Religion and the Workplace: Legal Analysis of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as It Applies to Religious Organizations









Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress



Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects employees against discrimination by certain
employers. Among other things, Title VII generally prohibits employers from discriminating
against employees on the basis of religion. Title VII prohibits discriminatory treatment of
employees on the basis of their religious beliefs and requires employers to make reasonable
accommodations for employees’ religious practices. Religious organizations, however, may be
exempt from some of the prohibitions of Title VII.
Congress regularly has proposed legislation that would amend the definition of religion under
Title VII and has introduced proposals to clarify which actions would qualify as religious
discrimination under the act. At times, legislative proposals that would not directly affect Title
VII’s prohibition on religious discrimination raise questions related to the protections provided
for religion. Therefore, legislative proposals that would amend other parts of Title VII may lead to
interest in the current interpretation and protections offered to religious groups.
This report reviews the scope of Title VII as it applies to religion and religious organizations and
the requirements of the anti-discrimination protections and the accommodations provision. It also
analyzes the exemptions available to religious organizations for the non-discrimination rules.






General Application of Title VII......................................................................................................1
Scope of Protection for Religion and Religious Belief...................................................................1
Unlawful Employment Practices Related to Religion.....................................................................2
Exemptions ...................................................................................................................................... 2
Accommodations Requirement.......................................................................................................4
Congressional Interest.....................................................................................................................6
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................6






The Civil Rights Act (CRA) of 1964 created protections for civil rights across a wide spectrum,
including religion. Title VII of the CRA prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of 1
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. Title VII applies to employers with 15 or more
employees, including the federal government and state and local governments. Individuals who
believe they are victims of employment discrimination may file a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which is responsible for enforcing individual
Title VII claims against private employers. The Department of Justice enforces Title VII against
state and local governments but may do so only after the EEOC has conducted an initial 2
investigation.


Section 701 of Title VII defines religion to include
all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employees or prospective
employees religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the 3
employer’s business.
This definition of religion forms the basis of requirements for employers under Title VII. Under
the statutory definition, employers cannot use an employee’s (or applicant’s) religious observance
or religious practice against the employee if the employer can reasonably accommodate the
observance or practice without undue hardship on the business. If an employer does discriminate
based on a religious observance or practice that can be reasonably accommodated, the employer
may be in violation of Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination on the basis of religion.
Sometimes whether a particular observance or practice is religious is disputed. Religious
practices and observances are generally considered “to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what 4
is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views.” The
belief does not need to be accepted by any religious group and does not need to be accepted by
the religious group to which the individual belongs in order to qualify as religious under Title 5
VII. Courts have upheld this understanding that a religious belief does not need to meet objective

1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
2 For more information on Title VII, see the EEOC website http://www.eeoc.gov/ and the DOJ’s Employment
Litigation Section website http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/emp/index.html. For general information on the Civil Rights Act
and other legislation protecting civil rights, see CRS Report RL33386, Federal Civil Rights Statutes: A Primer, by Jody
Feder.
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
4 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
5 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1.





tests of reasonableness, but instead must be a sincerely held belief of the individual regardless of 6
its broader acceptance.

While Title VII and the related regulations provide a broad prohibition on discrimination based on
religion as it is defined alone, Section 703 of Title VII more specifically defines unlawful
employment practices under the CRA. This section prohibits employers from using religion as a
basis for hiring or discharging any individual. It further prohibits employers from discriminating
“with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of the 7
individual’s religion. The section also prohibits employers from limiting or separating employees
or applicants “in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 8
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.... ”
Title VII generally prohibits employers from treating employees of one religion differently from
the way they treat employees of another religion. Employers cannot consider religion when 9
scoring results of employment-related tests; cannot use religion as a motivating factor for any 10
action, even if other factors also motivated the action; cannot retaliate against any individual
who opposed an employer’s action that is unlawful under Title VII or participated in the 11
investigation of the unlawful action; and cannot publish or advertise any preference based on 12
religion, unless that preference is based on a bona fide occupational qualification. The
discrimination prohibited by Title VII includes harassment that is “sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working 13
environment.” Furthermore, an employee cannot be required to participate in any religious 14
activity as part of his or her employment.

Title VII does not apply to all situations of religious discrimination. In addition to exempting
employers with fewer than 15 employees, Title VII includes exceptions that allow certain
employers to consider religion in employment decisions. Specifically, Title VII’s prohibition
against religious discrimination does not apply to “a religious corporation, association,
educational institution, or society with respect to the employment [i.e., hiring and retention] of

6 See, e.g., Van Koten v. Family Health Management, Inc., 955 F.Supp. 898 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Redmond v. GAF Corp.,
574 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1978); Weitkenaut v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 381 F.Supp. 1284 (D.C. Vt. 1974).
7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l).
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b).
13 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)(interpreting the extent of discrimination protection provided by Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination in
terms, conditions or privileges of employment).
14 See Young v. Sw. Sav. And Loan Assn, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding an employer could not discharge an
employee for not attending weekly meetings that included prayers led by a minister).





individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such 15
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.” However, the
statute does not define “religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society.”
Court decisions appear to indicate several factors relevant to deciding whether an organization
qualifies for the exemption. Courts have considered (1) the purpose or mission of the
organization; (2) the ownership, affiliation, or source of financial support of the organization; (3)
requirements placed upon staff and members of the organization (faculty and students if the
organization is a school); and (4) the extent of religious practices in or the religious nature of 16
products and services offered by the organization.
Title VII also provides two more specific exemptions. One separate, but similar, exemption
applies specifically to religious educational institutions. That exemption allows such institutions
“to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if [the institution] is, in whole or in
substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a
particular [organization], or if the curriculum of [the institution] is directed toward the 17
propagation of a particular religion.” The other exemption provided in Title VII allows
employers to discriminate on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin if those factors are “a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that 18
particular business or enterprise.” This exemption based on bona fide occupational 19
qualifications has been construed narrowly. Accordingly, courts have deemed valid
discriminatory qualifications to arise only in situations where religion plays an extremely
significant part of the work environment, including, for example, jobs where employee safety is 20
threatened because of the employee’s religious affiliation.
Exemptions for religious organizations in the context of Title VII are not absolute. Once an
organization qualifies as an entity eligible for Title VII exemption, it is permitted to discriminate
on the basis of religion in its employment decisions. The exemption does not allow qualifying
organizations to discriminate on any other basis forbidden by Title VII. Thus, although a religious
organization may consider an employee or applicant’s religion without violating Title VII, the
organization may still violate Title VII if it considers the individual’s race, color, national origin, 21
or sex. Furthermore, the exemptions in Title VII appear to apply only with respect to

15 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously upheld this exemption, allowing a religiously
affiliated, non-profit entity to make employment decisions based on religion, even if the position related to non-
religious activity of the organization. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). Faith-based
service providers are also eligible for the exemption, but if they receive government funding, the funds cannot be used
to directly advance the organization’s religious practices. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
16 See LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Community Center Association, 503 F.3d 217, 226-27 (3rd Cir. 2007) (providing a
summary discussion of circuit courts’ interpretations of organizations that qualify under Title VII’s exemption).
17 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2).
18 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
19 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
20 See Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F.Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (allowing an employer to require that helicopter
pilots convert to Islam in order to be hired for air surveillance over Mecca because Saudi Arabian law prohibited any th
non-Muslim from entering the holy area, a violation punishable by death), aff’d, 746 F.2d 810 (5 Cir. 1984).
21 See EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ’g. Assn, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1982); EEOC Notice, N-915, September 23,
1987. In some cases, an employer may claim that it had a valid discriminatory reason for the discharge based on
religion under the Title VII exemption, while the employee claims the discharge is based on some other Title VII
prohibition and therefore improper. For example, in several cases, employees of religious organizations, particularly
private religious schools, have been discharged after becoming pregnant. In one of these cases, the employer claimed
that the termination was based on a violation of an organization policy against extra-marital sex, stemming from the
(continued...)





employment decisions regarding hiring and firing of employees based on religion. Once an
organization makes a decision to employ an individual, the organization may not discriminate on
the basis of religion regarding the terms and conditions of employment, including compensation,
benefits, privileges, etc. In other words, religious organizations that decide to hire individuals
with other religious beliefs cannot later choose to discriminate against those individuals with 22
regard to wages or other benefits that the organization provides to employees.
It is important to note one more exemption relevant to Title VII’s prohibition on religious
discrimination. Religious organizations’ right to choose spiritual leaders is protected under the
Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause. Even before Title VII granted an exemption to religious
organizations’ hiring decisions generally, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the “freedom to
select the clergy” has “federal constitutional protection as part of the free exercise of religion 23
against state interference.” Title VII’s prohibition on use of religion in employment decisions
would appear to interfere with this constitutional freedom specific to clergy. The judicially
created “ministerial exception,” as this protection has become known, reconciles Title VII with
the Free Exercise Clause by allowing religious organizations to select clergy without regard to
any of Title VII’s restrictions but requires that employment decisions made regarding other 24
positions within the organization comply with Title VII’s requirements or exemptions.

Under Title VII, employers are prohibited from acting on the basis of employees’ observances and
practices only if they can be reasonably accommodated without undue hardship on the
employer’s business. In other words, the employer may discriminate on the basis of observances 25
and practices that cannot be reasonably accommodated without undue hardship. EEOC
regulations provide guidelines for what constitutes reasonable accommodation and undue
hardship. Once an employee requests religious accommodation, the employer must consider
whether the requested accommodation is reasonable or what reasonable alternatives might be

(...continued)
religions teachings. The employee claimed that the action was unlawful sex discrimination based on her pregnancy. If
the court determines that the employer’s action was taken in response to the resulting pregnancy, rather than because of
a violation of the faith-based policy, the organization may be held in violation of Title VII’s prohibition on sex
discrimination. In such cases, if the court determines the discharge was based on religious teachings, the organization th
can claim Title VII exemption. See Boyd v. Harding Academy of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410 (6 Cir. 1996).
22 EEOC Notice, N-915, September 23, 1987.
23 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
24 Each of the eight circuit courts to consider the ministerial exception has recognized the exception to some extent. See
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303-04 (3rd Cir. 2006) (citing EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, thth
213 F.3d 795 (4 Cir. 2000); Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5 th
Cir. 1999); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698 (7 Cir. 2003); Scharon v. St. Lukes thth
Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8 Cir. 1991); Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9 Cir. th
2004); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299 (11 Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Catholic Univ.
Of Amer., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Petruska explains that whether an employee qualifies for the ministerial
exception depends on “the function of the position. As a general rule, an employee will be considered a minister if her
primary duties include teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision
of participation in religious ritual and worship. Petruska, 462 F.3d at 304, footnote 6 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
25 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).





provided.26 If more than one accommodation is possible without causing undue hardship, the
EEOC determines the reasonableness of the chosen accommodation by examining the alternatives 27
considered by the employer and the alternatives actually offered to the employee. If more than
one manner of accommodation would not cause undue hardship, “the employer ... must offer the
alternative which least disadvantages the individual with respect to his or her employment 28
opportuni ti es.”
Employee requests for accommodation arise most often because religious practices conflict with
work schedules. EEOC guidelines suggest three possible accommodation alternatives in such
situations. First, the employer may permit a voluntary substitute policy under which employees
can find substitutes to cover their tasks during the conflict. Second, employers may create a
flexible work schedule, including flexible arrival and departure times, floating holidays, flexible
breaks, use of lunch time for early departure, and staggered work hours. Third, the employer may
consider a lateral transfer for individuals whose religious practices cannot be accommodated in 29
their current position. Another common scenario in which employees request accommodations
is under a provision in collective bargaining agreements that the employee must join a labor
organization or pay an amount equivalent to dues to that organization. When an employee objects
to this requirement on religious grounds, the EEOC recommends that the organization make an
exception for that employee or allow the employee to donate the equivalent of the amount due to 30
a charitable organization. Requests for accommodation may also arise when an employee’s
religious beliefs conflict with a work requirement, such as performing abortions, treating gay 31
patients, or complying with dress codes.
In order for these accommodations to be appropriate under Title VII, they must not cause undue
hardship to the employer. Employers cannot claim undue hardship on “a mere assumption that 32
many more people ... may also need accommodation.” The regulations provide two general
bases that may justify undue hardship: cost and seniority rights. An employer may refuse to
accommodate an employee’s religious practice if “the accommodation would require more than a 33
de minimis cost.” The EEOC determines whether an accommodation exceeds a de minimis cost
by evaluating the cost incurred to the particular employer and the number of employees that will 34
need the accommodation. Generally, administrative costs of rescheduling are considered de 35
minimis costs. An employer may also refuse to accommodate because the accommodation 36
would interfere with the preference guaranteed by a seniority system. Because seniority systems
create “a neutral way of minimizing the number of occasions when an employee must work on a

26 See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2.
27 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(2).
28 Id.
29 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1).
30 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(2).
31 For a discussion of how courts have decided in cases relating to these requests, see the Informal Discussion Letter
prepared by the EEOC Office of Legal Counsel regarding Title VII: Religious Expression, at http://www.eeoc.gov/foia/
letters/2004/titlevii_religious_expression.html.
32 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(1).
33 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1) (internal quotations omitted).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(2). See also Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (holding that employer did
not violate Title VII when it used a religiously neutral seniority system to determine employee work schedules).





day that he would prefer to have off,” Title VII does not require that seniority systems “must give 37
way when necessary to accommodate religious observances.”

Congress regularly has proposed legislation that would amend the definition of religion under
Title VII and has introduced proposals to clarify which actions would qualify as religious 38
discrimination under the act. At times, legislative proposals that would not directly affect Title
VII’s prohibition on religious discrimination raise questions related to the protections provided
for religion. For instance, the scope of Title VII’s exemption for religious organizations has been
significant in the debate for other non-discrimination legislation. The proposed Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 2007 (ENDA) would have prohibited discrimination based on sexual 39
orientation. Because several religious organizations hold religious beliefs that prohibit
homosexuality, the bill led to debate regarding the continued applicability of Title VII’s
exemption. Therefore, legislative proposals that would amend other parts of Title VII may lead to
interest in the current interpretation and protections offered to religious groups.
Cynthia Brougher
Legislative Attorney
cbrougher@crs.loc.gov, 7-9121


37 Hardison, 432 U.S. at 78-79.
38 See, e.g., H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 3628, 110th Cong. (2008).
39 H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007).