VII’s existing provisions. However, such actions would almost certainly be
prohibited by a plain reading of ENDA.

ENDA states that its provisions do not apply to “religious organizations” as defined under Title ³⁰
VII. Similarly, religious organizations would likely remain free from claims of any
discrimination with respect to their selection of clergy and certain other positions related to
worship.
At a minimum, ENDA would likely not apply to religious organizations’ selection of clergy or
other positions involved in worship or ritual. Discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national
origin or religion has been held to be permissible, in these positions, under the judicially created
“ministerial exception” to Title VII. This exception was created to reconcile some of Title VII’s
prohibitions with the Free Exercise Clause of the Federal Constitution. It has been adopted in

²⁴^Id^{. a}^t²³^3-²³⁴^.
²⁵^Id^{. a}^t²³^5.
²⁶^Id^.^a^t²⁵^0-²⁵¹^.
²⁷^Bib^b^y^v^.^Ph^ila.^Coc^a^Col^a^B^o^ttli^{ng C}^o^.^,²⁶⁰^F.^3d²⁵^7,²⁶^{4 (}³^rd^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾^.
²⁸^Id^{. a}^t²⁶^5.
²⁹^N^o^te^tha^t^§¹⁵^of^H^.^{R. 3}⁶⁸⁵^s^t^a^t^e^s^tha^t^the^a^c^t^w^{ill n}^o^t^be^c^ons^tr^ue^{d to}^inv^a^lida^t^e^{or lim}^{it the}^rig^h^ts^unde^{r a}ⁿ^y^othe^r
^Fe^de^ra^{l or sta}^t^e^la^w^.^T^h^e^r^e^f^ore^,^to^the^e^x^te^{nt t}^h^a^t^se^x^u^a^l^orie^nta^tⁱ^oⁿ^disc^rimⁱ^na^{tion is}^pro^h^ib^ite^d^un^de^{r T}^itle^V^{II o}^r^sta^t^e
^la^w^,^it^m^a^y^re^m^a^{in so if}^ENDA^is^eⁿ^a^c^t^e^d^.
³⁰^H^.^R^.³⁶⁸⁵^§§³⁽^a⁾⁽⁸⁾^a^nd^6.^S^{ee a}^l^so^{, CR}^{S Rep}^o^{rt RS}²²⁷⁴⁵^,^Re^lⁱ^gⁱ^on^an^{d t}^h^e^W^o^rk^plac^e^:^Le^gal^An^aly^s^{is of}^Title^VII
^{of t}^h^e^Cⁱ^v^{il Ri}^ghts^Ac^{t of}¹⁹⁶⁴^as^I^t^Ap^plie^s^to^Re^ligi^ous^O^r^ga^niz^a^ti^ons^,^by^C^y^nthia^B^r^oug^he^r^.

eight Federal Circuits and applies to employees whose “primary duties include teaching,
spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision of ³¹
participation in religious ritual and worship.” This exception to Title VII allows discrimination
on the basis of any characteristic, including race and sex, but only with respect to “a religious ³²
institution’s choice as to who will perform spiritual functions.” Because the rationale for this
exception is derived from the Federal Constitution, and not the text of Title VII, it would likely be
wholly applicable to ENDA as well.
In addition, ENDA states that its prohibitions will not apply to religious organizations as they are ³³
defined under Title VII. Title VII exempts religious organizations generally, as well as
educational institutions that are either substantially owned by a religious organization or directed ³⁴
towards the propagation of a particular religion. Federal courts have interpreted Title VII to
require an inquiry into whether an entity’s “purpose and character are primarily religious” in ³⁵
order to qualify as a religious entity. Most recently, in September of 2007, the Third Circuit
identified nine factors other courts have considered when determining if an institution is religious, ³⁶
none of which are determinative. This statutory exemption appears to apply to a much broader
group of entities than the ministerial exception, which only applies to specific positions with a
close nexus to ritual or worship activities.

^Ed^w^a^{rd C}^.^Lⁱ^u
^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e A}^t^torn^e^y
^elⁱ^u^@^c^rs^.l^oc.g^ov^{, 7-}⁹¹⁶⁶

³¹^Pe^tr^us^k^a^v^.^G^aⁿⁿ^on^Uⁿ^iv^.^,⁴^{62 F}^.^{3d 29}^{4, 30}⁴⁽³^rd^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾⁽^cⁱ^tⁱ^{ng f}^a^vo^r^a^b^l^{e o}^pⁱⁿⁱ^on^{s i}ⁿ^t^h^e⁴^th^{, 5}^th^{, 7}^th^{, 8}^th^{, 9}^th^{, 1}¹^th^,
^an^d^D.C.^Circu^its).
³²^Pe^tr^us^k^a^v^.^G^aⁿⁿ^on^{, 4}⁶²^F.^{3d a}^t³⁰⁵^.
³³^H^.^{R. 3}⁶⁸⁵^§§^3(a^)(8),^{6 (e}^x^p^lic^it^l^y^a^doptiⁿ^g^the^de^fⁱ^nition^of^re^lig^ious^org^a^niz^a^tionsⁱⁿ^T^itle^V^II).
³⁴^{42 U}^.^S.C^.^§^§²⁰⁰⁰^e^-¹⁽^a⁾^,²⁰^00e^-²⁽^e⁾⁽²⁾^.
³⁵^EEO^C^v^.^T^o^wⁿ^le^y^E^ng’^{g &}^M^f^{g. C}^o^.^,⁸⁵^{9 F.}^2d⁶^10,⁶^{18 (}⁹^th^{Cir. 1}⁹⁸⁸^).^Se^e^als^o^EEO^C^v^.^K^a^m^e^ha^m^e^{ha Sc}^h^o^o^l^s^,
⁹⁹⁰^F.^2d⁴^58,⁴⁶^{1 (}⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹³⁾^.
³⁶^Le^Booⁿ^v^.^La^nc^as^te^r^J^e^w^is^{h C}^o^m^m^.^C^t^r^.^As^s^’^n.^{, 20}⁰⁷^U.^S.^A^p^p^.^LE^X^I^S²²³²⁸^,¹⁹^-²⁰⁽³^rd^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾^“(¹⁾^w^h^et^h^e^r
^the^eⁿ^tity^ope^ra^te^{s f}^o^{r a}^prof^{it, (}²⁾^w^h^e^t^he^{r it pr}^od^uc^e^s^a^se^c^u^la^{r pro}^duc^{t, (}³^{) w}^h^e^t^he^{r the}^eⁿ^tity^{’s a}^r^tic^le^{s of}
^inc^o^rp^ora^tioⁿ^{or o}^t^he^r^pe^rtineⁿ^t^d^o^c^u^m^e^{nts sta}^t^e^a^re^ligⁱ^{ous pur}^pos^e^,^{(4) w}^h^e^t^he^{r it is}^ow^ne^{d, a}^f^f^ilia^t^e^{d w}^{ith or}
^fⁱ^na^nc^ia^ll^y^s^uppor^te^{d by}^a^f^o^r^m^a^l^l^y^r^e^lig^ious^eⁿ^tity^s^u^c^h^a^s^a^c^hurc^h^{or s}^y^na^g^o^g^u^e^,^{(5) w}^h^e^t^he^{r a}^f^o^r^m^a^lly^re^li^gⁱ^ous
^eⁿ^tity^pa^rtic^ipa^t^e^s^{in t}^h^e^m^a^na^ge^m^e^{nt, f}^o^{r insta}ⁿ^c^e^by^ha^vⁱ^ng^re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^{on the}^boa^rd^of^truste^e^s^{, (6) w}^h^e^t^he^{r the}
^eⁿ^tity^{holds itse}^l^f^ou^{t to}^the^pu^bli^c^a^s^se^c^u^la^{r or se}^c^t^a^r^ia^{n, (7) w}^h^e^t^he^{r the}^eⁿ^t^ity^re^g^u^la^rl^y^inc^l^ude^{s p}^r^a^y^e^r^{or othe}^r
^f^o^r^m^{s of}^w^o^{rship in}^{its a}^c^tiv^itie^s,^{(8) w}^h^e^t^he^{r it i}ⁿ^c^l^u^d^e^s^re^lig^{ious i}ⁿ^struc^tⁱ^{on i}ⁿ^its^c^u^rric^u^l^u^m^,^{to t}^h^e^e^x^te^{nt it is a}ⁿ
^e^duc^a^tiona^l^ins^tⁱ^t^uti^oⁿ^,^aⁿ^{d (}⁹⁾^w^h^e^t^he^r^its^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^h^{ip is}^m^a^de^up^by^c^o^r^e^lig^ionis^t^s^.^”^Id^.