Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations






Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress



Lebanon is a religiously diverse, democratic state transitioning toward independence after a
ruinous civil war and the Syrian and Israeli occupations that followed. The United States and
Lebanon have historically enjoyed a good relationship due in part to cultural and religious ties;
the democratic character of the state; a large, Lebanese-American community in the United
States; and the pro-western orientation of Lebanon, particularly during the Cold War. Current
U.S. concerns in Lebanon include strengthening the weak democratic institutions of the state,
limiting the influence of Iran and Syria in Lebanon’s political process, and disarming Hezbollah
and other militant groups in Lebanon.
Following Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 and the war between Israel and Hezbollah in
the summer of 2006, the Bush Administration requested and Congress appropriated a significant
increase in U.S. assistance to Lebanon. Since 2006, U.S. assistance to Lebanon has topped $750
million over three years, including for the first time over $410 million in U.S. security assistance
for the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces of Lebanon. Several key issues in
U.S.-Lebanon relations could potentially affect future U.S. assistance to Lebanon.
A political agreement among Lebanese parties in May 2008, brokered by the Qatari government
and the Arab League in Doha, ended 18 months of political stalemate. The period was marked by
cabinet resignations, political assassinations, labor strikes, a war between Hezbollah and Israel, an
insurrection by foreign and Palestinian militants, and the worst sectarian fighting since Lebanon’s

15-year civil war.


Since then, sectarian violence has continued in the northern city of Tripoli where Sunni factions
supported by Saudi Arabia and Alawite groups supported by Syria have clashed and three
bombings have targeted the Lebanese Armed Forces, raising concerns about a potential regional
proxy war in Lebanon. Fighting has subsided somewhat since a reconciliation, brokered by
Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, took effect on September 8, 2008.
In addition, the international community has continued to call for the disarming of all of
Lebanon’s militia groups. In particular, these demands have focused on Hezbollah’s militia,
which claimed victory in a 2006 war with Israel, improving its popular image in Lebanon. Efforts
to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which calls for the groups’
disarmament, are further complicated by the more prominent role that Hezbollah gained in the
unity government following the Doha agreement.
The next Administration and the Members of the 111th Congress will be faced with upcoming
parliamentary elections in Lebanon, scheduled for 2009. The outcome of the elections could
further complicate U.S.-Lebanon relations, particularly if they result in political paralysis or a
more substantial role for Hezbollah in the government. In addition, the ongoing sectarian violence
in Tripoli demonstrates the regional and international struggle over Iranian influence in the
Levant, the growing threat of radical Sunni movements, and Syria’s efforts to move out of
isolation, all of which weigh heavily on the Lebanese government and U.S.-Lebanon relations.
This report provides an overview of Lebanese politics, recent events in Lebanon, and current
issues in U.S.-Lebanon relations and will be updated to reflect major developments.






Recent Events..................................................................................................................................1
Violence in Tripoli.....................................................................................................................1
Syrian Border Deployment.......................................................................................................1
Aoun Visit to Syria....................................................................................................................1
U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon...........................................................................................................2
Backgr ound ............................................................................................................................... 2
Recent U.S. Assistance to Lebanon...........................................................................................4
Political Profile................................................................................................................................5
Demo gr aphy .............................................................................................................................. 5
Civil War, Occupation, and Taif Reform...................................................................................5
Syrian and Israeli Incursions...............................................................................................6
Taif Agreement....................................................................................................................6
Syrian Withdrawal and Parliamentary Elections of 2005.........................................................7
Syrian Withdrawal..............................................................................................................7
Parliamentary Elections of 2005.........................................................................................8
U.N. Resolutions 1595, 1757, and the Tribunal..................................................................8
Sectarianism and Stability.........................................................................................................9
Political Stalemate..............................................................................................................9
Renewed Sectarian Violence.............................................................................................10
Doha Agreement...............................................................................................................10
Unity Government.............................................................................................................11
Current Issues in U.S.-Lebanon Relations.....................................................................................11
Confronting Hezbollah............................................................................................................12
Lebanon-Syria Relations.........................................................................................................13
The Shib’a Farms....................................................................................................................14
Extremist Groups in Lebanon.................................................................................................15
The Lebanese Armed Forces...................................................................................................16
U.S. Assistance to Lebanon...........................................................................................................17
Economic Assistance...............................................................................................................17
Security Assistance..................................................................................................................18
Unexploded Cluster Munitions in Lebanon............................................................................19
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Lebanon, FY 2004-2009......................................................................4
Table A-1. U.S. Assistance to Lebanon, 1946-2003 20
Appendix A. U.S. Assistance to Lebanon......................................................................................20
Appendix B. Map of Lebanon.......................................................................................................21





Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................22






Despite the formation of a consensus government, sectarian tensions remain high in Lebanon. For
much of 2008, sporadic fighting has continued in the northern city of Tripoli between Sunni
residents of the Bab al Tebbaneh neighborhood and Alawites aligned with the opposition in Jabal
Mohsen. In June, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were deployed to Tripoli to stop the fighting.
The Tripoli conflict pits Sunnis against Alawites, a sect whose members include the leadership of
Syria, and appears to be fueled by a slow-burning proxy war involving Iran, Saudi Arabia, and 1
Syria. Sunnis in Tripoli, many of whom espouse the principles of Salafism, may be supported
financially and ideologically by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia may be seeking to counter Syrian
support of both the Alawite community and Hezbollah, along with Iranian financial, ideological,
and military support for Hezbollah and other Shiite groups.
The violence has calmed since the signing of a reconciliation agreement brokered by Prime
Minister Siniora on September 8, 2008, but two bombings since then have left 15 soldiers dead.
Targeted attacks against the LAF, viewed by some as the “only national institution in Lebanon”
are of particular concern to observers. Some express concerns that U.S. security assistance to the
LAF has made it a target for extremist attacks. Others blame Syria or pro-Syrian agents, who 2
might want to weaken the force ahead of a reoccupation of Lebanon.
On September 23, 2008, Syria deployed 10,000 Special Forces along Lebanon’s northern border.
Syrian officials state that the purpose of the deployment is to combat smuggling and to safeguard
the border against terrorists attempting to enter Lebanon following twin bombings in Tripoli and
Damascus earlier that month. Some observers, however, expressed concerns that the troop build-
up could indicate that Syria is positioning to re-enter Lebanon. Those concerns were somewhat
abated, at least temporarily, when, on October 14, 2008, following months of talks, the
governments of Lebanon and Syria established formal diplomatic relations for the first time since
the two countries gained independence. Reports indicate that the governments plan to exchange
ambassadors and open embassies some time before the end of 2008.
In early December, Michel Aoun3 visited Damascus in a reported attempt to present himself as the
leader and spokesman of Christians in Lebanon and to garner Syrian support for his party ahead
of parliamentary elections scheduled for 2009. With Sunnis and Shiites split almost evenly in
1
Alia Ibrahim,Lebanese City’s Strife Reflects 2 Conflicts, Washington Post, October 22, 2008.
2 Ibid.
3 Michel Aoun opposed Syrian occupation at the end Lebanese civil war and spent 15 years exile as a result. Aoun
returned to Lebanon in 2005 and is now a Member of Parliament and the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, a
Christian party and part of the March 8 opposition along with Hezbollah and others.





Lebanese politics, many observers believe that the vote of the Christian community could play a 4
pivotal role in deciding the outcome of the 2009 elections.

The United States and Lebanon have historically enjoyed a good relationship due in part to
cultural and religious ties; the democratic character of the state; a large, Lebanese-American
community in the United States; and the pro-western orientation of Lebanon, particularly during
the Cold War.
The American University of Beirut (AUB) was founded in 1866 by Americans in Lebanon and
continues to receive the support of the United States Government and the Congress today,
contributing to the long standing cultural ties between the two. In addition, the large Lebanese-
American community further strengthens the cultural ties and has supported U.S. assistance to
Lebanon in various forms.
Despite longstanding contact and interaction between the United States and Lebanon, some might
argue that Lebanon is of limited strategic value to the United States. Unlike many American
partners in the Middle East, Lebanon has no U.S. military bases, oil fields, international
waterways, military or industrial strength, or major trading ties with the United States. Others
would disagree, pointing to Lebanon’s strategic location as a buffer between Israel and Syria,
Lebanon’s large Palestinian refugee population, and its historical role as an interlocutor for the
United States with the Arab world.
During the 1975-1990 civil war, the United States expressed concern over the violence and
destruction taking place in Lebanon and provided emergency economic aid, military training, and
limited amounts of military equipment. In addition, the United States briefly deployed military
forces to Lebanon in the early 1980’s. The forces withdrew after a bombing at the U.S. Embassy
in April 1983 and a bombing at the U.S. Marine barracks in October 1983 killed 272 civilians and
members of the U.S. Armed Forces in Lebanon. The United States supported and participated in
various efforts to bring about a cease-fire during the civil war and subsequent efforts to quiet
unrest in southern Lebanon along the Lebanese-Israeli border.
The United States supported Lebanon in its reconstruction following the civil war with economic
assistance aimed at rebuilding Lebanon’s badly damaged infrastructure and political support for a
democratic, independent Lebanon (see Appendix A). In 1996, the United States helped negotiate
an agreement between Hezbollah and Israel to avoid targeting civilians and is a member of a five-
party force monitoring this agreement. The United States also endorsed the U.N. Secretary
General’s findings in May 2000 that Israel had completed its withdrawal from southern Lebanon.
Since Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, U.S. efforts have focused on countering
terrorism and promoting democracy, two agendas that sometimes clash in Lebanon as Hezbollah
4
U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document—GMP20081204966006—Aoun’s Trip to Syria Seen as a Bid to Corner
More Votes in Lebanon,” Daily Star (Beirut), December 4, 2008.





maintains a political party, a militia wing, and an overseas terrorist capability. The United States
also opposed the ongoing Syrian occupation of Lebanon as part of its policy to contain Syria as a
state sponsor of terrorism.
The Bush Administration reacted strongly to the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri in February 2005, criticized the Syrian presence in Lebanon, and demanded the withdrawal
of Syrian forces from Lebanon. The United States welcomed the formation of a new Lebanese
government following the withdrawal of Syrian forces in April 2005. After a meeting with
Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora on July 22, 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 5
said, “I think that you cannot find a partner more supportive of Lebanon than the United States.”
The United States also supported the United Nations in establishing an independent tribunal to
prosecute those responsible for Hariri’s assassination.
Large-scale fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in mid-2006 complicated U.S. policy toward
Lebanon. In a broader sense, the conflict jeopardized not only the long-term stability of Lebanon
but presented the U.S. government with a basic dilemma. On one hand, the Administration was
sympathetic to Israeli military action against a terrorist organization–and President Bush spoke in
favor of Israel’s right to self-defense. On the other hand, the fighting dealt a set back to
Administration efforts to support the rebuilding of physical infrastructure and democratic
institutions in Lebanon. When the fighting ended, Hezbollah and Syria, two forces that oppose
the U.S.-supported March 14 government, were strengthened.
Following the war, Hezbollah, emboldened by increased popular support, began to push for an
increased role in the government in Lebanon and internal government disputes led to a vacant
presidency and 18 months of political stalemate. The United States watched cautiously while
continuing assistance and support for the March 14 coalition until January 23, 2007, when
Hezbollah called a general strike aimed at toppling the government. In response, then-Under
Secretary of State Nicholas Burns called on Arabs and Europeans to throw their support behind
Prime Minister Siniora against those who would try to destabilize his regime. Following the Doha
Agreement in May 2008 that ended the stalemate, Secretary Rice reiterated U.S. support for the
government of Lebanon and its “complete authority over the entire territory of the country.”
The United States welcomed the new unity government in Lebanon following the Doha
Agreement and supported the choice of Michel Suleiman to fill the vacant presidency. Lebanese
President Michel Suleiman visited Washington. on September 26, 2008 while in the United States
to attend the U.N. General Assembly meeting in New York. He was the first Lebanese head of
state to do so since 1996.
As the incoming Obama Administration and the 111th Congress reevaluate U.S. policy in the
region, the U.S. approach toward Lebanon could become a harbinger of new direction or a
continuation of the status quo. While the United States wants to promote stability and curb
Iranian influence in Lebanon, there is a debate over how best to achieve these goals. The United
States could continue its support for the anti-Syrian March 14 coalition government, promoting
democracy and stability with economic and security assistance. Another alternative is to address
the situation in Lebanon as part of a larger regional initiative, possibly one that centers on Syria,
Israel, and the peace process. However, events may ultimately dictate a U.S. course of action in
5
BBC Monitoring Middle East, Text of live news conference by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and
Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in Beirut, Lebanese LBC TV, July 22, 2006.





Lebanon, particularly in the face of upcoming parliamentary elections and continued sectarian
tensions.
The United States has pledged to devote more financial resources to reconstruction and military
assistance. The withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon and the coming to power of the more
moderate March 14 government prompted the Administration and Congress to increase U.S.
assistance to Lebanon. The summer 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel heightened the need
for additional economic aid, as the Lebanese government and its international and Arab partners
vied with Iran and Hezbollah to win the hearts and minds of many Lebanese citizens who lost
homes and businesses as a result of the conflict. From a military standpoint, the war also
highlighted the need for a more robust Lebanese military to adequately patrol Lebanon’s porous
borders with Syria and prevent Hezbollah’s re-armament
The FY2007 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-28, adopted May 25, 2007)
provided over $580 million in security and economic assistance to support Lebanon’s recovery
and to strengthen the Lebanese security forces (See Table 1 below). The supplemental also
provided $184 million in Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) funding
for Lebanon. Appropriations for FY2008 and requests for FY2009 support the continuation of
these efforts, albeit at lower levels. For more information on U.S. economic and security
assistance to Lebanon, see “U.S. Assistance to Lebanon” below.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Lebanon, FY 2004-2009
regular and supplemental appropriations; current year $ in millions
FY07 FY09
Acct. FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 Supp. FY08 Bridge
ESF $34.79 $39.72 $39.60 $39.60 $295.00 $44.64 --
FMF -- -- $30.00a $4.80 $220.00 $6.94 $32.50
INCLE -- -- -- - $60.00 $0.50 --
NADR $0.90 $2.30 $2.98 $3.00 $5.50 $4.75 --
1206 -- -- $10.60 $30.60 -- $15.10 --
(DoD)b
IMET $0.70 $0.81 $0.75 $0.91 -- $1.20 --
CIPA -- -- -- -- $184.00 -- --
DA $0.40 $0.50 $2.00 -- -- -- --
Total $36.79 $43.33 $86.21 $79.35 $764.50 $73.13 $32.50
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations. Includes funds
from the following accounts: Economic Support Fund (ESF), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Assistance (INCLE), Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining, and
Related funding (NADR), International Military and Education Training (IMET),Contributions for International
Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) and Development Assistance (DA). Funding for ‘1206’ refers to the Department
of Defense Global Train and Equip program, authorized by Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163).
Notes





a. Includes reprogrammed funds. ‘FY2009 Bridge’ refers to the $66 billion in total request for the Defense
Department included in the FY2008 Spring Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008(P.L. 110-252, June 30, 2008),
constituting a “bridge fund” sufficient to allow services to carry out day-to-day peacetime activities and military
operations overseas until the middle of 2009. FY05 numbers include supplemental appropriations.
b. Funding for ‘1206’ refers to the Department of Defense Global Train and Equip program, authorized by
Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163).

The Lebanese government, with support from the United States and the international community,
constantly struggles to maintain the delicate political balance of its confessional system (see
below) and ongoing sectarian tension. The legacy of civil war and foreign occupation left
government institutions weak, and recovery has been difficult, particularly in the face of foreign
interference from Iran and Syria through their proxies. Political parties and citizens of Lebanon
express both a sense of dissatisfaction with the political system and a reluctance to alter it,
possibly because of the national memory of the civil war and a fear that any attempt to alter the
political system could reignite the tensions that led the country to fracture along sectarian lines in

1975.


Lebanon is the most religiously diverse society in the Middle East, with 17 recognized religious
sects. The Lebanese government operates under a confessional system, or the distribution of
government positions by religion. In 1943, when Lebanon became fully independent from France,
leaders of the principal religious communities adopted an unwritten agreement known as the
National Covenant, which provided that the president be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister
a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament a Shiite Muslim. Parliamentary seats were
apportioned between Christians and Muslims according to a ratio of 6:5, until 1989 when the ratio
was evened. Cabinet posts were generally distributed among the principal sectarian communities.
The 1943 ratios were developed based on the sole Lebanese census conducted in 1932 and
became less reflective of Lebanese society as Muslims gradually came to outnumber Christians. 6
Within the Muslim community, Shiite Muslims came to outnumber Sunni Muslims. As a result
of this system, Lebanese political parties developed along religious, geographic, ethnic, and
ideological lines and are often associated with prominent families. Discontent over power-sharing
imbalances was an important factor in the inter-communal tensions and civil strife culminating in
the 1975-1990 civil war.
At stake in the civil war were control over the political process in Lebanon, the status of
Palestinian refugees and militia, and the respective goals of Syria and Israel. From 1975-1990,
6
Because no census has been conducted in Lebanon since 1932, the proportion of Shiite to Sunni Muslims is uncertain.
The latest CIA World Fact Book estimates state that Lebanon’s population is 35% Shiite Muslim, 25% Sunni Muslim,
35% Christian, and 5% Druze and other groups.





hundreds of thousands were killed, wounded , or disabled, and comparable numbers were left
homeless at one time or another. The war was marked by foreign occupations, kidnappings, and
terror bombings. In the aftermath, Lebanon’s warring factions reached a precarious consensus,
but sectarian divisions and a culture of distrust among Lebanon’s various demographic groups
remain.
Both Syria and Israel sent troops into Lebanon during the 15-year civil war. Syria sent troops into
Lebanon in 1976 at the request of then-President Suleiman Frangieh. Israel invaded in 1978
following PLO attacks against Israelis that originated from southern Lebanon.
Thirty-five thousand Syrian troops entered Lebanon in March 1976 to protect Christians from
Muslim and Palestinian militias. From 1987 and June 2001, Syrian forces occupied most of west
Beirut and much of eastern and northern Lebanon.
In March 1978, Israel invaded and occupied Lebanese territory south of the Litani River to
destroy Palestinian bases that were being used as staging grounds for attacks against Israel. Israeli
forces withdrew in June 1978, after the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was
deployed to southern Lebanon to act as a buffer between Israel and the Palestinians (U.N.
Security Council Resolution 425, March 19, 1978). In June 1982, Israel mounted a more
extensive invasion designed to root out armed Palestinian guerrillas from southern Lebanon.
Israel defeated Syrian forces in central Lebanon and advanced as far north as Beirut.
Israeli forces completed a phased withdrawal in 1985, but maintained a 9-mile-wide security zone
in southern Lebanon from 1985 to 2000. About 1,000 members of the Israeli Defense Forces
(IDF) patrolled the zone, backed by a 2,000 to 3,000 member Lebanese militia called the South
Lebanon Army (SLA), which was trained and equipped by Israel. Israel withdrew unilaterally
from southern Lebanon in 2000, with the exception of its continuing presence in a small area
known as the Shib’a farms, which remains disputed. For more information, see “The Shib’a
Farms” below.
The Lebanese parliament elected in 1972 remained in office for 20 years since it was impossible
to elect a new parliament during the civil war. After a prolonged political crisis near the end of the
war, Lebanese parliamentary deputies met in 1989 in Taif, Saudi Arabia, under the auspices of the
Arab League, and adopted a revised power sharing agreement. The Taif Agreement raised the
number of seats in parliament from 99 to 108 (later changed to 128), replaced the former 6:5
ration of Christians to Muslims with an even ratio, provided for a proportional distribution of
seats among the various Christian and Muslim sub-sects, and left appointment of the prime
minister to parliament, subject to the president’s approval. In addition, Syria and Lebanon signed
a treaty of brotherhood, cooperation, and coordination in May 1991, which called for creating
several joint committees and coordinating policies. Although Syrian troop strength in Lebanon
reportedly declined over time, Syria continued to exercise controlling influence over Lebanon’s
domestic politics and regional policies. Syrian intelligence agents also were active in Lebanon.
Even after Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, the Taif agreement continues to be the
benchmark that the Lebanese people refer to in times of stress and sectarian violence. The





consensus reached in Taif still guides the distribution of political power in Lebanon. For many in
Lebanon, the Taif Agreement is still viewed as the compromise between Sunnis, Christians, and
Shiites that keeps the country from falling back into civil war. At the same time, ongoing
sectarian violence and political stalemate reflect deep tension over revisiting the core principles
of the agreement and the absence of a political framework for reevaluating the distribution of
political power in Lebanon.
In 2004, tensions mounted between then-Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, who favored more
independence from Syria, and pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud. On September 2, 2004, the
U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1559, calling for “all remaining security forces to
withdraw from Lebanon,” among other things. The next day, the Lebanese parliament, under
suspected Syrian pressure, adopted a constitutional amendment that extended President Lahoud’s
term by three years. Hariri, who disagreed with the amendment, resigned in October 2004 and
aligned himself with the anti-Syrian opposition coalition.
Hariri was killed when his motorcade was bombed in Beirut on February 14, 2005. Many
suspected Syrian involvement in the assassination. His death led to widespread protests by the
anti-Syrian coalition including Christians, Druze, and Sunni Muslims and to counter-
demonstrations by pro-Syrian groups including Shiites who rallied behind the Hezbollah and
Amal parties. Outside Lebanon, the United States and France were particularly vocal in their
denunciation of the assassination and of Syria for its suspected role in the bombing.
The Hariri assassination prompted strong international pressure on the Syrian regime, particularly
from the United States and France, to withdraw its forces and intelligence apparatus from
Lebanon in accordance with Resolution 1559. On April 26, 2005, the Syrian foreign minister
informed U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the President of the U.N. Security Council that
Syrian forces had completed their withdrawal from Lebanon. The United Nations confirmed that
all Syrian troops had been removed but acknowledged allegations that Syrian intelligence still
operates in Lebanon and that close, historical ties between the two nations make evaluating the 7
Syrian role in Lebanon difficult.
Syria has long regarded Lebanon as part of its sphere of influence. Some international observers
have expressed concern that Syrian leaders might try to circumvent the effect of the withdrawal
by maintaining their influence through contacts they have acquired over the years in the Lebanese 8
bureaucracy and security services. Attacks on and assassinations of some prominent Lebanese
critics of Syria in addition to Hariri have accentuated these fears.
7
See U.N. Security Council Document S/2006/832, October 19, 2006 and U.N. Security Council Document
S/2007/262, May 7, 2007.
8 Robin Wright, “Syria Moves to Keep Control of Lebanon,” Washington Post, March 31, 2005. Syria also has
potential built-in assets through parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri.





As Syrian troops departed from Lebanon under U.S. and international pressure, Lebanon prepared
to hold parliamentary elections without Syrian interference for the first time since 1972.
Parliamentary elections, held in four phases between May 29 and June 5, 2005, gave a majority
(72 out of 128 seats) to a large, anti-Syrian bloc known as the Bristol Gathering or the March 14
Movement, headed by Saad Hariri, a son of the late prime minister. A second, largely Shiite and
pro-Syrian bloc combining Hezbollah and the more moderate Amal organization won 33 seats. A
third bloc, the Change and Reform Movement (also known as the Free Patriotic Movement),
consisted of largely Christian supporters of former dissident armed forces chief of staff General 9
Michel Aoun, who returned to Lebanon from exile in France in May 2005. Aoun’s bloc, which
adopted a somewhat equivocal position regarding Syria, gained 21 seats.
Despite Hariri’s success, the electoral pattern resulted in a mixed government, which complicated
its ability to adopt clear policies. Hariri associate Fouad Siniora became prime minister, and the
24-member cabinet contained 15 members of Hariri’s bloc. It also contained five members of the
Shiite bloc, including for the first time in Lebanese history a member of Hezbollah. Other key
pro-Syrians remaining in the government were President Lahoud and veteran parliamentary
speaker Nabih Berri, who heads the Amal organization (Hezbollah’s junior partner in the Shiite
coalition). Berri has held the speakership since 1992.
On February 25, 2005, the president of the U.N. Security Council issued a statement that
condemned the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. On April 7, the U.N. Security Council adopted
Resolution 1595 to establish an International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) in
Lebanon “to assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act,
including to help identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers, and accomplices.” The
Commission was fully functional as of June 16, 2005 but has requested multiple extensions for its
work. The U.N. Security Council has passed a number of resolutions to extend the mandate of the
commission, call for Syrian cooperation with the investigation, and facilitate the establishment of 10
a tribunal to try suspects identified in the Commission investigation.
Political instability in Lebanon has delayed the beginning of the tribunal. On November 25, 2006,
members of the Lebanese cabinet approved the U.N. Security Council proposal to establish the 11
court, in the face of strong opposition from pro-Syrian elements. Approval from the Parliament
and pro-Syrian then-President Emile Lahoud proved all but impossible to obtain. Hezbollah and
the opposition reportedly stated that they supported the principle of the court but did not want it
to become a vehicle for attacking Syria.
Confronted with this impasse, supporters of the tribunal decided on a new approach that would
circumvent the need for parliamentary approval and enlist the international community. On April
4, 2007, a U.N. spokesman announced that 70 members of the Lebanese parliament petitioned the
9
General Aoun (variant spelling: Awn), a controversial former armed forces commander and prime minister, fought
against Syria in Lebanon, rejected the Taif Agreement, and eventually obtained political asylum in France.
10 See U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1636, 1644, 1686, 1748, and 1815.
11 The U.N. proposal for the international court is contained in U.N. Security Council Document S/2006/893, Report of
the Secretary-General on the establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon, November 15, 2006.





U.N. Secretary-General, asking that the Security Council establish the court as a matter of
urgency. Subsequently, on May 30, 2007, a divided U.N. Security Council voted 10 to 0 with 5
abstentions (Russia, China, South Africa, Indonesia and Qatar) to adopt Resolution 1757, which
established a tribunal outside of Lebanon to prosecute persons responsible for the attack against
Hariri.
Resolution 1757 has proven divisive in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region. Pro-Syrian elements
have criticized it and Syria has threatened not to cooperate with the tribunal. Western countries,
including France and Germany, praised this step. Opponents of the Resolution objected on the
grounds that it was passed under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which could include the use of
force, and that it represented interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs. The Russian delegate to
the U.N. commented that “never before has the Security Council ratified agreements on behalf of 12
a parliament of a foreign country.”
Preparations to establish the tribunal continue slowly. In December 2007, the U.N. finalized an
agreement with the Netherlands to host the tribunal. In January 2008, Daniel Bellemare was
named the prosecutor for the tribunal. On March 20, the U.N. appointed Robin Vincent to serve
as registrar for the tribunal and oversee its management and budget. The United States has 13
contributed $14 million for the tribunal. Lebanon is expected to fund 49% of its costs. In the
most recent report to the Security Council on the status of the tribunal, Bellemare indicated that 14
the tribunal is expected to commence on March 1, 2009.
Despite the end of Israeli and Syrian occupation, and the coming to power of a more moderate
Sunni coalition in March 14, Lebanon’s struggle for stability has continued, largely due to a
lasting environment of distrust between Lebanon’s demographic groups left over from the civil
war. As demographic groups have vied for a political stake in post-occupation Lebanon, the
weaknesses of the Taif Accords have become more evident. The strong showing of the March 14
coalition in the 2005 elections and the prospects for stability in Lebanon were soon jeopardized
by months of protracted political crises and renewed sectarian violence.
From mid-2007 until the agreement in Doha in May 2008, Lebanon’s political environment was
paralyzed by a number of interrelated disagreements. Preparations for a scheduled September
2007 presidential election went ahead, but were mooted by Lebanese leaders’ inability to agree on
a consensus presidential candidate and subsequent wrangling over the distribution of cabinet seats
under potential candidate Michel Suleiman. As a result, a vote to elect a new president was
postponed until October 23, 2007. Hezbollah and its allies boycotted the balloting and the
election was repeatedly delayed as a result. Parties failed to agree on a consensus presidential
candidate prior to the expiration of President Emile Lahoud’s term in November 2007.
12
Samar El-Masri, “The Hariri Tribunal, Middle East Policy, Fall 2008.
13 U.N. News Service Press Release,First Official of U.N. Backed Tribunal on Lebanese Killings Starts Work,” April
28, 2008.
14 U.N. Security Council Document S/2008/752, December 2, 2008.





The circumstances created an intricate set of possible outcomes and the issue of choosing a
president remained mired in constitutional questions. Debates centered on requirements for a
parliamentary quorum for a presidential election, with some constitutional scholars maintaining 15
that attendance by two-thirds of the Members was needed before elections could be held. Some
observers believed that opponents of an election, a group that perhaps included pro-Syrian actors,
were behind recent assassinations of anti-Syrian Lebanese members of parliament in an effort to
derail the elections or shape their outcome by undermining the dwindling majority of the March 16

14 bloc.


The political stalemate in Lebanon lasted until May 2008 when the worst round of sectarian
violence since the civil war broke out in Beirut. The violence and the resulting Doha Agreement
ended 18 months of political stalemate in the Lebanese parliament that had been marked by
cabinet resignations, a vacant presidency, political assassination, political demonstrations, and a
general strike that paralyzed the city of Beirut. On May 6, 2008, Parliament voted to replace the 17
pro-Hezbollah chief of security at Rafiq Hariri International Airport and to dismantle
Hezbollah’s extensive telecommunications network following accusations that the organization
was using these tools to monitor the movement of anti-Syrian politicians. At a press conference
on May 8, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah stated that the cabinet’s position was “a
declaration of war and a launching of war by the government...against the resistance and its
weapons.” A week-long confrontation between Hezbollah and its opposition allies and militias
loyal to the Siniora government followed. Shiite protestors burned tires in major thoroughfares,
effectively closing the airport. Hezbollah seized control of March 14 coalition strongholds in
West Beirut, looting and burning Future Movement media offices.
Fearing continued violence and possibly another civil war, the Arab League and the Qatari
government facilitated negotiations between the rival factions. In the resulting “Doha
Agreement,” the factions committed to end the violence, fill the vacant presidency, arrange for a
power-sharing agreement in the cabinet, and hold parliamentary elections in 2009 based on
updated electoral laws. In a statement following the negotiations, Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice stated that the Administration viewed the agreement as a “positive step toward resolving the
current crisis” and added that “the United States supports the government of Lebanon in its
complete authority over the entire territory of the country.”
In accordance with the agreement, General Michel Suleiman, perceived as relatively neutral, was
elected president on May 25, 2008. He chose Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to continue as the
head of the government. Disagreements over the assignment of ministry positions in the cabinet
delayed the formation of a unity government until July 11, 2008.
15
“Lebanese Constitution Said ‘vague’ on Outgoing President’s Last 10 Days, BBC Monitoring Middle East,
November 15, 2007.
16 Nadra Bakri and Hassan M. Fatah, “Car Bomb Near Beirut Kills Christian Lawmaker,” New York Times, September
20, 2007; Nadra Bakri, “In Lebanon, Staying Alive in Order to Preserve the Government,” New York Times, September
21, 2007.
17 The chief of security at Beirut airport was a member of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) accused by Druze leader
Walid Jumblatt of assisting Hezbollah with monitoring the travel of anti-Syrian diplomats and government officials.





In the new government, Hezbollah and the opposition gained a blocking minority (one-third plus
one) of cabinet seats. Eleven ministerial portfolios went to the opposition, including one to
Hezbollah itself—the Ministry of Labor. Hezbollah and the opposition have repeatedly pushed for
this veto power to block certain government decisions. In particular, Hezbollah has long sought to
block any attempt by the government to disarm its militia, as called for innited Nations Security
Council Resolution 1701.
Following the agreement, a committee of cabinet members set to work to draft a policy statement
for the new government. The group met 12 times before an agreement was reached. The delay
was caused by a dispute over language related to the Hezbollah and its weapons. On August 1, the
committee announced that it had unanimously agreed to a policy statement. On August 4, the
government released the statement to the Lebanese News Agency. Paragraph 24 recognized “the
right of Lebanon’s people, army and resistance to liberate the Israeli-occupied Shebaa (alternate
spelling: Shib’a) farms, Kfar Shuba Hills, and the Lebanese section of Ghajar village, and defend
the country using all legal and possible means.” On the other hand, the statement included the
“commitment of the government to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 with all its
clauses.”
On August 12, the new unity government, with its policy statement, won the Lebanese
parliament’s vote of confidence. One hundred of 127 members voted in favor of the new
arrangement, allowing the cabinet to finally start work. The vote of confidence was met with by
uncertainty among some members of Parliament. One member, Hussein Husseini, resigned from
the parliament stating that the parliament could be described as “legal but illegitimate.” Another
Future Movement member stated that he refused to grant his vote of confidence because the
“cabinet is one that only assembles odds” and expressed fears that the new government might not
be what the Lebanese people were looking for.
The ministerial statement also reaffirmed the government’s commitment to hold parliamentary
elections in accordance with the Doha agreement. Parliamentary elections in 2009 are scheduled
to be held based on a modified version of the 1960 electoral law, rather than the 1996 or 2000
electoral frameworks that were subject to pro-Syrian gerrymandering. The 1960 law was updated
with specific provisions for modified voting districts in Beirut and the eastern Bekaa valley. Some
analysts have argued that the amended law is unlikely to change the composition of parliament
and that sectarian deadlock could persist even after the elections. Others have expressed concerns 18
that the new electoral districts could lead to a stronger showing for Hezbollah and its allies.

Current U.S. policy toward Lebanon centers on supporting the Lebanese government as it
struggles to rebuild institutions and exert control over the entire territory of Lebanon. Years of
civil war and foreign occupation have left several key issues unresolved. The scope and influence
of foreign actors, primarily Syria and Iran, unresolved territorial disputes, concerns about
extremist groups operating in Lebanon, and the strength and character of the Lebanese Armed
18
Jean-Pierre Katrib, “Ending (or Deepening) the Crisis in Lebanon: The Role of Electoral Reform, Policy Watch
#1378, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 6, 2008.





Forces are among the challenges facing Prime Minister Siniora’s government and U.S. objectives
in Lebanon. These unresolved issues could become particularly sensitive for the next th
Administration and for the 111 Congress as Lebanon moves toward parliamentary elections,
scheduled to be held between April and June 2009. Rapprochement with Syria or negotiations
with Iran also could alter the political landscape in Lebanon as well as U.S. objectives there.
Syrian and Iranian backing of Hezbollah, an organization that has committed terrorist acts against
U.S. personnel and facilities and has sworn to eliminate Israel, is perhaps the greatest obstacle to
U.S. efforts to bolster the pro-Western forces in Lebanon. With Hezbollah deeply entrenched in
Lebanese Shiite society, the movement has become a fixture in the Lebanese political system and
a symbol of resistance against Israel for many in the region. This dual identity has benefitted
Hezbollah, and there have been no recent indications that it is willing to renounce armed struggle
against Israel and become solely a Lebanese political movement. There also is little evidence to
suggest that Iran and Hezbollah’s strategic relationship could be severed despite the fact that
Hezbollah’s agenda may be more nationalist while Iran’s may be more revolutionary pan-Shiite.
Though some analysts argue that Hezbollah has grown more independent of Tehran since the
1980s, Hezbollah still requires advanced weaponry and outside funding, while Iran requires a
proxy to pressure Israel and the United States. Both parties have found this relationship to be
mutually beneficial.
Hezbollah’s claim of victory in the 2006 war with Israel and its swift humanitarian aid delivery
following the conflict increased the organization’s popularity among Lebanese, particularly the 19
Shiite population. A prisoner exchange with Israel and the gains Hezbollah made in the
government during the May negotiations at Doha also might have served to further improve the
organization’s public image. In the face of ongoing violence and upcoming parliamentary
elections scheduled for 2009, the Lebanese government and the international community have
struggled to manage Hezbollah’s role in the government and to deal with its militia wing.
Israel has expressed concern about reports that Hezbollah continues to receive arms through
unsecured borders and the fact that the government of Lebanon includes members of Hezbollah.
In August 2008, Israel’s security cabinet voted to reverse a longstanding policy that considers the
government of Lebanon and Hezbollah separately, citing Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon’s new unity
government and the ministerial statement of that government, which recognizes the rights of the 20
“resistance.” This decision has led analysts to question whether Israel would refrain from
19
On July 16, 2008, Hezbollah and Israel completed a prisoner exchange brokered by German intelligence. In
exchange for the remains of the two Israeli Defense Force (IDF) soldiers captured by Hezbollah at the outset of the
2006 conflict, Israel freed five Lebanese militants, all alive. The most controversial release was that of Samir Kantar
(alternate spellings: Kuntar, Qantar), a Lebanese militant who had been convicted of the murder of an Israeli police
officer and a young civilian and his four-year-old daughter during a Palestinian Liberation Front raid in the coastal
Israeli town of Nahariya in 1979.Kantar and the other prisoners were greeted by Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan
Nasrallah, Prime Minister Siniora, and a crowd of thousands in southern Beirut. The government declared a national
day of celebration, closing government offices, schools, and banks. Despite government attempts to present the swap as
a national triumph, analysts have expressed concerns that the exchange bolstered support for Hezbollah, and that
national power in Lebanon appears to be in the hands of a non-state actor. On the other hand, some argue that the
resolution of the issue of prisoners and a renewed dialogue about the disputed Shib’a Farms territory could undermine
the legitimacy of Hezbollahs armed wing, which the organization maintains is necessary to support the “resistance” to
Israeli occupation.
20 Firas Miskad, “All of Lebanon is not Hezbollah, Jewish Daily Forward, August 21, 2008.





targeting the Lebanese government, as it did in 2006, if faced with another military conflict with
Hezbollah in Lebanon. In a statement to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, the Commander of the
Israeli Defense Force Northern Command, Gadi Eisenkot, said:
We will wield disproportionate power against every village from which shots are fired on
Israel, and cause immense damage and destruction. From our perspective, these are military 21
bases. This isn’t a suggestion. This is a plan that has already been authorized.
On September 16, 2008, President Suleiman convened a “national dialogue” session to discuss a
national defense strategy for Lebanon. The top item on the agenda was to define the role of
Hezbollah’s military force in Lebanon. The dialogue followed an incident on August 28, 2008,
when a member of Hezbollah’s militia force fired on an LAF helicopter, killing the pilot.
Following the incident, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah claimed that the militant
thought he was firing on an Israeli helicopter. Nasrallah called the incident “regrettable,” noting,
however, that the shooter was behaving “naturally or instinctively.” He also expressed
condolences to the family of the pilot. Hezbollah turned over the shooter to the Lebanese
government, but the incident raised questions about the role of Hezbollah’s militant wing and its
relationship with the LAF. So far, there is little indication that the dialogue will lead to 22
government control over the entire territory of Lebanon. If an operational arrangement is
formalized for national defense that includes a role for Hezbollah, U.S. policy options towards
Lebanon, particularly military assistance, could face more constraints.
Most analysts agree that Syrian interference is the single greatest hindrance to Lebanon’s
independence and stability. A cornerstone of Syrian foreign policy is to dominate the internal
affairs of Lebanon. For many hard-line Syrian politicians, Lebanon is considered an appendage of
the Syrian state and, until recently, Syria never formally recognized Lebanon as a state. From a
geostrategic standpoint, Lebanon is considered by the Syrian government to be a buffer between
Syria and Israel. The Lebanese economy also is deeply penetrated by pro-Syrian business
interests.
Syria is also criticized for its role as an intermediary between Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon and
emerged as a key, if indirect, actor in the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, primarily
through its role as a conduit for the delivery of rockets and other weaponry to Hezbollah units in
southern Lebanon. Since 2006, both U.N. and Israeli sources have expressed concerns that Iran
continues to arm Hezbollah via Syria in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, and
the international community has called upon Syria to secure its borders against the flow of
weapons into Lebanon.
During a summit in Paris on July 13, 2008, at a meeting facilitated by French President Nicolas
Sarkozy, Syrian President Bashar al Asad and Lebanese President Michel Suleiman discussed
exchanging embassies in a move toward normal diplomatic relations, a marked departure from
Syria’s historical reluctance to recognize Lebanon’s independence. Following a series of
negotiations and discussions, on October 14, 2008, Lebanon and Syria established formal
21
Amos Harel, IDF Plans to Use Disproportionate Force in Next War,” Haaretz (Israel), October 5, 2008.
22 U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document –GMP20081007644002 –“Washington and Beirut Set Up Joint Military
Panel, Daily Star (Beirut), October 7, 2008.





diplomatic ties for the first time since the two countries gained independence sixty years ago. The
official announcement stated that Syria and Lebanon planned to open embassies by the end of

2008.


Syria’s motivation for recognizing Lebanon’s independence is questionable. Some believe that it
is just one of many recent actions that indicate Syria’s desire to come out of isolation. Syria and
France reestablished diplomatic ties in July 2008 and Syria and Israel recently held indirect
negotiations facilitated by Turkey (which are now on hold). Others speculate that Syria might use
its diplomatic relationship with Lebanon as a front to cover continued meddling in Lebanon’s 23
domestic politics.
Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, pursuant to U.N. Security Council
Resolution 425, left several small but sensitive territorial issues unresolved. The most prominent
example is a 10-square-mile enclave called the Shib’a Farms (alternate spelling: Shebaa) located
at the Lebanese-Israeli-Syrian tri-border area (see Appendix B). Many third parties, notably the
United Nations, maintain that the Shib’a Farms is part of the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan
Heights and is not part of the Lebanese territory from which Israel was required to withdraw.
Lebanon, supported by Syria, asserts that this territory is part of Lebanon and should have been
evacuated by Israel. In a June 2008 interview, Prime Minister Siniora said that “the demand to 24
restore sovereignty to Shib’a is a Lebanese demand.”
Hezbollah has consistently used Israel’s presence in the Shib’a Farms as justification for retaining
its weapons and refusing to disarm. Until recently, Israel refused to negotiate a withdrawal from
the area. However, in June 2008, against the backdrop of prisoner exchange negotiations with
Hezbollah and indirect peace talks with Syria, Israel shifted its position and, in mid-June, U.S.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that “the time has come to deal with the Shebaa Farms
issue.” The most recent report of the U.N. Secretary General to the Security Council on the
implementation of Resolution 1701 stated that Syria and Lebanon have agreed to reactivate the
taskforce charged with delineating their common border and that Syria recognized the Shib’a as 25
part of the territory of Lebanon.
In response to the changing discourse on the Shib’a Farms, Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General
Sheikh Naim Qassem welcomed international intervention “if the whole of the Shib’a Farms is
returned to Lebanese sovereignty,” but emphasized that “this does not mean, however, that we
need to disarm. The question of our arms is not linked to the issue of Shib’a Farms or a prisoner 26
exchange” with Israel. Prime Minister Siniora appeared to embrace this view saying “we must
completely separate the issue of Israel’s withdrawal from the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons,
adding, “there are two different issues: The Israeli withdrawal from the Farms and placing it
23
Sue Pleming, “U.S. Assesses Isolation Policy of Syria,Reuters, October 7, 2008.
24 U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document –GMP20080620644012, “Lebanon: Excerpt of Sinioras Remarks on
Shab’a Farms, Hisballah Weapons,Lebanese National News Agency (Beirut), June 20, 2008.
25 U.N. Security Council Document S/2008/715, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security
Council Resolution 1701 (2006),” November 18, 2008.
26Shebaa Moves into Local, International Spotlights,” Daily Star (Beirut), June 22, 2008.





under the supervision of the U.N. until Syria and Lebanon decide on the borders...the debate on 27
the defensive strategy, which is to be decided by the Lebanese amongst themselves.”
On May 20, 2007, Lebanese police conducted raids against suspected terrorist organization Fatah
al Islam hideouts in Tripoli, reportedly in pursuit of bank robbers. Fighting between Fatah al
Islam militants and Lebanese army and police units spread to the nearby Nahr al Bared
Palestinian refugee camp and echoed in smaller clashes in the Ayn al Hulwah refugee camp in
southern Lebanon. Prohibited by a 1969 agreement from entering Palestinian camps, the
Lebanese Armed Forces besieged the camps and shelled militia positions in an effort to force the
group out of Nahr al Bared. Fighting continued for three months until September 3, 2007, when 28
the Army announced that it had taken control of the camp. By the end of the hostilities, 168
Lebanese soldiers and 42 civilians had died in the fighting. The refugee camp itself was left badly 29
damaged, and as many as 30,000 Nahr al Bared residents were displaced.
During the fighting, the U.S. government, already supporting the Lebanese government and army
against other internal challenges, notably Hezbollah, responded with assistance to the LAF
including humanitarian supplies, ammunition, and lightweight weapons and equipment. Although
most of these supplies had already been promised to the Lebanese government, the deliveries
were accelerated to assist the LAF at Nahr al Bared.
Shakir al Absi, the leader of Fatah al Islam, is reportedly either dead or being held in a Syrian 30
prison. U.S. officials have described al Absi as a well-known Palestinian-Jordanian militant
sentenced to death in absentia in Jordan for his involvement in the 2002 murder of U.S. diplomat
Lawrence Foley. Although little is known about Fatah al Islam, U.S. officials describe the
organization as a militant Islamic fundamentalist group. On August 9, 2007, Secretary of State
Rice designated Fatah al Islam as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Organization, citing the
leader’s role in the Foley murder, the unprovoked attack on Lebanese security forces in May
2007, and the use of civilian camp-dwellers at Nahr al Bared as human shields during the three
months of protracted fighting with the Lebanese military. The designation, among other things,
cuts Fatah al Islam off from the U.S. financial system, sanction any of its property or interests in
the United States, and block its members from entry into the United States. Fatah al Islam was
believed by some to have fractured and dispersed after the siege at Nahr al Bared, but reports
indicate that members of a cell associated with the group were arrested in Lebanon in October 31

2008.


The siege at Nahr al-Bared called attention to armed groups operating in Lebanon, the problems
associated with Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, and the strengths and weaknesses of the
Lebanese Armed Forces.
27
U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document –GMP20080620644012, “Lebanon: Excerpt of Sinioras Remarks on
Shab’a Farms, Hisballah Weapons,Lebanese National News Agency (Beirut), June 20, 2008.
28 Tom Perry,Lebanon Crushes Militant Group, but Threat Remains, Reuters, September 3, 2007.
29 U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document – GMP20080925966005 – “Funds for Nahr Al-Bared Refugees Nearly
Depleted, Daily Star (Beirut), September 25, 2008.
30 U.S. Open Source Center (OCS) DocumentEUP20081023177003Fatah al Islam Leader Held in Syrian Jail,
Intelligence Online (Paris), October 23, 2008.
31 Ibrahim, op. cit.





The 2006 war, the siege at Nahr al Bared, and months of extended government crisis called
attention to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and its role in stabilizing the country and
countering Hezbollah. The LAF enjoys a positive image among a wide spectrum of Lebanese
citizens. Observers say that most Lebanese, regardless of their affiliation, perceive the army as
defending the country against foreign elements, particularly Israel. One experienced observer
described the Lebanese army as “the only national institution left in the country” and went on to 32
say that the army has “credibility and respect in the country.”
The fracture of the Lebanese army along sectarian lines in 1976 was a key moment in Lebanon’s
collapse into civil war. Since the end of the civil war in 1990, the United States has periodically
supplied arms and training to Lebanon’s armed forces. Assistance levels increased dramatically
after the 2006 war when the LAF was deployed to southern Lebanon alongside UNIFIL.
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman stressed the “United States’ commitment to
enhancing the LAF’s capabilities” when he met with President Michel Suleiman following the 33
Doha Agreement in May 2008.
The significant increase in U.S. assistance to the LAF (see “Security Assistance” below) has
raised questions about the character of the institution. Some argue that weapons provided to the
LAF might one day be used against Israel, particularly if they fell into the hands of Hezbollah
militants. This argument is driven by concerns that the LAF leadership or members of the LAF
are sympathetic to or even allied with Hezbollah. In the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel,
Israel reportedly attacked LAF naval radar stations after it was discovered that Hezbollah used
LAF radar to track an Israeli vessel that was struck by Hezbollah missiles. In May 2008, Prime
Minister Siniora removed the chief of security at Beirut airport, a member of the LAF, following 34
accusations that he was working on behalf of Hezbollah.
Others have expressed concerns that U.S. support for the LAF has made the institution a target for
attacks. LAF leadership has reassured the international community and Lebanese citizens that the
force will not be intimidated by attacks against the force. Following a September 29, 2008 attack
against LAF soldiers in Tripoli, the LAF Commander Jean Qahwaji said that the attack “was
intended to undermine internal security, confuse the army, and weaken its domestic role.” He
added that “the army succeeded, shoulder to shoulder with the people and the resistance, against
Israeli attacks in the summer 2006 war, uprooted terrorism at Nahr al Bared, and safeguarded
peace in the nation’s darkest moment and will not retreat in the face of sporadic disturbances that 35
are taking place here and there.”
According to some critics of the U.S. aid for the LAF, U.S. assistance has been slow to arrive and
insufficient to counter the threats of internal instability facing the LAF. Timor Goskel, former
senior advisor to UNIFIL, criticized U.S. assistance, stating that the U.S. government is “not
helping its own cause because it is coming in bits and pieces,” adding that “what [the LAF] needs
32
Hassan M. Fattah,Army Provides a Sense of Unity in Fractured Lebanon,” New York Times, June 20, 2007.
33Stronger Defense Ties with Lebanon Needed: DoD Agence France-Presse, June 1, 2008.
34 David Schenker, “The Future of U.S. Military Aid to Lebanon,” Policy Watch #1407, Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, October 3, 2008.
35 U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document –GMP20081009966005 – “LAF Officers to Visit Pentagon for Talks on
Aid, Daily Star (Beirut), October 9, 2008.





is a bit more clarity, a bit more comprehensive package announced.”36 Criticisms that U.S.
assistance to the LAF and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) falls short of the needs of the forces
are sharply countered by U.S. officials. According to Defense Department officials, the
equipment delivered in 2007 during Nahr al Bared included “the same frontline weapons that the
U.S. military troops are currently using including assault rifles, automatic grenade launchers,
advanced sniper weapons systems, antitank weapons, and the most modern urban warfare bunker 37
weapons.”
Since the siege at Nahr al-Bared, the Bush Administration reportedly received requests from the
Lebanese government for Cobra attack helicopters to facilitate more effective counterterrorism
operations. Reports indicate that the LAF has fewer than a dozen operational helicopters. During
the fighting at Nahr al Bared in 2007, the LAF had to retrofit old Huey helicopters to target Fatah
al Islam bunkers, resulting in limited accuracy in targeting and possibly causing civilian
casualties. Some Israeli parties have expressed concerns about the potential for the transfer of 38
more sophisticated equipment for the LAF.

The United States has long provided foreign assistance to Lebanon,39 but following the Israel-
Hezbollah war in 2006, the Bush Administration requested and Congress appropriated a
significant increase in foreign assistance for Lebanon. The war heightened the need for additional
economic aid as the Lebanese government and its international and Arab partners vied with Iran
and Hezbollah to win the “hearts and minds” of many Lebanese citizens who had lost homes and
businesses as a result of the conflict. The war also highlighted the need for a more robust
Lebanese military to adequately patrol Lebanon’s porous borders with Syria and prevent
Hezbollah’s rearmament.
The battle for political primacy in Lebanon waged by Prime Minister Siniora’s March 14
government coalition and its U.S., European, and Saudi supporters against Hezbollah, its allies,
and its foreign patrons in Syria and Iran has been fought on a number of different fronts,
including in the economic arena. The summer 2006 war and the opposition’s campaign to
obstruct the government placed enormous financial strains on Lebanon’s economy. In response,
Prime Minister Siniora called upon the international community to provide financial support for
his fragile government, Lebanon’s economy, and the country’s badly damaged infrastructure.
36
U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document –GMP 20081021966009 – “U.S. Approach to LAF is Chaotic, Analysts
Say, Daily Star (Beirut), October 21, 2008.
37 Schenker, op. cit.
38 Yaakov Katz, “Jerusalem Worried the U.S. Will Sell Tanks to Lebanon,” The Jerusalem Post, November 22, 2008.
39 In December 1996, the United States organized a Friends of Lebanon conference, which resulted in a total
commitment of $60 million in U.S. aid to Lebanon over a five-year period from FY1997 to FY2001 ($12 million per
year mainly in Economic Support Funds (ESF)). Congress increased annual aid amounts to $15 million in FY2000 and
to $35 million in FY2001, reportedly to help Lebanon adjust to new conditions following Israel’s withdrawal from
south Lebanon and to help Lebanon cope with continuing economic challenges. U.S. economic aid to Lebanon hovered
around $35 million in subsequent years, rising to $42 million in FY2006.





The United States has committed several hundred million dollars to Lebanon’s rebuilding efforts.
President Bush announced on August 21, 2006 that the United States would provide an immediate
$230 million to Lebanon. At a January 2007 donors’ conference in Paris, France, Secretary Rice
pledged an additional $250 million in cash transfers directly to the Lebanese government. This
U.S. economic aid was provided by Congress in the 2007 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-28) under ESF assistance and was tied to certain benchmarks that
the Lebanese government is required to meet. The benchmarks are aimed to encourage economic 40
reform and to lower Lebanon’s crippling $43 billion public debt, up 2.7% from 2007. The new
cabinet has debated economic reform, but sectarian reconciliation and developing a national
defense strategy have dominated its agenda. It is unclear what policies the cabinet will adopt
relative to economic reform and public debt and how parliamentary elections in 2009 will further
affect these efforts.
For the first time since 1984, the Administration requested and Congress authorized Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) grants to Lebanon in the FY2006 foreign operations appropriations
bill. Originally, the request included approximately $1.0 million in FMF for FY2006 and $4.8
million for FY2007 to help modernize the small and poorly-equipped LAF following Syria’s
withdrawal in 2005. However, the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah spurred
Western donors to increase their assistance to the LAF. Drawing from multiple budget accounts,
the Administration reprogrammed funds to provide a more robust program of military assistance
in order to:
[P]romote Lebanese control over southern Lebanon and Palestinian refugee camps to prevent
them from being used as bases to attack Israel. The U.S. governments active military-to-
military programs enhance the professionalism of the Lebanese Armed Forces, reinforcing
the concept of Lebanese civilian control. To foster peace and security, the United States
intends to build upon welcome and unprecedented Lebanese calls to control the influx of 41
weapons.
The FY2007 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-28, adopted May 25, 2007)
included $220 million in FMF for Lebanon, a significant increase from previous levels. It also
included $60 million in Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining, and Related Programs
(NADR) funds primarily to train and equip Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces (ISF). The
FY2008 and FY2009 bridge appropriations continued to support these objectives and programs,
albeit at lower levels.
During a September 2008 visit to Lebanon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Hale called
the LAF an “institution with a special place in the heart of the Lebanese” and added that the LAF
“has suffered a great deal from foreign intervention and bad weapons in the past.” Hale went on
to state that the United States wanted to “move on to the next phase and supply Lebanon with
40
Adal Rafiq Mirza,Special Report: Lebanon-Political Consensus Breeds Hope,” Middle East Economics Digest,
August 29-September 4, 2008.
41 FY2008 International Affairs (Function 150) Congressional Budget Justification, U.S. Department of State, February
16, 2007.





equipment that are more effective and that meet its needs.”42 On October 6, 2008, the United 43
States and Lebanon set up a joint commission to organize their bilateral military relationship.
Recent reports indicate that Israeli officials disapprove of the sale of U.S. M60 tanks to Lebanon 44
because they fear that the weapons could fall into the hands of Hezbollah. In a recent interview,
a U.S. Department of Defense official said that the United States does not provide assistance to
Lebanon without “considering the concerns of Israel and Israel’s qualitative edge,” adding that
U.S. military aid to the LAF is designed to “strengthen the army domestically, not regionally” and 45
that M60 tanks would be “no match” for Israel’s Merkava 4 tanks.
The Israeli air campaign during the 2006 war against Hezbollah left unexploded ordnance from
cluster bombs in Lebanon. The United Nations Mine Action Coordination Center (UNMACC)
estimates that 30 to 40 percent of the estimated 1 million cluster bombs used by Israel failed to
explode on impact. Israeli officials acknowledged that most of the weapons used were supplied
by the United States. Humanitarian groups have criticized both Israel and the United States for
the use of these weapons, which they argue caused extensive and unnecessary civilian casualties 46
during and after the war. Observers as well as some Members of Congress have questions
whether Israeli use of cluster munitions purchased from the United States violates the Arms
Export Control Act, and the U.S. State Department has said that it has talked with the Israelis
about the matter and issued a preliminary classified report to Congress in January 2007 that Israel 47
“may have” misused cluster munitions. A final finding has not yet been issued. Israel has denied 48
violating these agreements, saying that they acted in self defense.
The international community has contributed to U.N. efforts to clear unexploded ordnance in
southern Lebanon. In support of these efforts, the United States contributed $2 million to the
voluntary trust fund of the UNMACC. In FY2007 and FY2008, the Congress appropriated a total
of $10.25 million in Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining, and Related funding (NADR)
for Lebanon, which might also be used in part to support efforts to clear unexploded cluster
munitions. Despite these efforts, recent reports indicate that the funding for demining in Lebanon 49
is insufficient to sustain the clearance process through to completion.
42
U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document – GMP20080925825001 – “U.S. State Department Official Says U.S.
Will Supply Lebanon with Military Aid,” Al-Hayah (London), September 25, 2008.
43 U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document –GMP20081007644002 – “Washington and Beirut Set up Joint Military
Panel, Daily Star (Beirut), October 7, 2008.
44 Katz, op. cit., and “Israel Worried Over Proposed U.S. Tank Sale to Lebanon,” Israel National News Online,
November 23, 2008.
45 Andrew WanderU.S. Mindful of Israel When Aiding Lebanese Army,” Daily Star (Beirut), December 3, 2008.
46 Glenn Kessler, “Israel May Have Misused Cluster Bombs, U.S. Says, Washington Post, January 30, 2007. The
United States has donated $2 million to support ongoing U.N. assisted efforts to clear munitions from southern
Lebanon. More information available at[http://www.maccsl.org/].
47 See Transcript from the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Hearing on the 2009 Budget for the State Department, April 9, 2008.
48 David S. Cloud and Greg Myre, “Israel May Have Violated Arms Pact, U.S. Officials Say,New York Times,
January 28, 2007.
49 Bassem Mrou, “U.N. Search for Bombs, Mines in Lebanon Runs Low on Money, Associated Press, October 18,
2008.






Table A-1. U.S. Assistance to Lebanon, 1946-2003
(millions of dollars)
Economic Aid Food Aid Military Aid
Year Total (Grants) (Grants) (Loans) IMET (Grants)
1946-1980 332.7 120.2a 86.2b 123.3c 3.0
1981 24.3 4.0 0 20.0 0.3
1982 21.8 9.0 2.2 10.0 0.6
1983 153.9 52.2 0 100.0 1.7
1984 44.0 28.1 0.3 15.0 0.6
1985 21.1 19.9 0.5 0 0.7
1986 17.6 16.0 1.1 0 0.5
1987 23.0 12.8 9.7 0 0.5
1988 12.3 5.1 6.8 0 0.4
1989 15.5 2.8 12.3 0 0.4
1990 19.4 8.3 10.7 0 0.4
1991 19.2 9.3 9.9 0 0
1992 16.4 9.2 7.2 0 0
1993 14.4 10.3 3.5 0 0.6
1994 2.0 1.7 0 0 0.3
1995 16.0 15.6d 0 0 0.4
1996 2.5 2.0 0 0 0.5
1997 12.8 12.3 0 0 0.5
1998 12.6 12.0 0 0 0.6
1999 12.6 12.0 0 0 0.6
2000 15.6 15.0 0 0 0.6
2001 35.4 34.9 0 0 0.5
2002 35.6 35.0 0 0 0.6
2003 35.5 34.8 0 0 0.7
Totals 916.2 482.5 150.4 268.3 15.0
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants. Available at
[http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/].
Notes: IMET = International Military Education and Training
a. Of the $120.2 million total, $19 million was loans.
b. Of the $86.2 million total, $28.5 million was loans.
c. Of the $123.3 million total $109.5 million was loans and $13.8 million was grants.
d. Includes about $6 million from 1994.






Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.





Casey L. Addis
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
caddis@crs.loc.gov, 7-0846