Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Annapolis Conference

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At the end of November 2007, the Bush Administration convened an international conference in
Annapolis, MD to officially revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmud Abbas reached a “Joint
Understanding,” in which they agreed to launch continuous bilateral negotiations in an effort to
conclude a peace treaty by the end of 2008 and to simultaneously implement the moribund 2003
Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict. Both leaders are operating under significant domestic political constraints and they
continue to disagree on many issues. Thus, their negotiations will be challenging. This report will
not be updated. For background and future developments, see CRS Report RL33530, Israeli-Arab
Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy, by Carol Migdalovitz.

Backgr ound ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Conference Attendees......................................................................................................................2
Agenda............................................................................................................................................. 2
Joint Understanding.........................................................................................................................3
Domestic Constraints......................................................................................................................4
Palestinian Politics....................................................................................................................4
Israeli Politics............................................................................................................................4
Prospects .......................................................................................................................................... 5
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................6

In early 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was said to have promised moderate Arab
regimes that the United States would become more engaged in the Israeli-Arab peace process in ¹
exchange for their support for countering increasing Iranian influence in the Middle East. The
Secretary made eight trips to the region during the year, initially to work with Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmud Abbas on developing a
“political horizon” that would lead to a resumption of the long-stalled Performance-Based Road
Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, issued by the
international Quartet (the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia) on April ²
30, 2003. Each side maintains that the other has not fulfilled its obligations under the three-phase
Road Map; independent observers agree that neither has done so. Phase I calls, inter alia, for
Israel to freeze all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements) and for the
Palestinians to confront terrorists and dismantle their infrastructures.
From February until June 2007, a Palestinian unity government included Hamas, a U.S.-
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), and Hamas’s participation impeded Rice’s
efforts. Olmert refused to negotiate with Abbas as long as Hamas failed to recognize Israel,
disavow violence, and accept prior Israeli-Palestinian agreements, i.e., met conditions that the
Quartet laid down in January 2006 after Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections. In
June 2007, however, Palestinian infighting ended with Hamas in complete control of the Gaza
Strip, and Abbas reacted by dissolving the unity government. The Bush Administration and the
Israeli government viewed the ouster of Hamas as an opportunity to return to diplomacy.
On July 16, President Bush promised to support Abbas in order to lay the foundation for serious
negotiations toward the creation of a Palestinian state. The President called for an international
meeting “of representatives from nations that support a two-state solution, reject violence,
recognize Israel’s right to exist, and commit to all previous agreements between the parties.”
When announced, the meeting was intended mainly to review progress toward building
Palestinian institutions and to look for ways to support further reform, although participants also ³
were to provide support for the parties in their bilateral negotiations on a Palestinian state.
Olmert and Abbas, and later negotiating teams led by Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and
former Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Quray (alternate spellings: Qurei, Qureia), met over the
next four months to work on a declaration of principles on final status or core issues: Jerusalem,
borders, settlements, refugees, security, and water. Olmert sought to keep the declaration vague in
order to avoid concessions that would prompt his domestic political opponents to bring down his
government, while Abbas wanted it to address core issues substantively in order to show his
people that negotiations could lead to an improvement in the quality of their lives, an end to the
occupation, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. They failed to produce a document.

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The United States invited 49 countries and international organizations to send representatives to a
conference at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD. Attendees included members of the
Arab League Follow-on Committee (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen), the G-8 group of industrialized countries,
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, fellow members of the international Quartet,
members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and representatives of the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The size of the gathering signaled strong international
support for a peace process. The size of the Arabs’ turnout was attributed to their need for a
strategic alliance with the United States against Iran, but also may have indicated support for
Abbas over Hamas.
The presence of Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal was considered significant
because the desert kingdom is a pro-Western Arab state that does not have relations with Israel.
The Foreign Minister clearly stated that normalization of relations would come as a result of ⁴
peace and not before it. The attendance of Syria suggested that the Bush Administration, which
had been trying to isolate Damascus because of its support for terrorist groups, its destabilization
of Lebanon, and its alliance with Iran, may now be willing to engage Syria and revive its dormant
peace track with Israel. Saudi Arabia and other Arab governments reportedly had demanded that
Syria be invited to Annapolis and that the conference call for a “comprehensive peace” that would
include the return of the Golan Heights. Syria would only attend if the Golan were on the agenda
and sent Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal al Miqdad, while almost all other governments were
represented by foreign ministers. Miqdad’s rank may have reflected a belief that a renewed peace
process would not address the Golan. However, Russia reportedly wants a follow-up meeting in
Moscow to address Syria’s concerns. Olmert publicly has said that “conditions have not yet
matured” for the start of a dialogue with Syria, but Israel and Syria have been talking via Turkish
and Russian intermediaries.
Iran and Hamas, which have the potential to act as spoilers of the peace process, were
conspicuously missing from Annapolis. Iran denounced the conference before, during, and after it
took place. Its influence may have been felt in the absence of the Shiite-led Maliki government of
Iraq, an invitee which declined to send a representative but which said that it would welcome
peace. Yet, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was unable to dissuade Syrian President Bashar al
Asad, his presumed ally, from sending a representative. For their part, Hamas officials described
the meeting as “useless” and stridently escalated their rhetoric, vowing not to abandon their goal ⁵
of a Palestinian state “from the river to the sea,” i.e., destroying Israel.

The conference began on November 26, when President Bush held separate meetings with Abbas
and Olmert at the White House and Secretary Rice hosted a dinner for attendees at the State
Department. A plenary session convened in Annapolis on November 27. After remarks by Bush,

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Abbas, and Olmert, the agenda included international support for the peace process, institutional
reform, and capacity building; a comprehensive peace to include Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon;
and advancing normal relations and security between Israel and the Arab states. On November 28,
President Bush briefly met jointly with Abbas and Olmert.

Instead of a declaration of principles, President Bush read a “Joint Understanding” at the ⁶
conference that dealt with the process or structure of negotiations. In it, Prime Minister Olmert
and President Abbas express their determination to “immediately launch bilateral negotiations in
order to conclude a peace treaty to resolve all core issues without exception, as specified in
previous agreements.” They agree to engage in continuous negotiations in an effort to conclude
an agreement before the end of 2008. For this purpose, a steering committee to oversee
negotiating teams will meet continuously beginning on December 12. Abbas and Olmert will
meet biweekly to follow and assist the negotiations. Negotiations will be bilateral. The Joint
Understanding does not specify a role for the United States in the negotiations, although one may
emerge with time. President Bush will not be playing a role similar to that of Presidents Carter
and Clinton in the past, and the United States will not necessarily make proposals in the event of
a deadlock. This is in line with a long-standing Administration view that it is the parties
themselves who must make peace. However, it is anticipated that Secretary of State Rice will
travel to the region frequently to provide encouragement and assistance. The resumption of
negotiations after a seven-year hiatus is viewed as the main achievement of the conference,
although the process may be said to have resumed with the Olmert-Abbas talks in mid-2007.
In the Joint Understanding, the parties also commit to immediately implement their respective
obligations under the Road Map. The United States will lead a tripartite U.S.-Israeli-Palestinian
mechanism to follow up on implementation. The parties further commit to continue implementing
the Road Map until they reach a peace treaty. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties,
implementation of the future peace treaty will be subject to the implementation of the road map,
as judged by the United States. The United States will monitor and judge fulfillment of their Road
Map commitments, a task that may prove to be extremely difficult.
The President named General James L. Jones (Ret.), former Commander of U.S. European
Command, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Commandant of the Marine Corps, as special
envoy for Middle East security. The general will report to Secretary Rice, who said that Jones will
oversee “the full range of security issues for the Israelis and Palestinians as well as security
cooperation with neighboring countries, and American efforts to provide assistance to the
Palestinian Authority.” He will not monitor compliance with the Road Map nor replace Lt. Gen.
Keith Dayton, the U.S. Middle East security coordinator, who has been assisting the Palestinians
with improving their security forces.

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The domestic political weaknesses of Olmert and Abbas may create challenges to or constraints
on progress on the Road Map and a peace treaty and have prompted much skepticism about the
prospects for the renewed peace process.
Since 1996, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has administered both the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
albeit amidst the presence of Israeli Defense Forces and settlements. Factional fighting between
Fatah and Hamas in May/June 2007 resulted in Hamas seizing total control of the Gaza Strip. PA
President Mahmoud Abbas then declared a state of emergency, dissolved the Hamas-led
government, and replaced it with one led by independent, technocrat Prime Minister Salam
Fayyad. In practice, the Abbas/Fayyad government now administers only the West Bank while
Hamas dominates the Gaza Strip. Abbas has been unable to prevent Hamas from permitting its
allies to launch rockets into southern Israel.
Israelis opposed to negotiations argue that talks are futile because Abbas is weak and unable to
implement the Road Map and/or a peace treaty. Others contend that progress in the peace process
would strengthen Abbas by showing him able to deliver benefits for the Palestinian people. Saudi
Arabia and others are urging Abbas to reconcile with Hamas in order to present a unified
Palestinian front in negotiations and to increase the legitimacy of any accord. However, as with
the prior unity government, it is unlikely that Israel would agree to negotiate with it unless Hamas
meets conditions set out in 2006 that it recognize Israel, disavow violence, and accept all prior
Israeli-Palestinian agreements. Hamas officials show no inclination to meet these conditions.
Instead, they organized protests against the Annapolis conference, rejected its results, hardened
their rhetoric, and continued to argue that Abbas lacks a legitimate mandate to conduct
negotiations because they won the 2006 parliamentary elections. Moreover, Hamas retains the
capability to sabotage the peace process by escalating terror attacks.
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert heads a fractious, multiparty coalition whose majority in the Knesset
(parliament) is deceptively large. Many in his own Kadima party oppose what they view as
“concessions” to the Palestinians and could defect to the opposition Likud. Two parties in the
coalition preemptively voiced objections to possible compromises on Jerusalem and territory that
would be required to conclude a peace treaty. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, spiritual leader of the
ultraorthodox Shas Party, declared that he will order Shas to leave the coalition if Jerusalem is
raised in negotiations. The Russian-language based Yisrael Beytenu (Israel Our Home) party, also
in the coalition, is willing to cede parts of Jerusalem, but not settlements. Meanwhile, opposition
Likud Party leader Benjamin Netanyahu continues to lead all public opinion polls, snipes at both
Shas and Yisrael Beytenu for not bolting the coalition, voices skepticism about Abbas’s ability to
fulfill commitments, and charges that territorial concessions will lead to a “Hamastan.”
The Joint Understanding conditions implementation of a treaty on implementation of the Road
Map. This provision is intended to reassure the Israeli people that their government continues to
give priority to security and preventing terror. Nonetheless, the Prime Minister’s ability to
compromise in negotiations and stay in office at the same time is severely constrained. Olmert’s

unease about his coalition’s durability may partly account for the complete failure of the Joint
Understanding to mention core issues by name—Jerusalem is one of them. Should the two
rightwing parties depart, Olmert could rely on the leftwing Meretz and three small Israeli Arab
parties to remain in power and get a peace accord ratified, but any agreement that depends on
Arab support would not be viewed by many Israelis as legitimate.
Olmert’s tenure as prime minister also may be in jeopardy for other reasons. He is the subject of
several investigations into alleged corruption and a report by a commission investigating Israel’s
conduct of its 2006 war with Hezbollah in Lebanon is due to be submitted shortly. A criminal
indictment or a scathing report could produce increased calls for Olmert’s resignation. Israeli
governments are notoriously short-lived and Olmert has already been in power for almost two
years, which is the average length of a government’s tenure. Finally, Olmert soon will undergo
treatment for prostate cancer, which may remove him from the negotiating process for at least a
limited time.

The two sides are no more able to fulfill their obligations under Phase I of the Road Map now
than they have been for the past four and a half years and still disagree about implementation.
Phase I calls on Israel to cease settlement activity. Israel has more than 275,000 settlers in the
West Bank (not including East Jerusalem) and, at Annapolis, Olmert referred to a letter that
President Bush gave to former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in April 2004. In it, the
President noted the need to take into account changed “realities on the ground, including already
existing major Israeli population centers,” (i.e., settlements), asserting “it is unrealistic to expect
that the outcome of final status negotiations will be full and complete return to the armistice lines ⁷
of 1949.” At the time, the Palestinians denounced the President’s “legitimization” of settlements
and prejudgment of final status. On November 19, 2007, Olmert stated that he does not view a
freeze on building beyond the 1967 border as part of the Road Map’s requirements. He also said
that Israel would not build new settlements or outposts or appropriate more land for settlement
use. In addition, Israel does not believe that construction in East Jerusalem is required in a freeze.
Palestinians argue that a freeze means a complete cessation of all settlement construction,
including in existing settlements. Phase I also requires the Palestinians to confront terrorists and
dismantle terrorist infrastructures. Palestinian officials claim that their limited actions against
Hamas-supporting charities and deployment of police in Nablus and Tulkarm prove that they are
fulfilling their obligations under Phase I. Yet, they lack the capability to truly confront Hamas and
other terror groups, even with the assistance provided thus far by the United States and Israel.
Final status issues also remain intractable. For example, on the issue of refugees, Abbas referred
at Annapolis to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194, which the Palestinians believe grants
refugees the “right to return” to their homes (now in Israel). (The Resolution also provides for an ⁸
alternative right to compensation.) However, he also had joined the Arab Initiative which calls
for an agreed upon solution to the issue. Israel maintains its right to remain a Jewish state, the
identity of which would be lost if the Palestinian refugees were allowed to return. It says that the

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refugees should resettle only in Palestine and in Arab lands and be compensated. For support,
Israelis cite another part of President Bush’s 2004 letter to Sharon, which stated that a solution to
the refugee issue will be found by settling Palestinian refugees in a Palestinian state, “rather than
in Israel,” and thereby rejected a “right of return.”
The 2000 Camp David talks failed largely because of the issue of Jerusalem. Olmert has
expressed willingness to cede the Arab neighborhoods and refugee camps in the city (the
boundaries of which the Israeli Knesset had enlarged after the 1967 war). It may be more difficult
for him to compromise on the control/sovereignty over holy sites. As noted above, rightwing
Israeli parties could bring down the government over any steps they consider threatening to
“divide” the city. In Annapolis, Abbas spoke of a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem and of
guaranteed access for all religions to holy sites.
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