Georgia's January 2008 Presidential Election: Outcome and Implications
Georgia’s January 2008 Presidential Election:
Outcome and Implications
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
This report discusses the campaign and results of Georgia’s January 5, 2008,
presidential election and implications for Russia and U.S. interests. The election took
place after the sitting president, Mikheil Saakashvili, suddenly resigned in the face of
domestic and international criticism over his crackdown on political dissidents. Many
observers viewed Saakashvili’s re-election as marking some democratization progress,
but some raised concerns that political instability might endure and that Georgia’s ties
with NATO might suffer. This report may be updated. Related reports include CRS
Report RL33453, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
Background
Political instability in Georgia appeared to worsen in November 2007 after several
opposition parties united in a “National Council” that launched demonstrations in Tbilisi,
the capital, to demand that legislative elections be held in early 2008 as originally called
for instead of in late 2008 as set by the government-dominated legislature. The
demonstrations had been spurred by sensational accusations by former defense minister
Irakli Okruashvili against President Mikheil Saakashvili (including that Saakashvili
ordered him to commit murder). Calls for Saakashvili’s resignation intensified after
Okruashvili claimed that he had been coerced by the government to recant the
accusations. On November 7, police and security forces forcibly dispersed demonstrators,
reportedly resulting in several dozen injuries. Security forces also stormed the
independent Imedi (“Hope”) television station, which had aired opposition grievances,
and shut it down. Saakashvili declared a state of emergency for 15 days, giving him
enhanced powers. He claimed that the demonstrations had been part of a coup attempt
orchestrated by Russia, and ordered three Russian diplomats to leave the country.
U.S. and other international criticism of the crackdown may have influenced
Saakashvili’s decision to step down as president on November 25, 2007, so that early
presidential elections could be held on January 5, 2008, “because I, as this country’s
leader, need an unequivocal mandate to cope with all foreign threats and all kinds of
pressure on Georgia.”1 At the same time, he called for a plebiscite on whether to have a
spring or fall legislative election and on whether Georgia should join NATO. Legislative
Speaker Nino Burjanadze became acting president. She called on prosecutors to drop
charges against Imedi. It renewed broadcasts on December 12, and became for a time the
main television outlet for opposition candidates in the election (see also below).
The Campaign
Significant amendments to the electoral code were adopted in late November and
mid-December to make elections more democratic, including by adding some opposition
party representatives to electoral commissions. However, the adoption of new rules
shortly before the election sometimes resulted in haphazard implementation, according
to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which monitored the
electoral process.2
Most observers considered the nomination process for presidential candidates to be
inclusive and transparent. Besides Saakashvili, six other candidates were successfully
registered (see Table 1). Among the campaign pledges made by the candidates,
Saakashvili ran on his claimed record of reducing corruption and crime and improving
living conditions, and pledged to further reduce poverty and to restore Georgia’s territorial
integrity peacefully. Levan Gachechiladze stated that he would work to create a
parliamentary system of rule with a constitutional monarchy, nominate former foreign
minister Salome Zourabichvili as the prime minister, and encourage private enterprise and
poverty alleviation. Davit Gamqrelidze pledged to consider backing either a
parliamentary system or constitutional monarchy, and to bolster freedom of speech,
personal property rights, and an independent judiciary. Shalva Natelashvili pledged to
boost social services and called for a parliamentary system. The Harvard-educated Giorgi
Maisashvili stressed business creation. All the candidates except Irina Sarishvili-
Chanturia and prominent businessman Badri Patarkatsishvili called for Georgia to seek
membership in NATO. Sarishvili-Chanturia urged voters to either vote for her or other
candidates she favored. Patarkatsishvili called for abolishing the presidency, creating a
confederation with a weak central government, and establishing close ties with Russia.
He pledged to use his fortune to provide unemployment benefits and some free utilities
to the poor.
Mass rallies were prominent in the campaign, and several candidates toured the
country. In contrast, Patarkatsishvili faced charges of involvement in a coup attempt
linked to the November demonstrations and conducted his campaign from abroad. Most
observers considered much of the campaigning as focused on accusations rather than
issues. Perhaps the most sensational event of the campaign occurred in late December,
when the government released recordings which it claimed incriminated Patarkatsishvili
in yet another coup planned for after the election. Patarkatsishvili denied planning a coup
1 Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), November 8, 2007,
Doc. No. CEP-950428.
2 OSCE. International Election Observation Mission. Georgia: Extraordinary Presidential
Election, 5 January 2008, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, January 6, 2008.
and called on journalists to defend him. He also stated that he would step down as a
candidate, but later reversed course. Staff at Imedi, which was at least partially owned
by Patarkatsishvili, decided to temporarily halt transmissions on December 26.
Results and Assessments
The Central Electoral CommissionPresidential Election Results
(CEC) reported that 56.2% of 3.35 millionCandidatePercent of VoteMikheil Saakashvili53.47
registered voters reportedly turned out and that
Saakashvili received enough votes (over 50%)Levan Gachechiladze25.69Badri Patarkatsishvili07.10
to avoid a legally mandated second round of
voting for the top two candidates (preliminaryShalva Natelashvili06.49Davit Gamqrelidze04.20
results; see Table 1). On the plebiscite issues,
77% of voters endorsed Georgia joiningGiorgi Maisashvili00.77Irina Sarishvili00.16
NATO and almost 80% supported holding
legislative elections in spring 2008. An effortNote: Saakashvili was nominated bythe United National Movement;
by the government to conduct balloting in
Georgia-controlled areas in South Ossetia wasGachechiladze by the National Councilof nine opposition parties; Gamqrel-
denounced by officials in the breakaway
region with the claim that almost all residentsidze by the New Right Party; Natel-ashvili by the Labour Party; and
are citizens of Russia. Saakashvili’s
performance at the polls benefitted from aPatarkatsishvili, Sarishvili-Chanturia,and Maisashvili by citizens’ groups.
growing economy and a boost in social
services provided by the government. HisSource: Central Electoral Commission,January 13, 2008.
pledge of greater efforts to alleviate poverty
also may have helped ease some grievances
against his rule, according to many observers.
The fractiousness of some of the opposition, which could not agree on a single candidate,
was a major factor in the results.
A preliminary report by observers from the OSCE, the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe (PACE), and the European Parliament (EP) assessed the election
as “in essence consistent with most ... commitments and standards for democratic
elections, [although] significant challenges were revealed....”3 Several positive aspects
of the election were listed, including that the race offered a competitive choice of
candidates. Negative aspects included “pervasive” violations that were “not conducive
to a constructive, issue-based election campaign.” These included the use of government
offices to support Saakashvili, “substantiated” instances in which officials harassed
opposition campaigners, allegations that state employees were ordered to vote for
3 A preliminary report by observers from the National Democratic Institute, a U.S.-based NGO,
similarly suggested that “key aspects of this election were in line with democratic principles. But
there were also flaws ... that should be addressed to enhance the integrity of future elections.”
Statement of the NDI Election Observer Delegation to Georgia’s 2008 Presidential Election,
January 7, 2008. According to a preliminary statement by observers from the International
Republican Institute, another U.S.-based NGO, the election “broadly met international
standards,” but they called for reforms regarding voter lists and for judicial impartiality.
Preliminary Statement: Georgia's Election Broadly Meets International Standards: Technical
Improvements Needed, January 6, 2008. See also comments by Kenneth Wollack and Jim Kolbe,
Hudson Institute, January 16, 2008.
Saakashvili, the use of social services to gain support for Saakashvili, and a tendency
toward pro-Saakashvili bias by the CEC in resolving complaints.4 The monitors viewed
the vote count more negatively, with a significant number assessing it as bad or very bad.
The preliminary report argued that electoral abuses varied from region to region, appeared
often due to incompetence or local fraud, and stopped short of organized and systematic
manipulation. The CEC and the courts eventually invalidated or corrected the results in
Among other assessments of the election, the prestigious Georgian NGO, Fair
Elections, reported on January 10 that its exit polling at 400 precincts appeared to indicate
that Saakashvili may have won enough votes to avoid a runoff, even if there were voting
irregularities.5 U.S. analyst Charles Fairbanks, however, argued on January 16, 2008, that
the balloting reported for Saakashvili was inflated, so that it was “unlikely” that he won
in the first round.6 Although no Russian election observers were invited, the Russian
Foreign Ministry asserted on January 6, 2008, that the election “could hardly be called
free and fair,” including because “the campaign was accompanied with the extensive use
of administrative resources, unconcealed pressure on opposition candidates and rigid
limits on their access to financial and media resources.”7
Implications for Georgia and Saakashvili
Many observers regarded the relative peacefulness of the election campaign
(compared to the November 2007 violence) as a positive sign that at least fitful
democratization might be preserved in Georgia. Among other possible signs of progress
toward democratization and stability, Saakashvili in his inaugural address on January 20,
Some analysts also suggest that opposition parties and politicians might have benefitted
from the campaign by becoming better known and might gain votes in upcoming
legislative elections, thereby enhancing political pluralism. These observers suggest that
opposition parties and politicians will soon shift from protesting the results of the
presidential race to campaigning for a prospective May 2008 legislative election. In the
economic realm, these observers suggest that Saakashvili’s re-election reassured
international investors that Georgia has a stable investment climate, although boosted
social spending could increase short-term inflation.8
The Secretary General of the Council of Europe (COE) on January 6 urged
opposition politicians to eschew “immature” rabble-rousing and to “show responsibility,
political maturity and respect for the democratic process” by working through
4 The NGO Transparency International’s Georgia office alleged that United National Movement
offices and activists had distributed government vouchers for utilities and medications to
pro-Saakashvili citizenry.
5 BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit, January 10, 2008.
6 Talk at the Hudson Institute, January 16, 2008.
7 ITAR-TASS, January 6, 2008.
8 ITAR-TASS, January 7, 2008; Ana Jelenkovic, “Georgia: Presidential Election,” Eurasia Group,
January 4, 2008.
constitutional procedures to address electoral irregularities.9 Thousands of people
reportedly turned out on January 13 and January 20 to peacefully protest against what they
considered a fraudulent election. Gachechiladze and other leaders of the National Council
asserted that Saakashvili did not win enough votes to avoid a run-off, where he would
have faced a single opponent (Gachechiladze).
Many observers argue that Saakashvili’s electoral victory with 53% of the vote
contrasts sharply with the 96% of the vote he won in 2004 and illustrates that public trust
in his governance has declined. One Georgian analyst has suggested, however, that
despite this decline in public trust, many citizens remembered the disorder of past months
and years and were fearful of voting for opposition candidates who promised radical
political and economic changes if elected. The risk of disorder could greatly increase if
public trust further declines as the result of a tainted prospective May 2008 legislative
el ect i on. 10
Saakashvili’s win appeared to be a further blow to Russia’s hopes of restoring its
influence in Georgia, according to many observers. These observers also raise concerns
that Saakashvili’s campaign pledge to soon unify Georgia (although he called for peaceful
measures) could contribute to further tensions with Russia. In his inaugural address,
however, Saakashvili attempted to reassure Russia that Georgia was intent on repairing
bilateral ties. One Tajik analyst has suggested that Saakashvili’s re-election provides a
positive example to reform-minded politicians in Russia and other Soviet successor states
and threatens non-reformist governments in these states.11
Implications for U.S. Interests
On November 8, 2007, the U.S. State Department welcomed President Saakashvili’s
call for early presidential elections and a plebiscite on the timing of legislative elections.
At the same time, it urged Saakashvili to relinquish emergency power and to “restore all
media broadcasts” to facilitate a free and fair election, and urged all political factions to
“maintain calm [and] respect the rule of law.” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Matthew Bryza visited Tbilisi on November 11-13 with a letter from Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice that listed these and other proposals “to restore [the] momentum of
democratic reform” in Georgia, highlighting U.S. interest in Georgia’s fate. He argued
that while in the past the United States had focused on Georgia as a conduit for oil and
gas pipelines to the West and on security assistance, “today what makes Georgia a top tier
issue for the U.S. government is democracy.” He held extensive talks with government
and opposition politicians to urge them to moderate their mutual accusations and to make
compromises necessary for democratic progress. He also stressed that “the United States
remains a firm supporter [of] Georgia’s NATO aspirations,” and called on unnamed
NATO allies to await further political developments in Georgia before deciding whether
9 Council of Europe. Press releases - Secretary General. Post-Election Period Is a Test of
Political Maturity for Georgian Politicians: Statement by Terry Davis, January 7, 2008.
10 CEDR, January 7, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950088; January 22, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950043;
Spiegel (Hamburg), January 7, 2008.
11 CEDR, January 7, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950069; “Georgia: Presidential Election.”
or not the country is eligible for a Membership Action Plan (MAP).12 Some observers
have suggested that NATO’s possible consideration of a MAP for Georgia may well be
delayed beyond the April 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania, for reasons that
include assessing Georgia’s performance in holding a prospective May 2008 legislative
election.
Just after the January 5 balloting, the State Department “congratulated” the people
of Georgia for an election that many international observers considered “was in essence
consistent with most OSCE and COE commitments and standards.” However, the State
Department also raised concerns about reported electoral violations and urged that they
be thoroughly investigated and remedied. U.S. ambassador to Georgia John Tefft
likewise appeared cautious when he stated on January 10 that the United States had not
yet reached an “official political assessment” of the election, so had not congratulated a
winner.13 After the CEC announced the final election results, President Bush on January
14 telephoned Saakashvili to congratulate him, and dispatched U.S. Commerce Secretary
Carlos Gutierrez to the inauguration. Some opposition supporters in Georgia criticized
the United States for recognizing Saakashvili’s win, perhaps reflecting some potential
increase in anti-Americanism, but at an opposition protest at the U.S. Embassy on January
Many in Congress long have supported democratization and other assistance to
Georgia, as reflected in hearings and legislation. The 110th Congress (P.L. 110-17) urged
NATO to extend a Membership Action Plan for Georgia and designated Georgia as
eligible to receive security assistance under the program established by the NATO
Participation Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-447). Indicating ongoing interest in Georgia’s reform
progress, on December 13, 2007, the Senate approved S. Res. 391, which urged the U.S.
President to publically back free and fair elections in Georgia. In introducing the
resolution, Senator Richard Lugar averred that he was “a strong friend of the Georgian
people,” and that the resolution indicated “our strong hopes that ... Georgia will return to
the democratic path and embrace a free and fair election process.” He also urged Georgia
to facilitate the work of international election monitors, particularly those from the
OSCE.14 Representative Alcee Hastings was appointed as Special Coordinator by the
OSCE Chairman-in-Office to lead a mission of nearly 500 short-term observers who
monitored the January 5 election. The day after the election, Representative Hastings
reportedly stated that he viewed the election as a “viable expression of free choice of the
Georgian people,” but he also cautioned that Georgia’s “future holds immense
challenges” because of the high degree of mistrust and polarization in Georgian society.15
Similarly, former Representative Jim Kolbe, who led a delegation from the International
Republican Institute, evaluated the election as broadly free and fair, but called for further
reforms.16
12 U.S. Fed News, November 12, 2007; U.S. Fed News, November 13, 2007.
13 U.S. Department of State. Press Statement. Georgia: Presidential Election, January 7, 2008;
Reuters, January 14, 2008.
14 Congressional Record, December 6, 2007, pp. S14856-7; December 13, 2007, p. S15571.
15 VOA News: Observers Say Georgia’s Election Was Fair, January 6, 2008.
16 Talk at Hudson Institute, January 16, 2008.