Iran's Ballistic Missile Programs: An Overview

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Iran has an active interest in developing, acquiring, and deploying a broad range of ballistic
missiles. This was spotlighted in mid-July 2008 when Iran launched a number of ballistic missiles
during military exercises, reportedly including the medium-range Shahab-3. On July 18, 2008, a
Pentagon spokesman said Iran was “not testing new technologies or capabilities, but rather firing
off old equipment in an attempt to intimidate their neighbors and escalate tension in the region.”
Subsequent analysis of the July 2008 missile launches also shows Iran apparently digitally altered
images of those launches. This short report seeks to provide an overview of the reported or
suspected variety of Iranian ballistic missile programs. Because there remains widespread public
divergence over particulars, however, this report does not provide specificity to what Iran may or
may not have, or is in the process of developing. This report may be updated.

Long-Range Ballistic Missiles........................................................................................................1
Medium and Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles.......................................................................3
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles........................................................................................................4
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................5

ran’s ballistic missile program dates to the late 1970s after the Shah was overthrown and the
Islamic Republic of Iran established. The new Iranian government embarked on a ballistic
missile program marked by considerable secrecy. Many consider that Iran’s ballistic missile I

development was in full force by the mid-1980s during its protracted war against Iraq, during
which Iran reportedly launched more than 600 ballistic missiles.
Today, there is little disagreement among most experts that Iran has acquired some number of
ballistic missiles from other countries and has developed other ballistic missiles indigenously or
in cooperation with others. Iranian ballistic missile proliferation has been a matter of U.S. and
international concern. At the same time, however, there has been considerable public
disagreement over precisely what kinds of ballistic missile systems Iran has or is developing itself
or in cooperation with others. This is because there is little transparency in Iran’s ballistic missile
programs, which has led to some degree of a lack of confidence in Iran’s public assertions of its
activities. Finally, details about Iranian ballistic missile programs remain classified in the United
States. Because of the secrecy inherent in the development of weapon systems, especially in less
open societies, open-source analyses reflect a wide-range of technical views and assessments.
This report provides a brief description of what is publicly discussed regarding Iran’s ballistic ¹²³
missile programs; it does not discuss Iranian cruise missiles or rockets. These latter weapons
were a source of concern when some reportedly Iranian-made rockets and other missiles may ⁴
have been used by Hezbollah against Israel in 2006. Charges of Iranian military support to Iraqi
insurgents do not include Iranian-made rockets or missiles, however. This report first examines
Iran’s long-range ballistic missile programs because those efforts generally drive the greatest
concerns within the United States, especially when coupled with concern over the development of
Iran’s nuclear capabilities. A brief overview of Iran’s medium and short-range ballistic missile
programs then follows.

Traditionally, the United States has defined long-range or Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs) as those ballistic missiles capable of ranges greater than 5,500 kilometers (about 3,400
miles). To date, five countries have deployed operational ICBMs (all with nuclear weapons): the

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United States, Russia, China, France, and Britain. Other countries, such as Iran, are believed by
some observers to have ICBM programs in varying stages of development.
In 1999, the U.S. intelligence community assessed that at some point the United States would ⁵
probably face ICBM threats from Iran. This remains the official U.S. position, that “Iran could
test an ICBM in the last half of the next decade using Russian technology and assistance” ⁶
(emphasis in the original). A similar report was issued in 2001. This assessment is often
interpreted that Iran will have ICBMs by 2015, but the unclassified intelligence statements place
various caveats on that potential capability.
These intelligence statements serve as the official U.S. basis for assessing the Iranian ICBM
threat to the United States and its friends and allies. These assessments drive U.S. military efforts
designed to respond to such threats, such as the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program in
general and the U.S. proposed missile defense system in Europe specifically, as well as U.S. ⁷
diplomatic efforts to curb Iranian long-range ballistic missile programs. These assessments, in
conjunction with official U.S. assessments of Iranian nuclear weapons development, contribute
significantly to ongoing U.S. concerns over Iranian threats to U.S. and international security.
These assessments do not mean, however, that there is universal agreement within the U.S.
intelligence community on the issue of an Iranian ICBM. According to these unclassified
statements, some argue that an Iranian ICBM test is likely before 2010, and very likely before
2015. Other U.S. officials believe, however, that there is “less than an even chance” for such a
test before 2015. Furthermore, U.S. assessments are also conditional in that an Iranian ICBM
capability would have to rely on access to foreign technology, from, for example, North Korea or ⁸
Russia. Finally, it is argued that an Iranian ICBM could develop from an Iranian space program
under which a space-launch vehicle program might be converted into an ICBM program. Some
have argued that Iran could develop and test such a space launch vehicle by 2010.
Some observers argue that although the U.S. position may be based upon a realistic assessment, it
is also a worst-case analysis of the potential threat from Iran. They argue that “with rare exception ⁹
this level of threat has rarely turned out to be the historical reality.”
Beyond these general U.S. public statements about Iranian ICBM developments, there are few
unclassified details. Further, non-official public sources reflect little technical or program
consensus regarding an Iranian ICBM program. Some have referred to a program called the
Shahab-6 (or Kosar in some instances) as a potential ICBM development program, perhaps

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derived from North Korean or Russian missile technology, or both.¹⁰ Although Iran continues to
declare it has no plans to develop an ICBM program, there appears to be considerable public
uncertainty and debate as to whether the Shahab-6 is an actual design study concept, or an active
or abandoned Iranian ICBM or even space-launch program. And in January 2004, Iran’s Defense
Minister reportedly announced that Iran would launch a satellite within 18 months, which launch
did not occur. Statements from other Iranian officials indicate they do have a space launch
program underway. In August 2008, U.S. defense officials said an Iranian missile test aimed at
putting a dummy satellite into orbit failed shortly after launch.

Many experts believe that Iran’s Shahab-3, which sometimes appears also to be called the Zelzal-
3 ballistic missile, is a derivative of the North Korean No-Dong 1 ballistic missile. It has a
reported range of about 1,000 to 1,500 kilometers. This could reach potential targets throughout
most of the Middle East. Some have speculated that North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan entered into
a cooperative effort at one point to develop a missile of this range and capability. Other observers
have alleged Russian assistance in Iranian development of this missile. Some reports suggest that
Iran has already deployed a number of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). Of all Iranian
ballistic missile programs, there seems to be more publicly available information in relative terms ¹¹
about this particular missile system than others. Even so, there remains considerable and
varying differences in open sources about this system.
Longer range versions of the Shahab-3, variously referred to as Shahab-3 variants, the Shahab-
3A, Shahab-3B, and Shahab-4, and a BM-25, may have range capabilities of 1,500-2,500
kilometers. These missiles potentially could reach targets throughout the Middle East, Turkey,
and into southeastern Europe. Some have reported that perhaps several dozen or more of these
missile types may be deployed and operational. Some Chinese, North Korean, or Russian
involvement is suspected. In 2006, Iran announced the successful test of a Fajr-3 MRBM
comparable to the Shahab-3, although U.S. and Israeli intelligence analysts reportedly expressed
skepticism.
In mid-July 2008, Iran launched a number of ballistic missiles and rockets of varying ranges
during military exercises. Some observers noted the missile launches were in direct response to
long-range Israeli air force exercises at the time. Iran claimed it flight tested a 2,000 km version
of the Shahab-3 that could carry a 1-ton warhead. If accurate, this missile could hit targets
throughout the Middle East and Turkey. But some analysts are skeptical of these Iranian claims
pending further technical analyses of these recent military exercises, and others have cited Iranian
exaggerations of its missile capabilities in the past. Various major international media retracted
initial images of the missile launches because they were reportedly digitally altered. Bush
Administration officials said Iran did not test new technologies or capabilities, but said the
missile launches were evidence of the need for its proposed missile defense system in Europe.
Secretary of State Rice stated the exercises were not helpful and that Iran should refrain from
such activities.

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Iran said it successfully test fired a 2-stage solid-fuel missile with a 2,000 kilometer range in
November 2008. At the time, a Pentagon spokesman said he could not confirm the launch
occurred, but that this was consistent with the fact that Iran continues to develop a ballistic
missile program that poses a threat to Iran’s neighbors in the region and beyond.
Other reports have also surfaced over Iran’s development of a much longer MRBM with ranges
of 4,000-5,000 kilometers, or even a space launch vehicle derived from these efforts that some
refer to as the Shahab-5. The degree to which this effort might be actually underway also is
highly uncertain.

Iran is widely believed to have deployed a number of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)—
those with ranges less than 1,000 kilometers. In addition, Iran is believed to have various other
SRBMs under development, either indigenously or in varying degrees of cooperation with
countries such as China, North Korea, or Russia.
Beyond these speculations, however, open source materials do not reflect a consensus over
technical capabilities and performance. Additionally, there appear to be considerable differences
in descriptions of the numbers of systems operational or deployed and even the agreed-upon
names of SRBMs ascribed to Iran. Some of the more commonly referred to Iranian missiles are
discussed briefly.
Some believe that Iran may have imported perhaps 200 Chinese CSS-8 (or Tondar-69) SRBMs in
the late 1980s, as well as a number of associated launch systems for their operational ¹²
deployment. The CSS-8 may have a range of about 150 kilometers.
Iran may have developed an SRBM in the 1990s called the Fateh A-110 (also apparently referred
to as the Mershad or Zelzal-2 variant). According to various reports, this missile may have been
developed with Chinese, Syrian, and North Korean involvement. This missile may have a range
of about 200 kilometers and may have become operational around 2004.
Some believe that Iran acquired several dozen Chinese M-11 or CSS-7 SRBMs and associated
launch vehicles in the mid-1990s, although China has denied this. The M-11 reportedly has a ¹³
range of around 280 kilometers.
Iran may also possess a number of SRBMs with ranges of 200-300 kilometers that it might have
acquired from Libya or North Korea. Some may have been produced or modified indigenously.
These have variously been referred to as the SCUD-B, SCUD-B variants, or Shahab-1 SRBMs.
Iran might also possess a few hundred SRBMs with a range of about 500-700 kilometers or so.
These SRBMs have sometimes been referred to as the SCUD-C and Shahab-2. Analysts have
expressed uncertainty over whether the Iranians developed and built these missiles on their own,
or had help from China and North Korea.

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Finally, there are some reports of an operational SRBM with a range up to 800 kilometers, which
may possibly be referred to as an M-9 variant, DF-15, or CSS-6. Reportedly, the PRC produced
the M-9 for export and Iran has acquired some number of them.
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