China's Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation

China’s Space Program:
Options for U.S.-China Cooperation
Jeffrey Logan
Specialist in Energy Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Summary
China has a determined, yet still modest, program of civilian space activities
planned for the next decade. The potential for U.S.-China cooperation in space — an
issue of interest to Congress — has become more controversial since the January 2007
Chinese anti-satellite test. The test reinforced concerns about Chinese intentions in outer
space and jeopardized space assets of more than two dozen countries by creating a large
cloud of orbital space debris. Some argue that Chinese capabilities now threaten U.S.
space assets in low earth orbit. Others stress the need to expand dialogue with China.
This report outlines recent activities and future plans in China’s civilian space
sector. It also discusses benefits and trade-offs of possible U.S.-China collaboration in
space, as well as several options to improve space relations, including information
exchange, policy dialogue, and joint activities. For more information, see CRS Report
RS21641, China’s Space Program: An Overview, by Marcia S. Smith.
Introduction
China has made clear advances in space capabilities over the past decade. The
country has launched over 100 orbital missions since 1970, including a string of 50
consecutive successful Long March rocket launches from 1996 to 2006, after overcoming
technical problems with the help of U.S. companies in the mid-1990s.¹ China sent
humans into space in 2003 and 2005, and orbited a lunar explorer in October 2007 that
is paving the way for additional moon exploration. China is now a world leader in yearly
space launches, yet remains notably less active than Russia or the United States, as shown
in Table 1.
China’s space program was initially institutionalized under the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA). In a series of government reforms in the 1990s, the China National Space

¹ See CRS Report 98-485, China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers under U.S. Satellite
Export Policy — Actions and Chronology, by Shirley A. Kan.

Administration (CNSA) — roughly equivalent to the U.S. National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) — was created under the civilian Commission of Science,
Technology and Industry for National Defense. The PLA continues to play a role in
China’s overall space activities, managing both manned civilian and military efforts,
while CNSA handles unmanned scientific projects and international collaboration.
China’s space activities and intentions are not transparent; the dual-use nature of most
space technology compounds the uncertainties of interpreting Chinese decision making.
Table 1. Reported Spaceflights Launched by Country, 2003-2007
Russia U.S. China EU Japan India
200321267432
200423198301
200526165521
200625236561
2007221610523
^So^urce^:^N^A^S^A^{, “}^T^h^e^Y^{ear i}ⁿ^R^e^vⁱ^ew^{,” 2003-}^{2006, an}^d^S^p^a^c^e^Ne^ws^{, 2007.}
China’s Space White Paper of 2006 states that Chinese space activities are
subservient to domestic social and economic development goals, which include national
security.² China has been a strong proponent of an arms control regime in space and has
argued for the peaceful use of outer space in the United Nations’ Conference on
Disarmament and at the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space dialogue. Some
claim that China takes this stand in order to prevent further progress by the United States
in space while allowing it to covertly catch up.³
China’s spending on space is growing, although details are often not available. The
CNSA reports to have a budget about one-tenth the size of NASA’s.⁴ Western experts
estimate Chinese space spending at $1.4-2.2 billion per year, on par with France and
Japan.⁵ Chinese budget opacity, the dual-use nature of most space technology, and
currency conversion difficulties make direct comparisons uncertain.
China collaborates with other countries on civilian space activities, but it is not
considered a key member of the international space community.⁶ Currently, China
collaborates with Russia, the European Union (EU), Brazil, Canada, Nigeria, and others.
The Russian partnership is probably the most active and has benefitted China’s manned
space effort significantly. A China-EU collaborative framework on space has been in

² “China’s Space Activities in 2006,” White Paper issued by the Information Office of the State
Council of the People’s Republic of China, October 2006.
³ See, for example, speech by Senator Jon Kyl, “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapons and American
National Security,” delivered on January 29, 2007, at the Heritage Foundation.
⁴ “Chinese Annual Space Budget Exceeds Two Billion Dollars,” Space Daily, Beijing, October

12, 2006.

⁵ Dean Cheng, Space News, “Dragons in Orbit: China’s Space Program Merits Greater
Attention,” 21 August 2006.
⁶ This was concluded by a panel of U.S. experts on Chinese space activities. “China’s Space
Program: Civilian, Commercial and Military Aspects,” CNA Conference Report, May 2006.

place since 1998. This includes cooperation on the EU-led Galileo satellite positioning
system, but progress on this has been slow and sometimes controversial. Competition in
space also exists among China, India, Japan, and South Korea. Although there may be
military implications to this competition, each country seems more focused on building
national pride by displaying technology prowess.
China’s Human Space Flight Program
China’s program to launch humans into space began earnestly in 1992 and is
designated as “Project 921.” China has apparently chosen the more expensive route of
sending humans into space, over machines, for the wider attention it attracts both
domestically and internationally. A manned program builds greater national prestige —
an increasingly important political benefit in China — and by drawing international
attention to the country’s technical capabilities.
China has made steady, although unremarkable progress in its human space schedule.
Compared to the U.S. Apollo and Soviet Soyez programs of the 1960s and 1970s, China’s
Shenzhou effort is far more modest.⁷
Project 921 is divided into three phases. Phase I included the first five Shenzhou
flights, culminating in China’s first human spaceflight on October 15, 2003. Phase II
began with Shenzhou 6, which flew two Chinese taikonauts⁸ on a five-day mission
starting on October 12, 2005. Shenzhou 7 was a three-day mission starting on September
24, 2008, and built experience with extra-vehicular activities. Shenzhou 8, 9, and 10 are
scheduled for 2009-2010 and will attempt to establish a space laboratory module with
docking capability. Shenzhou 9 will test docking procedures with the module delivered
by Shenzhou 8, and Shenzhou 10 will carry a crew to the module. Phase III is less well
developed, but includes establishing a permanent space station. China claims that it has
not set a date for development of the station.⁹ The Shenzhou modules have been designed
to dock at the International Space Station if that becomes politically feasible in the future.
China’s Lunar Exploration Activities and Beyond
On October 24, 2007, China successfully launched Chang-e 1, the country’s first
lunar probe. Approximately 14 days later, the probe entered final orbit around the moon.
China became the fourth country to orbit a satellite around the moon; Japan became the
third only weeks before China. Orbiting 200 kilometers (124 miles) above the surface,
China’s explorer uses stereo cameras and X-ray spectrometers to map three dimensional
images of the lunar surface. One goal of the mission is to begin mapping potential lunar
resources that could some day be used by Chinese industry. China plans to send Chang-e
2, equipped with a robotic lunar rover, to the moon around 2012. Approximately five
years later, Chang-e 3 is scheduled to send another rover to collect samples that will be

⁷ Steve Dutch, “Chronology of Pre-Space Shuttle Manned Space Flight,” University of
Wisconsin-Green Bay, September 1998.
⁸ “Taikonaut” is sometimes used in English language documents to distinguish Chinese space
explorers from astronauts and cosmonauts.
⁹ “China Denies Timetable for Space Station,” Xinhua, November 7, 2007.

returned to Earth.¹⁰ After this third phase, an effort to send humans to the moon will
commence, but China denies that it has a timetable for this effort.¹¹
China also has plans to explore Mars and the outer solar system and is discussing
collaboration with Russia to do so. These plans are more vague and uncertain than
Program 921 and the lunar exploration.
U.S.-China Space Cooperation
China and the United States have a limited history of both civilian and military
collaboration in space. China has publicly pushed for more dialogue and joint activities.
Mistrust of Chinese space intentions grew in the mid-1990s when U.S. companies were
accused of transferring potentially sensitive military information to China.¹² Since then,
cooperation has stagnated, often roiled by larger economic, political, and security frictions
in the U.S.-China relationship.
In September 2006, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin visited his Chinese
counterpart, Laiyan Sun, in China. He couched the visit as a “get acquainted” opportunity
rather than the start of any serious cooperation in order to keep expectations low. No
follow-on activities were announced after the trip, although the Chinese issued a four-
point proposal for ongoing dialogue between the two organizations that stressed annual
exchanges and confidence building measures.¹³
On January 11, 2007, China conducted its first successful anti-satellite (ASAT)
weapons test, destroying one of its inactive weather satellites.¹⁴ No advance notice of the
test was given, nor has China yet explained convincingly the intentions of the test.¹⁵ The
international community condemned the test as an irresponsible act because it polluted
that orbital slot with thousands of pieces of debris that will threaten the space assets of
more than two dozen countries, including China’s, for years.
Understanding the nuances of China’s intent in conducting the test is important, but
remains open to interpretation. How was the decision made to conduct a test that would
contradict Beijing’s publicly-held position on the peaceful use of outer space, and that
would almost certainly incur international condemnation? Some speculate that the United

¹⁰ Launch dates for Chang-e 2 and 3 may depend on development of the new, heavy-lift Long
March 5 booster rocket and the launch facility under construction on Hainan Island.
¹¹ “China Has No Timetable for Manned Moon Landing,” Xinhua, October 25, 2007.
¹² CRS Report 98-485, China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers under U.S. Satellite Export
Policy — Actions and Chronology, by Shirley A. Kan.
¹³ “China Offers 4-Point proposal to boost Sino-U.S. Space Co-Op,” The Chinese Government’s
Official Web Portal, [http://www.gov.cn], September 25, 2006.
¹⁴ See CRS Report RS22652, China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon’s Test, by Shirley A. Kan.
¹⁵ In a March 2007 press conference, Premier Wen Jiabao reiterated that the test was not directed
against any one country and that China’s position on the peaceful use of outer space remained
unchanged. “Premier Wen Jiabao’s Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s Republic of China, March 17, 2007.

States’ unilateral positions encouraged China to conduct the test to demonstrate that it
could not be ignored.¹⁶ In particular, the U.S. National Space Policy issued in September
2006 declares that the United States would “deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of
space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.”¹⁷ Given China’s apparent
commitment to space, the growing U.S. dependence on space for security and military
use, and Chinese concerns over Taiwan, the ASAT test may have been a demonstration
of strategic Chinese deterrence.¹⁸ Others saw a more nefarious display of China’s space
capabilities, and a sign that China has more ambitious objectives in space.¹⁹ Still others
speculate that the engineers running China’s ASAT program simply wanted to verify the
technology that they had spent decades developing and significantly underestimated the
international outrage the test provoked.²⁰
The Chinese ASAT test seemed to derail any movement to build on the meeting
between NASA and CNSA. Some believe that China’s ASAT test will continue to
dampen momentum that might have been building for the two countries to expand
cooperation, while others argue that it is a pressing reason to boost dialogue.²¹
Challenges of Cooperating with China. Some of the most important
challenges of expanding cooperation in space with China include:
^!Inadvertent technology transfer. From this perspective, increased space
cooperation with China should be avoided until Chinese intentions are
clearer. Joint space activities could lead to more rapid (dual-use)
technology transfer to China, and in a worst-case scenario, result in a
“space Pearl Harbor,” as postulated by a congressionally appointed
commission led by Donald Rumsfeld in 2001.²²
^!Moral compromise. China is widely criticized for its record on human
rights and non-democratic governance. Any collaboration that improves
the standing of authoritarian Chinese leaders might thus be viewed as
unacceptable.

¹⁶ William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Flexing Muscle, China Destroys Satellite in Test,”
New York Times, January 19, 2007.
¹⁷ Office of Science and Technology Policy, U.S. National Space Policy, August 31, 2006.
¹⁸ Eric Hagt, “China’s ASAT Test: Strategic Response,” China Security, World Security Institute,
Winter 2007.
¹⁹ See, for example, Statement of Michael Pillsbury to the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, “Hearing on China’s Military Modernization and its Impacts on the U.S.
and the Asia Pacific,” March 30, 2007.
²⁰ This speculation is attributed to Joan Johnson-Freese in May 7, 2008 testimony to the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. D. Shiga, “Did ‘Naive Engineers’ Spur
China’s Anti-Satellite Test?” New Scientist Space, May 7, 2008.
²¹ Philip Saunders and Charles Lutes, “China’s ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications,”
National Defense University, June 2007.
²² “Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and
Organization,” Washington, DC, January 11, 2001.

^!Ineffectiveness. Some argue that increased collaboration will not
produce tangible benefits for the United States, especially without a new
bilateral political climate.²³
Benefits of Cooperating with China. The potential benefits of expanded
cooperation and dialogue with China include:
^!Improved transparency. Regular meetings could help the two nations
understand each others’ intentions more clearly. Currently, there is
mutual uncertainty and mistrust over space goals, resulting in the need
for worst-case planning.
^!Offsetting the need for China’s unilateral development. Collaborating
with China — instead of isolating it — may keep the country dependent
on U.S. technology rather than forcing it to develop technologies alone.
This can give the United States leverage in other areas of the relationship.
^!Cost savings. China now has the economic standing to support joint
space cooperation. Cost-sharing of joint projects could help NASA
achieve its challenging work load in the near future. Some have argued
that U.S. space commerce has suffered from the attempt to isolate China
while doing little to keep sensitive technology out of China.
Options for Possible Cooperation.
^!Information and data sharing. Confidence building measures (CBMs)
such as information exchange on debris management, environmental and
meteorological conditions, and navigation, are widely considered an
effective first step in building trust in a sensitive relationship. NASA has
done some of this with CNSA in the past, but more is possible.
^!Space policy dialogue. Another area of potential exchange could begin²⁴
with “strategic communication,” an attempt for each side to more
accurately understand the other’s views, concerns, and intentions.
Dialogue on “rules of the road,” a “code of conduct,” or even select
military issues could be included.
^!Joint activities. This type of cooperation is more complex and would
probably require strong political commitments and confidence building
measures in advance. Bi- and multi-lateral partnerships on the
international space station, lunar missions, environmental observation,
or solar system exploration are potential options. A joint U.S.-Soviet
space docking exercise in 1975 achieved important technical and political
breakthroughs during the Cold War.

²³ “China’s Space Program: Civilian, Commercial and Military Aspects,” CNA Conference
Report, May 2006.
²⁴ Joan Johnson-Freese, “Strategic Communication with China: What Message About Space?,”
China Security, World Security Institute, 2006.