China's 17th Communist Party Congress, 2007: Leadership and Policy Implications

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

The Chinese Communist Party’s 17^th Congress, held from October 15 to 21, 2007, demonstrated
the Party’s efforts to try to adapt and redefine itself in the face of emerging economic and social
challenges while still trying to maintain its authoritarian one-Party rule. The Congress validated
and re-emphasized the priority on continued economic development; expanded that concept to
include more balanced and sustainable development; announced that the Party would seek to
broaden political participation by expanding intra-Party democracy; and selected two potential
rival candidates, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, with differing philosophies (rather than one
designated successor-in-waiting) as possibilities to succeed to the top Party position in five years.
More will be known about the Party’s future prospects and the relative influence of its two
potential successors once the National People’s Congress meets in early 2008 to select key
government ministers. This report will not be updated.

eriodically (approximately every five years) the Chinese Communist Party holds a
Congress, attended by some 2,000 senior Party members, to authorize important policy and
leadership decisions within the Party for the coming five years. In addition to authorizing P

substantive policies, the Party at its Congress selects a new Central Committee, comprised of the ¹
most important figures in the Party, government, and military. The Central Committee in turn
technically selects a new Politburo and a new Politburo Standing Committee, comprised of
China’s most powerful and important leaders. The appearance generally is given that these
choices are being made at the Party Congress itself. But the decisions almost always are made
ahead of time by a select group of senior leaders, then ratified at the Congress in a public
demonstration of political unity that belies months of political infighting, negotiation, and ^th
compromise. The October 2007 session was the 17 of these Party Congresses held since the
founding of the Chinese Communist Party and the first full Congress held under the leadership of ^th
Party Secretary Hu Jintao, who ascended to that post at the 16 Party Congress in 2002.

The 17^th Party Congress brought no surprises in terms of substantive policy decisions. In keeping
with established practice, Party General Secretary (hereafter Secretary) Hu Jintao opened the
Congress by presenting a lengthy political report extolling the Party’s accomplishments over the
past five years and noting problems the Party still has to address. The report, the product of
months of work among senior leaders, includes issues on which the Party has been able to agree.
The catch-phrases in the report continued to be to “build a well-off society (xiao kang she hui) in
an all-round way” and to adhere to the “scientific development concept”—both core ideas
developed by Secretary Hu.
The “scientific development concept” has been described as a new concept of development, one
that moves away from China’s previous ‘development at all costs’ approach and toward economic ²
and social progress that is “people-oriented, comprehensive, balanced and sustainable.”
According to the political report that Secretary Hu delivered at the opening of the Congress,
components of scientific development include emphasizing issues that would improve “people’s
livelihood,” including: employment, health, national education, renewable energy resources, and ³
environmental quality. As indicated by early rumors and news reports, the Congress voted at its
closing session on October 21, 2007 to enshrine the “scientific development” doctrine in an ⁴
amendment to the Party Constitution. This elevates this doctrine of Party General Secretary Hu ⁵
to a similar level of importance in the Party’s thinking as those of his predecessors.
Hu’s report also addressed the issue of Taiwan, reiterating China’s goal to “never waver in the
one-China principle [and] never abandon our efforts to achieve peaceful reunification.” But Hu

¹^T^h^e^Ce^ntra^{l Com}^m^itte^e^of^the¹⁷^th^P^a^r^t^y^C^ong^r^e^s^s^inc^l^ude^s³^{71 m}^e^m^b^e^r^s^—^{204 f}^u^{ll m}^e^m^b^e^r^s^a^{nd 1}^{67 a}^lte^rⁿ^a^t^e^s^.
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³^{Hu Jinta}^o^{’s p}^o^litic^a^l^re^p^o^rt,^“^F^ull^T^e^x^t^of^R^e^{port De}^liv^e^r^e^d^by^{Hu Jinta}^o^a^t¹⁷^th^P^a^r^t^y^C^ong^r^e^s^s^O^c^t^obe^r¹⁵^,²⁰⁰⁷^.”
⁴^F^o^{r exam}^p^l^e,^{as su}^gge^st^ed^b^y^Yu^Kepⁱⁿ^g^,ⁱⁿ^{a “S}^p^eci^al^artⁱ^c^l^e^on^W^e^l^c^o^mⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e 1}⁷^th^C^P^{C Na}^tio^na^{l Cong}^re^ss,”ⁱⁿ
^Be^ijing^Rib^a^o^.
⁵^Ma^{o Ze}^d^ong^T^h^o^u^g^h^{t, D}^e^ng^Xia^opi^ng^T^h^e^o^r^y^{, a}^{nd J}ⁱ^aⁿ^g^Ze^mⁱ^n’^s^“^t^he^T^h^r^e^e^R^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ts^.”

also appeared to make a peace overture, calling for consultations, ending hostilities, and
“reaching a peace agreement” on the basis of the “one-China” principle. Taiwan’s President Chen
Shui-bian denounced the overture, saying that basing such a treaty on the “one-China” principle ⁶
would make it “a treaty of surrender.”
The primary policy emphasis of the Congress, as anticipated, was on continued economic
development in China, continued market reform and continued integration of China into the
global system. According to Secretary Hu’s political report, the Party also endorsed the goal of
moving away from a purely investment and export-driven economic growth model to one that ⁷
includes expansion of domestic consumption. Other economic goals included:
• developing and improving modern service sectors;
• promoting rural development, including protecting arable land, strengthening
rural infrastructure, enhancing food security, preventing animal and plant
diseases, and narrowing gaps in urban-rural development;
• promoting private companies and individual entrepreneurship by removing
institutional barriers and promoting equitable market access;
• improving fiscal, tax, and financial restructuring in order to improve access to
basic public services; and
• improving the implementation of intellectual property rights strategies.
For much of the year leading up to the 17^th Party Congress, U.S. China-watchers followed a
remarkably public PRC debate on political reform that hinted at ongoing internal Party dissension
between conservatives and reformers. This debate was carried out in a number of articles by
notable PRC academicians and scholars, appearing in respected PRC journals, citing deficiencies ⁸
in the Party’s ability to govern and calling for greater democratization and political reform.
Secretary Hu’s report at the Congress made several references to these deficiencies, suggesting
that problems of governance continue to preoccupy central leaders: “The Party’s ability to govern
has not been fully competent to deal with the new situation and tasks ...” and “... the democratic
legal building is still unable to completely adapt to the requirements of expanding people’s ⁹
democracy and of economic and social development.... ”

⁶^Brad^sh^er,^Kei^t^h^,^“T^ai^w^aⁿ^l^ead^{er d}ⁱ^smⁱ^sse^{s Hu}^o^v^ert^u^re,^”^{New Yo}^r^k^Times^{, O}^c^tobe^r¹⁸^,²⁰⁰⁷^.
⁷^{Hu Jinta}^o^{, I}^b^id^.,^p.^12.^(“^W^e^m^u^s^t^prom^ote^the^traⁿ^sitioⁿ^of^e^c^ono^mⁱ^c^g^r^ow^{th f}^r^o^m^a^m^a^{jor re}^lia^nc^e^on^inv^e^stm^e^nt
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⁸^F^o^{r i}ⁿ^st^an^ce,^earl^yⁱⁿ²⁰⁰⁷^Be^ijin^{g Ri}^ba^o^(Be^iji^ng^D^a^ily^{) publis}^he^d^aⁿ^a^r^tic^le^eⁿ^title^{d “}^D^e^m^oc^racy^is^a^G^{ood T}^h^ing^.^”
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^Ze^dong^.”^“^C^hi^na^’^s^R^e^nm^{in U}ⁿ^iv^e^r^sⁱ^t^y^e^x^-^v^ic^e^-^pr^e^s^ideⁿ^{t c}^a^lls^f^o^r^polit^ic^a^l^r^e^f^o^r^m^,”^{BBC M}^onit^o^rin^g^Asia^Pacⁱ^fⁱ^c^,
^Ma^r^c^{h 1,}²⁰⁰⁷^.
⁹^H^u^Jⁱ^nta^o^{, I}^b^id^.,^p.^7.

Despite these calls for greater political pluralism, the Party at its 17^th Party Congress endorsed no
major political reforms and further made clear that its monopoly on power would continue. But in
a clear sign that the Party is feeling increasing pressure from public sentiment—what Hu in his
report acknowledged as the “growing enthusiasm of the people for participation in political
affairs”—Hu’s report called for modest, controversial, and potentially far-reaching
democratization reforms, but only within the Party itself. These included:
• allowing greater public participation in nominating Party leaders at grassroots
levels,
• allowing ordinary Party members to participate in direct elections for lower level
leaders, and
• expanding the role of Party Congress delegates beyond choosing Central ¹⁰
Committee members.

At the leadership and institutional levels, the story is somewhat more complex, with attending
implications likely to be unfolding for some months to come and a number of trends potentially
significant. According to one analyst, the make-up of Party leadership that emerged from the ¹¹
Congress has some unique collective characteristics. These include: a significant number (32%
of the Central Committee) from the so-called “lost generation” of the Cultural Revolution, when
the country’s educational system ceased to function and Chinese teenagers were dispatched to the
countryside to spend years working alongside peasants; a decline in those with technocratic and
engineering educational backgrounds and an increase in those educated in the social sciences; a
higher number of foreign-educated members; a greater percentage (76% of the Politburo) of
members with provincial leadership credentials; and a higher number of entrepreneurs and
corporate CEOs. These characteristics suggest a senior leadership that may be more familiar with
the problems that the disenfranchised in China’s interior provinces face; more personal
experience in the social and economic disruptions that can come from an excess of ideological
political zeal and loss of central government control; and a greater feel for the global business
environment.
In addition, rather than the standard practice of designating an “heir apparent” to succeed ^th
Secretary Hu Jintao, the 17 Party Congress appeared to field two potential candidates for this
post. Such a move could serve to institutionalize a certain amount of democratic choice in China’s
leadership succession arrangements. But the prospect of two rival candidates competing with one ¹²
another for the next five years also could raise new uncertainties in the succession process.

¹⁰^H^u^Jⁱ^nta^o^{, I}^b^id^.,^p.^26.
¹¹^C^h^eⁿ^g^Lⁱ^{, in a}^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tio^{n a}^t^T^h^e^B^r^ook^ing^s^Iⁿ^s^tit^uti^oⁿ^,^“^C^hi^na^’^s¹⁷^th^P^a^r^t^y^C^ong^r^e^s^s^:^L^ook^ing^A^h^e^a^d^{to H}^u
^Jin^t^ao^{’s 2}^nd^T^e^r^m^,”^O^c^tobe^r^30,²⁰⁰⁷^.
¹²^Cheⁿ^g^Lⁱ^{, Ibi}^d^.

The Politburo sits at the top of the Chinese Communist Party’s political structure. The 17^th Party
Congress announced the selection of a 25-member Politburo (including nine new members—ten
if counting as “new” the promotion of a previous alternate to a full member). This is an expansion
from its predecessor’s membership of 24 members (which included 17 new members) plus 1
alternate. Officially, the Politburo in Beijing is the PRC’s chief decision-making body. In the past,
its relatively unwieldy size and its lack of a known formalized meeting schedule have suggested
that the full Politburo has been involved only when the stakes are high—as when considering
major policy shifts, dealing with matters of immediate urgency, or when a higher level of
legitimization of a particular policy direction is necessary. But some now maintain that the ^th
Politburo emerging from the 17 Party Congress may end up being more involved in routine
decision-making than previous Politburos. Broader Politburo participation, according to this view,
is more likely under the increasingly collective leadership that China has been moving toward in
the years since Chairman Mao Zedong as “paramount leader” effectively wielded vast decision-¹³
making power.
With only one female member—the newly appointed Liu Yandong—the new Politburo continues
the PRC tradition of male-dominated decision-making bodies. Four well-known Politburo ^th
members, all born before 1940, stepped down from those positions at the 17 Party Congress.
They included Wu Yi, a frequent contact for U.S. government officials and named by Forbes in
2007 as the world’s second most powerful woman; and three members of the Politburo Standing
Committee: Zeng Qinghong, China’s current Vice-President; Wu Guanzheng, primarily
responsible for China’s anti-corruption work; and Luo Gan, the only protégé of former Premier Li ^th¹⁴
Peng named to the previous, 16 Party Congress Politburo.
The retirements of these four suggest the seriousness of the PRC leadership about mandatory
retirement for Politburo members at the age of 68. The establishment of unofficial retirement age
requirements for Party cadres at senior levels of leadership and the imposition of “term limits” for
top-level positions in the Party and government have been part of the incremental political ^th
reforms PRC leaders have made since 1978. The 17 Congress demonstrated the Party’s
continued willingness to adhere to these agreed-upon requirements. In the absence of statutory
discipline or electoral fiat, then, the Party appears to be counting on precedent to try to
institutionalize leadership succession issues and avert potentially divisive power struggles.

¹³^R^e^m^a^r^k^s^b^y^Jⁱ^ng^H^u^aⁿ^g^a^t^T^h^e^B^r^ook^ing^s^Iⁿ^s^tⁱ^t^uti^oⁿ^,^“^C^hi^na^’^s¹⁷^th^P^a^r^t^y^C^ong^r^e^s^s^:^L^ook^ing^A^h^e^a^d^{to H}^u^Jⁱ^nta^o^’^s
²^nd^T^e^r^m^,^”^O^c^tobe^r^30,²⁰⁰⁷^.
¹⁴^P^r^e^m^ie^r^Lⁱ^P^e^ng^a^c^h^ie^v^e^{d pr}^omⁱⁿ^eⁿ^c^e^{in W}^e^s^t^e^r^{n a}^c^c^ounts^a^s^t^h^e^c^h^ie^f^public^s^p^ok^e^s^m^a^{n f}^o^r^the^c^eⁿ^tr^a^l^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt
^durⁱⁿ^g^the^Tⁱ^aⁿ^aⁿ^m^e^{n Squa}^r^e^c^r^a^c^k^dow^{n of}¹⁹⁸^9.

Of more significance is the new membership of the 17^th Congress Politburo
Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the smaller group
of elite Party members that wields much of the political ^th^{(Standing Committee members}^b^{olded; new}^{full members}^italicized^{; * = previous}
power in China. The new 17 Congress PSC has nine ^Pol^{itburo alternate)}
members, including five returning members and four ^{Hu Jintao (Sec)}^{Liu Yuns}^han
new members. Of the latter, two—Xi Jinping and Li
Keqiang—have been tipped as frontrunners to be Hu ^th^{Wu Bang}^guo^{Zhang Dejiang}
Jintao’s successor as Party Secretary at the 18 Party ^{Wen Jiabao}^{Yu Zhengs}^heng
Congress in 2012. The two are the only PSC members to ^{Jia Qinglin}^{Guo Boxiong}
have been born in the 1950s, making them the first of
the “fifth generation” of China’s potential leadership to ^{Li Changc}^hun^{Wang Gang*}
rise to this level. If accepted retirement practices hold ^{Xi Jinping}^{Wang Qishan}
true, only these two will be young enough to remain in ^th^{Li Keq}^iang^{Liu Yandong (f)}
the Politburo after the 18 Party Congress; all others
will have to retire. ^{He Guoqiang}^{Liu Yuanchao}
^{Zhou Yon}^gkang^{Wang Yang}
One expert holds that Xi and Li each sit at the pinnacle ^{Wang Leq}^uan^{Zhang Gaoli}
of what effectively is an equal PSC split between two
distinct leadership camps: the “populist” group, ^{Wang Zhaoguo}^{Xu Caihou}
represented by Li Keqiang, a protegee of Hu Jintao; and ^{Hui Liangyu}^{Bo Xilai}
the “elitist” group, represented by Xi Jinping, one of the ^{Liu Qi}
so-called “princelings”—meaning a child of one of the

early senior officials of the Chinese Communist Party ¹⁵
and thus someone with elite personal connections. According to this analyst, the “populist”
group favors balanced economic development, focus on improving the lots of the poor and
disenfranchised, and an emphasis on the principles of “harmonious society”; the “elitist” group
favors continued rapid and efficient economic development, less emphasis on social issues, and
an emphasis on nurturing the entrepreneurial and middle-class populations.
According to news accounts, Li Keqiang is a close protégé of Hu Jintao and is his presumed
preferred choice. But Xi Jinping, who has slightly higher ranking than Li on the PSC and is also
the new head of the Secretariat (the “front office” of the Politburo) has emerged from the
Congress in a slightly better position. Both Xi and Li have doctoral degrees (in law and in
economics, respectively), and thus bring a different background and set of experiences to the PRC
leadership than the “revolutionary” generation of Mao Zedong or the “technocratic” generations
of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin.

¹⁵^Ch^en^{g L}ⁱ^,^Ibⁱ^d^.^Xⁱ^Jiⁿ^pⁱⁿ^{g’s f}^a^t^h^{er w}^a^{s X}ⁱ^Z^h^oⁿ^gxu^n,^{a t}^o^p^go^verⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^fⁱ^ci^alⁱⁿ^earl^y^Co^mm^uⁿⁱ^s^t^Chⁱⁿ^a.^T^h^{e el}^d^e^r
^{Xi s}^e^r^v^e^d^a^s^Vic^e^-^P^r^e^m^ie^r^,^Sta^t^e^C^ounc^il^lor^,^D^e^puty^P^r^e^m^ie^r⁽¹⁹⁵^9-¹⁹⁶²⁾^,^aⁿ^{d G}^o^v^e^r^nor^of^G^u^aⁿ^g^dong^Pr^ov^inc^e
⁽¹⁹^79-¹⁹⁸¹⁾^.

The 17^th Congress also announced the selection of a 17^th Central Military
new, eleven-member Central Military Commission Commission
(CMC), the most senior military decision-making body
in China. As expected, Secretary Hu Jintao, as head of ⁽^{* =}^{Politburo Members}⁾
the Party, remained the head of the CMC. Like its ^th^{Hu Jintao* (Chair)}^{Chen Bingde}
predecessor in the 16 Party Congress, the new CMC ^{Guo Boxiong*}^{Chang Wan}^quaⁿ
includes no other Politburo Standing Committee ^{Xu Caihou*}^{Jing Zhiyuan}
members other than Secretary Hu, with only three
(including Hu) on the Politburo. Unlike its predecessor, ^{Liang Gua}^nglie^{Wu Shengli}
the new CMC includes no one on the Secretariat, the ^{Liao Xil}^ong^{Xu Qiliang}
PSC “front office.” More suggestive, while Secretary Hu

spent years on the CMC (and on the PSC Secretariat)
while he was the “successor-in-waiting” for the top Party position, neither of the two “heirs
apparent”—Xi Jinping or Li Keqiang—was named to the new CMC, leaving them without
significant military contacts or experience during their ostensible apprenticeship. One analyst has ¹⁶
interpreted this to be an attempt to make China’s military more apolitical. But the absence of
stronger connections between the military and the younger generation on the Politburo also raises
questions about the strength of the formal lines of communication between the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) and the rest of the Party and government during the coming five-year
period.
^Kerry^D^u^m^b^augh
^Sp^ecialistⁱⁿ^A^s^iaⁿ^Af^f^a^ir^s
^k^dum^baugh^@^c^rs^.l^oc.^g^ov^{, 7-}⁷⁶⁸³

¹⁶^R^e^m^a^r^k^s^b^y^Jⁱ^ng^H^u^aⁿ^g^,^J^{ohn L}^.^T^hor^ntoⁿ^C^h^ina^C^eⁿ^t^e^r^a^t^T^h^e^B^r^ook^ing^s^Iⁿ^s^tⁱ^t^uti^oⁿ^,^“^C^hi^na^’^s¹⁷^th^P^a^rty^Coⁿ^g^ress:
^L^ook^ing^A^h^e^a^d^{to H}^u^Jⁱ^nta^o^’^s²^nd^T^e^r^m^,”^O^c^tobe^r^30,²⁰^07.