Pakistan's Capital Crisis: Implications for U.S. Policy

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

Pakistan—a key U.S. ally in global efforts to combat Islamist militancy—is in urgent need of an
estimated $4 billion in capital to avoid defaulting on its sovereign debt. The elected government
of President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani is seeking short-term
financial assistance from a number of sources, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
China, and an informal group of nations (including the United States) known as the “Friends of
Pakistan.” The Pakistani government reportedly has reached a tentative agreement with the IMF
for $7.6 billion in loans, but has reservations about conditions on the assistance, expressing
concerns that they may create political and economic problems. The current crisis has placed
some strain on U.S.-Pakistan relations. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.

The Immediate Task: Capital to Cover Debt...................................................................................2
Plans A and B............................................................................................................................2
China .......................................................................................................................... ............... 2
Saudi Arabia..............................................................................................................................3
Plan C: IMF Assistance.............................................................................................................3
Pakistan’s Long-Term Economic Problems....................................................................................4
Implications for U.S. Relations.......................................................................................................5
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................6

stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan is considered vital to U.S. interests.¹ U.S.
concerns regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism; Afghan stability;
democratization and human rights protection; the ongoing Kashmir problem and A

Pakistan-India tensions; and economic development in the region. Progress in this latter area has
been severely threatened in 2008 by a sharp decline in Pakistan’s economic stability, culminating
in an immediate need for capital assistance. U.S. officials and independent analysts are
increasingly concerned that a failing Pakistani economy could undermine multilateral efforts to
stabilize South Asia and curtail the incidence of Islamist radicalism.
After several years of strong and comparatively stable growth, Pakistan quickly slid into a severe
economic crisis in 2008 (for reasons discussed later in the report). Real GDP growth has slowed
from 7%-8% per year since 2004 to an estimated 3%-4% in 2008. Its official rate of inflation rose ²
from 8.8% in January to 23.9% in October. Since the beginning of the year, the Pakistani rupee
has depreciated by over 23% against the U.S. dollar, leading to rising trade and current account
deficits. During the summer of 2008, apparent capital flight added downward pressure on the
rupee, worsening Pakistan’s capital account deficit and accelerating the decline in the nation’s
foreign exchange reserve holdings—leading to the possibility that Pakistan could default on its ³
sovereign debt obligations.
Since his ascension to the presidency in September 2008, President Zardari has attempted to
address Pakistan’s economic problems, with the support of his chief economic advisor, Shaukat
Tarin. On September 19, 2008, acting finance minister Naveed Qamar released new economic
policies designed to bring about macroeconomic stability and avoid seeking IMF assistance that
included the elimination of fuel, electricity and food subsidies, and a reduction in the government ⁴
deficit. On November 3, 2008, Tarin announced reforms of Pakistan’s tax system, including the ⁵
politically sensitive taxation of large landowners, to reduce the incidence of tax evasion.
President Zardari has emphasized the importance of his nation’s economic problems, stating, ⁶
“The greatest challenge this government faces is an economic one.”
Despite the September announcement of new economic policies, Pakistan’s foreign exchange
reserves have continued their year-long decline. The State Bank of Pakistan’s holdings of foreign
exchange reserves fell from $14.2 billion at the end of October 2007 to $4.1 billion at the end of ⁷
October 2008. Of immediate concern, Pakistan reportedly needs $4 billion to $5 billion in
assistance by the end of November in order to avoid defaulting on maturing sovereign debt
obligations. According to Tarin, Pakistan will need $10 billion to $15 billion over the next two to ⁸
three years to continue to service its capital account deficits and its outstanding debt.

¹^{For m}^o^re^inf^o^rm^a^{tion a}^b^o^u^{t U.}^S.^-P^a^k^ista^{n re}^la^ti^{ons, se}^e^{CRS Re}^p^o^{rt RL}³³⁴⁹^8,^P^a^kⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^-^U^.S.^Re^latⁱ^ons^,^by^K^.^A^l^aⁿ
^K^r^ons^ta^dt.
²^Da^ta^f^r^o^m^the^Sta^t^e^Ba^nk^of^P^a^kⁱ^staⁿ^w^e^{b pa}^g^e^{, http://w}^ww^.sbp.or^g^.^pk^/e^c^oda^ta^/pric^eⁱ^.p^df^.
³^“^F^lig^{ht of}^Ca^pita^l^{to D}^ubaⁱ^on^th^e^Rise^{: P}^E^W^,^”^Th^e^P^o^s^t^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t^25,²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁴^“^P^a^k^is^ta^{n U}ⁿ^v^e^ils^P^a^c^k^a^g^e^f^o^{r Ec}^onom^ic^Sta^b^ility^,”^Re^ute^r^s^{, Se}^pt^em^be^r^19,²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵^F^a^rh^an^B^o^kh^ari^,^“^P^aki^s^t^aⁿ^V^o^w^s^t^o^T^a^rget^Ri^ch^T^a^{x E}^v^ad^{ers as I}^M^F^Con^c^l^u^d^e^{s T}^a^l^k^{s o}ⁿ^Vⁱ^t^a^l^L^o^an^,^”^Fin^ancⁱ^a^l
^Tim^e^s^,^No^ve^m^b^er³^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶^“^P^a^k^ista^{n’s Za}^rda^rⁱ^{to G}ⁱ^v^e^Up^Pow^e^rs,”^AFP^{, Se}^pte^m^be^r^20,²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁷^Da^ta^f^r^o^m^the^Sta^t^e^Ba^nk^of^P^a^kⁱ^staⁿ^w^e^{b pa}^g^e^{, http://w}^ww^.sbp.or^g^.^pk^/e^c^oda^ta^/f^ore^x^.pdf^.
⁸^Sim^{on C}^a^m^e^r^on-^Moor^e^,^“^P^a^k^is^ta^{n N}^e^e^d^s^$^10-^{15 B}^l^{n Fa}^s^t^,^Sa^y^s^P^M^’^s^A^d^vⁱ^s^e^r^,^”^Re^ute^r^s^,^Oct^o^b^e^r²¹^,²⁰⁰⁸^.

During September and October, Pakistan sought assistance from a number of sources, including
the Asian Development Bank (ADB), China, the IMF, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and the
World Bank. To date, Pakistan has been unable to secure a firm commitment for support from
most of these sources.
Pakistan’s initial approach, termed “Plan A,” was to obtain loans from selected sources, such as
the ADB, the World Bank, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development ⁹
(DFID), and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). The ADB did agree to provide Pakistan with
a $500 million loan “to address harm done to poor families and the country’s economy by ¹⁰
unprecedented international food and fuel price hikes.” In addition, the World Bank originally ¹¹
offered $1.4 billion in assistance. However, the combined ADB and World Bank loans are
insufficient to address Pakistan’s current capital shortfall.
When Plan A proved unworkable, Pakistan shifted to Plan B, which was to secure commitments
for support from an informal group of nations known as the “Friends of Pakistan.” On September
26, 2008, a group of nations met President Zardari in New York City to discuss ways to support
Pakistan with its political, economic, and security problems. Zardari reportedly sought $100 ¹²
billion in aid from the group. Calling themselves the “Friends of Pakistan,” the informal
coalition includes representatives from 11 nations (including China, Saudi Arabia, and the United
States), as well as the European Union, the United Nations, and the IMF. The group did not,
however, offer Pakistan any financial support following their September meeting. At the second
meeting of the Friends of Pakistan (held on November 17, 2008 in Abu Dhabi), Pakistan again
requested assistance, but no commitment to aid was forthcoming.
As part of the Plan B initiative, President Zardari traveled to Beijing in mid-October to strengthen
ties between the two nations, as well to ask for financial assistance. Following a meeting between
President Zardari and China’s Premier Wen Jiabao, a spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry
stated, “As a long-time friend of Pakistan, China understands it is facing some financial ¹³
difficulties. We are ready to support and help Pakistan within our capability.” Although China
provided no further details on the form and extent of its intended support to Pakistan, they did
agree to foster closer economic relations between China and Pakistan, setting the goal of

⁹^Mu^ba^r^e^k^Ze^{b K}^h^aⁿ^{, “}^$4.^{5 B}ⁱ^l^lio^{n N}^e^e^d^e^d^w^ithin³⁰^D^a^y^s^{to B}^u^il^{d U}^p^R^e^s^e^r^v^e^s^{: R}^e^c^our^s^e^{to I}^M^F^L^a^s^t^O^p^tion,”
^Da^wn^{, O}^c^to^be^r²³^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
¹⁰^“A^{DB P}^r^o^v^id^es^P^a^kⁱ^stan^w^ith^$⁵⁰⁰^M^illi^oⁿ^to^A^{ccelerate Ec}^onom^ic^T^r^aⁿ^sf^or^m^a^tion,”^A^D^B^pr^e^s^s^r^e^le^a^s^e^,^Se^pte^m^be^r
^{30, 20}⁰⁸^.
¹¹^“^W^{B to G}ⁱ^ve^P^a^kⁱ^staⁿ^$¹^.⁴^Billi^{on T}^h^{is Ye}^a^r^,”^Da^{ily T}ⁱ^mes^{, O}^c^to^be^{r 13}^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
¹²^{Nissar Ho}^ath^,^“UA^E^to^Ho^st^P^a^ki^staⁿ^Ba^ilou^t^T^a^lk^{s Ne}^x^t^Mont^h,”^Em^ir^ate^s^Busⁱ^ne^s^s^24/⁷^,^O^c^to^be^r^{27, 20}⁰⁸^.
¹³^“P^resi^d^eⁿ^t^Z^a^rd^ari^,^Chⁱⁿ^ese^P^r^emⁱ^e^{r Ho}^l^d^F^o^rm^al^T^a^l^k^s;^Chⁱⁿ^{a Vo}^w^s^t^o^Bai^l^Ou^t^P^a^ki^st^an^,^”^D^a^ily^Time^s^{, O}^c^tobe^r
^{17, 20}⁰⁸^.

increasing bilateral¹⁴ trade from $7 billion in 2007 to $15 billion in 2011.¹⁵ On November 14,

2008, China pledged to provide Pakistan with $500 million in financial assistance.

President Zardari and Tarin left for Riyadh on November 4, 2008, to reportedly ask for Saudi ¹⁶
support for Plan B and up to $6 billion in deferred payments for petroleum imports. The
deferred oil payments would free up capital that Pakistan could then use to pay its other
international obligations. In an interview prior to his departure, Tarin stated, “We will not require ¹⁷
IMF support in case we succeed in getting money from Saudi Arabia.” Saudi relations with
Pakistan, however, have been cool lately for several reasons, including Pakistan’s quest for an oil
facility in Iran. There was not public announcement of support at the end of President Zardari’s
Saudi Arabia trip.
With the apparent failure of both Plans A and B, Pakistan moved on to Plan C—formally
requesting IMF assistance. On October 22, 2008, the IMF released a statement announcing that
“The Pakistani authorities have requested discussions with the IMF on an economic program
supported by financial assistance from the Fund to meet the balance of payments difficulties the ¹⁸
country is experiencing.... ” The Pakistani government, however, has denied making a formal ¹⁹
request to the IMF. According to various reports, informal talks between Pakistan and the IMF ²⁰
have been going on for some time in Dubai.
According to China’s Xinhua News Service, the IMF has proposed 16 conditions on providing ²¹
assistance. Various news accounts have divulged some of those conditions: a devaluation of the
rupee; a reduction of the federal deficit from the current 7.4% of GDP to 4.3% of GDP by June
30, 2009; an increase in the base interest rate (currently 13%) by 350-400 basis points; a 30% cut
in defense spending between 2009 and 2020; the elimination of nearly two-thirds of pensionable
government jobs; tax reform designed to broaden the tax base, including new taxes of certain
agricultural crops; direct IMF and World Bank monitoring of the preparation of Pakistan’s federal ²²
budget; and prior notification of any funding agreement with any other lender.

¹⁴^“^C^hina^A^g^r^e^e^s^{to G}ⁱ^v^e^$500mⁱⁿ^B^a^ilout^,”^The^D^a^ily^M^a^il^,^No^vem^b^er¹⁴^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
¹⁵^Ibid^.
¹⁶^B^a^qir^Sa^jja^d^Sy^e^d^{, “}^Z^a^r^da^rⁱ^’^s^Sa^udi^Visⁱ^t^P^a^r^t^of^A^ttem^p^{t to A}^v^oi^{d I}^M^F^L^o^aⁿ^,”^Da^wⁿ^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{4, 20}⁰⁸^.
¹⁷^Sa^ha^{r A}^h^m^e^{d, “}^P^a^k^ista^{n’s Za}^rda^r^{i to}^Se^e^k^He^{lp in Sa}^udi^A^r^a^b^ia^,”^Re^ute^r^s^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{4, 20}^08.
¹⁸^“^S^ta^te^m^e^{nt by}^I^F^{M Ma}^na^gⁱ^ng^Dⁱ^r^e^c^t^or^Str^a^us^s^-^K^a^hn^on^P^a^kⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^,”^I^M^F^pr^e^s^s^r^e^le^a^s^e^N^o^{. 08/}²⁵^{4, O}^c^tobe^r²²^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
¹⁹^“IM^F^Bai^l^o^u^t^:^T^h^{e Co}^mⁱⁿ^g^M^e^dⁱ^ciⁿ^e^f^o^{r P}^a^ki^st^an^?”^Re^ute^r^s^{, O}^c^to^be^r²⁷^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸^{, a}^nd^Sa^ha^r^A^h^m^e^{d, “P}^a^k^is^ta^n’^s
^Za^rda^r^{i to}^Se^e^k^He^{lp in}^Sa^udi^A^r^a^b^ia^,”^Re^ute^r^s^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{4, 20}⁰⁸^.
²⁰^T^h^{e meet}ⁱⁿ^gs^w^e^{re h}^e^l^dⁱⁿ^Dub^aⁱ^,^an^dⁿ^o^t^Isl^a^m^a^b^a^d^,^b^ecau^{se o}^f^aⁿ^IM^F^b^a^{n on}^t^r^avel^t^o^P^a^ki^st^an^.^Aⁿ^IM^F^mⁱ^ssi^oⁿ
^w^a^s^{in I}^s^la^m^a^ba^{d on Se}^pte^m^be^r²⁰^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸^—^t^he^da^y^of^the^s^u^ic^ide^b^o^m^b^ing^of^the^Ma^r^rⁱ^ott^H^o^te^l.^T^h^e^I^M^{F m}ⁱ^s^sⁱ^{on w}^a^s
^una^ble^t^o^c^o^m^p^le^te^its^pr^oje^c^t^.
²¹^“P^aki^s^t^aⁿ^A^ccep^t^s^IM^F^Con^dⁱ^tⁱ^on^{s F}^o^r^Fⁱⁿ^aⁿ^cⁱ^a^l^Aⁱ^d^,^”^Xⁱ^nh^ua^,^N^o^ve^m^b^er³^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
²²^“IM^F^Bai^l^o^u^t^:^T^h^{e Co}^mⁱⁿ^g^M^e^dⁱ^ciⁿ^e^f^o^{r P}^a^ki^st^an^?”^Re^ute^r^s^{, Oc}^to^be^{r 27}^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸^{; a}^{nd “}^B^itte^r^Frui^{ts of}^{IMF Ba}^il^out^,”
^The^Inte^rn^ati^oⁿ^a^{l Ne}^ws^{, O}^c^to^be^r^24,²⁰⁰⁸^{; “}^P^a^k^is^ta^{n, I}^M^{F A}^g^r^e^e^t^o^C^u^t^D^o^wⁿ^Ex^pe^nd^itur^e^s^,^”^T^h^e^Iⁿ^te^rnati^oⁿ^a^{l Ne}^ws^,
^Nov^e^m^b^e^r^{1, 2}⁰⁰⁸^{; “}^P^a^k^ista^{n A}^c^c^e^p^{ts IMF Co}^nd^itio^{ns F}^o^{r Fi}^na^ncⁱ^a^{l A}ⁱ^d,”^Xinh^ua^,^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{3, 20}^{08; a}^nd^Sa^ha^r
^A^h^m^e^{d, “}^P^a^k^ista^{n’s Za}^rda^r^{i t}^o^Se^e^k^He^{lp in Sa}^u^d^{i A}^r^a^b^ia^,”^Re^ute^r^s^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{4, 200}⁸

Pakistan has repeatedly stated that it sees formally asking for IMF assistance as a last resort. The
Pakistani government is reluctant to accept formal IMF assistance for several reasons. First, there
is a history of poor relations between Pakistan and the IMF. Relations between the Pakistani
government and the IMF may have been further strained by recent reports that the IMF applied
pressure on the World Bank to cancel $300 million in aid to Pakistan. Second, the proposed
reduction in defense spending will be unpopular with the military and may make it more difficult
for the government to combat Islamist militancy. Third, the proposed tax reforms, especially on
agricultural crops, might lead to higher food prices and more inflation. Similarly, the elimination
of government jobs would exacerbate Pakistan’s already serious unemployment problem. Fourth,
the higher interest rates might drive some companies out of business. In the words of one
Pakistani economist, “Given our current political scenario, the standard IMF program would be ²³
disastrous.”
On November 15, Tarin announced that Pakistan had reached a tentative agreement with the IMF ²⁴
to borrow $7.6 billion over the next 23 months. The first installment of the loan—up to $4 ²⁵
billion—was expected by the end of November; Pakistan is to repay the loan by 2016.
According to Tarin, the only condition set by the IMF was that Pakistan had to raise its interest
rates to counteract its inflation problem. President Zardari reportedly commented on the IMF ²⁶
loan, “I think it’s a difficult pill, but one has to take medicine to get better.” News of the IMF
loan agreement was quickly met with strongly worded opposition inside Pakistan. Several
members of Pakistan’s parliament stated that the loan would lead Pakistan into a debt trap, ²⁷
worsen the national economy, and harm the living standards of the Pakistani people.
If Pakistan’s agreement with the IMF is formally concluded, the $7.6 billion loan is well short of
the estimated $10 billion to $15 billion Pakistan says it needs over the next two years to avoid a
financial crisis. Some observers speculate that the IMF agreement will spur help from other
potential donors, such as China, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.

Assuming Pakistan is able to secure the capital assistance it needs, it will not end the nation’s
economic problems. Pakistan’s recent period of economic growth was based on a combination of
export expansion and inward foreign direct investments (FDI). Pakistan was able to finance its
modest trade and capital account deficits in part due to the inward FDI and in part due to
remittances from overseas Pakistanis.
In 2007 and 2008, a rise in fuel and food prices, combined with political instability, led to a rapid
rise in inflation, a spike in the trade and current account deficits, a devaluation of the Pakistani
rupee, and a sharp decline in inward FDI. Foreign investment in Pakistan during its fiscal year
2007-2008 (July-June) was down by 38.4% from the previous year. Although global fuel and food
prices are on the decline, the global financial crisis is expected to precipitate a possibly extended

²³^S^.^M.^Nasee^m^,^“F^o^r^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Reco^ver^yⁱⁿ^P^a^ki^st^an^,^”^{Overseas P}^a^ki^st^anⁱ^F^rⁱ^eⁿ^d^s^h^t^t^p^://www.^o^p^f^b^l^o^g^.^co^m^,
^Se^pte^m^be^r^{25, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
²⁴^“IM^F^Oka^y^{s $}⁷^.⁶^B^lⁿ^P^{ackage f}^o^r^P^a^ki^st^an^:^T^a^reen^,^”^Asso^cia^t^ed^P^r^{ess o}^f^Pa^kistan^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{15, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
²⁵^J^a^mⁱ^e^A^nde^r^s^{on, “}^P^a^k^is^ta^{n T}^u^rⁿ^s^{to I}^M^{F f}^o^r^Fi^na^nc^ia^{l A}ⁱ^d,”^M^one^y^Tim^e^s^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^16,²⁰⁰⁸^.
²⁶^“^I^{MF Ba}^{ils Out}^P^a^kⁱ^staⁿ^w^{ith $}⁷^.^{6 Bill}^io^{n L}^o^aⁿ^,”^Do^m^aⁱⁿ^-B^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^17,²⁰⁰⁸^.
²⁷^“^S^e^v^e^r^a^l^Se^na^{tors Opp}^o^se^Re^c^o^u^r^se^{to IMF}^Fa^c^ility^,”^Asso^cia^t^ed^{Press o}^f^Pa^kistan^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^13,²⁰⁰^8.

global recession. For Pakistan, a global recession will reduce demand for its exports and inward
FDI flows.
The combination of high rates of inflation and high unemployment apparently have contributed to
a rise in poverty and hunger in Pakistan. According to one estimate, Pakistan’s unemployment ²⁸
rate in urban areas is nearly 40% and in rural areas over 60%. A recent United Nations study
reportedly determined 10 million Pakistanis are undernourished and over half of Pakistan’s ²⁹
population can be considered “food insecure.” Some observers speculate that the recent growth
in poverty and hunger is exacerbating Pakistan’s political problems.
When he announced the previously mentioned economic policies in September 2008, Finance
Minister Qamar said that the economic stabilization package would create jobs, promote
agriculture and manufacturing, and reduce poverty. There is concern in Pakistan, however, that
the required higher interest rates will force smaller businesses into bankruptcy and the repayment
of the IMF loan will stunt future economic growth.

As previously mentioned, the U.S. government considers a stable Pakistani government important
for several reasons. In addition, because Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, an unstable
government poses a threat throughout South Asia. As a result, Pakistan’s current capital crisis and
its underlying economic problems may pose a serious threat to U.S. regional and global interests.
Several recent events and trends, however, may have harmed U.S. relations with Pakistan.
Although the United States provides both military and humanitarian assistance ($968 million in
FY2008), Pakistan is increasingly turning to other friendly nations—such as China and Saudi
Arabia—for support. Pakistan’s trade relations have shifted so that China is its largest trading ³⁰
partner, followed by Saudi Arabia. In addition, U.S. military incursions into Pakistani territory ³¹
and the signing of nuclear cooperation agreement with India have harmed U.S.-Pakistan
relations. Also, some Pakistani analysts thought the United States was orchestrating the
negotiations with the IMF and the Friends of Pakistan to force Pakistan to accept the tougher IMF
conditions.
Some analysts maintain that there is a need for the United States to demonstrate its commitment ³²
to a stable and democratic Pakistan with an increase in non-military assistance. In their view,
with the IMF loan settled, there is an opportunity for the United States to demonstrate its support
for Pakistan by providing a portion of the missing $2 billion to $7 billion in assistance. Others
think that the United States should condition additional aid on Pakistan increasing its
commitment to combat Islamist militancy along its border with Afghanistan.

²⁸^H^a^s^h^im^A^b^r^o^{, “}^I^nf^la^{tion, U}ⁿ^e^m^ploy^m^e^{nt a}^{nd R}^e^c^r^uitm^eⁿ^t,”^Pa^kistaⁿ^News^{, O}^c^to^be^r²⁷^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
²⁹^Nⁱ^c^k^Sc^hif^r^{in, “}^P^a^k^is^ta^{n H}^e^a^d^e^d^f^o^r^Ec^onom^ic^Me^ltdow^n?^,”^{ABC News}^{, O}^c^tobe^r²¹^,²⁰^08.
³⁰^G^l^oba^{l T}^r^a^d^e^A^tla^{s da}^ta^.
³¹^For^m^o^r^e^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion o}ⁿ^the^a^g^r^e^em^eⁿ^{t, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³³⁰¹^6,^U^.^{S. N}^u^c^l^e^a^r^C^o^ope^r^a^tio^{n w}ⁱ^t^h^I^ndi^a:^I^s^s^u^e^s^for
^C^ongr^e^s^s^,^by^P^a^{ul K}^.^K^e^rr.
³²^Craⁱ^g^Cohe^{n a}ⁿ^{d De}^re^k^Chol^le^t,^“^W^he^{n $10}^Billi^{on Is}^{Not E}ⁿ^o^u^g^h^{: Re}^thiⁿ^kⁱ^ng^U.S.^Stra^te^g^y^to^w^a^r^d^P^a^kⁱ^staⁿ^,”
^Wa^shⁱⁿ^gt^on^Qua^r^t^e^rl^y^{, Spr}ⁱ^ng²⁰^07,³⁰^:2,^p^p^.^7-¹⁹^.

^Mich^{ael F. Marti}ⁿ ^{K. A}^l^aⁿ^Kroⁿ^s^t^ad^t
^An^al^y^s^{t i}ⁿ^A^s^ian^T^r^{ade an}^{d Fin}^aⁿ^ce^Sp^{ecialist i}ⁿ^So^u^t^h^Asian^Af^f^a^ir^s
^m^f^m^a^rtⁱⁿ^@^c^rs^.l^oc.g^o^v^{, 7-}²¹⁹⁹^k^k^r^ons^t^a^dt^@^c^rs^.l^oc.g^ov^{, 7-}⁵⁴¹⁵