Azerbaijan's October 2008 Presidential Election: Outcome and Implications
Azerbaijan’s October 2008 Presidential
Election: Outcome and Implications
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
This report discusses the win by incumbent Ilkham Aliyev in Azerbaijan’s October
15, 2008, presidential election. It describes the campaign and results, and examines
implications for Azerbaijani and U.S. interests. This report will not be updated. Related
reports include CRS Report RL33453, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, updated
regularly.
Introduction
After achieving independence in 1991, Azerbaijan was convulsed by secessionism
by its Nagorno Karabakh (NK) region, civil disorder, and a steep economic decline. In
recent years, however, the exploitation of oil and natural gas resources has contributed to
a rapidly growing economy, despite rising inflation and reported corruption. Progress in
democratization has been slow, according to the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other observers, who have judged that neither
presidential elections nor legislative races have yet been “free and fair.” The United
States and others in the international community have supported democratization efforts
in Azerbaijan. At the same time, U.S. interests have been served by Azerbaijan’s support
for the war on terrorism and its oil and gas exports to Western markets.
In anticipation of the 2008 presidential race, changes to the electoral code were
approved by the legislature in June 2008. Some of the amendments had been
recommended by the Venice Commission, an advisory body of the Council of Europe.
However, other Venice Commission recommendations were not enacted, including one
on eliminating the dominance of government representatives on election commissions.1
In late June, Azerbaijan’s Central Electoral Commission (CEC) announced that media
campaigning would be permitted for less than one month before the election, which critics
termed too short a time for candidates to present their platforms. Despite these concerns,
1 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission). Joint Interim
Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the Electoral Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan, March
a visiting delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)
praised Azerbaijan’s progress in electoral reform and stated that it was “heartened by the
assurances it received from top Azerbaijani representatives that their goal is to hold an
orderly and well-administered election that complies with European standards.”2
Besides President Aliyev, six other politicians were able to gather 40,000 valid
signatures to be registered as candidates for the presidential election. Most of the
candidates had some exposure at the national level. Qudrat Hasanquliyev and Hafiz
Hajiyev had run in the 2003 presidential election, and Hasanguliyev, Iqbal Agazade, and
Fazil Mustafayev are deputies in the legislature. Some government officials and observers
have suggested that these candidates are “new constructive opposition leaders,” as
opposed to those in opposition parties that boycotted the election (see below).
Hasanguliyev, Mustafayev, Fuad Aliyev, and Alibeyli had once belonged to the
boycotting parties but had left to form their own parties. Agazade had supported
oppositionist Isa Gambar’s candidacy in the 2003 presidential election, but in recent years
has been considered by some observers a “constructive oppositionist.”
The opposition Azadliq (Freedom) party bloc decided on July 20 that it would
boycott the election on the grounds that the election laws were not fair, their parties faced
harassment, and media were constrained.3 This bloc includes opposition politicians Ali
Kerimli, the head of the Popular Front Party (Reform); Lala Shovket Hajiyeva, the head
of the Liberal Party; and others. In early September 2008, the Azadliq bloc joined with
other parties to form an Opposition Cooperation Center (OCC) coalition, including the
Musavat Party (headed by Gambar); the Civil Development Party (headed by Ali Aliyev);
and the Public Forum for the Sake of Azerbaijan (headed by Eldar Namazov).
The Campaign
After losing to Ilkham Aliyev in the 2003 presidential election, Gambar (and other
opposition politicians) alleged large-scale vote fraud. Government forces and pro-Gambar
demonstrators clashed, resulting in injuries and property destruction and hundreds of
arrests and detentions. Agazade was among those imprisoned for eighteen months for
allegedly fomenting violence. The government was determined to prevent such an
outcome in 2008, a goal that seemed even more significant after violent demonstrations
in neighboring Georgia in November 2007 and in Armenia in March 2008. Among
measures to control demonstrations, amendments in mid-2008 to the law on freedom of
assembly specified that rallies could be limited to places designated by local officials.
The OCC planned a demonstration in Baku on September 28, but it turned down a venue
offered by city officials it deemed inconveniently located.4
2 PACE. Azerbaijan: Statement by PACE Pre-Election Delegation, September 18, 2008.
3 Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), April 24, 2008, Doc.
No. CEP-950216.
4 Commenting on the provision, OSCE/ODIHR urged that “assemblies should not routinely be
relocated to designated special places, but rather should be facilitated at the location, or along
the route,” requested by the organizer. Guidelines on the Implementation of the Law on Freedom
of Assembly of the Republic of Azerbaijan, September 2008.
Campaigning was low-key. Campaign posters could be displayed only in designated
sites. Public television devoted three hours a week of free air time for the candidates, and
there was scant paid political advertising. President Aliyev did not attend campaign
debates but sent emissaries to present his viewpoint. He emphasized the high economic
growth that had occurred during his first term and assured prospective voters that he
planned to keep growth on track. According to some observers, the media environment
was more restrictive than in previous legislative and presidential elections, and prevented
an informative public discussion of candidates and their platforms.5 Media focused on
Aliyev’s ostensible presidential duties and preparations by election officials.6
The tiny opposition Umid (Hope) Party alleged that its candidate (Agazade) was
“being obstructed in every way possible,” including by the defacement of campaign
posters. Some in Azerbaijan criticized a statement by the Minister of Education on
September 22 that all teachers, many of whom work on electoral commissions, would
support Aliyev’s re-election, but others dismissed the statement as merely over-
enthusiasm. Candidates filed a few election complaints with the CEC, but it dismissed
them. A few cases were filed by the candidates with the courts, which dismissed most but
ruled for the candidates in at least two cases.
Results and AssessmentsPresidential Election Results
CandidatePercent of Vote
Despite media reports that the election hadIlkham Aliyev88.73
failed to interest the public, the CEC reported
that more people had voted (75.1% of 4.93Iqbal Agazada 2.86
million registered voters) than in 2003, when
the turnout was 71.2%. Incumbent PresidentFazil Mustafayev2.47
Aliyev won a resounding victory, gainingQudrat Hasanquliyev2.28
nearly 89% of the vote. The remaining six
candidates each received about 1%-3% of theQulamhuseyn Alibayli2.23
vote, with Agazada coming in a distant secondFuad Aliyev 0.78
place with a little over 100,000 votes.
Hasanquliyev and Hajiyev gained slightly moreHafiz Hajiyev 0.65
votes than when they ran in 2003. The deputySource: Central Electoral Commission,
chairman of the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan PartyOctober 19, 2008.
hailed the election outcome as reflecting the
will of the people and as due to the success of
Aliyev’s economic policies that have boosted jobs and wages.7 The presidential
inauguration is planned for October 24, 2008.
According to a preliminary report by election monitors from OSCE/ODIHR, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and the European Parliament
5 Media Coverage of the 15 October Presidential Election in Azerbaijan, August 15 thru
September 12, 2008, Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety, September 16, 2008.
6 OSCE/ODIHR. Presidential Election 2008, Interim Report No. 2, September 18–30, 2008;
Reporters Without Borders. Press Release. Azerbaijan: Monitoring Shows State Media Failed
to Cover Election Campaign Properly, October 16, 2008.
7 BBC Worldwide Monitoring, October 16, 2008.
(EP), the election “marked considerable progress toward meeting OSCE and Council of
Europe commitments and other international standards but did not meet all ... the
principles of a meaningful and pluralistic democratic election.” The observers
commended a peaceful voting process that was “well organized and efficient,” but were
critical of a “lack of robust competition and of vibrant political discourse facilitated by
media,” and the decision by some opposition parties to boycott. The observers raised
concerns about Soviet-type “pyramidal networks of persons responsible for groups of
voters,” that worked to get out the vote, and which were “put in place by local authorities
and/or election commissions, and in some cases linked to the [ruling Yeni Azerbaijan
Party].” The observers also raised concerns that there appeared to be “significant
procedural shortcomings [in vote counting] in many cases, and manipulation in some
instances.”8 EU Council President Nicolas Sarkozy appeared more critical, issuing a
statement on October 17 that “the elections still do not satisfy international standards of
democracy, particularly as regards the organization of public debate, the conduct of
polling, and the counting of votes. The EU urges the Azerbaijani authorities to continue
their efforts to honor their international commitments regarding democratic pluralism and
media freedom.” The Azerbaijani Foreign Affairs Ministry retorted that the statement
was “biased” and did “not contribute to building trust” between Azerbaijan and the EU.9
The OCC issued a statement on October 16 that the winner of the “restrained and
unfair election may not be considered legitimate,” and that the election “does not reflect
the people’s will.” Columnist Zahid Safaroglu similarly asserted in the opposition
newspaper Yeni Musavat that the poll was a “show” and was the “most antidemocratic”
election yet in Azerbaijan.10 The OCC announced plans for an October 18 demonstration
in Baku, but city officials refused to give permission for a rally at the venue requested.
Implications for Azerbaijan
The election appeared to indicate that Aliyev has consolidated power since
succeeding his father as president in 2003. Government officials and others have stated
that the increase in the percentage of the vote for Aliyev — from 77% in 2003 to 89% in
2008 — reflects voter approval of his policies and the endorsement of his campaign theme
that stability would be jeopardized if there was a change of leadership. He also appears
8 OSCE/PACE/EP. Republic of Azerbaijan Presidential Election, 15 October 2008: Statement
of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, October 16, 2008. Forty election observers sponsored
by Bob Lawrence and Associates, a U.S. lobbying group, and the Association for Civil Society
Development in Azerbaijan, a pro-government NGO, stated that the election was “an orderly
process much like is seen in the United States,” and was “free and fair.” Statement of the
American Observers Group, Renaissance Associates of Baku, October 16, 2008. See also the
Preliminary Report of the pro-government Free, Transparent and Fair Elections Coalition, On the
Results of 15 October 2008 Presidential Election, October 17, 2008. Observers from the Institute
of War and Peace Reporting, an international NGO, stated that “violations were mainly of a
technical character that could not have altered the result.” However, they raised concerns about
possibly inflated turnout, not usually regarded as a technicality. “Azerbaijani Leader Cruises to
Victory,” October 16, 2008.
9 EU. Statement of the Presidency of the EU on the Presidential Election in Azerbaijan, October
10 CEDR, October 16, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950202. Open Source Center Feature, October 16,
to have bolstered support among critical constituencies such as military personnel, to
whom he granted a substantial pay boost just before the election. During Aliyev’s first
term, Azerbaijan’s economic growth was among the highest in the world, which lifted
living standards and partially reduced the level of poverty in the country. Other
accomplishments included the completion of oil and gas pipeline export routes to the
West. Although Aliyev has pledged to maintain his existing policy course, an Armenian
politician has suggested that Aliyev’s clear electoral mandate may give him increased
power to make unpopular decisions to resolve the conflict in the breakaway Nagorno
Karabakh region.11
Those who take a more pessimistic view of developments during Aliyev’s first term
and prospects for the future point to the reportedly increased level of corruption during
his rule and his failure thus far to resolve the NK conflict. They warn that Aliyev may face
decreasing economic growth during his second term — arising from the fall in world oil
prices and global economic problems — that may jeopardize his support among critical
constituencies and set back his efforts to improve living conditions in the country.
Many observers argue that Aliyev easily would have won the election even if the
boycotting opposition party leaders had decided to run. These opposition party leaders had
failed in the past to gain many votes and are hence “discredited,” they argue.12 The
apparent insignificance of the election boycott further indicates just how much their
parties have been marginalized, these observers maintain. Critics of this view argue that
without free media, the popularity of the president is not based on informed judgment, so
such conclusions about the electibility of opposition leaders are invalid.13 They also point
out that when prominent opposition politicians ran against Aliyev in 2003, they garnered
more votes than the supposed “new generation of opposition candidates” did in 2008.
Implications for U.S. Interests
According to the Administration, U.S. objectives in Azerbaijan include cooperation
in the war on terrorism, the advancement of U.S. energy security, and progress in
democratic and economic reforms. The United States is interested in Azerbaijan’s internal
stability and a peaceful approach to resolving the NK conflict.14 The Administration’s
interest in stability and cooperation with Azerbaijan seemed underlined by Vice President
Cheney’s September 3 visit to Baku. U.S. concerns about democracy prospects in
Azerbaijan were highlighted by Assistant Secretary of State David Kramer in
congressional testimony in July 2008. He raised concerns “that the political space for
dissenting voices has been shrinking over the past few years,” and stated that the
Azerbaijani “government bears ultimate responsibility for the climate within which
political parties and candidates operate, and within which public debate takes place.” He
11 ARMINFO News Agency, October 16, 2008.
12 EIU ViewsWire Select, October 16, 2008; Alman Mir Ismail, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst,
October 1, 2008.
13 “Five Myths About the 2008 Presidential Election in Azerbaijan,” Quirk Global Strategies,
December 5, 2007; Vugar Gojayev, “President Aliyev’s Tight Grip on the Press Has Severely
Damaged His Country’s Democracy,” Index on Censorship, October 15, 2008.
14 U.S. Department of State. Congressional Budget Justification for FY2009.
reported that the United States had urged Azerbaijani officials “to establish the conditions
that would be conducive to a truly competitive” presidential election.15
On October 16, State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack congratulated the
Azerbaijani people for “having this election and instituting some improvements in the
way this election occurred over previous elections.”16
Several Azerbaijani observers have argued that in the wake of the Russia-Georgia
conflict, the country’s significance to the United States and the West has increased as a
source of oil and gas not controlled by Russia. They suggest that the West is hoping that
Aliyev’s re-election connotes a continuation of his policy of seeking Western outlets for
Azerbaijan’s oil and gas and that the West is placing less insistence on short-term
democratization targets.
In July 2008, President Aliyev appeared to refer to U.S. and Western democratization
support when he reportedly informed his diplomatic corps that “no one has the right to
interfere in the domestic affairs of Azerbaijan, give us advice and read lectures.”17
Conversely, some opposition politicians have criticized the United States and the West
for not making greater efforts to foster democratization. Lala Shovket Hajiyeva has stated
that “the West sees Azerbaijan as a petrol station with only one goal, to function properly.
Here the West keeps its interests higher than its values.”18
Congressional Response. Congress has demonstrated an interest in
democratization in Azerbaijan by excepting most such aid from restrictions that it long
placed on some other U.S. assistance because of the conflict over NK. Concern about
Azerbaijan’s 2008 presidential race included pre-election legislative activities and
Member and staff participation as electoral observers. At a hearing of the Congressional
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki Commission) in July
2008, Chairman Alcee Hastings raised concerns about President Aliyev’s statement that
Azerbaijan would not tolerate criticism of its record. Representative Hastings called for
Azerbaijan to uphold its commitments as a signatory to the Helsinki Final Act, so that the
October 2008 presidential election would “register clear progress” over previous
elections. Commission Co-Chairman Benjamin Cardin similarly urged the “government
of Azerbaijan to open up the process so that it is easier for political parties to participate,19
and opposition representatives to have a fair opportunity.”
15 U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Hearing: Human Rights and
Democratization in Azerbaijan, July 29, 2008.
16 U.S. Department of State. Regular News Briefing, October 16, 2008.
17 “Azeri Leader Brushes Aside Foreign Pressure, Pledges to Back National Interests,” BBC
Monitoring Caucasus, July 10, 2008.
18 Khayal Shahinoglu, “Ilkham Aliyev Has Won a Victory over His Toy Soldiers,” Azadliq,
October 19, 2008; Leila Alieva, “Azerbaijan’s Presidential Elections: Do Oil and Democracy
Mix?” ISS Opinion, European Union Institute for Security Studies, October 2008.
19 Hearing: Human Rights and Democratization in Azerbaijan, July 29, 2008.