The "Red-Dead"Canal: Israeli-Arab Efforts to Restore the Dead Sea

The “Red-Dead” Canal: Israeli-Arab Efforts to
Restore the Dead Sea
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Regional cooperation in halting continued overuse of scarce water resources has
been a casualty of the long-running Arab-Israeli conflict. The Dead Sea has been a
victim of this neglect, and scientists estimate that it will decrease substantially in the
coming decades due to overexploitation of the Jordan River. One possible solution is to
construct a canal from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea to pump sea water into the salt lake
while generating hydroelectric power for use in desalination. The governments of Israel
and Jordan have been enthusiastic proponents of the “Peace Canal,” and are calling on
the international community, including the United States, to support its multi-billion
dollar construction. However, opponents of the canal claim that it may do more
environmental harm than good and suggest that the Dead Sea be naturally restored by
allowing the Jordan River to flow southward unimpeded. Water cooperation is an
essential element of the peace process and, with the renewal of Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations, joint projects, such as the Red Sea-Dead Sea (Red-Dead) Canal, have been
increasingly discussed. This report investigates the proposed Red-Dead Canal and
analyzes its political significance and the debate surrounding its possible construction.
It will be updated periodically.
Overview. In 2008, the World Bank is planning to launch an 18-month
comprehensive assessment of the so-called “Red-Dead” Canal, a joint Arab-Israeli project
designed to save the shrinking Dead Sea using water from the Red Sea.¹ The canal has
been in the works for decades and is controversial. The Israeli and Jordanian governments
are its staunch advocates, asserting that the only way to restore the Dead Sea’s water level
is to construct a 112-mile pipeline to transfer water northward from the Red Sea. Officials
claim that this water, while descending 1,870 feet on its journey to the Dead Sea, would
generate enough hydroelectricity to power desalination plants for producing fresh water.
This water could then be delivered to cities in Israel, Jordan and parts of the West Bank.

¹ The Red-Dead Canal project is officially referred to as the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water
Conveyance Concept. See, “Red Sea - Dead Sea Water Conveyance Feasibility Study and
Environmental and Social Assessment,” Information Note- July 2007, The World Bank, Middle
East and North Africa.

The canal’s Arab and Israeli supporters believe that the proposal is not only a creative
solution to an environmental challenge, but a potential model for Arab-Israeli
cooperation.
Opponents of the canal charge that
Israel and Jordan are exaggerating itsThe Red-Dead Canal

political symbolism in order to generate the
needed $5 billion dollars (or more) in
international financing for what is in
essence a desalination and hydroelectricity
project with potentially serious
environmental drawbacks. As an alternative,
environmental and peace activists have
called on regional governments and the
international community to push for a
comprehensive settlement to the Arab-
Israeli conflict that would include water
sharing agreements and the restoration of
the Jordan River and Dead Sea. Scientists
assert that the Red-Dead Canal could
potentially harm the Dead Sea further by
changing its unique chemistry through the
introduction of Red Sea water, and is too
expensive to justify the costs of
construction. Moreover, there is some
concern that without an Israeli-Palestinian
settlement that addresses the Dead Sea border and water rights, Israel and Jordan, which
concluded a bilateral peace treaty in 1994, will disproportionately benefit from the canal
at the expense of the Palestinians.
The United States government has, at times, played a key role in fostering
cooperation on Arab-Israeli water issues.² The Bush Administration has donated a small
sum ($1.5 million) to facilitate the World Bank’s feasibility study; however, no U.S.
Administration has officially endorsed the project. If the current study supports the canal’s
construction, Israel and Jordan will most likely seek a significant U.S. pledge and
appropriation from Congress to assist in financing the canal. Due to the slow progress in
reviewing the canal’s construction (some believe it may take as long as 20 years to build),
few U.S. policymakers have addressed the issue. In November 2007, Senator Richard
Lugar sponsored S.Res.387 (passed by the Senate November 16, 2007) which, among
other things, called for more international attention to the serious and potentially
irreversible degradation of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea.
² The 1955 “Johnston Plan” called for Arab-Israeli cooperation in sharing the Jordan River.
Though most Arab states rejected the U.S.-sponsored plan, Jordan and Israel adhered to its
suggested allocations for decades. In the 1990s, the United States helped establish the multilateral
Working Group on Water Resources, which led to the founding of the Middle East Desalination
Research Center in Muscat, Oman in December 1996.

The Shrinking of the Dead Sea. The Dead Sea, located at the lowest elevation
on earth, is slowly vanishing. Due to gradual water loss, the Sea has split into two
separate lakes and its coastline has receded significantly. For years, Israeli and Arab
governments have diverted for agricultural and industrial purposes up to 95% of the³
southward flow of the Jordan River, which naturally replenishes the Dead Sea. Israel
diverts an estimated 60% of the river, while Syria and Jordan divert the rest. The⁴
Palestinian Authority has demanded that it receive a fair share of the river’s flow. In the
last 55 years, the Dead Sea has lost 33% of its surface area. Scientists estimate that the
water level of the salt lake drops approximately three feet per year. Israeli scientists
estimate that even though the evaporation of the Dead Sea may slow in the coming
decades, it may lose another 33% of its surface area. Observers are concerned that its
disappearance will have severe ecological and economic repercussions and will deprive
future generations of a historical and religious landmark.
Figure 1. Declining Dead Sea Water Levels

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The “Red-Dead” Canal. After years of study and evaluation, the current plan, as
envisioned by the “beneficiary parties” (Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority), is to
construct a 112-mile, partially covered pipeline across the Wadi Araba (Arava), a desert
region between Israel and Jordan that stretches from the Gulf of Aqaba in the south to the
³ Like the Dead Sea, the Jordan River is under severe ecological strain. In addition to having its
waters diverted, the river absorbs large amounts of raw sewage flowing untreated from East
Jerusalem, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and cities under the control of the Palestinian
Authority. Political deadlock and ongoing violence have prevented Israelis and Palestinians from
finalizing water management agreements tentatively reached during the Oslo peace process.
⁴ In testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Dr. Ihab Barghothi, Advisor
to the Palestinian Water Authority, stated that “As a result of water diversion of the upper Jordan
River tributaries by the Israelis, there is no fresh water down stream of Lake Tiberias, and the
negligible quantity that reaches the Palestinian Riparian in the West Bank is of a deteriorated
quality.” Testimony of Ihab Barghothi, Ph.D. Advisor Palestinian Water Authority, Committee
on House International Relations, “Water Scarcity in the Middle East,” May 5, 2004.

Dead Sea in the north. The canal would likely straddle the Israeli-Jordanian border, but
remain almost entirely on Jordanian territory. Because of the Wadi Araba’s hilly terrain,
water traveling through the pipeline would initially have to be pumped between 500 and
550 feet upward before dropping 1,900 feet via natural elevation decline on its way to the
Dead Sea. Theoretically, enough Red Sea water flowing into the Dead Sea could restore
most of its water level over time. Moreover, hydroelectricity generated from the water
coursing down the gradient would power a large desalination plant. Potable freshwater
could then be delivered to urban areas, such as Jordan’s capital Amman, to relieve
existing shortages. In addition, the canal’s supporters argue that construction could spark
more joint Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian tourism and development projects in the Wadi
Araba region.
Historical Background. For over a century, Israelis and Zionist visionaries have
called for a national undertaking to link the Dead Sea to either the Mediterranean (Med-
Dead) or Red Sea (Red-Dead) via a canal. It was not until the peace process of the early

1990s that the Red-Dead canal evolved from a purely national Israeli project to a⁵

multilateral one associated with Arab-Israeli cooperation. During the energy crisis of the
early 1970s, the Israeli government began to pursue the construction of a Med-Dead canal
seriously in order to generate hydroelectricity and end the country’s dependence on oil.
It commissioned several feasibility studies and, in one instance, actually broke ground for
the canal’s construction. Financial constraints eventually halted the project in 1985 (cost
estimates then ranged between $2 billion and $5 billion). In addition, Jordan objected to
a Med-Dead canal, claiming that, if built, it would illegally traverse the previously Israeli-
occupied Gaza Strip and harm Jordan’s potash mining industry in the Dead Sea.⁶
The optimism that accompanied the Arab-Israeli peace process of the early 1990s
helped bring about a new canal proposal, one that linked the interests of Israel and Jordan.
Its champion was, and still is, former prime minister and current Israeli President Shimon
Peres. In his book, The New Middle East, Peres wrote that:
Politically, this earthshaking enterprise can help maintain peace and establish mutual
long term interests. This benefits not only the nations of the Middle East but those
outside the region.... I believe it will be built. The water will flow along the Arava, the
power stations will give light, and the wasteland will bloom with life. The region will
experience peace, serenity, and progress. People from other countries will use the sea
port and airport, visit the spas and vacation centers, and enjoy the products of our⁷
flourishing desert.
Though Peres has been praised for his positive vision, other observers perceive the Red-
Dead Canal as having tangible benefits for Israel and Jordan that transcend more abstract
notions of regional peace. Jordan is one of the ten most water-deprived countries in the

⁵ In 1855, English Admiral William Allen first proposed constructing a canal to link the
Mediterranean and Red Seas with the Dead Sea as an alternative to the then-planned Suez Canal.
Theodore Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, wrote in 1902 about a fictitious Med-Dead
canal in his book Altneuland (The Old New Land).
⁶ “Israel's Decision to Build a Canal Linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea,”Report of
the United Nations Secretary General, A/39/142, August 1, 1984.
⁷ Shimon Peres, The New Middle East, Element Book Ltd., 1993, p. 144.

world, and the estimated 850 million cubic meters of desalinated freshwater water that
could be generated by the canal would help alleviate Jordan’s chronic water shortages.
The Canal also could help restore the Dead Sea’s water levels, a task that neither Israel
nor Jordan could undertake unilaterally for both political and financial reasons. Many
experts assert that by marketing it as an essential component of the peace process, Israel
and Jordan are able to solicit international financing for the multi-billion dollar project.
According to Roni Milo, former Israeli minister for regional cooperation, “Jordan is the
key to obtaining support from the World Bank. If the pipeline were situated on the Israeli
side we would not be able to get this financing.”⁸
Upon concluding a peace treaty in 1994, Jordan and Israel pledged to rehabilitate the
Jordan Valley region and, since then, plans to construct the Red-Dead Canal steadily
moved forward. In 2002, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in
Johannesburg, South Africa, a Jordanian official proclaimed that the announcement of the
canal proposal sent “a message that we do live in one area with a common destiny. The
environment, ecology, and nature know no boundaries and no political conflicts.”
However, other Arab countries and the Palestinians expressed their opposition to the
announcement made at the height of the second Palestinian intifadah (uprising). A
Palestinian representative at the conference claimed that “the project involves drawing a
new border between Israel and Jordan at the expense of the Palestinian people.”⁹ Israeli-
Palestinian violence continued to hamper efforts to advance the canal for the next three
years. After the death of Palestinian President Yasir Arafat in November 2004, the process
regained momentum. At the May 2005 World Economic Forum, held on the Jordanian
side of the Dead Sea, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority (PA), and the World Bank
announced that the beneficiary parties had agreed to launch a two-year $15 million
feasibility study for the Red-Dead Canal. After the 2006 Hamas victory in PA elections,
the process stalled again, as Israel insisted that Palestinian moderates rather than Hamas
members sit on the tripartite committee overseeing the project. As of early 2008, the
World Bank is steadily moving the feasibility study process forward. It established a
multi-donor trust fund for the study. The United States contributed $1.5 million to the
fund; other donors include France, Spain, Greece, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Spain,
Britain and Germany.
Environmental Concerns. Israeli and Arab environmentalists argue that rather
than undertake a complex and expensive engineering project, the region’s governments
should stop diverting the Jordan River and allow the Dead Sea to replenish naturally.¹⁰
However, there is no consensus, even amongst the canal’s opponents, as to how countries
could use less water amidst rising demand or find new sources of freshwater. Moreover,
some scientists believe that mixing water from the two seas would lead to algae blooms,
causing the Dead Sea to both change color from turquoise to brown and lose its famous¹¹
buoyancy. If this were to occur, it could cripple the tourist industry on both banks of the
Sea. Other experts suggest that saltwater leaking out of the canal could seep into the

⁸ John Williamson, “Dead Sea Under Threat,” Middle East; Aug/Sep2003 Issue 337, p60.
⁹ “Dead Sea Rescue Plan Unveiled,” BBC News, September 2, 2002.
¹⁰ In practical terms, this would require riparian states to irrigate less and may result in a shift to
crops that require less water.
¹¹ “Better Red than Dead?” The Economist, March 17, 2007.

ground and contaminate aquifers, as the canal would lie along a major earthquake
fault-line. Some engineers question the cost-benefit analysis justifying the canal given the
large amounts of energy that would be needed to pump water uphill before it reaches the
Dead Sea and to send it to urban areas for consumption after desalination. Some scientists
suggest that there would be insufficient surplus hydroelectricity to power what would be
the world’s largest water pumping station and desalination plants.
A Model for Regional Cooperation? Israeli and Jordanian officials argue that
the Red-Dead Canal would spark Israeli-Arab cooperation in a number of fields.
According to Israeli National Infrastructure Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, “The Peace
Channel project will lead to regional and economic cooperation with our Jordanian
colleagues in the areas of energy, water, and agriculture. Regional development is an¹²
important step in promoting the political process.” The canal’s Israeli project manager,
Erez Ron has argued that the canal may further integrate Israel and Jordan economically,
stating, “We are not maximizing the potential that can be obtained from [the 1994 Israel-
Jordan peace treaty]. Look how long a border we have with them, and how little is
happening. But the moment you create shared economic interests, they will have to
continue running with it.... It's a completely political project.”¹³
Some critics believe that the project’s “peace dividend” has been oversold. Gideon
Bromberg, head of Friends of the Earth Middle East, stated that there was tremendous
pressure on the World Bank to support the Red-Dead Canal because “it's the only joint¹⁴
project between Jordan and Israel to come out of the Palestinian intifada.” Uri
Wirtzberger, who headed a company to develop the canal two decades ago, said “The
project may make Shimon Peres a close friend of King Abdallah II, but that’s its only
virtue.” Finally, other peace activists claim that the canal avoids the larger issues of
managing transboundary water sources. According to one observer, “The World Bank and
its sponsors have no intention of actually forcing regional actors to address their own
responsibility in the water shortage, as this would present very awkward questions for the
West’s regional allies. Why, for example, is the average Israeli able to consume four times¹⁵
as much water, per capita, as the average Palestinian?” Despite the vocal opposition to
the Red-Dead Canal, many analysts believe that, barring a final settlement to the Arab-
Israeli conflict, action is urgently needed to restore the Dead Sea and address other water
issues, particularly as climate change may threaten further environmental degradation and
water supply reliability. Some experts note that even if the canal is never built, it has
already brought Israel and Jordan closer on issues related to water conservation and
environmental restoration. Whether governments go even further in addressing regional
water shortages and the deterioration of the Dead Sea depends on political will, external
support, and the ability to withstand political pressures emanating from the expected
continuation of Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

¹² “Realizing Herzl's Pipe Dream,” Ha’aretz, December 13, 2006.
¹³ “Israel: Opposition to Government Plan To Build Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal Discussed,”
Ma'ariv (Tel Aviv), April 13, 2007, Open Source Center Document ID#GMP20070413743007.
¹⁴ Joshua Hammer, “The Dying of the Dead Sea,” Smithsonian; October 2005, Vol. 36 Issue 7,
pp. 58-70.
¹⁵ Isabelle Humphries, “World Bank's Red Sea-Dead Sea Feasibility Study Ignores the Source
of the Problem,”Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, March 2007, Vol. 26, Issue 2.