Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV):
Background and Issues for Congress
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is currently being developed by the Army
and the Marine Corps as a successor to the 11 different versions of the High Mobility,
Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) that have been in service since 1985. There are
concerns about the affordability of JLTVs and its redundancy with other tactical wheeled
vehicles. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Backgr ound1
The JLTV is an Army-led multi-service initiative to develop a family of future light
tactical vehicles to replace many of the 160,000 HMMWVs used by the armed service
today. HMMWVs, which first entered service in 1985, were developed during the Cold
War when improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other anti-vehicle explosive devices
were not a major factor in military planning. The HMMWV’s demonstrated vulnerability
to IEDs and the difficulties and costs experienced in “up-armoring” HMMWVs already
in the inventory have led to renewed emphasis on vehicle survivability. With more than
and with the needs of the services to repair equipment and grow their forces, the JLTV,
with its scalable armor protection, is intended to replace a large portion of the HMMWV
fleet. DOD officials have emphasized that JLTVs are not intended to replace HMMWVs
“one for one.”2 The Pentagon envisions HMMWVs remaining in service for many years
to come; about 3,000 to 5,000 HMMWVs continue to be produced on an annual basis.
1 Alan L. Gropman, “Combat Vehicle Sector Could be Headed for Turbulent Times,” National
Defense, April 25, 2008, and James P. Miller, “Race is On to Replace Humvee,” Chicago
Tribune, June 21, 2008.
2 Kris Osborn, “DOD’s JLTV Becoming an International Effort,” Defense News, August 4, 2008.
JLTV Program3
What Is the JLTV? The JLTV program is a joint Army/Marine Corps effort to
develop and produce three categories of vehicles and associated trailers. Category A
JLTVs are intended for general purpose mobility and would carry a 3,500 lb. payload.
Category Bs are intended to serve as infantry carriers, command and control and
reconnaissance vehicles, and weapons carriers and would accommodate a 4,000 to 4,500
lb. payload. Category Cs are intended to serve as shelter carriers, prime movers, and
ambulances and would carry a 5,100 lb. payload. JLTVs are to be designed with scalable
armor, enhanced suspension, and drive train capability to accommodate future load
carrying capacity. As planned, JLTVs would be more mechanically reliable, maintainable
(with on-board diagnostics), all-terrain mobile, and equipped to link into current and
future tactical data nets. Strategic and operational transportability by ship and aircraft are
also key JLTV design requirements.
Program Structure.4 The JLTV is an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D
program.5 The Army bears the overall responsibility for developing the JLTV through its
Joint Program Office within the Army’s Tank, Automotive, and Armament Command
(TACOM) in Warren, Michigan. Marine participation is centered on a program office
under the supervision of the Program Executive Officer Land Systems (PEO LS) Marine
Corps at Quantico, Virginia.
Program History. In November 2006, the Joint Chief of Staff’s Joint
Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) approved the JLTV program. On December 22,
2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD
(AT&L) signed an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) directing the JLTV
Program to move from the Concept Refinement Phase into the Technology Development
Phase (TDP) of the DOD System Acquisition Process. The Army and Marines had
intended to issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) for Technology Development Phase as
early as October 2007. Concerned with funding adequacy, technical maturity, and shifting
requirements, the Pentagon’s acquisition executive, John Young, disapproved the
issuance of the RFP and directed the Army and Marines to “go back to the drawing board6
and develop a robust technology development phase.” On February 5, 2008, an RFP for
3 Information in this section is taken from the Army Product Manager, Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle website, [http://peocscss.tacom.army.mil/pmJLTV.html], last visited August 14, 2008,
and Marine Corps PEO Land Systems Joint Light Tactical Vehicle website,
[http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/peolandssystems/jltv.aspx], last visited August 14, 2008.
4 CRS Report RL34026, Defense Acquisitions: Overview, Issues, and Options for Congress, by
Moshe Schwartz, provides an extensive discussion of the defense acquisition process.
5 The 12th Edition of the Defense Acquisition University Glossary, July 2005, defines an ACAT
1D program as “a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) which is estimated by the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) (USD (AT&L)) to require the
eventual expenditure for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) of more than
$365 million (FY2000 constant dollars) or the procurement of more than $2.19 billion (FY2000
constant dollars).”
6 Jason Sherman, “Pentagon Halts JLTV Competition, Directs Revised Strategy,”
InsideDefense.com, September 24, 2007.
Technology Development Phase was issued to industry.7 The RFP stated that the
government desired to award three contracts for the JLTV Technology Development
Phase. The RFP stipulated that proposals would be due April 7, 2008, and the TDP
would last 27 months. Contractors would build four test sub-configurations during the
first 15 months, followed by 12 months of testing. The Army and Marines planned on
issuing technology development contracts in June 2008, but in order to have sufficient
funding for more than two technology development contracts, DOD requested to
reprogram $60 million in FY2008 funds.8 Because DOD’s FY2008 Omnibus
Reprogramming Request was not approved by all four defense committees before the
August 2008 recess, JLTV technology development contracts may be delayed, contingent
upon congressional approval of DOD’s reprogramming request. On August 19, 2008, the
Army and Marines announced that they anticipated awarding JLTV technology
development contracts in October 2008.9 If the reprogramming is approved by Congress
after the recess, according to DOD, a design selection for the System Development and
Demonstration (SDD) phase could be made in the middle of FY2011, with a contract for
the final production design being issued in FY2013.
Potential JLTV Developers.10 A number of vendors and companies have teamed
together, and some claim that they have already built JLTV prototypes that meet program
requirements. These companies currently include AM General (General Tactical
Vehicles), BAE-Navistar, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin-BAE, Oshkosh-Northrop
Grumman, and Textron-Boeing-SAIC. A 2007 report on the Land Combat Systems
Industry by the National Defense University Industrial College of the Armed Forces
suggests that major defense contractors are likely interested in JLTV because vehicle
requirements for high survivability and other potential technologically advanced
requirements such as an Active Protection System and networking capabilities make the11
program economically attractive.
Program Cost and Funding.12 DOD has not publically assigned a definitive cost
to the JLTV program, suggesting that it is too early in the development process to
determine an accurate cost estimate. Some defense and trade analysts suggest that the
JLTV program will cost well over $10 billion and possibly as much as $30 to $70 billion,
7 JLTV Request for Proposal, W56HZV-08-R-0210, February 5, 2008, and Marjorie Censer,
“JLTV Solicitation Calls for Three Contractors: Officials Say More are Possible,”
InsideDefense.com, February 5, 2008.
8 Jason Sherman, “Army Seeking Funds to Ensure Three JLTV Contracts; Delay Possible,”
InsideDefense.com, July 17, 2008.
9 Marjorie Censer, “Army: JLTV Contracts Now Expected in October,” InsideDefense.com,
August 19, 2008.
10 Kris Osborn, “DOD’s JLTV Becoming International Effort,” Defense News, August 4, 2008.
11 Spring 2007 Industry Study, Final Report, Land Combat Systems Industry, National Defense
University Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C., p. 14.
12 Jason Sherman and Daniel G. Dupont, “JLTV Price Tag Drives New Three Step Tactical
Vehicle Plan for the Army,” InsideDefense.com, August 8, 2008.
depending on the final cost of the vehicles chosen and the number of vehicles procured.13
The Army estimates that each JLTV will cost $418,000, almost 70% higher than the target
cost of $250,000 per vehicle that would have enabled the Army to replace all of its
HMMWV’s with JLTVs. The Army’s current JLTV requirement is 140,709 vehicles, and
at the estimated $418,000 per vehicle cost, the Army may be required to reduce total
JLTV acquisition quantities, scale back JLTV capabilities, or find additional funds for the
program. One estimate by the Center for Army Analysis suggests that it would require
about $6.7 billion per year to outfit all Army brigades over 15 years with JLTVs.
The FY2008 Budget Request for JLTV was $82.3 million in Research, Development,
Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding, but Congress decreased funding to $38.5 million
because of contract award delays.14 The FY2009 Budget Request for JLTV is $ 66.1
million (RDT&E), and the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have
recommended fully funding the President’s Budget Request.15
Current JLTV Topics
JLTVs Versus MRAPs.16 In late 2007, the Department of Defense (DOD)
launched a major procurement initiative to replace most uparmored High Mobility, Multi-
Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) in Iraq with Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP)
vehicles by FY2009. MRAPs have been described as providing significantly more
protection against IEDs than uparmored HMMWVs. DOD approved the acquisition of
almost 11,300 MRAP vehicles. When the JLTV program first started in late 2006, the
15,858 MRAP requirement did not exist. The unforecasted procurement of significant
numbers of the costly MRAPs has had an impact on the JLTV program. The Army has
stated that MRAPs “fill a near-term, urgent joint service requirement for enhanced crew
protection” for both the Army and Marines and that JLTVs are the long term solution for
the services.18 While the services do not view the JLTV and MRAP as an “either/or”
proposition, some might question the affordability and necessity of maintaining both
programs given their overlapping missions and requirements.
Army-Marine Combat Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy. In late
November 2007, “concerned that the Pentagon’s multi-billion dollar procurement plans
13 Andrea Shalal-Esa, “Companies Jockey for Huge U.S. Military Truck Program,” Reuters,
November 12, 2007.
14 Report 110-434, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 3222, Department of Defense
Appropriations Act for FY2008, November 6, 2007, p. 272.
15 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009, H.Rept. 110-652, May 16,
16 For additional information on MRAPs, see CRS Report RS22707, Mine-Resistant, Ambush
Protected (MRAP) Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
17 Marjorie Censer, “DOD Reports More Than 11,000 MRAP Vehicles Already in Theater,”
InsideDefense.com, August 11, 2008.
18 Statement of Lieutenant General Stephen M. Speakes before the House Air and Land Forces
Subcommittee on the Army Force Protection Program, January 18, 2007, pp. 1-2.
for a raft of new tactical wheeled vehicles may be laden with excessive redundancy,” the
White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed the Army and Marine
Corps to develop and present a strategy by March 31, 2008, justifying wheeled vehicle
procurement.19 Some of the issues to be addressed by the Army and Marines in this
strategy were (1) what missions are envisioned for MRAPs, HMMWVs, and JLTVs? (2)
to what extent do their capabilities overlap? (3) how do the Army and Marines plan to
eliminate redundancies between their HMMWV, MRAP, and JLTV fleets? and (4) to
what extent are the acquisition of these three wheeled vehicles meeting the identical
requirement? OMB also asked the services to identify how many of each type of vehicle
the Army and Marine Corps plan to procure in the near and long term and how JLTVs
will be incorporated into vehicle fleets consisting of thousands of new MRAPs and
HMMWVs. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), also in November 2007,
called for a similar assessment from the Army and Marines to be provided by July 1,
The Army and Marines finalized their collaborative tactical wheeled vehicle strategy
in early August 2008.21 A briefing on the new strategy does not appear to propose any
major changes to current wheeled vehicle programs or consolidate developmental efforts
for vehicles with redundant capabilities. Both the Army and Marines emphasize a mixed-
fleet approach in the near term while transitioning to a fleet with scalable protection, with
the JLTV being the vehicle that embodies all desired light wheeled tactical vehicle
capabilities. Both services propose to eventually relegate the majority of their MRAPs
to war reserves and pre-position locations. Under this proposed strategy, the Army plans
to allocate about $1 billion annually to procure new light tactical vehicles, but funding
would need to be increased substantially in order to afford JLTVs in significant numbers.
International Procurement of JLTVs? U.S. defense officials have expressed
an interest in international involvement in the JLTV program, and to date, Australia,
Britain, and a number of unnamed non-NATO countries are discussing potential program22
participation with DOD. The Pentagon’s planned initial purchase of 60,000 JLTVs for
the services could be increased if there is international participation in the program.
There are concerns, however, that because of some of the advanced technologies that may
be incorporated into the JLTV, it may prove to be difficult to obtain export licenses from23
the Department of State. Some believe that Congress, too, could play a role by expressly
barring the sale of advance technology JLTVs to foreign governments, as it did in the
19 Jason Sherman, “White House: Tactical Vehicle Plans May Be Excessive, Redundant,”
InsideDefense.com, December 6, 2007.
20 Jason Sherman, “OSD Extends Due Date for Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy,”
InsideDefense.com, March 27, 2008.
21 Jason Sherman, “Army, Marine Corps Complete New Combat Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Plan,”
InsideDefense.com, August 11, 2008, and briefing slides, “Army and Marine Corps Tactical
Wheeled Vehicle Strategy and Response to the Office of Management and Budget,” Version
22 Kris Osborn, “DOD’s JLTV Becoming International Effort,” Defense News, August 4, 2008.
23 Ibid.
recent case of the F-22 Raptor aircraft.24 Others suggest that export problems are not
likely to arise in a light vehicle such as the JLTV, noting that HMMWVs have been sold
to numerous Asian and Middle Eastern countries.25 If JLTV export is permitted and
countries order significant numbers of JLTVs, the per-vehicle cost could possibly
decrease, thereby addressing some of the JLTV affordability concerns raised by U.S.
officials.
Potential Issues for Congress
JLTV Affordability. In a recent testimony on DOD weapons programs, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) asserted that total acquisition costs for the
FY2007 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs still in the System Development
and Demonstration (SDD) phase increased 26% and development costs increased by 40%26
from first estimates. As previously noted, while still in the Technology Development
(TD) phase, the Army now estimates that each JLTV will cost $418,000 — almost 70%
higher than the target cost of $250,000 per vehicle. In comparison with GAO’s data,
JLTV costs appear to be significantly higher than FY2007 program averages and could
possibly increase even more as JLTV progresses through the SDD phase. JLTV’s early
above-average cost growth may merit greater congressional oversight.
JLTV and the Army/Marine Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy. Although
the Army and Marines have not widely shared their combat tactical wheeled vehicle
strategy, there are indications that both services intend to continue with their current
acquisition efforts without fully taking into account redundant capabilities. These efforts
include the continued acquisition of HMMWVs and perhaps even an improved HMMWV27
(the ECV2) if JLTVs prove to be too expensive. All services are expected to complete
the acquisition of almost 16,000 MRAPs by the end of FY2009, and although these
vehicles have helped to reduce IED casualties, decreasing IED attacks in Iraq and
anticipated incremental large-scale troop withdrawals may drastically reduce the need for
MRAPs, resulting in an unused excess of these vehicles. Some analysts say that unless
the Pentagon can convincingly demonstrate that JLTVs are unique vehicles with
capabilities not found in HMMWVs, ECV2s, and MRAPs, it will likely be difficult to
justify a service-wide “pure fleet” of well over 100,000 JLTVs at the current estimated
cost. Army and Marine plans to “mothball” a large portion of the $23 billion-plus MRAP
fleet might also prove to be contentious unless JLTVs can provide comparable or superior
troop protection.
24 In CRS Report RS22684, Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan, by Christopher Bolkcom and
Emma Chanlett Avery, CRS notes that export of the F-22 has been denied by Congress in
FY1998, FY2001, and FY2005. This provision, known has the “Obey Amendment,” was debatedth
in the 109 Congress, and a move to repeal this amendment in the FY2007 Defense
Appropriations bill was blocked by the Senate.
25 Kris Osborn, “DOD’s JLTV Becoming International Effort,” Defense News, August 4, 2008.
26 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony, Defense Acquisitions:
Results of Annual Assessment of DOD Weapon Programs, GAO-08-674T, April 29, 2008, p. 2.
27 Jason Sherman and Daniel G. Dupont, “JLTV Price Tag Drives New Three Step Tactical
Vehicle Plan for the Army,” InsideDefense.com, August 8, 2008.