Privacy: An Overview of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

This report provides an overview of federal law governing wiretapping and electronic
eavesdropping. It also appends citations to state law in the area and contains a bibliography of
legal commentary as well as the text of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
It is a federal crime to wiretap or to use a machine to capture the communications of others
without court approval, unless one of the parties has given their prior consent. It is likewise a
federal crime to use or disclose any information acquired by illegal wiretapping or electronic
eavesdropping. Violations can result in imprisonment for not more than five years; fines up to
$250,000 (up to $500,000 for organizations); in civil liability for damages, attorneys’ fees and
possibly punitive damages; in disciplinary action against any attorneys involved; and in
suppression of any derivative evidence. Congress has created separate but comparable protective
schemes for electronic communications (e.g., e-mail) and against the surreptitious use of
telephone call monitoring practices such as pen registers and trap and trace devices.
Each of these protective schemes comes with a procedural mechanism to afford limited law
enforcement access to private communications and communications records under conditions
consistent with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. The government has been given even more
narrowly confined authority to engage in electronic surveillance, conduct physical searches,
install and use pen registers and trap and trace devices for law enforcement purposes under the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act and for purposes of foreign intelligence gathering under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
This report includes a brief summary of the recently expired Protect America Act, P.L. 110-55 and
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, P.L. 110-261
(H.R. 6304). It is available in an abridged form without footnotes, quotations, or appendices as
CRS Report 98-327, Privacy: An Abbreviated Outline of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping
and Electronic Eavesdropping, by Gina Marie Stevens and Charles Doyle. Both will be revised as
circumstances warrant.

Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Backgr ound ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Prohibitions ..................................................................................................................................... 6
Illegal Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping...................................................................6
Person......................................................................................................................... ......... 7
Intentional .................................................................................................................... ....... 7
J urisdicti on ................................................................................................................... ....... 7
Intercepti on ................................................................................................................... ...... 8
By Electronic, Mechanical, or Other Device......................................................................9
Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communications........................................................................11
Endeavoring to Intercept....................................................................................................11
Exemptions: Consent Interceptions..................................................................................12
Exemptions: Publicly Accessible Radio Communications...............................................13
Exemptions: Government Officials..................................................................................13
Exemptions: Communication Service Providers..............................................................14
Domestic Exemptions.......................................................................................................15
Consequences: Criminal Penalties....................................................................................16
Consequences: Civil Liability...........................................................................................17
Consequences: Civil Liability of the United States..........................................................18
Consequences: Administrative Action..............................................................................18
Consequences: Attorney Discipline..................................................................................18
Consequences: Exclusion of Evidence.............................................................................19
Illegal Disclosure of Information Obtained by Wiretapping or Electronic
Eave sdropping ...................................................................................................................... 21
Illegal Use of Information Obtained by Unlawful Wiretapping or Electronic
Eave sdropping ...................................................................................................................... 24
Shipping, Manufacturing, Distributing, Possessing or Advertising Wire, Oral, or
Electronic Communication Interception Devices................................................................25
Stored Electronic Communications.........................................................................................27
Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices.............................................................................30
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.....................................................................................31
Procedure ....................................................................................................................................... 34
Law Enforcement Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping..............................................34
Stored Electronic or Wire Communications............................................................................37
Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices.............................................................................39
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.....................................................................................40
Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices.......................................................................45
Tangible Items...................................................................................................................45
Protect America Act (Expired)..........................................................................................46
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (P.L.
110-261) ......................................................................................................................... 47
Selected Bibliography.............................................................................................................54

Appendix A. State Statutes Outlawing the Interception of Wire(w), Oral(o) and Electronic
Communications (e) .................................................................................................................... 61
Appendix B. Consent Interceptions Under State Law...................................................................62
Appendix C. Statutory Civil Liability for Interceptions Under State Law....................................63
Appendix D. Court Authorized Interception Under State Law.....................................................64
Appendix E. State Statutes Regulating Stored Electronic Communications (SE), Pen
Registers (PR) and Trap and Trace Devices (T).........................................................................65
Appendix F. State Computer Crime Statutes.................................................................................66
Appendix G. Spyware....................................................................................................................67
Appendix H. Text of ECPA/FISA.................................................................................................68
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................195

Depending on one’s perspective, wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping are either “dirty
business,” essential law enforcement tools, or both. This is a very general overview of the federal
statutes that proscribe wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping and of the procedures they
establish for law enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering purposes. Although the specifics
of state law are beyond the scope of this report, citations to related state statutory provisions have
been appended. The text of pertinent federal statutes and a selected bibliography of legal ¹
materials appear as appendices as well.

At common law, “eavesdroppers, or such as listen under walls or windows, or the eaves of a
house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales, are a
common nuisance and presentable at the court-leet; or are indictable at the sessions, and
punishable by fine and finding of sureties for [their] good behavior,” 4 B^LAC^K^S^T^O^N^E,
C^OM^M^E^NT^A^R^IES^ON^T^H^EL^AW^S^O^FE^NGLA^N^D, 169 (1769).
Although early American law proscribed common law eavesdropping, the crime was little ²
prosecuted and by the late nineteenth century had “nearly faded from the legal horizon.” With

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^c^onv^e^r^sa^{tions). I}ⁿ^pre^v^io^{us v}^e^rsio^{ns of}^{this re}^p^o^{rt a}^nd^othe^{r e}^a^r^lie^r^w^r^itin^g^s^{, it w}^a^{s c}^o^m^m^{on to use}^a^m^o^re^ne^utra^{l, a}^nd
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^coⁿ^tⁱⁿ^u^e^d^u^s^{e o}^f^th^{e term}^“electroⁿⁱ^{c su}^rv^eillan^{ce” rath}^er^th^an^“electroⁿⁱ^{c eav}^esd^r^o^p^pⁱⁿ^g^{” risk}^{s co}ⁿ^f^u^s^ioⁿ^w^ith^f^o^rm^s
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^Surv^e^illa^nc^e^A^c^{t, 50 U.S.C}^.¹⁸⁰¹⁽^f^{)), tha}^t^inv^o^lv^e^surv^e^illa^nc^e^tha^t^doe^s^{not c}^a^p^t^u^re^c^o^nv^e^r^sa^{tion (e}^.^g^{., the}^r^m^a^l
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^W^illiams^{, 1}²⁴^F.^3d⁴¹^{1 (}^{3d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁷⁾⁾^.
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^{ON T}^H^E^C^RI^MI^N^A^L^L^AW^{, 670 (}¹⁸⁸²⁾^.

the invention of the telegraph and telephone, however, state laws outlawing wiretapping or
indiscretion by telephone and telegraph operators preserved the spirit of the common law
prohibition in this country.
Congress enacted the first federal wiretap statute as a temporary measure to prevent disclosure of ³
government secrets during World War I. Later, it proscribed intercepting and divulging private ⁴
radio messages in the Radio Act of 1927, but did not immediately reestablish a federal wiretap
prohibition. By the time of the landmark Supreme Court decision in Olmstead, however, at least
forty-one of the forty-eight states had banned wiretapping or forbidden telephone and telegraph ⁵
employees and officers from disclosing the content of telephone or telegraph messages or both.
Olmstead was a Seattle bootlegger whose Prohibition Act conviction was the product of a federal
wiretap. He challenged his conviction on three grounds, arguing unsuccessfully that the wiretap
evidence should have been suppressed as a violation of either his Fourth Amendment rights, his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, or the rights implicit in the Washington
state statute that outlawed wiretapping.
For a majority of the Court, writing through Chief Justice Taft, Olmstead’s Fourth Amendment
challenge was doomed by the absence of “an official search and seizure of his person, or such a
seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house or ⁶⁷
curtilage for the purposes of making a seizure,” 277 U.S. at 466.
Chief Justice Taft pointed out that Congress was free to provide protection which the Constitution ⁸
did not. Congress did so in the 1934 Communications Act by expanding the Radio Act’s

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^the^h^o^m^e^,”^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^v^.^D^uⁿⁿ^{, 48}^{0 U}^.^S.²⁹^4,³⁰^{1 n}^.^{4 (}¹⁹⁸⁷⁾^.
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^a^s^“^d^ir^ty^bus^ine^s^s^,^”²⁷^{7 U}^.^S.^a^t⁴^{70. T}^h^e^dis^s^e^nt^of^J^u^s^tic^e^B^r^a^nde^is^obs^e^r^v^e^{d tha}^t^t^h^e^dr^a^f^te^r^s^of^the^C^ons^tit^uti^on
^“^c^onf^e^r^r^e^{d a}^s^a^g^aⁱ^ns^{t the}^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt, the}^rⁱ^g^h^t^to^be^le^{t a}^l^one^{– t}^h^e^m^o^s^t^c^o^m^p^r^e^he^ns^iv^e^of^rⁱ^g^h^ts^{and t}^h^e^rⁱ^g^h^{t m}^o^s^t
^val^u^ed^b^y^ci^vi^lⁱ^zed^m^eⁿ^.^T^o^p^r^o^t^e^c^t^t^h^at^ri^gh^t^,^ever^y^uⁿ^j^u^s^tif^ia^bleⁱⁿ^trusio^{n by}^the^G^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt a}^g^aⁱ^ns^{t priv}^a^c^y^o^f^the
^indivⁱ^d^u^a^l^w^h^a^t^e^v^e^r^the^m^e^aⁿ^s^em^plo^y^e^d^{, m}^u^s^t^be^de^em^e^d^{in v}ⁱ^ol^a^tion^of^the^Fo^ur^t^h^A^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^t,”²⁷⁷^U^.^S.^a^t⁴^78-^79.
⁸^“^C^ong^r^e^s^s^m^a^y^of^c^our^s^e^pr^ote^c^t^the^s^e^c^r^e^c^y^of^te^le^phone^m^e^ss^a^g^es^by^m^a^kⁱ^ng^the^m^,^w^h^eⁿ^inte^r^c^e^p^t^e^{d ina}^d^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^ble
^{in e}^v^ideⁿ^c^eⁱⁿ^f^e^de^ra^{l c}^rⁱ^m^ina^l^tria^{ls, by}^dire^c^t^le^gⁱ^sla^tion,”²^{77 U.}^{S. a}^t⁴⁶⁵^.

proscription against intercepting and divulging radio communications so as to include ⁹
intercepting and divulging radio or wire communications.
The Federal Communications Act outlawed wiretapping, but it said nothing about the use of ¹⁰
machines to surreptitiously record and transmit face to face conversations. In the absence of a
statutory ban the number of surreptitious recording cases decided on Fourth Amendment grounds ¹¹
surged and the results began to erode Olmstead’s underpinnings.
Erosion, however, came slowly. Initially the Court applied Olmstead’s principles to the electronic
eavesdropping cases. Thus, the use of a dictaphone to secretly overhear a private conversation in
an adjacent office offended no Fourth Amendment precipes because no physical trespass into the
office in which the conversation took place had occurred, Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1942). Similarly, the absence of a physical trespass precluded Fourth Amendment coverage of
the situation where a federal agent secretly recorded his conversation with a defendant held in a
commercial laundry in an area open to the public, On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment did reach the government’s physical intrusion upon
private property during an investigation, as for example when they drove a “spike mike” into the
common wall of a row house until it made contact with a heating duct for the home in which the
conversation occurred, Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
Silverman presented something of a technical problem, because there was some question whether
the spike mike had actually crossed the property line of the defendant’s town house when it made
contact with the heating duct. The Court declined to rest its decision on the technicalities of local
property law, and instead found that the government’s conduct had intruded upon privacy of ¹²
home and hearth in a manner condemned by the Fourth Amendment, 365 U.S. at 510-12.

⁹^{48 U}^.^S.C^.¹¹⁰³^-⁴⁽¹⁹³⁴⁾^{, 4}⁷^U^.^S^.^C^.⁶^{05 (}¹⁹⁴⁰^e^d^.)^.^T^h^e^A^c^{t ne}^ithe^r^e^x^pr^e^s^s^l^y^c^onde^mⁿ^e^d^law^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^t
ⁱⁿ^t^e^rcep^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^no^{r cal}^l^e^d^f^o^{r t}^h^{e excl}^u^sⁱ^o^{n o}^f^wⁱ^ret^a^p^evi^d^en^ce,^b^u^tⁱ^t^w^a^{s re}^ad^t^o^en^co^m^p^{ass b}^o^t^h^,^N^a^r^done^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d
^State^s^,³⁰^{2 U}^.^S^.³⁷⁹⁽¹⁹³⁷⁾^;^N^a^r^done^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^,³⁰^{8 U}^.^S.³^{21 (}¹⁹³⁹⁾^.
¹⁰^S^ectⁱ^o^{n 60}⁵^dⁱ^{d b}^a^{n t}^h^{e i}ⁿ^t^e^rcep^tⁱ^oⁿ^aⁿ^d^dⁱ^vu^l^g^en^{ce o}^f^radⁱ^o^b^r^o^a^dcast^s^b^u^tⁱ^t^dⁱ^d^no^t^reach^t^h^{e rad}ⁱ^{o t}^r^an^smⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^o^f
^c^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^tha^t^w^e^r^e^br^oa^dc^a^s^{t un}^be^k^now^ns^{t to a}^l^l^of^th^e^pa^rtie^{s to t}^h^e^c^onv^e^r^sa^tion^.^L^a^te^{in the}^g^a^m^e^{, the}^FCC
^s^uppl^ie^{d a}^pa^r^tia^{l s}^o^l^u^tio^{n w}^h^eⁿ^it^ba^nne^{d t}^h^e^us^e^of^lic^eⁿ^s^e^{d r}^a^di^o^e^quipm^eⁿ^{t to}^ov^e^r^he^a^r^or^r^e^c^o^r^d^p^r^iv^a^t^e
^c^onv^e^r^sa^{tion w}^itho^u^{t t}^h^e^c^onseⁿ^t^of^a^{ll the}^pa^rtie^{s i}ⁿ^v^o^lv^e^dⁱⁿ^the^c^onv^e^r^sa^tion,³¹^Fe^d.^Re^g.³⁴⁰⁰⁽^M^a^r^c^h^4,¹⁹⁶⁶⁾^,
^am^e^nding^theⁿ⁴⁷^C^.^F^.^R^.^§§^2.7⁰¹^,¹⁵^.1^{1. T}^h^e^FC^C^e^x^c^l^ude^{d “}^o^pe^r^a^tions^of^aⁿ^y^law^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^{t of}^fⁱ^c^e^s^c^onduc^te^d
^unde^r^la^w^f^ul^a^u^thor^ity^,”^id^.
¹¹^T^h^e^v^o^lum^e^of^a^{ll Fourth A}^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t c}^a^s^e^s^c^a^lling^f^o^{r Sup}^r^e^m^e^C^{ourt re}^vⁱ^e^w^inc^r^e^a^s^e^d^dra^m^a^tic^a^l^l^y^a^f^te^r^M^{app v}^.
^Oh^io^,³⁶^{7 U}^.^S.⁶⁴^{3 (}¹⁹⁶¹⁾^{, a}^c^k^no^w^l^e^dge^{d the}^a^p^p^lic^a^tio^{n of}^the^F^o^ur^{th A}^m^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^{t e}^x^c^l^us^iona^r^y^r^u^le^{to t}^h^e^s^t^a^t^e^s^.
¹²^“T^h^e^ab^sen^{ce o}^f^{a p}^h^y^si^calⁱⁿ^vasⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e p}^e^tⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^e^{r’s p}^r^emⁱ^s^es^{was al}^so^{a vi}^t^a^l^f^act^o^rⁱⁿ^t^h^{e Cou}^r^t^’^{s d}^eci^si^oⁿⁱⁿ
^O^l^m^s^te^{ad v}^.^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^State^s^.^{. .}^{. I}ⁿ^hol^di^ng^tha^t^t^h^e^wⁱ^r^e^ta^pping^the^r^e^did^no^{t v}ⁱ^ola^t^e^t^h^e^Fo^ur^th^A^m^eⁿ^dm^eⁿ^{t, the}^C^o^ur^t
^note^d^tha^t^theⁱⁿ^s^e^r^tio^ns^w^e^r^e^m^a^de^w^ithout^tr^e^s^pa^s^s^up^on^aⁿ^y^pr^ope^r^t^y^of^the^de^f^e^nda^nts^.^T^h^e^y^w^e^r^e^m^a^de^{in the}
^ba^s^e^m^e^{nt of}^the^la^r^g^e^of^fⁱ^c^e^build^ing^.^T^h^e^ta^ps^f^r^om^hous^e^line^s^w^e^r^e^m^a^de^{in the}^s^t^r^e^e^t^s^ne^a^r^t^h^e^h^o^u^s^e^s^.²⁷^{7 U}^.^S^.^a^t
⁴⁵⁷^{. T}^h^e^r^e^w^a^s^{no e}ⁿ^tr^y^of^the^ho^us^e^s^or^of^fⁱ^c^e^s^of^the^de^f^e^nda^nts^.²⁷⁷^U^.^S.^a^t⁴^64.^R^e^ly^ing^upon^the^s^e^cⁱ^r^c^um^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^s^,
^the^C^o^ur^{t r}^e^a^s^one^d^tha^t^theⁱⁿ^te^r^v^eⁿ^ing^wⁱ^r^e^s^a^r^e^{not pa}^r^t^of⁽^t^he^de^f^e^nda^nt’^s⁾^ho^us^e^or^of^fⁱ^ce^aⁿ^y^m^o^r^e^thaⁿ^a^r^e^the
^hig^h^w^a^y^s^a^l^ong^w^h^ic^{h the}^y^a^r^e^s^t^r^e^tc^he^{d. 2}⁷⁷^U^.^{S. a}^t⁴^65.
^“^H^e^r^e^,^b^y^c^ontra^{st, the}^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^{s ov}^e^r^he^a^r^{d the}^pe^titio^ne^{rs’ c}^onv^e^r^sa^{tions only}^by^usurping^pa^rt^of^the^p^e^titione^rs’^ho^use
^{or of}^fⁱ^c^e^{– a}^he^a^ting^sy^ste^m^w^h^ic^{h w}^a^{s a}ⁿ^inte^g^r^a^l^pa^{rt of}^the^p^r^e^m^ise^s^oc^c^upie^d^by^th^e^pe^titio^ne^{rs, a}^usur^pa^tio^{n t}^h^a^t
^w^a^s^ef^f^e^c^t^e^d^w^ithout^theⁱ^r^kⁿ^o^w^l^edg^e^a^{nd w}^itho^u^{t t}^h^eⁱ^r^c^ons^eⁿ^{t. I}ⁿ^the^s^e^cⁱ^r^c^um^s^t^aⁿ^ce^s^w^e^ne^e^d^not^pa^us^e^{to c}^onsⁱ^d^e^r
^w^h^e^t^he^r^or^no^{t t}^h^e^r^e^w^a^s^a^tec^hnic^a^l^tr^e^s^pa^s^s^unde^r^t^h^e^loc^a^l^pr^o^p^e^r^ty^law^r^e^l^a^ting^{to pa}^r^t^y^w^a^lls^{. I}^nhe^r^e^{nt Fo}^ur^th
^Amen^d^m^en^t^ri^gh^t^s^{are n}^o^tⁱⁿ^evi^t^a^b^l^y^m^e^asu^r^ab^l^eⁱⁿ^t^e^rm^{s o}^f^an^ci^en^tⁿⁱ^cetⁱ^e^{s o}^f^t^o^rt^o^r^real^p^r^op^ert^y^l^a^w^.^.^.^.
^“^T^he^Four^th^A^m^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^{t, a}^{nd t}^h^e^pe^r^s^ona^{l r}ⁱ^g^h^ts^w^h^ic^{h it s}^e^c^u^r^e^s^,^ha^v^e^a^long^his^t^or^y^.^A^t^the^v^e^r^y^cor^e^s^t^a^nds^t^h^e^rⁱ^g^h^t
^of^a^m^a^{n to r}^e^tr^e^a^t^int^o^his^ow^{n h}^o^m^e^a^{nd the}^r^e^be^f^r^e^e^f^r^o^m^unr^e^a^s^ona^ble^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nta^l^intr^usⁱ^oⁿ^{. .}^{. T}^h^is^C^o^ur^t^ha^s
^ne^v^e^r^he^{ld tha}^t^a^f^e^de^r^a^{l of}^fⁱ^c^e^r^m^a^y^w^ithout^w^a^r^r^a^{nt a}^{nd w}^ithout^c^ons^eⁿ^t^phy^sⁱ^c^a^l^l^y^eⁿ^tr^eⁿ^c^h^int^o^a^m^a^n’^s^of^fⁱ^c^e^or
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Each of these cases focused upon whether a warrantless trespass onto private property had
occurred, that is, whether the means of conducting a search and seizure had been so unreasonable
as to offend the Fourth Amendment. Yet in each case, the object of the search and seizure had
been not those tangible papers or effects for which the Fourth Amendment’s protection had been
traditionally claimed, but an intangible, a conversation. This enlarged view of the Fourth
Amendment could hardly be ignored, for “[i]t follows from u u u Silverman u u u that the Fourth
Amendment may protect against the overhearing of verbal statements as well as against the more
traditional seizure of papers and effects,” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).
Soon thereafter the Court repudiated the notion that the Fourth Amendment’s protection was
contingent upon some trespass to real property, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz
was a bookie convicted on the basis of evidence gathered by an electronic listening and recording
device set up outside the public telephone booth that Katz used to take and place bets. The Court
held that the gateway for Fourth Amendment purposes stood at that point where an individual
should to able to expect that his or her privacy would not be subjected to unwarranted ¹³
governmental intrusion, 389 U.S. at 353.
One obvious consequence of Fourth Amendment coverage of wiretapping and other forms of
electronic eavesdropping is the usual attachment of the Amendment’s warrant requirement. To
avoid constitutional problems and at the same time preserve wiretapping and other forms of
electronic eavesdropping as a law enforcement tool, some of the states established a statutory
system under which law enforcement officials could obtain a warrant, or equivalent court order,
authorizing wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping.
The Court rejected the constitutional adequacy of one of the more detailed of these state statutory
schemes in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). The statute was found deficient its failure to
require:
• a particularized description of the place to be searched; a particularized
description of the crime to which the search and seizure related;

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^h^o^m^e,^t^h^{ere secret}^l^y^o^b^s^{erve o}^r^lⁱ^s^t^eⁿ^,^an^{d rel}^a^t^e^at^t^h^{e m}^aⁿ^’^{s su}^b^s^eq^u^eⁿ^t^cri^mⁱⁿ^al^t^rⁱ^a^l^w^h^at^{was see}ⁿ^o^r^h^eard^.
^“^A^dis^tinc^tion^be^tw^e^eⁿ^the^dic^t^a^p^hone^e^m^ploy^e^d^{in G}^o^ldm^a^{n a}^{nd t}^h^e^s^p^ik^e^mⁱ^ke^utiliz^e^d^he^re^s^e^e^m^{ed to}^the^C^ourt^of
^A^ppe^a^l^{s too f}ⁱ^ne^a^one^to^dra^w^{. The}^c^ourt^w^a^{s unw}^illing^{to be}^lie^v^e^tha^t^the^re^spe^c^tiv^e^rig^h^{ts a}^r^e^to^be^m^e^a^s^ure^dⁱⁿ
^f^r^ac^tions^of^inc^h^e^s^{. B}^u^t^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^on^he^r^e^doe^sⁿ^o^t^turⁿ^u^p^oⁿ^t^h^e^te^c^hni^c^a^lit^y^of^a^tr^e^s^pa^s^s^{upon a}^pa^r^t^y^w^a^{ll a}^s^a^m^a^tte^r^of
^loc^a^l^la^w^.^{It is ba}^se^{d u}^p^oⁿ^t^h^e^re^a^lity^of^aⁿ^a^c^t^ua^{l intrusio}^{n i}ⁿ^t^o^a^c^onstit^uti^ona^lly^prote^c^t^e^d^a^r^e^a^.^W^h^a^t^the^Co^{urt sa}^id
^long^a^g^{o be}^a^r^{s re}^pe^a^ting^now^{: It}^m^a^y^be^tha^t^{it is t}^h^e^o^bⁿ^o^xⁱ^ous^thiⁿ^g^{in its}^m^ilde^s^{t a}^{nd le}^a^s^{t re}^pu^lsi^v^e^f^o^rm^{; but}
^ille^g^itim^a^t^e^a^{nd u}ⁿ^c^onsti^tuti^ona^l^pra^c^tic^e^s^g^e^{t the}ⁱ^{r f}ⁱ^{rst f}^ootin^gⁱⁿ^tha^t^w^a^y^,^na^m^e^l^y^{, b}^y^sile^{nt a}^ppro^a^c^h^e^s^a^{nd slig}^ht
^de^vⁱ^a^tions^f^r^om^le^ga^{l m}^ode^s^of^pr^oc^e^dur^e^.^B^o^yd^v.^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^a^t^es^{, 1}^{16 U}^.^S.⁶¹^6,⁶³^{5. W}^e^fⁱ^{nd n}^o^oc^c^a^sⁱ^{on t}^o^r^e^-
^e^x^am^ine^G^o^ldm^a^{n he}^r^e^{, but w}^e^de^c^line^{to g}^o^be^y^{ond it,}^by^e^v^eⁿ^a^f^r^a^c^tion^of^aⁿ^inc^h^,”³⁶^{5 U}^.^S^.^a^t⁵^10-^{12 (}ⁱ^nte^r^na^l
^quo^ta^tio^{n m}^a^rk^{s o}^m^itte^d).
¹³^“^W^e^c^onc^lude^tha^t^the^un^de^r^pⁱⁿⁿⁱ^ng^s^of^Olmstea^d^an^d^Go^l^d^man^h^a^v^e^be^eⁿ^s^o^e^r^ode^d^by^our^s^u^bs^e^q^ue^nt^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^ons
^tha^t^the^tre^s^pa^{ss doc}^triⁿ^e^the^r^e^eⁿ^unc^ia^te^{d c}^aⁿ^no^lo^ng^e^r^be^re^g^a^rde^d^a^s^c^ontr^o^lli^ng^{. T}^h^e^G^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt’s a}^c^tiv^itie^{s in}
^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^a^lly^lis^te^ning^{to a}ⁿ^{d re}^c^o^rdiⁿ^g^the^pe^titio^ne^r’s^w^o^rds^vⁱ^ol^a^t^e^d^the^pr^iv^a^c^y^upon^w^h^ic^{h he}^j^u^s^tif^ia^bl^y^re^lie^d
^w^h^ile^us^ing^the^te^le^p^h^oⁿ^e^b^oot^{h a}^{nd t}^hus^c^ons^tit^ute^d^a^s^e^a^r^c^h^a^{nd s}^e^iz^ur^e^w^{ithin the}^m^e^aⁿ^ing^of^the^Four^t^h
^Amen^d^m^en^t^.^T^h^e^f^act^t^h^at^t^h^{e el}^ect^roⁿⁱ^c^d^e^vi^{ce e}^m^p^l^o^y^ed^t^o^achⁱ^e^{ve t}^h^at^en^d^dⁱ^{d no}^t^h^a^p^p^e^{n t}^o^p^e^net^r^at^{e t}^h^{e w}^a^l^l^o^f
^t^h^{e bo}^o^t^h^can^h^a^{ve n}^o^con^s^tⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^si^gnⁱ^fⁱ^can^ce.^{” L}^a^t^e^{r co}^u^r^t^s^seem^t^o^p^r^ef^{er t}^h^{e “exp}^e^ct^atⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^p^rⁱ^v^ac^{y” l}^aⁿ^g^u^a^ge
^f^{ound i}ⁿ^J^u^s^t^ic^e^H^a^r^l^aⁿ^’^s^c^onc^ur^r^e^nc^e^:^“^M^y^unde^r^s^ta^nding^of^the^r^u^le^tha^t^ha^s^e^m^e^r^g^e^{d f}^r^o^m^pr^ior^d^e^cⁱ^sⁱ^ons^is^tha^t
^the^r^e^is^a^tw^of^{old r}^e^quir^e^m^e^{nt, f}ⁱ^r^s^{t tha}^t^a^pe^r^s^oⁿ^ha^v^e^e^x^hibite^{d a}ⁿ^a^c^t^ua^{l (}^s^ubje^c^tiv^e⁾^e^x^pe^c^t^a^{tion of}^pr^iv^a^c^y^a^nd,
^s^e^c^{ond, t}^h^a^t^t^h^e^e^x^pe^c^t^a^tion^be^oⁿ^e^tha^t^s^o^cⁱ^e^t^y^is^pr^e^p^a^r^e^d^to^r^e^c^o^gⁿ^iz^e^a^s^r^e^a^s^ona^ble^,^”³^{89 U}^.^{S. a}^t³^61.

• a particularized description of the conversation to be seized;
• limitations to prevent general searches;
• termination of the interception when the conversation sought had been seized;
• prompt execution of the order;
• return to the issuing court detailing the items seized; and
• any showing exigent circumstances to overcome the want of prior notice. 388
U.S. at 58-60.
Berger help persuade Congress to enact Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 87 Stat. 197, 18 U.S.C. 2510 - 2520 (1970 ed.), a comprehensive wiretapping and
electronic eavesdropping statute that not only outlawed both in general terms but that permitted
federal and state law enforcement officers to use them under strict limitations designed to meet
the objections in Berger.
A decade later another Supreme Court case persuaded Congress to supplement Title III with a
judicially supervised procedure for the use of wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping in foreign
intelligence gathering situations. When Congress passed Title III there was some question over
the extent of the President’s inherent powers to authorize wiretaps – without judicial approval – in
national security cases. As a consequence, the issue was simply removed from the Title III ¹⁴
scheme. After the Court held that the President’s inherent powers were insufficient to excuse
warrantless electronic eavesdropping on purely domestic threats to national security, United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), Congress considered it prudent to
augment the foreign intelligence gathering authority of the United States with the Foreign
Intelligence Security Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1783, 50 U.S.C. 1801-1862. The Act provides a
procedure for judicial review and authorization or denial of wiretapping and other forms of
electronic eavesdropping for purposes of foreign intelligence gathering.
In 1986, Congress recast Title III in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 100
Stat. 1848, 18 U.S.C. 2510 - 2521. The Act followed the general outline of Title III with
adjustments and additions. Like Title III, it sought to strike a balance between the interests of
privacy and law enforcement, but it also reflected a Congressional desire to avoid unnecessarily
crippling infant industries in the fields of advanced communications technology, H.Rept. 99-647,
at 18-9 (1984); S.Rept. 99-541, at 5 (1986).
ECPA also included new protection and law enforcement access provisions for stored wire and
electronic communications and transactional records access (e-mail and phone records),

18 U.S.C. 2701 - 2710, and for pen registers as well as trap and trace devices (devices for ¹⁵

recording the calls placed to or from a particular telephone), 18 U.S.C. 3121 - 3126.

¹⁴^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁵¹¹⁽³⁾⁽¹⁹^{70 e}^d^.)⁽^“^N^o^thiⁿ^g^c^ontaⁱ^ne^{d i}ⁿ^t^h^is^c^h^a^p^te^r^o^r^{in s}^e^c^tio^{n 6}⁰⁵^of^the^C^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^A^c^{t . . .}
^sh^al^l^lⁱ^mⁱ^t^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^s^tⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^on^al^po^w^e^{r o}^f^t^h^e^P^r^esi^d^ent^t^o^t^a^{ke su}^ch^m^e^asu^r^{es as h}^e^d^{eems n}^ecessar^y^t^o^pro^t^ect^t^h^{e Nat}ⁱ^oⁿ
^a^g^aⁱ^{nst a}^c^t^ua^{l or p}^o^te^ntia^l^a^tta^c^k^{or ot}^he^{r h}^o^stile^a^c^t^{s of}^a^f^o^re^ig^{n p}^o^w^e^{r, to ob}^ta^{in f}^o^re^ig^{n i}ⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^inf^o^rm^a^tion
^d^eemed^essen^tⁱ^a^l^t^o^t^h^{e secu}^ri^t^y^o^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es,^o^r^t^o^p^r^ote^c^tⁿ^a^tiona^{l se}^c^u^rity^inf^o^rm^a^{tion a}^g^aⁱ^{nst f}^o^re^igⁿ
^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^a^c^tiv^itie^{s. . .”}^).
¹⁵^T^h^e^s^e^pr^ov^is^ions^w^e^r^e^a^l^s^o^g^r^ou^nde^dⁱⁿ^Su^pr^e^m^e^C^our^{t jur}ⁱ^s^p^r^u^de^nc^e^.^Iⁿ^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^M^ille^r^{, 4}²⁵^U^.^S.⁴^35,⁴^41-
^{43 (}¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^{, the}^C^our^{t he}^l^d^t^h^a^t^a^c^u^s^t^om^e^r^ha^{d n}^o^F^our^t^h^A^m^e^ndm^{ent pr}^ote^c^t^e^d^e^x^pe^c^t^a^tion^of^pr^iv^a^c^y^{in the}^r^e^c^o^r^d^s^his
^b^aⁿ^k^m^aⁱⁿ^t^aⁱⁿ^ed^coⁿ^cernⁱⁿ^g^hⁱ^{s t}^r^an^sactⁱ^oⁿ^s^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^em^.^T^h^{ese t}^hⁱ^r^{d p}^a^rt^y^reco^rd^{s were t}^h^eref^o^r^{e a}^v^ai^l^a^b^l^{e t}^o^t^h^e
^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt unde}^r^a^s^u^b^poe^na^du^c^e^s^te^c^u^m^r^a^the^r^thaⁿ^a^m^o^r^e^na^r^r^o^w^l^y^cⁱ^r^c^u^m^s^c^rⁱ^be^d^w^a^r^r^a^{nt, 42}⁵^U^.^{S. 4}⁴^-⁴^{5. I}ⁿ
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Over the years, Congress has adjusted the components of Title III/ECPA or FISA. Sometimes in
the interests of greater privacy; sometimes in the interest of more effective law enforcement or ^th
foreign intelligence gathering. The 107 Congress, for instance, amended the basic statutes in the
USA PATRIOT Act, P.L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); the Intelligence Authorization Act for ^st
Fiscal Year 2002, P.L. 107-108, 115 Stat. 1394 (2001); the 21 Century Department of Justice
Appropriations Authorization Act, P.L. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002); the Department of
Homeland Security Act, P.L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). The later modifications appear in
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, P.L. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006)
and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, P.L. 110-261,

122 Stat. 2436 (2008).

Unless otherwise provided, Title III/ECPA outlaws wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping,
possession of wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping equipment, use or disclosure of
information obtained through illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping, and in order to
obstruct justice, disclosure of information secured through court-ordered wiretapping or
electronic eavesdropping, 18 U.S.C. 2511. Elsewhere ECPA outlaws:
• unlawful access to stored communications, 18 U.S.C. 2701;
• unlawful use of a pen register or a trap and trace device, 18 U.S.C. 3121; and
• abuse of eavesdropping and search authority or unlawful disclosures under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. 1809, 1827.
At the heart of Title III/ECPA lies the prohibition against illegal wiretapping and electronic
eavesdropping, 18 U.S.C. 2511(1), that proscribes:
• any person from
• intentionally
• intercepting, or endeavoring to intercept,
• wire, oral or electronic communications
• by using an electronic, mechanical or other device
• unless the conduct is specifically authorized or expressly not covered, e.g.
• one of the parties to the conversation has consent to the interception

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^{Smith v}^.^M^a^ry^lan^d^,⁴⁴^{2 U}^.^S^.⁷³⁵^,⁷⁴^1-⁴⁶⁽¹⁹⁷⁹⁾^,^it^he^{ld t}^h^a^tⁿ^o^w^a^r^r^a^{nt w}^a^s^r^e^quir^e^{d f}^o^r^the^s^t^a^t^e^’^s^us^e^of^a^peⁿ
^regi^st^{er o}^r^t^r^ap^an^{d t}^r^{ace d}^e^vi^{ce wh}ⁱ^c^h^m^e^rel^yⁱ^d^en^tⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^t^h^{e t}^e^l^e^p^hon^{e n}^u^m^b^e^{rs f}^o^{r cal}^l^s^mad^e^an^d^recei^ved^f^r^o^m^a
^pa^r^tic^ula^r^te^le^p^h^oⁿ^e^.^N^o^Fo^ur^th^A^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t s}^e^a^r^c^h^or^s^e^iz^ur^e^oc^c^u^r^r^e^{d, the}^C^our^{t he}^l^d^{, s}ⁱ^nc^e^the^c^u^s^t^om^e^r^ha^{d no}
^jus^tif^ia^ble^e^x^pe^c^t^a^{tion of}^pr^iv^a^c^y^{in s}^u^c^h^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion w}^h^ic^{h he}^kⁿ^e^w^or^s^houl^{d k}ⁿ^o^w^tha^t^the^te^le^p^h^oⁿ^e^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^y^mⁱ^g^h^t
^ordi^na^rily^c^a^p^ture^f^o^{r bill}^{or se}^rv^ic^e^purp^o^se^s,^id^.

• the interception occurs in compliance with a statutorily authorized, (and
ordinarily judicially-supervised) law enforcement or foreign intelligence
gathering interception,
• the interception occurs as part of providing or regulating communication
services,
• certain radio broadcasts, and
• in some places, spousal wiretappers.
The prohibition applies to “any employee, or agent of the United States or any State or political
subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, or ¹⁶
corporation,” 18 U.S.C. 2510(6).
Conduct can only violate Title III/ECPA if it is done “intentionally,” inadvertent conduct is no ¹⁷
crime; the offender must have done on purpose those things which are outlawed. He need not be ¹⁸
shown have known, however, that his conduct was unlawful.
Section 2511(1) contains two interception bars – one, 2511(1)(a), simply outlaws intentional
interception; the other, 2511(1)(b), outlaws intentional interception when committed under any of
five jurisdictional circumstances with either an implicit or explicit nexus to interstate or foreign ¹⁹
commerce. Congress adopted the approach because of concern that its constitutional authority

¹⁶^A^lthoug^{h t}^h^e^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^nta^l^eⁿ^titie^s^a^r^e^{not s}^u^bje^c^t^to^c^r^im^ina^l^lia^bi^lity^{, a}^s^note^dⁱⁿ^f^r^a^{, s}^o^m^e^c^{ourts b}^e^lie^v^e^the^m
^s^ubje^c^t^to^cⁱ^v^{il lia}^bil^ity^unde^r¹⁸^U^.^S.C^.²⁵^20.
¹⁷^“In^o^r^d^e^{r to}^uⁿ^d^e^rsco^{re t}^h^{at th}^{e i}ⁿ^ad^v^e^rten^{t recep}^tioⁿ^o^f^{a p}^r^o^t^ected^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^{is n}^o^{t a crim}^{e, th}^{e su}^b^c^o^m^m^ittee
^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^{d the}^s^t^a^t^e^of^mⁱ^{nd re}^qui^re^m^e^{nt un}^de^{r T}^itle^{III of}^the^O^m^nib^u^s^Crim^e^{Control a}^nd^Sa^f^e^Stre^e^t^s^A^c^{t of}^{1968 f}^r^om
^‘wⁱ^l^l^f^u^l^’^t^o^‘iⁿ^t^en^tⁱ^on^al^,^’^{” S}^.^Rept^.⁵⁴¹^,^at^.²³⁽¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^;^“T^hⁱ^{s p}^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^m^a^{kes cl}^{ear t}^h^at^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^a^d^vert^en^tⁱⁿ^t^e^rcep^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^a
^pr^ote^c^t^e^d^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion is}^not^uⁿ^la^w^f^{ul un}^de^r^this^A^c^t,”^H^.^R^e^pt.^99-⁶⁴^{7, a}^t^48-^{9 (}¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^.^Se^e^,^e^.^g^.,^{In r}^e^Ph^ar^m^a^tr^ak^,
^In^c^{., 3}²⁹^F.^3d^9,²³⁽¹^s^t^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰³⁾^;^Sa^nde^r^s^v^.^R^obe^r^t^B^o^s^c^{h C}^o^r^p^.^,^{38 F.}^{3d 73}^{6, 74}^2-⁴³⁽⁴^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁴⁾^;^Lo^ne^ga^{n v}^.
^Ha^sty^,⁴^{36 F.S}^u^p^p^.2^{d 41}^{9, 42}⁹⁽^E^.D^.N^.Y^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.
¹⁸^N^a^r^d^uc^cⁱ^v^.^Vill^age^{of Be}^llw^oo^d^,⁴⁴⁴^F.^Su^pp.⁹^24,^(N^.D^{. Ill}^.²⁰⁰⁶^).
¹⁹^“⁽¹⁾^Ex^c^e^p^{t a}^s^ot^he^r^w^is^e^s^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^ca^lly^pr^ov^ide^d^{in t}^h^is^c^h^a^p^te^r^aⁿ^y^pe^r^s^{on w}^ho^{– (}^a⁾ⁱⁿ^te^nti^ona^lly^int^e^r^c^e^p^ts^,
^e^nde^a^v^or^s^{to i}ⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^t,^or^p^r^oc^ur^e^s^aⁿ^y^othe^r^pe^r^s^on^{to i}ⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^t^or^e^nde^a^v^or^{to i}ⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^{t, a}ⁿ^y^wⁱ^r^e^{, or}^a^l^{, or}^e^l^e^c^t^r^o^nic
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion;
^“⁽^b)^inte^ntio^na^lly^us^e^s^{, e}^nde^a^v^or^s^to^us^e^,^or^pr^oc^ur^e^s^aⁿ^y^othe^r^pe^r^s^{on t}^o^us^e^or^eⁿ^de^a^v^or^to^us^e^aⁿ^y^ele^c^t^r^onic^,
^mech^an^{ical, o}^r^o^t^h^e^{r d}^e^vⁱ^{ce to}ⁱⁿ^t^e^rcep^{t an}^y^o^r^{al co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^wh^en^–^{(I) su}^c^h^d^e^vⁱ^{ce is aff}ⁱ^x^e^d^to^{, o}^r^o^t^h^e^rw^ise
^tr^aⁿ^s^m^its^a^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^l^thr^oug^{h, a}^wⁱ^r^e^{, c}^a^b^le^{, or}^othe^r^lik^e^c^onne^c^tⁱ^on^us^e^d^{in w}ⁱ^r^e^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion;^or⁽ⁱⁱ⁾^s^u^c^h^de^vⁱ^c^e
^tr^aⁿ^s^m^its^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^by^r^a^{dio, o}^rⁱⁿ^te^r^f^e^r^e^s^w^{ith the}^tr^aⁿ^s^m^is^sion^of^s^u^c^h^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion^;^or⁽ⁱⁱⁱ⁾^s^u^c^h^pe^r^s^on
^k^now^s^,^or^ha^s^r^e^a^s^{on t}^o^kⁿ^o^w^,^tha^t^s^u^c^h^de^vⁱ^c^e^or^aⁿ^y^c^o^m^pone^nt^t^h^e^r^e^o^f^ha^s^be^eⁿ^s^e^{nt t}^h^r^o^ug^{h t}^h^e^m^a^{il or}^tr^aⁿ^s^p^or^te^d
ⁱⁿⁱⁿ^t^e^rst^a^t^e^o^r^f^o^rei^gⁿ^co^mm^erc^e^;^o^r⁽ⁱ^{v) su}^{ch u}^s^{e or en}^d^eavo^r^t^o^u^s^{e (A}^{) t}^a^{kes p}^l^{ace o}ⁿ^t^h^e^p^r^emⁱ^s^e^s^o^f^an^y^b^u^sⁱⁿ^{ess o}^r
^othe^r^c^o^m^m^e^r^cⁱ^a^l^e^s^ta^blis^hm^eⁿ^{t the}^ope^r^a^ti^ons^of^w^h^ic^{h a}^f^f^e^c^t^inte^r^s^ta^te^or^f^o^r^e^ig^{n c}^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^;^or⁽^B⁾^obtaⁱ^ns^or^is^f^o^r
^the^p^u^r^p^os^e^of^obtaⁱ^ningⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^t^{ion r}^e^la^ti^ng^to^the^ope^r^a^tio^ns^of^aⁿ^y^bus^ine^s^s^or^othe^r^c^o^m^m^e^r^cⁱ^a^l^e^s^ta^blis^hm^eⁿ^{t the}
^ope^ra^tio^{ns of}^w^h^ic^{h a}^f^f^e^c^t^inte^rsta^te^{or f}^o^re^ig^{n c}^o^m^m^e^rc^e^;^o^r^{(v) su}^ch^p^e^rson^act^{s i}ⁿ^t^h^{e Di}^st^rⁱ^ct^o^f^Co^l^u^m^bⁱ^a^,^t^h^e
^C^o^m^m^onw^e^a^{lth of}^Pue^r^{to R}ⁱ^c^o^,^o^r^aⁿ^y^te^r^r^itor^y^or^pos^s^e^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^of^th^e^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^,”^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁵¹¹⁽¹⁾⁽^a⁾^,⁽^b⁾^.

might not be sufficient to ban instances of electronic surveillance that bore no discernable
connection to interstate commerce or any other of the enumerated powers. So it enacted a general
prohibition, and as a safety precaution, a second provision more tightly tethered to specific ²⁰
jurisdictional factors. The Justice Department has honored that caution by employing
subparagraph (b) to prosecute the interception of oral communications, while using subparagraph
(a) to prosecute other forms of electronic eavesdropping, D^EP^A^R^T^M^ENT^OFJ^US^T^I^CEC^RIM^I^NAL²¹
R^ESOURCEM^AN^U^A^L at 1050.
Interception “means the aural or other acquisition of the contents” of various kinds of ²²
communications by means of electronic, mechanical or other devices. The definition raises
questions of where, when, what, and how. Although logic might suggest that interception occurs
only in the place where the communication is captured, the cases indicate that interception occurs ²³
as well where the communication begins, is transmitted, or is received.
Once limited to aural acquisitions, ECPA enlarged the definition by adding the words “or other ²⁴
acquisition” so that it is no longer limited to interceptions of communications that can be heard.
The change complicates the question of whether the wiretap, stored communications, or trap and
trace portions of the ECPA govern the legality of various means of capturing information relating
to a communication. The analysis might seem to favor wiretap coverage when it begins with an
examination of whether an “interception” has occurred. Yet, there is little consensus over when an
interception occurs; that is, whether “interception” as used section 2511 contemplates only

²⁰^“^S^ub^pa^r^a^g^r^a^{ph (}^a⁾^e^s^ta^blis^he^s^a^b^l^aⁿ^k^e^{t pr}^oh^ibit^io^{n a}^g^aⁱ^ns^{t the}ⁱⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^tion^of^wⁱ^r^e^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion.^Sinc^e^the
^f^a^c^ilitie^{s use}^d^to^traⁿ^sm^{it w}ⁱ^re^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tions f}^o^r^m^pa^rt^of^theⁱⁿ^t^e^rsta^te^{or f}^o^re^ig^{n c}^o^m^m^unic^a^{tions ne}^tw^ork^,
^C^ong^r^e^s^s^ha^s^pleⁿ^a^r^y^pow^e^r^unde^r^the^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^c^l^a^u^s^e^{to pr}^ohi^bit^a^{ll inte}^r^c^e^p^ti^on^of^s^u^c^h^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^w^h^e^t^he^r^by
^wⁱ^r^e^ta^pping^or^ot^he^r^w^is^e^.
^“^T^he^br^oa^{d pr}^ohi^biti^on^of^s^u^b^p^a^r^a^g^r^a^{ph (}^a⁾^is^a^l^s^o^a^p^plic^a^b^le^t^o^th^e^inte^r^c^e^p^tio^{n of}^or^a^l^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^{. T}^h^e
^inte^r^c^e^p^tioⁿ^of^s^u^c^h^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^,^how^e^v^e^r^{, doe}^s^not^ne^c^e^s^s^a^r^ily^inte^r^f^e^r^e^w^{ith the}^inte^rsta^te^or^f^o^re^ig^{n c}^o^m^m^e^r^c^e
^ne^tw^ork^,^a^{nd the}^e^x^te^nt^of^the^c^oⁿ^s^tituti^ona^l^pow^e^r^of^Cong^re^{ss to p}^r^ohi^{bit s}^u^c^hⁱⁿ^te^rc^e^p^tio^{n is le}^{ss c}^l^e^a^r^thaⁿⁱⁿ^the
^c^a^s^e^of^inte^r^c^e^p^{tion of}^wⁱ^r^e^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^{. .}^{. .}
^“^T^he^ref^o^re^{, in a}^ddi^tio^{n t}^o^the^bro^a^{d pro}^hⁱ^b^iti^ons^of^s^ubpa^ra^g^r^a^{ph (}^a^{), the}^c^o^m^m^itte^e^ha^s^inc^l^ude^{d s}^u^bpa^ra^g^r^a^{ph (b)}^,
^w^hⁱ^c^h^relⁱ^e^{s o}ⁿ^accep^t^e^d^j^u^ri^sdⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^b^a^{ses u}ⁿ^d^e^{r t}^h^{e co}^m^m^{erce c}^l^au^se,^an^d^o^t^h^e^r^p^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^o^f^t^h^e^Coⁿ^s^tⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^o
^pr^o^h^ibit^the^inte^r^c^e^p^ti^on^of^or^a^l^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^,”^S.R^e^p^t^.^90-¹⁰⁹⁷^{, a}^t⁹¹^-²⁽¹⁹⁶⁸⁾^.
²¹^A^s^w^{ill be}^note^dⁱⁿ^m^o^m^e^{nt, the}^sta^t^utory^de^fⁱ^nitions^of^wⁱ^re^a^{nd e}^l^e^c^t^ronic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tions c}^ontaⁱⁿ^spe^cⁱ^fⁱ^c
^c^o^m^m^e^rc^e^c^l^a^u^se^e^l^e^m^eⁿ^{ts, but t}^h^e^de^fⁱ^nition^of^or^a^l^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tio^{ns d}^o^e^s^not^{, se}^e^no^te^{s 29}^aⁿ^d³⁰^,ⁱⁿ^f^r^a^{. Su}^bs^e^queⁿ^t
^S^u^p^r^em^{e Co}^u^r^t^j^u^ri^sp^r^u^d^eⁿ^{ce rel}^a^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^o^t^h^e^b^r^ead^t^h^o^f^Coⁿ^g^{ress’ co}^mm^er^{ce cl}^au^{se p}^o^w^er^{s i}ⁿ^dⁱ^cat^{es t}^h^at^t^h^e
^p^r^ecau^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^m^a^y^h^a^{ve b}^een^wel^l^ad^vi^sed^,^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^L^ope^z^,⁵¹^{4 U}^.^S.⁵^{49 (}¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^aⁿ^d^Un^{ited S}^t^{ates v.}^Mo^rrisoⁿ^,
⁵²⁹^U^.^S.⁵^{98 (}²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
²²^T^h^e^dic^tio^na^ry^de^fⁱ^nition^of^“^a^u^ra^l”^{is “}^o^f^{or re}^la^ting^to^the^e^a^r^or^t^o^the^se^nse^of^he^a^r^ing^,^”^M^E^RRI^A^M^-W^EBS^T^E^R^’^S
^C^OL^L^E^GI^A^T^E^D^IC^TIO^N^A^R^Y^{76 (}¹^0t^{h e}^d^.¹⁹⁹⁶⁾^.
²³^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Lu^on^g^,⁴⁷^{1 F}^.³^d¹¹^07,¹¹⁰⁹⁽⁹^{th C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾⁽^“^aⁿⁱⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^tio^{n oc}^c^u^r^s^w^h^e^r^e^the^ta^p^p^e^{d ph}^one^is
^l^o^cat^ed^an^{d w}^h^{ere t}^h^{e l}^a^w^en^f^o^rce^m^en^t^o^f^fⁱ^cers^fⁱ^rst^o^v^erh^eard^t^h^e^cal^l^.^.^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ats^v^.^R^odrⁱ^gue^z^,⁹⁶^{8 F.2}^d¹³^0,
¹³⁶⁽²^d^Cir.¹⁹⁹²^);^a^cco^rd^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^R^a^mⁱ^r^e^z^{, 1}¹²^F.3^d⁸⁴⁹^,⁸⁵^{2 (}⁷^the^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁷⁾⁽^c^oⁿ^c^l^u^d^ing^tha^t^aⁿ
^inte^r^c^e^p^tioⁿ^oc^c^u^r^sⁱⁿ^the^j^u^rⁱ^s^d^ic^tion^w^h^e^r^e^the^ta^ppe^d^p^h^oⁿ^e^is^lo^c^a^t^e^d^{, w}^h^e^r^e^the^s^e^c^{ond p}^h^oⁿ^eⁱⁿ^the^c^onv^e^r^s^a^tion^is
^l^o^cat^ed^,^and^w^h^{ere t}^h^{e scan}ⁿ^e^{r u}^s^ed^t^o^o^v^erh^{ear t}^h^{e cal}^lⁱ^s^l^o^cat^ed^);^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^D^e^nm^aⁿ^{, 100}^F.^{3d 39}^{9, 40}³⁽⁵^th
^{Cir. 1}⁹⁹⁶^)”).
²⁴^S.Re^pt.⁹⁹^-5^41,^a^t¹³⁽¹⁹⁸^6)(t^he^“^a^m^e^nd^m^e^{nt c}^l^a^r^if^ie^{s tha}^t^{it is ille}^g^a^{l to inte}^rc^e^p^t^the^no^n-v^o^ic^e^por^tⁱ^on^of^a^wⁱ^re
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion. F}^o^{r e}^x^a^m^ple^,^{it is ille}^g^a^{l to in}^te^rc^e^p^{t the}^da^ta^or^di^g^itiz^e^d^porti^on^of^a^v^o^ic^e^c^o^m^m^uⁿ^ic^a^tion”^);^{see a}^l^so
^H^.^R^e^{pt. 9}⁹^-⁶⁴⁷^{, a}^t^{34 (}¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^.

surreptitious acquisition, contemporaneous with transmission, or whether such acquisition may ²⁵
occur anytime before the initial cognitive receipt of the contents by the intended recipient.
The USA PATRIOT Act resolved some of the uncertainty when it removed voice mail from the
wiretap coverage of Title III, 115 Stat. 283 (2001)(striking the phrase “and such term includes any
electronic storage of such communication” from the definition of “wire communications” in Title
III (18 U.S.C. 2510(1)) and added stored wire communications to the stored communications
coverage of 18 U.S.C. 2703.
As for the “what,” the interceptions proscribed in Title III are confined to those that capture a
communication’s content. Trap and trace devices and pen registers once captured only
information relating to the source and addressee of a communication, not its content. That is no
longer the case. The “post-cut-through dialed digit features” of contemporary telephone
communications now transmit communications in such a manner that the use of ordinary pen ²⁶
register or trap and trace devices will capture both non-content and content. As a consequence, a
few courts have held, either as a matter of statutory construction or constitutional necessity, that
the authorities must rely on a Title III wiretap order rather than a pen register/trap and trace order ²⁷
if such information will be captured.
The statute does not cover common law “eavesdropping,” but only interceptions “by electronic, ²⁸
mechanical or other device,” 18 U.S.C. 2510(4). That phrase is in turn defined so as not to

²⁵^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Sm^it^h^,¹⁵^{5 F}^.³^d¹⁰⁵^1,¹⁰⁵⁸⁽⁹^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁸⁾⁽^u^na^ut^hor^iz^e^d^r^e^tr^ie^v^a^{l a}ⁿ^d^r^e^c^o^r^dⁱⁿ^g^of^a^not^he^r^’^s^v^o^ic^e
^m^a^{il m}^e^ssa^g^e^{s c}^onstitute^{s a}ⁿ^“ⁱ^nt^e^r^c^e^p^tion”^);^K^o^no^p^v.^Ha^waⁱⁱ^an^Aⁱ^rlⁱⁿ^es,^Iⁿ^c.^{, 3}⁰²^F.^3d⁸⁶^8,⁸⁷^{8 (}⁹^{th C}ⁱ^r^.
²⁰⁰²⁾⁽^f^r^a^uduleⁿ^t^{access to}^sto^r^ed^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^d^o^{es n}^o^{t co}ⁿ^s^titu^t^e^{s “in}^t^ercep^tioⁿ^;^”ⁱⁿ^tercep^ti^oⁿ^re^q^u^{ires access}
^c^onte^m^por^aⁿ^e^ous^w^{ith tr}^aⁿ^s^m^is^sⁱ^on)^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^C^o^unc^ilm^an^,⁴¹^{8 F}^.³^d⁶⁷^,^79-⁸⁰⁽^1s^{t C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^e^{n ba}^nc⁾⁽^s^e^r^vⁱ^c^e
^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^{er’s access t}^o^e-m^aⁱ^l^“d^u^rⁱ^{ng t}^r^an^si^en^t^st^o^r^{age” co}ⁿ^s^tⁱ^t^u^t^{es “i}ⁿ^t^ercep^tⁱ^oⁿ^”^;^wⁱ^t^h^o^u^t^d^eci^diⁿ^g^w^h^et^h^e^{r “i}ⁿ^t^ercep^tⁱ^oⁿ
^{is lim}^ite^{d to a}^c^quisi^tio^{n c}^o^nte^m^poraⁿ^e^{ous w}^{ith tra}ⁿ^sm^ission”^);^Unⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^Joⁿ^e^s^,⁴⁵^{1 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.2^d^71,⁷⁵^(D^.D^.C.
²⁰⁰⁶^)(g^o^v^ern^m^en^{t’s acq}^uⁱ^sitioⁿ^f^r^o^m^th^{e p}^h^oⁿ^e^co^m^p^an^y^o^f^te^x^t^messag^e^s^w^a^{s n}^oⁱⁿ^tercep^tioⁿ^b^ecau^{se th}^{ere w}^a^{s n}^o
^coⁿ^t^em^p^o^r^an^eo^u^s^access);^Fr^as^e^r^v^.^N^a^ti^on^{al M}^u^t^ual^Iⁿ^s^u^r^anc^e^C^o^.,¹^{35 F.S}^u^p^p^.^{2d 62}^{3, 63}^4-³⁷⁽^E^.^D^.P^a^.²⁰⁰¹⁾
^(“in^tercep^tioⁿ^”^o^f^{e-mail o}^ccu^{rs w}^ith^{its u}ⁿ^a^u^t^h^o^rized^acq^uⁱ^sitioⁿ^p^r^io^r^toⁱⁿ^itial^receip^t^b^y^{its ad}^d^r^e^ssee);^S^t^{eve Ja}^cksoⁿ
^Ga^mes,^In^c.^v.^Uni^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es S}^ecret^S^e^rvi^c^e^{, 36 F}^.³^d⁴⁵⁷^,⁴^61-⁶²^n.^{7 (}⁵^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁴⁾⁽^C^ong^r^e^s^s^didⁿ^o^{t i}ⁿ^te^nd^f^o^r
^“ⁱ^nte^r^c^e^p^tion”^{to a}^pply^{to e}^-^m^a^{il stor}^e^d^{on a}ⁿ^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^bu^lle^tin^b^o^a^r^d^{; s}^t^or^e^d^wⁱ^r^e^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions⁽^v^oic^e^m^a^il)^,
^h^o^w^ever,ⁱ^s^p^r^o^t^ect^ed^f^r^o^m^“iⁿ^t^er^cep^tⁱ^oⁿ^”^);^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^M^e^rⁱ^w^e^the^r^,⁹¹⁷^F^.^2d⁹⁵^5,⁹⁵⁹^-⁶⁰⁽⁶^t^h^Ci^r.¹⁹⁹⁰^)(access
^{to s}^t^or^e^dⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion t}^h^r^o^ug^{h t}^h^e^us^e^of^a^nothe^r^’^s^pa^g^e^r^doe^sⁿ^o^{t c}^ons^tit^ute^aⁿ^“ⁱ^nte^r^c^e^p^tio^n”⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^R^eyes^,
⁹²²^F.^Su^pp.⁸^18,⁸^36-^{37 (}^S^.D^.N^.^Y^{. 19}⁹⁶⁾⁽^s^a^m^e⁾^;^W^e^sle^y^Colle^ge^v^.^Pitts^,⁹⁴^{7 F.}^Su^pp.³^75,³^{85 (}^D^.^D^e^l^{. 19}⁹⁷⁾⁽^no
^“iⁿ^t^ercep^tⁱ^oⁿ^”^o^ccu^{rs w}^h^en^t^h^{e c}^oⁿ^t^en^t^s^o^f^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^{are acq}^uⁱ^red^uⁿ^l^{ess con}^t^em^p^o^r^an^eo^u^s^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^ei^r
^tran^sm^issioⁿ⁾^;^se^e^{also, A}^{dams v}^.^Battle^Cre^e^k^{, 2}⁵⁰^F.3^d⁹⁸^0,⁹⁸^{2 (}⁶^{th C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾⁽^u^s^e^of^a^“^c^l^one^”^or^du^plic^a^t^e^pa^g^e^r^to
^si^m^u^l^t^aⁿ^e^o^u^s^l^y^rec^eⁱ^v^{e t}^h^{e sa}^{me messa}^{ge as a t}^a^r^g^et^p^a^{ger i}^s^an^“iⁿ^t^ercep^tⁱ^oⁿ^”^);^Br^ow^{n v}^.^W^a^dde^ll^,^{50 F.3}^d²⁸^{5, 294}
⁽⁴^th^Cⁱ^r.¹⁹⁹⁵^)(sam^e).
²⁶^“^‘^Post-c^ut-t^hro^u^g^h^dia^l^e^d^dig^its’^a^r^e^aⁿ^y^num^be^{rs dia}^l^e^d^f^r^om^a^te^l^e^pho^ne^a^f^te^{r the}^c^a^{ll is initia}^l^l^y^se^tup^{or ‘c}^u^t^-
^t^h^rou^g^h^.^{’ S}^o^m^e^tⁱ^m^e^{s t}^h^{ese d}ⁱ^gi^t^s^{are o}^t^h^e^{r t}^e^l^e^ph^on^{e nu}^m^b^ers,^as^w^h^en^{a p}^a^rt^y^p^l^ace^{s a cred}ⁱ^t^card^cal^l^b^y^fⁱ^rst^dⁱ^alⁱⁿ^g
^t^h^{e l}^oⁿ^g^dⁱ^st^an^{ce carri}^{er access n}^u^m^b^e^{r an}^d^t^h^{en t}^h^e^p^h^oⁿ^eⁿ^u^m^b^e^{r o}^f^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^t^eⁿ^d^e^{d p}^a^rt^y^.^S^o^m^e^tⁱ^m^e^{s t}^h^{ese d}ⁱ^gi^t^s
^tr^aⁿ^s^m^{it r}^e^a^l^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion, s}^u^c^h^a^s^ba^nk^a^c^c^ountⁿ^u^m^b^e^r^s^,^Socⁱ^a^l^Se^c^u^r^ity^num^be^r^s^{, pr}^e^s^c^r^iption^num^be^r^s^{, a}^nd^the^lik^e^.
^Iⁿ^the^la^tte^r^c^a^s^e^,^the^dig^its^r^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^{t c}^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^c^o^nteⁿ^t;ⁱⁿ^th^e^f^o^r^m^e^r^{, they}^a^r^e^non-^c^oⁿ^t^eⁿ^{t c}^a^l^{l pr}^oc^e^s^sⁱ^ng
^num^be^r^s^,”^Iⁿ^r^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^{, 4}⁴¹^F.^Su^pp.^2d⁸^16,⁸^{18 (}^S^.D^{. T}^e^x^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.
²⁷^Iⁿ^r^e^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^f^o^r^O^r^de^r^s⁽¹⁾^Aut^hor^izⁱ^{ng U}^s^e^o^f^Peⁿ^Re^gis^t^e^r^s^an^{d Tr}^a^p^an^{d Tr}^ac^e^D^e^vⁱ^c^e^s^{, 51}^{5 F.}^Su^pp.^2d³^25,
³²⁸^-3^{8 (E.D}^.N^.Y^.²⁰⁰⁷^);^Iⁿ^r^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 4}⁴¹^F.S^u^p^p^.2^d⁸¹^6,⁸¹⁸^-²^{7 (}^S^.D^.^T^e^x^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.
²⁸^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^J^one^s^,⁴⁵^{1 F}^.^Su^pp.^2d⁷¹^{, 7}⁵^(D.D.C^{. 2}⁰⁰⁶^)(g^ov^e^r^nm^eⁿ^{t’s a}^c^quisition^f^r^om^the^pho^ne^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^y^o^f
^t^e^xt^m^e^ss^age^s^{was n}^o^t^anⁱⁿ^t^e^rceptⁱ^o^{n b}^ecau^{se i}^t^dⁱ^dⁿ^o^tⁱⁿ^vol^{ve co}ⁿ^t^em^p^o^r^an^eo^u^s^{access an}^d^b^ecau^s^eⁿ^o^el^ect^ronⁱ^c,
^mech^anⁱ^cal^,^o^r^o^t^h^e^{r d}^e^vi^{ces w}^e^re^u^s^ed^).

include hearing aids or extension telephones in normal use.²⁹ Whether an extension phone has
been installed and is being used in the ordinary course of business or in the ordinary course of law
enforcement duties, so that it no longer constitutes an interception device for purposes of Title ³⁰
III/ECPA and comparable state laws has proven a somewhat vexing question.
Although often intertwined with the consent exception discussed below, the question generally ³¹
turns on the facts in a given case. When the exemption is claimed as a practice in the ordinary
course of business, the interception must be for a legitimate business reason, it must be routinely
conducted, and at least in some Circuits employees must be notified that their conversations are ³²
being monitored. Similarly, “Congress most likely carved out an exception for law enforcement
officials to make clear that the routine and almost universal recording of phone lines by police
departments and prisons, as well as other law enforcement institutions, is exempt from the ³³
statute,” Adams v. Battle Creek, 250 F.3d at 984. The exception contemplates administrative ³⁴
rather than investigative monitoring, which must nevertheless be justified by a lawful, valid law ³⁵
enforcement concern.

²⁹^“‘[^E^]^l^ect^ronⁱ^c,^m^ech^anⁱ^cal^,^o^r^o^t^h^e^{r d}^e^vi^{ce’ mean}^{s an}^y^d^e^vi^{ce o}^r^ap^p^a^rat^u^{s w}^hⁱ^c^h^can^b^e^u^s^ed^t^oⁱⁿ^t^e^rcep^t^{a w}ⁱ^re,
^ora^l^{, or}^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion^othe^r^thaⁿ^{– (a}^{) a}ⁿ^y^te^le^pho^ne^or^te^le^g^r^a^{ph instrum}^e^{nt, e}^q^uipm^eⁿ^t^{or f}^a^c^ilit^y^,^{or a}ⁿ^y
^c^o^m^pone^{nt t}^h^e^r^e^o^f^,^{(I) f}^u^rnis^he^d^t^o^the^s^ubs^c^r^ibe^r^or^us^e^r^by^a^prov^ide^r^of^wⁱ^re^{or e}^l^e^c^t^ronic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion s}^e^rv^ic^eⁱⁿ
^the^or^dina^r^y^c^our^s^e^of^its^busⁱⁿ^e^s^s^a^nd^be^ing^us^e^d^by^the^s^ubs^c^r^ibe^r^or^us^e^rⁱⁿ^t^h^e^or^dina^r^y^c^our^s^e^of^its^busⁱⁿ^e^s^s^or
^f^u^rnishe^{d by}^suc^h^su^bsc^r^ibe^r^or^u^s^e^r^f^o^{r c}^onne^c^tio^{n to}^the^f^a^c^ilitie^{s of}^suc^h^se^rv^ic^e^a^{nd use}^d^{in t}^h^e^or^dina^ry^c^ourse^of
^its^busⁱⁿ^e^s^s^;^or⁽ⁱⁱ⁾^beⁱⁿ^g^us^e^d^by^a^pr^ov^ide^r^of^wⁱ^r^e^or^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion s}^e^r^v^ic^e^{in the}^or^dⁱ^na^r^y^c^our^s^e^of^its
^bus^ine^s^s^,^or^by^aⁿ^inv^e^s^tig^a^tive^or^la^w^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^{t of}^fⁱ^c^e^r^{in the}^or^dina^r^y^c^our^s^e^of^his^d^u^tie^s^;⁽^b⁾^a^he^a^r^ing^aⁱ^{d or}
^sⁱ^m^ila^r^de^vⁱ^ce^be^ing^us^e^d^to^c^o^r^r^e^c^t^s^ubn^or^m^a^{l he}^a^r^ing^{to n}^o^t^be^tte^r^thaⁿ^nor^m^a^l,”^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁵¹⁰⁽⁵⁾^.
³⁰^Se^e^t^h^{e cases ci}^t^e^d^an^d^c^o^mm^en^t^a^r^yⁱⁿ^Barn^et^t^{& M}^a^kar,^“Iⁿ^the^O^r^dinar^y^C^our^s^e^of^Busⁱ^ne^s^s^”^:^T^h^e^Le^ga^{l Lim}^its^of
^W^o^r^k^plac^e^Wⁱ^r^e^tappi^ng^{, 1}⁰^H^A^S^T^I^NGS^J^O^U^R^NA^L^OF^C^OM^M^UNI^C^A^T^I^O^N^S^A^N^D^E^N^TER^T^A^I^N^M^E^N^T^L^AW^{715 (}¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^;
^Ap^p^lic^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^Ex^teⁿ^sⁱ^oⁿ^Te^le^p^h^oⁿ^e^s^o^f^T^itle^III^o^f^t^h^e^Omnⁱ^b^u^s^Cri^m^e^Coⁿ^t^ro^l^aⁿ^d^S^a^fe^S^t^re^e^t^{s Ac}^{t o}^f¹⁹⁶⁸⁽¹⁸^U.S^.^C.
^§§2⁵¹^{0 e}^t^s^e^q^.⁾^,^Pe^r^t^aⁱⁿⁱ^ng^{to I}ⁿ^t^e^r^c^e^p^tions^of^Wⁱ^r^e^C^o^m^m^unic^a^tio^ns^{, 5}⁸^A^L^R^Fe^{d. 59}^4;^E^a^v^e^s^dr^op^pin^g^oⁿ^Ex^te^nsⁱ^oⁿ
^Te^le^pho^ne^as^Iⁿ^v^a^sⁱ^on^{of Pr}^iv^ac^y^{, 49 A}^L^R^4th⁴³^0.
³¹^Se^e^e^.^g.,^D^e^{al v}^.^Spe^ar^s^,⁷⁸⁰^F.S^upp^{. 6}¹⁸^,⁶²³⁽^W^.D^.A^r^k^{. 1991)}^,^a^ff’d^,⁹⁸^{0 F}^.²^d¹¹⁵³⁽⁸^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹²⁾⁽^e^m^p^loy^e^r
^regu^l^a^rl^y^t^a^p^e^d^em^p^l^o^y^{ee c}^a^l^l^s^b^y^m^e^an^{s o}^f^{a d}^e^vi^{ce at}^t^ach^ed^t^o^an^ext^eⁿ^sⁱ^oⁿ^ph^on^e;^m^o^st^o^f^t^h^{e cal}^l^s^w^e^{re p}^e^rsoⁿ^a^l
^a^{nd r}^e^c^o^r^d^ing^aⁿ^{d dis}^c^l^o^sⁱ^ng^the^m^se^r^v^e^d^{no b}^u^sⁱ^ne^s^s^p^u^r^p^os^e⁾^.
³²^A^d^a^m^{s v.}^B^a^t^t^l^e^Creek^{, 25}^{0 F.}^3d⁹⁸⁰^{, 9}⁸³⁽⁶^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾^;^Arⁱ^a^s^v^.^M^u^tual^C^e^ntr^a^l^Alar^m^Se^r^v^ic^e^{, 20}^{2 F.}^3d⁵^53,⁵⁵⁸
⁽²^d^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁰⁾^;^{Berry v.}^Fuⁿ^k^,¹⁴^{6 F.}^3d¹⁰⁰³^,¹⁰⁰^{8 (}^D^.C^.C^ir^.¹⁹⁹⁸⁾^;^Sa^nde^r^s^v^.^R^obe^r^t^B^o^s^c^{h C}^o^r^p^.^,^{38 F.}^{3d 73}^{6, 74}¹
⁽⁴^{th C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁴⁾^.^S^{ee a}^l^s^o^,^H^a^l^l^v.^E^a^rt^h^lⁱⁿ^{k Net}^w^o^r^{k I}ⁿ^c^{., 3}⁹⁶^F.³^d⁵⁰⁰^{, 5}⁰³^-⁰⁴⁽²^d^Cir.²⁰⁰⁵^{) (In}^tern^{et serv}^ice
^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^{er’s recei}^p^t^and^st^o^r^{age o}^f^fo^rm^{er cu}^st^o^m^{er’s e-}^mai^l^af^t^e^{r t}^e^r^mⁱⁿ^atⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e cu}^st^o^m^{er’s ac}^c^{ount w}^a^s^doneⁱⁿ
^or^di^na^r^y^c^our^s^e^of^bus^ine^s^s^a^{nd c}^ons^e^q^ue^ntly^did^not^c^ons^ti^tute^aⁿ^inte^r^c^e^p^tioⁿ⁾^.
^Som^e^c^ourts^inc^l^u^d^e^s^u^rre^p^titi^ous^{, e}^x^te^ns^ion^ph^oneⁱⁿ^te^rc^e^p^ti^ons^c^o^nduc^te^{d w}^ithin^the^f^a^mⁱ^l^y^hom^e^as^pa^{rt of}^the
^“^bus^ine^s^s^e^x^te^ns^ion”^e^x^c^e^p^tio^n,^A^nony^m^ous^v^.^Aⁿ^oⁿ^y^m^o^u^s^{, 5}⁵⁸^F.²^d⁶^77,⁶^78-⁷⁹⁽²^{d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^;^Sc^h^e^{ib v}^.^G^r^an^t^{, 22}
^F^.^3d¹⁴^9,¹⁵^{4 (}⁷^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁴⁾^;^N^e^w^c^om^{b v}^.^Iⁿ^gle^,⁹⁴^{4 F}^.²^d¹⁵³⁴^,¹⁵³⁶⁽¹^0th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹¹⁾^;^co^nt^ra^,^Uⁿⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^{es v.}
^M^u^r^doc^k^{, 6}³^F^.³^d¹³⁹¹^,¹⁴⁰⁰⁽⁶^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^.
³³^Se^e^e^.^g.,U^nite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Le^wⁱ^s^{, 4}^{06 F.3}^d^11,¹⁸⁽¹^s^t^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁵⁾^;^Un^ited^S^t^{ates v.}^Ha^mmon^d^,²⁸⁶^F.3^d¹^89,¹^{92 (}⁴^t^h
^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰²⁾^;^Sm^{ith v}^.^U^.^S^.^D^e^pt.^of^J^u^s^tic^e^{, 25}^{1 F}^.³^d¹⁰⁴⁷^,¹⁰^49-⁵⁰⁽^D^{.C.Cir. 2}⁰⁰¹^);^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^a^t^es^v.^P^o^yck^{, 77}^F.^3d²⁸^5,
²⁹²⁽⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁶⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^D^anie^l^s^,⁹^{02 F.2}^d¹²^38,¹²⁴⁵⁽⁷^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁰⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Paul^{, 6}¹⁴^F.^2d¹¹^5,
¹¹⁷⁽⁶^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁰⁾^.
³⁴^{Amati v}^.^W^o^o^d^stoc^k^{, 1}⁷⁶^F.^3d⁹⁵^{2, 9}⁵⁵⁽⁷^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁹⁾⁽^“^Iⁿ^v^e^s^tig^a^tion^is^w^{ithin t}^h^e^or^dina^r^y^c^our^s^e^of^law
^eⁿ^f^o^rc^em^eⁿ^{t, s}^o^if^‘ordina^r^y^’^w^e^r^e^re^a^d^lite^ra^lly^w^a^rr^aⁿ^ts^w^{ould ra}^r^e^l^y^if^ev^e^r^be^re^quire^{d f}^o^{r e}^l^e^c^t^ro^nic^e^a^v^e^s^droppi^ng^,
^w^h^ic^{h w}^a^s^s^u^r^e^l^y^{not C}^o^ng^r^e^s^s^’^s^inte^nt.^Si^nc^e^the^p^u^r^p^os^e^of^the^s^t^a^t^ute^w^a^s^prⁱ^m^a^r^il^y^{to r}^e^g^u^la^te^th^e^us^e^of
^wⁱ^re^ta^pping^a^{nd o}^t^he^{r e}^l^e^c^t^ro^nic^surv^e^illa^nc^e^f^o^{r inv}^e^stig^a^t^or^y^purp^o^se^s,^‛^or^dⁱ^na^r^y^’^s^houldⁿ^o^t^be^r^e^a^d^s^o^br^oa^dly^;^{it is}
^m^o^r^e^r^e^as^ona^bly^inte^r^p^r^e^te^{d t}^o^r^e^f^e^r^{to r}^o^utiⁿ^eⁿ^oni^nv^e^s^tig^a^tiv^e^r^e^cor^dⁱⁿ^g^of^te^le^pho^ne^c^o^nv^e^r^s^a^tions^”⁾^l^A^cco^rd^Unⁱ^t^e^d
^State^s^v^l^Le^wⁱ^s^,^4l^{6 Fl}^3d^a^t¹^l⁽¹^s^t^Cⁱ^r^l^2l^l5l;^C^o^l^aⁿ^d^r^e^{a v}^l^O^r^a^nge^t^o^wⁿ^{, 4ll}^FlS^u^p^p^l2^{d 34}^{2, 34}^7-⁴⁸⁽^S^.D^.N^.Y^{. 20}⁰⁷⁾^.
³⁵^T^h^e^e^x^c^e^p^{tion, h}^o^w^e^v^e^r^,^doe^s^no^{t pe}^r^m^{it a}^c^ounty^{to r}^e^c^o^r^d^a^{ll c}^a^l^l^s^{in a}ⁿ^{d o}^u^t^of^the^of^fⁱ^c^e^s^o^f^c^oun^ty^judg^e^s^m^e^r^e^l^y
^b^ecau^{se a d}^e^ten^tioⁿ^cen^{ter an}^d^t^h^{e ju}^d^g^{es sh}^{are a co}^mm^oⁿ^f^acilit^y^,^Abra^{ham v}^.^Gre^eⁿ^v^ille^{, 23}^{7 F}^.³^d³⁸^6,³⁹^{0 (}⁴^{th C}ⁱ^r^.
²⁰⁰¹⁾^,ⁿ^o^r^d^o^e^s^it^pe^r^m^{it ja}^ilhous^e^te^le^pho^ne^m^onitorⁱ^ng^of^aⁿ^inm^a^te^’^s^c^onf^e^s^sⁱ^{on to a}^c^l^e^r^g^y^m^aⁿ^,^M^o^c^k^a^{itis v}^.
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

An interception can only be a violation of ECPA if the conversation or other form of
communication intercepted is among those kinds which the statute protects, in over simplified
terms – telephone (wire), face to face (oral), and computer (electronic). Congress used the
definitions of the three forms of communications to describe the communications beyond the
Act’s reach as well as those within its grasp. For example, “oral communication” by definition
includes only those face to face conversations with respect to which the speakers have a ³⁶
justifiable expectation of privacy. Similarly, “wire communications” are limited to those that are ³⁷
at some point involve voice communications (i.e. only aural transfers). Radio and data
transmissions are generally “electronic communications.” The definition includes other forms of
information transfer but excludes certain radio transmissions which can be innocently captured ³⁸
without great difficulty. Although it is not a federal crime to intercept radio communications
under any number of conditions, the exclusion is not a matter of definition but of special general
exemptions, 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(g), discussed below.
Although the statute condemns attempted wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping
(“endeavoring to intercept”), 18 U.S.C. 2511(1), the provisions appear to have escaped use,
interest, or comment heretofore, perhaps because the conduct most likely to constitute preparation
for an interception – possession of wiretapping equipment – is already a separate crime, 18
U.S.C. 2512, discussed, infra.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^Ha^rclero^a^d^,¹⁰⁴^F.3^d¹⁵^22,¹⁵³⁰⁽⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^{. T}^h^e^c^our^ts^a^r^e^di^vⁱ^de^{d ov}^e^r^w^h^e^t^he^r^pr^iv^a^t^e^c^o^r^r^e^c^tions^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^a^r^e
^co^vered^b^y^t^h^{e l}^a^w^en^f^o^rce^m^en^t^excep^tⁱ^oⁿ^.^C^o^mpa^r^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^F^a^ul^kn^er^,³²^{3 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.^2d¹¹¹¹^,¹¹¹³^-¹⁷⁽^D^.
^K^a^{n. 2}⁰⁰⁴⁾^,^a^f^f^’^{d on ot}^he^r^g^r^ou^nd^s^,⁴³^{9 F}^.³^d¹²²¹⁽^10t^{h C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾⁽^not^c^o^v^e^r^e^d)^wi^t^h^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^a^t^es^v.^Rⁱ^vera^,²⁹^{2 F}^.
^Sup^p^.^2d⁸^38,⁸⁴^2-^{43 (}^E^.D^.^Va^.²⁰⁰³⁾⁽^c^ov^e^r^e^d⁾^.
³⁶^“^‘^[^O^]^r^a^l^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion’ m}^e^aⁿ^s^aⁿ^y^ora^l^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion^u^tte^re^d^b^y^a^pe^{rson e}^x^hib^iting^aⁿ^e^x^pe^c^t^a^{tion t}^h^a^t^suc^h
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion is}ⁿ^o^{t s}^ubje^c^t^t^oⁱⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^tio^{n u}^nde^r^cⁱ^r^c^um^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^s^jus^tif^yⁱ^ng^s^u^c^h^e^x^pe^c^t^a^tion,^but^s^u^c^h^te^r^m^doe^s^not
ⁱⁿ^cl^ud^{e an}^y^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^c^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^”²⁵¹⁰⁽²⁾^.^P^a^tte^e^v^.^G^e^or^gⁱ^{a Por}^t^s^Aut^hor^ity^,⁵^{12 F.S}^u^p^p^.2^{d 137}^{2, 13}^76-³⁷⁷
^(S^.^D^.^G^a.²⁰⁰⁷^)(“t^h^{e sect}ⁱ^oⁿ^con^t^aiⁿ^s^t^w^o^slⁱ^g^h^t^l^y^dⁱ^ff^eren^t^req^uⁱ^remen^t^s:⁽¹^{) t}^h^at^t^h^{e ci}^rc^u^m^st^an^ces^j^u^stⁱ^f^y^an
^exp^ect^atⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^at^t^h^{e co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿⁱ^sⁿ^o^t^b^eⁱⁿ^{g i}ⁿ^t^e^rcep^t^e^d^;^an^{d (}²^{) t}^h^at^t^h^{e sp}^{eaker exh}ⁱ^bⁱ^t^s^t^h^at^e^x^p^ect^atⁱ^oⁿ^”^).^No^t^e
^tha^t^uⁿ^lik^e^the^de^fⁱ^nitio^{ns of}^wⁱ^re^a^{nd e}^l^e^c^t^ronⁱ^c^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions,ⁱⁿ^f^r^a^,^the^r^e^is^{no re}^f^e^re^nc^e^{to inte}^r^s^ta^te^{or f}^o^re^igⁿ
^co^{mmerce h}^e^re.
³⁷^“^‘^[^W^]ⁱ^re^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion’ m}^e^aⁿ^{s a}ⁿ^y^a^u^ra^{l tra}ⁿ^sfe^r^m^a^de^{in w}^hole^{or in}^pa^{rt t}^h^ro^ug^{h t}^h^e^use^of^f^a^c^ilitie^{s f}^o^{r the}
^tr^aⁿ^s^m^is^sⁱ^{on of}^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^by^the^aⁱ^{d of}^wⁱ^r^e^{, c}^a^b^le^{, or}^ot^he^r^lik^e^c^onne^c^tio^{n be}^tw^e^eⁿ^the^p^oⁱⁿ^t^of^or^ig^{in a}ⁿ^{d t}^h^e
^p^oⁱⁿ^t^o^f^recep^tⁱ^oⁿ⁽ⁱⁿ^c^l^u^dⁱⁿ^g^t^h^e^u^s^{e o}^f^su^ch^coⁿⁿ^ectⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^{a sw}ⁱ^t^c^hⁱⁿ^g^st^atⁱ^oⁿ⁾^f^u^rnⁱ^s^h^e^d^o^r^op^erat^ed^b^y^an^y^p^e^rsoⁿ
^eⁿ^g^a^g^e^{d in prov}^id^ing^or^o^p^e^r^a^ting^suc^h^f^a^c^ilitie^{s f}^o^{r the}^traⁿ^sm^{ission of}^inte^rsta^te^or^f^o^re^ig^{n c}^o^m^m^unic^a^{tions or}
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^a^f^f^e^c^ting^inte^r^s^tate^or^f^o^r^e^ig^{n c}^o^m^m^e^r^ce^,”^{18 U}^.^S.^C^.²⁵¹⁰⁽¹⁾^.
³⁸^“^‘^[^E^]^l^e^c^t^ro^nic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion’ m}^e^aⁿ^s^aⁿ^y^traⁿ^s^f^e^r^of^sⁱ^gⁿ^s^,^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^l^s^,^w^r^iting^,^im^ag^e^s^{, s}^ounds^,^da^ta^,^or^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^of
^aⁿ^y^na^ture^traⁿ^s^m^itte^{d in w}^hole^o^rⁱⁿ^pa^{rt by}^a^wⁱ^re^{, ra}^dio,^e^l^e^c^t^ro^m^a^gⁿ^e^tic^{, phot}^oe^le^c^t^ronic^or^ph^ot^oop^tic^a^l^s^y^s^t^em^tha^t
^a^f^f^e^c^t^s^inte^r^s^ta^te^or^f^o^r^e^ig^{n c}^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^,^but^doe^sⁿ^o^{t i}ⁿ^c^l^u^d^e^{– (}^A⁾^t^h^e^r^a^dio^p^o^r^tioⁿ^of^a^c^o^r^d^le^s^s^te^le^pho^ne
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion tha}^t^{is tra}ⁿ^sm^itte^{d be}^tw^e^eⁿ^the^c^o^rdle^{ss ha}ⁿ^d^se^{t a}ⁿ^d^the^ba^se^uⁿ^it;^{(B) a}ⁿ^y^wⁱ^re^{or ora}^l^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion;
⁽^C⁾^aⁿ^y^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion m}^a^de^thr^oug^{h a}^t^one^-^only^pa^gⁱ^ng^de^vⁱ^c^e^;^or⁽^D⁾^aⁿ^y^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion f}^r^om^a^tr^a^c^k^ing^de^vⁱ^c^e⁽^a^s
^de^fⁱ^ne^{d in s}^e^c^tioⁿ³¹¹⁷^of^this^tit^l^e⁾^,^”^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁵¹⁰⁽¹²⁾^.

Consent interceptions are common, controversial and have a history all their own. The early bans
on divulging telegraph or telephone messages had a consent exception. The Supreme Court
upheld consent interceptions against Fourth Amendment challenge both before and after the ³⁹
enactment of Title III. The argument in favor of consent interceptions has always been
essentially that a speaker risks the indiscretion of his listeners and holds no superior legal position
simply because a listener elects to record or transmit his statements rather than subsequently ⁴⁰
memorializing or repeating them. Wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping by either the police
or anyone else with the consent of at least one party to the conversation is not unlawful under the ⁴¹
federal statute. These provisions do no more than shield consent interceptions from the
sanctions of federal law; they afford no protection from the sanctions of state law. Many of the
states recognize comparable exceptions, but some only permit interception with the consent of all ⁴²
parties to a communication.
Under federal law, consent may be either explicitly or implicitly given. For instance, someone
who uses a telephone other than his or her own and has been told by the subscriber that
conversations over the instrument are recorded has been held to have implicitly consented to ⁴³
interception when using the instrument. This is not to say that subscriber consent alone is

³⁹^On^L^{ee v.}^Unⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^es^,³⁴^{3 U}^.^S^.⁷⁴^{7 (}¹⁹⁵²⁾^;^Lo^pe^z^v^.^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^Stat^e^s^{, 37}^{3 U}^.^S.⁴^{27 (}¹⁹⁶³⁾^;^Unite^{d S}^t^ate^s^v^.^W^h^ite^,
⁴⁰¹^U^.^S.⁷^{45 (}¹⁹⁷¹⁾^.
⁴⁰^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^W^h^ite^,⁴⁰¹^U.^S^.^at⁷⁵¹⁽¹⁹⁷¹^)(“Con^ced^ed^l^y^{a p}^o^lⁱ^{ce agen}^t^w^h^o^coⁿ^ceal^{s h}ⁱ^s^p^o^lⁱ^{ce c}^onne^c^tio^ns^m^a^y
^w^r^ite^dow^{n f}^o^r^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^us^e^his^c^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^w^{ith a}^de^f^e^nda^{nt a}ⁿ^d^te^s^tif^y^c^onc^e^r^ning^the^m^{, w}^ithout^a^w^a^r^r^a^nt
^a^u^thor^iz^ing^his^eⁿ^c^o^uⁿ^te^r^s^w^{ith th}^e^de^f^e^nda^{nt a}^{nd w}^ith^out^ot^he^rw^is^e^vⁱ^ola^ting^the^la^tte^{r’s F}^our^{th A}^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t rig}^h^{ts . .}^.
^{. For}^c^ons^ti^tuti^ona^l^pur^pos^e^s^,^no^dⁱ^f^f^e^r^eⁿ^{t r}^e^s^u^{lt is}^r^e^quir^e^d^if^the^a^g^eⁿ^{t ins}^t^e^a^d^of^im^m^e^dia^t^e^l^y^r^e^por^ti^ng^a^nd
^tr^aⁿ^s^c^rⁱ^bing^hⁱ^s^c^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^w^{ith de}^f^e^nda^nt,^e^ithe^r⁽¹⁾^sⁱ^m^u^lta^ne^o^u^s^l^y^r^e^c^o^r^d^s^the^m^w^{ith e}^l^e^c^t^r^onic^e^quipm^eⁿ^{t w}^h^ic^h
^he^is^c^a^r^r^y^ing^{on his}^pe^r^s^on,^Lo^pe^z^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^{, s}^u^pr^a^{; (}²⁾^or^c^a^r^rⁱ^e^s^r^a^{dio e}^q^uipm^eⁿ^{t w}^h^ic^{h s}ⁱ^m^u^lta^ne^ous^ly
^t^r^an^smⁱ^t^s^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^v^ersatⁱ^oⁿ^s^ei^t^h^er^t^o^reco^r^dⁱⁿ^{g equ}ⁱ^p^m^en^t^l^o^cat^ed^e^l^sew^h^er^{e o}^r^t^o^o^t^h^e^{r agen}^t^s^m^oⁿⁱ^t^o^riⁿ^g^t^h^e
^traⁿ^sm^itting^f^r^e^que^nc^y^.^Oⁿ^Le^e^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^{, s}^upr^a^{. I}^f^the^c^o^nd^uc^{t a}ⁿ^d^r^e^v^e^la^tions^of^aⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^{t o}^p^e^r^a^ting^w^ithout
^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^e^qui^pm^eⁿ^{t do}^no^{t i}ⁿ^v^a^de^the^de^f^e^nda^nt’^s^c^ons^tit^uti^ona^ll^y^jus^tifⁱ^a^ble^e^x^pe^c^t^a^tions^of^pr^iv^a^c^y^,^ne^ithe^r^d^o^e^s^a
^si^m^u^l^t^aⁿ^e^o^u^s^reco^rdⁱⁿ^{g o}^f^t^h^{e same co}ⁿ^v^ersatⁱ^oⁿ^s^m^a^d^e^b^y^t^h^{e ag}^en^t^o^r^b^y^o^t^h^e^{rs f}^r^o^m^t^r^an^s^mⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^{s recei}^ved^f^r^o^m^t^h^e
^a^g^eⁿ^{t to w}^hom^the^de^f^e^nda^{nt is}^ta^lk^ing^a^{nd w}^hos^e^tr^us^tw^or^thiⁿ^e^s^s^t^h^e^de^f^e^nda^{nt ne}^c^e^s^s^a^r^ily^rⁱ^s^k^s^”⁾^;^Lope^z^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d
^State^s³⁷^{3 U}^.^S.⁴^27,⁴^{39 (}¹⁹^63)(“^Strip^p^e^d^t^o^its^e^s^s^e^ntia^ls^,^pe^titi^on^e^r’s^a^r^g^u^m^e^{nt am}^ounts^t^o^s^a^yⁱ^ng^t^h^a^t^he^ha^s^a
^c^ons^titu^tio^na^{l rig}^h^t^{to re}^ly^on^pos^sⁱ^ble^f^l^aw^s^{in the}^a^g^eⁿ^t’s^m^e^m^o^r^y^{, or t}^o^c^h^a^lle^ng^e^the^a^g^eⁿ^t’s^c^r^e^d^ibility^w^ithout
^b^eⁱⁿ^{g b}^e^set^b^y^co^rro^bo^ratⁱⁿ^{g evi}^d^en^{ce t}^h^atⁱ^s^no^t^s^u^scep^tⁱ^b^l^e^o^fⁱ^m^p^each^m^eⁿ^t^.^F^o^rⁿ^o^o^t^h^e^{r argu}^m^eⁿ^t^can^j^u^stⁱ^f^y
^excl^u^dⁱⁿ^g^an^accu^rat^e^versi^oⁿ^o^f^{a co}ⁿ^v^ersatⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^at^t^h^{e agen}^t^cou^l^d^t^e^stⁱ^f^y^t^o^f^r^o^m^me^m^o^r^y^.^W^e^t^hⁱⁿ^{k t}^h^{e ri}^{sk t}^h^at
^p^e^titioⁿ^e^{r to}^o^kⁱⁿ^o^f^f^e^rin^g^{a b}^r^ib^{e to}^Davⁱ^{s f}^a^irl^yⁱⁿ^clu^d^e^d^t^h^{e risk}^th^{at th}^e^o^f^{fer w}^o^u^l^d^b^e^accu^rately^rep^r^o^d^u^cedⁱⁿ
^c^ourt,^w^h^e^t^he^r^by^f^a^ultle^{ss m}^e^m^o^ry^{or m}^e^c^h^aⁿ^ic^a^l^re^c^o^rding^”^).
⁴¹^“⁽^c⁾^I^t^s^h^a^{ll n}^o^t^be^uⁿ^la^w^f^{ul unde}^r^this^c^h^a^p^te^r^f^o^r^a^pe^r^s^on^a^c^ting^unde^r^c^o^lor^of^la^w^{to inte}^r^c^e^p^{t a}^wⁱ^r^e^{, or}^a^l^{, or}
^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^,^w^h^ere^su^ch^p^e^rsonⁱ^s^a^p^a^rt^y^t^o^t^h^{e co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^o^r^on^{e o}^f^t^h^{e p}^a^rtⁱ^e^{s t}^o^t^h^e
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion ha}^s^gⁱ^v^e^{n pr}ⁱ^o^r^c^ons^eⁿ^t^{to s}^u^c^hⁱⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^tio^n.
^“⁽^d)^I^t^s^h^a^l^lⁿ^o^{t be}^un^la^w^f^{ul unde}^r^this^c^h^a^p^te^r^f^o^r^a^pe^r^s^onⁿ^o^{t a}^c^tⁱⁿ^g^un^de^r^c^o^l^o^r^of^la^w^{to inte}^r^c^e^p^t^a^wⁱ^r^e^{, or}^a^l^{, or}
^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^w^h^{ere su}^ch^p^e^rsonⁱ^s^a^p^a^rt^y^t^o^t^h^{e co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^o^r^w^h^{ere o}ⁿ^e^o^f^t^h^{e part}ⁱ^e^{s t}^o^t^h^e
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion ha}^s^gⁱ^v^e^{n pr}ⁱ^o^r^c^ons^eⁿ^t^{to s}^u^c^hⁱⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^tioⁿ^unle^s^s^s^u^c^h^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion is}ⁱⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^t^e^{d f}^o^r^the^p^u^r^p^os^e
^of^c^o^m^m^itting^aⁿ^y^c^rⁱ^m^ina^l^{or tor}^{tious a}^c^tⁱⁿ^vⁱ^ola^tⁱ^oⁿ^of^the^C^onsti^tutioⁿ^{or la}^w^s^of^the^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{or of}^aⁿ^y^Sta^t^e^,^”
^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁵¹¹⁽²⁾⁽^c⁾^,⁽^d⁾^.
⁴²^{For c}^ita^ti^ons^{to sta}^t^e^la^w^,^se^e^A^p^pe^ndix^II.
⁴³^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Fr^ie^dm^aⁿ^,³⁰^{0 F}^.^3d¹¹^1,¹²^2-²³⁽²^d^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰²⁾⁽ⁱⁿ^m^a^t^e^us^e^of^pr^is^on^ph^one⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^v^.
^Faulkⁿ^e^r^{, 4}³⁹^F.3^d¹²^21,¹²²⁴⁽¹^{0th C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾⁽^s^a^m^e⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^at^e^s^v^.^H^a^m^m^ond^{, 2}⁸⁶^F.^3d¹⁸^9,¹⁹^{2 (}⁴^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰²⁾
^(sa^m^e);^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^Fo^otm^aⁿ^{, 21}⁵^F.3^d¹⁴^{5, 1}⁵⁴^-⁵⁵⁽¹^s^t^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁽^s^a^m^e⁾^;^G^r^iggs^-^R^y^{an v}^.^Sm^it^h^,⁹⁰^{4 F}^.²^d¹¹²^,
¹¹⁶^-¹^{7 (}¹^s^t^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁰⁾⁽^u^s^e^of^laⁿ^d^la^dy^’^s^phone⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^a^t^{es v.}^Rⁱ^vera^{, 2}⁹²^{F. S}^u^p^p^.^2d⁸^38,⁸^43-^{45 (}^E^.D^.^Va^.
²⁰⁰³⁾⁽ⁱ^nm^a^t^e^us^e^of^pr^is^{on p}^h^oⁿ^e^m^onitor^e^d^by^pr^iv^a^t^e^c^ontr^a^c^t^or^s⁾^{; s}^e^e^a^l^s^o^,^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^C^o^nle^y^{, 53}^{1 F.}^3d⁵⁶^,^58-
⁹⁽^1s^{t C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁸⁾⁽^e^x^p^lic^{it c}^o^ns^eⁿ^t^a^s^a^c^onditi^on^f^o^r^ph^one^pr^iv^ile^g^e^s⁾^.

sufficient, for it is the parties to the conversation whose privacy is designed to protect.⁴⁴ Although
consent may be given in the hopes of leniency from law enforcement officials or as an election ⁴⁵
between unpalatable alternatives, it must be freely given and not secured coercively.
Private consent interceptions may not be conducted for a criminal or tortious purpose.⁴⁶ At one
time, the limitation encompassed interceptions for criminal, tortious, or otherwise injurious
purposes, but ECPA dropped the reference to injurious purposes for fear that First Amendment
values might be threatened should the clause be read to outlaw consent interceptions conducted to ⁴⁷
embarrass.
Radio communications which can be inadvertently heard or are intended to be heard by the public
are likewise exempt. These include not only commercial broadcasts, but ship and aircraft distress
signals, tone-only pagers, marine radio and citizen band radio transmissions, and interceptions
necessary to identify the source any transmission, radio or otherwise, disrupting communications ⁴⁸
satellite broadcasts.
Government officials enjoy an exemption when acting under judicial authority, whether that
authority is provided for in Title III/ECPA for federal and state law enforcement officers acting ⁴⁹⁵⁰
under a court order, acting in an emergency situation pending issuance of a court order, or in

⁴⁴^Aⁿ^t^h^on^{y v.}^Unⁱ^t^e^d^St^a^t^es^,⁶⁶^{7 F.}^2d⁸⁷^0,⁸⁷^{6 (}¹^0t^{h C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸¹⁾^.
⁴⁵^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Ant^o^oⁿ^,⁹³³^F.2^d²^00,²^03-²⁰^{4 (}^{3d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹¹⁾^.^Bu^{t se}^e^O’Fe^rre^{ll v}^.^Unite^{d S}^t^ate^s^{, 9}^{68 F.S}^u^p^p^{. 15}^19,
¹⁵⁴^{1 (}^M^.D^{. A}^l^a^.¹⁹⁹⁷⁾⁽^a^{n i}^ndivⁱ^dua^{l w}^{ho s}^p^ok^e^to^his^wⁱ^f^e^{on the}^te^le^pho^ne^a^f^te^r^be^ing^tol^d^by^FB^I^a^g^eⁿ^ts^w^{ho w}^e^r^e
^t^h^en^execu^tⁱⁿ^{g a search}^w^a^rran^t^at^hⁱ^{s pl}^{ace o}^f^b^u^sⁱⁿ^{ess t}^h^at^h^e^cou^l^d^on^l^y^sp^{eak t}^o^h^e^{r w}ⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e agen}^t^s^lⁱ^s^t^eⁿⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ
^c^onseⁿ^te^{d t}^o^t^h^eⁱⁿ^te^rc^e^p^tio^{n, e}^v^eⁿ^if^{FBI’s ini}^tia^{l se}^a^r^c^h^w^a^{s unc}^onstitutⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^).
⁴⁶^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁵¹¹⁽²⁾⁽^d)^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Lam^,²⁷^{1 F}^.^Su^pp^.2^{d 1}¹⁸²^,¹¹⁸^3-¹⁸^{4 (}^N^.D^.C^a^l^.²⁰⁰³⁾^.
⁴⁷^S.R^e^pt.⁹⁹^-⁵^41,^a^t¹⁷^-⁸⁽¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^;^H^.^R^e^{pt. 9}⁹^-⁶⁴⁷^{, a}^t^39-^{40 (}¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^.
⁴⁸^“(g⁾^{It sh}^{all n}^o^t^b^e^uⁿ^lawf^u^l^uⁿ^d^e^{r th}^{is ch}^a^p^{ter o}^r^c^h^ap^te^r¹²¹^o^f^thⁱ^s^{title f}^o^{r an}^y^p^e^rsoⁿ^–^(I)^toⁱⁿ^ter^cep^{t o}^r^{access an}
^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^m^a^d^e^t^h^rou^g^h^an^el^ect^ronⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^sy^st^e^m^t^h^atⁱ^s^coⁿ^fⁱ^g^u^r^ed^so^t^h^at^su^ch^el^ect^ronⁱ^c
^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿⁱ^s^readⁱ^l^y^acces^si^b^l^{e t}^o^t^h^{e gen}^e^ral^pu^b^lⁱ^c^;
^“⁽^{ii) to i}ⁿ^te^rc^e^p^{t a}ⁿ^y^ra^{dio c}^o^m^m^unic^a^tio^{n w}^h^ic^{h is}^traⁿ^s^m^itte^{d – (}^{I) by}^aⁿ^y^s^t^a^{tion f}^o^{r the}^us^e^of^the^g^e^ne^ra^{l publ}^ic^{, or}
^th^{at relates to}^s^h^ip^{s, aircraf}^t^{, v}^e^hⁱ^cles^{, o}^r^p^e^rsoⁿ^{s in}^dⁱ^{stress; (II)}^b^y^an^y^g^o^v^e^rn^men^t^{al, law}^en^f^o^rce^m^en^{t, civ}^{il d}^e^f^eⁿ^s^e,
^pr^iv^a^t^e^la^{nd m}^obile^,^or^pu^blic^s^a^f^e^t^y^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^s^y^s^t^em^{, inc}^l^uding^p^o^lic^e^aⁿ^{d f}ⁱ^r^e^{, r}^e^a^d^ily^a^c^c^e^s^sⁱ^ble^to^the^g^e^ne^r^a^l
^p^u^b^lic^{; (III)}^b^y^a^sta^tioⁿ^o^p^e^r^a^tin^g^oⁿ^aⁿ^a^u^t^h^o^r^iz^e^d^f^r^e^q^u^eⁿ^c^y^w^ithⁱⁿ^th^e^b^aⁿ^d^{s a}^llo^c^a^t^e^d^t^o^t^h^e^a^m^a^t^e^u^{r, c}^itiz^eⁿ^s^b^aⁿ^d^,
^or^g^e^ne^r^a^{l m}^obile^r^a^{dio s}^e^r^v^ic^e^s^{; or}⁽^I^V)^by^aⁿ^y^m^a^rⁱ^ne^or^a^e^r^ona^ut^ic^a^l^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^s^y^s^t^em^;
^“⁽^{iii) to e}ⁿ^g^a^g^e^{in a}ⁿ^y^c^onduc^{t w}^h^ic^h^{– (I) is}^pro^hⁱ^b^ite^d^by^s^e^c^{tion 633}^of^the^C^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^A^c^{t of}^1934;^{or (I}^{I) is}
^e^x^c^e^p^te^{d f}^r^o^m^the^a^pplic^a^tio^{n of}^s^e^c^{tion 7}⁰⁵⁽^a⁾^of^the^C^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^A^c^{t of}¹⁹³⁴^by^s^e^c^tion⁷⁰⁵⁽^b⁾^of^tha^t^A^c^t;
^“(i^v^{) t}^oⁱⁿ^t^e^rcep^t^aⁿ^y^wⁱ^{re o}^r^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^e^t^r^an^smⁱ^s^si^oⁿ^o^f^w^hⁱ^c^hⁱ^s^cau^siⁿ^g^h^a^rmf^u^lⁱⁿ^t^e^rf^eren^{ce t}^o
^an^y^l^a^wf^u^l^l^y^o^p^e^ratⁱⁿ^{g st}^atⁱ^oⁿ^o^r^coⁿ^s^u^m^{er el}^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c eq}^uⁱ^p^m^en^t^,^t^o^t^h^{e ext}^eⁿ^tⁿ^ecessar^y^t^oⁱ^d^en^tⁱ^f^y^t^h^{e so}^u^r^ce^o^f^su^ch
ⁱⁿ^t^e^rf^eren^ce;^o^r
^“⁽^v⁾^f^o^r^othe^r^us^e^r^s^of^the^s^a^m^e^f^r^e^que^nc^y^{to inte}^r^c^e^p^{t a}ⁿ^y^r^a^{dio c}^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion m}^a^de^thr^oug^{h a}^s^y^s^t^em^tha^t^util^iz^e^s
^f^r^e^que^nc^ie^s^m^onitor^e^d^by^indivⁱ^d^u^a^l^s^eⁿ^g^a^g^e^{d in the}^pr^ov^is^ioⁿ^or^t^h^e^us^e^of^s^u^c^h^s^y^s^t^em^{, if}^s^u^c^h^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion is}ⁿ^o^t
^s^c^r^a^m^b^le^{d or}^eⁿ^c^r^y^p^te^d,”¹⁸^U^.^S.^C^.²⁵¹¹⁽²⁾⁽^g⁾^.
⁴⁹^“^Excep^{t a}^s^o^t^h^e^{rwise sp}^ecifica^lly^p^r^o^v^id^e^dⁱⁿ^th^{is ch}^a^p^ter^aⁿ^y^pe^{rson w}^{ho (a}^{) i}ⁿ^teⁿ^tio^na^lly^inte^rc^e^p^{ts . . .}^.”¹⁸
^U^.^S.C^.²⁵¹¹⁽¹⁾⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d)^.
⁵⁰^“No^t^wⁱ^t^h^st^an^dⁱⁿ^g^an^y^o^t^h^e^r^p^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^hⁱ^s^ch^apt^e^r,^an^yⁱⁿ^vestⁱ^g^atⁱ^v^{e o}^r^l^a^w^en^f^o^rce^m^en^t^o^f^fⁱ^cer,^sp^eci^al^l^y
^de^sigⁿ^a^t^e^d^by^the^A^ttorne^y^G^e^ne^r^a^{l, the}^De^p^u^ty^A^ttorne^y^G^e^ne^ra^{l, t}^h^e^A^ssocⁱ^a^t^e^A^ttorne^y^Ge^ne^ra^{l, or by}^the^princⁱ^pa^l
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

the case of communications of an intruder in a communications system acting with the approval ⁵¹⁵²
of the system provider; in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or in the separate ⁵³
provisions according them the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices.
There is a general exemption for those associated with supplying communications services, the
telephone company, switchboard operators, and the like. The exemption not only permits ⁵⁴
improved service and lets the telephone company protect itself against fraud, but it allows for

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^p^r^o^s^ecu^tⁱⁿ^g^at^t^o^rn^ey^o^f^an^y^S^t^at^{e o}^r^sub^dⁱ^vi^si^on^t^h^ereo^f^actⁱⁿ^{g p}^u^r^s^u^an^t^t^o^{a st}^at^u^t^e^o^f^t^h^at^S^t^at^e,^w^h^{o reaso}ⁿ^a^b^l^y
^de^te^r^m^ine^s^tha^t^{– (}^a⁾^aⁿ^e^m^e^r^ge^nc^y^s^itua^{tion e}^x^is^ts^tha^t^inv^o^l^v^e^s^{– (}^I⁾^im^m^e^dia^t^e^da^ng^e^r^of^de^a^t^{h or}^s^e^rⁱ^ous^p^h^y^s^ic^a^l
^injury^{to a}ⁿ^y^pe^{rson, (}^{ii) c}^o^nspira^tori^a^l^a^c^tiv^itie^{s thre}^a^t^eⁿⁱⁿ^g^the^na^tiona^{l se}^c^u^ri^ty^inte^re^{st, or (iii)}^c^o^nspira^torⁱ^a^l
^a^c^tiv^itie^{s c}^h^a^r^a^c^t^e^r^istic^of^orga^niz^e^d^c^r^im^e^,^[^–^]^tha^t^re^quire^{s a}^wⁱ^re^{, ora}^l^,^{or e}^l^e^c^t^ro^nic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tio^{n to}^be
^inte^rc^e^p^te^d^be^f^o^re^aⁿ^orde^{r a}^u^th^or^iz^ing^suc^hⁱⁿ^te^rc^e^p^tio^{n c}^aⁿ^{, w}^ith^due^d^ilig^eⁿ^c^e^,^be^obtaⁱ^ne^{d, a}ⁿ^{d (}^b^{) the}^r^e^a^r^e^g^r^oun^ds
^upo^{n w}^h^ic^{h a}ⁿ^or^de^r^c^oul^d^be^eⁿ^t^e^r^e^{d un}^de^r^this^c^h^a^p^te^r^t^o^a^u^t^horⁱ^z^e^s^u^c^h^inte^r^c^e^p^ti^on,^m^a^y^inte^r^c^{ept s}^u^c^h^wⁱ^r^e^{, or}^a^l^,
^o^r^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c c}^o^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿⁱ^f^{an ap}^p^lⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^f^o^{r an o}^r^d^e^{r ap}^p^r^o^vⁱ^{ng t}^h^{e i}ⁿ^t^e^rcep^tⁱ^oⁿⁱ^s^m^a^d^eⁱⁿ^acco^rd^an^{ce w}ⁱ^t^h^t^hⁱ^s
^s^e^c^{tion w}^{ithin f}^o^r^t^y^-^eⁱ^g^h^{t hour}^s^a^f^te^r^the^inte^r^c^e^p^tio^{n ha}^s^oc^c^u^r^r^e^d,^or^be^gⁱ^ns^to^oc^c^u^r^.^Iⁿ^t^h^e^a^b^s^e^nc^e^of^aⁿ^or^de^r^,^s^u^c^h
ⁱⁿ^t^e^rcep^tⁱ^oⁿ^sh^al^lⁱ^m^m^e^dⁱ^at^el^y^t^e^r^mⁱⁿ^at^e^w^h^en^t^h^{e co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^so^u^g^h^tⁱ^s^o^b^t^aⁱⁿ^ed^o^r^w^h^en^t^h^{e app}^lⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^f^o^{r t}^h^e
^o^r^d^e^{r i}^s^d^eⁿⁱ^ed,^w^hⁱ^c^h^e^{ver i}^s^earlⁱ^e^r.^In^t^h^{e even}^t^su^ch^app^lⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^f^o^{r ap}^p^r^o^v^alⁱ^s^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,^o^rⁱⁿ^an^y^o^t^h^e^{r case}^w^h^{ere t}^h^e
ⁱⁿ^t^e^rcep^tⁱ^oⁿⁱ^s^t^e^rmⁱⁿ^at^ed^wⁱ^t^h^o^u^t^an^o^r^d^e^{r h}^a^viⁿ^g^b^eenⁱ^ssu^ed^,^t^h^e^coⁿ^t^en^t^s^o^f^an^y^wⁱ^re,^o^r^al^,^o^r^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^c
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion inte}^r^c^e^p^te^d^s^h^a^ll^be^tr^e^a^t^e^d^a^s^ha^vⁱ^ng^be^eⁿ^obtaⁱ^ne^{d in}^vⁱ^ola^tioⁿ^of^this^c^h^a^p^te^r^,^aⁿ^d^aⁿ^inv^e^ntor^y^s^h^a^ll
^be^s^e^r^v^e^d^a^s^pr^ov^ide^d^f^o^rⁱⁿ^s^u^bs^e^c^{tion (}^d⁾^of^this^s^e^c^tion^on^the^pe^r^s^on^na^m^e^{d in the}^a^p^plic^a^tio^n,”¹⁸^U^.^S.C^.²⁵¹⁸⁽⁷⁾^.
⁵¹^“^{(I) It s}^h^a^ll^not^be^unla^w^f^u^{l unde}^{r this}^c^h^a^p^te^{r f}^o^{r a}^pe^rs^on^a^c^ting^unde^{r c}^o^lor^of^la^w^{to inte}^rc^e^p^{t t}^h^e^wⁱ^re^or
^e^l^e^c^t^roⁿⁱ^c^c^o^m^m^uⁿⁱ^c^a^tioⁿ^s^o^f^a^c^o^m^p^u^t^e^r^tre^s^p^a^sse^{r tra}ⁿ^sm^itte^d^to^,^th^ro^u^g^h^,^o^r^f^r^o^m^th^e^p^r^o^t^e^c^t^e^d^c^o^m^p^u^t^e^r^{, if}^{— (I)}
^the^ow^ne^r^or^ope^r^a^tor^of^the^pr^ote^c^te^{d c}^o^m^pute^r^a^u^th^or^iz^e^s^theⁱⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^tion^of^the^c^o^m^pute^r^tr^e^s^pa^s^s^e^r^’^s
^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^s^oⁿ^th^e^p^r^o^t^ected^co^m^p^u^t^{er; (II) th}^e^p^e^rsoⁿ^actiⁿ^g^uⁿ^d^e^{r co}^l^o^r^o^f^law^{is la}^wf^u^l^l^y^en^g^a^g^e^dⁱⁿ^an
ⁱⁿ^v^e^stig^atioⁿ^;^{(III) t}^h^{e p}^e^rsoⁿ^actiⁿ^g^uⁿ^d^e^{r co}^l^o^{r o}^f^law^h^a^{s reaso}ⁿ^a^b^l^{e g}^r^o^uⁿ^d^s^t^o^b^e^liev^e^th^{at th}^{e co}ⁿ^t^en^ts^o^f^th^e
^c^o^m^pute^r^tre^s^pa^sse^{r’s c}^o^m^m^unic^a^{tions w}^{ill be}^re^le^v^a^{nt t}^o^t^h^e^inv^e^stig^a^{tion; a}ⁿ^{d (I}^V⁾^s^u^c^hⁱⁿ^te^rc^e^p^tio^{n d}^o^e^sⁿ^o^{t a}^c^qui^re
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tions ot}^he^{r tha}ⁿ^th^ose^traⁿ^sm^itte^{d to or f}^r^om^the^c^o^m^put^e^r^tre^s^pa^sse^r,”^{18 U.S.C}^.²⁵¹¹⁽²⁾⁽^I).
⁵²^“⁽^e⁾^N^o^tw^iths^t^a^nding^aⁿ^y^othe^r^p^r^ov^is^ion^of^this^ti^tle^or^s^e^c^tioⁿ⁷⁰^{5 or}⁷⁰⁶^of^the^C^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^A^c^{t o}^f¹⁹³^{4, i}^t
^s^h^a^{ll n}^o^{t be}^un^la^w^f^{ul f}^o^r^aⁿ^of^fⁱ^cer^{, e}^m^ploy^e^e^,^or^a^g^eⁿ^{t of}^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^sⁱⁿ^the^nor^m^a^{l c}^our^s^e^of^hⁱ^s^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^duty^to
^c^ond^uc^{t e}^l^e^c^t^ronic^s^u^rv^e^illa^nc^e^,^a^s^de^fⁱ^ne^{d in se}^c^tioⁿ¹⁰^{1 of}^the^Fo^re^ig^{n Inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^Surv^e^illa^nc^e^A^c^{t of}¹⁹⁷^{8, a}^s
^a^u^thor^iz^e^d^by^tha^t^A^c^t,”^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁵¹¹⁽²⁾⁽^e⁾^.
⁵³^“(h⁾^It^sh^al^l^no^t^b^e^un^l^a^wf^u^l^uⁿ^d^e^{r t}^hⁱ^s^ch^a^p^t^e^{r –}^(I^{) t}^o^u^s^{e a p}^eⁿ^re^gi^st^{er o}^r^{a t}^r^ap^and^t^r^{ace d}^e^vi^{ce (as t}^h^o^s^{e t}^e^rm^{s are}
^de^fⁱ^ne^{d f}^o^r^the^p^u^r^p^os^e^of^c^h^a^p^te^r²⁰⁶⁾^.^{. .}^.”¹⁸^U^.^S.C^.²⁵¹¹⁽²⁾⁽^h)^.^N^e^ithe^r^the^s^t^or^e^d^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion^s^s^e^c^tionsⁱⁿ
^ch^ap^t^e^{r 12}¹ⁿ^o^r^t^h^e^p^eⁿ^regi^st^{er an}^d^t^r^a^p^and^t^r^{ace d}^e^vi^{ce i}ⁿ^ch^ap^t^e^{r 2}⁰⁶^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^{ze t}^h^{e con}^t^em^p^o^r^an^eo^u^sⁱⁿ^t^e^rcep^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f
^the^c^onteⁿ^{ts of}^a^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion.^{For t}^h^e^c^ita^tio^{ns to}^sta^t^e^sta^t^ute^s^p^e^r^m^itting^judⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^a^u^th^oriz^a^tioⁿ^of^la^w^eⁿ^f^o^rc^e^m^eⁿ^t
ⁱⁿ^t^e^rcep^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^wⁱ^re,^o^r^al^o^r^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^f^o^{r access t}^o^st^o^r^{ed el}^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^and^f^o^{r t}^h^e^u^s^e
^o^f^p^eⁿ^regi^st^{ers an}^d^t^r^ap^aⁿ^d^t^r^{ace d}^e^vi^ces,^see^A^p^p^eⁿ^dⁱ^x^V^.
⁵⁴^“⁽^a^{)(I) It s}^h^a^ll^not^be^uⁿ^la^w^f^{ul un}^de^{r this}^c^h^a^p^te^{r f}^o^{r a}ⁿ^ope^ra^tor^of^a^s^w^itc^hboa^rd,^{or a}ⁿ^of^fⁱ^c^e^{r, e}^m^ploy^e^e^,^{or a}^g^eⁿ^t
^of^a^prov^ide^r^of^wⁱ^re^{or e}^l^e^c^t^ronic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion se}^rv^ic^e^,^w^hose^fa^c^ilitie^{s a}^r^e^use^dⁱⁿ^the^traⁿ^sm^{ission of}^a^wⁱ^re^or
^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion,^to^inte^r^c^e^p^{t, dis}^c^los^e^,^or^us^e^tha^t^c^o^m^m^u^nic^a^tionⁱⁿ^the^nor^m^a^{l c}^our^s^e^of^hⁱ^s^e^m^plo^y^m^e^nt
^w^h^ile^eⁿ^g^a^ge^{d in a}ⁿ^y^a^c^tiv^it^y^w^h^ic^{h is a}^ne^c^e^ssa^r^y^incⁱ^de^nt^t^o^t^h^e^r^e^nditi^on^of^his^s^e^r^v^ic^e^or^to^the^pr^ote^c^tion^of^the
^rⁱ^g^h^ts^or^pr^o^p^e^r^ty^of^the^pr^ov^ide^r^of^tha^t^s^e^r^v^ic^e^,^e^x^ce^{pt tha}^t^a^pr^ovⁱ^d^e^r^of^wⁱ^r^e^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion s}^e^r^v^ic^e^{to t}^h^e^pu^blic
^sha^{ll n}^o^{t u}^tiliz^e^se^rv^ic^e^obse^r^vⁱ^ng^{or ra}ⁿ^dom^m^onitoring^e^x^c^e^p^{t f}^o^{r m}^e^c^h^aⁿ^ic^a^l^{or se}^rv^ic^e^qua^lity^c^{ontrol c}^h^e^c^k^{s . .}^.
^{* * *}
^“⁽^h)^I^t^s^h^a^l^lⁿ^o^{t be}^un^la^w^f^{ul unde}^r^this^c^h^a^p^te^r^{. .}^.
^“(iⁱ⁾^f^o^{r a p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^er^o^f^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^servi^{ce t}^o^reco^rd^t^h^{e f}^act^t^h^at^{a w}ⁱ^{re o}^r^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c comm}^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^w^a^s
^initia^te^d^{or c}^o^m^p^le^te^{d i}ⁿ^o^r^de^{r t}^o^prote^c^t^suc^h^pr^ov^ide^r^{, a}ⁿ^ot^he^{r pr}^o^vⁱ^de^{r f}^u^rnishing^se^rv^ic^e^tow^a^{rd th}^e^c^o^m^p^le^{tion of}
^the^wⁱ^r^e^or^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion^,^or^a^us^e^r^of^tha^t^s^e^r^v^ic^e^,^f^r^om^f^r^a^uduleⁿ^t,^unla^w^f^u^{l or}^a^bus^iv^e^us^e^of^s^u^c^h
^serv^{ice,” 1}⁸^U.S.C.²⁵¹¹⁽²^)(a)(I),^(h^).

assistance to federal and state officials operating under a judicially supervised interception ⁵⁵⁵⁶
order, and for the regulatory activities of the Federal Communications Commission.
A few courts recognize a “vicarious consent” exception under which a custodial parent may ⁵⁷
secretly record the conversations of his or her minor child in the interest of protecting the child. ⁵⁸
Although rejected by most, a handful of federal courts have held that Title III/ECPA does not ⁵⁹
preclude one spouse from wiretapping or electronically eavesdropping upon the other, a result
other courts have sometimes reached through the telephone extension exception discussed ⁶⁰
above.

⁵⁵^“(iⁱ⁾^No^t^wⁱ^t^h^st^an^diⁿ^g^an^y^o^t^h^e^{r l}^a^w^,^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^{ers o}^f^wⁱ^r^e^o^r^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^servi^ce,^t^h^ei^{r o}^f^fⁱ^cer^s,
^e^m^ploy^e^e^{s, a}^{nd a}^g^eⁿ^{ts, la}^nd^lor^d^s,^c^u^stod^ia^ns,^{or o}^t^he^{r pe}^rs^{ons, a}^r^e^a^u^thor^iz^e^d^to^pr^ov^ide^inf^o^rm^a^tion^,^f^a^c^ilitie^{s, or}
^t^echⁿⁱ^cal^assi^st^an^{ce t}^o^p^e^rson^{s aut}^h^o^rⁱ^{zed b}^y^l^a^w^t^oⁱⁿ^t^e^rcep^t^wⁱ^re,^o^r^al^,^o^r^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^o^{ns o}^r^t^o^co^nd^u^c^t
^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^s^u^rv^e^illa^nc^e^,^a^s^de^fⁱ^ne^d^{in s}^e^c^tio^{n 1}⁰¹^of^the^F^o^re^ig^{n I}ⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^Surv^e^illa^nc^e^A^c^{t of}¹⁹⁷⁸^{, if}^s^u^c^h^pr^ov^ide^r^,
^its^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^s^,^em^ploy^ee^s^,^or^a^g^eⁿ^ts^{, la}^ndl^or^d^,^c^u^s^t^o^d^iaⁿ^,^or^ot^he^r^s^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^pe^r^s^on,^ha^s^be^eⁿ^pr^ov^ide^d^w^ith^–
^(A^{) a co}^u^r^t^o^r^d^e^r^dⁱ^rectⁱⁿ^{g su}^{ch assi}^st^an^{ce si}^gn^ed^b^y^t^h^{e au}^t^h^o^rⁱ^zⁱ^{ng j}^u^d^g^e,^o^r
^{(B) a}^c^e^r^tif^ic^a^{tion in w}^r^iting^by^a^pe^{rson s}^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^{in se}^c^tioⁿ²⁵¹⁸⁽⁷^{) of}^this^title^{or the}^A^ttorⁿ^e^y^G^e^ne^ra^{l of}^the
^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^tha^tⁿ^o^w^a^r^r^a^{nt or}^c^our^t^or^de^r^is^r^e^qu^ir^e^d^by^law^,^tha^t^a^{ll s}^t^a^t^ut^or^y^r^e^quir^e^m^e^nts^ha^v^e^be^eⁿ^m^e^{t, a}^nd
^t^h^at^t^h^{e s}^p^eci^fⁱ^ed^assi^st^an^{ce i}^s^req^uⁱ^red^,
^se^tting^f^o^{rth the}^pe^rio^d^of^tim^e^du^ring^w^h^ic^{h the}^p^r^ov^isioⁿ^of^theⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion, f}^a^c^ilitie^{s, or te}^c^hnic^a^l^a^ssistaⁿ^c^e^is
^a^u^thor^iz^e^d^aⁿ^d^spe^cⁱ^fy^ing^the^inf^o^rm^a^{tion, f}^a^c^ilitie^{s, or te}^c^hnic^a^l^a^ssistaⁿ^c^e^re^quire^{d. N}^o^pr^ov^ide^r^of^wⁱ^re^{or e}^l^e^c^t^ronic
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion s}^e^r^v^ic^e^,^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^{, em}^plo^y^e^e^,^or^a^g^eⁿ^{t the}^r^e^o^f^,^or^laⁿ^d^l^or^d,^c^u^s^t^o^d^ia^n,^or^ot^he^r^s^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^pe^r^s^on^s^h^a^ll
^dⁱ^sclo^{se th}^{e ex}^isten^{ce o}^f^an^yⁱⁿ^tercep^tioⁿ^o^r^s^u^rv^eillaⁿ^{ce o}^r^t^h^{e d}^e^vⁱ^{ce u}^s^ed^to^acco^m^p^lish^t^h^{e in}^terce^p^tioⁿ^o^r
^surv^e^illa^nc^e^w^{ith re}^spe^c^t^{to w}^h^ic^{h the}^pe^rson^ha^{s be}^eⁿ^f^u^rnishe^d^a^c^ourt^orde^r^{or c}^e^r^tif^ic^a^{tion u}^nde^{r t}^h^{is c}^h^a^p^te^r,^e^x^c^e^p^t
^a^s^m^a^y^othe^r^w^ise^be^r^e^quir^e^d^by^le^g^a^{l pr}^oc^e^s^s^a^{nd the}ⁿ^oⁿ^ly^a^f^te^{r prior n}^o^tif^ic^a^tion^to^the^A^ttorne^y^Ge^ne^ra^{l or to}^the
^p^rⁱⁿ^ci^p^a^l^p^r^o^s^ecu^tⁱⁿ^{g at}^t^o^rn^ey^o^f^{a S}^t^at^{e o}^r^an^y^p^o^lⁱ^tⁱ^cal^su^bdⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^{a S}^t^at^e,^{as m}^a^y^b^e^ap^p^r^o^p^rⁱ^a^t^e^.^Aⁿ^y^su^ch
^dⁱ^scl^o^su^re,^s^h^al^l^rend^{er su}^ch^p^e^rsoⁿ^lⁱ^ab^l^e^f^o^{r t}^h^{e ci}^vi^l^d^a^m^a^{ges p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^ed^f^o^{r i}ⁿ^sectⁱ^o^{n 25}²⁰^.^{No cau}^{se o}^f^actⁱ^oⁿ^sh^al^l
^lⁱ^eⁱⁿ^an^y^co^u^r^t^agaiⁿ^s^t^an^y^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^{er o}^f^wⁱ^{re o}^r^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^servi^ce,ⁱ^t^s^o^f^fⁱ^cers,^e^m^p^l^o^y^ees,^o^r^agen^t^s^,
^la^ndl^ord,^c^u^sto^d^ia^n,^or^othe^{r s}^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^pe^{rson f}^o^{r pr}^ov^idiⁿ^g^inf^o^rm^a^tion^,^f^a^c^ilitie^{s, or a}^ssi^staⁿ^c^e^{in a}^c^c^o^rdaⁿ^c^e^w^{ith the}
^te^r^m^s^of^a^c^our^{t or}^de^r^,^s^t^a^t^ut^or^y^auth^or^iz^a^tio^n,^or^c^e^r^tif^ic^a^{tion u}^nde^r^this^c^h^a^p^te^r^,^”¹⁸^U^.^S^.^C^.²⁵¹¹⁽²⁾⁽^a⁾⁽ⁱⁱ⁾^.
⁵⁶^“⁽^b)^I^t^s^h^a^l^{l n}^o^t^be^uⁿ^la^w^f^{ul un}^de^r^this^c^h^a^p^te^r^f^o^r^aⁿ^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^{, em}^ploy^ee^{, or}^a^g^eⁿ^{t of}^the^Fe^de^r^a^{l C}^o^m^m^unic^a^tions
^Com^m^is^sⁱ^{on, in t}^h^eⁿ^o^rm^a^l^c^ours^e^of^his^e^m^plo^y^m^e^{nt a}^{nd in}^dis^c^h^a^rg^e^of^the^m^onitori^ng^re^s^ponsⁱ^b^il^itie^s^e^x^e^r^cⁱ^s^e^{d b}^y
^the^Com^m^{ission in}^the^eⁿ^f^o^rc^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^c^h^a^p^te^r^{5 of}^title⁴⁷^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^Code^,^to^inte^rc^e^p^{t a}^wⁱ^re^{or e}^l^e^c^t^ronic
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion, or}^ora^l^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion tra}ⁿ^sm^itte^{d by}^ra^dio,^{or t}^o^disc^lose^or^use^theⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^a^{tion th}^e^r^e^b^y^obtaⁱ^ne^d^,^”¹⁸
^U^.^S.C^.²⁵¹¹⁽²⁾⁽^b⁾^.
⁵⁷^P^o^l^l^o^{ck v.}^P^o^l^l^o^c^k^,¹⁵^{4 F.}^3d⁶^01,⁶¹^{1 (}⁸^{th C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁸⁾^;^W^agne^r^v^.^W^agne^r^{, 64 F.S}^u^p^p^{. 2d 89}^{5, 88}^9-⁹⁰¹⁽^D^.Miⁿⁿ^.
¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^;^C^a^mp^be^{ll v}^.^Pric^e^{, 2}^F^.^Su^{pp. 2d}¹¹⁸⁶^{, 11}^91-¹⁹²⁽^E^.D^.A^r^k^.¹⁹⁹⁸⁾^;^Th^om^ps^oⁿ^v^.^D^u^la^ne^y^,⁸³^{8 F}^.^Su^pp^.¹⁵³⁵^,
¹⁵⁴^4-^{45 (}^D^.U^ta^{h 1}⁹⁹³⁾^.
⁵⁸^G^l^az^ne^r^v^.^G^l^az^ne^r^{, 3}⁴⁷^F.^3d¹²^12,¹²¹⁵^-¹⁶⁽¹^1th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰³⁾^;^Heg^g^y^v.^Hegg^y^,⁹⁴^{4 F}^.²^d¹⁵³⁷^,¹⁵³⁹⁽¹⁰^t^{h C}ⁱ^r^.
¹⁹⁹¹⁾^;^Kemp^{f v. Kemp}^f^{, 86}⁸^F^.^2d⁹⁷⁰^,⁹⁷^{2 (}⁸^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁹⁾^;^Prⁱ^t^c^har^{d v}^.^Pr^itc^h^a^r^d^,⁷³²^F.^{2d 37}^{2, 37}^{4 (}⁴^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁴⁾^;
^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^v^.^J^one^s^,⁵⁴^{2 F.}^2d⁶^61,⁶⁶^{7 (}⁶^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^;^Kra^t^{z v.}^Kra^t^z^,⁴^{77 F.S}^u^p^p^{. 46}^{3, 46}^7-⁷⁰⁽^E^.D^.^P^a^.¹⁹⁷⁹⁾^;
^Heymaⁿ^v.^Heymaⁿ^{, 5}⁴⁸^F.S^u^p^p^.¹⁰⁴^1,¹⁰^45-⁴⁷⁽^N^.D^.I^ll^.1⁹⁸²⁾^;^L^o^m^bar^d^o^v^.^L^o^m^b^ar^d^o^{, 1}⁹²^F.^Su^pp^{. 2d}⁸^85,⁸⁰⁹
^(N^.D^{.Ill. 20}^02).
⁵⁹^Sim^p^s^{on v}^.^Sim^p^s^oⁿ^,⁴⁹^{0 F}^.²^d⁸⁰³^,⁸⁰^{9 (}⁵^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁴⁾^;^Pe^rfit^v^.^P^e^rfit^,⁶⁹^{3 F.S}^u^p^p^{. 85}^{1, 85}^4-⁵⁶⁽^C^.^D^.C^a^l^.¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^;
^{see gen}^e^ral^l^y^,^Applic^abil^ity^{, i}ⁿ^Cⁱ^v^{il Ac}^tion^,^o^f^Pr^ov^isⁱ^ons^{of O}^mⁿⁱ^bus^C^r^im^e^C^o^ntr^o^l^a^nd^Sa^fe^Str^e^e^t^s^Ac^{t of}¹⁹⁶⁸
^Pr^ohi^biti^{ng I}ⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^tioⁿ^{of C}^o^m^m^unic^a^tio^ns⁽^{18 U}^S^C^S^§2⁵¹¹⁽¹⁾⁾^,^t^o^Iⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^ti^on^by^S^p^o^u^s^e^{, or}^Sp^ou^s^e^’^s^Ageⁿ^t,^of
^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tio^ns^o^f^O^t^he^r^Sp^ous^e^,¹^{39 A}^L^R^Fe^{d. 51}^{7, a}^nd^the^c^a^s^e^s^dⁱ^s^c^us^s^e^{d the}^r^eⁱ^n.
⁶⁰^Anoⁿ^y^m^ous^v^.^An^ony^m^o^us^{, 55}⁸^F^.^{2d 67}^{7, 67}^8-⁷⁹⁽²^d^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^;^Sch^eⁱ^b^v.^Gran^t^{, 22}^F.^{3d 14}^{9, 15}⁴⁽⁷^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁴⁾^;
^N^e^w^c^om^{b v}^.^Iⁿ^gle^,⁹⁴^{4 F.}^2d¹⁵³⁴^,¹⁵³⁶⁽¹^0th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹¹⁾^;^c^oⁿ^t^r^a^{, U}ⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^M^u^r^doc^k^{, 63}^F.^{3d 139}^{1, 14}⁰⁰⁽⁶^t^h
^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^.

Subject to the same exceptions, section 2511 also protects wire, oral and electronic
communications from any person who intentionally:
• discloses or endeavors to disclose information with reason to know it has been
unlawfully intercepted, or
• uses or endeavors to use information with reason to know it has been unlawfully
intercepted, or
• discloses or endeavors to disclose information with intent to obstruct justice and
with reason to know the information was secured through a court-ordered
interception.
Interceptions in violation of Title III/ECPA are generally punishable by imprisonment for not
more than five years and/or a fine of not more than $250,000 for individuals and not more than ⁶¹
$500,000 for organizations. The same penalties apply to the unlawful capture of cell phone and
cordless phone conversations, now that the Homeland Security Act, 116 Stat. 2158 (2002), has
repealed the reduced penalty provisions that at one time applied to the unlawful interceptions
using radio scanners and the like, 18 U.S.C. 2511(4)(b)(2000 ed.). There is a reduced penalty,
however, for filching satellite communications as long as the interception is not conducted for
criminal, tortious, nor mercenary purposes: unauthorized interceptions are broadly proscribed ⁶²
subject to an exception for unscrambled transmissions and are subject to the general five-year
penalty, but interceptions for neither criminal, tortious, nor mercenary purposes subject offenders ⁶³
to only civil punishment. Equipment used to wiretap or eavesdrop in violation of Title III is

⁶¹^“^E^x^c^e^p^{t a}^s^pr^ov^ide^d^{in (}^b⁾^of^this^s^ubs^e^c^tio^{n or}ⁱⁿ^s^ubs^e^c^tio^{n (}⁵⁾^,^w^hoe^v^e^r^vⁱ^ola^t^e^s^s^ubs^e^c^{tion (}¹⁾^o^f^this^s^e^c^{tion s}^h^a^l^l
^be^fⁱ^ne^{d u}^nde^r^t^h^is^tit^le*^or^im^prⁱ^s^one^d^not^m^o^r^e^thaⁿ^fⁱ^v^e^y^e^a^r^s^,^or^bot^h.”^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁵¹¹⁽⁴⁾⁽^a⁾^.
^*^Se^c^tion³⁵⁵⁹^of^title¹⁸^c^l^a^ssifⁱ^e^s^a^s^a^fe^lony^aⁿ^y^offe^ns^e^w^{ith a}^m^a^xⁱ^m^u^m^pe^na^lt^y^ofⁱ^m^prisonm^eⁿ^{t of}^m^o^re^thaⁿ^oⁿ^e
^y^e^a^r^{; a}^{nd a}^s^a^C^l^a^s^s^A^mⁱ^s^d^em^e^a^nor^aⁿ^y^of^f^e^ns^e^w^{ith a}^m^a^xⁱ^m^u^m^pe^na^lty^ofⁱ^m^pr^is^onm^eⁿ^{t s}^e^{t a}^t^be^tw^ee^{n s}ⁱ^x^m^onths
^a^{nd o}ⁿ^e^y^e^a^r^{. Unle}^{ss Cong}^re^{ss c}^l^e^a^r^l^y^re^je^c^t^{s the}^g^e^ne^ra^l^fⁱ^ne^c^e^iling^s^{it pr}^ov^ide^s^{, se}^c^tion³⁵⁷¹^of^tit^le^{18 se}^{ts t}^h^e^fⁱ^ne^s
^f^o^r^f^e^lonie^s^a^t^{not m}^o^r^e^thaⁿ^$2⁵⁰^,00⁰^f^o^rⁱⁿ^divⁱ^d^u^a^l^s^aⁿ^dⁿ^o^{t m}^o^r^e^thaⁿ^$5^00,⁰⁰^{0 f}^o^r^or^g^a^niz^a^tio^ns^,^a^{nd f}^o^r^c^l^a^s^s^A
^mⁱ^s^d^em^e^a^nor^s^a^t^not^m^o^r^e^thaⁿ^$¹⁰⁰^,0^{00 f}^o^rⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vⁱ^dua^ls^aⁿ^d^not^m^o^r^e^thaⁿ^$²⁰⁰^,0⁰⁰^f^o^r^or^g^a^niz^a^tio^ns^{. I}^f^the^r^e^is
^m^one^ta^r^y^{loss or g}^a^{in a}^ssocⁱ^a^t^e^d^w^ith^the^of^f^e^ns^e^,^the^of^f^e^nde^r^m^a^y^a^lte^rⁿ^a^tiv^e^l^y^be^fⁱ^ne^{d not m}^o^r^e^thaⁿ^tw^ic^e^the
^am^ount^of^the^los^s^or^g^a^in,¹⁸^U^.^S.C^.³⁵⁷¹^.
⁶²^“⁽^{b) Co}^nd^uc^{t ot}^he^rw^is^e^aⁿ^off^e^ns^e^unde^r^this^s^ubs^e^c^tio^{n t}^h^a^t^c^ons^is^ts^of^{or re}^la^te^s^{to t}^h^eⁱⁿ^te^rc^e^p^tioⁿ^of^a^s^a^te^llite
^traⁿ^sm^issioⁿ^th^a^t^isⁿ^o^t^eⁿ^c^r^y^p^te^d^o^r^sc^ra^m^b^le^d^aⁿ^d^t^h^a^t^{is tra}ⁿ^sm^itte^d^{— (I) t}^o^a^b^r^o^a^d^c^a^s^tin^g^sta^tioⁿ^f^o^{r p}^u^r^p^o^s^e^s^o^f
^re^traⁿ^sm^is^{sion to}^the^g^e^ne^ra^{l p}^u^b^l^ic^{; or (ii)}^a^s^aⁿ^a^u^{dio s}^ubc^a^rrie^rⁱⁿ^te^nde^{d f}^o^{r re}^distrⁱ^b^u^tio^{n t}^o^f^a^c^ilitie^{s ope}^{n t}^o^t^h^e
^pub^lic^,^but^no^{t inc}^l^ud^ing^da^ta^tr^aⁿ^sm^is^sⁱ^ons^or^te^le^p^h^oⁿ^e^c^a^lls^{, is}^no^{t a}ⁿ^of^f^e^ns^e^unde^r^t^h^is^s^u^bs^e^c^tion^unle^s^s^the
^c^ond^uc^{t is}^f^o^r^the^pur^pos^e^of^dir^e^c^t^orⁱ^ndir^e^c^t^c^o^m^m^e^r^cⁱ^a^l^a^d^v^a^ntag^e^or^pr^iv^a^t^e^fⁱ^na^nc^ia^{l g}^a^in,”¹⁸^U^.^S.C^.²⁵¹¹⁽⁴⁾⁽^b⁾^.
⁶³^“⁽⁵^)(a^{)(I) If}^th^e^c^o^m^m^uⁿⁱ^c^a^tioⁿⁱ^s^{— (A}^{) a}^p^r^iv^a^t^e^sa^te^llite^vⁱ^d^e^o^c^o^m^m^uⁿⁱ^c^a^tioⁿ^t^h^a^t^{is n}^o^{t sc}^ra^m^b^le^d^o^r^eⁿ^c^r^y^p^te^d
^a^{nd t}^h^e^c^oⁿ^duc^t^{in v}ⁱ^o^l^a^tio^{n of}^thi^s^c^h^a^p^te^{r is the}^priv^a^t^e^vⁱ^e^w^ing^of^tha^t^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion a}ⁿ^d^isⁿ^o^{t f}^o^r^a^tor^tⁱ^ous^or
^ille^g^a^{l purp}^o^se^{or f}^o^r^pur^pose^s^of^dire^c^t^{or i}ⁿ^dⁱ^re^c^t^c^o^m^m^e^r^cⁱ^a^l^a^dva^nta^g^e^{or priv}^a^t^e^c^o^m^m^e^r^cⁱ^a^l^g^aⁱⁿ^{; or}^{(B) a}^ra^di^o
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion tha}^t^{is tra}ⁿ^sm^itte^{d on f}^r^e^que^nc^ie^{s a}^l^l^o^c^a^t^e^d^u^nde^{r su}^bpa^{rt D}^of^pa^{rt 7}⁴^of^the^r^u^le^{s of}^t^h^e^Fe^de^ra^l
^C^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^{on tha}^t^isⁿ^o^{t s}^c^r^a^m^b^le^{d or}^eⁿ^c^r^y^p^te^d^aⁿ^{d the}^c^oⁿ^duc^{t i}ⁿ^vⁱ^ola^tⁱ^oⁿ^of^this^c^h^a^p^te^{r is n}^o^{t f}^o^r
^tortio^us^{or ille}^g^a^{l p}^u^rp^ose^{or f}^o^{r p}^u^rp^os^e^s^of^dire^c^t^{or i}^ndire^c^t^c^o^m^m^e^rc^ia^{l a}^d^v^a^nta^g^e^{or priv}^a^t^e^c^o^m^m^e^rc^ia^{l g}^a^{in, the}ⁿ
^the^pe^r^s^oⁿ^w^{ho e}ⁿ^g^a^g^e^s^{in s}^u^c^h^c^ond^uc^{t s}^h^a^l^l^be^s^u^bje^c^t^t^o^s^u^it^by^the^Fe^de^r^a^{l G}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt in a}^c^o^ur^t^of^c^o^m^p^e^t^eⁿ^t
^jurisdic^ti^on^{. (ii) I}ⁿ^aⁿ^a^c^tion^u^nde^{r this}^su^bse^c^tion^{— (A}^{) if}^the^vⁱ^ola^tion^of^this^ch^ap^t^e^rⁱ^s^{a f}ⁱ^rst^o^f^feⁿ^s^{e f}^o^{r t}^h^{e p}^e^rson
^unde^r^pa^r^a^g^r^a^{ph (}^a⁾^of^s^ubs^e^c^tⁱ^oⁿ⁽⁴⁾^aⁿ^{d s}^u^c^h^pe^r^s^oⁿ^ha^s^not^be^eⁿ^f^{ound l}ⁱ^a^b^leⁱⁿ^a^cⁱ^v^{il a}^c^tion^u^nde^r^s^e^c^tion²⁵²⁰^of
^{this tit}^le^{, the}^Fe^de^ra^{l G}^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt sha}^{ll be}^eⁿ^title^d^to^a^ppr^opr^ia^teⁱⁿ^junc^tiv^e^re^lie^f^;^a^{nd (B) if}^the^vⁱ^ol^a^tion^of^this
^c^h^a^p^te^r^is^a^s^e^c^ond^or^s^ubs^e^q^ue^nt^of^f^e^ns^e^unde^r^pa^r^a^g^r^a^{ph (}^a⁾^of^s^ubs^e^c^{tion (}⁴⁾^or^s^u^c^h^pe^r^s^oⁿ^ha^s^be^eⁿ^f^ound^lia^bleⁱⁿ
^aⁿ^y^pr^ior^cⁱ^v^{il a}^c^tion^un^de^r^s^e^c^tio^{n 2}⁵²⁰^{, t}^h^e^pe^r^s^oⁿ^s^h^a^l^l^be^s^u^bje^c^{t to a}^m^a^nda^tor^y^$50^{0 c}ⁱ^v^{il f}ⁱ^ne^.
^“⁽^b)^T^h^e^c^our^{t m}^a^y^us^e^aⁿ^y^m^e^aⁿ^s^w^{ithin its}^a^u^t^hor^ity^{to e}ⁿ^f^o^r^c^e^{an in}^ju^nc^tio^{n is}^s^u^e^d^u^nde^r^pa^r^a^g^r^{aph (}ⁱⁱ⁾⁽^A⁾^,^a^{nd s}^h^a^l^l
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

subject to confiscation by the United States, either in a separate civil proceeding or a part of the ⁶⁴
prosecution of the offender.
In addition to exemptions previously mentioned, Title III provides a defense to criminal liability ⁶⁵
based on good faith. As noted below, the defense seems to lack sufficient breadth to shelter any
offender other than a government official or some one working at their direction.
Victims of illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping may be entitled to equitable relief, ⁶⁶
damages (equal to the greater of actual damages, $100 per day of violation, or $10,000), ⁶⁷
punitive damages, reasonable attorney’s fees and reasonable litigation costs, 18 U.S.C. 2520. A
majority of federal courts hold that a court may decline to award damages, attorneys’ fees and ⁶⁸
costs once a violation has been shown, but a few still consider such awards mandatory. In
addition, a majority holds that governmental entities other than the United States may be liable ⁶⁹
for violations of section 2520 and that law enforcement officers enjoy a qualified immunity ⁷⁰
from suit under section 2520.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
ⁱ^m^p^o^s^{e a ci}^vi^l^fⁱⁿ^e^o^fⁿ^o^t^l^e^{ss t}^h^an^$5⁰⁰^f^o^{r each}^vi^o^l^atⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^su^ch^anⁱⁿ^j^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^.^”¹⁸^U.^S^.^C^.²⁵¹¹⁽⁵⁾^.
^U^nde^r¹⁸^U^.^S^.^C^.²⁵^20,^vⁱ^c^tim^s^m^a^y^r^e^c^o^v^e^r^the^g^r^ea^te^r^of^a^c^t^ua^{l da}^m^a^g^e^s^or^s^t^a^t^utor^y^da^m^a^g^e^s^of^{not le}^s^s^thaⁿ^$5^{0 a}ⁿ^d
^{not m}^o^r^e^thaⁿ^$⁵⁰⁰^f^o^r^the^fⁱ^r^s^{t of}^f^e^ns^e^;^thos^e^am^ounts^a^r^eⁱⁿ^c^r^e^a^s^{ed to}^$¹⁰⁰^aⁿ^{d $}¹⁰⁰⁰^f^o^r^s^ubs^e^q^ue^{nt of}^f^e^ns^e^s^.
⁶⁴¹⁸^U^.^S^.^C.²⁵¹³^(“Aⁿ^y^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^c,^m^e^ch^anⁱ^cal^,^o^r^o^t^h^e^r^d^e^vi^{ce u}^s^ed^,^sen^t^,^carri^ed^,^m^aⁿ^u^f^act^u^r^ed^,^asse^m^b^l^e^d^,
^pos^s^e^s^s^e^{d, s}^o^l^d^,^or^a^d^v^e^r^tis^e^dⁱⁿ^vⁱ^ola^tioⁿ^of^s^e^c^{tion 2}⁵¹¹^or^s^e^c^tion²⁵¹²^of^this^c^h^a^p^te^r^m^a^y^be^s^e^{ized a}ⁿ^d^f^o^r^f^e^ite^{d to}
^the^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{. .}^.”^{); 1}⁸^U.^S.C.⁹⁸³^(a^)(3)(C)(“^{In l}ⁱ^e^u^of^,^{or i}ⁿ^a^d^d^ition^to^{, f}^iling^a^cⁱ^v^{il f}^o^rf^e^iture^c^o^m^p^la^{int, the}
^G^o^vern^men^t^m^a^{y i}ⁿ^cl^u^d^e^{a f}^o^rf^ei^t^u^{re al}^l^e^gatⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^{a cri}^mⁱⁿ^alⁱⁿ^dⁱ^ct^men^t^.^.^.^”^).
⁶⁵^“^A^g^{ood f}^a^{ith r}^e^lia^nc^e^on^{– (}¹⁾^a^c^our^{t w}^a^r^r^a^{nt or}^or^de^r^,^a^g^r^aⁿ^{d jur}^y^s^ubpoe^na^{, a}^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e^a^u^thor^iz^a^tion,^or^a
^s^t^a^t^utor^y^a^u^thor^iz^a^tⁱ^{on; (}²⁾^a^r^e^q^u^e^s^t^of^aⁿ^inv^e^s^tig^a^tiv^e^or^la^w^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^{t of}^fⁱ^c^e^r^unde^r^s^e^c^tion²⁵¹⁸⁽⁷⁾^of^this^tit^le^;
^or⁽³⁾^a^g^o^o^d^f^a^{ith de}^te^r^m^ina^{tion t}^h^a^t^s^e^c^tion²⁵¹¹⁽³⁾^[^e^le^c^t^r^o^nic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^pr^ov^ide^r^a^u^th^or^ity^{to d}ⁱ^s^c^los^e^c^onteⁿ^t
^of^aⁿ^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion “}⁽^{i) a}^s^ot^he^rw^ise^a^u^thoriz^e^d^{in se}^c^t^ion²⁵¹¹⁽^2)(a⁾^or²⁵¹⁷^of^th^{is titl}^e^;^{(ii) w}^{ith the}
^la^wf^{ul c}^onseⁿ^{t of}^the^orig^ina^t^or^o^r^aⁿ^y^a^ddre^sse^e^{or inte}^nde^d^re^cⁱ^pi^eⁿ^{t of}^suc^h^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion; (iii)}^t^o^a^pe^rsoⁿ
^e^m^ploy^e^d^{or a}^u^th^oriz^e^d^,^{or w}^hose^f^a^c^ilitie^{s a}^r^e^use^d^{, to f}^o^rw^a^r^{d suc}^h^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion^{to i}^t^{s de}^stiⁿ^a^tio^{n; or}^(iv⁾^w^h^ic^h
^w^e^r^eⁱⁿ^ad^vert^en^t^l^y^o^b^t^aiⁿ^e^d^b^y^t^h^{e servi}^{ce p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^{er an}^d^w^hⁱ^c^h^{appear t}^o^p^e^rt^ai^{n t}^o^t^h^{e co}^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^of^{a cri}^m^e,ⁱ^f^su^ch
^dⁱ^v^u^lg^en^{ce is m}^a^d^e^to^{a law}^en^f^o^rce^m^en^{t ag}^en^c^y^]^o^r²⁵¹¹⁽²^)(I)^[ⁱⁿ^t^ercep^tioⁿ^o^f^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^s^o^f^{a tresp}^a^{sser in}^a
^c^o^m^pute^r^s^y^ste^m^]^of^{this title}^pe^rm^itte^{d the}^c^ond^uc^{t c}^o^m^p^la^ine^d^of^{; is a}^c^o^m^p^le^te^de^f^e^nse^a^g^aⁱ^{nst a}ⁿ^y^cⁱ^v^{il or c}^r^im^ina^l
^a^c^{tion b}^r^oug^h^t^u^nde^r^this^c^h^a^p^te^r^or^aⁿ^y^othe^r^la^w^,^”^{18 U}^.^S^.^C^.²⁵²⁰⁽^d⁾^.
⁶⁶^T^h^e^$10^,0⁰⁰^lum^p^s^u^m^f^o^{r liquid}^a^te^{d da}^m^a^g^e^s^is^li^m^ite^{d to a}^sⁱ^ng^l^e^aw^a^r^{d pe}^{r v}ⁱ^c^tim^ra^the^r^thaⁿ^pe^r^m^itting^$10,⁰⁰⁰
^m^u^ltiple^{s ba}^se^{d o}ⁿ^the^num^be^{r of}^vⁱ^ola^tions^{or t}^h^eⁿ^u^m^b^e^r^of^t^y^pe^{s of}^vⁱ^ola^{tions, a}^s^l^ong^a^s^t^h^e^vⁱ^ola^t^{ions a}^r^e
^“iⁿ^t^errel^a^t^e^d^an^d^tⁱ^m^{e co}^m^p^act^ed^,^”^Sm^oot^v^.^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^Tr^ans^p^o^r^t^a^tioⁿ^Uⁿ^ioⁿ^,²⁴^{6 F}^.^3d⁶^33,⁶^42-⁶⁴^{5 (}⁶^{th C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾^;
^De^sile^{ts v}^.^W^a^l-M^a^{rt Store}^s^{, I}ⁿ^c^.,¹⁷¹^F.^3d⁷^11,⁷¹^{3 (}¹^s^t^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^.
⁶⁷^T^h^e^te^x^t^of^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁵²⁰^is^a^p^pe^nde^d^.
⁶⁸^Co^mp^a^r^e^{, e}^.^g^.,^DIRECTV^{, Inc}^.^v^.^Brown^,³^{71 F.3}^d⁸¹^{4, 81}⁸⁽¹^1t^{h C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁴⁾^;^Do^{rris v.}^Ab^sh^er^{, 17}^{9 F.3}^d^{, 42}^{0, 42}^9-
^{30 (}⁶^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^;^Na^l^l^{ey v.}^Na^l^l^ey^{, 53 F}^.³^d⁶⁴⁹^,⁶^51-⁵³⁽⁴^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^,^Re^y^nol^ds^v^.^Spe^ar^s^,⁹³^F.³^d⁴^28,⁴^{33 (}⁸^t^h
^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁶⁾^;^DIR^E^C^T^V^,^Iⁿ^c.^v.^Nezⁿ^a^k^,³⁷¹^F^.^S^u^p^p^.²^d¹³⁰^,¹³³^-³⁴⁽^D^.^C^oⁿⁿ^.²⁰⁰⁵⁾^(each^con^c^l^u^dⁱⁿ^g^t^h^at^co^u^r^t^s^h^a^ve
^dis^c^r^e^tion)^,^wit^h^,^Ro^dg^{ers v.}^Wo^od^{, 9}¹⁰^F.^2d⁴^44,⁴⁴^7-^{49 (}⁷^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁰⁾^aⁿ^d^M^e^nd^{a B}^ito^{n v}^.^M^e^nd^a^,⁸¹^{2 F.S}^u^p^p^{. 28}^3,
²⁸⁴⁽^D^.^Pue^r^to^Rⁱ^c^o¹⁹⁹³⁾⁽^c^our^t^s^ha^v^e^{no s}^u^c^h^dis^c^r^e^tioⁿ⁾⁽^note^t^h^a^t^a^f^te^r^M^e^nda^{, the}^{First Circ}^u^itⁱⁿ^De^sile^{ts v}^.^W^a^l-
^M^a^r^t^Stor^e^s^{, I}ⁿ^c^.^,¹⁷^{1 F.}^3d^a^t⁷¹⁶^-^{17 tr}^e^a^t^e^d^a^s^a^m^a^tte^r^f^o^r^the^tr^ia^{l c}^our^t’^s^dis^c^r^e^tion^the^que^s^tⁱ^on^of^w^h^e^t^he^r^the
^a^w^a^r^{d of}^plaⁱ^ntif^f^’^{s a}^ttorne^y^{s’ fe}^e^s^shou^ld^be^re^duc^e^d^w^h^eⁿ^pu^nitiv^e^da^m^a^g^e^{s ha}^v^e^be^eⁿ^de^nie^d^).
⁶⁹^A^d^a^m^{s v.}^B^a^t^t^l^e^Creek^{, 25}^{0 F.}^3d⁹⁸⁰^{, 9}⁸⁴⁽⁶^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾^;^O^r^g^aⁿⁱ^z^a^cⁱ^on^J^D^Ltd^a^{. v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^D^e^par^tm^eⁿ^t^of
^J^u^stic^e^{, 18}^F.^3d⁹¹^{, 9}⁴^-⁵⁽²^{d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁴⁾^;^C^oⁿ^nor^v^.^Ta^te^,¹³^{0 F}^.^Su^pp^.^2d¹³⁷⁰^,¹³⁷⁴⁽^N^.^D^.^G^a.²⁰⁰¹⁾^;^Do^{rris v.}^Ab^s^h^er^,
⁹⁵⁹^F.^Su^pp.⁸^13,⁸^{20 (}^M^.D^.T^e^nn.¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^,^af^f’^d/r^e^v^’^{d i}ⁿ^par^t^on^ot^he^r^gr^ou^nds^,¹⁷⁹^F.3^d⁴²^{0 (}⁶^{th C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^;^{PBA Loc}^a^l
^N^o^{. 3}⁸^v^.^W^o^od^br^id^ge^P^o^lic^e^D^e^p^a^r^t^m^e^nt^,⁸³²^F^.^S^u^p^p^.⁸⁰⁸^,⁸²²^-²³^(D.^N^.^J^.¹⁹⁹³^{) (each}^con^c^l^u^diⁿ^g^t^h^at^go^vern^m^eⁿ^t^al
^eⁿ^titie^{s m}^a^y^be^he^{ld lia}^ble⁾^;^c^o^ntr^a^{, A}^b^b^o^{tt v}^.^Wⁱ^nthr^{op H}^a^r^bor^{, 2}⁰⁵^F.^3d⁹^76,⁹^{80 (}⁷^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁰⁾^;^{Amati v}^.
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

The cause of action created in section 2520 is subject to a good faith defense, 18 U.S.C. 2520(d).
The only apparent efforts to claim the defense by anyone other than a government official or ⁷¹
someone working at their direction have been unsuccessful.
The USA PATRIOT Act authorizes a cause of action against the United States for willful
violations of Title III, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or the provisions governing stored ⁷²
communications in 18 U.S.C. 2701-2712, 18 U.S.C. 2712. Successful plaintiffs are entitled to
the greater of $10,000 or actual damages, and reasonable litigation costs, 18 U.S.C. 2712(a).
Upon a judicial or administrative finding of a Title III violation suggesting possible intentional or
willful misconduct on the part of a federal officer or employee, the federal agency or department
involved may institute disciplinary action. It is required to explain to its Inspector General’s ⁷³
office if declines to do so.
At one time, the American Bar Association (ABA) considered it ethical misconduct for an
attorney to intercept or record a conversation without the consent of all of the parties to the
conversation, ABA Formal Op. 337 (1974). The reaction of state regulatory authorities with the ⁷⁴
power to discipline professional misconduct was mixed. Some agreed with the ABA. Some
agreed with the ABA, but expanded the circumstances under which recording could be conducted

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^W^oods^toc^k^,¹⁷⁶^F.^3d⁹⁵^2,⁹⁵^{6 (}⁷^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^.
⁷⁰^C^o^m^p^ar^e^,^Be^r^r^y^v^.^Funk^,¹^{46 F.3}^d¹⁰⁰³^{, 10}¹³⁽^D^.C^.C^ir^{. 19}⁹⁸⁾⁽ⁿ^o^im^m^unit^y⁾^,^{with, T}^a^p^l^e^y^v^.^Colliⁿ^s^,²¹¹^F.^3d¹²¹⁰^,
¹²¹^{6 (}^11t^{h C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁽ⁱ^m^m^unity⁾^;^B^l^a^{ke v.}^Wri^g^ht^,¹⁷^{9 F.}^3d¹⁰⁰³^,¹⁰¹^1-¹³⁽^{6th C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁹⁾⁽^s^a^m^e⁾^{; s}^e^e^g^e^ne^r^a^ll^y^,
^Qualifie^{d Immu}^nity^{as De}^fe^nseⁱⁿ^Sui^{t Un}^de^{r Fe}^de^{ral W}ⁱ^re^ta^{p Ac}^t⁽^{18 U.S.C.A}^.^§^§²⁵¹⁰^e^t^se^q^.⁾^,¹⁷⁸^ALR^F^ED^{. 1.}
⁷¹^W^{illiams v}^.^P^oul^os^{, 11 F.3}^d²⁷^{1, 285}⁽¹^s^t^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹³⁾^;^Unite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^W^u^lige^r^{, 98}¹^F^.²^d¹⁴⁹⁷^{, 15}⁰⁷⁽⁶^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹²⁾^.
⁷²^T^h^e^te^x^t^of^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁷¹²^is^a^p^pe^nde^d^.
⁷³^“^I^f^a^c^our^{t or}^a^p^pr^o^p^rⁱ^a^t^e^de^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt or}^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^de^te^r^m^ine^s^tha^t^th^e^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^or^aⁿ^y^of^its^de^pa^r^t^m^e^nts^or
^agen^ci^{es h}^a^{s vi}^o^l^at^ed^an^y^p^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^hⁱ^s^ch^ap^t^e^r,^an^{d t}^h^{e cou}^r^t^{or ap}^p^r^op^ri^at^{e d}^e^p^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^r^agen^cy^fⁱⁿ^d^s^t^h^at^t^h^e
^cⁱ^r^c^um^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^s^s^u^r^r^oun^ding^t^h^e^vⁱ^ola^tio^{n r}^a^is^e^s^e^rⁱ^ous^que^s^tⁱ^ons^a^b^{out w}^h^e^t^he^r^orⁿ^o^{t a}ⁿ^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^or^e^m^plo^y^e^e^o^f^the
^Un^ited^S^t^{ates acted}^w^illf^u^l^l^y^o^rⁱⁿ^ten^tioⁿ^a^lly^w^ith^resp^{ect to}^t^h^{e v}ⁱ^o^l^atioⁿ^,^th^e^d^e^p^a^rtm^eⁿ^t^o^r^ag^en^cy^s^h^all,^u^p^oⁿ^receip^t
^of^a^tr^ue^a^{nd c}^o^r^r^e^c^t^c^opy^of^the^d^e^cⁱ^sⁱ^{on a}ⁿ^d^fⁱ^ndi^ng^s^of^the^c^our^t^or^a^ppr^op^rⁱ^a^t^e^de^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt or}^a^g^eⁿ^cy^pr^om^ptl^y
ⁱⁿ^{itiate a p}^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^t^o^d^e^termⁱⁿ^{e w}^h^eth^e^{r d}ⁱ^scip^liⁿ^a^ry^a^c^tioⁿ^ag^ain^s^{t th}^{e o}^f^fⁱ^{cer o}^r^e^m^p^l^o^y^e^e^{is warr}^an^ted^.^If^th^{e h}^ead
^o^f^t^h^{e d}^e^p^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^r^agen^cyⁱⁿ^vo^l^v^ed^d^e^t^e^rmⁱⁿ^{es t}^h^at^dⁱ^sc^ipli^na^ry^a^c^{tion is}^no^{t w}^a^rra^nte^d^{, he}^{or she}^s^h^a^{ll n}^o^tif^y^the
^Iⁿ^s^p^e^c^t^or^G^e^ne^r^a^{l w}^{ith jur}ⁱ^s^d^ic^ti^oⁿ^ov^e^r^the^de^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt or}^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^conc^e^r^ne^{d a}^{nd s}^h^a^{ll pr}^ov^ide^t^h^e^Iⁿ^s^p^e^c^t^or^G^e^ne^r^a^l
^w^{ith the}^r^e^a^s^ons^f^o^r^s^u^c^h^de^te^r^mⁱⁿ^a^tio^n,”¹⁸^U^.^S^.^C^.²⁵²⁰⁽^f⁾^.
⁷⁴^Ala.^O^pⁱⁿ^io^{n 8}⁴^-²²⁽¹⁹⁸⁴⁾^;^P^e^opl^{e v.}^S^mⁱ^t^h^,⁷⁷⁸^P^.^{2d 68}^{5, 68}^{6, 68}⁷⁽^C^ol^{o. 19}⁸⁹⁾^;^Ha^w.^Fo^{rmal Op}ⁱⁿ^ion^No.³⁰
⁽¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^;^Iⁿ^d^.^St^ate^B^a^r^As^s^’^{n O}^p^.N^o.1⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^;^I^o^w^a^State^Bar^As^s^’^{n v}^.^M^o^llm^an^,⁴⁸⁸^N^.^W^.^{2d 16}^{8, 16}^9-⁷⁰^{, 17}^1-⁷²⁽^I^o^w^a
¹⁹⁹²⁾^;^M^o^.Adv^is^or^y^Com^m^.^O^p^.^Mⁱ^s^c^{. 30}⁽¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^;^Te^x^.^Sta^t^.B^ar^O^p^.⁵¹⁴⁽¹⁹⁹⁶⁾^;^Va.^LEO^#1⁶³⁵⁽¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^,^Va^.^LE^O
^#13²⁴^;^G^u^nte^r^v^.^Vir^gⁱⁿⁱ^a^State^B^a^r^{, 2}³⁸^Va^.⁶^17,⁶^21-^22,³⁸⁵^S.E.^2d⁵⁹^7,⁶⁰^{0 (}¹⁹⁸⁹⁾^.
^T^h^{e fed}^e^ral^co^u^r^t^s^seem^t^o^h^a^{ve b}^eenⁱⁿ^acco^rd^,^Parr^{ott v}^.^W^ilsoⁿ^,⁷⁰⁷^F.^2d¹²⁶²⁽¹^1th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸³⁾^;^M^oody^v^.^I^R^S^{, 65}⁴
^F^.^2d⁷⁹^{5 (}^D^.^C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸¹⁾^;^Wa^rd^v.^Ma^ri^t^z^,^Iⁿ^c^.,¹⁵⁶^F.R.D^.⁵⁹^{2 (D}^.N^.J^{. 1}⁹⁹⁴^);^W^ilsoⁿ^v^.^L^a^mb^,¹²^{5 F}^.^R^.^D.¹⁴²
⁽^E^.D^.K^y^.¹⁹⁸⁹⁾^;^Hai^g^h^{V. M}^a^ts^ushita^Ele^c^t^ric^Corp^.^,⁶⁷⁶^F.S^u^p^p^.¹³³²⁽^E^.D^.^V^a^.¹⁹⁸⁷⁾^.

within ethical bounds.⁷⁵ Some disagreed with the ABA view.⁷⁶ The ABA has now repudiated its
earlier position, ABA Formal Op. 01-422 (2001). Attorneys who engage in unlawful wiretapping ⁷⁷
or electronic eavesdropping will remain subject to professional discipline in every jurisdiction;
in light of the ABA’s change of position, courts and bar associations have had varied reactions to ⁷⁸
lawful wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping by members of the bar.
When the federal wiretap statute prohibits disclosure, the information is inadmissible as evidence ⁷⁹
before any federal, state, or local tribunal or authority, 18 U.S.C. 2515. Individuals whose

⁷⁵^Ar^iz^{. O}^pⁱⁿ^io^{n N}^o^.^95-⁰³⁽¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^;^Alas^k^a^B^a^r^As^s^’ⁿ^Eth^.^C^o^m^m^.^Et^hi^c^s^O^p^inio^ns^N^o^{. 9}⁵^-⁵⁽¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^aⁿ^d^N^o^{. 9}¹^-⁴⁽¹⁹⁹¹⁾^;
^I^d^a^{ho F}^o^r^m^{al O}^pⁱⁿ^io^{n 1}³⁰⁽¹⁹⁸⁹⁾^;^K^aⁿ^.^Bar^.^As^s^’^{n O}^pⁱⁿⁱ^on^96-⁹⁽¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^;^K^y^.O^pi^nioⁿ^E-²⁷⁹⁽¹⁹⁸⁴⁾^;^Mⁱ^nn.L^a^w^.^Pr^o^f^.
^Re^s^p^.Bd.^O^pⁱⁿ^io^{n No}^{. 1}⁸⁽¹⁹⁹⁶⁾^;^O^h^{io B}^d^.C^om^.G^rⁱ^e^v^.^Dⁱ^s^p^{. O}^pⁱⁿⁱ^o^{n No.}⁹⁷^-3⁽¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^;^S^.^C^.^Et^hic^s^A^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y^O^pⁱⁿⁱ^on^92-
¹⁷⁽¹⁹⁹²⁾^;^T^eⁿⁿ^.^B^d^.^P^r^of^.^R^esp^.^F^o^rma^l^E^t^hi^{cs Op}ⁱⁿ^io^{n N}^o^{. 86}^-^F^-¹⁴⁽^a⁾⁽¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^.
⁷⁶^D.^C.^Opⁱⁿ^ion^N^o^.²²⁹⁽¹⁹⁹²⁾^(re^co^rdⁱⁿ^{g w}^a^{s n}^o^t^uⁿ^e^t^hⁱ^cal^b^ecau^{se i}^t^o^ccu^rred^uⁿ^d^e^{r ci}^rcu^m^st^an^cesⁱⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^e
^uni^nf^or^m^e^{d pa}^r^t^y^s^hould^ha^v^e^aⁿ^tⁱ^cⁱ^pa^te^{d t}^h^a^t^the^c^o^nv^e^r^s^a^{tion w}^o^uld^be^r^e^c^o^r^d^e^d^or^ot^he^r^w^is^e^m^e^m^o^rⁱ^a^liz^e^d⁾^;
^Mississip^pⁱ^Ba^{r v.}^Att^o^rn^{ey S}^T^.^,⁶²¹^S^o^.2^{d 22}⁹⁽^Mⁱ^ss.¹⁹⁹³⁾⁽^c^on^t^e^xt^o^f^t^h^{e ci}^r^c^u^m^st^an^ce^{s t}^e^st⁾^;^Conⁿ^.Bar^As^s^’‘n^O^p^.
^98-⁹⁽¹⁹⁹⁸^)(sam^e);^Mⁱ^c^h^.State^B^a^r^O^p^.^RI-3⁰⁹⁽¹⁹⁹⁸^)(sam^e);^M^e^.^S^tate^B^a^{r Op}^.No.¹⁶⁸⁽¹⁹⁹⁹^)(sam^e);^N.M^.^Opⁱⁿⁱ^oⁿ
¹⁹⁹^6-²⁽¹⁹⁹⁶^)(m^e^m^b^e^{rs o}^f^t^h^{e b}^a^{r are ad}^vi^sed^t^h^at^t^h^{ere are n}^o^cl^e^a^{r gu}ⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^{es and}^t^h^at^t^h^e^p^r^ud^en^t^at^t^o^rn^ey^avoⁱ^d^s
^surre^ptiti^{ous re}^c^o^r^d^ing⁾^;^N^.^{C. RP}^{C 1}⁷¹⁽¹⁹⁹⁴^)(l^awy^e^{rs ar}^{e en}^co^u^r^aged^t^o^dⁱ^scl^o^{se t}^o^t^h^{e o}^t^h^e^{r l}^a^{wyer t}^h^at^a
^c^onv^e^r^s^a^{tion is}^be^ing^ta^pe^r^e^c^o^r^d^e^d⁾^;^Ok^la.B^{ar Ass’n O}^pⁱⁿ^ioⁿ³⁰⁷⁽¹⁹⁹⁴^{)(a lawy}^er^m^a^y^secr^etl^y^rec^o^rdⁱⁿ^g^hⁱ^s^o^r^h^e^r
^c^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^w^ithou^{t t}^h^e^k^now^le^dg^e^or^c^ons^eⁿ^{t of}^ot^he^r^pa^r^tie^s^t^o^the^c^onv^e^r^s^a^tion^uⁿ^le^s^s^the^r^e^c^o^r^d^ing^is^uⁿ^la^w^f^{ul or}
^{in v}ⁱ^ola^tⁱ^on^of^s^o^m^e^e^t^hic^a^l^s^t^a^nda^r^d^inv^o^lv^ing^m^o^re^thaⁿ^sim^p^ly^re^c^o^rding⁾^;^O^r^e^.^S^t^ate^B^a^r^As^s^’ⁿ^Fo^r^m^{al O}^pⁱⁿ^io^{n N}^o^.
¹⁹⁹^1-⁷⁴⁽¹⁹⁹¹⁾⁽^a^{n a}^t^t^o^rⁿ^e^y^w^{ith one}^pa^r^t^y^c^ons^eⁿ^t^he^or^s^h^e^m^a^y^r^e^c^o^r^d^a^te^le^ph^one^c^onv^e^r^s^a^{tion “}ⁱ^{n a}^b^s^e^nc^e^of
^c^ond^uc^{t w}^h^ic^{h w}^ould^r^e^a^s^ona^bly^le^a^d^aⁿⁱⁿ^divⁱ^d^u^a^l^t^o^be^lie^v^e^tha^t^{no r}^e^c^o^r^d^ing^w^oul^{d be}^m^a^de^”⁾^;^U^t^{ah St}^ate^Bar
^Ethic^s^Advⁱ^s^o^ry^Opin^io^{n No}^{. 9}⁶^-0⁴⁽¹⁹⁹⁶⁾⁽^“^r^e^c^o^r^dⁱⁿ^g^c^onv^e^r^s^a^tion^s^{to w}^h^ic^{h a}ⁿ^a^t^t^o^rⁿ^e^y^is^a^pa^r^t^y^w^ithout^pr^ior
^dⁱ^scl^o^su^{re t}^o^t^h^{e o}^t^h^e^{r p}^a^rtⁱ^e^{s i}^s^no^t^un^et^hⁱ^cal^w^h^en^t^h^{e act}^,^coⁿ^sⁱ^d^e^r^ed^wⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^t^h^{e co}^nt^ext^o^f^t^h^{e ci}^rcumst^an^ces,^d^o^e^s
^not^inv^o^lv^e^dis^h^oⁿ^e^s^ty^,^f^r^a^{ud, de}^c^e^{it or}^mⁱ^s^r^e^p^r^e^s^e^nta^tion”⁾^;^Wi^s.^O^pⁱⁿ^io^{n E}^-⁹⁴^-⁵^(“w^h^et^h^e^{r t}^h^{e secret}^reco^rdⁱⁿ^{g o}^f^a
^te^le^pho^ne^c^onv^e^r^sa^tion^by^a^la^wye^r^inv^o^lv^e^s^‛^dis^h^one^s^t^y^,^f^r^a^{ud, de}^c^e^{it or}^mⁱ^s^r^e^p^r^e^s^e^nta^tion’^u^nde^r^S^C^R^20:^8.⁴⁽^c⁾
^de^pe^nds^up^on^a^{ll t}^h^e^cⁱ^r^c^um^s^t^aⁿ^ce^s^ope^r^a^ting^a^t^t^h^e^tim^e^”⁾^{. I}ⁿ^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{, the}^que^s^tⁱ^on^of^w^h^e^t^he^r^aⁿ^a^ttorⁿ^e^y^’^s
^surre^ptiti^ously^re^c^o^rding^c^onv^e^r^s^a^{tions is e}^t^hic^a^lly^suspe^c^t^{is de}^te^rm^ine^d^by^loc^a^lit^y^,^c^o^m^p^a^r^e^,^As^s^’^{n of}^the^B^a^r^{of C}^ity
^{of N}^.^Y^.^F^o^r^m^{al O}^pⁱⁿⁱ^oⁿ^N^o^.¹⁹⁹⁵^-¹⁰⁽¹⁹⁹⁵^)(secret^reco^rdⁱⁿ^{g i}^s^p^e^r^{se u}ⁿ^e^t^hⁱ^cal^),^wⁱ^t^h^,^N.Y^.^Co^uⁿ^t^{y L}^a^{wyer’s Ass’n}
^O^pⁱⁿⁱ^{on N}^o^.⁶⁹⁶⁽¹⁹⁹³^)(secret^reco^rdⁱⁿ^{g i}^sⁿ^o^t^p^e^{r se un}^et^hi^cal^).
⁷⁷^{Cf., Nissa}ⁿ^M^o^t^o^{r Co}^{., L}^t^d^.^{v. Ni}^ssaⁿ^Co^m^p^u^t^{er C}^o^rp^.,¹⁸⁰^F.S^u^p^p^.2^{d 1}⁰⁸⁹^,¹⁰^95-⁹⁷⁽^C^.D^.C^a^l^.²⁰⁰²⁾^.
⁷⁸^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^St^a^t^{e v.}^Mu^rt^a^g^h^,¹⁶⁹^P.3d⁶⁰^2,⁶¹^7-¹⁸⁽^A^la^s^k^a²⁰⁰⁷⁾⁽^“^u^ndis^c^los^e^d^r^e^c^o^r^dⁱⁿ^g^isⁿ^o^t^une^thⁱ^c^a^l^”⁾^;^In^re
^Cro^ssen^{, 4}⁵⁰^Ma^s^s^.⁵³^3,⁵⁵^8,⁸⁸⁰^N^.^E.2^d³⁵²^{, 3}⁷²⁽²⁰⁰⁸⁾⁽^uⁿ^d^is^c^l^os^e^d^w^a^s^une^thic^a^l^w^h^e^r^e^{it w}^a^s^p^a^r^t^of^s^c^hem^e^to
^c^o^e^r^c^e^or^m^a^nuf^a^c^t^ur^e^te^s^tⁱ^m^ony^a^g^aⁱ^ns^{t the}^ju^dg^e^pr^e^s^iding^ov^e^r^p^e^nding^li^tig^a^tion)^;^Mⁱ^dwe^s^{t M}^o^tor^Sp^{orts v}^.^Arc^tic
^{Cat S}^a^le^{s, I}ⁿ^c^.,³⁴^{7 F.}^3d⁶^93,⁶⁹⁹^(8th^Cir.²⁰⁰³⁾^(c^iting^AB^{A Com}^m^{. on}^Ethⁱ^c^s^an^{d Pr}^{of’l Re}^sp^onsi^b^ility^{, Form}^a^l^O^p^.
^01-⁴²^{2, w}^h^ic^{h s}^t^a^t^e^s^tha^t^r^e^c^o^r^dⁱⁿ^g^w^{ithout c}^o^ns^eⁿ^{t s}^h^oul^d^be^pr^ohi^bite^{d w}^h^eⁿ^cⁱ^r^c^um^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^s^m^a^k^e^{it une}^t^h^ic^a^l⁾^;
^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^v^.^Sm^al^lw^o^o^d^,³⁶⁵^{F. S}^u^p^p^.^2d⁶⁸^9,⁶⁹^7-⁹⁸⁽^E^.D^.^Va^{. 20}⁰⁵⁾⁽^h^oldⁱ^ng^tha^t^a^la^w^y^e^r^c^a^{nnot e}^t^hic^a^lly
^r^e^c^o^r^d^a^c^onv^e^r^s^a^tion^w^ithout^the^c^ons^eⁿ^t^of^a^{ll pa}^r^tie^s^,^e^v^eⁿ^th^oug^{h d}^o^ing^s^o^isⁿ^o^{t i}^lle^g^a^{l un}^de^r^Vⁱ^r^g^inia^la^w⁾^.
^D^e^c^l^a^r^ing^the^ne^w^A^B^A^opini^on^t^o^be^aⁿ^“^o^v^e^r^c^or^r^e^c^tion,”^one^ba^r^a^s^s^o^cⁱ^a^{tion e}^x^plaⁱ^ne^d^tha^t^s^e^c^r^e^t^t^a^ping^s^h^o^u^l^dⁿ^o^t
^be^rou^tine^pra^c^tic^e^,^bu^{t tha}^t^{it s}^h^o^u^ld^be^pe^rm^itte^{d if}^{it a}^d^v^a^nc^e^s^a^“^s^oc^ie^ta^{l g}^ood.”^{Ass’n o}^f^the^Bar^o^f^the^City^{of Ne}^w
^Yor^k^For^m^a^l^O^pⁱⁿ^io^{n N}^o^.²⁰^03-⁰²⁽²⁰⁰³⁾^,^availab^l^{e at}^[^h^ttp^:^//www.^ab^cn^y^.^o^r^g]^.^F^o^{r a New}^Yo^{rk state b}^a^{r o}^pⁱⁿⁱ^oⁿ
^em^ploy^ing^a^sⁱ^m^ila^r^line^of^r^e^a^s^oning^{, s}^e^e^Men^a^v.^{Key F}^o^od^St^o^r^e^s^Co^-op^e^ra^tⁱ^ve,^In^c^.^,⁷⁵⁸^N^.^Y^.^S.²^d²^46,²^47-⁵⁰
^(N.^Y^.^S^u^p^.^Ct^.²⁰⁰³^{) (con}^du^ct^o^f^at^t^o^rn^ey^w^h^o^ob^t^aⁱⁿ^{ed a p}^rⁱ^v^at^{e i}ⁿ^vestⁱ^g^at^o^{r’s servi}^c^{es f}^o^{r a cl}ⁱ^eⁿ^t^an^dⁱⁿ^st^ru^ct^ed^t^h^e
^clⁱ^eⁿ^t^on^t^h^{e u}^s^{e o}^f^reco^rdⁱⁿ^{g eq}^ui^p^m^en^t^h^e^l^d^not^to^w^a^rran^t^sev^e^re^san^c^tioⁿ^s^,^b^ecau^{se th}^{ere w}^a^{s a co}^m^p^ellin^g^public
ⁱⁿ^t^e^restⁱⁿ^expo^siⁿ^g^t^h^{e raci}^al^dⁱ^scri^mⁱⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^at^w^a^{s t}^h^{e su}^b^j^ect^o^f^t^h^{e secret}^reco^rdⁱⁿ^gs).
⁷⁹^“^W^he^ne^v^e^r^aⁿ^y^wⁱ^r^e^or^or^{al c}^o^m^m^unic^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^ha^s^be^eⁿⁱⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^te^d,^no^pa^r^t^of^the^c^o^nteⁿ^ts^of^s^u^c^h^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion a}^nd
ⁿ^o^evi^d^en^{ce d}^e^ri^ved^t^h^eref^ro^m^ma^y^b^e^recei^v^e^dⁱⁿ^evi^d^en^{ce i}ⁿ^an^y^t^rⁱ^a^l^,^h^eariⁿ^g,^o^r^o^t^h^e^r^p^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^{g i}ⁿ^o^r^b^e^f^o^{re an}^y
^c^{ourt, g}^r^aⁿ^{d j}^u^ry^{, de}^pa^rtm^e^{nt, of}^fⁱ^c^e^r^{, a}^g^eⁿ^cy^{, reg}^u^la^tory^body^{, le}^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e^c^o^m^m^itte^e^,^{or othe}^{r a}^u^th^or^ity^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^d
^Sta^t^e^s^{, a}^Sta^t^e^,^or^a^p^o^litic^a^l^su^bdi^vⁱ^{sion t}^h^e^r^e^o^f^if^the^disc^losure^of^tha^t^inf^o^rm^a^{tion w}^ould^beⁱⁿ^vⁱ^ol^a^tion^of^this
^c^h^a^p^te^r^,^”¹⁸^U^.^S.C^.²⁵¹⁵⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d)^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^L^a^m^,²⁷¹^F.^Su^pp.^2d¹¹⁸²^,¹¹^83-¹⁸^{4 (}^N^.D^.C^a^l^{. 20}⁰³⁾^.
^N^o^te^tha^t^s^u^p^p^r^e^s^sⁱ^on^doe^s^{not e}^x^te^{nd t}^o^unla^w^f^u^ll^y^inte^r^c^e^p^te^d^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^c^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^,^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^v^.^Steⁱ^ge^r^,
³¹⁸^F.^3d¹⁰³⁹^{, 1}⁰⁵⁰^-^{52 (}^11t^{h C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰³⁾^;^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^State^s^v^.^J^one^s^,³⁶⁴^{F. S}^u^p^p^.^2d¹³⁰³^,¹³^08-^{09 (}^D^.^U^t^a^h²⁰⁰⁵⁾^;^nor
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

conversations have been intercepted or against whom the interception was directed⁸⁰ have
standing to claim the benefits of the section 2515 exclusionary rule through a motion to suppress ⁸¹
under 18 U.S.C. 2518(10)(a). Paragraph 2518(10)(a) bars admission as long as the evidence is
the product of (1) an unlawful interception, (2) an interception authorized by a facially
insufficient court order, or (3) an interception executed in manner contrary to the order
authorizing the interception.18 U.S.C. 2518(10)(a). Mere facial insufficiency is not enough; the
defect must be of a nature that substantially undermines the regime of court-supervised ⁸²
interception for law enforcement purposes.
Although the Supreme Court has held that section 2515 may require suppression in instances
where the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule would not, Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41,

52 (1972), some of the lower courts have recognized the applicability of the good faith exception ⁸³

to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in section 2515 cases. Other courts have held,
moreover, that the fruits of an unlawful wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping may be used for ⁸⁴
impeachment purposes.
The admissibility of tapes or transcripts of tapes of intercepted conversations raise a number of
questions quite apart from the legality of the interception. As a consequence of the prerequisites

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^d^o^e^{s i}^t^ext^eⁿ^d^t^o^evi^d^en^{ce secu}^redⁱⁿ^vi^o^l^atⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^{e p}^eⁿ^regi^st^er/^t^r^ap^an^d^t^r^{ace p}^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^at^e^s^v^.^G^e^r^m^an^{, 4}⁸⁶
^F^.^3d⁸⁴^9,⁸⁵²^-⁵³⁽⁵^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾^.
⁸⁰^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁵¹⁰⁽¹¹⁾⁽^“^‘^a^g^g^r^iev^e^{d pe}^r^s^on’^m^e^aⁿ^s^a^pe^r^s^{on w}^{ho w}^a^s^a^pa^r^t^y^{to a}ⁿ^y^aⁿ^inte^r^c^e^p^te^{d w}ⁱ^r^e^,^or^a^l^,^or
^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^o^r^{a p}^e^rsoⁿ^agaiⁿ^s^t^w^h^o^m^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^t^e^rcep^tⁱ^on^w^a^{s d}ⁱ^rect^ed^”);^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^v^.^G^onz^ale^s^{, 41}²
^F.3^d¹¹⁰²^,¹¹^15-¹¹^{7 (}⁹^{th C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.
⁸¹^T^h^e^te^x^t^of^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁵¹⁸⁽¹⁰⁾⁽^a⁾^is^a^ppeⁿ^d^e^d^.
⁸²^Unite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^W^illiams^,¹²^{4 F}^.^3d⁴¹^1,⁴²^{6 (}³^{d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁷⁾⁽^“^T^h^e^Supr^e^m^e^C^our^t^ha^s^e^x^plaⁱ^ne^{d t}^h^e^r^e^la^tions^hi^p
^be^tw^e^eⁿ^the^s^e^t^w^{o pr}^ov^is^io^ns^{. I}ⁿ^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^v^.^Gⁱ^or^d^aⁿ^o^,⁴¹^{6 U}^.^S.⁵⁰^{5 (}¹⁹⁷⁴⁾^{, t}^h^e^C^o^ur^{t w}^r^ote^th^a^t^‘^w^ha^t
^dis^c^los^u^r^e^s^a^r^e^f^o^r^b^id^deⁿ^un^de^r²⁵¹⁵^aⁿ^d^w^e^s^ubje^c^t^{to m}^o^tio^ns^to^s^uppr^e^s^s^is^.^{. .}^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^e^d^by²⁵¹⁸⁽¹⁰⁾⁽^a⁾^.^’^T^hus^,
^e^v^ideⁿ^c^e^m^a^y^be^s^uppr^e^s^s^e^{d on}^ly^if^one^of^the^g^r^ou^nds^s^e^t^outⁱⁿ²⁵¹⁸⁽¹⁰⁾⁽^a⁾^is^m^e^{t. Mor}^e^ov^e^rⁿ^o^{t e}^v^e^r^y^f^a^ilur^e^to
^c^o^m^p^l^y^f^u^lly^w^ith^aⁿ^y^re^q^uⁱ^re^m^eⁿ^t^p^r^o^v^id^e^dⁱⁿ^T^itle^{III w}^o^u^l^d^reⁿ^d^e^r^th^eⁱⁿ^te^rc^e^p^tioⁿ^o^f^wⁱ^re^o^r^o^r^a^l^c^o^m^m^uⁿⁱ^c^a^tioⁿ^s
^unla^w^f^u^{l unde}^r²⁵¹⁸⁽^10)(a^)(I).^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es v.}^Do^no^van^,⁴²^{9 U}^.^S.⁴¹^3,⁴³^{3 (}¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^,^q^uotiⁿ^g^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^C^h^a^vez^,
⁴¹⁶^U^.^S.⁵^{62 (}¹⁹⁷⁴⁾^{. R}^a^the^r^s^upp^r^e^s^sⁱ^{on is}^m^a^nda^te^{d o}ⁿ^ly^f^o^r^a^f^a^il^ur^e^{to s}^a^tis^f^y^aⁿ^y^o^f^thos^e^s^t^a^t^utor^y^r^e^quir^e^m^e^nts
^tha^t^dire^c^tly^a^{nd su}^bsta^ntia^lly^im^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^{t the}^c^ong^re^ssiona^lⁱⁿ^te^ntio^{n to}^lim^{it the}^use^of^inte^rc^e^p^{t pr}^oc^e^dure^s^to^th^ose
^situa^tio^{ns c}^l^e^a^r^ly^c^a^lling^f^o^{r the}^e^m^plo^y^m^e^nt^of^{this e}^x^tra^o^rdina^r^y^inv^e^stig^a^tiv^e^de^vⁱ^c^e^,^D^onov^aⁿ^,⁴²^{9 U}^.^S.^a^t⁴^33-^34,
^quo^ting^Gⁱ^r^o^da^no^,⁴¹^{6 U.}^S^.^{at 527}^”)^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^L^ope^z^,³⁰^{0 F}^.^3d⁴⁶^{, 5}⁵^-⁶⁽¹^s^t^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰²⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^{es v.}
^Staffe^l^d^t^,⁴⁵¹^F.3^d⁵⁷^8,⁵⁸²^-⁸^{5 (}⁹^{th C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^Gr^a^y^{, 5}²¹^F.3^d⁵¹^4,⁵²^{2 (}⁶^{th C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁸⁾^.^T^h^is^is^the
^c^a^s^e^e^v^eⁿ^w^h^e^r^e^the^c^{ourt is}^c^l^e^a^r^ly^trouble^d^by^the^g^o^v^e^rn^m^e^nt’s^fa^ilure^{to c}^o^m^p^l^y^w^{ith the}^re^quire^m^e^nts^of^T^itle^III,
^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^v^.^C^a^ll^um^,⁴¹⁰^F^.³^d⁵⁷¹^,⁵⁷⁹^(9t^h^Cⁱ^r.²⁰⁰⁵^)(“Und^e^r^t^h^{e f}^o^{rce o}^f^p^r^eced^en^t^,^w^e^upho^ld^the^c^h^a^lle^ng^e^d
^wⁱ^re^ta^{p a}^pplic^a^{tions a}ⁿ^d^orde^{rs. S}^{till, w}^e^note^t^h^a^t^the^De^pa^rt^m^e^nt^of^Justic^e^a^{nd its}^of^fⁱ^c^e^{rs did n}^o^t^c^o^v^e^{r the}^m^s^e^lv^e^s
^w^ith^g^l^o^r^yⁱⁿ^o^b^t^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^th^e^wⁱ^re^ta^p^o^r^d^e^{rs a}^t^issu^eⁱⁿ^th^{is c}^a^s^e^.^T^itle^{III is a}ⁿ^e^x^a^c^tin^g^sta^t^u^t^e^o^b^vⁱ^o^u^sl^y^m^e^aⁿ^{t to}^b^e
^f^o^llow^e^{d punc}^tili^ous^ly^{, y}^e^{t the}^offic^e^r^s^re^pe^a^t^e^d^l^y^ig^nore^d^its^c^l^e^a^r^r^e^quire^m^e^nts^”^).
⁸³^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^M^oor^e^,⁴¹^F^.^3d³⁷⁰^,³⁷^{6 (}⁸^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁴⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^v^.^Am^br^osⁱ^o^,⁸⁹^{8 F.}^Su^pp.¹^77,¹⁸⁷
^(S.D^.N^.Y^{. 19}^95);^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^M^a^le^lzade^h^{, 8}⁵⁵^F.^2d¹⁴⁹²^{, 1}⁴⁹⁷⁽¹^1th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^;^Unite^{d S}^t^ate^s^v^.^M^u^lleⁿ^{, 45}¹
^F.Su^pp^.2^{d 5}⁰⁹^,⁵^30-³¹⁽^W^.D^.N^.Y^{. 20}⁰⁶⁾^;^con^t^ra^,^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^a^t^{es v.}^Rⁱ^ce^{, 47}^{8 F.}^3d⁷^04,⁷^11-^{14 (}⁶^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾^.
^G^e^lbar^d^he^ld^tha^t^a^g^r^aⁿ^d^jur^y^wⁱ^tne^s^s^mⁱ^g^h^{t c}^l^aⁱ^m^the^pr^ote^c^tio^{n o}^f^s^e^c^tion²⁵^{15 t}^h^r^o^ug^{h a}^r^e^f^u^s^a^{l t}^o^aⁿ^s^w^e^r^que^s^tions
^ba^s^e^{d up}^on^aⁿ^unla^w^f^u^{l w}ⁱ^r^e^t^a^{p n}^o^tw^iths^t^a^ndi^ng^the^f^a^c^t^tha^t^the^F^our^t^h^A^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t e}^x^c^l^us^iona^r^y^r^u^le^d^o^e^s^no^{t a}^p^p^l^y
ⁱⁿ^gran^d^j^u^ry^p^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^gs.^Gelba^r^d^,⁴⁰^{8 U.}^S^.^at⁵¹^-52^.^T^h^{e go}^od^f^aⁱ^t^h^excep^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^t^h^e^F^o^u^r^t^h^A^m^en^d^m^en^t
^excl^u^sⁱ^oⁿ^a^ry^ru^l^e^p^e^rmⁱ^t^s^t^h^{e ad}^mi^ssi^oⁿ^o^f^evi^d^en^{ce secu}^redⁱⁿ^vi^o^l^atⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e F}^o^u^r^t^h^Am^en^d^m^en^t^,ⁱ^f^t^h^{e o}^f^fⁱ^cers
^r^e^s^ponsⁱ^b^le^f^o^r^the^br^each^w^e^{re a}^c^tⁱⁿ^{g i}ⁿ^goo^d^f^aⁱ^t^h^relⁱ^aⁿ^ce^u^p^oⁿ^t^h^{e ap}^p^a^ren^t^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^t^y^o^f^{a search}^w^a^rr^an^t^o^r^so^m^e
^lik^e^c^onditi^on^ne^g^a^ting^the^re^m^e^dia^l^f^o^rc^e^of^the^rule^,^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^v^.^Le^on^,⁴⁶^{8 U.}^S^.⁸⁹⁷^,⁹⁰⁹⁽¹⁹⁸⁴⁾^.
⁸⁴^Culbe^r^tsoⁿ^v^.^C^u^lbe^r^tsoⁿ^{, 14}³^F^.^{3d 82}^{5, 82}^7-²⁸⁽⁴^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁸⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Ec^hav^ar^rⁱ^a-^O^l^ar^te^{, 9}⁰⁴^F.^2d¹³⁹¹
⁽⁹^{th C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁰⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Ve^s^t^,⁸¹³^F.^2d⁴⁷^7,⁴⁸^{4 (}¹^st^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁷⁾^.

required for admission, privately recorded conversations are more likely to be found inadmissible
than those recorded by government officials. Admissibility will require the party moving for ⁸⁵
admission to show that the tapes or transcripts are accurate, authentic and trustworthy. For some
courts this demands a showing that, “(1) the recording device was capable of recording the events
offered in evidence; (2) the operator was competent to operate the device; (3) the recording is
authentic and correct; (4) changes, additions, or deletions have not been made in the recording;
(5) the recording has been preserved in a manner that is shown to the court; (6) the speakers on
the tape are identified; and (7) the conversation elicited was made voluntarily and in good faith, ⁸⁶
without any kind of inducement.”
Although often overlooked, it also a federal crime to disclose information obtained from illicit
wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping, 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(c):
• any person [who]
• intentionally
• discloses or endeavors to disclose to another person
• the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication
• having reason to know
• that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or
electronic communication
• in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)
• is subject to the same sanctions and remedies as the wiretapper or electronic
eavesdropper.

⁸⁵^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Th^om^ps^on^{, 13}⁰^F^.^3d⁶⁷^6,⁶⁸^{3 (}⁵^th^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^v^.^Pa^nar^o^,²⁴^{1 F}^.³^d¹¹⁰⁴^,¹¹¹¹⁽⁹^t^h
^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^v^.^Sm^it^h^,²⁴²^F^.^3d⁷³⁷^,⁷⁴^{1 (}⁷^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾^.
⁸⁶^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^W^e^bs^te^r^{, 84}^F.^3d¹⁰^56,¹⁰⁶⁴⁽⁸^{th C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁶⁾^;^Uⁿⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^Green^{, 1}⁷⁵^F.^3d⁸²^2,⁸³⁰^n.^{3 (}^10t^h
^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^v^.^G^r^e^eⁿ^{, 3}²⁴^F.^3d³^75,³⁷^{9 (}⁵^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰³⁾⁽^c^iti^ng⁴^of^the^{7 f}^a^c^t^or^s⁾^{; c}^f^.,^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^v^.
^Calde^r^in-^R^o^d^rigue^z^,²⁴⁴^F.3^d⁹⁷^{7, 9}⁸⁶^-⁸⁷⁽⁸^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾^.^T^h^e^s^e^s^e^v^e^{n f}^a^c^t^or^s^ha^v^e^be^eⁿ^f^a^ir^l^y^wⁱ^d^e^l^y^c^ite^{d s}ⁱ^nc^e^the^y
^w^e^r^e^fⁱ^r^s^{t a}^nnounc^e^dⁱⁿ^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^McKeeve^r^{, 169}^F.^Su^pp.⁴²⁶^{, 4}³⁰^(S.D^.N^.Y^{. 1}⁹⁵⁸^),^r^e^v^’^{d on}^othe^r^gr^ou^nds^,
²⁷¹^F.^2d⁶^{69 (}²^d^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁵⁹⁾^.^T^h^e^y^a^r^e^a^{bit f}^o^r^m^a^lis^tic^f^o^r^s^o^m^e^c^our^ts^w^{ho e}ⁿ^dor^s^e^a^m^o^r^e^a^d^hoc^a^ppr^oa^c^h^to^the
^a^sse^ss^m^e^{nt of}^w^h^e^t^he^{r the}^a^d^mⁱ^ss^ion^of^w^h^a^t^purp^o^{rts t}^o^be^a^ta^pe^d^c^onv^e^r^sa^{tion w}^{ill in}^tro^duc^e^f^r^a^u^d^{or c}^o^nf^usion^int^o
^the^c^our^t,^s^e^e^e^.^g.,^Strⁱ^nge^{l v}^.^M^e^thod^is^{t H}^o^s^p^.^{of I}ⁿ^di^an^{a, I}ⁿ^c^.^,⁸⁹^F^.^3d⁴¹^5,⁴²^{0 (}⁷^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁶⁾⁽^M^c^K^eev^er^“set^{s o}^u^t^a
^rat^h^{er f}^o^rmal^,^seven^st^ep^ch^ecklⁱ^s^t^f^o^{r t}^h^{e au}^t^h^en^tⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^a^p^e^reco^rdⁱⁿ^gs,^an^d^w^e^h^a^{ve l}^o^o^k^ed^t^o^{some o}^f^t^h^{e f}^e^at^u^r^es
^[ⁱ^{n t}^h^e^pa^s^t^]^”⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^ed^St^a^t^{es v.}^W^hⁱ^t^e^,¹¹^{6 F.}^3d⁹^03,⁹^{21 (}^D^.C^.C^ir^.¹⁹⁹⁷⁾⁽^“^ta^pe^s^m^a^y^be^a^u^theⁿ^tic^a^t^e^d^by^te^s^tim^on^y
^de^s^c^rⁱ^bing^the^pr^oc^e^s^s^or^s^y^s^t^em^tha^t^c^r^e^a^t^e^d^the^ta^pe^or^by^te^s^tⁱ^m^oⁿ^y^f^r^o^m^pa^r^tie^s^{to t}^h^e^c^onv^e^r^s^a^tio^{n a}^f^fⁱ^r^m^ing^tha^t
^t^h^{e t}^a^p^e^{s co}^nt^aiⁿ^e^d^aⁿ^accu^rat^e^reco^rd^o^f^w^h^at^w^a^{s s}^aⁱ^d^”);^Unⁱ^t^e^d^St^a^t^{es v.}^T^r^op^ean^o^,²^{52 F.3}^d⁶⁵^{3, 661}⁽²^d^Cⁱ^r^.
²⁰⁰^1)(“^[^T^]^h^is^Circ^uit^ha^s^ne^v^e^{r e}^x^pre^s^s^l^y^a^dopte^d^a^rigⁱ^d^s^t^a^nda^r^d^f^o^{r de}^te^rm^ining^the^a^d^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^bility^of^ta^pe
^reco^rdⁱⁿ^gs”);^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^W^e^s^t^m^o^r^e^land^{, 3}¹²^F.^3d³⁰^2,³¹^0-¹¹⁽⁷^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰²⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^v^.^D^a^w^s^on^,⁴²⁵^F.3^d
³⁸⁹^,³⁹^{3 (7}^t^h^Ci^r^.²⁰⁰⁵^)(“Bu^t^t^h^e^r^{e are n}^o^ri^gi^d^ru^l^e^s,^s^u^ch^{as ch}^aiⁿ^o^f^cu^st^od^y^,^f^o^{r au}^t^h^en^tⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^;^a^l^l^t^h^atⁱ^s^req^uⁱ^re^dⁱ^s
^a^d^e^q^u^a^te^e^v^id^eⁿ^c^e^o^f^g^eⁿ^uⁱⁿ^eⁿ^e^ss^{. (T}^h^e^re^a^r^e^su^c^h^ru^le^{s f}^o^{r e}^l^e^c^t^roⁿⁱ^c^su^rv^e^illaⁿ^c^e^g^o^v^e^rn^e^d^b^y^T^itle^{III, b}^u^{t T}^itle^{III is}
ⁱⁿ^ap^plⁱ^cab^l^e^t^o^coⁿ^v^ersatⁱ^oⁿ^s^t^h^at^,^{as h}^e^re,^{are reco}^rd^ed^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e con}^s^en^t^o^f^on^{e o}^f^t^h^e^p^a^rtⁱ^cⁱ^p^an^t^s^”))^.

This is true of the wiretapper or electronic eavesdropper and of all those who disclose
information, that in fact can be traced to a disclosure by the original wiretapper or eavesdropper,
with reason to know of the information’s illicit origins, except to the extent the First Amendment ⁸⁷
bans application. The legislative history speaks of a common knowledge limitation on the
statute’s coverage, but it is not clear whether it refers to common knowledge at the time of ⁸⁸
interception or at the time disclosure, S.Rept. 90-1097, at 93 (1967). By definition a violation of
paragraph 2511(1)(c) requires an earlier unlawful interception under subsection 2511(1). If there
is no predicate unlawful interception there can be no violation of paragraph 2511(1)(c).
The results of electronic eavesdropping authorized under Title III/ECPA may be disclosed and ⁸⁹⁹⁰
used for law enforcement purposes and for testimonial purposes.
It is also a federal crime to disclose, with an intent to obstruct criminal justice, any information
derived from lawful police wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping, i.e.:
• any person [who]
• intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person

⁸⁷^B^a^rtⁿⁱ^cki^v.^V^o^p^p^e^r^,⁵³²^U.^S^.⁵¹⁴^,⁵³^3-34⁽²⁰⁰¹⁾^,^p^oⁱⁿ^t^{ed ou}^t^t^h^at^t^h^{e F}ⁱ^rst^Am^en^d^m^en^t^ri^gh^t^t^o^f^r^e^e^sp^eech^b^a^{rs t}^h^e
^a^pplic^a^tioⁿ^of^se^c^{tion 2}⁵¹¹^(1)(c⁾^{to t}^h^e^disc^los^u^re^of^ille^g^a^lly^inte^r^c^e^p^te^{d, b}^u^{t la}^w^f^ull^y^a^c^quire^{d, c}^o^m^m^unic^a^tions
^de^a^ling^w^{ith a}^m^a^tte^r^of^unus^ua^l^pub^lic^c^onc^e^rⁿ^.^B^a^r^t^nic^k^{i w}^a^s^a^unioⁿ^ne^g^o^tia^t^o^r^w^hos^e^te^le^ph^one^c^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^w^ith
^the^uⁿ^io^{n’s pre}^sⁱ^d^eⁿ^{t w}^e^re^surre^ptitiously^inte^rc^e^p^te^{d a}ⁿ^{d r}^e^c^o^r^d^e^d^a^disc^ussion^ne^g^o^tia^ti^on^of^a^te^a^c^he^{rs’ c}^ontra^c^t^.
^D^u^ring^the^c^onv^e^r^s^a^tion,^the^pos^sⁱ^bility^of^us^ing^vⁱ^oleⁿ^c^e^a^g^aⁱ^ns^{t s}^c^hool^b^o^a^r^{d m}^e^m^b^e^r^s^w^a^s^m^e^ntio^ne^{d. A}^f^te^{r the}
^t^each^{ers’ co}ⁿ^t^ract^w^a^{s si}^gn^ed^,^t^h^e^uⁿ^kno^wⁿ^wⁱ^ret^a^p^p^e^{r secret}^l^y^s^upplie^{d Y}^o^c^u^m^,^a^c^r^itic^of^the^un^ioⁿ^’^{s positi}^on^{, w}^{ith a}
^c^opy^of^the^ta^pe^{. Yoc}^u^m^{in tur}ⁿ^p^l^a^y^e^d^{it f}^o^{r m}^e^m^b^e^r^{s of}^the^s^c^hoo^{l boa}^r^d^aⁿ^{d tu}^rⁿ^e^d^it^ov^e^r^to^Vo^pp^e^r^{, a}^r^a^{dio ta}^lk
^s^how^hos^{t, w}^ho^pla^y^e^d^{it on}^his^s^how^{. O}^t^he^r^s^t^a^tio^ns^aⁿ^{d m}^e^dia^ou^tle^ts^pu^blis^he^{d the}^c^onteⁿ^ts^a^s^w^e^l^l^{. B}^a^r^t^nic^k^{i s}^u^e^d
^Vo^ppe^r^a^{nd Y}^o^c^u^m^f^o^r^us^e^a^{nd di}^s^c^los^u^r^e^{in v}ⁱ^ola^tio^{n of}^s^e^c^tions²⁵¹¹⁽¹⁾⁽^c⁾^aⁿ^{d 2}⁵¹¹⁽¹⁾⁽^d⁾^.^V^o^p^p^e^r^a^{nd Y}^o^c^u^m
^o^f^fered^{a f}^r^{ee sp}^eech^d^e^f^eⁿ^s^e,^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^e^S^u^p^r^em^{e Co}^u^r^t^accep^t^e^d^.^B^u^t^see,^Quⁱ^g^l^{ey v.}^R^o^sen^t^ha^l^,³²^{7 F.}^3d¹⁰⁴⁴^,¹⁰⁶^7-
^{68 (}^10t^{h C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰³⁾⁽^d^eⁿ^yⁱ^ng^Fir^s^{t A}^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t pr}^ote^c^tio^{n f}^o^r^th^os^e^k^now^ing^l^y^inv^o^lv^e^d^w^{ith inte}^r^c^e^p^tor^s^of^pr^iv^a^t^e
^m^a^tte^r^s⁽^{not p}^u^b^lic^c^onc^e^r^ns⁾⁾^;^B^o^e^hne^r^v^.^M^c^D^e^r^m^ott^{, 4}⁸⁴^F.^3d⁵^73,⁵⁷^7-^{81 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾⁽^M^e^m^be^r^s^of^C^ong^r^e^s^s
^do^not^ha^v^e^a^Fir^s^{t A}^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t r}ⁱ^g^h^{t to}^dis^c^los^e^uⁿ^la^w^f^ul^wⁱ^r^e^ta^{p inf}^o^r^m^a^{tion i}ⁿ^vⁱ^ola^tⁱ^on^of^H^ous^e^r^u^le^s⁾^{. F}^o^r^a^m^o^r^e
^e^x^te^nsiv^e^e^x^a^m^ina^{tion of}^Ba^rtnicki,^see^{, CRS Rep}^o^r^t^RS2⁰⁹⁷⁴^,^T^h^e^Right^to^Pu^blish^Law^f^ully^O^b^taⁱⁿ^e^d^B^u^{t Ille}^gally
^In^t^e^rcep^t^e^d^Ma^t^e^ri^a^l^o^f^P^u^b^lⁱ^c^Con^cern^:^B^a^rtⁿⁱ^cki^v.^V^o^pp^er^.
⁸⁸^“^S^ub^pa^r^a^g^r^a^phs⁽^c⁾^a^{nd (}^d⁾^pr^o^hⁱ^b^{it, i}ⁿ^t^u^rⁿ^{, t}^h^e^dis^c^los^u^r^e^or^us^e^o^f^the^c^onteⁿ^ts^of^aⁿ^y^inte^r^c^e^p^te^{d c}^o^m^m^unic^a^tion
^by^aⁿ^y^pe^r^s^{on k}^now^ing^or^ha^vⁱ^ng^r^e^a^s^{on to}^k^now^the^inf^o^r^m^a^tion^w^a^s^obtaⁱ^ne^d^thr^oug^{h a}ⁿⁱⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^tⁱ^on^{in v}ⁱ^o^l^a^tio^{n of}
^this^s^u^bs^e^c^tion.^T^h^e^dis^c^los^u^r^e^of^the^c^onteⁿ^ts^of^aⁿⁱⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^te^{d c}^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion tha}^t^ha^{d a}^l^r^e^a^d^y^be^c^o^m^e^‘^public
^inf^o^r^m^a^tion’^or^‘^c^om^m^{on k}^now^le^dg^e^’^w^{ould n}^o^t^be^pr^ohi^bite^d^.^T^h^e^s^c^ope^of^this^kⁿ^o^w^l^e^d^g^e^r^e^quir^e^{d to}^vⁱ^ola^t^e^e^ithe^r
^s^ubpa^r^a^g^r^a^{ph r}^e^f^l^e^c^t^s^e^x^is^ting^law⁽^Pe^r^eⁱ^r^{a v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^,³⁴⁷^U.^S^.^{1 (}¹⁹⁵⁴⁾⁾^.^{” Th}^{e r}^e^m^a^r^k^m^a^y^al^so^h^a^{ve b}^een
^inf^l^ue^nc^e^d^by^the^hig^h^le^v^e^{l of}^int^e^{nt (w}^illf^ull^y^ra^the^r^thaⁿⁱⁿ^te^nti^oⁿ^a^lly^{) inc}^l^ude^{d in}^the^disc^losure^pr^ov^{ision a}^s
^r^e^por^te^{d ou}^t.
⁸⁹^“Aⁿ^yⁱⁿ^vestⁱ^g^atⁱ^v^{e o}^r^l^a^w^en^f^o^rc^e^m^en^t^o^f^fⁱ^cer^w^h^o^,^b^y^an^y^mean^{s au}^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^b^y^t^hⁱ^s^ch^ap^t^e^r,^h^a^{s obt}^aiⁿ^e^d
^kn^o^w^l^e^d^g^{e o}^f^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^t^en^t^s^o^f^an^y^wⁱ^re,^o^r^al^,^o^r^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^,^o^r^evi^d^en^{ce d}^e^ri^ved^t^h^erefro^m^,^m^a^y^dⁱ^scl^o^se
^su^ch^co^nt^en^t^s^t^o^ano^t^h^e^{r i}ⁿ^vestⁱ^g^atⁱ^v^{e o}^r^l^a^w^en^f^o^rce^m^en^t^o^f^fⁱ^{cer t}^o^t^h^{e ext}^eⁿ^t^t^h^at^su^ch^dⁱ^scl^o^s^u^{re i}^s^ap^p^r^op^ri^at^{e t}^o^t^h^e
^p^r^op^{er p}^e^rf^o^r^m^aⁿ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e o}^f^fⁱ^ci^al^d^u^tⁱ^e^{s o}^f^t^h^{e o}^f^fⁱ^cer^makiⁿ^g^o^r^recei^viⁿ^g^t^h^{e d}ⁱ^scl^o^su^re,^”¹⁸^U.^S^.^C.²⁵¹⁷⁽¹⁾^.
⁹⁰^“Aⁿ^y^p^e^rsoⁿ^w^h^o^h^a^{s recei}^ved^,^by^an^y^m^ean^{s au}^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^b^y^t^hⁱ^s^ch^ap^t^e^r,^an^yⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^coⁿ^cernⁱⁿ^g^{a w}ⁱ^re,^o^r^al^,^o^r
^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^,^o^r^evi^d^en^{ce d}^e^ri^ved^t^h^eref^ro^mⁱⁿ^t^e^rcep^t^e^dⁱⁿ^acco^r^d^an^{ce w}ⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e p}^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^o^f^t^hⁱ^s^ch^ap^t^e^r
^m^a^y^dis^c^los^e^the^c^onteⁿ^ts^of^tha^t^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion or}^s^u^c^h^de^rⁱ^v^a^tiv^{e e}^v^ideⁿ^c^e^w^h^ile^gⁱ^vⁱ^ng^te^s^tⁱ^m^on^y^unde^r^oa^th^or
^affⁱ^r^m^atioⁿⁱⁿ^an^y^p^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^h^e^l^d^uⁿ^d^e^{r t}^h^{e au}^t^h^o^rⁱ^t^y^o^f^th^{e Un}^ited^{States o}^r^o^f^an^y^{State o}^r^p^o^{litical su}^b^d^iv^isioⁿ
^the^r^e^o^f^,^”^{18 U.S}^.^C.²⁵¹⁷⁽^{3). T}^h^is^doe^s^{not e}ⁿ^title^priv^a^t^e^litig^aⁿ^{ts t}^o^disc^l^o^sureⁱⁿ^the^vⁱ^e^w^of^a^t^le^a^s^t^one^c^o^urt,^In^re
^M^o^tion^{to U}ⁿ^s^e^{al E}^l^e^c^t^r^onic^Sur^v^e^illanc^e^Ev^ideⁿ^c^e^,⁹^{90 F.2}^d¹⁰^{15 (}⁸^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹³⁾^.
^W^h^en^co^u^r^t^-^o^r^d^e^redⁱⁿ^t^e^rcep^tⁱ^oⁿ^resu^l^t^sⁱⁿ^evi^d^en^ce^o^f^{a cri}^m^{e o}^t^h^e^{r t}^h^an^t^h^{e cri}^m^e^wⁱ^t^h^resp^ect^t^o^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^{e o}^r^d^e^{r w}^a^s
^issue^d^{, t}^h^e^e^v^ideⁿ^c^e^{is a}^d^mⁱ^ssible^only^up^{on a}^judⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^fⁱ^nding^t^h^a^tⁱ^t^w^a^{s othe}^rw^is^e^se^c^u^re^{d in c}^o^m^p^lia^nc^e^w^{ith T}^itle
^III/EC^P^A^req^uⁱ^rem^eⁿ^t^{s, 1}⁸^U.S^.^C^.²⁵¹⁷⁽⁵^).

• the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication
• intercepted by means authorized by sections:
• 2511(2)(a)(ii) (communication service providers, landlords, etc. who
assist police setting up wiretaps or electronic eavesdropping devices
• 2511(2)(b) (FCC regulatory activity)
• 2511(2)(c) (police one party consent)
• 2511(2)(e) (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act)
• 2516 (court-ordered, police wiretapping or electronic surveillance)
• 2518 (emergency wiretaps or electronic surveillance)
• knowing or having reason to know that
• the information was obtained through the interception of such a communication
• in connection with a criminal investigation
• having obtained or received the information in connection with a criminal
investigation
• with intent to improperly obstruct, impede, or interfere with a duly authorized
criminal investigation,
• is subject to the same sanctions and remedies as one who illegally wiretaps, 18 ⁹¹
U.S.C. 2511(1)(e).
The proscriptions in 2511(1)(e) would appear to apply to efforts to obstruct justice by information
gleaned from either federal or state police wiretaps. Use of the word “authorized” in conjunction
with a list of federal statutes might suggest that the paragraph was only intended to protect
wiretap information gathered by federal rather than by federal or state authorities. But most of the
cited sections do not “authorize” anything; they simply confine the reach of the statutory
prohibitions. And several are as likely to involve state interceptions as federal, e.g., the one-party-
consent-under-color-of-law interceptions.
Essentially, the same consequences flow from an unlawful disclosure under paragraphs
2511(1)(c) or 2511(1)(e) as follow unlawful interception under paragraphs 2511(1)(a) or

2511(1)(b):

⁹¹^W^h^eⁿ^a^c^ting^w^{ith a}^sim^ila^{r inte}^{nt, disc}^los^u^re^of^the^fa^c^t^of^a^u^th^oriz^e^d^f^e^de^ra^l^wⁱ^re^ta^{p or f}^o^re^ig^{n inte}^l^lig^eⁿ^c^e
^g^a^the^r^ing^{is prosc}^r^ibe^d^e^l^se^w^h^e^r^e^{in ti}^tle¹⁸^{. “}^W^hoe^v^e^r,^ha^vⁱ^ng^kⁿ^o^w^l^e^d^g^e^tha^t^a^Fe^de^ra^{l inv}^e^stig^a^tiv^e^{or la}^w
^en^f^o^rce^m^en^t^o^f^fⁱ^{cer h}^a^{s b}^een^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^o^r^h^a^{s app}^lⁱ^e^d^f^o^{r aut}^h^o^rⁱ^zatⁱ^oⁿ^uⁿ^d^e^{r ch}^ap^t^e^r¹¹⁹^t^oⁱⁿ^t^e^rcep^t^{a w}ⁱ^re,^o^r^al^,^o^r
^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^,ⁱⁿ^o^r^{der t}^o^ob^st^ru^ct^,ⁱ^m^p^e^d^e^,^o^r^p^r^even^t^su^chⁱⁿ^t^e^rcep^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^gi^{ves n}^o^tⁱ^{ce o}^r^at^t^e^m^p^t^s^t^o^gi^ve
^notic^e^of^the^pos^sⁱ^bleⁱⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^tioⁿ^{to a}ⁿ^y^pe^r^s^{on s}^h^a^{ll be}^fⁱ^ne^d^u^nde^r^this^ti^tle^or^im^pr^is^one^d^not^m^o^r^e^thaⁿ^fⁱ^v^e^y^e^a^r^s^,^or
^bot^h.”
^“^W^hoe^v^e^r^,^ha^vⁱ^ng^k^now^le^dge^tha^t^a^Fe^de^r^a^{l of}^fⁱ^c^e^r^ha^s^be^eⁿ^a^u^tho^r^iz^e^d^or^ha^s^a^pplie^{d f}^o^r^a^u^t^hor^iz^a^t^ion^{to c}^oⁿ^duc^t
^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^surv^e^illa^nc^e^un^de^{r t}^h^e^Fore^ig^{n In}^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^Surv^e^illa^nc^e^A^c^{t o}^f¹⁹⁷^{8 (5}^{0 U.}^S.C.¹⁸⁰¹^{, e}^t^s^e^{q.), i}ⁿ^or^de^{r t}^o
^obs^tr^uc^t^,^im^pe^de^{, or}^pr^e^v^eⁿ^{t s}^u^c^h^a^c^tiv^it^y^,^gⁱ^ve^s^notic^e^or^a^tte^m^p^{ts t}^o^gⁱ^v^e^notic^e^of^the^possib^l^e^a^c^tiv^ity^{to a}ⁿ^y^pe^rson
^sha^{ll be}^fⁱ^ne^d^un^de^{r this}^title^{or i}^m^prisone^{d n}^o^{t m}^o^re^thaⁿ^fⁱ^v^e^y^e^a^r^{s, or}^bot^h,”¹⁸^U.^S.C.²²³²⁽^d),(e⁾^.

• maximum five year prison terms and fines of not more than $250,000 or
$500,000, depending upon whether the offender is an individual or ⁹²
organization;
• exposure to civil liability including equitable relief and actual or statutory ⁹³
damages.
The prohibition on the use of information secured from illegal wiretapping or electronic
eavesdropping mirrors the disclosure provision, 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(d):
• any person [who]
• intentionally
• uses or endeavors to use to another person
• the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication
• having reason to know
• that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or
electronic communication
• in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)
• is subject to the same sanctions and remedies as the wiretapper or electronic
eavesdropper.
The available case law under the use prohibition of section 2511(1)(d) is scant, and the section
has rarely been invoked except in conjunction with the disclosure prohibition of section

2511(1)(c). The wording of the two is clearly parallel, the legislative history describes them in the ⁹⁴⁹⁵

same breath, and they are treated alike for law enforcement purposes. Bartnicki seems
destined to change all of that, because it appears to parse the constitutionally suspect ban on

⁹²^“^[^W^]^hoe^v^e^{r v}ⁱ^ola^t^e^s^subse^c^tio^{n (}¹^{) of}^th^{is se}^c^tio^{n s}^h^a^{ll be}^fⁱ^ne^d^un^de^{r this}^title^or^im^prisone^d^no^{t m}^o^re^thaⁿ^fⁱ^v^e
^y^e^a^r^s^,^or^bot^h,”¹⁸^U^.^S^.^C^.²⁵¹¹⁽⁴⁾⁽^a⁾^.
⁹³^“⁽^a⁾^{. . . a}ⁿ^y^pe^r^s^{on w}^hos^e^wⁱ^r^e^{, or}^a^l^{, or}^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion^is^{. .}^{. d}ⁱ^s^c^los^e^{d .}^{. .}^us^e^dⁱⁿ^vⁱ^o^l^a^tion^of^this
^c^h^a^p^te^{r m}^a^y^{in a}^cⁱ^v^{il a}^c^{tion re}^c^o^v^e^r^f^r^om^the^pe^{rson or}^eⁿ^tity^{, oth}^e^{r tha}ⁿ^t^h^e^Unite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^{, w}^h^ic^{h e}ⁿ^g^a^g^e^{d in tha}^t
^vⁱ^ola^tion^suc^h^re^lie^f^a^s^m^a^y^be^a^ppro^p^ria^t^e^.^.^{. .(g}⁾^Aⁿ^y^w^ill^f^u^{l disc}^losure^.^{. .}^by^aⁿ^inv^e^stig^a^tiv^e^{or la}^w^eⁿ^f^o^rc^e^m^eⁿ^t
^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^{or g}^o^v^e^rnm^e^nta^l^eⁿ^tity^ofⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^a^{tion be}^y^ond^the^e^x^te^nt^pe^rm^itte^{d by}^s^e^c^{tion 2}⁵¹⁷^is^a^vⁱ^ola^tⁱ^on^of^this^c^h^a^p^te^r
^f^o^r^pur^p^o^s^e^s^of^s^e^c^{tion 2}⁵²⁰⁽^a⁾^,^”^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁵²⁰⁽^a⁾^,(^g⁾^.
⁹⁴^“^S^ub^pa^r^a^g^r^a^phs⁽^c⁾^a^{nd (}^d⁾^pr^o^hⁱ^b^{it, i}ⁿ^t^u^rⁿ^{, t}^h^e^dis^c^los^u^r^e^or^us^e^o^f^the^c^onteⁿ^ts^of^aⁿ^y^inte^r^c^e^p^te^{d c}^o^m^m^unic^a^tion
^by^aⁿ^y^pe^r^s^{on k}^now^ing^or^ha^vⁱ^ng^r^e^a^s^{on to}^k^now^the^inf^o^r^m^a^tion^w^a^s^obtaⁱ^ne^d^thr^oug^{h a}ⁿⁱⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^tⁱ^on^{in v}ⁱ^o^l^a^tio^{n of}
^this^s^u^bs^e^c^tion,”^S.R^e^pt^{. 9}⁰^-¹⁰⁹^7,^a^t⁹³⁽¹⁹⁶⁷⁾^.
⁹⁵^Co^mp^a^r^e^,¹⁸^U.^S^.^C^.²⁵¹⁷⁽¹^)(“Aⁿ^yⁱⁿ^vestⁱ^g^atⁱ^v^{e o}^r^l^a^w^en^f^o^rce^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^fⁱ^cer^w^h^o^,^b^y^an^y^mean^{s au}^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^b^y^t^hⁱ^s
^c^h^a^p^te^r^,^ha^s^obtaⁱ^ne^{d k}ⁿ^o^w^l^e^d^g^e^of^the^c^onteⁿ^ts^of^aⁿ^y^wⁱ^r^e^{, or}^a^l^,^or^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion,^or^e^v^ideⁿ^c^e^de^rⁱ^v^e^d
^t^h^eref^ro^m^,^m^a^y^dⁱ^scl^o^{se su}^ch^co^nt^en^t^s^t^o^aⁿ^o^t^h^e^{r i}ⁿ^vestⁱ^g^atⁱ^v^{e o}^r^l^a^w^en^f^o^rce^m^en^t^o^f^fⁱ^{cer t}^o^t^h^{e ext}^eⁿ^t^t^h^at^su^ch
^dⁱ^scl^o^su^{re i}^s^a^p^p^r^o^p^rⁱ^a^t^e^t^o^t^h^{e p}^r^o^p^e^{r p}^e^rf^o^r^m^aⁿ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e o}^f^fⁱ^ci^al^d^u^tⁱ^e^{s o}^f^t^h^{e o}^f^fⁱ^cer^m^a^kiⁿ^g^o^r^recei^viⁿ^g^t^h^e
^dⁱ^sclo^su^re”),^wit^h¹⁸^U.^S^.^C.²⁵¹⁷⁽²^)(“Aⁿ^yⁱⁿ^vestⁱ^g^atⁱ^v^{e o}^r^l^a^w^en^fo^rcemen^t^o^f^fⁱ^c^e^r^w^h^o^,^b^y^an^y^me^an^{s au}^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^b^y
^t^hⁱ^s^ch^ap^t^e^r,^h^a^{s ob}^t^aⁱⁿ^e^d^kn^o^w^l^e^d^g^{e o}^f^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^t^ent^s^o^f^an^y^wⁱ^re,^o^r^al^,^o^r^el^ect^ronⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^o^r^evi^d^en^{ce d}^e^ri^ved
^the^r^e^f^r^o^m^m^a^y^us^e^s^u^c^h^c^onteⁿ^ts^{to t}^h^e^e^x^te^{nt s}^u^c^h^us^e^is^a^ppr^opr^ia^te^{to t}^h^e^pr^ope^r^pe^r^f^or^m^a^nc^e^of^his^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^dutie^s^”⁾^.

disclosure from the constitutionally permissible ban on use.⁹⁶ In doing so, it may also resolve a
conflict among the lower federal appellate courts over the so-called “clean hands” exception. A
few courts had recognized an exception to the disclosure-use bans of section 2511(1) where law
enforcement officials might disclose or use the results of an illegal interception in which they had ⁹⁷
played no role. Bartnicki appears to dim the prospects of a clean hands exception because, to
illustrate situations to which the section 2511(1)(d) use might be constitutionally outlawed, it ⁹⁸
points to one of the cases which rejected to the exception.
The consequences of unlawful use of intercepted communications in violation of paragraph
2511(d) are similar to those for unlawful disclosure in violation of paragraphs 2511(1)(c) or

2511(1)(e), or for unlawful interception under paragraphs 2511(1)(a) or 2511(1)(b):

• maximum five year prison terms and fines of not more than $250,000 or
$500,000, depending upon whether the offender is an individual or organization,

18 U.S.C. 2511(4)(a);

• exposure to civil liability including equitable relief and actual or statutory
damages, 18 U.S.C. 2520(a), (g).
The proscriptions for possession and trafficking in wiretapping and eavesdropping devices are
even more demanding than those that apply to the predicate offense itself. There are exemptions ⁹⁹¹⁰⁰
for service providers, government officials and those under contract with the government, but

⁹⁶^“[^T^]^h^eⁿ^a^ked^p^r^o^hⁱ^bⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^agaiⁿ^s^t^dⁱ^scl^o^su^{res i}^s^f^aⁱ^r^l^y^ch^ara^c^t^e^ri^zed^{as a regu}^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^pu^{re sp}^eech^.^Unlⁱ^k^{e t}^h^e
^pro^h^ibit^io^{n a}^g^aⁱ^{nst the}^‛^use^’^of^th^e^c^onteⁿ^ts^of^aⁿ^ille^g^a^{l inte}^rc^e^p^ti^oⁿⁱⁿ^§²⁵¹¹⁽^1)(d),^su^bse^c^{tion (c}^{) is}^not^a^re^g^u^la^tioⁿ
^of^c^onduc^t^,^”⁵^{32 U}^.^{S. a}^t⁵²^6-²⁷^.
⁹⁷^Fo^rsyth^v.^Ba^rr^{, 19 F.3}^d¹⁵^27,¹⁵⁴¹^-⁵⁴⁵⁽⁵^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁴⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^v^.^M^u^r^d^oc^k^{, 6}³^F.^3d¹³⁹¹^,¹⁴⁰⁰^-⁴^{03 (}⁶^th^Cⁱ^r^.
¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^;^c^ontr^a^{, Be}^r^r^y^v^.^Fu^nk^,¹⁴⁶^F.3^d¹⁰^03,¹⁰¹¹^-¹^{3 (}^D^.C^.C^ir^.¹⁹⁹⁸⁾^;^C^h^an^dl^{er v.}^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^a^t^{es A}^r^my^{, 12}^{5 F.}^3d
¹²⁹^6,¹³^00-³⁰^{2 (}⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^;^Iⁿ^r^e^G^r^an^{d J}^u^r^y^,¹¹^{1 F.}^3d¹⁰⁶⁶^,¹⁰⁷^{7 (}³^d^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Ve^s^t^{, 8}¹³^F.2^d
⁴⁷⁷^{, 4}⁸¹⁽¹^s^t^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁷⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^e^{d St}^a^t^{es v.}^La^m^{, 2}⁷¹^F.S^u^p^p^.^2d¹¹⁸²^{, 11}⁸⁴^-¹^{87 (}^N^.D^.C^a^l^{. 2}⁰⁰³⁾^;^s^e^e^a^l^s^o^,^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^State^s
^v.^Gra^y^{, 5}²¹^F.3^d⁵¹^4,⁵³^{0 (}⁶^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁸⁾⁽ⁿ^otiⁿ^g^tha^t^doc^trⁱⁿ^e^is^oⁿ^ly^a^v^a^ila^ble^{in c}^a^s^e^s^of^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt us}^e⁾^.
⁹⁸^“Un^lⁱ^k^{e t}^h^{e p}^r^o^hⁱ^bⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^agaiⁿ^s^t^t^h^e^‛^use^’^of^the^c^o^nteⁿ^ts^of^aⁿ^ille^g^a^{l inte}^r^c^e^p^tio^{n i}ⁿ^§2⁵¹¹⁽¹⁾⁽^d^),^*^s^ubse^c^tio^{n (c}^{) is}
^{not a}^r^e^g^u^la^ti^on^of^c^ond^uc^t.
^*^”^T^h^e^Solic^itor^G^e^ne^r^a^{l ha}^s^c^a^t^a^l^og^ue^{d s}^o^m^e^of^the^c^a^s^e^s^tha^t^f^a^ll^unde^r^s^ubs^e^c^tio^{n (}^d⁾^:^.^{. .}^{. T}^h^e^s^t^a^t^ute^ha^s^a^l^s^o^be^eⁿ
^he^{ld t}^o^ba^{r the}^use^of^ille^g^a^ll^y^inte^rc^e^p^te^{d c}^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^f^o^{r im}^porta^{nt a}^{nd s}^o^cⁱ^a^lly^va^lua^b^le^pur^po^se^{s, se}^e^,^In^re
^G^r^{and J}^u^r^y^{, 1}¹¹^F.3^d¹⁰^66,¹⁰⁷⁷^-^{79 (}³^d^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^,”⁵³^{2 U}^.^{S. a}^t⁵^{27 (}^f^oot^no^te¹⁰^of^the^C^our^t’^s^opⁱⁿ^io^{n q}^u^o^t^e^d^a^f^te^r
^the^*⁾^.
⁹⁹^“^I^{t s}^h^a^{ll n}^o^t^be^uⁿ^la^w^f^{ul unde}^r^t^h^is^s^e^c^{tion f}^o^r^–⁽^a⁾^a^pr^ov^ide^r^of^wⁱ^r^e^or^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion^s^e^r^v^ic^e^or^aⁿ
^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^{, a}^g^eⁿ^{t, or}^e^m^plo^y^e^e^of^{, or}^a^pe^r^s^on^un^de^r^c^oⁿ^t^r^a^c^t^w^{ith, s}^u^c^h^a^pr^ov^ide^r^{, i}ⁿ^t^h^eⁿ^o^r^m^a^l^c^our^s^e^of^the^b^u^sⁱ^ne^s^s^of
^pr^ov^idiⁿ^g^tha^t^wⁱ^r^e^or^e^l^e^c^t^r^o^nic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion s}^e^r^v^ic^e^{. . . t}^o^s^eⁿ^d^thr^o^ug^{h t}^h^e^m^a^{il, s}^e^{nd or}^c^a^r^r^y^{in inte}^r^s^ta^te^or
^f^o^rei^gⁿ^co^mmerc^e,^o^r^m^aⁿ^u^f^a^c^t^u^re,^asse^m^b^l^e^,^p^o^ssess,^o^r^sel^l^an^y^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^c,^m^ech^anⁱ^cal^,^o^r^ot^h^e^r^d^e^vi^{ce kn}^o^wⁱⁿ^{g o}^r
^ha^vⁱ^ng^r^e^a^s^{on to}^k^now^tha^t^t^h^e^de^sⁱ^gⁿ^of^s^u^c^h^de^vⁱ^c^e^r^e^nde^r^s^it^prⁱ^m^a^r^il^y^us^ef^{ul f}^o^r^the^p^u^r^p^os^e^of^t^h^e^s^u^r^r^e^ptit^io^us
^inte^r^c^e^p^tioⁿ^of^wⁱ^r^e^{, or}^a^l^{, or}^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^,”¹⁸^U^.^S.C^.²⁵¹²⁽²⁾⁽^a⁾^.
¹⁰⁰^“⁽²⁾^I^t^s^h^a^l^{l n}^o^t^be^uⁿ^la^w^f^{ul un}^de^r^this^s^e^c^tio^{n f}^o^r^{. .}^{. (}^b⁾^aⁿ^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^{, a}^g^eⁿ^{t, or}^e^m^ploy^e^e^of^{, or}^a^pe^r^s^on^un^de^r
^c^ontra^c^t^w^{ith, t}^h^e^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, a}^Sta^t^e^,^or^a^po^litic^a^l^su^bdivⁱ^si^{on t}^h^e^r^e^o^f^,^{in t}^h^e^norm^a^{l c}^ourse^of^th^e^a^c^tiv^itie^{s of}^the
^Unite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^{, a}^Sta^t^e^,^or^a^p^o^litic^a^l^subd^iv^ision^the^r^e^o^f^,^{to se}ⁿ^d^t^h^r^oug^{h t}^h^e^m^a^{il, se}^{nd or}^c^a^rry^{in int}^e^rsta^te^{or f}^o^re^igⁿ
^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^,^or^m^a^nuf^a^c^t^ur^e^,^a^s^s^e^m^b^le^{, pos}^s^e^s^s^,^or^s^e^{ll a}ⁿ^y^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^,^m^e^c^h^aⁿ^ic^a^l^{, or}^othe^r^de^vⁱ^c^e^k^now^ing^or^ha^vⁱ^ng
^re^a^s^{on to k}ⁿ^o^w^tha^t^the^de^sigⁿ^of^suc^h^de^vⁱ^c^e^re^nde^rs^it^prim^a^r^il^y^use^f^ul^f^o^{r the}^p^u^rp^ose^of^the^surre^p^titio^us
^inte^r^c^e^p^tioⁿ^of^wⁱ^r^e^{, or}^a^l^{, or}^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^.
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

there is no exemption for equipment designed to be used by private individuals, lawfully but ¹⁰¹
s u r re p ti ti o us l y.
The three prohibitions in section 2512 present generally common features, declaring that:
• any person who
• intentionally
• either
(a)
• sends through the mail or sends or carries in interstate or foreign
commerce
• any electronic, mechanical, or other device
• knowing or having reason to know
• that the design of such device renders it primarily useful
• for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications; or
(b)
• manufactures, assembles, possesses, or sells
• any electronic, mechanical, or other device
• knowing or having reason to know
• that the design of such device renders it primarily useful
• for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications, and
• that such device or any component thereof has been or will be sent
through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(c)
• places in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication or
disseminates electronically
• any advertisement of —
• any electronic, mechanical, or other device

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^“⁽³⁾^I^t^s^h^a^l^lⁿ^o^{t be}^un^la^w^f^{ul unde}^r^this^s^e^c^tio^{n t}^o^a^d^v^e^r^tis^e^f^o^r^s^a^le^a^de^vⁱ^c^e^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^{d in s}^ubs^e^c^tio^{n (}¹⁾^of^this^s^e^c^tio^{n if}
^the^a^d^v^e^rtise^m^eⁿ^{t is m}^a^ile^{d, se}^{nt, or c}^a^rrie^dⁱⁿⁱⁿ^te^rsta^te^or^f^o^r^e^igⁿ^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^s^o^le^l^y^{to a}^dom^e^s^tic^pr^ov^ide^r^of^wⁱ^r^e^or
^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion se}^rv^ic^e^{or t}^o^aⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^of^the^Un^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^{, a}^Sta^t^e^,^{or a}^po^litic^a^l^su^bdivⁱ^sⁱ^on^the^r^e^o^f^w^h^ic^h
^is^duly^a^u^tho^r^iz^e^d^to^us^e^s^u^c^h^de^vⁱ^c^e^,^”^{18 U}^.^S^.^C^.²⁵¹²⁽²⁾⁽^b⁾^,⁽³⁾^.
¹⁰¹^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^Sp^{y F}^a^ct^o^r^y,^In^c^.,⁹^{51 F.S}^u^p^p^{. 45}^{0, 47}^3-⁷⁵⁽^S^.D^.^N^.Y^.¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^v^.^B^a^s^t^{, 4}⁹⁵^F.^2d¹³^8,
¹⁴¹^(D^.C.Cir.¹⁹⁷⁴^).

• knowing or having reason to know
• that the design of such device renders it primarily useful
• for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications; or
• any other electronic, mechanical, or other device
• where such advertisement promotes the use of such device
• for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications
• knowing the content of the advertisement and knowing or having reason
to know
• that such advertisement will be sent through the mail or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce
• shall be imprisoned for not more than five years and/or fined not more than
$250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations), 18 U.S.C. 2512.
The legislative history lists among the items Congress considered “primarily useful for the
purpose of the surreptitious interception of communications: the martini olive transmitter, the
spike mike, the infinity transmitter, and the microphone disguised as a wristwatch, picture frame,
cuff link, tie clip, fountain pen, stapler, or cigarette pack,” S.Rept. 90-1097, at 95 (1968).
Questions once raised over whether section 2512 covers equipment designed to permit ¹⁰²
unauthorized reception of scrambled satellite television signals have been resolved. Each of the ¹⁰³
circuits to consider the question has now concluded that 2512 outlaws such devices, but simple ¹⁰⁴
possession does not give rise to a private cause of action. Their use is also proscribed by 47 ¹⁰⁵
U.S.C. 605.
In its original form Title III was ill-suited to ensure the privacy of those varieties of modern
communications which are equally vulnerable to intrusion when they are at rest as when they are
in transmission. Surreptitious “access” is as least as great a threat as surreptitious “interception”

¹⁰²^T^h^e^tw^{o a}^ppe^lla^te^pa^ne^l^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^on^s^tha^t^f^oun^{d t}^h^e^de^vⁱ^c^e^s^be^y^{ond t}^h^e^bo^un^ds^of^s^e^c^tion²⁵¹²^,^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.
^Herrin^g^{, 9}³³^F.^2d⁹³^{2 (}^11t^{h C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹¹⁾^aⁿ^d^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^H^u^x^,⁹⁴⁰^F.2^d³¹^{4 (}⁸^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹¹⁾^w^e^r^e^ov^e^r^turⁿ^e^d^eⁿ
^ba^nc^,^Unⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^Herri^ng^{, 9}^{93 F.2}^d⁷⁸^{4, 786}⁽¹^1th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹³⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^a^t^{es v.}^Da^vi^s^,⁹⁷^{8 F}^.²^d⁴¹^5,⁴¹^{6 (}⁸^{th C}ⁱ^r^.
¹⁹⁹²⁾^.
¹⁰³^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^H^a^r^r^e^ll^,⁹⁸^{3 F.}²^d³⁶^,^37-³⁹⁽⁵^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹³⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^On^{e Ma}^c^o^{m V}ⁱ^d^e^o^Ci^ph^{er II}^,⁹⁸^{5 F}^.²^d
²⁵⁸^,²⁵^9-⁶¹⁽⁶^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹³⁾^;^Uⁿⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^Sh^ri^ver^,⁹⁸⁹^F.^2d^.⁸⁹⁸^,⁹⁰^1-⁰⁶⁽⁷^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹²⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^v^.^D^a^vⁱ^s^,
⁹⁷⁸^F.^2d⁴^15,⁴¹^7-^{20 (}⁸^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹²⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^L^aⁿ^d^e^,⁹⁶⁸^F^.^2d⁹⁰^7,⁹¹⁰^-¹¹⁽⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹²⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^v^.
^McN^u^t^t^,⁹^{08 F.2}^d⁵⁶^{1, 56}^4-⁶⁵⁽¹^0th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁰⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^H^e^r^rⁱ^ng^{, 9}⁹³^F.^2d⁷⁸^4,⁷⁸^6-⁸⁹⁽^11t^{h C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹¹⁾^.
¹⁰⁴^DIR^E^C^T^V^,^Iⁿ^c.^v.^T^r^ewo^r^g^y^,³⁷³^F.3^d¹¹^24,¹¹²⁹⁽¹^1th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁴⁾^;^DIRECTV,^Inc^.^v^.^Ro^bson^,⁴²⁰^F^.^3d⁵³^2,⁵³⁸^-³⁹
⁽⁵^t^h^Cⁱ^r.²⁰⁰⁵^)(ci^tⁱⁿ^g^several^dⁱ^st^ri^ct^co^u^r^t^{cases t}^h^at^h^a^{ve reach}^ed^t^h^{e sam}^e^coⁿ^c^l^u^si^on^).^P^r^oo^f^t^h^at^t^h^{e p}^o^ssesso^r^u^s^ed
^the^de^vⁱ^c^e^{to i}ⁿ^te^rc^e^p^{t s}^a^te^llite^traⁿ^s^m^is^sⁱ^{on e}^v^ideⁿ^c^e^s^a^vⁱ^ola^tion^o^f^s^e^c^tion²⁵^{11 a}^{nd e}^x^pos^ure^to^cⁱ^v^{il lia}^bility^unde^r
^sectⁱ^oⁿ²⁵²⁰^,^DIR^E^CT^V^,^Iⁿ^c.^v.^Nⁱ^ch^o^l^a^s^{, 4}⁰³^F.^3d²²^3,²²^7-²⁸⁽⁴^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁵⁾^;^DIR^E^C^T^V^,^In^c.^v.^P^e^p^e^,⁴³¹^F.^3d¹⁶^2,
¹⁶⁹⁽³^d^Cir.²⁰⁰⁵^).
¹⁰⁵^T^h^{e t}^e^xt^o^f^t^h^{e sect}ⁱ^oⁿⁱ^s^app^eⁿ^d^ed^.

to the patrons of electronic mail (e-mail), electronic bulletin boards, voice mail, pagers, and
remote computer storage.
Accordingly, Title III/ECPA also bans surreptitious access to communications at rest, although it
does so beyond the confines of that apply to interception, 18 U.S.C. 2701 - 2711. These separate
provisions afford protection for e-mail, voice mail, and other electronic communications
somewhat akin to that available for telephone and face to face conversations under 18 U.S.C.

2510-2522. Thus, subject to certain exceptions, it is a federal crime to:

• intentionally
• either
• access without authorization or
• exceed an authorization to access
• a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided
• and thereby obtain, alter, or prevent authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage in such system, 18 U.S.C.

2701(a).

The exceptions cover electronic storage facility operators, their customers, and – under ¹⁰⁶
procedural counterparts to court ordered wiretapping – governmental entities.
Violations committed for malicious, mercenary, tortious or criminal purposes are punishable by
imprisonment for not more than five years and/or a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than
10 years for a subsequent conviction); lesser transgressions, by imprisonment for not more than
one year (not more than five years for a subsequent conviction) and/or a fine of not more than ¹⁰⁷
$100,000. Those who provide the storage service and other victims of unlawful access have a
cause of action for equitable relief, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, damages equal the loss ¹⁰⁸
and gain associated with the offense but not less than $1000. Both criminal and civil liability ¹⁰⁹
are subject to good faith defenses.

¹⁰⁶^“^S^ubs^e^c^tio^{n (}^a⁾^of^this^s^e^c^tion^do^e^s^{not a}^p^ply^w^{ith r}^e^s^p^e^c^t^{to c}^oⁿ^d^u^c^t^a^u^th^or^iz^e^d^{– (}¹⁾^by^the^pe^r^s^oⁿ^or^eⁿ^t^ity
^p^r^o^vⁱ^dⁱⁿ^{g a w}ⁱ^{re o}^r^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c comm}^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^servi^ce;⁽²^{) b}^y^{a u}^s^{er o}^f^t^h^at^servi^ce^wⁱ^t^h^resp^ect^t^o^a^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^o^f
^orⁱⁿ^te^nde^d^f^o^r^tha^t^us^e^r^{; or}⁽³⁾ⁱⁿ^s^e^c^tion²⁷⁰³^[^r^e^quir^e^m^e^nts^f^o^r^gov^e^r^nm^eⁿ^{t a}^c^c^e^s^s^]^{, 27}⁰⁴^[^b^a^c^k^up^pr^e^s^e^r^v^a^tion]^or
²⁵¹^{8 [}^c^o^u^{rt orde}^re^d^wⁱ^re^ta^pping^or^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^e^a^v^e^s^drop^ping^]^of^th^{is title}^,”¹⁸^U.S^.^C.²⁷^01(c⁾^.
^Se^c^tion²⁷⁰⁹^c^r^e^a^t^e^s^aⁿ^e^x^c^e^p^{tion f}^o^{r c}^ounte^rⁱⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^{access t}^o^t^e^l^e^p^h^oⁿ^e^reco^rd^s.
¹⁰⁷^“^T^he^punis^h^m^e^{nt f}^o^r^aⁿ^of^f^e^ns^e^unde^r^s^ubs^e^c^tio^{n (}^a⁾^of^this^s^e^c^tio^{n is}^–⁽¹⁾^if^the^of^f^e^ns^e^is^c^o^m^m^itt^e^d^f^o^r^pur^pos^e^s
^of^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^ia^{l a}^dva^nta^g^e^,^m^a^lic^ious^de^s^t^r^u^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^or^da^m^a^g^e^{, or}^pr^iv^a^t^e^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^ia^{l ga}^{in, or}ⁱⁿ^f^u^r^t^he^r^a^nc^e^of^aⁿ^y
^c^r^im^ina^l^or^tor^tⁱ^ous^a^c^tⁱⁿ^vⁱ^ola^tⁱ^o^{n of}^the^c^o^ns^tit^utio^{n a}ⁿ^{d la}^w^s^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^or^aⁿ^y^s^t^a^t^e^{– (}^A⁾^a^fⁱ^ne^unde^r^t^h^is
^title^or^im^pris^onm^eⁿ^{t f}^o^{r not m}^o^re^thaⁿ^{5 y}^e^a^r^s^,^{or both}^,ⁱⁿ^t^h^e^c^a^s^{e of}^a^fⁱ^rs^{t off}^e^ns^e^unde^{r this}^s^u^b^p^a^r^a^g^ra^{ph; a}^{nd (B)}^a
^fⁱ^ne^unde^r^t^h^is^tit^le^or^im^pr^is^onm^eⁿ^{t f}^o^r^no^{t m}^o^r^e^thaⁿ^{10 y}^e^a^r^s^,^or^bot^{h, f}^o^r^aⁿ^y^s^ubs^e^queⁿ^t^of^f^e^ns^e^unde^r^this
^s^ubpa^ra^g^r^a^{ph; a}^{nd (}²^)(A^{) a}^fⁱ^ne^unde^{r t}^h^is^title^{or im}^pris^oⁿ^m^e^{nt f}^o^r^not^m^o^re^thaⁿ¹^y^e^a^r^{or both,}ⁱⁿ^t^h^e^c^a^s^e^of^a^fⁱ^rs^t
^of^fe^ns^e^unde^{r t}^h^is^pa^ra^g^r^a^{ph; a}^nd^{(B) a}^fⁱ^ne^unde^{r t}^h^is^t^itle^or^im^pris^onm^eⁿ^{t f}^o^{r not m}^o^re^thaⁿ^{5 y}^e^a^r^s^,^or^bot^{h, i}ⁿ^t^h^e
^c^a^s^e^of^aⁿ^of^f^e^ns^e^unde^r^this^s^u^b^p^a^r^a^g^r^a^{ph tha}^t^oc^c^u^r^s^a^f^te^r^a^c^onv^ic^tion^of^a^nothe^r^of^f^e^ns^e^unde^r^thi^s^s^e^c^tion,”¹⁸
^U^.^S.C^.²⁷⁰¹⁽^b)^.
¹⁰⁸^{“(a) Cau}^s^{e o}^f^actⁱ^oⁿ^–^E^x^cep^t^{as p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^{ed i}ⁿ^sectⁱ^oⁿ²⁷⁰³⁽^e)^[^r^el^atⁱⁿ^{g t}^oⁱ^m^m^uⁿⁱ^t^y^f^o^{r co}^m^p^lⁱ^aⁿ^{ce wi}^t^h^j^u^dⁱ^ci^al
^pr^oc^e^s^s^]^,^aⁿ^y^pr^ov^ide^r^of^e^l^e^c^t^r^oⁿⁱ^c^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion s}^e^r^v^ic^e^,^s^ubs^c^r^ibe^r^{, or}^c^u^s^t^om^e^r^a^g^g^rⁱ^e^v^e^{d b}^y^aⁿ^y^vⁱ^ola^tion^of^this
^c^h^a^p^te^{r in w}^h^ic^h^the^c^o^nd^uc^{t c}^o^nstituti^ng^the^vⁱ^ola^t^io^{n is e}ⁿ^g^a^g^e^{d in w}^{ith a}^k^now^ing^{or i}ⁿ^te^nti^ona^l^st^a^t^e^of^mⁱ^{nd m}^a^y^,
ⁱⁿ^{a ci}^vi^l^actⁱ^oⁿ^,^reco^{ver f}^r^o^m^t^h^{e p}^e^rsoⁿ^o^r^en^tⁱ^t^y^o^t^h^e^{r t}^h^{an t}^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es w}^hⁱ^c^h^en^gagedⁱⁿ^t^h^at^vi^o^l^atⁱ^o^{n su}^ch
^r^e^lie^f^a^s^m^a^y^be^a^ppr^opr^ia^te^.
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Service providers, nevertheless, may incur civil liability for unlawful disclosures,¹¹⁰ unless they ¹¹¹
can take advantage of one of a fairly extensive list of exceptions and defenses.
Violations by the United States may give rise to a cause of action and may result in disciplinary
action against offending officials or employees under the same provisions that apply to U.S. ¹¹²
violations of Title III, but unlike Title III there is no statutory rule for the exclusion of evidence

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^“⁽^{b) Re}^lie^f^{– In a}^cⁱ^v^{il a}^c^tio^{n u}ⁿ^d^e^{r this se}^c^tion^,^a^p^pro^p^ri^a^t^e^r^e^lie^f^inc^l^ude^s^{– (}¹⁾^s^u^c^h^pr^e^lim^ina^r^y^a^{nd ot}^he^r^e^q^uita^ble
^or^de^c^l^a^r^a^t^or^y^r^e^lief^a^s^m^a^y^be^a^p^pr^o^p^rⁱ^a^t^e^;⁽²⁾^da^m^a^ge^s^unde^r^s^u^bs^e^c^tion(^c⁾^{; a}ⁿ^{d (}³⁾^a^r^e^a^s^ona^ble^a^t^t^o^rⁿ^e^y^’^s^f^e^e^a^nd
^othe^r^li^tig^a^tion^c^o^s^t^s^r^e^a^s^ona^bly^inc^u^r^r^e^d;
^{“(c) Da}^m^a^{ges –}^T^h^{e co}^u^r^t^m^a^y^as^{sess as d}^a^m^a^{ges i}ⁿ^{a ci}^vi^l^actⁱ^oⁿ^un^d^e^{r t}^hⁱ^s^sectⁱ^o^{n t}^h^{e s}^u^m^o^f^t^h^{e ac}^t^u^al^d^a^m^a^ge^s
^su^ff^ered^b^y^t^h^{e p}^l^aiⁿ^tⁱ^f^f^an^d^an^y^p^r^o^fⁱ^t^s^mad^e^b^y^t^h^{e vi}^o^l^at^o^r^{as a resu}^l^t^o^f^t^h^{e vi}^ol^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^b^u^tⁱⁿⁿ^o^{case sh}^al^l^{a p}^e^rson
^en^titled^t^o^reco^v^e^{r receiv}^e^{less th}^aⁿ^th^{e s}^u^m^o^f^$¹^,⁰⁰⁰^.^{. .}^{.” 1}⁸^U.S^.^{C. 2}⁷⁰⁷^.
¹⁰⁹^“^A^g^{ood f}^a^{ith r}^e^lia^nc^e^on^{– (}¹⁾^a^c^our^{t w}^a^r^r^a^{nt or}^or^de^r^,^a^g^r^aⁿ^{d jur}^y^s^ubpoe^na^{, a}^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e^a^u^thor^iz^a^tion,^or^a
^sta^t^utory^a^u^thoriz^a^tⁱ^{on (i}^nc^lu^ding^a^re^que^{st of}^a^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^nta^l^eⁿ^tity^un^de^{r se}^c^tion²⁷⁰³^(f^{) of}^{this title}^{) [}^r^e^l^a^tⁱⁿ^g^{to a}ⁿ
^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^req^u^e^st^t^o^f^o^{r a servi}^{ce p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^{er p}^r^{eserve evi}^d^en^ce]^;⁽²⁾^{a r}^e^q^u^e^st^o^f^anⁱⁿ^vestⁱ^g^atⁱ^v^{e o}^r^l^a^w^en^f^o^rce^m^en^t^o^f^fⁱ^cer
^unde^{r s}^e^c^tⁱ^on²⁵¹⁸⁽⁷⁾^of^this^title^[^r^e^l^a^ting^t^o^e^m^e^r^ge^ncy^wⁱ^re^ta^ppin^g^a^{nd e}^l^e^c^t^ronic^e^a^v^e^s^drop^ping^]^;^{or (3)}^a^g^o^o^d^f^a^ith
^de^te^r^m^ina^{tion tha}^t^s^e^c^tⁱ^on²⁵¹¹⁽³⁾^of^this^tit^le^[^r^e^l^a^ting^to^the^cⁱ^r^c^u^m^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^s^unde^r^w^h^ic^{h a}ⁿ^e^l^e^c^t^r^oⁿⁱ^c^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions
^prov^ide^r^m^a^y^div^u^lg^e^the^c^onteⁿ^t^s^of^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion] pe}^rm^itte^{d th}^e^c^ond^uc^{t c}^o^m^p^la^ine^d^of^{– is a}^c^o^m^p^le^te^de^f^e^nse^to
^aⁿ^y^cⁱ^v^{il or}^c^r^im^ina^l^a^c^{tion br}^oug^{ht u}^nde^r^this^c^h^a^p^te^r^or^aⁿ^y^othe^r^la^w^,^”^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁷⁰⁷⁽^e⁾^.
¹¹⁰^“E^xcep^t^{as i}ⁿ^su^b^s^ectⁱ^oⁿ⁽^b⁾^o^r^(c^{) –}⁽¹^{) a p}^e^rson^o^r^en^tⁱ^t^y^p^r^o^vⁱ^dⁱ^{ng an}^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^se^rvi^{ce t}^o^t^h^e
^pub^lic^s^h^a^ll^no^{t k}^now^ing^l^y^div^u^lge^{to a}ⁿ^y^pe^r^s^on^or^eⁿ^ti^ty^the^c^onteⁿ^ts^of^a^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion w}^h^ileⁱⁿ^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^s^t^or^a^g^e
^b^y^th^{at service; (2}^{) a p}^e^rsoⁿ^o^r^entity^p^r^o^v^idⁱⁿ^{g rem}^o^{te co}^m^p^u^tin^{g service to}^th^{e p}^u^b^{lic sh}^all^no^{t know}ⁱⁿ^gl^y^dⁱ^vu^{lge to}
^aⁿ^y^pe^r^s^{on or}^eⁿ^t^ity^the^c^onteⁿ^ts^of^aⁿ^y^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion w}^h^ic^{h is}^c^a^r^rⁱ^e^d^or^m^a^inta^ine^d^on^tha^t^s^e^r^v^ic^e^{– (}^A⁾^{on be}^ha^lf
^o^f^,^an^d^recei^ved^b^y^m^ean^{s o}^f^el^ec^t^r^oⁿⁱ^{c t}^r^aⁿ^smⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^f^r^o^m^(o^{r creat}^ed^b^y^m^ean^{s o}^f^co^m^p^u^t^{er p}^r^o^cessiⁿ^g^o^f
^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^recei^ved^b^y^meaⁿ^{s o}^f^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c t}^r^an^smⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^f^r^o^m^),^{a su}^b^s^cri^b^{er o}^r^cu^st^o^m^{er o}^f^su^ch^servi^ce;^an^d^(B)
^s^o^le^ly^f^o^r^the^pu^r^p^os^e^of^pr^ov^idiⁿ^g^s^t^or^a^g^e^or^c^o^m^pute^r^pr^oc^e^s^sⁱ^ng^s^e^r^v^ic^es^{to s}^u^c^h^s^ubs^c^r^ibe^r^or^c^u^s^t^om^e^r^{, if}^the
^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^{er i}^sⁿ^o^t^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^t^o^{access t}^h^{e co}ⁿ^t^eⁿ^t^s^o^f^an^y^su^ch^co^mmuⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^f^o^{r pu}^rpo^s^{es o}^f^p^r^o^vⁱ^dⁱⁿ^{g an}^y^ser^vⁱ^ces
^othe^r^t^h^aⁿ^s^t^or^a^g^e^or^c^o^m^pute^r^pr^oc^e^s^sⁱ^ng^{; a}^{nd (}³⁾^a^pr^ov^ide^r^of^r^e^m^o^te^c^o^m^puting^s^e^r^v^ic^e^or^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion
^ser^vⁱ^{ce t}^o^t^h^{e p}^u^b^lⁱ^c^sh^al^{l no}^t^knowⁱⁿ^gl^y^dⁱ^vu^l^g^{e a r}^eco^r^d^o^r^o^t^h^e^rⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^p^e^r^t^ainⁱⁿ^g^to^{a sub}^s^cr^ib^er^t^o^o^r^cu^sto^m^er
^of^s^u^c^h^s^e^r^v^ic^e⁽^{not inc}^l^ud^ing^the^c^onteⁿ^ts^of^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^c^o^v^e^r^e^{d by}^pa^r^a^g^r^a^{ph (}¹⁾^or⁽²⁾⁾^{to a}ⁿ^y^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt
^eⁿ^tity^,”^{18 U.S.C.}²⁷⁰²^(a^).
^S^ectⁱ^oⁿ²⁷⁰²^m^a^{kes n}^o^m^eⁿ^tⁱ^oⁿ^of^an^y^coⁿ^s^eq^u^eⁿ^{ces t}^h^at^f^o^l^l^o^w^{a b}^r^each^o^fⁱ^t^s^co^mm^an^d^s^,^b^u^t²⁷⁰⁷^est^a^b^lⁱ^s^h^e^{s a ci}^vi^l
^c^a^u^s^e^of^a^c^{tion f}^o^r^the^vⁱ^c^tim^s^of^aⁿ^y^vⁱ^ola^tion^of^c^h^a^p^te^r¹²¹⁽¹⁸^U^.^S.C^.²⁷^{01 -}²⁷¹¹⁾^.
¹¹¹^“^A^pr^ov^ide^r^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^{d i}ⁿ^s^u^bs^e^c^{tion (}^a⁾^m^a^y^div^u^lg^e^the^c^onteⁿ^ts^o^f^a^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion –}⁽¹⁾^{to a}ⁿ^a^d^d^r^e^s^s^e^e^or
ⁱⁿ^t^e^nd^ed^reci^pⁱ^ent^o^f^su^ch^c^o^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^o^{n o}^r^aⁿ^agen^t^o^f^su^ch^add^r^e^{ssee o}^rⁱⁿ^t^e^nd^ed^reci^pⁱ^ent^;⁽²^{) as}^o^t^h^e^rwⁱ^s^e
^a^u^thor^iz^e^dⁱⁿ^se^c^tion²⁵¹⁷^{, 2}⁵¹¹⁽²^)(a^{), or}²⁷⁰³^of^this^title^{; (}³^{) w}^{ith the}^la^wf^{ul c}^onseⁿ^t^of^th^e^origⁱⁿ^a^t^{or or a}ⁿ^a^d^dre^sse^e
^orⁱⁿ^te^nde^d^r^e^cⁱ^pieⁿ^t^of^s^u^c^h^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion,^or^the^s^ubs^c^r^ibe^rⁱⁿ^t^h^e^c^a^s^e^{of r}^e^m^o^te^c^o^m^putⁱⁿ^{g s}^e^r^v^ic^e^{; (4}^{) to}^{a p}^e^rsoⁿ
^e^m^ploy^e^d^{or a}^u^th^oriz^e^d^or^w^hose^f^a^c^ilitie^{s a}^r^e^use^d^{to f}^o^rw^a^r^{d suc}^h^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion t}^o^its^de^stina^tⁱ^on;^{(5) a}^s^m^a^y^be
^ne^c^e^s^s^a^rⁱ^l^y^incⁱ^de^{nt to}^the^r^eⁿ^d^iti^on^of^the^s^e^r^v^ic^e^or^{to t}^h^e^pr^ote^c^tⁱ^on^of^the^rⁱ^g^h^ts^or^pr^ope^r^t^y^of^the^pr^ov^ide^r^of^tha^t
^se^rv^ic^e^;^{(6) to the}^Na^ti^ona^{l Ce}ⁿ^t^e^r^f^o^{r Missing}^a^nd^Ex^ploi^te^{d C}^h^ildr^e^{n, in}^c^oⁿⁿ^e^c^tio^{n w}^{ith a}^re^por^{t su}^bm^itte^{d the}^r^e^t^o
^unde^r^s^e^c^tⁱ^on²²⁷^of^the^Vic^tim^s^of^C^h^{ild A}^bus^e^A^c^{t of}¹⁹⁹^{0; (}⁷⁾^t^o^a^la^w^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^{t a}^g^eⁿ^cy^{– (}^A⁾^if^the^c^onteⁿ^ts^–
^{(I) w}^e^{re in}^ad^v^e^rten^tl^y^o^b^t^ain^e^d^b^y^th^{e ser}^v^{ice p}^r^o^v^id^{er; an}^d⁽ⁱⁱ⁾^ap^p^{ear to}^p^e^rtain^t^o^t^h^{e co}^mm^issioⁿ^o^f^{a cri}^m^{e; (8}^{) to}^a
^Fe^de^ra^{l, Sta}^t^e^,^{or l}^o^c^a^l^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt e}ⁿ^ti^ty^{, if}^the^prov^ide^r^{, i}ⁿ^g^o^o^d^f^a^ith,^be^lie^v^e^{s tha}^t^aⁿ^e^m^e^r^g^e^nc^yⁱⁿ^v^o^lv^ing^da^ng^e^r^of
^de^a^t^{h or}^s^e^rⁱ^ous^phy^sⁱ^c^a^l^injur^y^{to a}ⁿ^y^pe^r^s^{on r}^e^quir^e^s^dis^c^los^u^r^e^w^itho^u^t^de^la^y^o^f^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^r^e^la^ting^to^the
^em^e^r^ge^ncy^,^”^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁷⁰²⁽^b⁾^.
^T^h^{e Ni}ⁿ^t^h^Ci^rcui^t^recen^t^l^yⁿ^o^t^ed^t^h^at^{a rem}^o^t^e^co^m^p^u^t^{er servi}^{ce p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^{er m}^a^{y d}ⁱ^scl^o^{se t}^o^{a sub}^s^cri^b^{er (as n}^o^t^{ed i}ⁿ
ⁱ^t^a^lⁱ^c^{s ab}^o^v^e),^bu^t^t^h^at^an^el^ect^roni^{c servi}^{ce p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^er,^su^ch^{as on}^{e w}^h^o^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^{es t}^e^xt^m^e^ssa^giⁿ^g^servi^c^es,^ma^yⁿ^o^t^,^even
^w^h^en^th^{e m}^a^{terial d}ⁱ^sclo^sed^resid^e^{s in}^sto^r^age,^Qu^on^v.^A^r^ch^Wi^rel^e^{ss Op}^era^tⁱⁿ^g^C^o^.^,^In^c^.,⁵^{29 F.3}^d⁸⁹²^,⁹⁰⁰^-⁹⁰¹⁽^9th
^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁸⁾^.
¹¹²^“^Aⁿ^y^pe^{rson w}^{ho is a}^g^g^r^ie^ve^{d b}^y^aⁿ^y^w^ill^f^u^{l v}ⁱ^ola^tion^this^c^h^a^p^te^{r or}^of^c^h^a^p^te^{r 11}⁹^of^{this title}^[18^U.S.C.²⁵^10-
²⁵^20]^.^.^.^m^a^y^co^mmen^{ce an}^actⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^Uni^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es Di}^st^ri^ct^Cou^r^t^.^.^.^.^I^f^.^.^.^an^y^o^f^t^h^{e d}^e^p^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^{s o}^r^agen^ci^{es h}^a^s
^vⁱ^o^l^ated^an^y^p^r^o^v^isioⁿ^o^f^th^{is ch}^a^p^{ter . .}^{. t}^h^{e d}^e^p^a^rtm^eⁿ^t^o^r^ag^en^cy^sh^{all .}^{. .}^p^r^o^m^p^tlyⁱⁿ^{itiate a p}^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^to
^de^te^rm^ine^w^h^e^t^he^{r dis}^c^ipli^na^ry^a^c^tion^{. .}^{. is}^w^a^rra^nte^d^{. .}^{. .”}¹⁸^U^.^S^.^{C. 27}^12(a⁾^,(c⁾^.

as a consequence of a violation.¹¹³ A Sixth Circuit panel has held, in a decision since vacated en
banc, that the Fourth Amendment precludes government access to the content of stored
communications (e-mail) held by service providers in the absence of a warrant, subscriber ¹¹⁴
consent, or other indication that the subscriber has waived his or her expectation of privacy.
Where the government instead secures access through a subpoena or court order as section 2703
permits, the evidence may be subject to both the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and the ¹¹⁵
exceptions to the rule.
Unlawful access to electronic communications may involve violations of several other federal and
state laws, including for instance the federal computer fraud and abuse statute, 18 U.S.C. 1030, ¹¹⁶
and state computer abuse statutes.
A trap and trace device identifies the source of incoming calls, and a pen register indicates the ¹¹⁷
numbers called from a particular phone. Since neither allows the eavesdropper to overhear the
“contents” of the phone conversation, they were not considered interceptions within the reach of
Title III prior to the enactment of ECPA, United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159
(1977). Although Congress elected to expand the definition of interception, it chose to continue to
regulate these devices beyond the boundaries of Title III for most purposes, 18 U.S.C. 3121 -

3127.

As noted earlier, however, the Title III wiretap provisions apply when due to the nature of
advances in telecommunications technology pen registers and trap and trace devices are able to ¹¹⁸
capture wire communication “content.”

¹¹³^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Steⁱ^ge^r^{, 3}¹⁸^F.3^d¹⁰³⁹^,¹⁰^{49 (}¹¹^t^{h C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰³⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Pe^r^rⁱ^ne^{, 5}¹⁸^F.^3d¹¹⁹^6,¹²⁰²⁽¹^0th
^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁸⁾^.
¹¹⁴^W^a^r^s^hak^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^,⁴⁹⁰^F.^3d⁴⁵^5,⁴⁶^8-⁸²⁽⁶^{th C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾^,^v^a^c^’^{d e}ⁿ^ba^nc^,⁵³²^F.3^d⁵²^{1 (}⁶^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.
²⁰⁰⁸^)(vacat^ed^oⁿ^gro^uⁿ^d^s^t^h^at^t^h^{e i}^ssu^{e w}^a^{s n}^o^t^ri^p^e^f^o^{r d}^eci^si^on^).
¹¹⁵^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Fe^r^gus^on^,⁵⁰⁸^F^.^Su^pp.^2d^7,^8-^{10 (}^D^.D^.C^{. 2}⁰⁰⁷⁾⁽^e^v^e^{n if}^a^Four^th^A^m^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^{t v}ⁱ^ola^tion^oc^c^u^r^r^e^d,
^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^s^c^{ould r}^e^ly^{in g}^ood^f^a^{ith o}ⁿ^the^m^a^gⁱ^s^t^r^a^te^’^s^or^de^r^is^s^u^e^d^be^f^o^r^e^aⁿ^y^c^our^{t ha}^d^r^a^is^e^d^the^s^p^e^c^t^e^r^of
^c^onstitu^tio^na^{l sus}^p^ic^io^{n w}^h^ic^{h sur}^f^a^c^e^d^la^te^{r in}^W^a^r^s^hak^).
¹¹⁶^Se^e^g^e^ne^r^a^ll^y^,^C^R^S^R^e^por^t^97-¹⁰^25,^C^y^be^r^c^rⁱ^m^e^:^{An O}^v^e^r^vⁱ^e^w^{of t}^h^e^Fe^de^r^a^{l C}^o^m^p^ute^r^Fr^au^d^an^d^Abus^e^S^t^at^ute
^and^Re^late^{d Fe}^de^r^a^l^C^r^imⁱⁿ^{al L}^a^w^s^.^Ci^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^t^o^t^h^{e vari}^ou^{s st}^at^{e co}^m^p^u^t^{er ab}^u^s^{e st}^at^u^t^{es are ap}^p^e^nd^ed^.
¹¹⁷^“(3⁾^t^h^e^t^e^rm^‘p^en^regi^st^er’^m^ean^{s a d}^e^vi^ce^w^hⁱ^c^h^reco^rd^s^o^r^d^{ecodes el}^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c o}^r^o^t^h^e^{r i}^m^p^u^l^{ses w}^hⁱ^c^hⁱ^d^en^tⁱ^f^y^t^h^e
^num^be^{rs dia}^l^e^d^or^ot^he^rw^ise^traⁿ^sm^itte^{d on the}^te^le^ph^one^li^ne^t^o^w^h^ic^{h suc}^h^de^vⁱ^c^e^{is a}^tta^c^h^e^d^,^but^suc^h^te^rm^doe^{s n}^o^t
^inc^l^u^d^e^aⁿ^y^de^vⁱ^c^e^use^d^by^a^provide^{r or c}^u^stom^e^r^of^a^wⁱ^re^{or e}^l^e^c^t^ronic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion se}^rv^ic^e^f^o^r^billi^ng^{, or}
^reco^rdⁱⁿ^{g as an}ⁱⁿ^ci^d^eⁿ^t^t^o^bⁱ^l^lⁱⁿ^g^,^f^o^{r co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^servi^{ces p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^ed^b^y^su^ch^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^{er o}^r^an^y^d^e^vi^{ce u}^s^ed^b^y^a
^pr^ov^ide^r^or^c^u^s^t^om^e^r^of^a^wⁱ^r^e^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion s}^e^r^v^ic^e^f^o^r^c^o^s^t^a^c^c^oun^ting^or^ot^he^r^lik^e^p^u^r^p^os^e^s^{in t}^h^e^or^dⁱ^na^r^y^c^our^s^e
^o^fⁱ^t^s^b^u^sⁱⁿ^ess;⁽⁴^{) t}^h^{e t}^e^rm^‘t^rap^an^d^t^r^{ace d}^e^vi^{ce’ mean}^{s a d}^e^vi^ce^w^hⁱ^c^h^cap^t^u^{res t}^h^{e i}ⁿ^co^mⁱⁿ^g^el^ec^t^r^oⁿⁱ^c^o^r^o^t^h^e^r
^im^pulse^s^w^h^ic^{h ide}ⁿ^tify^the^orig^ina^tingⁿ^u^m^b^e^r^of^aⁿⁱⁿ^s^t^r^u^m^e^{nt o}^r^de^vⁱ^c^e^f^r^o^m^w^h^ic^{h a}^wⁱ^r^e^or^e^l^ec^tr^onic
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion w}^a^{s tra}ⁿ^s^m^itte^d,”^{18 U}^.^S.C.³¹²⁷^(3),(⁴^{)). A}^lth^oug^h^c^l^one^pa^g^e^{rs a}^r^e^{not c}^onsi^d^e^r^e^d^p^e^{n re}^gⁱ^ste^r^s,
^Br^ow^{n v}^.^W^a^dde^ll^{, 5}⁰^F^.³^d²⁸⁵^,²^90-^{91 (}⁴^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^{, “}^c^a^lle^r^id”^s^e^r^v^ic^es^ha^v^e^be^eⁿ^f^{ound t}^o^c^o^ns^t^itute^tr^a^p^aⁿ^d^tr^ace
^d^e^vi^ces,^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^Fr^e^g^os^o^,⁶⁰^F.^3d¹³¹⁴^{, 1}³²⁰⁽⁸^{th C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^.
¹¹⁸^“^‘^Post-c^ut-t^hro^u^g^h^dia^l^e^d^dig^its’^a^r^e^aⁿ^y^num^be^{rs dia}^l^e^d^f^r^om^a^te^l^e^pho^ne^a^f^te^{r the}^c^a^{ll is initia}^l^l^y^se^tup^{or ‘c}^u^t^-
^t^h^rou^g^h^.^{’ S}^o^m^e^tⁱ^m^e^{s t}^h^{ese d}ⁱ^gi^t^s^{are o}^t^h^e^{r t}^e^l^e^ph^on^{e nu}^m^b^ers,^as^w^h^en^{a p}^a^rt^y^p^l^ace^{s a cred}ⁱ^t^card^cal^l^b^y^fⁱ^rst^dⁱ^alⁱⁿ^g
^t^h^{e l}^oⁿ^g^dⁱ^st^an^{ce carri}^{er access n}^u^m^b^e^{r an}^d^t^h^{en t}^h^e^p^h^oⁿ^eⁿ^u^m^b^e^{r o}^f^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^t^eⁿ^d^e^{d p}^a^rt^y^.^S^o^m^e^tⁱ^m^e^{s t}^h^{ese d}ⁱ^gi^t^s
^tr^aⁿ^s^m^{it r}^e^a^l^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion, s}^u^c^h^a^s^ba^nk^a^c^c^ountⁿ^u^m^b^e^r^s^,^Socⁱ^a^l^Se^c^u^r^ity^num^be^r^s^{, pr}^e^s^c^r^iption^num^be^r^s^{, a}^nd^the^lik^e^.
^Iⁿ^the^la^tte^r^c^a^s^e^,^the^dig^its^r^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^{t c}^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^c^o^nteⁿ^t;ⁱⁿ^th^e^f^o^r^m^e^r^{, they}^a^r^e^non-^c^oⁿ^t^eⁿ^{t c}^a^l^{l pr}^oc^e^s^sⁱ^ng
^num^be^r^s^,”^Iⁿ^r^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^{, 4}⁴¹^F.^Su^pp.^2d⁸^16,⁸^{18 (}^S^.D^{. T}^e^x^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾^;^Iⁿ^r^e^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^State^s^f^o^r^O^r^de^r^s⁽¹⁾^Auth^or^izⁱⁿ^g
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

The USA PATRIOT Act enlarged the coverage of sections 3121-3127 to include sender/addressee
information relating to e-mail and other forms of electronic communications, 115 Stat. 288-91
(2001).
The use or installation of pen registers or trap and trace devices by anyone other than the
telephone company, service provider, or those acting under judicial authority is a federal crime,
punishable by imprisonment for not more than a year and/or a fine of not more than $100,000 ¹¹⁹
($200,000 for an organization). There is no accompanying exclusionary rule, however, and
consequently a violation of section 3121 will not serve as a basis to suppress any resulting ¹²⁰
evidence.
Unlike other violations of Title III/ECPA, there is no separate federal private cause of action for
victims of a pen register or trap and trace device violation. Some of the states have established a
separate criminal offense for unlawful use of a pen register or trap and trace device, yet most of
these do seem to follow the federal lead and decline to establish a separate private cause of action,
See Appendix III.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) authorizes special court orders for four
purposes: electronic surveillance, physical searches, installation and use pen registers/trap and
trace devices, and orders to disclose tangible items, 50 U.S.C. 1801-1861. The electronic
surveillance portion of FISA, 50 U.S.C. 1801-1811, creates a procedure for judicially supervised
“electronic surveillance” (wiretapping) conducted for foreign intelligence gathering purposes.
The Act classifies four kinds of wiretapping as “electronic surveillance.” The four classes of
electronic surveillance involve wiretapping that could otherwise only be conducted under court
order:

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^U^s^e^{of Pe}^{n Re}^gis^t^e^r^s^an^{d Tr}^ap^an^{d Tr}^ac^e^D^e^vⁱ^c^e^s^{, 51}^{5 F.}^Su^pp.^2d³^25,³²^8-^{38 (}^E^.D^.N^.Y^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾^.
¹¹⁹^“(a)^Iⁿ^ge^ne^r^a^l^{– E}^x^cep^t^{as p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^edⁱⁿ^t^hⁱ^s^sectⁱ^o^n,^no^p^e^rsoⁿ^m^a^{y i}ⁿ^st^al^l^o^r^u^s^{e a}^p^eⁿ^regi^st^{er o}^r^{a t}^r^ap^an^d^t^r^ace
^de^vⁱ^c^e^w^ithout^fⁱ^rs^{t obta}ⁱ^ning^a^c^ourt^orde^r^un^de^{r s}^e^c^tion³¹²³^of^t^h^is^title^or^un^de^{r the}^F^o^re^ig^{n I}ⁿ^te^l^lig^eⁿ^c^e
^Surv^e^illa^nc^e^A^c^{t of}^{1978 (}⁵⁰^U^.^S.^{C. 18}⁰¹^e^t^s^e^q.).^(b)^E^xcep^tⁱ^oⁿ^–^T^h^e^pr^ohi^biti^on^of^s^ubs^e^c^tio^{n (}^a⁾^doe^sⁿ^o^{t a}^p^ply
^wⁱ^t^h^resp^ect^t^o^t^h^e^u^s^{e o}^f^{a p}^eⁿ^re^gi^st^{er o}^r^{a t}^r^ap^and^t^r^{ace d}^e^vi^{ce by}^{a p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^{er o}^f^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^c^o^r^wⁱ^{re co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ
^s^e^r^v^ic^e^{– (}¹⁾^r^e^la^ting^to^the^ope^r^a^tⁱ^on,^m^a^inte^na^nc^e^,^a^{nd te}^s^tⁱⁿ^g^of^a^wⁱ^r^e^or^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion s}^e^r^v^ic^e^or^{to t}^h^e
^pr^ote^c^tioⁿ^of^the^rⁱ^g^h^ts^or^pr^ope^r^t^y^o^f^s^u^c^h^pr^ov^ide^r^,^or^to^the^pr^ote^c^tion^of^us^e^r^s^of^tha^t^s^e^r^v^ic^e^f^r^o^m^a^bus^e^of^s^e^r^v^ic^e
^o^r^un^l^a^wf^u^l^u^s^{e o}^f^servi^ce;^o^r⁽²⁾^t^o^reco^{rd t}^h^{e f}^act^t^h^at^{a w}ⁱ^{re o}^r^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^w^a^{s i}ⁿⁱ^tⁱ^at^ed^o^r^co^m^p^l^e^t^e^d
^{in or}^de^r^t^o^pr^ote^c^t^s^u^c^h^pr^ov^ide^r^,^a^nothe^r^pr^ovⁱ^d^e^r^f^u^rⁿ^is^hi^ng^s^e^r^v^ice^tow^a^r^d^the^c^o^m^p^le^tion^of^the^wⁱ^r^e
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion, or}^a^us^e^r^of^tha^t^s^e^r^v^ic^e^,^f^r^om^f^r^a^uduleⁿ^t,^unla^w^f^u^{l or}^a^bus^iv^e^us^e^of^s^e^r^v^ic^e^;^or⁽³⁾^w^h^e^r^e^the^c^o^ns^eⁿ^t
^o^f^t^h^{e u}^s^{er o}^f^t^h^at^servi^{ce h}^a^{s b}^een^ob^t^aⁱⁿ^ed.^(c)^Limi^tati^on^{– A}^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt a}^g^eⁿ^cy^a^u^thor^iz^e^d^toⁱⁿ^s^t^a^{ll a}^nd^us^e^a^peⁿ
^regi^st^{er o}^r^t^r^ap^an^{d t}^r^{ace d}^e^vi^ce^unde^r^t^h^is^c^h^a^p^te^r^or^un^de^r^Sta^t^e^la^w^s^h^a^{ll us}^e^te^c^hnol^og^y^r^e^a^s^ona^bl^y^a^v^a^ila^ble^{to it}
^tha^t^r^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^s^the^r^e^c^o^r^d^ing^or^de^c^odi^ng^of^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^or^ot^he^r^im^pul^s^e^s^{to the}^dia^ling^,^r^out^ing^,^a^d^dr^e^s^sⁱ^ng^{, a}ⁿ^d^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^ling
^inf^o^rm^a^{tion utiliz}^e^dⁱⁿ^ideⁿ^tⁱ^fy^{ing the}^or^ig^ina^tio^{n or}^de^stiⁿ^a^tio^{n of}^wⁱ^re^{or e}^l^e^c^t^ronic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion^s^{. (d)}^Peⁿ^a^lty^{. –}
^W^hoe^v^e^{r k}^now^ing^l^y^vⁱ^ola^t^e^s^subse^c^{tion (a}^{) sha}^l^l^be^fⁱ^ne^d^un^de^{r thi}^s^title^or^im^prisone^d^not^m^o^re^thaⁿ^oⁿ^e^y^e^a^r^{, or}
^bot^h,”¹⁸^U^.^S^.^C^.³¹^21.
¹²⁰^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^G^e^r^m^an^,⁴⁸^{6 F}^.³^d⁸^49,⁸^52-⁵³⁽⁵^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^Fr^e^g^os^o^,⁶⁰^F.^3d¹³^14,¹³²⁰⁽⁸^t^h
^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^v^.^Th^om^ps^on^{, 9}³⁶^F.^2d¹²⁴⁹^{, 1}²⁴⁹^-²⁵⁰⁽¹^{1th C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹¹⁾^.^T^o^the^e^x^te^{nt t}^h^a^t^the^uⁿ^la^w^f^{ul us}^e
^cap^t^u^{res co}ⁿ^t^ent^,^t^h^{e F}^o^u^r^t^h^Am^eⁿ^d^m^en^t^excl^u^sⁱ^oⁿ^a^ry^ru^l^e^ma^y^ap^p^l^y^,^cf.^,^In^{re Un}^ite^d^Sta^t^{es f}^o^{r Ord}^e^{rs (}¹⁾
^Auth^or^izⁱⁿ^{g U}^s^e^of^Pe^{n Re}^gis^t^e^r^s^and^Tr^a^p^an^{d Tr}^ac^e^D^e^vⁱ^c^e^s^{, 51}⁵^F.S^u^p^p^.2^d³²^5,³²^8-³⁸⁽^E^.D^.N^.Y^{. 20}⁰⁷⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^ed
^State^s^v^.^Fe^r^g^us^oⁿ^{, 50}⁸^F^.^Su^pp^.2^d^{7 (}^D^.D^.C^{. 20}⁰⁷⁾^.

^“⁽¹⁾^th^{e acq}^uⁱ^sitⁱ^oⁿ^b^y^an^elect^r^oⁿⁱ^c,^m^ech^aⁿ^{ical, o}^r^o^t^h^e^r^su^r^v^eillaⁿ^c^e^d^e^vⁱ^c^e^o^f^t^h^e^c^oⁿ^t^en^ts
^o^f^aⁿ^y^wi^r^e^o^r^r^a^dⁱ^o^co^mmuⁿⁱ^c^a^tⁱ^o^{n s}^eⁿ^t^b^y^o^rⁱⁿ^t^e^nd^e^d^t^o^b^e^r^eceiv^e^d^by^a^particu^l^ar,^kn^o^wⁿ
^Un^{ited State}^s^pers^on^w^h^{o is}ⁱⁿ^th^{e Un}ⁱ^t^{ed States}^{, if}^t^h^{e con}^t^eⁿ^ts^{are acqu}ⁱ^re^d^b^yⁱⁿ^t^eⁿ^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^lly
^targ^etiⁿ^g^t^h^{at Un}ⁱ^t^{ed States}^pers^on^{, un}^{der circ}^um^s^t^an^ce^sⁱⁿ^wh^ich^{a pers}^on^h^a^s^{a reas}^on^able
^ex^pect^atⁱ^oⁿ^of^pri^v^ac^y^aⁿ^{d a w}^a^rran^t^w^o^u^l^{d be requ}ⁱ^r^{ed f}^o^{r l}^a^w^eⁿ^f^o^rce^m^ent^pu^rpos^es^;
^“⁽²⁾^th^{e acq}^uⁱ^sitⁱ^oⁿ^b^y^an^elect^r^oⁿⁱ^c,^m^ech^aⁿ^{ical, o}^r^o^t^h^e^r^su^r^v^eillaⁿ^c^e^d^e^vⁱ^c^e^o^f^t^h^e^c^oⁿ^t^en^ts
^o^f^aⁿ^y^wⁱ^r^e^co^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^to^o^r^f^r^o^m^a^p^e^r^s^oⁿⁱⁿ^th^e^Uⁿ^ited^States,^w^ith^o^u^t^th^e^coⁿ^s^eⁿ^t^o^f
^an^y^p^a^r^t^y^t^h^er^eto^,^if^su^c^h^ac^q^u^isitioⁿ^o^ccu^r^sⁱⁿ^th^e^Unⁱ^t^e^d^{States, d}^o^e^{s n}^o^tⁱⁿ^cl^u^d^{e t}^h^e
^acq^uⁱ^sitioⁿ^o^f^th^o^s^{e co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^s^o^f^co^m^p^u^t^er^tr^esp^a^sse^r^s^th^at^w^o^u^l^d^b^e^p^e^r^mⁱ^ssib^l^e
^uⁿ^d^{er s}^ectioⁿ²⁵¹¹⁽²⁾^(I)^of^{title 18, Un}^{ited States}^C^ode;
^“⁽³⁾^th^{e in}^teⁿ^tioⁿ^a^{l acq}^uⁱ^s^itioⁿ^b^y^an^electr^oⁿⁱ^c,^m^e^c^h^an^ica^l^{, o}^r^o^t^h^e^r^su^r^v^eillaⁿ^{ce d}^e^vⁱ^{ce o}^f
^th^{e co}ⁿ^t^ents^o^f^aⁿ^y^{radio comm}^un^icatioⁿ^,^uⁿ^d^{er circ}^um^s^t^an^cesⁱⁿ^w^h^{ich a pers}^oⁿ^h^a^s^a
^reas^on^{able ex}^pectation^of^priv^ac^y^an^{d a}^w^a^rrant^w^o^u^l^{d be}^requ^{ired f}^o^{r law}^enf^o^rce^m^eⁿ^t
^pu^rpos^es^{, an}^{d if}^both^th^{e s}^eⁿ^d^{er an}^{d all in}^ten^d^{ed recipien}^ts^{are located w}ⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^th^{e U}ⁿ^ited
^States^{; or}
^“⁽⁴⁾^th^{e in}^s^t^allatioⁿ^o^r^u^s^{e o}^f^an^electr^oⁿⁱ^c,^m^e^c^h^an^ica^l^{, o}^r^o^t^h^e^r^su^r^v^eillaⁿ^{ce d}^e^vⁱ^{ce in}^t^h^e
^Un^ited^State^s^f^o^r^m^oⁿ^ito^rⁱⁿ^g^to^acq^uⁱ^r^eⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^,^o^t^h^e^r^th^an^f^r^o^m^a^wⁱ^r^e^o^r^r^a^dⁱ^o
^com^m^unication^,^un^{der circum}^s^t^an^ce^sⁱⁿ^w^h^ich^{a pers}^on^h^a^s^{a reas}^on^{able ex}^pectation^of
^pri^v^ac^y^an^{d a}^w^a^rran^t^w^o^u^l^{d be requ}ⁱ^r^{ed f}^o^{r l}^a^w^eⁿ^f^o^rce^m^eⁿ^t^pu^rpos^es^{,” 50 U}^.^S^.^C^.¹⁸⁰^1(f⁾^.
^S^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{1809 pr}^os^cri^b^es^:
^•ⁱⁿ^teⁿ^tioⁿ^a^l^l^y
^•^eith^er
^•^e^nga^gi^ngⁱⁿ^elect^r^{onic s}^u^r^veill^ance
^•^uⁿ^d^{er color of}^la^w
^•^ex^{cept as}^au^t^h^{orized by}^s^t^at^u^t^e^,^or
^•^di^s^c^l^o^sⁱ^ng^{or u}^sⁱⁿ^g
^•ⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^o^b^t^aiⁿ^e^d^uⁿ^d^er^co^lo^r^o^f^la^w
^•^by^elect^r^{onic s}^u^r^veillance^,
^•^kⁿ^o^wⁱ^ng^{or h}^a^vⁱ^ng^reas^on^t^o^kn^o^w
^•^t^h^at^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^w^a^s^obt^ai^{ned by}^el^ectronⁱ^{c s}^u^rv^ei^llan^ce^{not au}^th^{orized by}
^s^t^at^ut^{e, 50 U}^.^S^.^C^.¹⁸⁰⁹^.
The prohibitions of section 1809 apply only to federal officers and employees,¹²¹ but do not apply ¹²²
to a law enforcement officer operating under a warrant or court. Violations are punishable by

¹²¹^“^T^he^re^is^Fe^de^ra^{l juris}^d^ic^ti^on^ov^e^r^aⁿ^of^f^e^ns^e^unde^{r this}^s^e^c^tio^{n if}^the^pe^rs^oⁿ^c^o^m^m^itting^the^of^f^e^ns^e^w^a^s^aⁿ^of^fⁱ^c^e^r
^{or e}^m^ploy^e^e^of^the^Unite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^a^t^the^tim^e^the^of^f^e^nse^wa^{s c}^o^m^m^itte^d,”⁵⁰^U.^S.C.¹⁸⁰⁹⁽^{d). T}^h^e^c^rⁱ^m^ina^l
^p^r^o^s^c^r^ip^tⁱ^oⁿ^{s a}ⁿ^d^e^x^e^m^p^tioⁿ^s^o^f^T^itle^III/ECP^A⁽¹⁸^U.S.C.²⁵¹⁰^-2⁵¹⁸^{) m}^a^y^a^p^p^l^y^a^s^w^e^ll.

imprisonment for not more than five years and/or a fine of not more than $250,000, id. and ¹²³
expose the offender to civil liability. By virtue of USA PATRIOT Act amendments, victims of
any improper use of information secured under a FISA surveillance order may also be entitled to ¹²⁴
actual or statutory damages.
FISA also has its own exclusionary rule for electronic surveillance and physical searches.¹²⁵ ¹²⁶
However, Congress anticipated, and the courts have acknowledged, that surveillance conducted ¹²⁷
under FISA for foreign intelligence purposes may result in admissible evidence of a crime.
The physical search portion of FISA authorizes the issuance of physical search orders for foreign
intelligence gathering purposes, 50 U.S.C. 1821-1829. Its accompanying criminal proscriptions

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
¹²²^“^I^{t is}^a^de^f^e^ns^e^{to a}^pr^os^e^c^u^tio^{n u}^nde^r^s^u^bs^e^c^tion⁽^a⁾^of^this^s^e^c^tioⁿ^tha^t^t^h^e^de^f^e^nda^{nt w}^a^s^a^law^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^{t or}
^inv^e^stig^a^tiv^e^o^f^fⁱ^c^e^r^eⁿ^g^a^g^e^{d in t}^h^e^c^ourse^of^his^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^dutie^{s a}^{nd the}^e^l^e^c^t^ro^nic^surv^e^illa^nc^e^w^a^s^a^u^thor^iz^e^d^by^a^nd
^c^ond^uc^te^d^pur^s^u^aⁿ^{t t}^o^a^s^e^a^r^c^h^w^a^r^r^a^{nt or}^c^o^ur^t^or^de^r^of^a^c^our^t^of^c^o^m^p^e^t^eⁿ^{t jur}ⁱ^s^d^ic^ti^on,”⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁰⁹⁽^b⁾^.
¹²³^“^A^{n a}^g^g^r^ie^ve^{d pe}^r^s^on,^ot^he^r^thaⁿ^a^f^o^r^e^ig^{n pow}^e^r^or^aⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^{t of}^a^f^o^r^e^ig^{n p}^o^w^e^r^,^a^s^de^fⁱ^ne^{d in s}^e^c^tio^{n 1}⁸⁰¹⁽^a⁾^or
^(b)(1)(A^{) of}^{this tit}^le^{, re}^spe^c^tiv^e^l^y^,^w^{ho ha}^{s be}^eⁿ^s^ubje^c^t^e^d^{to a}ⁿ^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^surv^e^illa^nc^e^or^a^b^o^u^{t w}^h^o^m^inf^o^r^m^a^tion
^obtaⁱ^ne^{d by}^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^surv^e^illa^nc^e^of^suc^h^pe^rsoⁿ^ha^s^be^eⁿ^di^sc^l^o^se^{d or}^use^dⁱⁿ^vⁱ^ola^tⁱ^on^of^se^c^tion¹⁸⁰⁹^of^{this tit}^le
^sha^{ll ha}^v^e^a^c^a^u^se^of^a^c^{tion a}^g^aⁱ^{nst a}ⁿ^y^pe^{rson w}^{ho c}^o^m^m^itte^{d suc}^h^vⁱ^ola^tⁱ^{on a}^{nd s}^h^a^{ll be}^eⁿ^title^d^to^re^c^o^v^e^{r – (a}⁾
^act^u^a^l^d^a^m^a^ges,^b^u^t^no^t^l^e^{ss t}^h^aⁿ^lⁱ^q^uⁱ^d^a^t^e^d^d^a^m^a^{ges o}^f^$¹^,⁰⁰⁰^o^r^$¹⁰⁰^p^e^{r d}^a^y^f^o^{r each}^d^a^y^o^f^vi^o^l^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^w^hⁱ^c^h^e^{ver i}^s
^g^r^e^a^t^e^r^{; (b) pu}^nitiv^e^da^m^a^ge^{s; a}^{nd (c}^{) re}^a^s^ona^ble^a^t^t^o^rne^y^’s^fe^e^s^a^nd^othe^r^inv^e^stig^a^{tion a}ⁿ^{d li}^tig^a^{tion c}^o^sts^re^a^s^ona^bly
^inc^u^rre^d,”⁵⁰^U.S.C.¹⁸¹⁰^.^Vⁱ^c^tⁱ^m^{s a}^r^e^{not e}ⁿ^tit^le^{d t}^oⁱⁿ^ju^nc^tiv^e^re^lie^f^,^AC^LU^Foun^da^tioⁿ^{of S}^o^u^t^h^e^rⁿ^C^a^lif^orⁿⁱ^{a v}^.
^Barr^{, 9}⁵²^F.^2d⁴⁵^7,⁴⁶^9-⁷⁰⁽^D^.C^.^C^ir^{. 1}⁹⁹²⁾^.^T^h^e^c^o^ur^{t d}ⁱ^d^not^a^ddr^e^s^s^the^que^s^tⁱ^on^of^w^h^e^t^he^r^c^ondu^c^t^{in v}ⁱ^ola^tⁱ^oⁿ^of
^b^o^t^h^FISA^aⁿ^d^T^itle^III/E^P^CA^mⁱ^g^h^{t b}^e^eⁿ^j^oⁱⁿ^e^d^uⁿ^d^e^r¹⁸^U.S.C.²⁵²⁰^(b⁾⁽¹⁾^{. T}^h^e^Six^t^h^Circ^u^it,^h^o^w^e^v^e^{r, h}^a^{s h}^e^ld^th^a^t
^th^e^p^r^o^s^c^r^ip^ti^oⁿ^s^o^f^T^itle^III/ECPA^d^oⁿ^o^t^a^p^p^l^y^toⁱⁿ^te^rc^e^p^ti^oⁿⁱⁿ^t^h^{is c}^o^uⁿ^try^f^o^{r f}^o^re^igⁿⁱⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^g^a^th^e^rⁱⁿ^g
^pur^pos^e^s^of^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^be^t^w^ee^{n pa}^r^tie^s^{in t}^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^a^{nd t}^hos^eⁱⁿ^ot^he^r^na^ti^ons^,^ACLU^v^.^Natio^na^{l Se}^c^u^rity
^A^g^en^cy^{, 4}⁹³^F.^3d⁶⁴^4,⁶⁸^{0 (}⁶^{th C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾^,^c^iti^ng^{, 1}⁸^U^.^S^.^C^.²⁵¹¹⁽²⁾⁽^f⁾^.
¹²⁴^“^Aⁿ^y^pe^{rson w}^{ho is a}^g^g^r^ie^ve^{d b}^y^aⁿ^y^w^ill^f^u^{l v}ⁱ^ola^tion^of^{. .}^{. se}^c^tion^[^]¹⁰^6(a⁾^.^{. .}^of^the^Fore^igⁿ^Int^e^llig^eⁿ^c^e
^Surv^e^illa^nc^e^A^c^{t [}^r^e^l^a^ting^to^the^u^s^e^of^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion a}^c^quire^d^f^r^om^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^surv^e^illa^nc^e^u^nde^{r t}^h^e^A^c^t]^m^a^y
^co^mmen^{ce an}^actⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es Di}^st^ri^ct^Co^u^r^t^agaiⁿ^s^t^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^ed^S^t^at^{es t}^o^reco^{ver m}^oⁿ^e^y^d^a^m^a^ges.^In^an^y^su^ch
^a^c^{tion, if}^a^pe^rsoⁿ^w^{ho is a}^g^g^r^ie^ve^{d suc}^c^e^ssf^ull^y^e^s^t^a^blishe^s^a^vⁱ^ola^tion^of^{. .}^{. the}^a^bov^e^spe^cⁱ^a^l^pr^ov^isions^of^title⁵⁰^,
^the^C^o^ur^{t m}^a^y^a^s^s^e^s^s^a^s^dam^a^g^e^s^{– (}¹⁾^a^c^t^ua^{l da}^m^a^g^e^s^,^but^not^le^s^s^thaⁿ^$1^0,0⁰⁰^,^w^h^ic^he^v^e^r^am^ount^is^g^r^e^a^t^e^r^{; a}^{nd (}²⁾
^litig^a^{tion c}^o^{sts, re}^a^s^ona^b^l^y^inc^u^rre^d,”¹⁸^U.S.C.²⁷¹²^(a^).
¹²⁵^“^I^f^the^Unite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^distric^t^c^o^ur^{t purs}^u^aⁿ^t^{to s}^ubse^c^tio^{n (f}^{) of}^this^se^c^tion^de^te^rm^ine^s^tha^t^the^surv^e^illa^nc^e^w^a^{s not}
^l^a^wf^u^l^l^y^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^{or co}^nd^u^c^t^e^d^,ⁱ^t^sh^al^l^,ⁱⁿ^acco^rd^an^{ce w}ⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e re}^q^uⁱ^rem^eⁿ^t^{s o}^f^l^a^w^,^s^uppr^e^s^s^the^e^v^ideⁿ^c^e^w^h^ic^{h w}^a^s
^unla^w^f^u^ll^y^obtaⁱ^ne^d^or^de^riv^e^{d f}^r^om^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^surv^e^illa^nc^e^of^the^a^g^g^r^ie^v^e^{d pe}^{rson or}^ot^he^rw^ise^g^r^aⁿ^{t t}^h^e^m^o^tion^of
^the^a^g^g^r^ie^ve^{d pe}^rson.^If^the^c^ourt^de^te^rm^ine^s^tha^t^the^surv^e^illa^nc^e^w^a^{s la}^wf^ully^a^u^thoriz^e^d^aⁿ^d^c^oⁿ^d^u^c^t^e^d^{, it}^sha^ll^de^ny
^the^m^o^tion^of^the^a^g^g^r^ie^v^e^{d pe}^r^s^{on e}^x^c^e^p^{t to t}^h^e^e^x^te^{nt tha}^t^d^u^e^pr^o^c^e^s^s^r^e^quir^e^s^dis^c^ov^e^r^y^or^dis^c^los^u^r^e^,”⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.
¹⁸⁰⁶⁽^g)^;¹⁸²⁵⁽^f⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^C^a^m^p^a^,⁵²^{9 F.}^3d⁹^80,⁹^{93 (}^11t^h^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁸⁾^.^T^h^e^te^x^t^of⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.¹⁸²^{5 a}ⁿ^d¹⁸⁰⁶⁽^f⁾
^a^r^e^a^ppe^nde^d^.
¹²⁶^S.R^e^pt.⁹⁵^-⁷^01,^a^t⁶¹⁽¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^;⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁰⁶⁽^b)⁽^“^{. .}^{. s}^u^c^h^inf^o^r^m^ation^{. .}^{. m}^a^y^only^be^us^e^d^{in a}^c^rⁱ^m^ina^l
^p^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^{g w}ⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e ad}^van^{ce au}^t^h^o^rⁱ^zatⁱ^o^{n o}^f^t^h^{e A}^t^t^o^rn^ey^Gen^e^ral^”^).
¹²⁷^W^h^eⁿ^FISA^re^quire^{d c}^e^r^tif^ic^a^tio^{n tha}^t^the^a^c^q^uisiti^on^of^f^o^re^ig^{n inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^wa^{s “}^t^he^”^purpose^f^o^{r s}^e^e^k^ing^the^a
^FISA^surv^e^illa^nc^e^orde^{r, the}^r^e^w^a^{s som}^e^de^ba^te^a^m^ong^th^e^c^ourts^o^v^e^{r how}^prom^ineⁿ^{t the}^f^o^re^ig^{n in}^t^e^llig^eⁿ^c^e^purp^o^se
^ha^{d t}^o^beⁱⁿ^or^de^r^t^o^pe^r^m^{it the}^e^v^ideⁿ^c^e^it^une^a^r^the^d^u^nde^r^a^s^FI^SA^or^de^r^t^o^be^us^e^d^{in a}^c^r^im^ina^l^pr^o^s^e^c^u^tion,^Unite^d
^State^s^v^.^J^o^hns^on^{, 9}⁵²^F.^2d⁵⁶^5,⁵⁷²⁽¹^s^t^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹²⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^a^t^{es v.}^Du^gg^an^,⁷⁴^{3 F}^.²^d⁵⁹^,⁷⁷⁽²^d^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁴⁾^;^Un^ite^d
^State^s^v^.^Sar^kⁱ^s^sⁱ^aⁿ^,⁸⁴^{1 F}^.²^d⁹⁵⁹^,⁹⁶^{4 (}⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^at^e^s^v^.^Badi^a^,⁸²^{7 F}^.²^d¹⁴⁵⁸^,¹⁴⁶³⁽^11t^{h C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁷⁾^.
^T^h^{e US}^A^P^A^T^R^IO^T^A^c^t^ch^an^ged^“t^h^e^pu^rpo^s^{e” t}^o^{“a si}^gnⁱ^fⁱ^can^t^pu^rpo^s^e,^{” a ch}^an^{ge w}^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^{e F}^I^S^A^re^vi^e^w^co^u^r^t
^c^onc^lu^de^d^de^m^a^{nds only}^tha^t^the^g^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt ha}^v^e^a^“^m^e^a^sura^ble^”^f^o^re^ig^{n inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^pur^pose^w^h^eⁿ^{it se}^e^k^{s a}^FISA
^surv^e^illa^nc^e^orde^r,^Iⁿ^{re S}^e^aled^C^a^se^{, 3}¹⁰^F.3^d⁷¹^7,⁷³^4-³⁵⁽^F^.I^.S.^C^t.R^e^v^.²⁰⁰²⁾^{; s}^e^e^a^l^s^o^,^Se^a^m^{on &}^G^a^r^dne^r^,^The
^Patriot^Ac^t^an^{d the}^W^a^{ll Be}^twe^eⁿ^Fore^ig^{n In}^te^lligeⁿ^c^e^an^{d L}^a^{w E}ⁿ^forc^e^m^eⁿ^t^{, 2}⁸^H^AR^V^A^R^D^J^OURN^A^L^OF^L^A^W^AND
^P^UB^L^I^C^P^OL^I^C^Y^{319 (}²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.

and civil liability provisions, and are identical to those used in the electronic surveillance portion ¹²⁸
of FISA.

Each of the prohibitions mentioned above recognizes a procedure for government use
notwithstanding the general ban, usually under judicial supervision. Although Fourth Amendment
concerns supply a common theme, the procedures are individually distinctive.
Title III/ECPA authorizes both federal and state law enforcement wiretapping and electronic
eavesdropping, under court order, without the prior consent or knowledge of any of the
participants, 18 U.S.C. 2516 - 2518. At the federal level, a senior Justice Department official must ¹²⁹
approve the application for the court order. The procedure is only available where there is
probable cause to believe that the wiretap or electronic eavesdropping will produce evidence of ¹³⁰
one of a long, but not exhaustive, list of federal crimes, or of the whereabouts of a “fugitive
from justice” fleeing from prosecution of one of the offenses on the predicate offense list, 18
U.S.C. 2516(1)(l). Any federal prosecutor may approve an application for a court order under
section 2518 authorizing the interception of e-mail or other electronic communications during ¹³¹
transmission.

¹²⁸^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸²⁷⁽^“^A^pe^r^s^{on is}^g^uⁱ^lty^of^aⁿ^of^f^e^ns^eⁱ^f^he^inte^nti^ona^ll^y^{– (}¹⁾^un^de^r^c^o^l^o^r^of^la^w^f^o^r^the^pur^pos^e^of
^o^b^t^aiⁿⁱⁿ^g^f^o^rei^gⁿⁱⁿ^t^e^l^lⁱ^g^en^{ce i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^execu^t^e^{s a p}^h^y^si^cal^se^a^r^ch^wⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es exce}^p^t^{as au}^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^b^y
^s^t^a^t^ute^{. .}^{. .”}⁾^;⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.¹⁸²⁸⁽^“^Aⁿ^a^g^g^r^ie^ve^{d pe}^r^s^on,^ot^he^r^thaⁿ^a^f^o^r^e^ig^{n pow}^e^r^or^aⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^{t of}^a^f^o^r^e^ig^{n pow}^e^r^{, a}^s
^de^fⁱ^ne^{d in se}^c^tioⁿ¹⁸^01(a⁾^{or (b)(}^1)(A^{), re}^spe^c^tiv^e^l^y^,^of^th^{is title}^{, whose}^pre^m^ise^s^{, prope}^rty^,^inf^o^rm^a^t^ion,^{or m}^a^te^ria^l
^ha^s^be^eⁿ^s^u^bje^c^t^e^d^t^o^a^p^h^y^s^ic^a^l^se^a^r^c^h^w^{ithin the}^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^or^a^bout^w^hom^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion ob}^ta^ine^d^by^s^u^c^h^a
^phy^sic^a^l^se^a^r^c^h^ha^{s be}^eⁿ^dⁱ^sc^lose^{d or}^use^dⁱⁿ^vⁱ^ola^t^io^{n of}^s^e^c^tion¹⁸²⁷^of^this^title^sha^l^l^ha^v^e^a^c^a^u^se^of^a^c^{tion a}^g^aⁱ^nst
^aⁿ^y^pe^{rson w}^{ho c}^o^m^m^itte^{d suc}^h^vⁱ^ola^tion^{. .}^{. .”}^);¹⁸^U.S.^C^.²⁷¹²⁽^a^)(“^Aⁿ^y^pe^{rson w}^{ho is a}^g^g^r^ie^v^e^{d by}^aⁿ^y^w^illf^ul
^vⁱ^ola^tion^of^{. .}^{. se}^c^tion^{[] 3}^05(a⁾^.^{. . of}^the^Fore^ig^{n I}ⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^Sur^v^e^illa^nc^e^A^c^{t [}^r^e^l^a^ting^to^the^use^of^inf^o^rm^a^tion
^a^c^quir^e^{d f}^r^om^a^phy^sⁱ^ca^{l s}^e^a^r^c^h^unde^r^t^h^e^A^c^t]^m^a^y^c^o^m^m^e^nc^e^aⁿ^a^c^{tion i}ⁿ^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^Sta^t^e^s^Dⁱ^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^C^our^{t a}^g^aⁱ^ns^{t t}^h^e
^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^{to re}^c^o^v^e^{r m}^one^y^da^m^a^ge^s^.^{. . . “}⁾^.
¹²⁹^“^T^he^A^ttorne^y^G^e^ne^ra^l,^De^puty^A^ttorne^y^G^e^ne^ra^l,^Assocⁱ^a^t^e^A^ttorne^y^G^e^ne^r^a^{l, or a}ⁿ^y^Assistaⁿ^{t A}^t^torne^y^G^e^ne^ra^l,
^aⁿ^y^a^c^ting^A^s^sistaⁿ^{t A}^ttorne^y^Ge^ne^ra^{l, or a}ⁿ^y^De^puty^Assist^aⁿ^{t A}^t^torne^y^G^e^ne^ra^{l or a}^c^ting^De^puty^A^s^sistaⁿ^{t A}^ttorne^y
^G^eⁿ^e^r^a^lⁱⁿ^t^h^{e Cr}ⁱ^mⁱⁿ^al^Di^vi^si^oⁿ^sp^eci^al^l^y^d^e^si^gn^at^ed^b^y^t^h^{e A}^t^t^o^rn^ey^Gen^e^ral^,^ma^y^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^{ze an}^app^lⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^a
^Fe^de^r^a^{l judg}^e^of^c^o^m^p^e^t^eⁿ^{t jur}ⁱ^s^d^ic^{tion f}^o^r^,^a^{nd s}^u^c^h^j^udg^e^m^a^y^g^r^aⁿ^{t in}^c^onf^or^mⁱ^t^y^w^{ith s}^e^c^tion²⁵¹⁸^of^this^c^h^a^p^te^r
^aⁿ^or^de^r^a^u^th^or^iz^ing^or^a^p^pr^ov^ing^theⁱⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^tio^{n of}^wⁱ^r^e^or^or^a^l^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^by^the^Fe^de^r^a^{l B}^u^r^e^a^u^of
^Iⁿ^v^e^s^tig^a^{tion, or}^a^Fe^de^r^a^{l a}^g^eⁿ^c^y^ha^vⁱ^ng^r^e^s^ponsⁱ^b^ili^ty^f^o^r^the^inv^e^s^tig^a^{tion of}^the^of^f^e^ns^e^as^{to w}^h^ic^{h the}^a^pplic^a^tⁱ^on
^is^m^a^de^,^w^h^eⁿ^s^u^c^hⁱⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^tioⁿ^m^a^y^pr^ov^ide^or^ha^s^pr^ov^ide^d^e^v^id^eⁿ^c^e^of^[^t^he^pr^e^d^ic^a^t^e^of^f^e^ns^e^s^]^.^.^.”^{18 U}^.^S.C^.
²⁵¹⁶⁽¹⁾^.
¹³⁰^T^h^e^lis^{t a}^ppe^a^r^sⁱⁿ¹⁸^U^.^S.C^.²⁵¹⁶⁽¹⁾^t^h^e^te^x^t^of^w^h^ic^{h is}^a^ppe^nde^d.
¹³¹^“^Aⁿ^y^a^ttorⁿ^ey^f^o^r^the^G^ove^rⁿ^m^e^{nt (}^a^s^s^u^c^h^te^r^m^is^de^fⁱ^ne^{d f}^o^r^the^pur^pos^e^s^of^the^Fe^de^r^a^{l R}^u^le^s^of^C^r^im^ina^l
^P^r^o^ced^u^r^{e) m}^a^y^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^{ze an}^app^lⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^{a F}^e^d^e^ral^j^u^d^g^{e o}^f^co^mp^et^en^t^j^u^ri^sdⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^f^o^r,^an^{d su}^ch^j^u^d^g^{e m}^a^y^gran^t^,ⁱⁿ
^c^onf^ormⁱ^t^y^w^{ith se}^c^{tion 2}⁵¹⁸^of^t^h^{is title}^,^aⁿ^orde^r^a^u^t^hor^iz^ing^{or a}^ppr^ov^ing^theⁱⁿ^te^rc^e^p^tioⁿ^of^e^l^e^c^t^ronic
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^by^aⁿ^inv^e^s^tig^a^tiv^e^or^la^w^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^{t of}^fⁱ^c^e^r^ha^ving^r^e^s^ponsⁱ^b^ili^ty^f^o^r^the^inv^e^s^tig^a^tion^of^the
^o^f^fen^s^{e as t}^o^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^{e ap}^plⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿⁱ^s^m^a^d^e^,^w^h^en^su^chⁱⁿ^t^e^rcep^tⁱ^oⁿ^m^a^{y p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^{e o}^r^h^a^{s p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^ed^evi^d^en^{ce o}^f^an^y
^Fe^de^r^a^{l f}^e^lony^,”^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁵¹⁶⁽³⁾^{. T}^h^e^le^s^s^de^m^a^nding^pr^oc^e^d^ur^e^s^of^{18 U}^.^S^.^C^.²⁷^01-²⁷^{11 m}^a^y^be^us^e^d^w^{ith r}^e^s^p^e^c^t
^t^o^e-m^aⁱ^l^o^r^o^t^h^e^{r el}^ect^ronⁱ^{c co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^t^h^at^{are i}ⁿ^st^o^r^age;^re^co^u^r^{se t}^o^s^u^b^s^ectⁱ^oⁿ²⁵¹⁶⁽³^{) i}^s^on^l^yⁿ^ecess^a^r^y^w^h^en
^wⁱ^re,^o^r^al^o^r^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^{are t}^o^b^e^“iⁿ^t^ercep^t^e^d^.^”

At the state level, the principal prosecuting attorney of a state or any of its political subdivisions
may approve an application for an order authorizing wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping
based upon probable cause to believe that it will produce evidence of a felony under the state
laws covering murder, kidnaping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, drug trafficking, or any
other crime dangerous to life, limb or property. State applications, court orders and other ¹³²
procedures must at a minimum be as demanding as federal requirements.
Applications for a court order authorizing wiretapping and electronic surveillance include:
• the identity of the applicant and the official who authorized the application;
• a full and complete statement of the facts including
• details of the crime,
• a particular description of nature, location and place where the ¹³³
interception is to occur,
• a particular description of the communications to be intercepted, and
• the identities (if known) of the person committing the offense and of the
persons whose communications are to be intercepted;
• a full and complete statement of the alternative investigative techniques used or
an explanation of why they would be futile or dangerous;
• a statement of period of time for which the interception is to be maintained and if
it will not terminate upon seizure of the communications sought, a probable
cause demonstration that further similar communications are likely to occur;
• a full and complete history of previous interception applications or efforts
involving the same parties or places;
• in the case of an extension, the results to date or explanation for the want of
results; and
• any additional information the judge may require, 18 U.S.C. 2518(1), (2).
Before issuing an order authorizing interception, the court must find:
• probable cause to believe that an individual is, has or is about to commit one or
more of the predicate offenses;
• probable cause to believe that the particular communications concerning the
crime will be seized as a result of the interception requested;
• that normal investigative procedures have been or are likely to be futile or too
dangerous; and
• probable cause to believe that “the facilities from which, or the place where, the
wire, oral, or electronic communications are to be intercepted are being used, or

¹³²^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁵¹⁶⁽²⁾^.^T^h^e^te^x^t^of^s^ubs^e^c^tion²⁵¹⁶⁽²⁾^is^a^p^peⁿ^d^e^d^.
¹³³^Id^en^tif^icatioⁿ^o^f^th^{e p}^l^{ace w}^h^ere,^o^r^f^{acilities o}^v^{er, w}^h^ich^th^{e targ}^eted^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^s^{are to}^o^ccu^r^ma^y^b^e^ex^cu^sed
^w^h^e^r^e^the^c^{ourt f}ⁱ^{nds t}^h^a^t^the^s^u^s^p^e^c^t^ha^{s or w}^{ill ta}^k^e^ste^p^s^to^thw^a^{rt inte}^rc^e^p^ti^on,¹⁸^U.S^.^C.²⁵¹⁸⁽¹¹^{), (}^12)(te^x^{t is}
^a^ppe^nde^d)^.

are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are
leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person,” 18 U.S.C.

2518(3).

Subsections 2518(4) and (5) demand that any interception order include:
• the identity (if known) of the persons whose conversations are to be intercepted;
• the nature and location of facilities and place covered by the order;
• a particular description of the type of communication to be intercepted and an
indication of the crime to which it relates;
• individual approving the application and the agency executing the order;
• the period of time during which the interception may be conducted and an
indication of whether it may continue after the communication sought has been
seized;
• an instruction that the order shall be executed
• as soon as practicable, and
• so as to minimize the extent of innocent communication seized; and
• upon request, a direction for the cooperation of communications providers and
others necessary or useful for the execution of the order, 18 U.S.C. 2518(4).
Compliance with these procedures may be postponed briefly until after the interception effort has
begun, upon the approval of senior Justice Department officials in emergency cases involving
organized crime or national security threatening conspiracies or involving the risk of death or ¹³⁴
serious injury, 18 U.S.C. 2518(7).
The court orders remain in effect only as long as required but not more than 30 days. After 30
days, the court may grant 30 day extensions subject to the procedures required for issuance of the
original order, 18 U.S.C. 2518(5). During that time the court may require progress reports at such
intervals as it considers appropriate, 18 U.S.C. 2518(6).
Intercepted communications are to be recorded and the evidence secured and placed under seal
(with the possibility of copies for authorized law enforcement disclosure and use) along with the
application and the court’s order, 18 U.S.C. 2518(8)(a),(b).
Within 90 days of the expiration of the order those whose communications have been intercepted
are entitled to notice, and evidence secured through the intercept may be introduced into evidence
with 10 days’ advance notice to the parties, 18 U.S.C. 2518(8)(d), (9).
Title III also circumscribes the conditions under which information derived from a court ordered
interception may be disclosed or otherwise used. Nevertheless, it may be disclosed to and used
for official purposes by:
• other law enforcement officials including foreign officials, 18 U.S.C. 2517(1),
(2), (5), (7);

¹³⁴^T^h^e^te^x^t^of^s^e^c^{tion 25}¹⁸⁽⁷⁾^is^a^p^pe^nde^d^.

• federal intelligence officers to the extent that it involves foreign intelligence ¹³⁵
information, 18 U.S.C. 2517(6);
• other American or foreign government officials to the extent that it involves the
threat of hostile acts by foreign powers, their agents, or international terrorists, 18 ¹³⁶
U.S.C. 2517(8).
It may also be disclosed by witnesses testifying in federal or state proceedings, 18 U.S.C. ¹³⁷

2517(3), (5), provided the intercepted conversation or other communication is not privileged,

18 U.S.C. 2517(4).

The procedural requirements for law enforcement access to stored wire or electronic
communications and transactional records are less demanding but equally complicated, 18 U.S.C.
2701-2712. They deal with two kinds of information – often in the custody of the telephone
company or some other service provider rather than of any of the parties to the communication –
communications records and th content of electronic or wire communications. Law enforcement
officials are entitled to access:
• with the consent of the one of the parties;¹³⁸
• on the basis of a court order or similar process under the procedures established ¹³⁹
in Title III/ECPA;
• in certain emergency situations;¹⁴⁰ or

¹³⁵^“^‘^[^F^]ore^ig^{n i}ⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^inf^o^rm^a^t^ion’,^f^o^{r pur}^pose^s^of^se^c^ti^{on 2}⁵¹⁷⁽^{6) of}^this^title^{, m}^e^aⁿ^{s – (A}^{) inf}^o^rm^a^{tion, w}^h^e^t^he^r
^{or n}^o^{t c}^o^nc^e^r^ning^a^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^pe^rson,^tha^t^re^la^te^{s to}^the^a^b^ility^of^the^Unite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^t^o^p^r^ote^c^t^a^g^aⁱ^{nst – (}^{I) a}^c^t^ua^{l or}
^poteⁿ^tia^{l a}^tta^c^k^{or ot}^he^{r g}^r^a^v^e^hostile^a^c^t^{s of}^a^f^o^re^ig^{n pow}^e^r^or^aⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^{t of}^a^f^o^reⁱ^g^{n pow}^e^r^{; (ii) sa}^b^o^ta^g^e^{or inte}^ntio^na^l
^te^rrorism^b^y^a^f^o^reⁱ^g^{n pow}^e^r^{or a}ⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^{t of}^a^f^o^re^ig^{n pow}^e^r^{; or (iii}^{) c}^l^a^nde^stineⁱⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^a^c^tiv^itie^{s by}^a^nd
^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^se^rv^ic^e^{or ne}^tw^ork^{of a}^f^o^re^ig^{n pow}^e^r^{or by}^aⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^{t of a}^f^o^re^ig^{n pow}^e^r^{; or (B) i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^a^{tion, w}^h^e^t^he^r^{or n}^o^t
^coⁿ^cernⁱⁿ^g^{a Un}ⁱ^t^ed^S^t^{ates p}^e^rsoⁿ^{, w}^ith^resp^{ect to}^{a f}^o^reigⁿ^p^o^w^{er o}^r^f^o^reigⁿ^territo^ry^th^{at relates to}^–^{(I) t}^h^{e n}^a^ti^oⁿ^a^l
^d^e^f^eⁿ^s^{e o}^r^t^h^{e secu}^ri^t^y^o^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es;^o^r⁽ⁱⁱ⁾^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^duc^t^of^th^e^f^o^r^e^ig^{n af}^f^a^ir^s^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^,”^{18 U}^.^S^.^C^.
²⁵¹⁰⁽¹⁹⁾^.
¹³⁶^T^h^{e tex}^t^o^f¹⁸^U.S.C^.²⁵⁷⁸⁽¹⁾^,⁽²^{), (5}^),⁽⁶^),⁽⁷^),^an^d⁽⁸^{)is a}^p^p^eⁿ^d^ed^.
¹³⁷^T^h^e^te^x^t^of^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁵¹⁷⁽³⁾^aⁿ^{d (}⁴⁾^is^a^ppe^nde^d^.
¹³⁸^“⁽^b)^A^pr^ov^ide^r^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^{d in}^s^u^bs^e^c^{tion (}^a⁾^m^a^y^div^u^lg^e^the^c^onteⁿ^ts^of^a^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion . .}^{. (}³⁾^w^{ith the}^la^w^f^ul
^coⁿ^s^en^t^o^f^t^h^{e o}^rⁱ^gⁱⁿ^at^o^r^{or an}^add^r^{essee o}^rⁱⁿ^t^e^nd^ed^reci^pi^en^t^o^f^su^ch^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^o^n,^o^r^t^h^{e s}^u^b^s^crⁱ^b^{er i}ⁿ^t^h^{e case o}^f
^r^e^m^o^te^c^o^m^puting^s^e^r^v^ic^e^.^{. . . (}^c⁾^{. . .}^A^pr^ov^ide^r^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^{d in}^s^u^bs^e^c^{tion (}^a⁾^m^a^y^div^u^lg^e^a^r^e^c^o^r^d^or^othe^r^inf^o^r^m^a^tion
^pe^r^t^aⁱ^ning^t^o^a^s^u^bs^c^r^ibe^r^t^o^or^c^u^s^t^om^e^r^of^s^u^c^h^s^e^r^v^ice^,⁽^{not i}ⁿ^c^l^u^d^ing^t^h^e^c^onteⁿ^ts^of^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^c^o^v^e^r^e^{d by}
^s^ubs^e^c^tion⁽^a⁾⁽¹⁾^or⁽^a⁾⁽²⁾⁾^{. .}^{. (}²⁾^w^{ith the}^la^w^f^{ul c}^ons^eⁿ^t^of^the^c^u^s^t^om^e^r^or^s^ubs^c^r^ibe^r^{. “}^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁷⁰²⁽^b)⁽³⁾^,⁽^c⁾⁽²⁾^.
¹³⁹^“^A^pr^ov^ide^r^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^{d i}ⁿ^s^u^bs^e^c^{tion (}^a⁾^m^a^y^div^u^lg^e^the^c^onteⁿ^ts^o^f^a^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion .}^{. . (}²⁾^a^s^o^t^he^r^w^is^e
^a^u^thor^iz^e^dⁱⁿ^s^e^c^tion²⁵¹⁷^{, 2}⁵¹¹⁽²⁾⁽^a⁾^,^or²⁷⁰³^.^{. .}^.(^c⁾^{. .}^{. A}^pr^ovⁱ^d^e^r^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^{d i}ⁿ^s^ubs^e^c^tio^{n (}^a⁾^m^a^y^div^u^lg^e^a^r^e^c^o^r^d
^or^ot^he^rⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^tion^pe^r^t^aⁱ^ning^t^o^a^s^ubs^c^r^ibe^r^t^o^or^c^u^s^t^om^e^r^of^s^u^c^h^s^e^r^v^ic^e^,⁽^{not i}ⁿ^c^l^u^d^ing^t^h^e^c^ont^eⁿ^ts^of
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^c^o^v^e^r^e^{d by}^s^ubs^e^c^{tion (}^a⁾⁽¹⁾^or⁽^a⁾⁽²⁾⁾⁽¹⁾^a^s^ot^he^r^w^is^e^a^u^thor^iz^e^d^{in s}^e^c^tioⁿ²⁷^03,^“^{18 U}^.^S.C^.
²⁷⁰²⁽^b⁾⁽²^),^(c)(1^).
¹⁴⁰^“⁽^b)^A^pr^ov^ide^r^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^{d in}^s^u^bs^e^c^{tion (}^a⁾^m^a^y^div^u^lg^e^the^c^onteⁿ^ts^of^a^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion . .}^{. (}⁸⁾^t^o^a^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nta^l
^eⁿ^tity^{, if}^the^prov^ide^r^{, i}ⁿ^g^o^{od f}^a^{ith, be}^lⁱ^e^v^e^s^tha^t^aⁿ^e^m^e^r^g^e^ncy^involvⁱ^ng^da^ng^e^r^of^de^a^t^h^{or s}^e^rio^u^s^phy^sⁱ^c^a^l^injury^to
^aⁿ^y^pe^r^s^{on r}^e^quir^e^s^dⁱ^s^c^los^u^r^e^w^itho^u^t^de^la^y^o^f^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^r^e^la^ting^to^the^e^m^e^r^ge^ncy^.⁽^c⁾^{. . . A}^pr^ov^ide^r
^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^{d i}ⁿ^s^u^bs^e^c^{tion (}^a⁾^m^a^y^div^u^lg^e^a^r^e^c^o^r^d^or^othe^rⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^tⁱ^on^pe^r^t^aⁱⁿⁱ^ng^{to a}^s^ubs^c^r^ibe^r^t^o^or^c^u^s^t^om^e^r^of^s^u^c^h
^s^e^r^v^ic^e^,⁽^{not inc}^l^udi^ng^the^c^o^nteⁿ^t^s^of^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^c^o^v^e^r^e^{d by}^subs^e^c^tio^{n (}^a⁾⁽¹⁾^or⁽^a⁾⁽²⁾⁾^{. .}^.(⁴⁾^t^o^a^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt
^eⁿ^tity^{, if}^the^prov^ide^r^{, i}ⁿ^g^o^{od f}^a^{ith, be}^lⁱ^e^v^e^s^tha^t^aⁿ^e^m^e^r^g^e^ncy^involvⁱ^ng^da^ng^e^r^of^de^a^t^h^{or s}^e^rio^u^s^phy^sⁱ^c^a^l^injury^to
^aⁿ^y^pe^{rson re}^quire^{s d}ⁱ^sc^losure^w^itho^u^t^de^la^y^o^f^the^inf^o^rm^a^{tion re}^la^ting^{to t}^h^e^e^m^e^r^g^e^nc^y^,^”^{18 U.S.}^C.
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

• under one of the other statutory exceptions to the ban on service provider ¹⁴¹
disclosure.
Section 2703, which affords law enforcement access to the content of stored wire and electronic
communications, distinguishes between recent communications and those that have been in
electronic storage for more than six months. Government officials may gain access to wire or
electronic communications in electronic storage for less than six months under a search warrant
issued upon probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and the search will produce ¹⁴²
evidence of the offense.
The government must used the same warrant procedure to acquire older communications or those
stored in remote computer storage if access is to be afforded without notice to the subscriber or ¹⁴³
customer. If government officials are willing to afford the subscriber or customer notice or at
least delayed notice, access may be granted under a court order showing that the information
sought is relevant and material to a criminal investigation or under an administrative subpoena, a ¹⁴⁴
grand jury subpoena, a trial subpoena, or court order.
Under the court order procedure, the court may authorize delayed notification in 90 day ¹⁴⁵
increments when contemporaneous notice might have an adverse impact. Government ¹⁴⁶
supervisor officials may certify the need for delayed notification in the case of a subpoena.
Traditional exigent circumstances and a final general inconvenience justification form the
grounds for delayed notification in either case:
• endangering the life or physical safety of an individual;
• flight from prosecution;

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
²⁷⁰²⁽^b⁾⁽⁸^),(c)(⁴⁾^.
¹⁴¹^“⁽^b)^A^pr^ov^ide^r^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^{d in}^s^u^bs^e^c^{tion (}^a⁾^m^a^y^div^u^lg^e^the^c^onteⁿ^ts^of^a^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion —}⁽¹⁾^to^aⁿ^a^ddr^e^s^s^e^e^or
ⁱⁿ^t^e^nd^ed^reci^pⁱ^ent^o^f^su^ch^c^o^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^o^{n o}^r^aⁿ^agen^t^o^f^su^ch^add^r^e^{ssee o}^rⁱⁿ^t^e^nd^ed^reci^pⁱ^ent^;^.^.^.⁽⁴⁾^t^o^{a p}^e^rson
^e^m^ploy^e^d^{or a}^u^th^oriz^e^d^or^w^hose^f^a^c^ilitie^{s a}^r^e^use^d^{to f}^o^rw^a^r^{d suc}^h^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion t}^o^its^de^stina^tⁱ^on;^{(5) a}^s^m^a^y^be
^ne^c^e^s^s^a^rⁱ^l^y^incⁱ^de^{nt to}^the^r^eⁿ^d^iti^on^of^the^s^e^r^v^ic^e^or^{to t}^h^e^pr^ote^c^tⁱ^on^of^the^rⁱ^g^h^ts^or^pr^ope^r^t^y^of^the^pr^ov^ide^r^of^tha^t
^se^rv^ic^e^;^{(6) to the}^Na^ti^ona^{l Ce}ⁿ^t^e^r^f^o^{r Missing}^a^nd^Ex^ploi^te^{d C}^h^ildr^e^{n, in}^c^oⁿⁿ^e^c^tio^{n w}^{ith a}^re^por^{t su}^bm^itte^{d the}^r^e^t^o
^unde^r^s^e^c^tⁱ^on²²⁷^of^the^Vic^tim^s^of^C^h^{ild A}^bus^e^A^c^{t of}¹⁹⁹^{0; (}⁷⁾^t^o^a^la^w^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^{t a}^g^eⁿ^cy^{– (}^A⁾^if^the^c^onteⁿ^ts^–
^{(I) w}^e^{re in}^ad^v^e^rten^tl^y^o^b^t^ain^e^d^b^y^th^{e ser}^v^{ice p}^r^o^v^id^{er; an}^d⁽ⁱⁱ⁾^ap^p^{ear to}^p^e^rtain^t^o^t^h^{e co}^mm^issioⁿ^o^f^{a cri}^m^{e . . . (c) .}
^{. . A}^pr^ov^ide^r^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^{d i}ⁿ^s^u^bs^e^c^tion⁽^a⁾^m^a^y^div^u^lg^e^a^r^e^c^o^r^d^or^o^t^he^r^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion pe}^r^t^aⁱ^ning^t^o^a^s^ubs^c^r^ibe^r^t^o^or
^c^u^s^t^om^e^r^of^s^u^c^h^s^e^r^v^ice^,⁽^not^inc^l^udi^ng^the^c^o^nteⁿ^ts^of^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^c^o^v^e^r^e^{d by}^s^ubs^e^c^{tion (}^a⁾⁽¹⁾^or⁽^a⁾⁽²⁾⁾^{. .}^{. (}³⁾
^as^m^a^y^b^eⁿ^ecess^a^ril^yⁱⁿ^cid^eⁿ^t^t^o^th^{e ren}^d^itioⁿ^o^f^th^{e serv}^{ice o}^r^to^t^h^{e p}^r^o^t^ectioⁿ^o^f^th^{e rig}^h^ts^o^r^p^r^o^p^e^rt^y^o^f^th^e
^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^er^o^f^t^h^at^servi^ce,^{” 1}⁸^U.^S^.^C.²⁷⁰²⁽^b⁾⁽¹^),(4⁾^,⁽⁵^),(⁶^),(⁷^{); (c)(3}^).
¹⁴²^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁷⁰³⁽^a⁾⁽^t^e^x^{t is}^a^ppeⁿ^d^e^d)^{. T}^h^e^21s^t^C^e^ntur^y^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^J^u^s^tic^e^A^ppr^opr^ia^ti^ons^A^u^th^o^r^iz^a^{tion A}^c^{t, 11}⁶
^Sta^t^{. 1}⁸²²⁽²⁰⁰²⁾^,^a^m^e^nde^{d s}^e^c^tion²⁷⁰³^to^pe^r^m^{it e}^x^ec^ution^of^th^e^w^a^r^r^a^{nt by}^s^e^r^v^ic^e^pr^ov^ide^r^s^a^{nd ot}^he^r^s^w^ithout
^re^quiri^ng^the^pre^s^eⁿ^c^e^of^a^f^e^de^ra^{l of}^fⁱ^c^e^r^{, 18 U.S.C.}²⁷^03(g^)(“^Not^w^ithsta^nding^se^c^tion³¹⁰⁵^of^this^title^{, t}^h^e^pre^s^eⁿ^c^e
^o^f^an^o^f^fⁱ^c^e^{r sh}^al^lⁿ^o^t^b^e^requⁱ^r^ed^f^o^{r servi}^c^{e o}^r^execu^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^{a searc}^h^w^a^rran^tⁱ^ssu^edⁱⁿ^acco^rd^an^{ce w}ⁱ^t^h^t^hⁱ^s^ch^ap^t^e^r
^r^e^quirⁱ^ng^dis^c^los^u^r^e^by^a^pr^ov^ide^r^of^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^ser^vⁱ^{ce o}^r^re^m^o^t^e^co^m^p^u^tⁱⁿ^{g servi}^ce^o^f^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^t^ent^s^o^f
^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^o^r^reco^r^d^{s o}^r^o^t^{her i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^p^e^rt^aiⁿⁱⁿ^g^t^o^{a subscri}^b^{er t}^o^o^r^cu^st^o^m^{er o}^f^su^ch^ser^vⁱ^ce”),^see^Unite^d
^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^B^a^ch^,³¹⁰^F.3^d¹⁰^{63 (}⁸^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰²⁾⁽^t^he^F^our^{th A}^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t d}^o^e^s^no^{t r}^e^q^u^ir^e^the^pr^e^s^eⁿ^c^e^of^a^f^e^de^r^a^{l of}^fⁱ^c^e^r
^w^h^en^t^echⁿⁱ^ci^an^{s execu}^t^e^{a searc}^h^w^a^rran^t^oⁿ^{a servi}^{ce p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^er’s^server).
¹⁴³¹⁸^U^.^S.C.²⁷⁰³^{(a), (b}⁾⁽¹^)(A^{), (b}⁾⁽²⁾^(tex^{t is ap}^p^eⁿ^d^e^d⁾^.
¹⁴⁴¹⁸^U^.^S.C.²⁷⁰³^(b⁾⁽¹^{)(B), (}^d^{) (tex}^{t is ap}^p^eⁿ^d^e^d⁾^.
¹⁴⁵¹⁸^U^.^S.C.²⁷⁰⁵^(a)(1^)(A^{), (4}^{) (tex}^{t is ap}^p^eⁿ^d^e^d⁾^.
¹⁴⁶¹⁸^U^.^S.C.²⁷⁰⁵^(a)(1^{)(B), (}⁴^{) (tex}^{t is ap}^p^eⁿ^d^e^d⁾^.

• destruction of or tampering with evidence;
• intimidation of potential witnesses; or
• otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial, 18 ¹⁴⁷
U.S.C. 2705(a)(2), (b).
Comparable, if less demanding, procedures apply when the government seeks other customer
information from a service provider (other than the content of a customer’s communications). The
information can be secured:
• with a warrant;
• with a court order;
• with customer consent;
• with a written request in telemarketing fraud cases; or
• with a subpoena in some instances.¹⁴⁸
Most customer identification, use, and billing information can be secured simply with a subpoena ¹⁴⁹
and without customer notification.
Pen registers and trap and trace devices identify the source of calls placed to or from a particular
telephone. Federal government attorneys and state and local police officers may apply for a court
order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register and/or a trap and trace device upon

¹⁴⁷^A^Sⁱ^xt^h^Ci^rcuⁱ^t^p^aⁿ^e^l^,ⁱⁿ^a^d^eci^si^oⁿ^l^a^t^e^{r vacat}^ed^en^b^aⁿ^c^on^gro^und^{s o}^f^ri^p^eⁿ^e^ss,^h^e^l^d^t^h^at^t^h^{e F}^o^u^r^t^h^Am^en^d^m^en^t
^pr^e^c^l^ude^d^the^s^e^iz^ur^e^of^s^t^or^e^d^e^-^m^a^{il f}^r^o^m^a^s^e^r^v^ic^e^pr^ov^ide^r^un^de^r^a^s^e^c^tion²⁷^{03 c}^o^ur^t^or^de^r^w^h^ic^{h f}^e^a^t^ur^e^d^a
^de^la^y^e^{d notic}^e^a^u^t^hor^iz^a^tion^u^nde^r^s^e^c^tion²⁷^05,^W^a^r^s^hak^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 4}⁹⁰^F.3^d⁴⁵^5,⁴⁶^8-⁸²⁽⁶^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾^,^v^a^c^’^d
^eⁿ^ba^nc^,⁵³^{2 F}^.³^d⁵²¹⁽⁶^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁸⁾^.^T^h^e^pa^ne^l^di^{d n}^o^{t a}^d^dr^e^s^s^w^h^e^t^he^r^e^x^ig^eⁿ^{t c}ⁱ^r^c^um^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^s^w^{ould pe}^r^m^{it s}^e^iz^ur^e
^wⁱ^t^h^d^e^l^a^y^e^dⁿ^o^tⁱ^ce,^p^e^rh^ap^s^b^ecau^{se t}^h^{e go}^vern^m^eⁿ^t^ap^p^a^ren^t^l^y^dⁱ^d^no^t^rai^s^{e t}^h^e^q^u^e^stⁱ^o^n,⁴⁹⁰^F^.³^d^at⁴⁶⁴^-⁶⁵^.
¹⁴⁸^“⁽^{1) A}^g^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt e}ⁿ^tity^m^a^y^re^quire^a^prov^ide^r^of^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion se}^rv^ic^e^{or re}^m^o^te^c^o^m^puting^se^rv^ic^e
^t^o^di^scl^o^{se a reco}^rd^o^r^ot^h^e^{r i}ⁿ^f^o^rmatⁱ^oⁿ^p^e^rt^aiⁿⁱⁿ^g^t^o^{a sub}^s^cri^b^er^t^o^o^r^cu^st^o^m^{er o}^f^su^ch^servi^{ce (n}^o^tⁱⁿ^cl^udⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^e
^c^onteⁿ^ts^of^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions⁾^{– (}^A⁾^obtaⁱ^ns^a^w^a^r^r^a^{nt is}^s^u^e^d^usⁱⁿ^g^the^pr^oc^e^dur^e^s^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^dⁱⁿ^the^F^e^de^r^a^{l R}^u^le^s^of
^C^r^im^ina^l^P^r^oc^e^d^ur^e^by^a^c^our^{t w}^{ith jur}ⁱ^s^d^ic^ti^on^ov^e^r^the^of^f^e^ns^e^unde^r^inv^e^s^tig^a^tion^or^e^q^uiv^a^le^{nt St}^a^t^e^w^a^r^r^a^{nt; (}^B⁾
^obtaⁱ^ns^a^c^our^t^or^de^r^f^o^r^s^u^c^h^dis^c^los^u^r^e^u^nde^r^s^ubs^e^c^tio^{n (}^d⁾^of^this^s^e^c^{tion; (}^C⁾^ha^s^the^c^ons^eⁿ^t^of^th^e^s^ubs^c^r^ibe^r^or
^c^u^stom^e^r^{to suc}^h^dⁱ^sc^losure^;^{or (}^D^{) subm}^{its a}^f^o^r^m^a^l^w^r^itte^{n re}^que^{st re}^le^v^a^{nt to a}^la^w^eⁿ^f^o^rc^e^m^eⁿ^{t inv}^e^stig^a^tion
^coⁿ^cernⁱⁿ^g^t^e^l^e^m^a^rk^etⁱⁿ^{g f}^r^au^d^f^o^{r t}^h^{e n}^a^m^e^,^ad^d^r^ess,^an^d^p^l^{ace o}^f^b^u^sⁱⁿ^ess^o^f^{a su}^b^s^cri^b^{er o}^r^cu^st^{omer o}^f^su^ch
^pr^ov^ide^r^{, w}^h^ic^{h s}^ubs^c^r^ibe^r^or^c^u^s^t^om^e^r^is^eⁿ^g^a^g^e^{d in te}^le^m^a^r^k^e^ting^(a^{s suc}^h^te^rm^{is de}^fⁱ^ne^{d in se}^c^tion²³²⁵^of^this
^title^{); or}^{(E) se}^e^k^{s inf}^o^rm^a^{tion u}ⁿ^d^e^r^pa^ra^g^r^a^{ph (2)}^{. .}^{. (}³^{) A}^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nta^l^eⁿ^tity^re^c^e^iv^ing^re^c^o^{rds or inf}^o^rm^a^tion
^unde^r^this^s^ubs^e^c^tio^{n is}^not^r^e^quir^e^{d to}^pr^ovⁱ^d^e^no^tic^e^{to a}^s^ubs^c^r^ib^e^r^or^c^u^s^t^om^e^r^,”^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁷⁰³⁽^c⁾⁽¹⁾^,⁽³⁾^.
¹⁴⁹^“(2⁾^A^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^{er o}^f^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c c}^o^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^servi^{ce o}^r^re^m^o^t^e^co^m^p^u^tⁱⁿ^{g servi}^{ce sh}^al^l^dⁱ^scl^o^{se t}^o^{a go}^vern^men^t^al
^eⁿ^tity^the^(A^{) na}^m^e^{; (B) a}^ddre^{ss; (C) loc}^a^l^aⁿ^d^lo^ng^distaⁿ^c^e^te^le^p^h^one^c^o^nne^c^tio^{n re}^c^o^r^d^{s, or}^re^c^o^rd^{s of}^se^{ssion tim}^e^s
^a^{nd d}^u^ra^tio^{ns; (D)}^le^ng^th^of^se^rvⁱ^c^e^(inc^ludi^ng^sta^r^{t da}^te^{) a}ⁿ^{d ty}^pe^{s of}^se^rv^ic^e^utiliz^e^d^{; (E) te}^le^p^h^oⁿ^e^{or instr}^u^m^e^nt
^num^be^{r or o}^t^he^{r su}^bsc^r^ibe^r^num^be^{r or ide}ⁿ^tity^{, inc}^l^u^d^ing^aⁿ^y^te^m^pora^r^ily^a^ssi^gⁿ^e^d^ne^tw^ork^a^ddre^{ss; a}^{nd (}^F^{) m}^e^aⁿ^{s a}^nd
^s^our^c^e^of^pa^y^m^eⁿ^{t (}ⁱ^nc^lu^ding^aⁿ^y^c^r^e^d^{it c}^a^r^or^ba^nk^a^c^c^ountⁿ^u^m^b^e^r⁾^,^of^a^s^ubs^c^r^ibe^r^t^o^or^c^u^s^t^om^e^r^of^s^u^c^h^s^e^r^v^ic^e^,
^w^h^eⁿ^the^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^nta^l^eⁿ^tity^us^e^s^aⁿ^a^d^mⁱ^nis^t^ra^tiv^e^s^ubpoe^na^a^u^t^h^oriz^e^d^by^a^Fe^de^ra^{l or S}^t^a^t^e^s^t^a^t^ut^e^{or a}^Fe^de^ra^l^or
^Sta^t^e^g^r^a^{nd jury}^{or tria}^{l s}^u^b^poe^na^{or a}ⁿ^y^m^e^aⁿ^s^a^v^a^ila^ble^unde^r^pa^r^a^g^r^a^{ph (1). (}³^{) A}^g^o^v^e^rn^m^e^nta^l^eⁿ^tity^r^ecei^viⁿ^g
^r^e^c^o^r^d^s^orⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion un}^de^r^t^h^is^s^ubs^e^c^tion^isⁿ^o^{t r}^e^q^u^ir^e^d^to^pr^ov^ide^no^tic^e^{to a}^s^ubs^c^r^ibe^r^or^c^u^s^t^o^m^e^r^,”^{18 U}^.^S.C^.
²⁷⁰³⁽^c)(2⁾^,⁽³^).

certification that the information that will provide is relevant to a pending criminal ¹⁵⁰
investigation.
An order authorizing installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device must:
• specify
• the person (if known) upon whose telephone line the device is to be
installed,
• the person (if known) who is the subject of the criminal investigation,
• the telephone number, (if known) the location of the line to which the
device is to be attached, and geographical range of the device,
• a description of the crime to which the investigation relates;
• upon request, direct carrier assistance pursuant to section 3124;
• terminate within 60 days, unless extended;
• involve a report of particulars of the order’s execution in Internet cases; and
• impose necessary nondisclosure requirements.¹⁵¹
Senior Justice Department or state prosecutors may approve the installation and use of a pen
register or trap and trace device prior to the issuance of court authorization in emergency cases
that involving either an organized crime conspiracy, an immediate danger of death or serious ¹⁵²
injury, an threat to national security, or a serious attack on a “protected computer.”
Federal authorities have applied for court orders, under the Stored Communications Act (18
U.S.C. 2701-2712) and the trap and trace authority of 18 U.S.C. 3121-3127, seeking to direct
communications providers to supply them with the information necessary to track cell phone
users in conjunction with an ongoing criminal investigation. Thus far, their efforts have met with ¹⁵³
mixed success.
The procedure for securing wiretapping court orders under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance ¹⁵⁴
Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1801-1811, is the most distinctive of the wiretap-related procedures.
First, its focus is different. It was designed to secure foreign intelligence information – not

¹⁵⁰^{18 U}^.^S.C^.³¹²²⁽^t^e^x^{t is}^a^p^pe^nde^d⁾^.
¹⁵¹^{18 U}^.^S.C^.³¹²³⁽^t^e^x^{t is}^a^p^pe^nde^d⁾^.
¹⁵²^{18 U}^.^S.C^.³¹²⁵⁽^t^e^x^{t is}^a^p^pe^nde^d⁾^.
¹⁵³^E.g^.,^Iⁿ^r^e^Ap^plic^ati^oⁿ^of^the^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^St^ate^s^{, 4}⁹⁷^F.^Su^pp.^2d³⁰^{1 (}^D^.^P^.^R^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾^;^Iⁿ^r^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^,⁴^{41 F.3}^d⁸¹⁶
^(S.D^{. T}^e^x^.²⁰⁰^6);^Iⁿ^re^Ap^plic^a^tio^{n of}^the^Uⁿ^tie^d^St^ate^s^{, 4}¹⁶^F.S^u^p^p^{. 3}⁹⁰⁽^D^.M^d.²⁰⁰⁶⁾^;^Iⁿ^r^e^A^ppl^ic^atioⁿ^{of t}^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^d
^State^s^,⁴¹^{5 F}^.^Su^pp^.2^{d 2}¹¹⁽^W^.D^.N^.Y^{. 20}⁰⁶⁾^;^Iⁿ^r^e^Ap^plic^ati^oⁿ^of^t^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^{, 4}¹²^F.S^u^p^p^.^2d⁹⁴⁷^(E.D^.W^is^.
²⁰⁰⁶⁾^;^Iⁿ^r^e^A^pplic^atioⁿ^{of t}^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^,⁴⁰⁷^F^.^S^u^pp^.²^d¹³⁴⁽^D^.^D^.^C^.²⁰⁰⁶^{) (each}^d^eⁿ^yⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e a}^p^p^lⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ⁾^;^b^u^t^see,
^Iⁿ^r^e^Ap^plic^at^io^{n of}^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^,⁵^{09 F.S}^u^p^p^.2^{d 76}⁽^D^.Ma^s^s^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾^;^Iⁿ^r^e^A^pplic^atioⁿ^{of t}^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 4}⁶⁰
^F.Su^pp^.2^{d 4}⁴⁸^(S.D^.N^.Y^.²⁰⁰⁶^);^Iⁿ^r^e^Ap^plic^at^io^{n of}^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^a^t^e^s^{, 43}^{3 F.}^Su^pp.^2d⁸^{04 (}^S^.D^{. T}^e^x^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾^;^In^re
^Applic^ati^on^{of t}^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^,⁴¹¹^F.^Su^pp.^2d⁶^{78 (}^W^.D^.L^a^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.
¹⁵⁴^Se^e^g^e^ne^r^a^ll^y^,^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³⁰⁴⁶⁵^,^T^h^{e F}^o^rei^gⁿ^Iⁿ^t^e^l^lⁱ^g^eⁿ^{ce Su}^rvei^l^l^aⁿ^{ce A}^c^t^:^Aⁿ^Overvi^{ew o}^f^t^h^e^S^t^at^u^t^o^r^y
^Fr^am^e^w^or^k^,^b^y^E^lⁱ^zab^et^h^B.^Bazan^.

evidence of a crime.¹⁵⁵ Second, it operates in a highly secretive manner. But its most
individualistic feature is that the procedure is conducted entirely before members of an
independent court convened for no other purpose. The Act operates in the field of foreign
intelligence gathering, primarily through a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court whose judges
grant or reject petitions for wiretap and electronic surveillance orders, orders authorizing physical
searches and seizures, pen register and trap and trace orders, and orders relating to the surrender
of tangible items.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is comprised of eleven federal court judges ¹⁵⁶
designated by the Chief Justice to sit on the Court for a single seven year term. In the area of ¹⁵⁷
wiretaps and physical searches, the judges of the Court individually receive and approve or ¹⁵⁸
reject requests, authorized by the Attorney General, to conduct the four specific types of ¹⁵⁹¹⁶⁰
electronic surveillance noted earlier of the communications and activities of foreign powers.
The contents of FISA application include:
• the identity of the individual submitting the application;
• the identity or a description of the person whose communications are to be
intercepted;
• an indication of
• why the person is believed to be a foreign power or the agent of a foreign
power, and

¹⁵⁵^{In its}^orig^ina^l^f^o^rm^{, g}^a^the^r^ing^f^o^re^ig^{n inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^w^a^{s “}^t^he^”^purpo^se^f^o^r^w^h^ic^{h FISA}^surv^e^illa^nc^e^or^de^{rs w}^e^re
^s^oug^ht,⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁰⁴⁽^a⁾⁽⁷⁾⁽^B⁾⁽¹⁹⁸^{2 e}^d^.)^{. A}^ltho^u^g^h^a^m^e^nde^{d by}^the^U^S^A^P^A^T^R^I^O^T^A^c^{t, g}^a^the^r^ing^f^o^r^e^igⁿ
^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^m^u^{st still prov}ⁱ^d^e^a^“^s^ig^nifⁱ^c^aⁿ^t”^re^a^s^{on f}^o^{r se}^e^k^ing^a^FISA^surv^e^illa^nc^e^orde^{r, 5}⁰^U.S^.^{C. 18}^04(a⁾⁽⁷^)(B);^In
^r^e^Se^ale^d^C^a^s^e^,³¹⁰^F^.^3d⁷¹⁷^,⁽^F^.I^.^S^.^C^t^.^R^e^v.²⁰⁰²⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Nⁱⁿ^g^W^eⁿ^,⁴⁷^{7 F.}^3d⁸^96,⁸^{97 (}⁷^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾^.
¹⁵⁶⁵⁰^U^.^S.C.¹⁸⁰³^(a),(b^),(^d^{) (tex}^{t is}^ap^p^eⁿ^d^e^d⁾^.
¹⁵⁷^T^h^e^FISA^proc^e^dure^s^re^la^ting^t^o^wⁱ^re^ta^pping^a^{nd e}^l^e^c^t^ronⁱ^c^surv^e^illa^nc^e^orde^rs,^{50 U.}^S.C.¹⁸^01-¹⁸¹¹^{, a}ⁿ^{d t}^hose
^rel^a^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^o^p^h^y^si^cal^sear^ch^es,⁵⁰^U.^S^.^C.¹⁸²¹^-¹⁸²⁹^,^{are vi}^rt^u^a^l^l^yⁱ^d^en^tⁱ^cal^and^con^s^eq^u^eⁿ^t^l^y^{are t}^r^ea^t^e^d^t^o^get^h^er^h^e^re.
¹⁵⁸^P^.^L^.¹¹^0-2⁶¹^e^x^plic^itly^g^r^aⁿ^te^{d the}^FISA^c^{ourt j}^udg^e^s^the^a^u^th^orit^y^{to s}^{it a}^s^a^g^r^oup^{on t}^h^eⁱ^r^ow^{n in}^itia^tiv^e^{or o}ⁿ^t^h^e
^pe^titioⁿ^of^the^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^nt^w^h^eⁿ^a^m^a^jority^of^c^{ourt c}^onc^lu^de^{s tha}^t^a^pa^rtic^ula^r^m^a^tte^{r is e}^x^c^e^p^tiona^l^sigⁿ^if^ic^aⁿ^c^e^{or in}
^or^de^r^uⁿ^if^or^mⁱ^t^y^of^inte^r^p^r^e^ta^tion^am^ong^the^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^of^the^c^our^t,^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁰³⁽^a⁾⁽²⁾^.
¹⁵⁹⁵⁰^U^.^S.C.¹⁸⁰¹^(f^)(te^x^{t is a}^p^p^eⁿ^d^e^d^{). T}^h^e^c^o^u^r^ts^h^a^v^eⁿ^o^t^e^d^th^a^t^,^uⁿ^lik^e^su^rv^e^illaⁿ^c^e^uⁿ^d^e^{r T}^itle^III/EP^CA^{, sile}ⁿ^t
^vⁱ^de^{o surv}^e^illa^nc^e^f^a^lls^w^{ithin t}^h^e^purvⁱ^e^w^of^FISA^b^y^vⁱ^rtue^of^subse^c^{tion 1}⁸⁰¹^(f^)(4),^Unⁱ^t^ed^St^a^t^es^v.^Ko^yo^mejⁱ^aⁿ^,
⁹⁷⁰^F.^2d⁵^36,⁵⁴^{0 (}⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹²⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^a^t^{es v.}^Mesa^-Rⁱⁿ^con^{, 9}^{11 F.2}^d¹⁴^33,¹⁴³⁸⁽¹^0th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁰⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s
^v.^Bⁱ^a^s^u^cci^,⁷⁸^{6 F}^.²^d⁵⁰⁴^,⁵⁰⁸⁽²^{d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^.
¹⁶⁰^“^‘^For^e^ig^{n p}^o^w^e^r^’^m^e^aⁿ^s^{– (}¹⁾^a^f^o^r^e^ig^{n g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt or}^aⁿ^y^c^o^m^pone^{nt t}^h^e^r^e^o^f^,^w^h^e^t^he^r^orⁿ^o^{t r}^e^c^o^gⁿ^iz^e^d^by^the
^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^{; (}²⁾^a^f^a^c^tion^of^a^f^o^r^e^ig^{n na}^tio^{n or}^na^ti^ons^,^no^{t s}^u^bs^ta^ntia^lly^c^o^m^pos^e^d^of^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^pe^r^s^ons^;⁽³⁾^aⁿ
^eⁿ^tity^tha^t^{is ope}^nly^a^c^k^now^le^dg^e^d^by^a^f^o^re^ig^{n g}^o^v^e^rn^m^e^nt^{or g}^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nts to be}^dire^c^t^e^d^a^{nd c}^ontr^o^lle^d^by^suc^h
^f^o^re^ig^{n g}^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt or g}^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nts; (4)}^a^g^r^ou^{p e}ⁿ^g^a^g^e^{d in}ⁱⁿ^te^rn^a^tiona^{l te}^rr^orism^{or a}^c^tiv^itie^{s in p}^r^e^p^a^r^a^{tion t}^h^e^r^e^f^or;
^{(5) a}^f^o^re^ig^n-ba^se^{d p}^o^litic^a^l^org^a^niz^a^tion^,ⁿ^o^{t s}^ubsta^nt^ia^lly^c^o^m^pose^d^of^Unite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^pe^{rsons; (}⁶⁾^aⁿ^eⁿ^tity^tha^t^is
^dir^e^c^t^e^d^aⁿ^d^c^oⁿ^t^r^o^lle^{d by}^a^f^o^r^eⁱ^g^{n g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt or}^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nts^;^or^an^eⁿ^tity^not^subst^ant^ially^c^o^mp^ose^d^of^Unite^d
^State^s^pe^rsons^t^hat^{is e}ⁿ^g^age^{d i}ⁿ^the^inte^rn^ati^oⁿ^a^l^prolife^ra^tioⁿ^of^we^apo^{ns of}^{mass de}^struc^tⁱ^oⁿ^,”⁵⁰^U^.^S.C.
¹⁸⁰¹⁽^a⁾⁽^l^aⁿ^g^u^a^g^e^{in i}^t^a^lic^s^a^dde^dⁱⁿ^P^.^L^.¹¹^0-²⁶¹⁾^.^N^o^te^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^de^fⁱ^nition^of^f^o^r^e^ig^{n pow}^e^r^inc^l^ude^s^inte^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^ona^l
^te^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^s^g^r^ou^ps^r^e^g^a^r^d^le^s^s^of^w^h^e^t^he^r^aⁿ^y^ne^x^u^s^{to a}^f^o^r^e^ig^{n pow}^e^r^c^aⁿ^be^s^h^ow^{n, 5}⁰^U^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁰¹⁽^a⁾⁽⁴⁾^aⁿ^{d inc}^l^ude^s
^a^g^eⁿ^ts^of^f^o^r^e^ig^{n pow}^e^r^s^tha^t^no^l^ong^e^r^e^x^is^t,^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^S^qui^l^l^ac^ote^,²²^{1 F}^.^3d⁵^42,⁵^{54 (}⁴^t^h^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁽^a^g^e^nts^of
^{East G}^e^r^m^an^yⁱⁿ^tercep^ted^uⁿ^d^e^{r a}ⁿ^o^r^d^e^{r g}^r^an^ted^af^{ter u}ⁿⁱ^fⁱ^catioⁿ⁾^.^M^o^reo^v^{er, at least u}ⁿ^til^{it ex}^pⁱ^res^oⁿ^Decem^b^e^{r 3}¹^,
²⁰⁰^9,^the^de^fⁱ^nition^of^“^a^g^eⁿ^{t of}^fore^ig^{n p}^o^w^e^r”^{(50 U.}^S.C.¹⁸⁰¹⁽^b)^(1)(c^{)) inc}^l^ude^{s i}ⁿ^te^rna^tio^na^{l te}^rro^{rists w}^{ith no}
^ne^c^e^s^s^a^r^y^{to c}^onne^c^tio^{n to}^a^f^o^r^e^ig^{n pow}^e^r^or^g^r^ou^{p. T}^h^e^FI^SA^phy^sⁱ^c^a^l^s^e^a^r^c^h^pr^ov^is^ions^a^d^op^{t by}^c^r^os^s^r^e^f^e^r^e^nce^the
^de^fⁱ^nitions^of^“^f^or^eⁱ^gⁿ^pow^e^r^”^aⁿ^{d “}^a^g^eⁿ^{t of}^a^f^o^r^e^ig^{n pow}^e^r^,”⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.¹⁸²¹⁽¹⁾^.

• why foreign powers or their agents are believed to use the targeted
facilities or places;
• a summary of the minimization procedures¹⁶¹ to be followed;
• a description of the communications to be intercepted and the information ¹⁶²
sought;
• certification by a senior national security or senior defense official designed by
the President that
• the information sought is foreign intelligence information,
• a significant purpose of interception is to secure foreign intelligence
information,
• the information cannot reasonably be obtained using alternative ¹⁶³
means,
• a summary statement of the means of accomplishing the interception (including ¹⁶⁴
whether a physical entry will be required);
• a history of past interception applications involving the same persons, places or
facilities;
• the period of time during which the interception is to occur, whether it will
terminate immediately upon obtaining the information sought, and if not, the ¹⁶⁵
reasons why interception thereafter is likely to be productive intercepted.
FISA court judges issue orders approving electronic surveillance or physical searches upon a
finding that the application requirements have been met and that there is probable cause to
believe that the target is a foreign power or the agent of a foreign power and that the targeted ¹⁶⁶
places or facilities are used by foreign powers of their agents.

¹⁶¹^“^M^inim^iz^a^{tion pr}^oc^e^dur^e^s^”^a^r^e^d^e^fⁱ^ne^{d in 5}⁰^U^.^S^.^C^.¹⁸⁰¹⁽^h)^{. T}^h^e^y^a^r^e^e^s^se^ntia^lly^thos^e^pr^oc^e^dur^e^s^de^sⁱ^gⁿ^e^d^t^o
^mⁱⁿⁱ^mⁱ^z^e^the^unne^c^e^ssa^r^y^a^c^quisition^,^re^te^nti^on,^aⁿ^d^disse^mⁱ^na^tion^of^inf^o^rm^a^{tion re}^la^ting^t^o^U.S^.^pe^{rsons (Am}^e^ric^aⁿ
^c^itiz^eⁿ^s^,^pe^r^m^aⁿ^eⁿ^{t r}^e^sⁱ^de^{nt a}^lieⁿ^s^{, U}^.^{S. c}^o^r^por^a^tⁱ^ons^{, a}ⁿ^d^or^g^a^niz^a^tions^a^s^ubs^ta^nt^ia^{l n}^u^m^b^e^r^of^w^hos^e^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^a^r^e
^A^m^e^r^ic^aⁿ^s⁾^{. L}ⁱ^k^e^the^proc^e^dure^sⁱⁿ^T^itle^{III, t}^h^e^y^a^r^e^c^r^a^f^te^{d to m}ⁱ^nimⁱ^z^e^the^a^m^{ount of}^“ⁱⁿⁿ^oc^eⁿ^t”^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions
^cap^t^u^red^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^o^{ns w}^hⁱ^c^h^{are t}^h^{e t}^a^rget^o^f^t^h^{e o}^r^d^e^r^an^d^requⁱ^r^{e a goo}^d^f^aⁱ^t^h^ef^f^o^rt^oⁿ^t^h^{e p}^a^rt^o^f^t^h^e
^g^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt to a}^v^oid^the^c^a^p^t^u^re^a^{nd re}^teⁿ^tio^{n of}^irre^le^v^a^{nt m}^a^te^ria^l^,^Un^{ited S}^t^a^t^{es v.}^Ha^mmou^d^,³⁸¹^F^.^3d³¹^6,³³⁴
⁽⁴^{th C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁴⁾^,^v^a^c^’^{d on}^ot^he^r^g^r^oun^ds^,⁵⁴^{3 U}^.^S^.¹⁰⁹⁷⁽²⁰⁰⁴⁾^,^r^eⁱⁿ^s^t^a^t^e^dⁱⁿ^pe^r^tineⁿ^{t pa}^r^t^a^f^te^r^r^e^m^a^nd,⁴⁰⁵^F.3^d¹⁰³⁴
⁽⁴^{th C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁵⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Ros^eⁿ^,⁴⁴^{7 F.}^Su^pp.^2d⁵^38,⁵^50-⁵¹⁽^E^.D^.^V^a^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.
¹⁶²^Se^c^tion¹⁰⁴⁽^a⁾⁽¹⁾⁽^c⁾^of^P.L^.¹¹^0-²⁶¹^e^lim^ina^t^e^d^the^r^e^q^u^ir^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^a^“^d^e^t^a^ile^d”^de^s^c^rⁱ^pti^on.
¹⁶³^S^ectⁱ^o^{n 10}⁴⁽^a)(1^)(D)^o^f^P^.^L^.¹^10-2⁶¹^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^t^h^e^P^r^esi^d^en^t^t^o^desi^gn^at^{e t}^h^{e Dep}^u^t^y^Di^rect^o^r^o^f^t^h^{e F}^e^d^e^ral
^Bu^reau^o^f^In^vestⁱ^g^atⁱ^oⁿ^{as a cert}ⁱ^f^yⁱⁿ^g^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^as^w^e^l^l^.
¹⁶⁴^S^ectⁱ^o^{n 10}⁴⁽^a)(1⁾⁽^E⁾^o^f^P^.^L^.¹¹^-26¹^add^e^d^t^h^at^t^h^{e st}^at^em^en^tⁿ^eed^oⁿ^l^y^b^e^“su^mmar^y^.^”
¹⁶⁵^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁰⁴⁽^t^e^x^{t is}^a^p^pe^nde^d⁾^{. 5}⁰^U^.^S.C^.¹⁸²³^r^e^la^ti^ng^{to a}^p^pli^c^a^tions^f^o^r^a^FI^SA^phy^sⁱ^c^a^l^s^e^a^r^{ch or}^de^r^is
^e^s^s^e^ntia^ll^y^the^s^a^m^e^{. Se}^c^{tion 1}⁰⁴⁽^a⁾⁽¹⁾⁽^A⁾^of^P^.^L^.¹¹^0-²⁶¹^e^lim^ina^t^e^d^the^re^q^u^ire^m^eⁿ^{t tha}^t^the^a^pplic^a^{tion i}ⁿ^dⁱ^c^a^t^e^tha^t
^t^h^{e A}^t^t^o^rn^ey^G^eⁿ^e^ral^ap^p^r^o^v^ed^t^h^{e ap}^p^lⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^and^t^h^at^t^h^e^P^r^esi^d^eⁿ^t^h^a^d^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^{zed h}ⁱ^m^t^o^d^o^s^o^.^It^al^so^elⁱ^mⁱⁿ^at^ed^t^h^e
^req^uⁱ^rem^eⁿ^t^t^h^at^t^h^{e app}^lⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^dⁱ^cat^{e w}^h^et^h^e^{r m}^o^{re t}^h^an^on^{e i}ⁿ^t^e^rcep^tⁱ^oⁿ^d^e^vi^{ce was t}^o^b^e^u^s^ed^aⁿ^dⁱ^f^so^t^h^ei^{r ran}^g^e
^an^d^t^h^{e m}ⁱⁿⁱ^mⁱ^z^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^p^r^o^ced^u^r^es^asso^ci^at^ed^wⁱ^t^h^each^.^S^ectⁱ^oⁿ¹^04(a)(2^{) o}^f^P^.^L^.¹¹⁰^-²⁶¹^,^h^o^w^ever,^r^e^p^eal^ed^t^h^e
^la^ng^ua^g^e^onc^e^f^oundⁱⁿ⁵⁰^U^.^S.C.¹⁸⁰⁴⁽^{b) w}^h^ic^{h, w}^h^eⁿ^t^h^e^ta^rg^e^t^o^f^the^s^u^rv^e^illa^nc^e^w^a^s^a^f^o^re^ig^{n pow}^e^r^{, e}^x^c^u^s^e^{d the}
^inc^l^usioⁿ^of^m^u^ltiple^de^vⁱ^c^e^inf^o^rm^a^tion,^of^a^sta^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^the^m^e^aⁿ^{s of}^e^x^e^c^u^tion,^of^a^sta^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t re}^la^ting^{to t}^h^e^ba^sis
^f^o^{r the}^“^l^a^s^{t re}^sort”^a^{nd f}^o^re^ig^{n i}ⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^inf^o^rm^a^{tion c}^e^r^tif^ic^a^{tions, a}ⁿ^{d of}^a^de^sc^ripti^on^of^the^inf^o^rm^a^{tion soug}^ht
^a^{nd t}^h^e^ty^pe^of^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^t^a^r^g^e^t^e^d^.
¹⁶⁶⁵⁰^U^.^S^.^C.¹⁸⁰⁵^{(a) (t}^extⁱ^s^ap^p^e^nd^ed^);⁵⁰^U.^S^.^C.¹⁸²⁴⁽^a)ⁱ^s^t^o^t^h^e^sa^m^e^e^f^f^e^ct^wⁱ^t^h^resp^ect^t^o^p^h^y^si^cal^search^o^r^d^e^rs.

Orders approving electronic surveillance must:
• specify
• the identity or a description of the person whose communications are to
be intercepted,
• the nature and location of the targeted facilities or places, if known,
• type of communications or activities targeted and the kind of information
sought,
• the means by which interception is to be accomplished and whether
physical entry is authorized,
• the tenure of the authorization, and
• whether more than one device are to be used and if so their respective
ranges and associated minimization procedures;
• require
• that minimization procedures be adhered to,
• upon request, that carriers and others provide assistance,¹⁶⁷
• that those providing assistance observe certain security precautions, and ¹⁶⁸
be compensated;
• direct the applicant to advise the court of the particulars relating to surveillance
directed at additional facilities and places when the order permits surveillance
although the nature and location of targeted facilities and places were unknown at
the time of issuance;
• expire when its purpose is accomplished but not later than after 90 days generally
(after 120 days in the case of certain foreign agents and after a year in the case of

¹⁶⁷^“^A^{n orde}^{r a}^ppr^ov^ing^aⁿ^e^l^e^c^t^roⁿⁱ^c^s^u^rv^e^illa^nc^e^unde^{r t}^h^is^s^e^c^tio^{n s}^h^a^{ll .}^{. . (}²⁾^dire^c^t^{– (B)}^tha^t^,^u^p^oⁿ^the^re^q^u^e^s^{t of}
^the^a^ppl^ic^aⁿ^{t, a}^s^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion^or^ot^he^r^c^o^m^m^{on c}^a^r^rⁱ^e^r^{, la}^ndl^or^d^,^c^u^s^t^o^d^iaⁿ^,^or^ot^he^r^s^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^pe^r^s^on,^orⁱⁿ
^cⁱ^r^c^um^s^t^anc^e^s^w^h^e^r^e^the^C^o^ur^{t fi}^nds^t^hat^the^ac^tio^ns^of^the^t^a^r^g^e^t^{of t}^h^e^a^pplic^atio^{n m}^a^y^hav^e^t^h^e^e^f^fe^c^t^{of t}^h^w^a^r^tⁱ^ng
^the^ideⁿ^tific^at^io^{n o}^f^a^spe^c^ifie^d^pe^{rson, suc}^h^o^t^he^{r pe}^rso^ns^{, f}^u^rnish^the^a^ppl^ic^aⁿ^{t f}^o^rthw^{ith a}^ll^inf^o^rm^a^tion,^f^a^c^ilitie^{s, or}
^techⁿⁱ^{cal assistan}^{ce n}^ecessar^y^to^acco^m^p^lis^h^th^{e electro}ⁿⁱ^{c su}^rv^eill^an^{ce in}^su^ch^{a m}^aⁿⁿ^e^{r as}^w^{ill p}^r^o^t^{ect its secrec}^y^an^d
^pr^o^duc^e^a^mⁱ^nim^u^m^of^inte^r^f^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^w^{ith the}^s^e^r^v^ic^e^s^tha^t^s^u^c^h^c^a^r^rⁱ^e^r^{, la}^ndl^or^d^,^c^u^s^t^odiaⁿ^{, or}^ot^he^r^p^e^r^s^{on is}^pr^ov^idiⁿ^g
^tha^t^ta^rg^e^t^of^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^surv^e^illaⁿ^c^e^,^”^{50 U.S.C}^.¹⁸⁰⁵^(c^)(2)(B).^By^vⁱ^rtue^of^se^c^{tion 1}⁰²⁽^b)^of^the^US^A^P^A^T^R^IO^T
^Im^p^r^o^v^e^m^en^t^an^d^Reau^t^h^o^rⁱ^zatⁱ^oⁿ^A^c^t^,^t^h^{e l}^aⁿ^g^u^a^{ge i}ⁿⁱ^t^a^lⁱ^c^{s exp}ⁱ^{res o}ⁿ^Decem^b^e^{r 3}¹^,²⁰⁰⁹^,^uⁿ^l^ess^st^at^u^t^o^rⁱ^l^y
^e^x^te^nde^{d or}^m^a^de^pe^r^m^aⁿ^eⁿ^{t, P.L}^.¹⁰^9-¹⁷^{7, §}¹⁰²⁽^b⁾¹²⁰^Sta^t^.¹⁹^{5 (}²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.
¹⁶⁸⁵⁰^U^.^S.C.¹⁸⁰⁵^(c)(2^)(C),(D);⁵⁰^U.S.C.¹⁸²⁴⁽^c)(2^)(C)^,^(D)(tex^tⁱ^s^ap^p^e^nd^ed^).^F^I^S^A^p^h^y^si^cal^sear^ch^ord^e^{rs m}^u^st^al^so
^dir^e^c^t^“^t^he^f^e^de^r^a^{l of}^fⁱ^c^e^r^c^onduc^tⁱ^ng^the^phy^sⁱ^c^a^l^s^e^a^r^c^h^pr^om^ptly^r^e^por^{t t}^o^t^h^e^c^our^{t the}^cⁱ^r^c^um^s^t^aⁿ^ce^s^a^{nd r}^e^s^u^lts^of
^th^{e p}^h^y^s^ic^{al search}^{,” 5}⁰^U.S.C^.¹⁸²⁴^(c)(2^)(E).
^T^h^{e US}^A^P^A^T^R^IO^T^A^c^t^’^{s a}^m^en^d^m^en^t^s^{make i}^t^cl^{ear t}^h^at^t^h^o^s^{e w}^h^o^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^{e su}^{ch assi}^st^an^{ce are i}^m^m^uⁿ^e^f^r^o^m^ci^vi^l
^s^u^it,^{18 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁰⁵⁽ⁱ⁾⁽^“^N^o^c^a^u^s^e^of^a^c^{tion s}^h^a^{ll l}ⁱ^e^{in a}ⁿ^y^c^our^{t a}^g^aⁱ^ns^{t a}ⁿ^y^pr^ov^ide^r^of^a^wⁱ^r^e^or^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion s}^e^r^v^ic^e^,^la^ndlor^d,^c^u^s^t^odiaⁿ^,^or^ot^he^r^pe^r^s^oⁿ^s⁽ⁱ^nc^lu^ding^aⁿ^y^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^{, em}^ploy^e^e^,^a^g^eⁿ^{t, or}^othe^r^s^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^e^d
^p^e^rsoⁿ^t^h^ereo^f⁾^th^{at f}^u^rn^ish^e^{s an}^yⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^atioⁿ^,^f^acilities,^o^r^techⁿⁱ^c^a^{l assistan}^{ce in}^acco^rd^an^{ce w}^ith^{a co}^u^r^t^o^r^d^e^r^o^r
^re^que^s^t^f^o^{r e}^m^e^r^g^e^ncy^a^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^unde^r^this^A^c^{t f}^o^{r e}^l^e^c^t^ronic^s^u^rv^e^illa^nc^e^{or p}^h^y^s^ic^a^l^s^e^a^r^c^h^”⁾^{. A}^s^dis^c^us^s^e^{d a}^t^g^r^e^a^t^e^r
^le^ng^{th la}^te^r,^P.L^.¹¹^0-2^{61 a}^f^f^o^{rds se}^rv^ic^e^prov^ide^r^{s re}^tr^oa^c^tiv^e^prot^e^c^{tion f}^o^{r f}^o^re^ig^{n inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^a^ssistaⁿ^c^e^prov^ide^d
^outsⁱ^de^the^c^o^nf^ine^s^of^FI^SA^.

foreign governments or their entities or factions of foreign nations) unless ¹⁶⁹
extended (extensions may not exceed one year).
As in the case of law enforcement wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, there is authority ¹⁷⁰
for interception and physical searches prior to approval in emergency situations, but there is
also statutory authority for foreign intelligence surveillance interceptions and physical searches
without the requirement of a court order when the targets are limited to communications among
or between foreign powers or involve nonverbal communications from places under the open and ¹⁷¹
exclusive control of a foreign power. The second of these is replete with reporting requirements ¹⁷²¹⁷³
to Congress and the FISA court. These and the twin war time exceptions may be subject to ¹⁷⁴
constitutional limitations, particularly when Americans are the surveillance targets.
FISA has detailed provisions governing the use of the information acquired through the use of its
surveillance or physical search authority that include:
• confidentiality requirements, 50 U.S.C. 1806(a), 1825(a);
• notice of required Attorney General approval for disclosure, 50 U.S.C. 1806(b),

1825(b);

• notice to the “aggrieved” of the government’s intention to use the results as
evidence, 50 U.S.C. 1806(c),(d), 1825(c),(d);
• suppression procedures, 50 U.S.C. 1806(e), (f), (g), (h), 1825(e), (f), (g), (h);¹⁷⁵
• inadvertently captured information, 50 U.S.C. 1806(I), 1825(b);

¹⁶⁹⁵⁰^U^.^S.C.¹⁸⁰⁵^{(c); 1}⁸²⁴^{(c) (tex}^t^{is ap}^p^eⁿ^d^ed^).
¹⁷⁰^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁰⁵⁽^f⁾^;¹⁸²⁴⁽^e⁾⁽^t^e^x^t^is^a^ppeⁿ^d^e^d⁾^.^P.L^.¹^10-²⁶^{1 e}^x^te^nds^the^pe^r^m^is^sⁱ^ble^le^ng^{th of}^e^m^e^r^g^e^ncy
^a^u^thor^iz^a^tions^a^b^s^e^{nt c}^o^ur^{t a}^p^pr^o^v^a^{l f}^r^o^m^{72 ho}^ur^s^t^o⁷^da^y^s^{. I}^t^a^l^s^o^r^e^m^o^v^e^s^ea^r^lie^r^la^ng^ua^g^e^w^h^ic^{h c}^a^lle^{d f}^o^r^r^e^vⁱ^ew
^o^f^{a F}^I^S^A^co^u^r^t^d^eⁿⁱ^al^o^f^an^ap^plⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^app^r^o^v^{e an}^em^erg^eⁿ^c^y^a^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^zatⁱ^oⁿ^.^Fⁱⁿ^a^l^l^y^,ⁱ^t^st^at^{es t}^h^at^t^h^{e A}^t^t^o^rn^ey
^G^e^ne^r^a^{l is}^{to a}^s^s^e^s^s^c^o^m^p^lia^nc^e^w^{ith t}^h^e^s^t^a^t^ut^or^y^pr^ov^is^ions^w^h^ic^h^pe^r^m^{it us}^e^of^the^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion s}^e^cur^e^{d u}^nde^r^aⁿ
^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^zatⁱ^o^{n w}^hⁱ^c^h^f^aⁱ^l^s^t^o^secu^{re j}^u^dⁱ^ci^al^app^r^o^v^al^.
¹⁷¹⁵⁰^U^.^S.C.¹⁸⁰²^(a)(1^),(⁴^);¹⁸²²⁽^a⁾⁽¹^{), (}⁴^{) (tex}^{t is ap}^p^eⁿ^d^e^d⁾^.
¹⁷²⁵⁰^U^.^S.C.¹⁸⁰²^(a)(2^),(³^);¹⁸²²⁽^a⁾⁽²^{), (}³^{) (tex}^{t is ap}^p^eⁿ^d^e^d⁾^.
¹⁷³^“^N^otw^ithsta^nding^aⁿ^y^othe^{r la}^w^,^the^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^t^,^t^h^ro^ug^h^t^h^e^A^ttorne^y^Ge^ne^ra^{l, m}^a^y^a^u^thoriz^e^e^l^e^c^t^ronⁱ^c^surv^e^illa^nc^e
^w^{ithout a}^c^o^ur^t^or^de^r^un^de^r^this^s^ubc^ha^p^t^e^r^{to a}^c^q^uir^e^f^o^r^e^ig^{n inte}^l^lⁱ^g^e^nc^e^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^o^r^a^pe^rⁱ^o^dⁿ^o^{t t}^o^e^x^ceed^fⁱ^f^t^een
^c^a^l^e^nda^r^da^y^s^f^o^llowⁱ^ng^a^de^c^l^a^r^ation^of^w^a^r^b^y^the^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^“⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.¹⁸^11.
^“^N^otw^iths^t^a^nding^aⁿ^y^othe^r^pr^ovⁱ^s^ion^of^la^w^,^the^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t, t}^h^r^o^ug^{h the}^A^ttorⁿ^e^y^G^e^ne^r^a^{l, m}^a^y^a^u^thor^iz^e^phy^sⁱ^c^a^l
^s^e^a^r^c^h^e^s^w^{ithout a}^c^o^urt^orde^r^un^de^{r this}^s^ubc^ha^pte^r^to^a^c^quire^f^o^re^ig^{n inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^inf^o^rm^a^{tion f}^o^{r a}^pe^riodⁿ^o^{t t}^o
^exce^ed¹⁵^cal^end^a^{r d}^a^y^s^f^o^l^l^o^wⁱⁿ^g^{a d}^ecl^aratⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^w^a^{r b}^y^t^h^{e Co}^ngress,^{” 5}⁰^U.^S^.^C.¹⁸²⁹^.
¹⁷⁴^{Over t}^h^{e years,}^h^o^w^e^v^er,^t^h^{e vast}^m^a^j^o^ri^t^y^o^f^co^u^r^t^s^h^a^{ve rej}^ect^ed^t^h^{e su}^ggestⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^at^F^I^S^Aⁱ^s^vu^lⁿ^er^ab^l^e^t^o
^c^ons^titu^tio^na^{l a}^tta^c^k^on^Fo^urth^A^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t g}^r^ounds^{or a}ⁿ^y^othe^r,^Iⁿ^r^e^Se^ale^d^C^a^s^e^,³¹^{0 F}^.³^d⁷¹⁷^,⁷^37-⁴⁶
^(F.I.S.Ct^.^Re^v^.²⁰⁰²⁾^;^Un^ite^d^Sta^t^{es v.}^Da^mra^h^,⁴¹^{2 F}^.³^d⁶¹⁸^,⁶^24-^{25 (}⁶^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁵⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^v^.^M^ubay^yⁱ^d^,⁵²¹
^F.Su^pp^.2^{d 1}²⁵^,¹^35-³⁶⁽^D^{. Ma}^s^s^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Be^nk^a^h^l^a^,⁴³^{7 F}^.^Su^pp^.2^{d 5}⁴¹^,⁵^54-⁵⁵⁽^E^.D^.^V^a^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾^;
^c^ontra,^M^a^y^fie^{ld v}^.^Unite^d^St^ate^s^,⁵⁰^{4 F}^.^Su^pp^.2^{d 1}⁰²³^,¹⁰^36-⁴³⁽^D^{. O}^r^e^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾^.
¹⁷⁵^Coⁿ^sⁱ^d^eratⁱ^o^{n o}^f^{a m}^o^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^supp^{ress o}^ccu^{rs ex p}^a^rt^{e an}^dⁱⁿ^cam^e^r^{a w}^h^en^t^h^{e go}^vern^men^t^fⁱ^l^e^{s a n}^o^tⁱ^{ce t}^h^at
^na^tio^na^{l s}^e^c^u^r^ity^w^ould^othe^r^w^is^e^be^c^o^m^p^r^o^mⁱ^s^e^{d, 50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁰⁶⁽^f⁾^;^Iⁿ^r^e^G^r^{and J}^u^r^y^Pr^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^s^,³⁴^{7 F.3}^d¹⁹^7,
²⁰³⁽⁷^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰³⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^D^a^m^r^ah^,⁴¹^{2 F}^.³^d⁶¹⁸^,⁶²³^-²⁴⁽⁶^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁵⁾^;^r^e^vi^ewⁱ^s^t^h^{e same as t}^h^at^af^f^o^r^d^ed
^by^the^FI^SA^c^our^{t, s}^t^a^t^ut^or^y^c^o^m^p^lia^nc^e^;^t^h^e^r^e^is^no^a^u^t^hor^ity^{to “}^s^e^c^{ond g}^u^e^s^s^the^e^x^e^c^u^tiv^e^br^aⁿ^c^h^e^s^c^e^r^tifⁱ^c^a^tion,”^In
^r^e^G^r^{and J}^u^r^y^Pr^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^s^,³⁴⁷^F.3^d¹⁹⁷^,²^04-²⁰^{5 (}⁷^{th C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰³⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^C^a^m^p^a^,⁵²⁹^F.3^d⁹^80,⁹^{93 (}¹¹^t^h
^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁸⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^v^.^Am^a^wⁱ^,⁵^{31 F.S}^u^p^p^.2^{d 83}^{2, 83}⁷⁽^N^.D^.^O^h^{io 20}⁰⁸⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^A^b^u-Ji^h^a^a^d^{, 53}¹
^F^.^S^u^p^p^.²^d²⁹^9,³¹^{2 (}^D^.^C^onⁿ^.²⁰⁰⁸⁾^.

• notification of emergency surveillance or search for which no FISA order was
subsequently secured, 50 U.S.C. 1806(j), 1825(j); and
• clarification that those who execute FISA surveillance or physical search orders
may consult with federal and state law enforcement officers, 50 U.S.C. 1806(k),

1825(k).

Both the surveillance and the physical search authorities are subject to Congressional oversight in
the form of semiannual reports on the extent and circumstances of their use, 50 U.S.C. 1808,

1826.

FISA pen register and trap and trace procedures, 50 U.S.C. 1841-1846, are similar to those of
their law enforcement counterparts, but with many of the attributes of other FISA provisions. The
orders may be issued either by a member of the FISA court or by a FISA magistrate upon the
certification of a federal officer that the information sought is likely to be relevant to an
investigation of international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, 50 U.S.C. 1842. The
order may direct service providers to supply customer information related to order, 50 U.S.C.
1842.(d)(2)(C). The statute allows the Attorney General to authorize emergency installation and
use as long as an application is filed within 48 hours, 50 U.S.C. 1843, and restricts the use of any
resulting evidence if an order is not subsequently granted, 50 U.S.C. 1843(c)(2). The provisions
for use of the information acquired run parallel to those that apply to FISA surveillance and
physical search orders, 50 U.S.C. 1845. The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization
Act increased the level of Congressional oversight by requiring that the semiannual report on the
government’s recourse to FISA pen register/trap and trace authority including statistical
information on the extent its use, 50 U.S.C. 1846.
FISA’s tangible item orders, 50 U.S.C. 1861, are perhaps its most interesting feature. Prior to the
USA PATRIOT Act, senior FBI officials could approve an application to a FISA judge or
magistrate for an order authorizing common carriers, or public accommodation, storage facility,
or vehicle rental establishments to release their business records based upon certification of a
reason to believe that the records pertained to a foreign power or the agent of a foreign power, 50
U.S.C. 1862 (2000 ed.). The USA PATRIOT Act and later the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act temporarily rewrote the procedure. In its temporary form, it requires rather
than authorizes access; it is predicated upon relevancy rather than probable cause; it applies to all
tangible property (not merely records); and it applies to the tangible property of both individuals ¹⁷⁶
or organizations, commercial and otherwise. It is limited, however, to investigations conducted
to secure foreign intelligence information or to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities, 50 U.S.C. 1861(a).
Recipients are prohibited from disclosing the existence of the order, but are expressly authorized
to consult an attorney with respect to their rights and obligations under the order, 50 U.S.C.

1861(d). They enjoy immunity from civil liability for good faith compliance, 50 U.S.C. 1861(e).

¹⁷⁶^Un^l^e^{ss l}^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^v^{e ext}^eⁿ^d^e^d^,^t^h^{e au}^t^h^o^rⁱ^t^y^revert^{s t}^oⁱ^t^s^p^r^e-US^A^P^A^T^R^IO^T^A^c^t^f^o^r^m^oⁿ^Decem^b^e^r³¹^,²⁰⁰⁹^,⁵⁰
^U^.^S.C^.¹⁸^{61 note}^;^P^.^L^.¹^09-¹⁷^{7, §10}²⁽^b)^{, 12}⁰^Sta^t^.¹⁹⁵⁽²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.

They may challenge the legality of the order and/or ask that its disclosure restrictions be lifted or
modified, 50 U.S.C. 1861(f). The grounds for lifting the secrecy requirements are closely defined,
but petitions for reconsideration may be filed annually, 50 U.S.C. 1861(f)(2)(C)(iii). The decision
to set aside, modify or let stand either the disclosure restrictions of an order or the underlying
order itself are subject to appellate review, 50 U.S.C. 1861(f)(3),(4),(5).
As addition safeguards, Congress has:
• insisted upon the promulgation of minimization standards, 50 U.S.C. 1861(g);
• established use restrictions, 50 U.S.C. 1861(h),
• required the approval of senior officials in order to seek orders covering the
records of libraries and certain other types of records, 50 U.S.C. 1861(a)(3);
• confirmed and reenforced reporting requirements, 50 U.S.C. 1862; and
• directed the Justice Department’s Inspector General to conduct an audit of the use
of the FISA tangible item authority, P.L. 109-177, §106A, 120 Stat. 200-202
(2006).
The Protect America Act (Protect Act) granted the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence the power, under limited conditions, to authorize gathering foreign intelligence ¹⁷⁷
information, including by electronic surveillance, (for up to a year) relating to persons believed ¹⁷⁸
to be overseas. In order to exercise that power, the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence were required to certify under oath that the collection effort involved:
• procedures reasonably calculated to assure that the information sought concerned
a person outside the United States;
• communications to which service providers or others had access;
• a desire, at least in significant part, to gather foreign intelligence information;
• accompanying minimization procedures; and

¹⁷⁷^“^‘^Fore^ig^{n i}ⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^inf^o^rm^a^{tion’ m}^e^aⁿ^{s – (1) i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^a^{tion th}^a^t^re^la^te^{s to, a}ⁿ^{d if}^c^onc^e^rⁿⁱ^ng^a^Unite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^pe^rsoⁿ
^{is ne}^c^e^ssa^r^y^{to, the}^a^b^ili^ty^of^the^Unite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^to^prote^c^t^a^g^aⁱ^{nst –}^(A^{) a}^c^t^ua^l^{or pote}ⁿ^tia^{l a}^tta^c^k^{or o}^t^he^{r g}^r^a^v^e^hostile
^act^{s o}^f^a^f^o^rei^gⁿ^p^o^w^{er o}^r^an^agen^t^o^f^{a f}^o^rei^gⁿ^p^o^w^er;^{(B) sab}^o^t^age,ⁱⁿ^t^e^rⁿ^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^t^e^rro^ri^sm^,^{or the}^int^e^rnatio^nal
^prolife^ratⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^we^ap^ons^{of m}^a^ss^de^struc^tioⁿ^by^a^f^o^r^e^ig^{n pow}^e^r^or^aⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^{t of}^a^f^o^r^e^ig^{n pow}^e^r^{; or}⁽^C⁾^c^l^a^nde^s^tine
^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^a^c^tiv^itie^{s by}^aⁿ^inte^lli^g^e^nc^e^se^r^v^ic^e^{or ne}^tw^ork^of^a^f^o^re^ig^{n pow}^e^r^{or by}^aⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^{t of}^a^f^o^r^e^ig^{n pow}^e^r^{; or (2)}
^inf^o^rm^a^{tion w}^{ith re}^spe^c^t^{to a}^f^o^re^ig^{n pow}^e^r^{or f}^o^re^ig^{n te}^rritory^t^h^at^rel^a^t^e^{s t}^o^,^andⁱ^f^coⁿ^cernⁱⁿ^g^{a Uni}^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es p}^e^rson
^{is ne}^c^e^ssa^r^y^{to – (A}^{) the}^na^tio^na^l^de^f^e^nse^{or the}^se^c^u^rity^of^the^Unite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^{; or}^(B)^the^c^oⁿ^duc^t^of^th^e^f^o^re^ig^{n a}^f^f^a^irs
^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^,”⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁰¹⁽^e⁾⁽^l^aⁿ^g^u^a^g^e^{in ita}^lic^s^a^d^de^{d b}^y^P^.^L^.^110-²⁶¹^didⁿ^o^{t a}^p^ply^w^h^eⁿ^the^Pr^ote^c^t^A^c^t
^w^a^{s i}ⁿ^eff^ect^).
¹⁷⁸^P^.^L^.¹¹^0-⁵⁵^,^§§^2,^3,¹²^{1 S}^t^a^t^.⁵⁵^{2 (}²⁰⁰⁷⁾^,⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁰⁵^a^-¹⁸⁰⁵^c^{. B}^y^ope^r^a^{tion of}^s^e^c^tion⁶⁽^c⁾^of^the^P^u^blic^L^a^w^,
^s^e^c^tions^2,^3,^4,^aⁿ^d^{5 e}^x^pir^e^d¹⁸⁰^da^y^s^af^te^r^eⁿ^a^c^t^m^e^{nt; the}^de^a^d^li^ne^w^a^s^ex^te^nde^{d to}¹⁹⁵^da^y^s^{on J}^a^nua^r^y^{31, 2}⁰⁰⁸^,^by
^P.L^.¹¹^0-¹^82,¹²²^Sta^t^.⁶⁰^{5 (}²⁰⁰⁸⁾^{; a}^nd^the^s^e^c^tio^ns^e^x^pir^e^{d w}^h^eⁿ^t^h^e^de^a^d^li^ne^r^aⁿ^out^{in m}ⁱ^d-^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{. Se}^c^{tion 6(}^b)^of
^the^A^c^{t pr}^ov^ide^s^tha^t^or^de^r^s^is^s^u^e^d^aⁿ^d^e^x^te^nde^d^un^de^r^the^a^u^th^or^it^y^o^f^the^A^c^{t r}^e^m^a^{in in e}^f^f^e^c^t^until^the^y^e^x^pir^e^unde^r
^t^h^{e t}^e^rm^{s o}^f^t^h^{e o}^r^d^e^r,^t^h^{e A}^c^t^,^an^d^t^h^e^F^I^S^A^p^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^sⁱⁿ^eff^ect^wh^en^t^h^ey^w^e^r^eⁱ^ssu^ed^.^S^{ee gen}^e^ral^l^y^,^CRS^Rep^o^r^t
^R^L³⁴¹⁴^3,^P^.^L.¹¹^0-5⁵^{, t}^h^e^Prote^c^{t Ame}^r^ic^{a Ac}^{t o}^f²⁰⁰⁷^{: M}^o^dific^atⁱ^{ons t}^o^t^h^e^Fore^ig^{n I}ⁿ^te^lli^ge^nc^e^Su^rv^e^illanc^e^Ac^t^{, by}
^E^lⁱ^zab^et^h^B.^Bazan^.

• no electronic surveillance other than that directed at a person reasonably believed ¹⁷⁹
to be abroad, 50 U.S.C. 1805b(a)(expired).
That having been done or in emergency situations with their oral approval,¹⁸⁰ the Attorney
General and Director of National Intelligence might direct the communications providers, or
others with access, to immediately assist in the gathering of the foreign intelligence information
in a manner least disruptive of service to the target and under confidentiality restrictions imposed
by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, 50 U.S.C. 1805b(e)(expired).
The directive came with the promise of compensation at prevailing rates as well as immunity
from civil liability and was enforceable through the contempt power of the FISA court, 50 U.S.C.

1805b(f), (g), (l)(expired). Recipients were entitled to seek judicial modification of a directive,

issued contrary to the statute or otherwise unlawfully, in the FISA court under expedited
procedures, 50 U.S.C. 1805b(h), (I), (j), (k) (expired).
The FISA court was also tasked with the responsibility of reviewing the procedures crafted to
ensure that the authority was only invoked with respect to persons reasonably believed to be
found overseas, 50 U.S.C. 1805c(expired). Should the court have determined that the procedures
were clearly erroneous, the government was free to amend them or to appeal the determination
initially to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review and then to the Supreme Court,
id.
P.L. 110-261 (H.R. 6304), signed July 10, 2008, addresses four FISA-related matters.¹⁸¹ First, in a
manner reminiscent of the Protect Act, it provides temporary authority to gather foreign ¹⁸²
intelligence information from overseas targets. Second, it reasserts the exclusivity of FISA and ¹⁸³
Title III/ECPA as a basis for governmental electronic surveillance. Third, it instructs the
Inspectors General in various agencies to conduct a review and report to Congress on the Terrorist ¹⁸⁴
Surveillance Program. Fourth, it seeks to protect those who assist government surveillance ¹⁸⁵
activities from civil liability.

¹⁷⁹^Se^c^tion¹⁸⁰^5b(a⁾⁽²⁾^sim^p^l^y^c^a^lle^{d f}^o^{r a}^de^te^rm^ina^tion^t^h^a^t^“^t^he^a^c^quisiti^on^d^o^e^s^no^{t c}^o^nstitu^te^e^l^e^c^t^ronic
^s^u^rv^e^illa^nc^e^,^”^{but s}^e^c^tioⁿ¹⁸^05a^h^a^{d de}^c^l^a^r^e^d^tha^t^“^not^hi^ng^{in t}^h^e^d^e^fⁱ^nition^of^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^s^u^rv^e^illa^nc^e^unde^{r s}^e^c^tioⁿ
¹⁰¹⁽^f⁾^[^w^h^ic^{h pr}^ov^ide^s^the^de^fⁱ^nitⁱ^on^of^te^r^m^s^us^e^d^{in the}^s^u^bc^ha^pt^e^r^{in w}^h^ic^{h s}^e^c^tion¹⁸⁰^5b^is^f^oun^d^]^s^h^a^ll^be
^c^onstrue^d^to^eⁿ^c^o^m^p^a^{ss surv}^e^illa^nc^e^dire^c^t^e^d^a^t^a^pe^rsoⁿ^r^e^a^s^ona^bl^y^be^lie^v^e^{d to be}^l^o^c^a^t^e^d^o^u^tsi^d^e^t^h^e^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^.”
¹⁸⁰^Iⁿ^e^m^e^r^ge^ncy^s^itua^tions^{, i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^ation^g^a^the^r^ing^c^oul^d^be^gⁱ^{n pr}ⁱ^o^r^c^e^r^tif^ic^a^{tion un}^de^r^or^a^lⁱⁿ^s^t^r^u^c^t^io^ns^a^s^long^a^s
^mⁱⁿⁱ^mⁱ^z^a^{tion pr}^oc^e^d^ur^e^s^w^e^r^e^f^o^llow^e^{d a}^{nd c}^e^r^tif^ic^a^{tion w}^a^s^pr^ov^ide^d^w^ithin⁷²^h^our^s^,⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁰⁵^b(^a⁾^,
^(d^)(ex^p^ired^).
¹⁸¹^For^a^g^e^ne^r^a^{l dis}^c^us^sⁱ^on^of^the^d^e^ba^te^le^a^d^ing^u^p^to^eⁿ^a^c^t^m^e^{nt s}^e^{e C}^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³⁴²⁷⁹^,^T^h^e^For^eⁱ^{gn I}ⁿ^te^lli^ge^nc^e
^Surv^e^illa^nc^e^Ac^{t: An}^Ov^e^r^vⁱ^e^w^{of Se}^le^c^t^e^d^Issue^s^,^b^y^E^lⁱ^zab^et^h^B.^B^azan^.
¹⁸²^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸¹^-¹⁸⁸^1g^.
¹⁸³^{50 U}^.^S.C.¹⁸¹²^(“^(a^{) Ex}^c^e^p^{t a}^s^p^r^ov^ide^dⁱⁿ^su^bse^c^tion^(b),^the^pro^c^e^dure^s^of^c^h^a^p^te^{rs 11}^9,¹²^{1, a}ⁿ^d²⁰^{6 of}^title¹⁸^,
^Unite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^Code^{, a}^{nd t}^h^{is A}^c^{t sha}^{ll be}^t^h^e^e^x^c^l^usiv^e^m^e^aⁿ^{s b}^y^whic^{h e}^l^e^c^t^ro^nic^surv^e^illa^nc^e^aⁿ^d^t^h^e^inte^rc^e^p^ti^on^of
^dom^e^s^tic^wⁱ^r^e^{, or}^a^l^{, or}^e^l^e^c^t^r^o^nic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^m^a^y^be^c^onduc^te^{d. (}^b⁾^Oⁿ^ly^aⁿ^e^x^pr^e^s^s^s^t^a^t^utor^y^auth^or^iz^a^tio^{n f}^o^r
^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^surv^e^illa^nc^e^{or t}^h^eⁱⁿ^te^rc^e^p^tion^of^dom^e^s^tic^wⁱ^r^e^{, ora}^l^{, or}^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^c^o^m^m^uni^c^a^tions,^ot^he^{r tha}ⁿ^a^s^aⁿ
^a^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t to t}^h^{is A}^c^{t or c}^h^a^p^te^r^s¹¹^9,¹²^1,^{or 2}⁰⁶^of^title¹⁸^{, U}ⁿ^it^e^d^Sta^t^e^s^Co^de^{, sha}^{ll c}^onstit^ute^aⁿ^a^d^d^itio^na^l
^excl^u^sⁱ^v^e^mean^{s f}^o^{r t}^h^{e p}^u^r^p^o^s^{e of}^su^b^s^ectⁱ^oⁿ^(a)”).
¹⁸⁴^P^.^L^.¹¹⁰^-²⁶¹^,^tit^{. III,}¹²²^Stat.²⁴⁷¹⁽²⁰⁰⁸⁾^.
¹⁸⁵^P^.^L^.¹¹^0-²⁶¹^,^tit^{. I}^I^,¹²²^Sta^t^.²⁴^{67 (}²⁰⁰⁸⁾^;⁵⁰^U^.^S^.^C^.¹⁸^85-¹⁸^85c⁽^t^e^x^{t is}^a^ppeⁿ^d^e^d⁾^.^For^a^g^e^ne^r^a^l^dis^c^us^sⁱ^on^of^the
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

P.L. 110-261 repeals the Protect Act.¹⁸⁶ Yet like the Protect Act, it establishes a temporary set of
three procedures to authorize the acquisition of foreign intelligence information by targeting an ¹⁸⁷
individual or entity thought to be overseas. One, 50 U.S.C. 1881a, applies to the targeting of an ¹⁸⁸
overseas person or entity that is not a U.S. person. Another, 50 U.S.C. 1881b, covers situations
when the American target is overseas but the gathering involves electronic communications or ¹⁸⁹
stored electronic communications or data acquired in this country. The third, 50 U.S.C. 1881c,
applies to situations when the American target is overseas, but section 1881b is not available,
either because acquisition occurs outside of the United States or because it involves something
other than electronic surveillance or the acquisition of stored communications or data, e.g., a ¹⁹⁰
physical search.
In the case of targets who are not U.S. persons, section 1881a(a) declares “upon the issuance of
an order in accordance with subsection (i)(3) or a determination under subsection (c)(2), the
Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence may authorize jointly, for a period of
up to 1 year from the effective date of the authorization, the targeting of persons reasonably
believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information.” It
makes no mention of authorizing acquisition. It merely speaks of targeting with an eye to
acquisition. Moreover, it gives no indication of whether the anticipated methods of acquisition
include the capture of a target’s communications, of communications relating to a target, of
communications of a person or entity related to the target, or information concerning one of the
three. The remainder of the section, however, seems to dispel some of the questions. Section
1881a is intended to empower the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to
authorize the acquisition of foreign intelligence information and the methods that may be used to
the capture of communications and related information.
The procedure begins either with a certification presented to the FISA court for approval or with a
determination by the two officials that exigent circumstances warrant timely authorization prior ¹⁹¹
court approval. In the certification process, they must assert in writing and under oath that:
• a significant purpose for the effort is the acquisition of foreign intelligence
information
• the effort will involve the assistance of an electronic communication service
provider

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^im^m^unit^y^pr^ov^is^ions^s^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³⁴⁶^00,^Re^tr^oac^tiv^e^I^m^m^u^nity^Pr^ovⁱ^d^e^d^by^the^FI^{SA Am}^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^ts^Ac^{t of}²⁰⁰⁸^,
^by^Edw^a^r^d^C^.^Lⁱ^u.
¹⁸⁶^P^.^L^.¹¹⁰^-²⁶¹^,^§⁴⁰³^(a)(1^)(A^{), 1}²²^Stat.²⁴⁷³⁽²⁰⁰⁸^)(rep^ealin^g⁵⁰^U.S.C.¹⁸⁰⁵^a^,¹⁹⁸⁵^b^,^an^d¹⁸⁰⁵^c^).
¹⁸⁷^Se^c^tions¹⁸^81a^-¹⁸^81g^a^r^e^r^e^pe^a^l^e^d^e^f^f^e^c^tⁱ^v^e^D^e^cem^be^r^{31, 2}⁰¹²^,^P.L^.¹¹^0-²^61,^§⁴⁰³⁽^b⁾⁽¹⁾^,¹²^{2 Sta}^t^{. 2}⁴⁷⁴⁽²⁰⁰⁸⁾^.
¹⁸⁸^“Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es p}^e^rsoⁿ^”ⁱⁿ^cl^ud^{es Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es ci}^tⁱ^zen^s,^p^e^rm^an^en^t^resi^d^eⁿ^t^alⁱ^eⁿ^s^o^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^e^s^,^co^rpo^r^atⁱ^oⁿ^s
ⁱⁿ^co^rpo^r^at^edⁱⁿ^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es,^an^d^uⁿⁱⁿ^c^o^r^p^o^r^at^ed^asso^ci^at^{es mad}^e^u^p^o^f^{a su}^b^s^t^aⁿ^tⁱ^a^l^nu^m^b^{er o}^f^U.^S^.^ci^tⁱ^zen^s,⁵⁰
^U^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸¹⁽^a⁾^{, 18}⁰¹⁽^j⁾^.
¹⁸⁹^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸^1b.
¹⁹⁰⁵⁰^U^.^S^.^C^.¹⁸⁸¹^c.
¹⁹¹⁵⁰^U^.^S.C.¹⁸⁸¹^{a(a), (i)(3}⁾^,^(c)(2^).

• the court has approved, or is being asked to approve, procedures designed to
ensure that acquisition is limited to targeted persons found outside the U.S. and to
prevent the capture of communications in which all the parties are within the
U.S.
• minimization procedures, which the court has approved or is being asked to
approve and which satisfy the requirements for such procedures in the case of
FISA electronic surveillance and physical searches, will be honored
• guidelines to ensure compliance with limitations imposed in the section have
been adopted and the limitations will be observed
• these procedures and guidelines are consistent with Fourth Amendment ¹⁹²
standards.
The certification is be accompanied by a copy of the targeting and minimization procedures, any
supporting affidavits from senior national security officials, an indication of the effective date of
the authorization, and a notification of whether pre-approval emergency authorization has been ¹⁹³
given. The certification, however, need not describe the facilities or places at which acquisition ¹⁹⁴
efforts will be directed.
The limitations preclude intentionally targeting a person in the U.S., “reverse targeting”
(intentionally targeting a person overseas purpose of targeting a person within the U.S.),
intentionally targeting a U.S. person outside the U.S., intentionally acquiring a communication in
which all of the parties are in the U.S., or conducting the acquisition in a manner contrary to the ¹⁹⁵
demands of the Fourth Amendment.
The Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, is obligated to
promulgate targeting and minimization procedures and guidelines to ensure that the section’s ¹⁹⁶
limitations are observed. The minimization procedures must satisfy the standards required for ¹⁹⁷
similar procedures required for FISA electronic surveillance and physical searches. The
targeting procedures must be calculated to avoid acquiring communications in which all of the ¹⁹⁸
parties are in the U.S. and to confine targeting to persons located outside the U.S. Both are
subject to review by the FISA court for sufficiency when it receives the request to approve the ¹⁹⁹
certification. Copies of the guidelines, which also provide directions concerning the application
for FISA court approval under the section, must be supplied to court and to the congressional ²⁰⁰
intelligence and judiciary committees.
The Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence may instruct an electronic
communications service provider to assist in the acquisition. Cooperative providers are entitled to

¹⁹²⁵⁰^U^.^S^.^C^.¹⁸⁸¹^a(^g)⁽²⁾^.
¹⁹³^Id^.
¹⁹⁴⁵⁰^U^.^S^.^C^.¹⁸⁸¹^a(^g)⁽⁴⁾^.
¹⁹⁵^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸¹^a⁽^b)^.
¹⁹⁶⁵⁰^U^.^S.C.¹⁸⁸¹^a(d⁾^{, (e),}^(f^).
¹⁹⁷⁵⁰^U^.^S^.^C^.¹⁸⁸¹^a(^e)^.
¹⁹⁸^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸¹^a⁽^d)^.
¹⁹⁹⁵⁰^U^.^S.C.¹⁸⁸¹^a(d⁾^{, (e),}^(i).
²⁰⁰⁵⁰^U^.^S^.^C^.¹⁸⁸¹^a(^f⁾^.

compensation and are immune from suit for their assistance.²⁰¹ They may also petition the FISA ²⁰²
court to set aside or modify the direction for assistance, if directive is unlawful. The Attorney ²⁰³
General may petition the court to enforce a directive against an uncooperative provider. The
court’s decisions concerning certification approval, modification of directions for assistance, and
enforcement of the directives are each appealable to the Foreign Intelligence Court of Review and ²⁰⁴
on certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Except with respect to disclosure following a failure to court approval of an emergency
authorization, section 1806, discussed earlier, governs the use of information obtained under the ²⁰⁵
authority of section 1881a.
When the overseas target is an American individual or entity and acquisition is to occur in this
country, the FISA court may authorize acquisition by electronic surveillance or by capturing
stored electronic communications or data under section 1881b. The Attorney General must
approve the application which must be made under oath and indicate:
• the identity of the applicant
• the identity, if known, or description of the American target
• the facts establishing that reason to believe that the person is overseas and a
foreign power or its agent, officer, or employee
• the applicable minimization procedures
• a description of the information sought and the type of communications or
activities targeted
• certification by the Attorney General or a senior national security or defense
official that
• foreign intelligence information is to be sought
• a significant purpose of the effort is to obtain such information
• the information cannot otherwise reasonable be obtained (and the facts
upon which this conclusion is based)
• the nature of the information (e.g., relating to terrorism, sabotage, the
conduct of U.S. foreign affairs, etc.)(and the facts upon which this
conclusion is based)
• the means of acquisition and whether physical entry will be necessary
• the identity of the service providing assisting (targeted facilities and premises
need not be identified)
• a statement of previous applications relating to the same American and actions
taken

²⁰¹⁵⁰^U^.^S.C.¹⁸⁸¹^(h⁾⁽¹^)-(3^).
²⁰²^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸¹⁽^h⁾⁽⁴⁾^.
²⁰³^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸¹⁽^h⁾⁽⁵⁾^.
²⁰⁴⁵⁰^U^.^S.C.¹⁸⁸¹^a(h⁾⁽⁶⁾^,^(i).
²⁰⁵⁵⁰^U^.^S^.^C^.¹⁸⁸¹^e(^a)^.

• the proposed tenure of the order (not to exceed 90 days), and
• any additional information the FISA court may require.²⁰⁶
The court must issue an acquisition order upon a finding that the application satisfies statutory
requirements, the minimization procedures are adequate, and there is probable cause to believe
that the American target is located overseas and is a foreign power or its agent, officer or ²⁰⁷
employee. The court must explain in writing any finding that the application’s assertion of ²⁰⁸
probable cause, minimization procedures, or certified facts is insufficient. Such findings are
appealable to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review and under certiorari to the ²⁰⁹
Supreme Court.
The court’s order approving acquisition is to include the identity or description of the American
target, the type of activities targeted, the nature of the information sought, the means of ²¹⁰
acquisition, and duration of the order. The order will also call for compliance with the
minimization procedures, and when appropriate, for confidential, minimally disruptive provider ²¹¹
assistance, compensated at a prevailing rate. Providers are immune from civil liability for any ²¹²
assistance they are directed to provide.
As in other instances, in emergency cases the Attorney General may authorize acquisition ²¹³
pending approval of the FISA court. The court must be notified of the Attorney General’s ²¹⁴
decision and the related application must be filed within 7 days. If emergency acquisition is not
judicially approved subsequently, no resulting evidence may be introduce any judicial, legislative
or regulatory proceedings unless the target is determined not to be an American, nor may
resulting information be shared with other federal officials without the consent of the target,
unless the Attorney General determines that the information concerns a threat of serious bodily ²¹⁵
injury. Except with respect to disclosure following a failure to court approval of an emergency
authorization, section 1806, discussed earlier, governs the use of information obtained under the ²¹⁶
authority of section 1881a.
The second provision for targeting an American overseas in order to acquire foreign intelligence
information, section 1881c, is somewhat unique. Both FISA and Title III/ECPA have been
understood to apply only to interceptions within the United States. Neither has been thought to
apply overseas. Section 1881c, however, may be used for acquisitions outside the United States.
Moreover, it may be used for acquisitions inside the United States as long as the requirements that ²¹⁷
would ordinarily attend such acquisition are honored. 50 U.S.C. 1881d(“(a) Joint applications

²⁰⁶^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸^1b(^b)^.
²⁰⁷^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸^1b(^c⁾⁽¹⁾^.^Aⁿ^A^m^e^r^ic^aⁿ^m^a^y^{not be}^c^ons^ide^r^e^d^a^f^o^r^e^ig^{n pow}^e^r^or^its^a^g^eⁿ^t,^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^or^em^ploy^ee^ba^s^e^d
^sole^ly^{on a}^c^tiv^itie^{s prote}^c^t^e^d^by^t^h^e^{First A}^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t, 50 U.S}^.^C.¹⁸⁸¹^b(c⁾⁽²⁾^.
²⁰⁸^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸^1b(^c⁾⁽³⁾^.
²⁰⁹^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸^1b(^f⁾^.
²¹⁰^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸^1b(^c⁾⁽⁴⁾^.
²¹¹^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸^1b(^c⁾⁽⁵⁾^.
²¹²^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸^1b(^e⁾^.
²¹³^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸^1b(^d)⁽¹⁾^.
²¹⁴^Id^.
²¹⁵^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸^1b(^d)⁽⁴⁾^.
²¹⁶⁵⁰^U^.^S^.^C^.¹⁸⁸¹^e(^a)^.
²¹⁷^{50 U}^.^S.C.¹⁸⁸¹^c⁽^a^)(3)(B)(“^If^aⁿ^a^c^quisitio^{n f}^o^{r f}^o^re^ig^{n inte}^ll^ig^eⁿ^c^e^purp^o^se^{s is to}^be^c^o^nd^uc^te^{d i}ⁿ^si^de^the^Un^ite^d
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

and orders.– If an acquisition targeting a United States person under section 703 or 704 is
proposed to be conducted both inside and outside the United States, a judge having jurisdiction
under section 703(a)(1) or 704(a)(1) may issue simultaneously, upon the request of the
Government in a joint application complying with the requirements of sections 703(b) and
704(b), orders under sections 703(c) and 704(c), as appropriate. (b) Concurrent authorization– If
an order authorizing electronic surveillance or physical search has been obtained under section
105 or 304, the Attorney General may authorize, for the effective period of that order, without an
order under section 703 or 704, the targeting of that United States person for the purpose of
acquiring foreign intelligence information while such person is reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States”).
Otherwise, section 1881c features many of the same application, approval, and appeal provisions
as section 1881b. Authorization is available under a FISA court order or in emergency ²¹⁸
circumstances under the order of the Attorney General. Acquisition activities must be ²¹⁹
discontinued during any period when the target is thought to be in the United States. Unlike
1881b, however, it is not limited to electronic surveillance or the acquisition of stored electronic
information. Moreover, it declares that in the case of acquisition abroad recourse to a FISA court
order need only be had when the target American, found overseas, has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and a warrant would be required if the acquisition efforts had taken place in the United ²²⁰
States and for law enforcement purposes.
Title III/ECPA has long declared that it should not be construed to confine governmental activities
authorized under FISA, but that the two – Title III/ECPA and FISA – are the exclusive authority ²²¹
under which governmental electronic surveillance may be conducted in this country. The
Justice Department suggested, however, that in addition to the President’s constitutional authority ²²²
the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Resolution, enacted in response to the events of

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^Sta^t^e^s^a^{nd c}^o^uld^be^a^u^t^hor^iz^e^d^uⁿ^d^e^r^se^c^tion⁷⁰³^[18⁸¹^b^]^,^t^h^e^a^c^q^uⁱ^sition^m^a^y^onl^y^be^c^ond^uc^te^{d if}^a^u^th^oriz^e^d^u^nde^r
^sectⁱ^oⁿ⁷⁰^{3 o}^rⁱⁿ^acco^rd^aⁿ^{ce w}ⁱ^t^h^an^o^t^h^e^{r p}^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^hⁱ^s^A^c^t^o^t^{her t}^h^an^t^hⁱ^s^sectⁱ^oⁿ^”^).
^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸¹^d(^“⁽^a⁾^J^oⁱⁿ^{t a}^ppl^ic^atio^ns^aⁿ^d^or^de^r^s^.^–^If^an^acq^uⁱ^si^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^a^rgetⁱⁿ^{g a Un}ⁱ^t^ed^S^t^at^es^p^e^rson^un^d^e^{r sect}ⁱ^oⁿ
⁷⁰³^or⁷^{04 is}^pr^o^pos^e^d^to^be^c^o^nd^uc^te^{d b}^o^th^insⁱ^de^aⁿ^{d o}^u^ts^ide^t^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^{, a}^ju^dg^e^ha^vⁱ^ng^jurⁱ^s^d^ic^tion^u^nde^r
^s^e^c^{tion 7}⁰³⁽^a⁾⁽¹⁾^or⁷⁰⁴⁽^a⁾⁽¹⁾^m^a^y^is^s^u^e^sⁱ^m^u^lta^ne^ous^ly^{, upon}^the^r^e^que^s^t^of^the^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt in a}^j^oⁱⁿ^{t a}^p^plic^a^tioⁿ
^c^o^m^p^l^y^ing^w^{ith the}^r^e^q^u^ir^e^m^eⁿ^ts^of^s^e^c^tions⁷⁰³⁽^b)^aⁿ^d⁷⁰⁴⁽^b)^,^or^de^r^s^un^de^r^s^e^c^tions⁷⁰³⁽^c⁾^aⁿ^{d 7}⁰⁴⁽^c⁾^,^a^s
^ap^p^r^o^p^{riate. (b}⁾^C^o^nc^ur^r^e^{nt aut}^ho^rⁱ^z^a^tioⁿ^{– If}^aⁿ^orde^{r a}^u^t^hor^iz^ing^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^surv^e^illa^nc^e^or^p^h^y^s^ic^a^l^se^a^r^c^h^ha^{s be}^eⁿ
^obtaⁱ^ne^{d u}^nde^r^s^e^c^tioⁿ¹⁰^{5 or}³⁰⁴^,^the^A^ttorⁿ^e^y^G^e^ne^r^a^l^m^a^y^a^u^tho^r^iz^e^,^f^o^r^the^e^f^f^e^c^tⁱ^v^e^pe^rⁱ^od^of^th^a^t^or^de^r^,^w^ith^out
^aⁿ^or^de^r^un^de^r^s^e^c^tion⁷⁰³^or⁷⁰⁴^,^the^ta^r^g^e^ting^of^tha^t^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^pe^r^s^{on f}^o^r^t^h^e^p^u^r^p^os^e^of^a^c^quirⁱ^ng^f^o^r^e^igⁿ
^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^inf^o^rm^a^{tion w}^h^ile^suc^h^pe^rson^{is re}^a^s^ona^b^l^y^be^lie^v^e^{d to be}^l^o^c^a^t^e^d^o^u^tsi^d^e^the^Un^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^”⁾^.
²¹⁸⁵⁰^U^.^S^.^C^.¹⁸⁸¹^c(^a)^.
²¹⁹⁵⁰^U^.^S.C.¹⁸⁸¹^c(a)(3^).
²²⁰⁵⁰^U^.^S.C.¹⁸⁸¹^c(a)(2^).
²²¹¹⁸^U^.^S.C.²⁵¹¹⁽²^)(f^).
²²²^Se^c^tion²⁽^a⁾^,^P.L^.¹⁰^7-⁴⁰^,¹¹⁵^St^a^t^{. 22}^{4 (}²⁰⁰¹⁾^,⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.¹⁵⁴¹^no^te⁽^“^T^h^a^t^the^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^t^is^a^u^th^or^iz^e^d^to^us^e^a^ll
^ne^c^e^s^s^a^r^y^a^{nd a}^ppr^opr^ia^te^f^o^r^c^e^ag^aⁱ^ns^{t thos}^e^na^tio^ns^{, or}^g^a^niz^a^tioⁿ^s^{, or}^pe^r^s^ons^he^de^te^r^m^ine^s^plaⁿⁿ^e^{d, a}^u^t^hor^iz^e^d^,
^c^o^m^m^itte^{d, or a}ⁱ^de^{d t}^h^e^te^rrorⁱ^{st a}^tta^c^k^{s tha}^t^oc^c^u^rre^{d o}ⁿ^Se^pte^m^be^r^11,²⁰⁰¹^,^{or ha}^r^bor^e^d^suc^h^org^aⁿⁱ^z^a^{tions or}
^pe^r^s^ons^,ⁱⁿ^or^de^r^t^o^pr^e^v^eⁿ^{t a}ⁿ^y^f^u^tur^e^a^c^t^s^of^inte^rⁿ^a^tio^na^{l te}^rroris^m^a^g^aⁱ^{nst the}^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^by^suc^h^na^tio^ns,
^or^g^a^niz^a^tions^or^pe^r^s^oⁿ^s^”⁾^.

September 11, established an implicit exception to the exclusivity requirement.²²³ Section 102 of
P.L. 110-261 seeks to overcome the suggestion by establishing a second exclusivity section which ²²⁴
declares that it exceptions may only be created by explicit statutory language.
Section 301 of P.L. 110-261 instructs the Inspectors General of the Justice and Defense
Departments, of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, of the National Security
Agency, and of any pertinent intelligence agency to conduct a comprehensive review of their
agency’s activities relating to presidentially authorized intelligence activities involving ²²⁵
communications, including the Terrorist Surveillance Program. It further directs them to
provide the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees with interim reports within 60 days of ²²⁶
enactment and final reports within 1 year.
P.L. 110-261 bars the initiation or continuation of civil suits in either state or federal court based ²²⁷
on charges that the defendant assisted any of the U.S. intelligence agencies. Dismissal is
required upon the certification of the Attorney General that the person either:
• did not provide the assistance charged;
• provided the assistance under order of the FISA court;
• - provided the assistance pursuant to a national security letter issued under 18
U.S.C. 2709;
• provided the assistance pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B) and 2518(7)
under assurances from the Attorney General or a senior Justice Department
official, empowered to approve emergency law enforcement wiretaps, that no
court approval was required;
• provided the assistance in response to a directive from the President through the
Attorney General relating to communications between or among foreign powers
pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1802(a)(4);
• provided the assistance in response to a directive from the Attorney General and
the Director of National Intelligence relating to the acquisition of foreign

²²³^H.Re^pt.¹¹^0-3^73,^a^t^9-¹⁰⁽²⁰⁰^7),^c^iting^a^le^tte^{r f}^r^om^A^ssistaⁿ^t^A^ttorne^y^G^e^ne^ra^{l W}^illia^m^{E. Mosc}^he^lla^.
²²⁴^{50 U}^.^S.C.¹⁸¹²^(“^(a^{) Ex}^c^e^p^{t a}^s^p^r^ov^ide^dⁱⁿ^su^bse^c^tion^(b),^the^pro^c^e^dure^s^of^c^h^a^p^te^{rs 11}^9,¹²^{1, a}ⁿ^d²⁰^{6 of}^title¹⁸^,
^Unite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^Code^{, a}^{nd t}^h^{is A}^c^{t sha}^{ll be}^t^h^e^e^x^c^l^usiv^e^m^e^aⁿ^{s b}^y^whic^{h e}^l^e^c^t^ro^nic^surv^e^illa^nc^e^aⁿ^d^t^h^e^inte^rc^e^p^ti^on^of
^dom^e^s^tic^wⁱ^r^e^{, or}^a^l^{, or}^e^l^e^c^t^r^o^nic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^m^a^y^be^c^onduc^te^{d. (}^b⁾^Oⁿ^ly^aⁿ^e^x^pr^e^s^s^s^t^a^t^utor^y^auth^or^iz^a^tio^{n f}^o^r
^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^surv^e^illa^nc^e^{or t}^h^eⁱⁿ^te^rc^e^p^tion^of^dom^e^s^tic^wⁱ^r^e^{, ora}^l^{, or}^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^c^o^m^m^uni^c^a^tions,^ot^he^{r tha}ⁿ^a^s^aⁿ
^a^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t to t}^h^{is A}^c^{t or c}^h^a^p^te^r^s¹¹^9,¹²^1,^{or 2}⁰⁶^of^title¹⁸^{, U}ⁿ^it^e^d^Sta^t^e^s^Co^de^{, sha}^{ll c}^onstit^ute^aⁿ^a^d^d^itio^na^l
^excl^u^sⁱ^v^e^mean^{s f}^o^{r t}^h^{e p}^u^r^p^o^s^{e of}^su^b^s^ectⁱ^oⁿ^(a)”).
²²⁵^P^.^L.¹¹⁰^-²⁶^1,^§3⁰¹⁽^b⁾^,⁽^a⁾⁽³⁾^,¹²²^S^t^at^{. 24}⁷¹⁽²⁰⁰⁸⁾^.
²²⁶^P^.^L^.¹¹^0-²⁶¹^,^§³⁰¹⁽^c⁾^,¹²^{2 Sta}^t^.²⁴⁷¹⁽²⁰⁰⁸⁾^.
²²⁷^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸⁵^a⁽^a⁾⁽^“^N^o^tw^iths^t^a^ndi^ng^aⁿ^y^othe^r^pr^ov^is^ion^of^la^w^,^a^cⁱ^v^{il a}^c^{tion m}^a^y^{not lie}^or^be^m^a^inta^ine^d^{in a}
^Fe^de^ra^{l or S}^t^a^t^e^c^ourt^a^g^aⁱ^{nst a}ⁿ^y^pe^rs^on^f^o^{r prov}^id^ing^a^ssistaⁿ^c^e^{to a}ⁿ^e^l^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^the^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^c^o^m^m^unity^{, a}^nd
^s^h^a^{ll be}^pr^om^ptly^dism^is^s^e^{d. . .”}⁾^.

intelligence information concerning persons believed to be overseas pursuant to

50 U.S.C. 1805b (Protect Act);

• provided the assistance in response to a directive from the Attorney General and
the Director of National Intelligence relating to the acquisition of foreign
intelligence information targeting non-U.S. persons thought to be overseas
pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1881a(h); or
• provided the assistance in connection with intelligence activities authorized by
the President between September 11, 2001 and January 17, 2007 relating to ²²⁸
terrorist attacks against the United States.
Only telecommunications carriers, electronic service providers, and other communication service
providers may claim the protection afforded those who assisted activities authorized between 9/11 ²²⁹
and January 17, 2007. The group which may claim protection for assistance supplied under
other grounds is larger. It includes not only communication service providers but also any ²³⁰
“landlord, custodian or other person” ordered or directed to provide assistance.
The Attorney General’s certification is binding if supported by substantial evidence, and the court
is to consider challenges and supporting evidence ex parte and in camera where the Attorney ²³¹
General asserts that disclosure would harm national security. Cases filed in state court may be ²³²
removed to federal court.
P.L. 11-261 also preempts state regulatory authority over communication service providers with ²³³
respect to assistance provide intelligence agencies. Moreover, it directs the Attorney General to
report to the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees on implementation of the protective ²³⁴
provisions.
Books and Articles
Banisar & Davies, Global Trends in Privacy Protection: An International Survey of Privacy, Data
Protection, and Surveillance Laws and Developments, 18 J^OHNM^A^R^S^HALLJ^OURNAL^OF
C^OM^P^U^T^E^{R A}^NDI^NF^ORM^A^TIONL^AW 1 (1999)

²²⁸^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸⁵^a⁽^a⁾^{. O}ⁿ^J^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^17,²⁰^07,^the^A^ttorⁿ^e^y^G^e^ne^r^a^{l no}^tif^ie^{d C}^ong^r^e^s^s^tha^t^aⁿ^y^s^ubs^e^que^{nt e}^l^e^c^t^r^oⁿⁱ^c
^surv^e^illa^nc^e^c^ond^uc^te^{d a}^s^pa^rt^of^the^T^e^{rrorist Surv}^e^illa^nc^e^P^r^og^ra^m^w^{ould c}^oⁿ^duc^te^d^p^u^rsua^nt^to^F^I^SA^c^{ourt a}^ppr^ov^a^l^,
^{S. R}^e^pt.¹^10-²⁰^{9, a}^t^{4 (}²⁰⁰⁷⁾^.
²²⁹⁵⁰^U^.^S^.^C.¹⁸⁸⁵^a(a)(4^);¹⁸⁸⁵^(6)(“(A^{) a t}^e^l^eco^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^carri^er,^{as t}^h^at^t^e^rmⁱ^s^d^e^fⁱⁿ^e^dⁱⁿ^sectⁱ^oⁿ³^o^f^t^h^e
^C^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^A^c^{t of}¹⁹³⁴⁽⁴⁷^U^.^S.C^.¹⁵³⁾^{; (}^B⁾^a^pr^ovⁱ^d^e^r^of^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion s}^e^r^v^ic^e^,^a^s^tha^t^te^r^m^is
^de^fⁱ^ne^{d in se}^c^tioⁿ²⁵¹⁰^of^title¹⁸^,^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^Co^de^{; (C) a}^p^r^ov^id^e^r^of^a^re^m^o^te^c^o^m^puting^se^rv^ic^e^,^a^s^tha^t^te^rm^is
^d^e^fⁱⁿ^e^dⁱⁿ^sectioⁿ²⁷¹¹^o^f^{title 1}⁸^,^Un^ited^{States Co}^d^e^;^{(D) an}^y^o^t^h^e^{r co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^serv^{ice p}^r^o^v^id^{er w}^h^o^h^a^{s access}
^{to w}ⁱ^re^{or e}^l^e^c^t^ronic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tions e}ⁱ^t^h^e^r^a^s^suc^h^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion^s^a^r^e^traⁿ^sm^itte^{d or a}^s^suc^h^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tio^{ns a}^r^e
^sto^r^ed^{; (E)}^{a p}^a^ren^t^,^su^b^sⁱ^d^iary^{, aff}^iliate,^su^ccesso^{r, o}^r^assigⁿ^{ee o}^f^aⁿ^en^tity^d^e^scrib^e^dⁱⁿ^su^b^p^a^rag^r^ap^h^(A^{), (B), (C),}^o^r
⁽^D⁾^;^or⁽^F⁾^aⁿ^of^fⁱ^ce^r^,^em^ploy^e^e^,^or^a^g^eⁿ^{t of}^aⁿ^eⁿ^ti^ty^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^{d in}^s^ubpa^r^a^g^r^a^{ph (}^A⁾^,⁽^B⁾^,⁽^C⁾^,⁽^D⁾^,^o^r⁽^E⁾^”⁾^.
²³⁰⁵⁰^U^.^S.C.¹⁸⁸⁵^a(a)(1^)-(3^),⁽⁵^);¹⁸⁸⁵⁽⁷^).
²³¹^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸⁵^a⁽^b)^{, (}^c⁾^.
²³²⁵⁰^U^.^S^.^C^.¹⁸⁸⁵^a(^g)^.
²³³^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁸^5b.
²³⁴⁵⁰^U^.^S^.^C^.¹⁸⁸⁵^c.

Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 C^ORNELLL^AWQ^UA^R^T^E^R^L^Y 154 (1954)
Carr & Bellia, T^HEL^AW^O^FE^L^E^CT^RO^NICS^U^R^VE^I^L^L^A^NC^E (2001)
Chemerinsky, Losing Liberties: Applying a Foreign Intelligence Model to Domestic Law
Enforcement, 51 UCLA^LA^WR^EV^IEW1619(2004)
Chiarella & Newton, “So Judge, How Do I Get that FISA Warrant?”: The Policy and Procedure
for Conducting Electronic Surveillance, 1997 A^RMYL^AW^Y^E^R 25 (Oct. 1997)
Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and First Ten Years of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U^NIV^E^RS^IT^Y^OFP^ENNS^YL^V^A^NI^AL^AWR^EV^IEW

793 (1989)

Cooper, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Does the Answer to the Internet
Information Privacy Problem Lie in a Fifteen-Year-Old Federal Statute? A Detailed Analysis, 20
J^OHNM^AR^S^H^A^L^LJ^OURNAL^OFC^OM^P^U^T^E^R&I^NF^ORM^A^T^I^ONL^AW 1 (2001)
Dinger, Should Parents Be Allowed to Record a Child’s Telephone Conversations When They
Believe the Child Is in Danger?: A Examination of the Federal Wiretap Statute and the Doctrine
of Vicarious Consent in the Context of a Criminal Prosecution, 28 S^EA^TT^L^EU^NIV^E^RS^IT^YL^AW
^REV^I^EW 955 (2005)
Donnelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wiretapping Controversy, 63 Y^ALEL^AWJ^OURNA^L 799
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Fishman, Technologically Enhanced Visual Surveillance the Fourth Amendment: Sophistication,
Availability and the Expectation of Privacy, 26 A^MERI^CA^NC^RIMIN^A^LL^AWR^EV^IE^W 315 (1989)
Fishman & McKenna, W^I^R^E^T^AP^P^I^N^G^AN^DE^A^V^ES^DROP^P^I^NG (2d ed.1995) & (Mar. 2005)
Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 A^LA^B^A^M^AL^AW
R^EV^IEW 9 (2004)
Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143
U^NIV^E^RS^IT^Y^OFP^ENNS^YL^V^A^NI^AL^AWR^EV^IEW 709 (1995)
Garrie, Armstrong & Harris, Voice Over Internet Protocol and the Wiretap Act: Is Your
Conversation Protected?, 29 S^EA^TTL^EU^NIV^E^RS^IT^YL^AWR^EV^IEW 97 (2005)
Gilbreath & Cukjati, Tape Recording of Conversations: Ethics, Legality and Admissibility, 59
T^EX^ASB^ARJ^OURNAL 951 (1996)
Goldsmith & Balmforth, The Electronic Surveillance of Privileged Communications: A Conflict
of Doctrines, 64 S^OUT^HC^AL^IF^ORNI^AL^AWR^EV^IEW 903 (1991)
Kash, Prewarrant Thermal Imaging as a Fourth Amendment Violation: A Supreme Court
Question in the Making, 60 A^LB^AN^YL^AWR^EV^IEW1295(1997)
Kesan, Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking?: A First Principles Examination of Electronic Privacy
in the Workplace, 54 F^LO^R^I^D^AL^AWR^EV^IEW 289 (2002)

Kastenmeier, Leavy & Beier, Communications Privacy: A Legislative Perspective, 1989
W^ISCONSINL^AWR^EV^IEW 715
Lieb, E-Mail and the Wiretap Laws: Why Congress Should Add Electronic Communications to
Title III’s Statutory Exclusionary Rule and Expressly Rejected a “Good Faith” Exception, 34
H^AR^V^A^R^DJ^OURNAL^OFL^E^G^I^S^LA^TI^O^N 393 (1997)
Maher, Tale of the Tape: Lawyers Recording Conversations, 15 P^ROF^E^S^S^IONALL^AW^Y^E^R 10
(2004)
McCarthy, Don’t Fear Carnivore: It Won’t Devour Individual Privacy, 66 M^ISSO^U^R^IL^AW
R^EV^IEW 827 (2001)
Meason, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Time for Reappraisal, 24 I^N^TERNA^T^I^ON^AL
L^AW^Y^E^R 1043 (1990)
National Commission for the Study of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and
Electronic Surveillance, F^I^NALR^EP^OR^T (1976)
Rosenstein, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and Satellite Descramblers:
Toward Preventing Statutory Obsolescence, 76 M^INNE^S^O^T^AL^AWR^EV^IEW 1451 (1992)
Seamon & Gardner, The Patriot Act and the Wall Between Foreign Intelligence and Law
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Simons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First
Century Technologies, 53 H^AS^TI^N^G^SL^AWJ^OURNAL 1303 (2002)
Symposium, The Future of Internet Surveillance Law: A Symposium to Discuss Internet
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(2004)
- Kerr, Foreword: The Future of Internet Surveillance Law, 72 G^EORG^EW^A^S^HIN^G^T^ONL^AW
R^EV^IEW 1139 (2004)
- Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 72 G^EORG^EW^A^S^HINGT^ONL^AW
R^EV^IEW 1145 (2004)
- Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending
It, 72 G^EOR^G^EW^A^S^HIN^G^T^O^NL^AWR^EV^IEW 1208 (2004)
- Schwartz, Evaluating Telecommunications Surveillance in Germany: The Lessons of the Max
Plank Institute’s Study, 72 G^EORG^EW^A^S^HIN^G^T^ONL^AWR^EV^IEW 1244 (2004)
- Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 G^EORG^EW^A^S^HIN^G^T^ONL^AWR^EV^IEW

1264 (2004)

- Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 G^EORG^EW^A^S^HINGT^ONL^AW
R^EV^IEW 1306 (2004)

- Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 G^EORG^EW^A^S^HIN^G^T^ONL^AWR^EV^IEW

1375 (2004)

-Dempsey & Flint, Commercial Data and National Security, 72 G^EORG^EW^A^S^HINGT^ONL^AW
R^EV^IEW 1459 (2004)
- Fishman, Technology and the Internet: The Impending Destruction of Privacy by Betrayers,
Grudgers, Snoops, Spammers, Corporations, and the Media, 72 G^EORG^EW^A^S^HINGT^ONL^AW
R^EV^IEW 1503 (2004)
- Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications; A Critical Perspective on
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 G^EOR^G^EW^A^S^HIN^G^T^ONL^AWR^EV^IEW 1557
(2004)
- Ohm, Parallel-Effect Statutes and E-Mail “Warrants”: Reframing the Internet Surveillance
Debate, 72 G^EORG^EW^A^S^HINGT^ONL^AWR^EV^IEW 1559 (2004)
Symposium, Spyware: The Latest Cyber-Regulatory Challenge, 20 B^ERKEL^E^YT^E^C^HNOLO^G^Y
L^AWJ^OURNAL1269(2005)
- Schwartz, Privacy Inalienability and the Regulation of Spyware, 20 B^ERKEL^E^YT^ECHNOL^OGY
L^AWJ^OURNAL1269(2005)
- Bellia, Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance Law, 20 B^ERKEL^E^YT^ECHNOL^OGYL^AWJ^OURNAL

1283 (2005)

-Winn, Contracting Spyware by Contract, 20 B^ERKEL^E^YT^ECHNOL^OGYL^AWJ^OURNAL 1345
(2005)
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J^OURNA^L 1433 (2005)
Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition, 118
U^NIV^E^RS^IT^Y^OFP^ENNS^YL^V^A^NI^AL^AWR^EV^IEW 169 (1969)
Taylor, Issues Raised by the Application of the Pen Register Statutes to Authorize Government
Collection of Information on Packet-Switched Networks, 6 V^IRG^I^NIAJ^OURNAL^OFL^AW&
T^ECHNOL^OGY 4 (2001)
Turkington, Protections for Invasions of Conversational and Communications Privacy by
Electronic Surveillance in Family, Marriage, and Domestic Disputes Under Federal and State
Wiretap and Store Communications Acts and the Common Law Privacy Intrusion Tort, 82
N^EBRA^SK^AL^AWR^EV^IEW 693 (2004)
Turley, The Not-So-Noble Lie: The Nonincorporation of State Consensual Surveillance Standards
in Federal Court, 79 J^OUR^NAL^OFC^RIMIN^A^LL^AW&C^RIM^I^NOL^O^G^Y 66 (1988)
Whitehead & Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring Freedom” for “Homeland Security”: A Constitutional
Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Justice Department’s Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51
A^MERICA^NU^NIV^E^RS^IT^YL^AWR^EV^IEW 1081 (2002)

Notes and Comments
Attorney Private Eyes: Ethical Implications of a Private Attorney’s Decision to Surreptitiously
Record Conversations, 2003 U^NIV^E^RS^IT^YO^FI^LL^INOISL^AWR^EV^IEW 1605 (2003)
The Case for Magic Lantern: September 11 Highlights the Need for Increased Surveillance, 15
H^AR^V^A^R^DJ^OURNAL^OFL^AW&T^ECHNOL^OGY 521 (2002)
Electronic Surveillance in the Internet Age: The Strange Case of Pen Registers, 41 A^MERICA^N
C^RIM^I^NALL^AWR^EV^IEW 1321 (2004)
The Fourth Amendment and the Wiretap Act Fail to Protect Against Random ISP Monitoring of
E-Mails for the Purpose of Assisting Law Enforcement, 22 J^OHNM^A^R^S^HALLJ^OURNAL^OF
C^OM^P^U^T^E^{R A}^NDI^NF^ORM^A^TIONL^AW 493 (2004)
Government Access to Transactional Information and the Lack of Subscriber Notice, 8 B^OS^T^ON
U^NIV^E^RS^IT^YJ^OURNA^L^OFS^CIENCE&T^ECHNOL^O^G^Y 648 (2002)
Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 33 L^OYOL^AU^NIV^E^RS^IT^Y^OFC^HICAGO
L^AWJ^OURNAL933(2002)
How the USA PATRIOT Act Will Permit Governmental Infringement Upon the Privacy of
Americans in the Name of “Intelligence” Investigations, 150 U^NI^V^E^RS^IT^Y^OFP^E^NNS^YL^V^A^NI^A
L^AWR^EV^IEW 1651 (2002)
The “Magic Lantern” Revealed: A Report of the FBI’s New “Key Logging” Trojan and Analysis
of its Possible Treatment in a Dynamic Legal Landscape, 20 J^OHNM^A^R^S^HALLJ^OU^RNAL^OF
^COM^P^UT^{ER A}^NDI^NF^ORM^A^T^I^ONL^AW287 (2002)
The Patriot Act’s Impact on the Government’s Ability to Conduct Electronic Surveillance on
Ongoing Domestic Communications, 52 D^UKEL^AWJ^OU^R^N^A^L 179 (2002)
Privacy Versus Protection: Exploring the Boundaries of Electronic Surveillance in the Internet
Act, 29 F^ORDHA^MU^RBA^NL^AWJ^OURNAL 2233 (2002)
A Puzzle Even the Codebreakers Have Trouble Solving: A Clash of Interests Over the Electronic
Encryption Standard, 27 L^A^W^ANDP^OL^IC^Y^INI^NT^E^R^NA^T^I^O^N^A^LB^US^INES^S 217 (1995)
Qualified Immunity as a Defense to Federal Wiretap Act Claims, 68 U^NI^V^E^RS^IT^Y^OFC^HICAG^O
L^AWR^EV^IEW 1369 (2001)
The Revamped FISA: Striking a Better Balance Between the Government’s Need to Protect Itself ^th
and the 4 Amendment, 58 V^A^NDERBI^L^TL^AWR^EV^IEW 1671 (2005)
Scowl Because You’re on Candid Camera: Privacy and Video Surveillance, 31 V^AL^P^A^R^A^IS^O
U^NIV^E^RS^IT^YL^AWR^EV^IEW 1079 (1997)
Should “Clean Hands” Protect the Government Against §2515 Suppression Under Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968? 53 W^A^S^HIN^G^T^ON&L^EEL^AWR^EV^IEW

1473 (1996)

Tapping Into Family Affairs: Examining the Federal Wiretapping Statute as It Applies to the ^th
Home, Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601 (6 Cir. 1998), 68 U^NIV^E^RS^IT^Y^OFC^INCINNA^T^IL^AW
R^EV^IEW 995 (2000)
Thirty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Electronic Surveillance, 91 G^EORG^E^T^O^W^N
L^AWJ^OURNAL 117 (2003)
You’ve Got Mail . . . And Your Boss Knows It: Rethinking the Scope of the E-Mail Monitoring
Exceptions to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 2001 UCLAJ^OURNAL^OFL^AW&
T^ECHNOL^OGY 5
ALR Notes
Applicability, in Civil Action, of Provisions of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, Prohibiting Interception of Communications (18 USCS §2511(1)), to Interceptions by
Spouse, or Spouse’s Agent, of Conversations of Other Spouse, 139 ALRF^ED. 517
Application of Extension Telephones of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§2510 et seq.) Pertaining to Interceptions of Wire Communications, 58
ALRF^ED. 594
Constitutionality of Secret Video Surveillance, 91 ALR 5^th 585
Construction and Application of 18 USCS 2511(1)(a) and (b), Providing Criminal Penalty for
Intercepting, Endeavoring to intercept, or Procuring Another to Intercept Wire, Oral or
Electronic Communication, 122 ALRF^ED. 597
Construction and Application of Provision of Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18
U.S.C.A. §2520) Authorizing Civil Cause of Action by Person Whose Wire, Oral, or Electronic
Communication Is Intercepted, Disclosed, or Used in Violation of the Act, 164 ALRF^ED. 139
Construction and Application of State Statutes Authorizing Civil Cause of Action by Person
Whose Wire or Oral Communications Is Intercepted, Disclosed, or Used in Violation of Statutes, ^TH
33 ALR4 506
Eavesdropping and Wiretapping, What Constitutes “Device Which Is Primarily Useful for the
Surreptitious Interception of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communication,” Under 18 USCS

2512(1)(b), Prohibiting Manufacture, Possession, Assembly, Sale of Such Device, 129 ALRF^ED.

549
Eavesdropping on Extension Telephone as Invasion of Privacy, 49 ALR4^TH 430
Interception of Telecommunications by or With Consent of Party as Exception Under 18 USCS
§2511(2)(c) and (d), to Federal Proscription of Such Interceptions, 67 ALRF^ED. 429
Permissible Surveillance, Under State Communications Interception Statute, by Person Other ^TH
than State or Local Law Enforcement Officer or One Acting in Concert with Officer, 24 ALR4
1208
Permissible Warrantless Surveillance, Under State Communications Interception Statute, by State ^TH
or Local Law Enforcement Officer or One Acting in Concert with Officer, 27 ALR4 449

Propriety of Attorney’s Surreptitious Sound Recording of Statements by Others Who Are or May
Become Involved in Litigation 32 ALR5^H 715
Propriety of Monitoring of Telephone Calls to or From Prison Inmates Under Title III of Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (18 USCS §§2510 et seq.) Prohibiting Judicially
Unauthorized Interception of Wire or Oral Communications, 61 ALRF^ED. 825
Propriety of Governmental Eavesdropping on Communications Between Accused and His
Attorney, 189 ALD Fed. 419
Propriety, Under 18 USCS 2517(5), of Interception or Use of Communications Relating to
Federal Offenses Which Were Not Specified in Original wiretap Order, 103 ALRF^ED. 422
Qualified Immunity as Defense in Suit Under Federal Wiretap Act (18 U.S.C.A. §§2510 et seq.),
178 ALRF^ED 1
State Regulation of Radio Paging Services, 44 ALR4^TH 216
Validity, Construction, and Application of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
USCS §§1801 et seq.) Authorizing Electronic Surveillance of Foreign Powers and Their Agents,
86 ALRF^ED. 782
What Constitutes Adequate Response by the Government, Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3504, Affirming
or Denying Use of Unlawful Electronic Surveillance, 53 ALR Fed. 378
What Constitutes Compliance by Government Agents With Requirement of 18 U.S.C. 2518(5) that
Wire Tapping and Electronic Surveillance Be Conduct in Such Manner as to Minimize
Interception of Communications Not Otherwise Subject to Interception, 181 ALR Fed. 419
Who May Apply or Authorize Application for Order to Intercept Wire or Oral Communications
Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. 2510 et
seq.), 169 ALR Fed. 169

^Alabama^{: Ala.Code §§13A-11-30 to 13A-}^11-3^7(w/o);^{New Jersey}^{: N.J.}^{Stat.Ann. §§ 2A}^{:156A-2, 2A:}¹⁵^6A-
^Alaska^{: Alaska Stat. §}^§42.20.30⁰^{to 42.20.3}⁹⁰^(w/o/e);^3(w/o/e);
^Arizona^{: Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§13-300}^{1 to 1}^3-30⁰⁹^{New Mex}^ico^{: N.M.Stat.Ann. §30}^-12-1(w);
^(w/o/e);^{New York}^{: N.Y.Penal Law §§ 250.00, 2}^50.0^5(w/o/e);
^Arkansas^{: Ark.Code §§5-60-12}⁰^,^23-17-¹⁰^7(w/o/e);^{North Car}^olina^{: N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 15A-28}^{6, 15A-}
^California^{: Cal.Penal Code §}^{§631(w), 632(o), 63}^2.7(e);^287(w/o/e);
^Colora^do^{: Colo.Rev}^.Stat.^{§§18-9-301 to}^18-9-^{New Hampshire}^{: N.H.Rev.Stat}^.^{Ann. §§ 570-A:1, 5}^70-A:2
^305(w/o/e);^(w/o);
^Connecticut^{: Conn.Ge}^{n.Stat.Ann. §§53a-18}^{7 to 5}^3a-^{New Jersey}^{: N.J.}^{Stat.Ann. §§ 2A}^{:156A-2, 2A:}¹⁵^6A-
^189,^54-4^{1t (w/o);}^3(w/o/e);
^Delaware^{: Del.C}^{ode tit}^{.11 §§ 24}^{01, 2}⁴⁰^2(w/o/e);^{New Mex}^ico^{: N.M.Stat.Ann. §30}^-12-1(w);
^Florida^{: Fla.Stat}^{.Ann. §§ 934.02,}^934.^03(w/o/e);^{New York}^{: N.Y.Penal Law §§ 250.00, 2}^50.0^5(w/o/e);
^Georgia^{: Ga.Code §16-11-6}^{2 (w}^/o/e);^{North Car}^olina^{: N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 15A-28}^{6, 15A-}
^Hawaii^{: Hawaii Rev.}^Stat.^{§§ 711-111}^{1, 8}^03-4^{1, 8}^03-^287(w/o/e);
^42(w/o/e);^{North Dakota}^{: N.D.Cent.Code}^{§§12.1-15-0}^{2, 1}^2.1-15-⁰⁴
^Idaho^{: Idaho Code §§ 18-6}⁷⁰^{1, 1}^8-67^02(w/o/e);^(w/o);
^Indiana^{: Ind.Code Ann. §§ 35-3}³^{.5-1-5, 35-}^33.5-5-^Ohio^{: Ohio Rev.Code §§ 2933.5}^{1, 29}^33.5^{2 (w/o/e);}
^5(w/e);^Oklahoma^{: Okla.Stat.Ann. tit.13 §§ 176.2, 1}^{76.3 (w/o/e);}
^Iowa^{: Iowa Code Ann. §§27}^{2.8, 808B.2(w/o/e);}^Oregon^{: O}^{re.Rev.Stat. §}^§165.53^{5 to 16}^5.54^{5 (w/o/e);}
^Kansas^{: Kan.Stat.Ann. §21-40}⁰¹⁽^{w/o); 21-40}^02(w);^Pennsylvania^{: Pa.}^{Stat.Ann. tit.1}^{8 §§ 570}^{2, 5}⁷⁰³^(w/o/e);
^Kentucky^{: Ky.Rev}^.Stat.^§§526.01^{0, 52}^6.02^0(w/o);^{Rhode Island}^{: R.I.Gen.Laws §§1}^1-35-2^1(w/o/e);
^Louisiana^{: La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 1}^5:13^{02, 1}^5:13⁰³^{South Car}^olina^{: S.C. C}^{ode Ann. §§16-17-47}^{0, 1}^7-30-¹⁰
^(w/o/e);^{to 17-3}^{0-20 (w/o/e);}
^Maine^{: Me.Rev.}^{Stat.Ann. tit. 15 §§ 709, 7}^10(w/o);
^Maryland^{: Md.Cts. & Jud.Pro.Co}^{de Ann. §§ 10-4}^01,^{South Dakota}^{: S.D}^.Cod^{.Laws §}^§^23A-35A-^{1, 23A-}^35A-2⁰
^10-4^02(w/o/e);^(w/o);
^{Massachusetts}^{: Mass.Gen.Laws}^{Ann. ch.2}⁷²^§99^Tennessee^:^{Tenn.Code Ann. §39-13-6}^01(w/o/e);
^(w/o);^Texas^{: Tex.Penal Co}^{de. § 16.02; Tex. Crim. Pro. Co}^de
^Michigan^{: Mich.Comp.Laws An}ⁿ^.^{§§750.539a,}^{art. 18.2}^{0 (w/o/e);}
^750.⁵³^{9c(o); 750.5}^40(w);^Utah^{: Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-}⁴^{05, 7}^7-23a-^{3, 77-}^23a-4
^Minnesota^{: Minn.Stat.Ann. §§ 626A.01, 6}^26A.0²^(w/o/e);
^(w/o/e);
^Mississippi^{: Miss.Code}^§41-29-5^33(w/o/e)^Virginia^{: Va.Co}^{de §§ 19.2-61, 1}⁹^{.2-62(w/o/e);}
^Missouri^{: Mo.Ann.Stat. §}^§^542.4^{00 to 5}^42.4⁰²^(w/o);^Washington^{: Was}^h.Rev.Code^Ann.§9.73.0^{30 (w/o);}
^Montana^{: Mont.Code Ann. §45-}^8-21^3(w/o/e);^{West Virginia}^{: W.Va}^.Code^{§§ 62-1D-2, 62-}^1D-3(w/o/e);
^Nebraska^{: Neb.Rev.Stat. §}^§^86-2^{71 to 8}^6-2^{90 (w/o/e);}^Wisconsin^{: Wis.Stat.Ann. §§ 968.27, 9}^68.3^1(w/o/e);
^Nevada^{: Nev.Rev.Stat}^{. §§ 200.61}^{0, 20}^0.62^0(w),^Wyoming^{: Wyo.Stat. §§ 7-3-701, 7-3-7}^02(w/o/e);
^200.⁶⁵^0(o);^{District of Columbia}^{: D.C.Co}^{de §§ 23-54}^{1, 23-5}^42(w/o).

^{New Hampshire}^{: N.H.Rev.Stat}^.^{Ann. §§ 570-A:1, 5}^70-
^{A:2 (w/o);}

^Alabama^{: Ala.Code §13A-11-30}^{(one party}^consent);^Montana^{: Mont.Code Ann. §§45}^-8-213^(all
^Alaska^{: Alaska Stat. §}^§42.20.31^{0, 42.2}^0.33^{0 (one}^{party con}^sent);^{party con}^{sent with}^{an e}^xcep^{tion f}^{or the}
^Arizona^{: Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §13-300}^{5 (one}^party^consent);^performa^{nce of official duties);}
^Arkansas^{: Ark.Code §5-60-1}²⁰^{(one party con}^sent);^Nebraska^{: Neb.Rev.Stat. § 86-290 (one}^party
^California^{: Cal. Penal Code §§ 6}^{31, 6}^{32 (one}^party^conse^{nt for}^consent);
^{police; all party consent other}^{wise), 632.7 (all party}^consent);^Nevada^{: Nev.Rev.Stat}^{. §§200.62}^{0, 20}^0.65^{0 (one}
^{party con}^sent);
^{New Hampshire}^{: N.H.Rev.Stat}^.^{Ann. §57}^0-A:2
^{(all party consent);}
^{New Jersey}^{: N.J.}^{Stat.Ann. §§2A:}^156A-^{4 (one}
^{party con}^sent);
^Colora^do^{: Colo.Rev}^.Stat.^{§§18-9-303, 1}^8-9-3⁰⁴^{(one pa}^rty^{New Mex}^ico^{: N.M.Stat.Ann. §§30-12-1}^(one
^consent);^{party con}^sent);
^Connecticut^{: Conn.Ge}^{n.Stat.Ann. §§53a-18}^{7, 53a-}¹⁸^{8 (criminal}^{New York}^{: N.Y.Penal Law §250.00 (one}^party
^{proscription: one pa}^{rty conse}^{nt); §52-57}^{0d (civil liabi}^{lity: a}^{ll party}^consent);
^{consent e}^xcept^{for police);}^{North Car}^olina^{: N.C.Gen.Stat. §15A-28}^{7 (one}
^Delaware^{: Del.C}^{ode tit}^{.11 §240}^{2 (one pa}^{rty conse}^nt);^{party con}^sent);
^Florida^{: Fla.Stat}^{.Ann. §934.03}^{(one pa}^{rty conse}^{nt for t}^he^police;^{North Dakota}^{: N.D.Cent.Code}^{§§12.1-15-0}²
^{all party consent}^{for other}^s);^{(one party con}^sent);
^Ohio^{: Ohio Rev.Code §2933.5}²^{(one party}
^consent);
^Georgia^{: Ga.Code §16-11-6}^{6 (one pa}^{rty conse}^nt);^Oklahoma^{: Okla.Stat.Ann. tit.13 §176.4 (one}
^Hawaii^{: Hawaii Rev.}^Stat.^{§§ 711-111}^{1, 8}^03-4^{2 (one}^party^{party con}^sent);
^consent);^Oregon^{: O}^{re.Rev.Stat. §165.540}^{(one party}
^Idaho^{: Idaho Code §18-6}⁷⁰^{2 (on}^{e party co}^nsent);^{consent for}^wiretappi^{ng and all p}^{arties must}
^Illinois^{: Il}^l.Comp.^{Stat.Ann. ch.72}^{0 §§5/14-2,}^5/1^{4-3 (all party}^{consent for ot}^{her form}^{s of electr}^onic
^{consent with law e}^nforceme^{nt e}^x^ceptions);^{eavesdropping);}
^Indiana^{: Ind.Code Ann. §35-}^33.5^{-1-5 (one pa}^{rty conse}^{nt );}^Pennsylvania^{: Pa.}^{Stat.Ann. tit.1}^{8 §57}^{04 (one}
^Iowa^{: Iowa Code Ann. §8}^{08B.2 (}^{one party}^consent);^{party con}^sent^{for the}^{police; all parties consent}
^otherwise);
^{Rhode Island}^{: R.I.Gen.Laws §§1}^1-35-2^{1 (one}
^{party con}^sent);
^Kansas^{: Kan.Stat.Ann. §§21-40}⁰¹^{, 21-40}⁰²^{(one pa}^{rty conse}^nt);^{South Car}^olina^{: S.C. C}^{ode Ann. § 17-30-3}⁰
^Kentucky^{: Ky.Rev}^.Stat.^§526.01⁰^{(one party}^consent);^{(one party con}^sent);
^Louisiana^{: La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §15:130}^{3 (one}^party^consent);^{South Dakota}^{: S.D}^{.Comp.Laws §§23A-35A-2}⁰
^Maine^{: Me.Rev.}^{Stat.Ann. tit. 15 §709}^{(one pa}^{rty conse}^nt);^{(one party con}^sent);
^Maryland^{: Md.Cts. & Jud.Pro.Co}^{de Ann. §10-4}⁰²^{(all party}^Tennessee^:^{Tenn.Code Ann. §39-13-6}⁰¹^(one
^consent);^{party con}^sent)
^{Massachusetts}^{: Mass.Gen.Laws}^{Ann. ch.2}⁷²^{§99 (all parties}^Texas^{: Tex.Penal Co}^{de §16.02 (}^{one party}
^{must c}^onse^{nt, exce}^{pt in}^{some law enforceme}^{nt case}^s);^consent);
^Utah^{: Utah Code Ann. §§77-2}^3a^{-4 (one party}
^consent);
^Virginia^{: Va.Co}^{de §19.2-62 (one}^{party co}^nsent);
^Michigan^{: Mich.Comp.Laws An}ⁿ^.^§750.53^{9c (p}^roscription^Washington^{: Was}^h.Rev.Code^{Ann. §9.73.0}³⁰
^{regarding eavesdrop}^{ping on oral}^{conversation: all party conse}^nt,^{(all parties must conse}^{nt, exce}^pt^{that one}^party
^{except t}^{hat t}^{he p}^{roscription does not ap}^{ply to otherwise lawful}^{consent is s}^{ufficient in}^{certain law}^enforceme^nt
^{activities of police officers);}^cases);
^Minnesota^{: Minn.Stat.Ann. §626}^{A.02 (one pa}^{rty conse}^nt);^{West Virginia}^{: W.Va}^.Code^{§62-1D-3 (one}
^Mississippi^{: Miss.Code}^§41-29-5^{31 (one}^party^consent);^{party con}^sent);
^Missouri^{: Mo.Ann.Stat. §542.402}^{(one party}^consent);^Wisconsin^{: Wis.Stat.Ann. §968.}^{31 (one}^party
^consent);
^Wyoming^{: Wyo.Stat. §7-3-702 (}^{one party}
^consent);
^{District of Columbia}^{: D.C.Co}^{de §23-54}^{2 (one}
^{party con}^sent).

^Arizona^{: Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §12-731;}^Nevada^{: Nev.Rev.Stat}^{. §200.69}^0;
^California^{: Cal. Penal Code §§ 6}^37.2;^{New Hampshire}^{: N.H.Rev.Stat}^.^{Ann. §57}^0-A:11;
^Colora^do^{: Colo.Rev}^.Stat.^§18-9-309.^5;^{New Jersey}^{: N.J.}^{Stat.Ann. §§2A:}^156A-^24;
^Connecticut^{: Conn.Ge}^{n.Stat.Ann. §§54-41r,}^52-5^70d;^{New Mex}^ico^{: N.M.Stat.Ann. §§30-12-1}^1;
^Delaware^{: Del.C}^{ode tit}^{.11 §240}^9;^{North Car}^olina^{: N.C.Gen.Stat. §15A-29}^6;
^Florida^{: Fla.Stat}^{.Ann. §§934.10, 9}^34.2^7;^Ohio^{: Ohio Rev.Code §2933.6}^5;
^Hawaii^{: Hawaii Rev.}^Stat.^§803-4^8;^Oregon^{: O}^{re.Rev.Stat. §133.739}^;
^Idaho^{: Idaho Code §18-6}⁷⁰^9;^Pennsylvania^{: Pa.}^{Stat.Ann. tit.1}^{8 §§572}^{5, 57}^47;
^Illinois^{: Il}^l.Comp.^{Stat.Ann. ch.72}^{0 §5/1}^4-6;^{Rhode Island}^{: R.I.Gen.Laws §1}²^-5.1-13;
^Indiana^{: Ind.Code Ann. §35-}^33.5^-5-4;^{South Car}^olina^{: S.C. C}^{ode Ann. § 17-30-1}^35;
^Iowa^{: Iowa Code Ann. §8}^08B.8;^Tennessee^:^{Tenn.Code Ann. §39-13-6}^03;
^Kansas^{: Kan.Stat.Ann. §22-25}¹⁸^Texas^{: Tex.Co}^{de Crim.Pro}^{. art.}^18.2^0;
^Louisiana^{: La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §15:131}^2;^Utah^{: Utah Code Ann. §§77-2}^3a^{-11; 7}^7-23^b-8;
^Maine^{: Me.Rev.}^{Stat.Ann. ch.15 §711;}^Virginia^{: Va.Co}^{de §19.2-69;}
^Maryland^{: Md.Cts. & Jud.Pro.Co}^{de Ann. §§10-4}^{10, 1}^0-4A-0^8;^Washington^{: Was}^h.Rev.Code^{Ann. §9.73.0}^60;
^{Massachusetts}^{: Mass.Gen.Laws}^{Ann. ch.2}⁷²^§99;^{West Virginia}^{: W.Va}^.Code^§62-^1D-12;
^Michigan^{: Mich.Comp.Laws An}ⁿ^.^§750.53^9h;^Wisconsin^{: Wis.Stat.Ann. §968.}^31;
^Mississippi^{: Miss. Code § 41-29-529;}^Wyoming^{: Wyo.Stat. §7-3-710;}
^Minnesota^{: Minn.Stat.Ann. §§626A.02, 6}^26A.1^3;^{District of Columbia}^{: D.C.Co}^{de §23-55}^4.

^Nebraska:^{Neb.Rev.Stat. § 86-297;}

^Alaska^{: Alaska Stats. §}^§12.37.01^{0 to 12.}^37.9^00;^{North Car}^olina^{: N.C.Gen.Stat. §§15A-286}^{to 15A-}²⁹^8;
^Arizona^{: Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§13-301}^{0 to 1}^3-30^19;^{North Dakota}^{: N.D.Cent.Code}^{§§29-29.2-0}^{1 to 2}⁹^-
^California^{: Cal.Penal Code §629.50 to 6}^29.9^8;^29.2-0^5;
^Colora^do^{: Colo.Rev}^.Stat.^§§16-15-10^{1 to 1}^6-15-¹⁰^4;^Ohio^{: Ohio Rev.Code §§2933.51}^{to 293}^3.66;
^Connecticut^{: Conn.Ge}^{n.Stat.Ann. §§54-41a to}^54-4^1u;^Oklahoma^{: Okla.Stat.Ann. tit.13 §§176.1 to 1}^76.1⁴
^Oregon^{: O}^{re.Rev.Stat. §}^§133.72^{1 to 13}^3.73^9;
^Delaware^{: Del.C}^{ode tit}^{.11 §§24}^{01 to 2}⁴¹^2;^Pennsylvania^{: Pa.}^{Stat.Ann. tit.1}^{8 §§570}^{1 to 5}⁷²⁸
^Florida^{: Fla.Stat}^{.Ann. §§934.02 t}^o^934.4^3;^{Rhode Island}^{: R.I.Gen.Laws §§1}^{2-5.1-1 to}^12-5.1-^16;
^Georgia^{: Ga.Code §16-11-6}^{4 to}^16-1^1-6^9;^{South Car}^olina^{: S.C. C}^{ode Ann. §§ 17-30-1}^{0 to 17-}^30-
^Hawaii^{: Hawaii Rev.}^Stat.^{§§803-41 to 8}^03-^49;^145;
^Idaho^{: Idaho Code §§18-6}⁷⁰^{1 to 18-6}⁷⁰^{9; 6}⁷¹⁹^{to 6}⁷²^5;
^Illinois^{: Il}^l.Stat^{.Ann. ch.72}^{5 §§5/1}^{08A-1 to}¹⁰^8B-14;^{South Dakota}^{: S.D}^.Cod^{.Laws §}^§23A-35A-^{1 to 23A-}
^Indiana^{:Ind.Code §§35-33.5-1-1}^{to 35-3}^3.5-5-6;^35A-3^4;
^Iowa^{: Iowa Code Ann. §§80}^8B.3^{to 808B.7;}^Tennessee^:^{Tenn.Code Ann. §§}^40-6-3⁰¹^{to 40-}^6-31^1;
^Kansas^{: Kan.Stat.Ann. §§ 22-25}¹⁴^{to 22-}²⁵^19;^Texas^{: Tex.Crim}^{.Pro. C}^{ode. art.}^18.2^0;
^Louisiana^{: La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§15:130}^{1 to 15:}¹³^16;^Utah^{: Utah Code Ann. §§77-2}^3a^{-1 to 77-2}^3a-1^6;
^Maryland^{: Md.Cts. & Jud.Pro.Co}^{de Ann. §§10-4}^{01 to}^10-^Virginia^{: Va.Co}^{de §§19.2-61 to}^19.2-7^0.3;
^410;
^{Massachusetts}^{: Mass.Gen.Laws}^{Ann. ch.2}⁷²^§99;^Washington^{: Was}^h.Rev.Code^{Ann. §§9.73.04}^{0 to}
^Minnesota^{: Minn.Stat.Ann. §§626A.01 to 6}^26.^41;^9.73.2^50;
^Mississippi^{: Miss.Code}^§§41-29-⁵⁰¹^{to 41-}^29-5^37;^{West Virginia}^{: W.Va}^.Code^{§§62-1D-1 to 6}^2-1D-16;
^Missouri^{: Mo.Ann.Stat. §}^§542.40^{0 to 54}^2.42^2;^Wisconsin^{: Wis.Stat.Ann. §§968}^{.27 to 9}^68.3^3;
^Nebraska^{: Neb.Rev.Stat. §}^§^86-2^{71 to 8}^6-2,1^15;^Wyoming^{: Wyo.Stat. §§7-3-701}^{to 7-3-71}^2;
^{District of Columbia}^{: D.C.Co}^{de §§23-541}^{to 23-}⁵⁵^6.
^Nevada^{: Nev.Rev.Stat}^{. §§179.41}^{0 to 17}^9.51^5;

^{New Hampshire}^{: N.H.Rev.Stat}^.^{Ann. §§570-A:1 to}⁵⁷^0-
^A:9;
^{New Jersey}^{: N.J.}^{Stat.Ann. §§2A:}^156A-^{8 to 2A:1}^56A-2^6;
^{New Mex}^ico^{: N.M.Stat.Ann. §§30-12-1}^{to 30-}^12-1^1;
^{New York}^{: N.Y.Crim.}^{Pro. Law}^{§§700.05 to}⁷⁰^0.70;

^Alaska^{: Alaska Stats. §}^§12.37.20^{0 (PR&T), 12.37.30}^0(SE);^{New Jersey}^{; N.J.Stat}^{.Ann. §§2A:}^156A-^{27 to}
^Arizona^{: Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§13-301}^{6 (SE); 1}^3-30^{05, 1}³^-^2A:15^{6A-34 (SE);}
³⁰¹^{7 (PR&T);}^{New York}^{: N.Y.Crim.}^{Pro.Law §}^§705.0^{0 to 7}^05.3⁵
^Arkansas^{: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-}⁶^0-12^{0(g) (PR&T);}^(PR&T);
^Colora^do^{: Colo. Rev.}^{Stat. § 18-9-30}^{5 (PR&T);}^{North Car}^olina^{: N.C.Gen.Stat. §§15A-260}^{to 15A-}
^Delaware^{: Del.C}^{ode tit}^{.11 §§ 24}^{01; 2}⁴²¹^{to 2}⁴²⁷^{(SE); 2}⁴³⁰²⁶⁴^(PR&T);
^{to 243}^{4 (PR&T);}^{North Dakota}^{: N.D.Cent.Code}^{§§29-29.3-0}^{1 to}
^29-2^9.3-0^{5 (PR&T);}
^Florida^{: Fla.Stat}^{.Ann. §§934.02;}⁹^34.2^{1 to 93}^4.2^{8 (SE);}^Ohio^{: Ohio Rev.Code §2933.7}⁶^(PR&T);
^934.^{32 to 9}^34.^34(PR&T);^Oklahoma^{: Okla.Stat.Ann. tit.13 §177.1 to}¹⁷^7.5
^Georgia^{: Ga.Code Ann. §§16-11}^{-60 to 1}^6-11-^{64.2 (PR &T);}^(PR&T);
^{§ 16-9-1}^{09 (SE);}^Oregon^{: O}^{re.Rev.Stat. §}^§165.65^{7 to 16}^5.67³
^Hawaii^{: Hawaii Rev.}^Stat.^{§§803-41; 8}^03-^{44.5, 8}^03-^44.6^(PR&T);
^(PR&T)^{, 803-4}^{7.5 to 8}^03.4^{7.9 (SE}^);^Pennsylvania^{: Pa.}^{Stat.Ann. tit.1}^{8 §§574}^{1 to 5}⁷⁴⁹
^Idaho^{: Idaho Code §§18-6}⁷¹^{9 to 18-6}⁷²^{5 (PR&T);}^{(SE), 5771}^{to 57}^{75 (PR&T);}
^Iowa^{: Iowa Code Ann. §§80}^{8B.1, 80}^{8B.10 to 8}^08B.1⁴^{Rhode Island}^{; R.I.Gen.Laws}^{§§12-5.2-1 to}^12-5.2-⁵
^(PR&T);^(PR&T);
^Kansas^{: Kan.Stat.Ann. §§22-25}²⁵^{to 22-2}⁵²^{9 (PR&T);}^{South Car}^olina^{: S.C.C}^{ode §}^§17-29-10^{to 17-}^29-5^0,
^Louisiana^{: La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§15:130}^{2, 15:1}³¹^{3 to 1}^5:13¹⁶^17-3^0-45^{to 17-}^30-5^{0 (PR&T);}
^(PR&T);^{South Dakota}^{: S.D}^.Cod^{.Laws §}^§23A-35A-^{22 to}
^Maryland^{: Md.Cts. & Jud.Pro.Co}^{de Ann. §§10-4A-0}^{1 to 1}⁰^-^23A-3^5A-34^(PR&T);
^{4A-08 (SE), 1}^0-4B-0^{1 to 10-}^4B-0^{5 (PR&T);}^Tennessee^:^{Tenn.Code Ann. §40-6-31}^{1 (PR&T);}
^Minnesota^{: Minn.Stat.Ann. §§626A.01;}^626A.^{26 to 6}^26A.3^4;^Texas^{: Tex.Co}^{de Crim.Pro}^{. art.}^18.2^{0, 18.2}^{1; Tex.}
^{(SE), 626A.35}^{to 63}^6A.39^{1 (PR&T);}^{Penal Code §§ 16.03, 16.0}^{4 (SE, PR&T);}
^Mississippi^{: Miss.Code}^§41-29-7^01(PR&T);^Utah^{: Utah Code Ann. §§77-2}^3a^{-13 to 7}^7-23a-¹⁵
^{(PR&T); 77-23b-1 to}^77-2^3b-^9(SE^);
^Missouri^{: Mo.Ann.Stat. §542.408}^(PR);^Virginia^{: Va.Co}^{de §§19.2-70.1, 1}^9.2-70.2^(PR&T),
^Montana^{: Mont.Code Ann. §§46}^-4-401^{to 46-}^4-40^{5 (PR&T);}^19.2-7^{0.3 (SE);}
^Nebraska^{: Neb.Rev.Stat. §}^§^86-2^{79, 8}^6-2,1^{04 to 8}^6-2,1¹⁰^Washington^{: Was}^h.Rev.Code^{Ann. §9.73.2}⁶⁰
^{(SE); 86-28}^{4, 8}^6-28^{7, 8}^6-29^{8 to 8}^6-2,10^{1 (PR&T);}^(PR&T);
^Nevada^{: Nev.Rev.Stat}^{. §§179.53}^{0 (PR&T), 205.49}^{2 to}^{West Virginia}^{: W.Va}^.Code^{§§62-1D-2, 62-}^1D-10
^205.⁵¹^3(SE);^(PR&T);
^{New Hampshire}^{: N.H.Rev.Stat}^.^{Ann. §§570-B:1 to 5}^70-B:7^Wisconsin^{: Wis.Stat.Ann. §968.}^{30 to 9}^68.3⁷
^(PR&T);^(PR&T);
^Wyoming^{: Wyo.Stat. §§7-3-801}^{to 7-3-80}^{6 (PR&T).}

^Alabama^{: Ala.Code §§13A-8-100 to 13A-}^8-10^3;^Nevada^{: Nev.Rev.Stat}^{. §§205.47}^{3 to 20}^5.49^{2; 2}^05.⁵⁰^{9 to}
^Alaska^{: Alaska Stat. §11.46.740;}^205.⁵¹^3;
^Arizona^{: Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§13-231}^{6 to 1}³^-^{New Hampshire}^{: N.H.Rev.Stat}^.^{Ann. §63}^{8:16 to}⁶³^8:19;
²³¹^6.0^2;^{New Jersey}^{: N.J.}^{Stat.Ann. §§2C:}^{20-2, 2C:2}^0-2^{3 to 2C:2}^0-34;
^Arkansas^{: Ark.Code §§5-41-10}¹^{to 5-41-2}^06;
^California^{: Cal.Penal Code §502;}
^Colora^do^{: Colo.Rev}^.Stat.^{§§18-5.5-101,}^18-5.5-^{New Mex}^ico^{: N.M.Stat.Ann. §§30-45-1}^{to 30-}^45-7;
^102;^{New York}^{: N.Y.Penal Law §§156.00 to}^156.^50;
^Connecticut^{: Conn.Ge}^{n.Stat.Ann. §§53a-25}^{0 to}^{North Car}^olina^{: N.C.Gen.Stat. §§14-453}^{to 14-}⁴⁵^8;
^53a-2^61;^{North Dakota}^{: N.D.Cent.Code}^§12.1-0^6.1-08;
^Delaware^{: Del.C}^{ode tit}^{.11 §§93}^{1 to 94}^1;^Ohio^{: Ohio Rev.Code §§2909.01}^{, 290}^{9.07, 2}⁹¹^3.0^{1 to 29}^13.^04,
^Florida^{: Fla.Stat}^{.Ann. §§815.01 t}^o^815.0^7;²⁹¹^3.4^21;
^Georgia^{: Ga.Code §§16-9-92 to}^16-9-9^4;
^Hawaii^{: Hawaii Rev.}^Stat.^§708-8^{90 to 7}^08-⁸⁹^5.7;^Oklahoma^{: Okla.Stat.Ann. tit.21 §§1951 to}¹⁹^59;
^Idaho^{: Idaho Code §§18-2}²⁰^{1, 1}^8-22^02;^Oregon^{: O}^{re.Rev.Stat. §164.377}^;
^Illinois^{: Il}^l.Stat^{.Ann. ch.72}^{0 §§5/1}^{6D-1 to 5/1}^6D-7;^Pennsylvania^{: Pa.}^{Stat.Ann. tit.1}^{8 §76}^11;
^Indiana^{: Ind.Code §§35-43-1-}^{4 t}^o^35-4^3-2-3;^{Rhode Island}^{: R.I.Gen.Laws §§1}^1-52-1^{to 11-}^52-8;
^Iowa^{: Iowa Code Ann. §7}^16.6B;^{South Car}^olina^{: S.C.C}^{ode §}^§16-16-10^{to 16-}^16-4^{0, 2}^6-6-2^10;
^Kansas^{: Kan.Stat.Ann. §21-37}^55;^{South Dakota}^{: S.D}^.Cod^{.Laws §}^§43-43B-1^{to 43-}^43B-8;
^Kentucky^{: Ky.Rev}^.Stat.^§§434.84^{0 to 43}^4.86^0;^Tennessee^:^{Tenn.Code Ann. §§}^39-1^4-60^{1 to 3}^9-1^4-60^5;
^Louisiana^{: La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§14:73.1 to 1}^4:73.7;^Texas^{: Tex.Penal Co}^{de. §}^§33.01^{to 33.05;}
^Maine^{: Me.Rev.}^{Stat.Ann. tit. 17-A §§431 to 4}^33;^Utah^{: Utah Code Ann. §§76-6-7}^{02 to 7}^6-6-7^05;
^Maryland^{: Md.Code Ann., Crim.}^{Law. §7-302;}
^{Massachusetts}^{: Mass.Gen.Laws}^{Ann. ch.2}⁶⁶
^§120F;
^Michigan^{: Mich.Comp.Laws An}ⁿ^.^§§752.791^to^Vermont^{: Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §§ 4101 to}⁴¹^07;
^752.⁷⁹^7;^Virginia^{: Va.Co}^{de §§18.2-152.1 t}^o^18.2-1^52.1^{5, 19.2-}²⁴^9.2;
^Minnesota^{: Minn.Stat.Ann. §§609.87 to}^609.⁸⁹^3;^Washington^{: Was}^h.Rev.Code^{Ann. §§9A.52.11}^{0 to 9A.5}^2.13^0;
^Mississippi^{: Miss.Code}^§§97-45-^{1 to 97-}^45-2^9;^{West Virginia}^{: W.Va}^.Code^{§§61-3C-1 to 6}^1-3C-2^1;
^Missouri^{: Mo.Ann.Stat. §}^§569.09^{5 to 56}^9.09^9;^Wisconsin^{: Wis.Stat.Ann. §943.}^70;
^Montana^{: Mont.Code Ann. §§45}^-6-310,^45-6-³¹^1;^Wyoming^{: Wyo.Stat. §§6-3-501}^{to 6-3-50}^5.

^Nebraska^{: Neb.Rev.Stat. §}^§28-1341^{to 28-}¹³^48;

^Alaska:^{Alaska Stat. §}^§^45.45.4⁷¹^{to 45.4}^5.79^8;
^Arizona:^{Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§}^44-7³⁰^{1 to 4}^4-7³⁰⁴^;
^Arkansas:^{Ark. Code §§ 4-11}^0-1^{01 to 4-}¹¹^0-10^5;
^California:^{Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 2294}^{7 to 2}²⁹^47.6;
^Georgia:^{Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-9}^{-150 to}^16-9-¹⁵^7;
^Indiana:^{Ind. Code Ann. §§ 24-}^{4.8-1-1 to 2}^4-4.8-^3-2;
^Iowa:^{Iowa Code Ann. §§ 71}^4F.1^{to 714F.8;}
^Louisiana:^{La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§}^51:2⁰⁰^{6 to 5}^1:20^14;
^Nevada:^{Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §205.4}⁷³^7;
^{New Hampshire:}^{N.H. Rev. St}^{at. Ann. §§ 359-H:1}^{to 35}^9-H:6;
^Texas:^{Tex. Bus. & Com. Co}^{de Ann. §§ 48.0}^{01 to 4}^8.1^02;
^Utah:^{Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-4}^0-¹⁰¹^{to 13-}^40-4^01;
^Washington:^Was^{h. Rev. Code Ann. §§19.27}^0.01^{0 to 1}^9.27^0.90^0.

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Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).

18 U.S.C. 2510. Definitions.

As used in this chapter--
(1) “wire communication” means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of
facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like
connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such
connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or
operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or
communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce;
(2) “oral communication” means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an
expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying
such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic communication;
(3) “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States;
(4) “intercept” means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device;
(5) “electronic, mechanical, or other device” means any device or apparatus which can be used to
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication other than--
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof, (i)
furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in
the ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course
of its business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such
service and used in the ordinary course of its business; or (ii) being used by a provider of wire or
electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or
law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties;
(b) a hearing aid or similar device being used to correct subnormal hearing to not better than
normal;
(6) “person” means any employee, or agent of the United States or any State or political
subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, or
corporation;
(7) “Investigative or law enforcement officer” means any officer of the United States or of a State
or political subdivision thereof, who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of or to make
arrests for offenses enumerated in this chapter, and any attorney authorized by law to prosecute or
participate in the prosecution of such offenses;
(8) “contents”, when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic communication, includes
any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication;

(9) “Judge of competent jurisdiction” means--
(a) a judge of a United States district court or a United States court of appeals; and
(b) a judge of any court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State who is authorized by a statute
of that State to enter orders authorizing interceptions of wire, oral, or electronic communications;
(10) “communication common carrier” has the meaning given the term in section 3 of the
Communications Act of 1934;
(11) “aggrieved person” means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral, or
electronic communication or a person against whom the interception was directed;
(12) “electronic communication” means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign
commerce, but does not include--
(A) any wire or oral communication;
(B) any communication made through a tone-only paging device;
(C) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117 of this title); or
(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a communications
system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds;
(13) “user” means any person or entity who--
(A) uses an electronic communication service; and
(B) is duly authorized by the provider of such service to engage in such use;
(14) “electronic communications system” means any wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of wire or electronic
communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic
storage of such communications;
(15) “electronic communication service” means any service which provides to users thereof
the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications;
(16) “readily accessible to the general public” means, with respect to a radio communication,
that such communication is not--
(A) scrambled or encrypted;
(B) transmitted using modulation techniques whose essential parameters have been withheld from
the public with the intention of preserving the privacy of such communication;
(C) carried on a subcarrier or other signal subsidiary to a radio transmission;

(D) transmitted over a communication system provided by a common carrier, unless the
communication is a tone only paging system communication; or
(E) transmitted on frequencies allocated under part 25, subpart D, E, or F of part 74, or part 94 of
the Rules of the Federal Communications Commission, unless, in the case of a communication
transmitted on a frequency allocated under part 74 that is not exclusively allocated to broadcast
auxiliary services, the communication is a two-way voice communication by radio;
(17) “electronic storage” means--
(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the
electronic transmission thereof; and
(B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of
backup protection of such communication; and
(18) “aural transfer” means a transfer containing the human voice at any point between and
including the point of origin and the point of reception.
(19) “foreign intelligence information”, for purposes of section 2517(6) of this title, means –
(A) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that relates to the ability of
the United States to protect against –
(i) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power;
(ii) sabotage or intentional terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or
(iii)_ clandestine intelligence activities by and intelligence service or network of a foreign power
or by an agent of a foreign power; or
(B) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, with respect to a foreign
power or foreign territory that relates to –
(i) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(ii) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
(20) “protected computer” has the meaning set forth in section 1030; and
(21) “computer trespasser” –
(A) means a person who accesses a protected computer without authorization and thus has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in any communication transmitted to, through, or from the
protected computer; and
(B) does not include a person known by the owner or operator of the protected computer to have
an existing contractual relationship with the owner or operator of the protected computer for
access to all or part of the protected computer.

18 U.S.C. 2511. Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic
communications prohibited.
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who--
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or
endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication;
(b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use
any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when--
(i) such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like
connection used in wire communication; or
(ii) such device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with the transmission of such
communication; or
(iii) such person knows, or has reason to know, that such device or any component thereof has
been sent through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iv) such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the premises of any business or other
commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (B)
obtains or is for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the operations of any business or
other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or
(v) such person acts in the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any
territory or possession of the United States;
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire,
oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was
obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this
subsection;
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection; or
(e) (i) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any
wire, oral, or electronic communication, intercepted by means authorized by sections
2511(2)(a)(ii), 2511(2)(b)-(c), 2511(2)(e), 2516, and 2518 of this chapter, (ii) knowing or having
reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of such a
communication in connection with a criminal investigation, (iii) having obtained or received the
information in connection with a criminal investigation, and (iv) with intent to improperly
obstruct, impede, or interfere with a duly authorized criminal investigation,
shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be subject to suit as provided in
subsection (5).
(2)(a)(i) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an officer,
employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose facilities are
used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that

communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a
necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of
the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire communication service to the public
shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or service quality
control checks.
(ii) Notwithstanding any other law, providers of wire or electronic communication service, their
officers, employees, and agents, landlords, custodians, or other persons, are authorized to provide
information, facilities, or technical assistance to persons authorized by law to intercept wire, oral,
or electronic communications or to conduct electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, if such provider, its officers, employees, or
agents, landlord, custodian, or other specified person, has been provided with--
[Sec. 101(c)(1)] (A) a court order directing such assistance or a court order pursuant to section

704 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 signed by the authorizing judge,

[Sec.403(b)(2)(C)] Effective December 31, 2012 . . . (C) except as provided in section 404,
section 2511(2)(A)(ii)(A) of title 128, United States Code, is amended by striking “or a court
order pursuant to