The Marines' Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): Background and Issues for Congress

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is an armored amphibious vehicle program that
originated two decades ago to replace the 1970s-era Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV). The
EFV has experienced a variety of developmental difficulties, resulting in significant program
delays and cost growth. While the Marine Corps and Department of Defense remain optimistic
about the future of the EFV program, there continue to be major concerns about the EFV’s
reliability and escalating costs. This report will be updated as conditions warrant.

Backgr ound ............................................................................................................................... 1
The EFV Program.....................................................................................................................1
What Is the EFV?................................................................................................................1
Program Structure...............................................................................................................1
Program History .................................................................................................................2
Program Cost and Funding ................................................................................................4
Potential Issues for Congress....................................................................................................5
Amphibious Fleet and EFV Vulnerabilities........................................................................5
What if the EFV Fails Its Second Systems Development and Demonstration
(SDD) Phase Attempt?.....................................................................................................6
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................6

The Marine Corps is responsible for the conduct of amphibious operations in support of the full
spectrum of U.S. national security objectives. If the Marines need armored fighting vehicles in
the early stages of an amphibious landing, these vehicles must either be transported by landing
craft with limited protection against enemy fire, or the armored vehicle must come ashore under ¹
its own power. Like current AAVs, the EFV is designed to roll off a Navy amphibious assault
ship, move under its own power to the beach, and cross the beach and operate inland. The EFV is
to be designed to be able to be launched 25 miles off shore (the AAV can be launched only 2
miles from shore) permitting the fleet to operate “over the horizon,” where it theoretically would
be less vulnerable to enemy fire. Some suggest that the 25-mile over the horizon operating
capability may no longer provide the protection to the fleet that it once did, noting that the
Hezbollah C-802 cruise missile, which successfully struck an Israeli ship in 2006, has a
maximum range of 75 miles. Concerns also have been raised that, when ashore, the flat-bottomed
EFV may be excessively vulnerable to improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

The EFV is an armored, fully tracked infantry combat vehicle operated by a three-person crew
that can carry 17 combat-equipped Marines. It is to be a self-deploying, high-speed amphibious
vehicle that will be able transport Marines from ships to objectives inland and will have the
speed, maneuvering capabilities, fire power, and protection to operate with main battle tanks on
land. It is intended to have a 20-knot speed in the water and a 345-mile range ashore with a 45-
kilometer-per-hour speed on hard-surfaced roads. The EFV is to be designed to have modular
armor and expanded mine blast protection and mount a 30mm high-velocity cannon in a
stabilized turret. The EFV is also supposed to be able to communicate in joint networks and
operate as part of a joint land force. There are to be two EFV variants. The EVF-P1 will carry a
Marine rifle squad and its equipment and provide direct fire support during combat operations.
The EFV-C1 variant provides command and control capabilities for commanders and their staffs.
The EFV is described as the Marines’ number one priority ground weapon system acquisition
program and is the only Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program managed by the Marine ³
Corps. The Marine Corps EFV Program Office is collocated with the EFV’s prime contractor—

¹^Uⁿ^le^s^s^othe^r^w^is^e^note^d^{, inf}^o^r^m^a^tion^{in t}^h^is^s^e^c^tio^{n is}^ta^k^e^{n f}^r^om^Sy^dney^J^.^Fr^e^e^dbe^r^g^{, “}^F^utur^e^C^o^r^p^s^,^”^Natio^nal
^J^ourⁿ^a^l^{, Ma}^y^10,²⁰⁰⁸^.
²^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion in t}^h^is^s^e^c^tio^{n is}^f^r^o^m^the²⁰⁰^{8 U}ⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^Ma^rⁱ^ne^C^o^r^p^s^C^onc^e^p^ts^&^P^r^og^r^a^m^s^Ha^ndbo^ok^{, p}^p^.¹¹^2-
¹¹³^{; G}^e^ne^r^a^{l Dy}^namⁱ^c^s^L^a^{nd Sy}^ste^m^s^br^ie^fⁱ^ng^{: EFV}^P^r^og^r^a^m^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{2008; a}^nd^Ma^rⁱ^ne^C^o^r^p^s^T^a^c^tic^a^l^Sy^s^t^em^s
^S^u^pp^o^r^t^A^c^tⁱ^vⁱ^t^y^E^F^V^F^act^S^h^eet^.
³^M^a^riⁿ^e^Co^r^p^{s T}^actⁱ^cal^S^y^st^e^m^{s S}^u^p^p^o^r^t^A^c^tⁱ^vⁱ^t^y^E^F^V^F^act^S^h^eet^.^T^h^{e 1}²^th^Editi^on^of^the^D^e^fe^ns^e^A^c^quis^iti^on
^Un^{iversity Glo}^ssa^ry^{, July}²⁰⁰^5,^d^e^fⁱ^ne^{s a}ⁿ^A^C^AT^{1D prog}^ra^m^a^s^a^Ma^{jor De}^f^e^nse^Ac^quisitioⁿ^P^r^og^ra^m^(MDA^P⁾^,
^w^h^ic^{h is}^e^s^tim^a^t^e^d^by^the^U^nde^r^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^D^e^f^e^ns^e⁽^A^c^quis^ition^,^T^e^c^hnolog^y^,^a^{nd L}^o^gⁱ^s^tic^s⁾^(U^SD^[^A^T^&^L^]^{) to}
^re^quire^t^h^e^e^v^eⁿ^tua^l^e^x^pe^ndit^u^re^f^o^{r Re}^se^a^r^c^h^{, De}^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t, T}^e^st,^a^{nd Ev}^a^l^ua^ti^{on (RDT}^&^E^{) of}^m^o^r^e^thaⁿ^$3^{65 m}^illioⁿ
^(FY20^{00 c}^onsta^nt^d^o^lla^{rs) or}^the^proc^ure^m^eⁿ^{t of}^m^o^re^thaⁿ^$2.¹⁹^billi^{on (}^F^Y2⁰⁰^{0 c}^onsta^nt^dolla^rs).

General Dynamics—in Woodbridge, Virginia, and the Marines claim that collocation—the first of
its kind for a major weapon system—has greatly reduced government contractor design costs and
streamlined the program decision-making process.

In 1988, Acquisition and Program Decision Memorandums were signed by defense officials to ⁵
initiate the Concept Exploration/Definition Phase (CE/D) of what was then known as the
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) program. In 1995, the program entered into the ⁶
Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase, where it was considered by many to be a
“model defense acquisition program,” winning two DOD awards for successful cost and
technology management. In June 1996, a contract was awarded to General Dynamics Land
Systems to begin full-scale engineering development of their design. Based on the
aforementioned early success of the program, the Marine Corps awarded a cost-plus contract to
General Dynamics in July 2001 for the Systems Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase of
the program. General Dynamics and the Marines envisioned that the SDD phase would be ⁷
completed by October 2003, a schedule that some say “proved too ambitious.” In 2003, the
Marines renamed the program the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) alleges that:
^T^h^{e prog}^ram^di^{d n}^o^t^al^l^o^w^e^nou^gh^tⁱ^m^e^t^o^de^m^ons^t^r^at^e^m^a^t^u^ri^t^y^o^f^t^h^{e E}^F^V^desⁱ^gⁿ^du^ri^ng
^S^D^D^.^T^h^{e ori}^gⁱⁿ^al^S^D^D^s^c^h^e^du^l^e^of^about^t^h^ree^y^ear^s^prov^{ed t}^{oo sh}^ort^t^o^con^d^u^c^t^al^l
ⁿ^eces^s^a^r^y^plannⁱ^ng^an^{d to in}^co^{rporate th}^{e res}^u^lts^o^f^tes^t^sⁱⁿ^{to des}ⁱ^gn^ch^aⁿ^g^e^s^.^Speci^fⁱ^call^y^,
^th^{e o}^r^igⁱⁿ^{al sch}^e^d^u^{le d}ⁱ^dⁿ^o^{t allo}^w^ad^eq^u^a^{te ti}^m^e^f^o^r^t^e^s^tⁱⁿ^g^,^e^v^a^l^u^a^tⁱⁿ^g^th^e^r^e^s^u^l^t^s^,^fⁱ^xⁱⁿ^g^th^e⁸
^probl^em^s^,^an^{d ret}^e^s^tⁱⁿ^g^t^o^m^a^k^e^cert^aⁱⁿ^t^h^at^probl^e^m^s^{are f}ⁱ^x^e^{d bef}^o^re^m^o^vⁱⁿ^g^f^o^r^w^ard.

⁴^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^House^of^Re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^{, Com}^m^itte^e^{on Ov}^e^r^sig^h^{t a}^{nd G}^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt Re}^f^o^r^m^{, Ma}^jorit^y^Sta^f^f^,^“^T^he
^Ex^pe^ditio^na^ry^Fig^h^ting^V^e^hⁱ^c^l^e^:^Ov^e^r^Budg^e^t^{, Be}^hind^Sc^he^d^u^le^{, a}^{nd U}ⁿ^re^lia^ble^,^”^A^p^{ril 2}⁹^,²⁰^08;^“^M^ilita^ry^V^e^hic^l^e
^F^o^recast^:^E^x^p^e^dⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^ry^Fⁱ^gh^tⁱⁿ^g^V^e^hⁱ^cl^e,^{” Z}^F^o^recast^In^t^e^rn^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^,^Juⁿ^e²⁰⁰⁷^,^pp^.⁴^-^5;^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es G}^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t
^A^c^c^ounta^b^il^ity^O^f^fⁱ^c^e⁽^G^A^O^{) Report}^{to C}^ong^re^s^sⁱ^ona^{l C}^o^m^m^itte^es^{, “}^D^e^f^eⁿ^s^e^A^c^quis^itio^ns^{; T}^h^e^Ex^pe^diti^ona^ry
^Fig^h^tin^g^V^e^hⁱ^{cle E}ⁿ^co^uⁿ^tered^Dif^fⁱ^cu^{lties in}^Desigⁿ^Dem^oⁿ^s^tratioⁿ^an^d^{Faces Fu}^tu^{re Risk}^{s,” GA}^O-0⁶^-³⁴⁹^,^M^a^y²⁰⁰⁶^,
^{pp. 6-}^7.
⁵^T^h^e^C^onc^e^p^{t Ex}^p^l^or^a^tⁱ^on/D^e^fⁱ^nitⁱ^{on (}^C^E/D⁾^Pha^s^e^of^the^D^e^f^e^ns^e^Sy^s^t^em^s^A^c^quis^ition^Pr^oc^e^s^s⁽ⁿ^o^w^ca^lle^{d the}
^Conc^e^p^{t Re}^fⁱ^ne^m^e^{nt [}^C^R^]^Pha^s^e⁾^{is g}^o^v^e^rne^d^by^De^pa^rt^m^e^{nt of}^De^f^e^nse^{(DOD) Di}^re^c^tiv^e^5000.^{1, “}^T^he^De^f^e^nse
^A^c^quisition^Sy^ste^m^.^”^A^c^tiv^itie^{s during}^t^h^e^{CE/D p}^h^a^s^e^,^w^h^ic^{h n}^o^r^m^a^l^l^y^la^{sts one}^{to tw}^{o y}^e^a^r^{s, inc}^l^ude^e^x^ploring
^m^a^te^ria^l^a^lte^rna^tiv^e^s^{to sa}^tisfy^mⁱ^ssion^ne^e^d^{s; ide}ⁿ^tif^ic^a^tion^of^hig^h^-^rⁱ^s^k^a^r^e^a^s^{; ide}ⁿ^tif^yⁱ^ng^m^o^s^t^pr^om^is^ing^s^y^s^t^em
^c^onc^e^p^{ts; de}^v^e^lo^ping^a^pr^op^ose^d^a^c^quisitio^{n stra}^te^g^y^{; a}^{nd de}^v^e^lopi^ng^initia^l^c^o^{st, sc}^he^d^u^le^{, a}ⁿ^d^pe^rform^aⁿ^c^e
^o^b^j^ectⁱ^v^es.
⁶^T^h^e^P^r^og^ra^m^D^e^fⁱ^nitio^{n a}ⁿ^d^Risk^Re^duc^tio^{n (}^P^DRR)^P^h^a^s^eⁿ^o^rm^a^l^ly^la^{sts t}^w^{o to f}^{our y}^e^a^r^{s. A}^c^ti^v^itie^{s during}^t^h^is
^pha^se^inc^l^u^d^e^de^fⁱ^ning^k^e^y^de^sigⁿ^c^h^a^r^a^c^t^e^r^istic^{s a}^{nd e}^x^pe^c^t^e^d^c^a^p^a^b^ilitie^{s a}ⁿ^d^de^m^onstra^ting^tha^t^te^c^hno^logⁱ^e^s^c^aⁿ^be
^inc^o^r^p^or^a^t^e^dⁱⁿ^t^o^s^y^s^t^em^s^de^sⁱ^gⁿ^s.^P^r^ot^oty^p^e^sy^s^t^em^s^a^r^e^de^v^e^lope^{d dur}ⁱⁿ^g^this^p^h^a^s^e^.
⁷^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^House^of^Re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^{, Com}^m^itte^e^{on Ov}^e^r^sig^h^{t a}^{nd G}^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt Re}^f^o^r^m^{, Ma}^jorit^y^Sta^f^f^,^“^T^he
^Ex^pe^ditio^na^ry^Fig^h^ting^V^e^hⁱ^c^l^e^:^Ov^e^r^Budg^e^t^{, Be}^hind^Sc^he^d^u^le^{, a}^{nd U}ⁿ^re^lia^ble^,^”^A^p^{ril 2}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁸^{, p}^.^2.
⁸^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^G^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt A}^c^c^ounta^b^ility^O^f^fⁱ^c^e⁽^G^A^O^{) Re}^{port t}^o^Co^ng^re^s^sⁱ^ona^{l Com}^m^itte^es^{, “}^D^e^f^eⁿ^s^e
^A^c^q^uⁱ^sitioⁿ^s^{; T}^h^{e Ex}^p^e^dⁱ^tioⁿ^a^ry^Fig^h^tin^g^V^e^hⁱ^{cle E}ⁿ^co^uⁿ^tere^d^Dif^fⁱ^cu^{lties in}^Desigⁿ^Dem^oⁿ^s^tratioⁿ^an^d^{Faces Fu}^tu^re
^Rⁱ^s^k^s^,^”^G^A^O^-^06-³⁴⁹^{, Ma}^y²⁰⁰^6,^{p. 1}³^.

Because of these and other difficulties, the EFV program was “rebaselined” in November 2002,
adding an additional year to the program schedule, and then rebaselined again in March 2003, ⁹
also adding another year to the program schedule. In December 2004, EFV prototypes
experienced major failures of the hull electronics unit (HEU), the vehicle’s main computer ¹⁰
system. These failures caused the water-mode vehicle steering to freeze, making the vehicle
non-responsive. The EFV also experienced significant problems in September and October 2004
with the bow flap—a folding panel extended forward to generate additional hydrodynamic lift as ¹¹
the EFV moves through the water. The EFV experienced myriad hydraulics system failures,
leaks, and pressure problems during testing that contributed to low reliability ratings. Because of
reliability problems, the originally required 70-hour mean time between operational mission
failure (MTBOMF) rate for the EFV was reduced by the Marines to 43.5 hours. Because of these
demonstrated failures and related concerns about a lack of program management and oversight,
the program was rebaselined for a third time in March 2005, this time adding an additional two
years to the extra two years added during the previous rebaselinings.

In 2006, the EFV was subject to an Operational Assessment—a series of tests to demonstrate that
it could meet performance requirements—that if successfully completed, would permit the
program to move into the production phase. During this assessment, the EFV experienced
numerous critical failures and, because of repeated breakdowns, the EFV failed to meet reliability
requirements and failed the assessment. For example, during the test, the vehicles were able to
operate for only 4.5 hours between breakdowns and required about 3.4 hours of corrective
maintenance for every 1 hour of operation—a maintenance burden that evaluators said would
“wear out a unit under realistic combat operations.” Poor reliability also resulted in 117
Operational Mission Failures and 645 Unscheduled Maintenance Actions during testing. The
EFV’s low reliability resulted in the EFV completing 2 out of 11 attempted amphibious tests, 1
out of 10 gunnery tests, and none of the 3 scheduled land mobility tests. The EFV prototypes
tested were approximately 1,900 lb. too heavy to achieve the desired high water speed and, in
some circumstances, could not accommodate equipment needed by Marines for special climatic
conditions. Evaluators also noted significant problems in terms of limited visibility, excessive
noise, and difficulty in reloading the EFV’s main gun.

⁹^Ib^id.^,^p^p^.⁸^-⁹^.^{DOD h}^a^s^b^een^kn^owⁿ^to^reb^a^selin^{e p}^r^o^g^rams^—ch^aⁿ^g^{e th}^{e p}^r^o^g^ram^’^{s esti}^mated^co^{st an}^d^sch^e^du^{le so}
^the^y^a^r^e^a^m^o^r^e^ac^c^u^r^a^te^r^e^f^l^e^c^{tion of}^h^o^w^the^pr^og^r^a^m^is^pr^og^r^e^s^sⁱ^ng^—ⁱ^{n i}ⁿ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^s^w^h^e^r^e^a^tr^ouble^d^pr^og^r^a^m^s^how^s
^poteⁿ^tia^{l f}^o^{r im}^prov^e^m^eⁿ^t.
¹⁰^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^House^of^Re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^{, Com}^m^itte^e^{on Ov}^e^r^sig^h^{t a}^{nd G}^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt Re}^f^o^r^m^{, Ma}^jorit^y^Sta^f^f^,^“^T^he
^Ex^pe^ditio^na^ry^Fig^h^ting^V^e^hⁱ^c^l^e^:^Ov^e^r^Budg^e^t^{, Be}^hind^Sc^he^d^u^le^{, a}^{nd U}ⁿ^re^lia^ble^,^”^A^p^{ril 2}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁸^{, p}^.^4.
¹¹^In^f^o^rm^atioⁿⁱⁿ^t^h^{is section}^{is f}^r^om^Un^ited^S^t^{ates G}^o^ve^rn^m^eⁿ^t^A^c^c^o^uⁿ^tab^ili^ty^O^f^fⁱ^{ce (}^{GAO) Rep}^o^r^t^to^Con^g^ressioⁿ^a^l
^Com^m^itte^e^s^{, “}^D^e^f^eⁿ^se^A^c^quisitio^{ns; T}^h^e^Ex^pe^diti^ona^ry^Fig^h^ting^Ve^hic^l^e^Enc^o^unte^r^e^d^Dif^fⁱ^c^u^ltie^{s in}^De^sigⁿ
^De^m^oⁿ^s^t^r^atⁱ^oⁿ^aⁿ^d^F^{aces F}^u^t^u^re^Ri^sks,^”^GA^O-0⁶^-³⁴⁹^,^M^a^y²⁰⁰⁶^,^p^p^.¹⁶^-18^.
¹²^Inf^o^rm^a^{tion in t}^h^{is se}^c^tio^{n is f}^r^o^m^Unite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^Ho^u^s^{e o}^f^Rep^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^v^es,^Co^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee o}ⁿ^Oversi^g^h^t^and
^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt R}^e^f^o^r^m^{, Ma}^jor^ity^Sta^f^f^,^“T^he^Ex^pe^ditiona^r^y^Fig^h^ting^Ve^hic^l^e^:^O^v^e^r^B^udg^e^t^{, B}^e^hin^d^Sc^he^dule^,^aⁿ^d
^Uⁿ^r^e^lia^ble^,^”^A^p^r^{il 2}⁹^,²⁰^08,^p^p^.⁷^-^10.

In the aftermath of 2006 Operational Assessment, the Marines “went back to the drawing ¹³
board.” In February 2007, the EFV program office issued a “sources sought” notice, requesting
information from industry leaders on “tracked combat vehicles that can provide an alternative
design concept of the EFV”—a perceived vote of no confidence in General Dynamics by the
Marines. Also that month, the Navy formally advised Congress that the EFV program would
incur a cost breach, requiring program recertification under the Nunn-McCurdy Act (10 U.S.C. ¹⁴
2433). Finally, in late February 2007, the Navy announced that it would have to relax EFV
performance and reliability requirements in order for the program to continue. In March 2007, the
Marines modified the original SDD contract and awarded General Dynamics an additional $143.5 ¹⁵
million to redesign the EFV. In what has been termed “the largest program setback,” the
Marines decided in June 2007 to repeat the entire SDD phase, meaning that instead of the original
completion date of 2003, the SDD phase—if successful—will now be completed in 2011, eight ¹⁶
years behind the original schedule. In August 2008, the Marines and General Dynamics signed a ¹⁷
SDD II contract, and work on seven new EFV prototypes is expected to begin in January 2009.
These new prototypes are expected to include rewired electronics to better protect against sea
water, a rebuilt and strengthened gun turret that should improve ammunition feed to the main gun,
and the addition of trim tabs to make the EFV more stable in the water. The new EFVs are
scheduled to be built at the U.S. military’s joint tank production facility at Lima, Ohio, and are
expected to be completed by early 2010.

The Marines originally planned to procure 1,025 EFVs at a total cost of $8.5 billion. A December

2007 estimate by DOD predicts that the cost will increase by over 50% to $13.2 billion—a 168%

per-vehicle cost increase. The Marines currently plan to procure only 573 EFVs, giving the
Marines the capacity to amphibiously transport eight infantry battalions (approximately 970 ¹⁹
marines and sailors per battalion). The President’s FY2009 EFV Budget Request was $ 316.1 ²⁰
million for Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E). The House Armed
Services Committee (HASC) “concerned that “plans to begin fabrication of new EFV prototypes

¹³^In^f^o^rm^atioⁿⁱⁿ^t^h^{is sectio}ⁿ^is^f^r^o^m^“M^ilitar^y^V^e^hⁱ^{cle Fo}^{recast: Ex}^p^e^d^iti^oⁿ^a^ry^Fig^h^tin^g^V^e^hⁱ^{cle,” Z}^Fo^recast
^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tio^na^{l, J}^une²⁰^07,^p.^5.
¹⁴^T^h^e^N^unn-^Mc^Curdy^A^c^{t (10 U}^.^S^.^{C. 2}⁴³³^{) re}^q^u^ire^s^tha^t^C^ong^re^s^s^be^no^tif^ie^{d w}^h^eⁿ^a^m^a^{jor de}^fe^ns^e^a^c^quis^itioⁿ
^p^r^o^g^ramⁱⁿ^cu^{rs a co}^stⁱⁿ^{crease o}^f^at^l^east¹⁵^%^.^If^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^creas^{e i}^s^{25% o}^r^great^er,^t^h^{e S}^ecret^ar^y^o^f^De^fen^s^{e m}^u^st^certⁱ^fy
^t^h^at^t^h^e^p^r^o^g^ramⁱ^s^essen^tⁱ^a^l^t^oⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^secu^ri^t^y^an^d^t^h^atⁿ^e^w^co^st^estⁱ^m^at^{es are rea}^s^oⁿ^a^b^l^e,^t^h^at^t^h^e^pro^g^ra^mⁱ^s^p^r^o^p^e^rl^y
^man^a^ged^,^an^d^t^h^at^t^h^{ere are no}^f^easi^b^l^e^al^t^e^rn^atⁱ^v^{es t}^o^t^h^{e sy}^st^e^mⁱⁿ^qu^estⁱ^oⁿ^.
¹⁵^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^House^of^Re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^{, Com}^m^itte^e^{on Ov}^e^r^sig^h^{t a}^{nd G}^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt Re}^f^o^r^m^{, Ma}^jorit^y^Sta^f^f^,^“^T^he
^Ex^pe^ditio^na^ry^Fig^h^ting^V^e^hⁱ^c^l^e^:^Ov^e^r^Budg^e^t^{, Be}^hind^Sc^he^d^u^le^{, a}^{nd U}ⁿ^re^lia^ble^,^”^A^p^{ril 2}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁸^{, p}^.^10.
¹⁶^Ibid^.
¹⁷^Inf^o^rm^a^{tion i}ⁿ^t^h^{is se}^c^tion^{is f}^r^om^{Kris Os}^bor^{n, “}^U^SMC^t^o^B^u^ild^{7 N}^e^w^EFV^P^r^oto^t^y^p^e^s^,”^Defen^s^e^News,^O^c^tobe^r⁹^,
²⁰⁰^8.
¹⁸^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^House^of^Re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^{, Com}^m^itte^e^{on Ov}^e^r^sig^h^{t a}^{nd G}^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt Re}^f^o^r^m^{, Ma}^jorit^y^Sta^f^f^,^“^T^he
^Ex^pe^ditio^na^ry^Fig^h^ting^V^e^hⁱ^c^l^e^:^Ov^e^r^Budg^e^t^{, Be}^hind^Sc^he^d^u^le^{, a}^{nd U}ⁿ^re^lia^ble^,^”^A^p^{ril 2}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁸^{, p}^.^11.
¹⁹^B^r^ie^fⁱ^ng^s^lide^s^{, “}^A^r^m^y^a^{nd Ma}^rⁱ^ne^C^o^r^p^s^T^a^c^tic^a^l^W^h^e^e^l^e^d^Ve^hic^l^e^Str^a^te^gy^a^{nd R}^e^s^pons^e^t^o^t^h^e^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^o^f
^Ma^na^g^e^m^e^{nt a}^{nd B}^u^dg^e^t^,”^Ve^r^sⁱ^on^21.⁰⁹^{, J}^u^ly^9,²⁰^08,^o^b^ta^ine^d^f^r^om^Iⁿ^sⁱ^de^D^e^fe^ns^e^.^c^o^m^,^A^u^gu^st²⁰^,²⁰⁰⁸^,^aⁿ^d^th
^No^rm^an^P^o^l^m^ar,^“1⁸^Edit^io^{n of}^the^Na^v^a^{l Institute}^G^u^ide^t^o^t^h^e^S^h^ip^{s a}ⁿ^{d A}ⁱ^rc^ra^f^t^of^the^{U.S. Fle}^e^t^,”^{U.S. Na}^v^a^l
^Institute^,^p.⁴⁴^.
²⁰^{DOD FY20}^{09 B}^udg^e^t^Re^q^u^e^s^{t S}^u^m^m^a^r^y^Jus^tif^ic^a^{tion, Fe}^brua^ry²⁰⁰⁸^{, p}^.¹⁸⁷^.

in FY 2009 have not sufficiently addressed the need to enhance protection of the EFV from mines ²¹
and improvised explosive devices” recommended a $40.2 million reduction. The Senate Armed
Services Committee (SASC) in its version (S. 3001), recommended fully funding the President’s ²²
$316.1 million request. The final version of the defense authorization bill agreed instead to a ²³
$35 million cut. House and Senate defense appropriators recommended $256 million—a $60 ²⁴
million reduction to the President’s EFV Budget Request.
Some analysts contend that the operational environment has changed so significantly since the ²⁵
EFV’s inception that both the fleet and the EFV face greater risks than anticipated. The Navy
and Marines envision that future conflicts will require a “persistent presence in littoral areas”
characterized by land-based anti-ship cruise missiles, mines, and small, fast suicide boats. Twenty
years ago when the EFV was conceived, some defense officials suggested that the fleet could
operate 25 to 30 miles from shore, debarking EFVs for amphibious operations, but with the
advent of these new enemy weapons and tactics, this is no longer possible. Instead, in order to
sufficiently protect the large amphibious ships that transport Marines and EFVs, it has been
suggested that the fleet might need to operate at least 100 miles from shore—beyond the EFV’s
range. If there are new developments in enemy weapons and tactics between now and 2025—
when the EFV is scheduled to reach full operational capability—the vulnerability to the fleet
could increase further. Another potential issue is the EFV’s vulnerability to IEDs. Some in
Congress are concerned that the flat-bottomed EFV, with a 16-inch ground clearance, would be ²⁶
highly vulnerable to IEDs that detonate under vehicles. The Marines contend that a “V” shaped
hull on the EFV to better protect it from IED blasts would force a total redesign of the EFV.
Instead, the Marines propose that once ashore, armor could be applied to the underside of the
EFV, a solution that has met with congressional skepticism.
A recent study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (CSBA) titled the U.S. ^st
Marine Corps: Fleet Marine Forces for the 21 Century advocates “cancelling the EFV in favor
of an armored combat vehicle optimized for modern land warfare (with modest ability to traverse
water obstacles) and combine it with a high-speed, shallow-draft, ship to shore ‘connector’ (e.g. ²⁷
high-speed lighterage, air-cushioned landing craft).” The primary argument is that this solution

²¹^Re^port¹¹^0-6⁵²^,^D^u^nc^aⁿ^H^u^nte^r^N^a^tiona^{l D}^e^f^e^ns^e^A^u^thor^iz^a^tioⁿ^A^c^t^f^o^{r Fis}^c^a^l^Y^e^a^r²⁰⁰⁹^{, Re}^p^o^rt^{on t}^h^e^Com^m^itte^e
^{on A}^r^m^e^{d Se}^r^v^ic^e^s^H^ous^e^of^R^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^{on H}^.^R^.⁵⁶⁵⁸^,^Ma^y^{16, 2}⁰⁰⁸^,^p.¹⁹^8.
²²^R^e^por^t¹¹^0-³³⁵^,^N^a^tio^na^{l D}^e^f^e^nse^A^u^thor^iz^a^tion^A^c^{t f}^o^r^Fis^c^a^l^Y^e^a^r²⁰⁰^{9, R}^e^por^t^{to A}^c^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^y^{S. 30}^01,
^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on A}^r^m^e^{d Se}^r^v^ic^e^s^{, Unite}^d^Sta^t^e^s^Se^na^te^{, Ma}^y^12,²⁰⁰⁸^{. p.}¹⁷^9,^pp^{. 2}^70-²⁷^1.
²³^D^unc^aⁿ^H^unte^r^N^a^ti^ona^{l D}^e^f^e^ns^{e A}^u^thor^iz^a^tio^{n A}^c^{t f}^o^r^FY²⁰⁰^9,^H^A^SC^N^o^{. 10, J}^oⁱⁿ^{t Ex}^plaⁿ^a^t^or^y^Sta^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t to}
^A^c^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^y^{S. 300}^{1, Se}^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰^8,^p.⁵²^1.
²⁴^C^ons^olida^t^e^d^Se^c^u^r^ity^{, D}ⁱ^s^a^s^t^e^r^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^,^a^{nd C}^o^ntin^ui^ng^A^ppr^opr^ia^ti^ons^A^c^{t, 20}⁰⁹⁽^H^.R^.²⁶^38:^P.L^.¹¹^0-³²⁹⁾^,
^Dⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on c}^–^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^eⁿ^s^e^A^ppr^opr^ia^tio^ns^A^c^{t, 20}^09,^O^c^tobe^r²⁰⁰⁸^,^p.³⁵^2.
²⁵^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^the^N^a^vy^{, “A}^C^oope^r^a^tiv^e^Str^a^te^gy^f^o^r²¹^st^C^e^nt^ur^y^Se^a^pow^e^r^,”^O^c^tobe^r²⁰^07,^aⁿ^d^Sy^dne^y^J^.
^F^r^eed^b^e^rg,^“F^u^t^u^r^{e Co}^r^p^s,^”^N^a^ti^o^{nal J}^ourⁿ^a^l^{, M}^a^y¹⁰^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
²⁶^Em^e^lie^Ruthe^r^f^o^{rd, “}^L^a^w^m^a^ke^{rs Cite}^Conc^e^rⁿ^s^W^ith^Marin^e^C^o^rp^{s EFV A}^r^m^o^{r So}^lu^tⁱ^oⁿ^,”^Iⁿ^sⁱ^de^D^e^fe^ns^e^.^c^o^m^,
^Jan^u^a^ry¹⁴^,²⁰⁰⁸^{, an}^d^Em^{elie Ru}^th^erf^o^rd^{, “M}^arin^{e C}^o^rp^s^P^r^o^ceed^s^w^ith^Ex^p^e^d^itioⁿ^a^ry^Fig^h^tin^g^V^e^hⁱ^cle,
^C^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l C}^onc^e^r^{n R}^e^m^a^ins^,^”^De^fe^nse^Daily^{, A}^p^{ril 11}^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
²⁷^D^a^k^o^ta^L^.^W^{ood, “}^T^he^U^.^{S. Ma}^rⁱ^ne^C^o^r^p^s^:^Fle^e^t^Ma^rⁱ^ne^F^o^r^c^e^s^f^o^r^the²¹^st^C^e^nt^ur^y^,^”^C^e^nte^r^f^o^r^Str^a^te^gⁱ^c^a^nd
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

would better address the “evolving anti-armor and precision-guided weapons regimes that will ²⁸
threaten naval forces at increasing distances at sea, and Marine Corps ground forces ashore.”
This approach may become an alternative if the EFV proves to be too unreliable or expensive to
field, but any type of ship (such as the suggested Improved Navy Lighterage System) or ground
combat vehicle (a modified Light Armored Vehicle [LAV] or the proposed Marine Personnel ²⁹
Carrier [MPC]) might also be equally as vulnerable to anti-armor and precision weapons. One
proposal to address this vulnerability—an Active Protection System (APS) such as the one being
developed for the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS)—may be a potential solution, but it is not ³⁰
known if the APS can be readily adapted for maritime use. The assertion that the MPC and a
surface transport would have “the additional benefit of nearly doubling the intended purchase,
thereby lowering the per-unit cost and simplifying related logistics issues within the Service”
merits detailed examination, but any such examination should acknowledge that abandoning EFV
altogether will result in a significant “sunk cost” that should be factored into any decisions related
to the affordability of EFV alternatives.
In order for the EFV to enter its planned Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) phase in 2011, it
must successfully complete its second attempt at SDD. While reports suggest that an earlier
requirement for a prototype reliability demonstration has been dropped, there will likely be a
series of operational tests similar to those conducted in 2006. Given the EFVs poor reliability and
performance in the past, it is possible that new tests might be even more rigorous—in part to
restore confidence in the EFV program. General Dynamics has predicted that it will achieve 60.7 ³¹
hours mean time between operational mission failure (MTBOMF) with its new EFV prototypes.
Despite claims that the second SDD phase is going well, it is possible that the $16 million per
vehicle EFV may again perform poorly in operational testing. If this is the case, it would likely be
difficult to justify a third SDD phase, and it would probably not be operationally feasible to
reduce the 573 EFV requirement any further to cut program costs. Given this potential scenario, it
might be prudent to examine possible contingencies (such as the aforementioned CSBA proposal)
should the EFV perform poorly on upcoming operational tests.

^An^d^r^e^w^Feick^e^rt
^Sp^{ecialist i}ⁿ^Militar^y^Gr^o^uⁿ^d^Fo^r^ces
^af^ei^c^k^ert^@^crs^.^l^o^c.^g^o^v^,^7-⁷⁶⁷³

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^B^udg^e^t^a^r^y^A^s^s^e^s^s^m^e^{nt, W}^a^s^h^ing^t^{on, D}^.^C^{., N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^17,²⁰⁰⁸^{, p}^.^x^v^.
²⁸^Ibid^.
²⁹^I^b^id^{., p. 64.}
³⁰^Ibid^.
³¹^B^r^ie^fⁱ^ng^pr^ov^ide^to^C^R^S^by^G^eⁿ^e^r^a^{l Dy}^namⁱ^c^s^L^a^{nd Sy}^s^t^em^s^“^E^F^V^P^r^og^r^a^m^,^”^Fe^br^ua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.