Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation

Critical Infrastructures:
Background, Policy, and Implementation
Updated October 10, 2008
John D. Moteff
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division

Critical Infrastructures:
Background, Policy, and Implementation
The nation’s health, wealth, and security rely on the production and distribution
of certain goods and services. The array of physical assets, functions, and systems
across which these goods and services move are called critical infrastructures (e.g.,
electricity, the power plants that generate it, and the electric grid upon which it is
The national security community has been concerned for sometime about the
vulnerability of critical infrastructure to both physical and cyber attack. In May 1998,
President Clinton released Presidential Decision Directive No. 63. The Directive set
up groups within the federal government to develop and implement plans that would
protect government-operated infrastructures and called for a dialogue between
government and the private sector to develop a National Infrastructure Assurance
Plan that would protect all of the nation’s critical infrastructures by the year 2003.
While the Directive called for both physical and cyber protection from both man-
made and natural events, implementation focused on cyber protection against man-
made cyber events (i.e., computer hackers). However, given the physical damage
caused by the September 11 attacks, physical protections of critical infrastructures
has received increased attention.
Following the events of September 11, the Bush Administration released
Executive Order 13228, signed October 8, 2001, establishing the Office of Homeland
Security. Among its duties, the Office shall “coordinate efforts to protect the United
States and its critical infrastructure from the consequences of terrorist attacks.” In
November 2002, Congress passed legislation creating a Department of Homeland
Security. Among its responsibilities is overall coordination of critical infrastructure
protection activities. In December 2003, the Bush Administration released
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, reiterating and expanding upon
infrastructure protection policy and responsibilities. In June 2006, the Bush
Administration released a National Infrastructure Protection Plan. This Plan presents
the process by which the Department of Homeland Security intends to identify those
specific assets most critical to the United States, across all sectors, based on the risk
associated with their loss to attack or natural disaster, and then to prioritize activities
aimed at maximizing the reduction of those risks for a given investment.
This report discusses in more detail the evolution of a national critical
infrastructure policy and the institutional structures established to implement it. The
report highlights five issues of Congressional concern: identifying critical assets;
assessing vulnerabilities and risks; allocating resources; information sharing; and,
regulation. This report will be updated.

Latest Update Information...........................................1
In troduction ......................................................1
Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy: In Brief...................2
The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection............3
Presidential Decision Directive No. 63.................................4
Restructuring by the Bush Administration...............................8
Pre-September 11..............................................8
Post-September 11.............................................9
Department of Homeland Security....................................14
Initial Establishment..........................................14
Second Stage Review Reorganization.............................15
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006............16
Policy Implementation.............................................17
Government — Sector Coordination..............................17
Appointment of the National Infrastructure Advisory Council..........20
Internal Agency Plans.........................................21
National Critical Infrastructure Plan..............................22
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC)....................24
Identifying Critical Assets, Assessing Vulnerability and Risk, and
Prioritizing Protective Measures.............................26
Issues and Discussion..............................................28
Identifying Critical Assets, Functions, and Systems..................28
Assessing Vulnerabilities and Risk...............................29
Allocating Resources..........................................31
Information Sharing...........................................33
Regulation ..................................................35
Appendix .......................................................36
Federal Funding for Critical Infrastructure Protection.................36
FY2009 Budget Request and Appropriations for Infrastructure
Protection and Information Security Program and Other
Relevant DHS Budget Activities.............................38

List of Tables
Table 1. Lead Agencies per PDD-63..................................5
Table 2. Current Lead Agency Assignments...........................18
Table 3. Performance Measures for the Infrastructure Protection and
Risk Management Program.....................................31
Table A.1. Critical Infrastructure Protection Funding by Department........37
Table A.2 Funding for the Infrastructure Protection and Information
Security Program.............................................39

Critical Infrastructures:
Background, Policy, and Implementation
Latest Update Information
Funding data related to critical infrastructure protection has been updated to
include appropriations contained in P.L. 110-329, the Consolidated Security,
Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (see Appendix). This
update also includes a short discussion of the approval by DHS of an 18th critical
infrastructure sector, the Critical Manufacturing Sector (see Policy Implementation,
Government-Sector Coordination).
Certain socioeconomic activities are vital to the day-to-day functioning and
security of the country; for example, transportation of goods and people,
communications, banking and finance, and the supply and distribution of electricity
and water. Domestic security and our ability to monitor, deter, and respond to
outside hostile acts also depend on some of these activities as well as other more
specialized activities like intelligence gathering and command and control of police
and military forces. A serious disruption in these activities and capabilities could1
have a major impact on the country’s well-being.
These activities and capabilities are supported by an array of physical assets,
functions, information, and systems forming what has been called the nation’s
critical infrastructures. These infrastructures have grown complex and
interconnected, meaning that a disruption in one may lead to disruptions in others.2
Disruptions can be caused by any number of factors: poor design, operator error,
physical destruction due to natural causes, (earthquakes, lightning strikes, etc.) or
physical destruction due to intentional human actions (theft, arson, terrorist attack,
etc.). Over the years, operators of these infrastructures have taken measures to guard
against, and to quickly respond to, many of these threats, primarily to improve

1 As a reminder of how dependent society is on its infrastructure, in May 1998, PanAmSat’s
Galaxy IV satellite’s on-board controller malfunctioned, disrupting service to an estimated
80-90% of the nation’s pagers, causing problems for hospitals trying to reach doctors on
call, emergency workers, and people trying to use their credit cards at gas pumps, to name
but a few.
2 The electricity blackout in August 2003 in the United States and Canada illustrated the
interdependencies between electricity and other elements of the energy market such as oil
refining and pipelines, as well as communications, drinking water supplies, etc.

reliability and safety. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, and the
subsequent anthrax attacks, demonstrated the need to reexamine protections in light
of the terrorist threat, as part of an overall critical infrastructure protection policy.3
This report provides an historical background and tracks the evolution of such
an overall policy and its implementation. However, specific protections associated
with individual infrastructures is beyond the scope of this report. For CRS products
related to specific infrastructure protection efforts, the reader is encouraged to visit
the Homeland Security Current Legislative Issues webpage and look at the Critical
Infrastructure Security link.
Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy:
In Brief
As discussed further below, a number of federal executive documents and
federal legislation lay out a basic policy and strategy for protecting the nation’s
critical infrastructure. To summarize, it is the policy of the United States to enhance
the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure has been
defined as those systems and assets, the destruction or incapacity of which would:
!cause catastrophic health effects or mass casualties comparable to
those from the use of weapons of mass destruction,
!impair Federal departments and agencies’ abilities to perform
essential missions or ensure the public’s health and safety,
!undermine State and local government capacities to maintain order
and deliver minimum essential public services,
!damage the private sector’s capability to ensure the orderly
functioning of the economy...,
!have a negative effect on the economy through the cascading
disruption of other critical infrastructure,
!or undermine the public’s morale and confidence in our national
economic and political institutions.4
The federal government will work with states, localities, and the owners and
operators of critical infrastructure (in both the private and public sector) to identify
those specific assets and systems that constitute the nation’s critical infrastructure.

3 Besides loss of life, the terrorist attacks of September 11 disrupted the services of a number
of critical infrastructures (including telecommunications, the internet, financial markets, and
air transportation). In some cases, protections already in place (like off-site storage of data,
mirror capacity, etc.) allowed for relatively quick reconstitution of services. In other cases,
service was disrupted for much longer periods of time.
4 White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 7, Critical Infrastructure
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection. Released December 17, 2003. A more general
definition is given in statute (P.L. 107-71, Sec. 1016): “... systems and assets, physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and
assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national
public health and safety, or any combination of those matters.”

Together, these entities will assess those assets’ vulnerabilities to the threats facing
the nation (natural or manmade, i.e., all hazards), determine the level of risk
associated with possible attacks or the impacts of natural events on those assets, and
identify and prioritize a set of measures that can be taken to reduce those risks.
Primary responsibility for protection, response, and recovery lies with the owners and
operators.5 However, the federal government holds open the possibility of
intervening in those areas where owners and operators are unable (or unwilling) to
provide what it, the federal government, may assess to be adequate protection or
response. 6
The reader who is not interested in the evolution of this policy and the
organizational structures that have evolved to implement it can proceed to the Policy
Implementation and/or Issues sections of this report.
The President’s Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection
This report takes as its starting point the establishment of the President’s7
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) in July 1996. Its tasks
were to: report to the President the scope and nature of the vulnerabilities and threats8
to the nation’s critical infrastructures (focusing primarily on cyber threats);
recommend a comprehensive national policy and implementation plan for protecting
critical infrastructures; determine legal and policy issues raised by proposals to
increase protections; and propose statutory and regulatory changes necessary to effect
The PCCIP released its report to President Clinton in October 1997.9
Examining both the physical and cyber vulnerabilities, the Commission found no
immediate crisis threatening the nation’s infrastructures. However, it did find reason
to take action, especially in the area of cyber security. The rapid growth of a

5 See White House. Office of Homeland Security. National Strategy for Homeland Security,
p. 33, “Private firms bear primary and substantial responsibility for addressing the public
safety risks posed by their industries....”
6 Op. cit., p. 33, “The plan will describe how to use all available policy instruments to raise
the security of America’s critical infrastructure and key assets to a prudent level....In some
cases the Department may seek legislation to create incentives for the private sector to adopt
security measures.... In some cases, the federal government will need to rely on regulation.”
7 Executive Order 13010. Critical Infrastructure Protection. Federal Register. Vol. 61, No.
138. July 17, 1996. pp. 3747-3750. Concern about the security of the nation’s information
infrastructure and the nation’s dependence on it preceded the establishment of the
8 Given the growing dependence and interconnectedness of the nation’s infrastructure on
computer networks, there was concern that computers and computer networks presented a
new vulnerability and one that was not receiving adequate attention.
9 President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations:
Protecting America’s Infrastructures, October 1997.

computer-literate population (implying a greater pool of potential hackers), the
inherent vulnerabilities of common protocols in computer networks, the easy
availability of hacker “tools” (available on many websites), and the fact that the basic
tools of the hacker (computer, modem, telephone line) are the same essential
technologies used by the general population indicated to the Commission that both
threat and vulnerability exist.
The Commission generally recommended that greater cooperation and
communication between the private sector and government was needed. The private
sector owns and operates much of the nation’s critical infrastructure. As seen by the
Commission, the government’s primary role (aside from protecting its own
infrastructures) is to collect and disseminate the latest information on intrusion
techniques, threat analysis, and ways to defend against hackers.
The Commission also proposed a strategy for action:
!facilitate greater cooperation and communication between the
private sector and appropriate government agencies by: setting a top
level policy-making office in the White House; establishing a
council that includes corporate executives, state and local
government officials, and cabinet secretaries; and setting up
information clearinghouses;
!develop a real-time capability of attack warning;
!establish and promote a comprehensive awareness and education
!streamline and clarify elements of the legal structure to support
assurance measures (including clearing jurisdictional barriers to
pursuing hackers electronically); and,
!expand research and development in technologies and techniques,
especially technologies that allow for greater detection of intrusions.
The Commission’s report underwent interagency review to determine how to
respond. That review led to a Presidential Decision Directive released in May 1998.
Presidential Decision Directive No. 63
Presidential Decision Directive No. 63 (PDD-63)10 set as a national goal the
ability to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure from intentional attacks (both
physical and cyber) by the year 2003. According to the PDD, any interruptions in the
ability of these infrastructures to provide their goods and services must be “brief,

10 See The Clinton’s Administration’s Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Presidential Decision Directive 63, White Paper, May 22, 1998. Available at the Federation
of American Scientists website: []. This site
was last viewed on April 2, 2009.

infrequent, manageable, geographically isolated, and minimally detrimental to the
welfare of the United States.”11
PDD-63 identified the following activities whose critical infrastructures should
be protected: information and communications; banking and finance; water supply;
aviation, highways, mass transit, pipelines, rail, and waterborne commerce;
emergency and law enforcement services; emergency, fire, and continuity of
government services; public health services; electric power, oil and gas production,
and storage. In addition, the PDD identified four activities where the federal
government controls the critical infrastructure: internal security and federal law
enforcement; foreign intelligence; foreign affairs; and national defense.
A lead agency was assigned to each of these “sectors” (see Table 1). Each lead
agency was directed to appoint a Sector Liaison Official to interact with appropriate
private sector organizations. The private sector was encouraged to select a Sector
Coordinator to work with the agency’s sector liaison official. Together, the liaison
official, sector coordinator, and all affected parties were to contribute to a sectoral
security plan which was to be integrated into a National Infrastructure Assurance
Plan. Each of the activities performed primarily by the federal government also were
assigned a lead agency who was to appoint a Functional Coordinator to coordinate
efforts similar to those made by the Sector Liaisons.
Table 1. Lead Agencies per PDD-63
Depart m e nt / Agency Sect or/ F unct i on
CommerceInformation and Communications
TreasuryBanking and Finance
Transportation T ransportation
JusticeEmergency Law Enforcement
Federal Emergency Management AgencyEmergency Fire Service
Health and Human ServicesEmergency Medicine
EnergyElectric Power, Gas, and Oil
Justice**Law Enforcement and Internal Security
Director of Central Intelligence**Intelligence
State**Foreign Affairs
Defense**National Defense
** These are the functions identified by PDD-63 as being primarily under federal control.

11 Ibid.

The PDD also assigned duties to the National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism.12 The National Coordinator
reported to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs.13 Among his many duties outlined in PDD-63, the National Coordinator
chaired the Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group. This Group was the
primary interagency working group for developing and implementing policy and for
coordinating the federal government’s own internal security measures. The Group
included high level representatives from the lead agencies (including the Sector
Liaisons), the National Economic Council, and all other relevant agencies.
Each federal agency was made responsible for securing its own critical
infrastructure and was to designate a Critical Infrastructure Assurance Officer
(CIAO) to assume that responsibility. The agency’s current Chief Information
Officer (CIO) could double in that capacity. In those cases where the CIO and the
CIAO were different, the CIO was responsible for assuring the agency’s information
assets (databases, software, computers), while the CIAO was responsible for any
other assets that make up that agency’s critical infrastructure. Agencies were given
180 days from the signing of the Directive to develop their plans. Those plans were
to be fully implemented within two years and updated every two years.
The PDD set up a National Infrastructure Assurance Council. The Council
was to be a panel that included private operators of infrastructure assets and officials
from state and local government officials and relevant federal agencies. The Council
was to meet periodically and provide reports to the President as appropriate. The
National Coordinator was to act as the Executive Director of the Council.
The PDD also called for a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan. The Plan
was to integrate the plans from each of the sectors mentioned above and should
consider the following: a vulnerability assessment, including the minimum essential
capability required of the sector’s infrastructure to meet its purpose; remedial plans
to reduce the sector’s vulnerability; warning requirements and procedures; response
strategies; reconstitution of services; education and awareness programs; research
and development needs; intelligence strategies; needs and opportunities for
international cooperation; and legislative and budgetary requirements.
The PDD also set up a National Plan Coordination Staff to support the plan’s
development. Subsequently, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO,
not to be confused with the agencies’ Critical Infrastructure Assurance Officers) was
established to serve this function and was placed in the Department of Commerce’s
Export Administration. CIAO supported the National Coordinator’s efforts to
integrate the sectoral plans into a National Plan, supported individual agencies in

12 The National Coordinator position was created by Presidential Decision Directive 62,
“Combating Terrorism.” PDD-62, which was classified, codified and clarified the roles and
missions of various agencies engaged in counter-terrorism activities. The Office of the
National Coordinator was established to integrate and coordinate these activities. The
White House released a fact sheet on PDD-62 on May 22, 1998.
13 President Clinton designated Richard Clarke (Special Assistant to the President for Global
Affairs, National Security Council) as National Coordinator.

developing their internal plans, helped coordinate national education and awareness
programs, and provided legislative and public affairs support. Coordinating the
development of and maintaining the National Plan is now part of the Department of
Homeland Security Infrastructure Protection and Information Security (IPIS)
Most of the Directive established policy-making and oversight bodies making
use of existing agency authorities and expertise. However, the PDD also addressed
operational concerns. These dealt primarily with cyber security. The Directive called
for a national capability to detect and respond to cyber attacks while they are in
progress. Although not specifically identified in the Directive, the Clinton
Administration proposed establishing a Federal Intrusion Detection Network
(FIDNET) that would, together with the Federal Computer Intrusion Response
Capability (FedCIRC), established just prior to PDD-63, meet this goal.14 The
Directive explicitly gave the Federal Bureau of Investigation the authority to expand
its existing computer crime capabilities into a National Infrastructure Protection
Center (NIPC). The Directive called for the NIPC to be the focal point for federal
threat assessment, vulnerability analysis, early warning capability, law enforcement
investigations, and response coordination. All agencies were required to forward to
the NIPC information about threats and actual attacks on their infrastructure as well
as attacks made on private sector infrastructures of which they become aware.
Presumably, FIDNET15 and FedCIRC would feed into the NIPC. According to the
Directive, the NIPC would be linked electronically to the rest of the federal
government and use warning and response expertise located throughout the federal
government. The Directive also made the NIPC the conduit for information sharing
with the private sector through an equivalent Information Sharing and Analysis
Center(s) operated by the private sector, which PDD-63 encouraged the private
sector to establish. Later, many of these functions were transferred to the Department
of Homeland Security. The U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team (U.S.
CERT) and the National Operations Center (NOC), discussed later in this report,
perform similar tasks today.

14 FedCIRC was renamed the Federal Computer Incident Response Center and has since
been absorbed into the Department of Homeland Security’s National Cyber Security
15 FIDNET initially generated controversy both inside and outside the government. Privacy
concerns, cost and technical feasibility were at issue. By the end of the Clinton
Administration, FIDNET as a distributed intrusion detection system feeding into a
centralized analysis and warning capability was abandoned. A comparable capability has
been developed, called the Einstein Program, that addressed the privacy concerns of
FIDNET. Under Einstein, participating agencies retain complete control of network data
in strict accordance with Federal laws and polices. Agencies gather and subsequently share
security data directly with DHS, based on reporting requirements established by the Office
of Management and Budget. In turn, DHS prepares a strategic, cross-agency assessment,
which is then shared back with all federal civilian agencies. According to the DHS FY2009
budget justification documents, additional funds were requested to expand the Einstein
program to include all federal agencies and to use improved sensors to monitor network
traffic. This was part of a broader cyber security initiative aimed at better securing federal
information systems.

Quite independent of PDD-63 in its origin, but clearly complimentary in its
purpose, the FBI established a program called INFRAGARD to private sector firms.
The program facilitates information exchange between FBI field offices and the
surrounding business communities. Its initial focus was network security. After
September 11, its focus includes both cyber and physical security. INFRAGARD is
geographically-oriented rather than sector-oriented. Each FBI field office has a
Special Agent Coordinator who gathers interested companies of various sizes from
all industries to form a chapter. Any company can join INFRAGARD. Local
executive boards govern and share information within the membership. Chapters
hold regular meetings to discuss issues, threats, and other matters that impact their
companies. Chapters may also engage in contingency planning for using alternative
systems in the event of a successful large scale attack on the information
infrastructure. The program was transferred to the NIPC, before it was absorbed by
the Department of Homeland Security. The program is now managed by the FBI’s
Cyber Division.
It should also be noted that the FBI had, since the 1980s, a program called the
Key Assets Initiative (KAI). The objective of the KAI was to develop a database
of information on “key assets” within the jurisdiction of each FBI field office,
establish lines of communications with asset owners and operators to improve
physical and cyber protection, and to coordinate with other federal, state, and local
authorities to ensure their involvement in the protection of those assets. The program
was initially begun to allow for contingency planning against physical terrorist
attacks. According to testimony by a former Director of the NIPC, the program was
“reinvigorated” by the NIPC and expanded to include the cyber dimension.16 The
Department of Homeland Security is now responsible for creating a data base of
critical assets.
Restructuring by the Bush Administration
Pre-September 11
As part of its overall redesign of White House organization and assignment of
responsibilities, the in-coming Bush Administration spent the first eight months
reviewing its options for coordinating and overseeing critical infrastructure
protection. During this time, the Bush Administration continued to support the
activities begun by the Clinton Administration.
The Bush Administration review was influenced by three parallel debates. First,
the National Security Council (NSC) underwent a major streamlining. All groups
within the Council established during previous Administrations were abolished.
Their responsibilities and functions were consolidated into 17 Policy Coordination
Committees (PCCs). The activities associated with critical infrastructure protection
were assumed by the Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness PCC. At the

16 Testimony by Michael Vatis before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on
Technology and Terrorism. October 6, 1999. This effort was transferred to the Department
of Homeland Security.

time, whether, or to what extent, the NSC should remain the focal point for
coordinating critical infrastructure protection (i.e., the National Coordinator came
from the NSC) was unclear. Richard Clarke, himself, wrote a memorandum to the
incoming Bush Administration advocating that the function should be transferred
directly to the White House.17
Second, there was a continuing debate about the merits of establishing a
government-wide Chief Information Officer (CIO), whose responsibilities would
include protection of all federal non-national security-related computer systems and
coordination with the private sector on the protection of privately owned computer
systems. Shortly after assuming office, the Bush Administration announced its desire
not to create a separate federal CIO position, but to recruit a Deputy Director of the
Office of Management and Budget that would assume an oversight role of agency
CIOs. One of the reasons cited for this was a desire to keep agencies responsible for
their own computer security.18
Third, there was the continuing debate about how best to defend the country
against terrorism, in general. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st
Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission) proposed a new National Homeland
Security Agency. The recommendation built upon the current Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) by adding to it the Coast Guard, the Border Patrol,
Customs Service, and other agencies. The Commission recommended that the new
organization include a directorate responsible for critical infrastructure protection.
While both the Clinton and Bush Administration remained cool to this idea, bills
were introduced in Congress to establish such an agency. As discussed below, the
Bush Administration changed its position in June 2002, and proposed a new
department along the lines of that proposed by the Hart/Rudman Commission and
Post-September 11
Soon after the September 11 terrorist attacks, President Bush signed two
Executive Orders relevant to critical infrastructure protection. These have since been
amended to reflect changes brought about by the establishment of the Department of
Homeland Security (see below). The following is a brief discussion of the original
E.O.s and how they have changed.
E.O. 13228, signed October 8, 2001 established the Office of Homeland
Security, headed by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.19 Its
mission is to “develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive
national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats and attacks.”

17 Senior NSC Official Pitches Cyber-Security Czar Concept in Memo to Rice. Inside the
Pentagon. January 11, 2001. p. 2-3.
18 For a discussion of the debate surrounding this issue at the time, see CRS Report
RL30914, Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO): Opportunities and Challenges, by
Jeffery Seifert.
19 President Bush selected Tom Ridge to head the new Office.

Among its functions is the coordination of efforts to protect the United States and its
critical infrastructure from the consequences of terrorist attacks. This includes
strengthening measures for protecting energy production, transmission, and
distribution; telecommunications; public and privately owned information systems;
transportation systems; and, the provision of food and water for human use. Another
function of the Office is to coordinate efforts to ensure rapid restoration of these
critical infrastructures after a disruption by a terrorist threat or attack.
The EO also established the Homeland Security Council. The Council is made
up of the President, Vice-President, Secretaries of Treasury, Defense, Health and
Human Services, and Transportation, the Attorney General, the Directors of FEMA,
FBI, and CIA and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. The EO was
later amended to add the Secretary of Homeland Security. Other White House and
departmental officials can be invited to attend Council meetings.20 The Council
advises and assists the President with respect to all aspects of homeland security.
The agenda for those meetings shall be set by the Assistant to President for
Homeland Security, at the direction of the President. The Assistant is also the
official recorder of Council actions and Presidential decisions.
In January and February 2003, this E.O. was amended (by Executive Orders
13284 and 13286, respectively). The Office of Homeland Security, the Assistant to
the President, and the Homeland Security Council were all retained. However, the
Secretary of Homeland Security was added to the Council. The duties of the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security remain the same, recognizing the
statutory duties assigned to the Secretary of Homeland Security as a result of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (see below).
The second Executive Order (E.O. 13231) signed October 16, 2001, stated that
it is U.S. policy “to protect against the disruption of the operation of information
systems for critical infrastructure...and to ensure that any disruptions that occur are
infrequent, of minimal duration, and manageable, and cause the least damage
possible.”21 This Order also established the President’s Critical Infrastructure
Protection Board. The Board, consisting of federal officials, was authorized to
“recommend policies and coordinate programs for protecting information systems for
critical infrastructure...” The Board also was directed to propose a National Plan on
issues within its purview on a periodic basis, and, in coordination with the Office of
Homeland Security, review and make recommendations on that part of agency
budgets that fall within the purview of the Board.
The Board was chaired by a Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace
Security.22 The Special Advisor reported to both the Assistant to the President for

20 For more information on how the Homeland Security Council and the Office of Homeland
Security were structured, see CRS Report RL31148, Homeland Security: The Presidential
Coordination Office, by Harold Relyea.
21 Executive Order 13231 — Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age.
Federal Register. Vol. 86. No. 202. October 18, 2001.
22 President Bush designated Richard Clarke.

National Security and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Besides
presiding over Board meetings, the Special Advisor, in consultation with the Board,
was to propose policies and programs to appropriate officials to ensure protection of
the nation’s information infrastructure and to coordinate with the Director of OMB
on issues relating to budgets and the security of computer networks.
The Order also established the National Infrastructure Advisory Council.
The Council is to provide advice to the President on the security of information
systems for critical infrastructure. The Council’s functions include enhancing
public-private partnerships, monitoring the development of ISACs, and encouraging
the private sector to perform periodic vulnerability assessments of critical
information and telecommunication systems.
Subsequent amendments to this E.O. (by E.O. 13286) abolished the President’s
Board and the position of Special Advisor. The Advisory Council was retained, but
now reports to the President through the Secretary of Homeland Security.
In July 2002, the Office of Homeland Security released a National Strategy for
Homeland Security. The Strategy covered all government efforts to protect the
nation against terrorist attacks of all kinds. It identified protecting the nation’s
critical infrastructures and key assets (a new term, different as implied above by the
FBI’s key asset program) as one of six critical mission areas. The Strategy expanded
upon the list of sectors considered to possess critical infrastructure to include public
health, the chemical industry and hazardous materials, postal and shipping, the
defense industrial base, and agriculture and food. The Strategy also added continuity
of government and continuity of operations to the list, although it is difficult to see
how the latter would be a considered sector. It also combined emergency fire service,
emergency law enforcement, and emergency medicine as emergency services. And,
it dropped those functions that primarily belonged to the federal governments (e.g.
defense, intelligence, law enforcement). It also reassigned some of the sectors to
different agencies, including making the then proposed Department of Homeland
Security lead agency for a number of sectors — postal and shipping services, and the
defense industrial base. It also introduced a new class of assets, called key assets,
which was defined as potential targets whose destruction may not endanger vital
systems, but could create a local disaster or profoundly affect national morale. Such
assets were defined later to include national monuments and other historic attractions,
dams, nuclear facilities, and large commercial centers, including office buildings and
sport stadiums, where large numbers of people congregate to conduct business,
personal transactions, or enjoy recreational activities.23
The Strategy reiterated many of the same policy-related activities as mentioned
above: working with the private sector and other non-federal entities, naming those
agencies that should act as liaison with the private sector, assessing vulnerabilities,
and developing a national plan to deal with those vulnerabilities. The Strategy also
mentioned the need to set priorities, acknowledging that not all assets are equally
critical, and that the costs associated with protecting assets must be balanced against

23 The White House, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructures and Key Assets. February 2003. p. 71.

the benefits of increased security according to the threat. The Strategy did not create
any new organizations, but assumed that a Department of Homeland Security would
be established (see below). The Strategy was updated in October 2007.24 With the
exception of a somewhat greater recognition of the role improving resilience can play
in reducing the nation’s risk, the strategy related to critical infrastructure saw little
On December 17, 2003, the Bush Administration released Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). HSPD essentially updated the policy of the
United States and the roles and responsibilities of various agencies in regard to
critical infrastructure protection as outlined in previous documents, national
strategies, and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (see below). For example, the
Directive reiterated the Secretary of Homeland Security’s role in coordinating the
overall national effort to protect critical infrastructure. It also reiterated the role of
Sector-Specific Agencies (i.e., Lead Agencies)25 to work with their sectors to
identify, prioritize, and coordinate protective measures. The Directive captured the
expanded set of critical infrastructures and key assets and Sector-Specific Agencies
assignments made in the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The Directive
also reiterated the relationship between the Department of Homeland Security and
other agencies in certain areas. For example, while the Department of Homeland
Security will maintain a cyber security unit, the Directive stated that the Director of
the Office of Management remains responsible for overseeing government-wide
information security programs and for ensuring the operation of a federal cyber
incident response center within the Department of Homeland Security. Also, while
the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for transportation security,
including airline security, the Department of Transportation remains responsible for
control of the national air space system.
The only organizational change made by the Directive was the establishment of
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy Coordinating Committee which
will advise the Homeland Security Council on interagency policy related to physical
and cyber infrastructure security.
The Directive made a few other noticeable changes or additions. For example,
the Department of Homeland Security was assigned as Lead Agency for the chemical
and hazardous materials sector (it had been the Environmental Protection Agency).
The Directive required Lead Agencies to report annually to the Secretary of
Homeland Security on their efforts in working with the private sector. The Directive
also reiterated that all federal agencies must develop plans to protect their own
critical infrastructure and submit those plans for approval to the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget by July 2004.
The Bush Administration policy and approach regarding critical infrastructure
protection can be described as an evolutionary expansion of the policies and
approaches laid out in PDD-63. The fundamental policy statements are essentially

24 Homeland Security Council. National Strategy for Homeland Security. October 2007.
25 This report will continue to use the term “Lead Agency” to refer to the agency assigned
to work with a specific sector.

the same: the protection of infrastructures critical to the people, economy, essential
government services, and national security. National morale was added to that list.
Also, the stated goal of the government’s efforts is to ensure that any disruption of
the services provided by these infrastructures be infrequent, of minimal duration, and
manageable. The infrastructures identified as critical were essentially the same
(although expanded and with an emphasis placed on targets that would result in large
numbers of casualties). Finally, the primary effort is directed at working
collaboratively and voluntarily with the private sector owners and operators of
critical infrastructure to identify critical assets and provide appropriate protection.
Organizationally, there remains an interagency group for coordinating policy
across departments and for informing the White House (Homeland Security Council,
supported by the Critical Infrastructure Protection Coordinating Committee). Certain
agencies have been assigned certain sectors with which to work. Sectors are asked
to organize themselves to assist in coordination of effort and information sharing.
A Council made up of private sector executives, academics, and State and local
officials was established to advise the President. Certain operational units (e.g., the
Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) and elements of the National
Infrastructure Protection Center (at the FBI)) were initially left in place, though later
moved to and restructured within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
where, now, the Undersecretary for National Protection and Programs is responsible
for coordinating the implementation of policies and programs (see below). However,
DHS takes a much more active role in identifying critical assets, assessing
vulnerabilities, and recommending and supporting protective measures than did these
earlier operational units. Also, the manpower and resources devoted to these
activities have greatly increased.
One major difference between PDD-63 and the current Administration’s efforts
is a shift in focus. PDD-63 focused on cybersecurity. While the post-September 11
effort is still concerned with cybersecurity, its focus on physical threats, especially
those that might cause mass casualties, is greater than the pre-September 11 effort.
This led to some debate and organizational instability initially. The early executive
orders discussed above segregated cyber security from the physical security mission
with the formation of the Office of Homeland Security and the President’s Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board. Dissolution of the Board and the subsequent
establishment of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy Coordinating
Committee, responsible for advising the Homeland Security Council on both physical
and cyber security issues, would appear to reunite these two concerns within a single
White House group.26

26 Computer security advocates have sought to highlight cyber security issues by maintaining
a separate organization high within the bureaucracy. There now exists both an Assistant
Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications and an Assistant Secretary for
Infrastructure Protection, both reporting to the Undersecretary for National Protection and
Programs. While the latter is concerned with both physical and cyber security issues, the
former is focused on cyber security issues.

Department of Homeland Security
Initial Establishment
In November 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296),
establishing a Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The act assigned to the
new Department the mission of preventing terrorist attacks, reducing the vulnerability
of the nation to such attacks, and responding rapidly should such an attack occur.
The act essentially consolidated within one department a number of agencies that
had, as part of their missions, homeland security-like functions (e.g., Border Patrol,
Customs, Transportation Security Administration). The following discussion
focuses on those provisions relating to critical infrastructure protection.
In regard to critical infrastructure protection the act transferred the following
agencies and offices to the new department: the NIPC (except for the Computer
Investigations and Operations Section), CIAO, FedCIRC, the National Simulation
and Analysis Center (NISAC),27 other energy security and assurance activities
within DOE, and the National Communication System (NCS).28 These agencies
and offices were integrated within the Directorate of Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IA/IP) (one of four operational Directorates established
by the act).29 Notably, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which is
responsible for securing all modes of the nation’s transportation system, was not
made part of this Directorate (it was placed within the Border and Transportation
Security Directorate); nor was the Coast Guard, which is responsible for port
security. The act assigned the rank of Undersecretary to the head of each Directorate.
Furthermore, the act designated that within the Directorate of Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection, there were to be both an Assistant Secretary for
Information Analysis, and an Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection.

27 The NISAC was established in the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56), Section 1062. The
Center builds upon expertise at Sandia National Laboratory and Los Alamos National
Laboratory in modeling and simulating infrastructures and the interdependencies between
28 The NCS is not a single communication system but more a capability that ensures that
disparate government agencies can communication with each other in times of emergencies.
To make sure this capability exists and to assure that it is available when needed, an
interagency group meets regularly to discuss issues and solve problems. The NCS was
initially established in 1963 by the Kennedy Administration to ensure communications
between military, diplomatic, intelligence, and civilian leaders, following the Cuban Missile
Crisis. Those activities were expanded by the Reagan Administration to include emergency
preparedness and response, including natural disaster response. The current interagency
group includes 23 departments and agencies. The private sector, which own a significant
share of the assets needed to ensure the necessary connectivity, is involved through the
National Security Telecommunication Advisory Committee (NSTAC). The National
Coordinating Center, mentioned later in this report, and which serves as the
telecommunications ISAC, is an operational entity within the NCS.
29 The other operational directorates included Science and Technology, Border and
Transportation Security and Emergency Preparedness and Response.

Among the responsibilities assigned the IA/IP Directorate were:
!to access, receive, analyze, and integrate information from a variety
of sources in order to identify and assess the nature and scope of the
terrorist threat;
!to carry out comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of
key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States,
including risk assessments to determine risks posed by particular
types of attacks;
!to integrate relevant information, analyses, and vulnerability
assessments in order to identify priorities for protective and
support measures;
!to develop a comprehensive national plan for securing key resources
and critical infrastructures;
!to administer the Homeland Security Advisory System;
!to work with the intelligence community to establish collection
priorities; and,
!to establish a secure communication system for receiving and
disseminating information.
In addition, the act provided a number of protections for certain information
(defined as critical infrastructure information) that non-federal entities, especially
private firms or ISACs formed by the private sector, voluntarily provide the
Department. Those protections included exempting it from the Freedom of
Information Act, precluding the information from being used in any civil action,
exempting it from any agency rules regarding ex parte communication, and
exempting it from requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
The act basically built upon existing policy and activities. Many of the policies,
objectives, missions, and responsibilities complement those already established (e.g.,
vulnerability assessments, national planning, communication between government
and private sector, and improving protections).
Second Stage Review Reorganization
Secretary Chertoff (the second Secretary of Homeland Security), as one of his
Second Stage Review recommendations, proposed restructuring the IA/IP Directorate
and renaming it the Directorate of Preparedness. The IA function was merged into
a new Office of Intelligence and Analysis. The IP function, with the same missions
as outlined in the Homeland Security Act, remained, but was joined by other existing
and new entities. The renamed Directorate included elements from Office of State
and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, including its principal grant-
making functions and some of the preparedness functions of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). A new position of Chief Medical Officer was created
within the Directorate and the U.S. Fire Administration and the Office of National
Capital Region Coordination were transferred into the Directorate. In addition, the
restructuring called for an Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and
Telecommunications (a position sought by many within the cyber security
community following the termination of the position of Special Advisor to the

President for Cyberspace Security) and an Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure
According to the DHS press release, the mission of the restructured Directorate
was to “facilitate grants and over see nationwide preparedness efforts supporting first
responder training, citizen awareness, public health, infrastructure and cyber security,
and [to] ensure proper steps are taken to protect high-risk targets.”
Other recommendations resulting from the review that impacted infrastructure
protection included moving the Homeland Security Operations Center, now called
the National Operations Center, out of the old IA/IP Directorate and placing it within
a new Office of Operations Coordination; and, a new Directorate of Policy, which is
described as serving as the primary Department-wide coordinator of policies,
regulations, and other initiatives. The conference committee report on the
Department’s FY2006 appropriations (H.Rept. 109-241) approved these changes.30
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (referred hereon
as the Post-Katrina Act) was passed as Title VI of the Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295). The Post-Katrina Act reunited the
Department’s preparedness activities with its response and recovery activities within
a restructured Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Post-Katrina
Act explicitly preserved the restructured FEMA as a distinct entity within the
Department. The Post-Katrina Act also transferred the Preparedness Directorate’s
Office of Grants and Training to the restructured FEMA. The Post-Katrina Act left
the remaining activities, including those associated with the Office of the Chief
Medical Officer and the critical infrastructure protection activities associated with the
Assistant Secretary of Infrastructure Protection and the Assistant Secretary for Cyber
Security and Telecommunications, in the Preparedness Directorate. The Post-Katrina
Act also established the Office of Emergency Communications and required that
it report to the Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications. The
Office of Emergency Communications has within its responsibilities a number of
activities associated with assisting interoperable communications among first
On January 18, 2007, Secretary Chertoff submitted to Congress a description of
the Department’s reorganization pursuant to the Post-Katrina Act, and additional
changes made pursuant to the Secretary’s authority provided in the Homeland
Security Act (P.L. 107-296, Section 872). Under this latter authority, the Secretary
renamed the Preparedness Directorate the National Protection and Programs
Directorate (NPPD), still to be headed by someone of Undersecretary rank. The
NPPD includes the Office of the Undersecretary, the Office of Cybersecurity and
Communications (including the new Office of Emergency Communications), the
Office of Infrastructure Protection, the Office of Risk Management and Analysis
(formerly a division of the Office of Infrastructure Protection), and the Office of

30 See report language, H.Rept. 109-241, accompanying H.R. 2360, September 2005, p. 29.

Intergovernmental Programs. In addition, the Secretary moved the U.S.-VISIT
program into the NPPD.31
The Secretary also, pursuant to his Section 872 authority, transferred the Chief
Medical Officer to head a new Office of Health Affairs. This new Office reports to
the Secretary through the Deputy Secretary. This reorganization consolidated
activities associated with the Department’s bio-defense efforts, including the transfer
of the Biosurveillance program, formerly part of the Infrastructure Protection and
Information Security (IPIS) Program (see Appendix). Except for the transfer of the
Biosurveillance program, the IPIS program, which represents the core of the
Department’s effort to coordinate the nation’s critical infrastructure protection
activities, remained in the National Protection and Programs Directorate.
Policy Implementation
Government — Sector Coordination
The number and breakdown of sectors and lead, or sector specific agencies, have
expanded and changed since the assignments made by PDD-63 (see Table 1). As
mentioned above, the Bush Administration has expanded the number of sectors
considered to possess critical infrastructure and made some changes in assignments.
In March 2008, DHS announced that it was designating what would be an 18th32
critical infrastructure sector, Critical Manufacturing. The sector includes certain
sub-groups from the primary metal, machinery, electrical equipment, and33
transportation equipment manufacturing industries. The designation was made by
the Secretary by authority granted him in HSPD-7, and represents the first exercise
of that authority. Table 2, below, shows the current list of sectors and their lead
PDD-63 called for the selection, by each Lead Agency, of a Sector Liaison
Official (representing the Lead Agency) and a Sector Coordinator (representing the
owners/operators of each sector). While most agencies quickly identified their Sector
Liaison Official, it took more time to identify Sector Coordinators. Different sectors
present different challenges for coordination. Some sectors are more diverse than
others (e.g., transportation includes rail, air, waterways, and highways; information
and communications include computers, software, wire and wireless
communications) and raise the issue of how to have all the relevant players

31 U.S.-VISIT is the Department’s effort to verify the identity of people entering and exiting
the United States.
32 Department of Homeland Security. Designation of the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan Critical Manufacturing Sector. Federal Register. Vol 73, No. 84. April 30, 2008.
33 These include iron and steel, ferro alloys, alumina and aluminum, and other non-ferrous
metal production; engine, turbine, and power transmission equipment; and, motor vehicle,
aerospace products, railroad rolling stock, and other transportation equipment.

represented. Other sectors are fragmented, consisting of small or local entities.
Some sectors, such as banking, telecommunications, and energy have more
experience than others in working with the federal government and/or working
collectively to assure the performance of their systems.
Table 2. Current Lead Agency Assignments
Department/Agency Sector/Subsector
Agriculture Agriculture
Agriculture Meat/Poultry
Health and Human ServicesAll other
TreasuryBanking and Finance
EPADrinking Water and Water Treatment Systems
Health and Human ServicesPublic Health and Healthcare
DefenseDefense Industrial Base
InteriorNational Monuments and Icons
Ener gy Ener gya
Homeland SecurityTransportation Systemsb
Homeland SecurityPostal and Shipping
Homeland SecurityInformation Technology
Homeland SecurityCommunications
Homeland SecurityCommercial Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste
Homeland SecurityChemical
Homeland SecurityEmergency Services
Homeland SecurityDams
Homeland SecurityCommercial Facilities
Homeland SecurityGovernment Facilities
Homeland SecuritycCritical Manufacturing
a. While noted here as a single sector, in practice it is represented by two relatively separate sectors:
electric power (except for nuclear power facilities); and the production, refining, and some
distribution of oil and gas. The Department of Energy is the lead agency for both. However, the
Department of Homeland Security (through the Transportation Security Administration) is the
lead agency for the distribution of oil and gas via pipelines. Nuclear power is considered its
own sector.
b. While noted here as a single sector, Transportation includes all modes of transportation: rail, mass
transit (rail and bus), air, maritime, highways, pipelines, etc. The Transportation Security
Administration within the Department of Homeland Security, in collaboration with the
Department of Transportation, is the lead agency for all but the maritime subsector, for which
the Coast Guard, also within the Department of Homeland Security, acts as lead agency.
c. According to the Federal Register announcement, the Department of Homeland Security will act
as the interim Lead Agency.

In addition to such structural issues are ones related to competition. Inherent in
the exercise is asking competitors to cooperate. In some cases it is asking competing
industries to cooperate. This cooperation not only raises issues of trust among firms,
but also concerns regarding anti-trust rules.
Over time, Sector Coordinators were selected for most of the sectors identified
under PDD-63. Typically, a representative from a relevant trade organizations was
chosen to act as sector coordinator. For example, the Environmental Protection
Agency selected the Executive Director of the Association of Metropolitan Water
Agencies to act as Sector Coordinator for the water sector. In the case of the law
enforcement sector (no longer identified as a separate sector), the National
Infrastructure Protection Center helped create a Emergency Law Enforcement
Services Forum, consisting of senior state, local, and non-FBI law enforcement
officials. In the case of banking and finance, the Sector Coordinator was chosen from
a major banking/finance institution, who doubled as the Chairperson of the Financial
Services Sector Coordinating Council, an organization specifically set up by the
industry to coordinate critical infrastructure protection activities with the federal
In December 1999, a number of the sectors formed a Partnership for Critical
Infrastructure Security to share information and strategies and to identify
interdependencies across sectoral lines. The Partnership was a private sector
initiative. The federal government was not officially part of the Partnership, but the
Department of Homeland Security (and CIAO before that) acted as a liaison and
provided administrative support for meetings. Sector Liaisons from lead agencies
were considered ex officio members. The Partnership helped coordinate its members
input to a number of the national strategies released to date and were to provide input
into the National Plan called for in PDD-63.
While initially working with this organizational structure, the Bush
Administration promoted a new Critical Infrastructure Protection Partnership Model.
Resembling the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council approach, this newer
Model expanded the sector liaison and sector coordinator model of PDD-63 into
Government Coordinating Councils and Sector Coordinating Councils for each
sector. The primary objective was to expand both owner/operator and government
representation within all sectors. Now, for example, the Water Sector Coordinating
Council consists of two owner/operator representatives, along with one non-voting
association staff, from each of the following participating organizations: the
Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies, the American Water Works
Association, the American Water Works Association Research Foundation, the
National Association of Clean Water Agencies, the National Association of Water
Companies, the National Rural Water Association, the Water Environment
Federation, and the Water Environment Research Foundation. The Water
Government Coordinating Council is chaired by the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Lead Agency, but also includes the Department of Homeland Security,
the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Interior, and the Center for
Disease Control. Government Coordinating Councils can also include state, local,
and tribal government entities. The Sector Coordinating Councils are to establish
their own organizational structures and leadership and act independently from the
federal government. Also, under this model, the Partnership for Critical

Infrastructure Security has been designated the Private Sector Cross-Sector
Council. The Sector Coordinating Councils are to provide input into both the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan and the individual Sector Specific Plans (see
below). Many of the issues governing the progress made in identifying and working
with the sector coordinators model of PDD-63 continue with the sector coordinating
councils. 34
In March 2006, the Department of Homeland Security used its authority under
the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296, Section 871) — to form advisory
committees that are exempt from the Federal Advisory Committee Act (P.L. 92-463)
— to establish the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council
(CIPAC).35 The Federal Advisory Committee Act requires advisory committees
generally to meet in open session and make written materials available to the public.
The purpose of waiving this act for the CIPAC is to facilitate more open discussion
between the sector coordinating councils and the government coordinating councils
(if not with the public). DHS acts as the Executive Secretariat. Members include
owner/operators that are members of their respective sector coordinating councils or
belong to an association that is a member of the coordinating council. Members also
include federal, state, local, and tribal government entities that belong to their
respective government coordinating councils. While the CIPAC is exempt from the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, DHS stated in its public notice that it will make
meeting dates and appropriate agendas available. There is a CIPAC webpage on the
DHS website.36
Appointment of the National Infrastructure Advisory Council
The Clinton Administration released an Executive Order (13130) in July, 1999,
formally establishing the National Infrastructure Assurance Council. Just prior to
leaving office, President Clinton put forward the names of 18 appointees.37 The
Order was rescinded by the Bush Administration before the Council could meet. In
Executive Order 13231,38 President Bush established a National Infrastructure
Advisory Council (with the same acronym, NIAC) whose functions are similar to
those of the Clinton Council. On September 18, 2002, President Bush announced his
appointment of 24 individuals to serve on Council.39 The E.O. amending 13231

34 See U.S. Congress. General Accountability Office. Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Progress Coordinating Government and Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors’
Characteristics. GAO-07-39. October 2006.
35 See Federal Register. Vol. 71 No. 57. pp. 14930-14933. March 24, 2006.
36 See []. This site was last
visited on April 2, 2008.
37 White House Press Release, dated January 18, 2000.
38 Executive Order 13231 — Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age.
Federal Register. Vol. 66. No. 202. October 18, 2001. pp. 53063-53071. The NIAC is
established on page 53069.
39 See White House Press Release, September 18, 2002.

makes some minor modifications to NIAC. Primarily, the Council now reports to the
President through the Secretary of Homeland Security.40
Internal Agency Plans
There had been some confusion about which agencies were required by PDD-63
to submit critical infrastructure plans. The Directive required every agency to
develop and implement such a plan. A subsequent Informational Seminar on PDD-
63 held on October 13, 1998 identified two tiers of agencies. The first tier included
lead agencies and other “primary” agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency and
Veteran’s Affairs. These agencies were held to the Directive’s 180-day deadline. A
second tier of agencies were identified by the National Coordinator and required to
submit plans by the end of February 1999. The “secondary” agencies were
Agriculture, Education, Housing and Urban Development, Labor, Interior, General
Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. All of these “primary” and “secondary” agencies
met their initial deadlines for submitting their internal plans for protecting their own
critical infrastructures from attacks and for responding to intrusions. The Critical
Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) assembled an expert team to review the
plans. The plans were assessed in 12 areas including schedule/milestone planning,
resource requirements, and knowledge of existing authorities and guidance. The
assessment team handed back the initial plans with comments. Agencies were given

90 days to respond to these comments. Of the 22 “primary” and “secondary”

agencies that submitted plans, 16 modified and resubmitted them in response to first
round comments.
Initially, the process of reviewing agency plans was to continue until all
concerns were addressed. Over the summer of 1999, however, review efforts slowed
and subsequent reviews were put on hold as the efficacy of the reviews was debated.
Some within the CIAO felt that the plans were too general and lacked a clear
understanding of what constituted a “critical asset” and the interdependencies of
those assets. As a result of that internal debate, the CIAO redirected its resources to
institute a new program called Project Matrix. Project Matrix is a three step process
by which an agency can identify and assess its most critical assets, identify the
dependencies of those assets on other systems, including those beyond the direct
control of the agency, and prioritize. CIAO offered this analysis to agencies,
including some not designated as “primary” or “secondary” agencies, such as the
Social Security Administration and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Participation by the agencies was voluntary.41
In the meantime, other agencies (i.e., those not designated as primary or
secondary) apparently did not develop critical infrastructure plans. In a much later
report by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (dated March 21, 2001),
the Council, which was charged with reviewing agencies’ implementation of PDD-

40 The current membership and activities of the National Infrastructure Advisory Council
can be found on the DHS website. See [
editorial_0353.shtm]. Site was last visited on April 2, 2008.
41 The use of Project Matrix’s methodology continues under HSPD-7.

63, stated that there was a misunderstanding as to the applicability of PDD-63 to all
agencies. The Council asserted that all agencies were required to develop a critical
infrastructure plan and that many had not, because they felt they were not covered by
the Directive. Also, the Council found that of the agency plans that had been
submitted, many were incomplete, had not identified their mission-critical assets, and
that almost none had completed vulnerability assessments. Two years later, the
Government Accountability Office42 reported that four of the agencies they reviewed
for the House Committee on Energy and Commerce (HHS, Energy, Commerce, and
EPA) had still not yet identified their critical assets and operational dependencies, nor
have they set any deadlines for doing so.43
HSPD-7 reestablished a deadline for agencies to submit critical infrastructure
protection plans to the Director of OMB for approval by July 2004. The Director of
OMB provided guidance on how agencies should meet their requirement
(Memorandum M-04-15, June 17, 2004). The memorandum stated that plans for the
physical protection of assets would be subject to interagency review coordinated by
the Department of Homeland Security, with DHS providing a written evaluation of
each agency’s plans within 120 days. Agency cyber security plans would be
reviewed by OMB, as part of the requirements associated with the Federal
Information Security Management Act of 2002, included as Title III of E-
Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347). These plans are to provide information to
be included in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (see below). DHS and
OMB have not been willing to provide CRS with the status of these reports.
National Critical Infrastructure Plan
PDD-63 called for a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan that would be
informed by sector-level plans and would include an assessment of minimal
operating requirements, vulnerabilities, remediation plans, reconstitution plans,
warning requirements, etc. The National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the
Homeland Security Act each have called for the development of a comprehensive
national infrastructure protection plan, as well, although without specifying deadlines
and what that plan should include. HSPD-7 called for a comprehensive National
Plan for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection by the end of 2004.
According to HSPD-7, the National Plan should include (a) a strategy to identify,
prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources,
including how the Department will work with other stakeholders; (b) a summary of
activities to be undertaken in order to carry out the strategy; (c) a summary of
initiatives for sharing critical infrastructure information and threat warnings with
other stakeholders; and (d) coordination with other federal emergency management

42 Note: The General Accounting Office has had its name changed legislatively to the
Government Accountability Office.
43 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges for
Selected Agencies and Industry Sectors. Repot to the Committee on Energy and Commerce,
House of Representatives. GAO-03-233. February 2003. pp. 4-5.

In January 2000, the Clinton Administration released Version 1.0 of a National
Plan for Information Systems Protection.44 In keeping with the original focus of
PDD-63, the Plan focused primarily on cyber-related efforts within the federal
government. The Bush Administration, through the President’s Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board, released The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
in February 2003, which could be considered Version 2.0 of the Clinton-released
Plan. It addressed all stakeholders in the nation’s information infrastructure, from
home users to the international community, and included input from the private
sector, the academic community, and state and local governments. Also in February
2003, the Office of Homeland Security released The National Strategy for the
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets. This strategy took
a broad perspective of the issues and needs associated with organizing the nation’s
efforts to protect its critical infrastructure; identifying roles and responsibilities,
actions that need to be taken, and guiding principles.
The Department of Homeland Security missed the December 2004 deadline for
releasing the National Infrastructure Protection Plan called for in HSPD-7. It did
publish an Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan in February 2005.
According to media reports, some in the private sector complained they were not
adequately consulted.45 The Department subsequently released for public comment
a “draft” National Infrastructure Protection Plan in November 2005.46 A final version
of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was approved June 30, 2006.47
The NIPP identifies and integrates specific processes by which an integrated
national risk management effort can proceed. For example, it defines and seeks to
standardize, across all sectors, the process for identifying and selecting assets for
further analysis, identifying threats and conducting threat assessments, assessing
vulnerabilities to those threats, analyzing consequences, determining risks,
identifying potential risk mitigation activities, and prioritizing those activities based
on cost-effectiveness.48 The NIPP also calls for implementation plans for these risk
reduction activities, with timelines and responsibilities identified, and tied to
resources. Each lead agency is to work with its sector to generate Sector Specific

44 Defending America’s Cyberspace. National Plan for Information Systems Protection.
Version 1.0. An Invitation to a Dialogue. The White House. 2000.
45 See “Still Waiting: Plan to Protect Critical Infrastructure Overdue from DHS,”
Congressional Quarterly. Homeland Security-Transportation & Infrastructure Newsletter,
January 28, 2005. The Newsletter is electronic and available by subscription only. See
[ /cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/hsnews/10
9/hsne ws109-000001507251.html @a llnews&me tapub=HSNEWS&seqNum=827&searc
hIndex=1]. The article was last viewed on April 2, 2008.
46 See Federal Register, vol. 70, no. 212, November 3, 2005, pp. 66840-66841.
47 The NIPP can be found at [].
This site was last visited on April 2, 2008.
48 For a discussion of a basic risk management process in a critical infrastructure context,
see CRS Report RL32561, Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Assessing, Integrating, and Managing Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Consequences, by John

Plans, utilizing the processes outlined in the NIPP. DHS will then use these same
processes to integrate the sector specific plans into a national plan that identifies
those assets and risk reduction plans that require national level attention because of
the risk the incapacitation of those assets pose to the nation as a whole.49
According to the NIPP, Sector Specific Plans (SSPs) were due 180 days after
release of the NIPP (i.e. the end of 2006). Apparently, all 17 sectors met that
deadline. However, they went through a DHS review process before being released
in May 2007. Of the 17 plans submitted, 7 were made available to the public, the rest
were designated For Official Use Only.50 The Government Accountability Office
(GAO) reviewed 9 of the SSPs and found that while all complied, more or less, with
the NIPP process, some plans were more developed and comprehensive than others.51
As a result, GAO was unable to assess how far along each sector actually is in
identifying assets, setting priorities, and protecting key assets. DHS views these
SSPs as a first step in the process, and plans to review the sectors’ annual progress
reports, as required by HSPD-7.
It should be noted, that some sectors and agencies have performed already some
or all of these risk management steps using various techniques and processes. The
NIPP requires that each sector and lead agency ensure that previous work meets the
basic requirements associated with the processes described in the NIPP.
Distinguishing between a strategy and plan, and whether these documents yet
fulfill the requirement for the comprehensive national plan called for in the
Homeland Security Act, is beyond the scope of this report. However, each
succeeding document does appear to refine further some goal, objective, or initiative
discussed in preceding documents.
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC)
PDD-63 envisaged a single ISAC to be the private sector counterpart to the
FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), collecting, analyzing, and
sharing incident and response information among its members and facilitating
information exchange between government and the private sector. The idea of a
single ISAC evolved into each sector having its own center. ISACs differ somewhat
from sector coordinating councils in that ISACs were to be 24/7/365 operations,
where incidents experienced by owner/operators, as well as threat information from
the government, could be reported, analyzed, and shared. Many were conceived

49 The Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Center (HITRAC), a joint effort by the
Office of Infrastructure Protection and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, through its
Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment (SHIRA) program priorities the risk
across all sectors to produce an annual National Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
Risk Profile.
50 See [] for a short
discussion and to access those SSPs that are not designated as For Official Use Only. This
site was last viewed on April 2, 2008.
51 Government Accountability Office. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Plans and
Sector Councils Continue to Evolve. GAO-07-706R. July 10, 2007.

originally as concentrating on cyber security issues, and some still function with that
emphasis. However, others have incorporated physical security into their missions.
ISACs were formed around two primary models. One model involved ISAC
members legally incorporating and establishing either their own ISAC operations or
contracting operations out to a security firm. The banking, information, water, oil
and gas, railroad, and mass transit sectors followed this approach.
The other model involved utilizing an existing industry or government-industry
coordinating group and adding critical infrastructure protection to the mission of that
group. The electric power (which uses North American Electricity Reliability
Council (NERC)) and the telecommunications sector (which uses the National
Coordinating Center (NCC)) followed this model. The emergency fire services
sector incorporated ISAC functions into the existing operations of the U.S. Fire
Administration, which has interacted with local fire departments for years.
Different federal financial support models were developed for ISACs, too. In
some cases, ISACs received start up funding from their Lead Agency (e.g., drinking
water received funding from EPA). In some cases, that support continues, in some
cases the support has not continued (e.g., DOE no longer supports the energy ISAC).
Other ISACs have always been self-supporting. The individual ISACs have formed
a group called the ISAC Council.52 Their formation and function experience some of
the same variation as the coordinating councils, for some of the same reasons.
While PDD-63 envisioned ISACs to be a primary conduit for exchanging
critical infrastructure information between the federal government and specific
sectors, the Department of Homeland Security has developed a number of other
information sharing systems and mechanism. For example, US-CERT (the U.S.
Computer Emergency Readiness Team, which took over many of the NIPC
functions) publishes information on the latest computer-related vulnerabilities and
threats and information on how to respond to a specific incident. U.S.-CERT also
accepts incidents reports. It also manages the National Cyber Alert System, to
which any organization or individual can subscribe. The Department also has
developed a Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). HSIN initially
served as the primary communication network for communicating and analyzing
threat information between government law enforcement agencies at the federal,
state, and local levels. The HSIN now provides real-time connectivity between all
50 states, 5 territories, and 50 urban areas and the National Operations Center at
DHS. The HSIN is being expanded to include each critical infrastructure sector
(dubbed HSIN-CI) as part of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Partnership Model
(i.e., through each sector and government coordinating council).
Shortly after September 11, 2001, the Department established what is now
called the Infrastructure Protection Executive Notification Service (ENS), which
connects DHS directly with the Chief Executive Officers of major industrial firms.
The ENS is used to alert partners to infrastructure incidents, to disseminate warning
products, and to conduct teleconferences. The Department is also responsible for

52 See, []. This site was last visited on January 15, 2008.

operating the Critical Infrastructure Warning Network (CWIN), which provides
secure communications between DHS and other federal, state, and local agencies, the
private sector, and international agencies. CWIN does not rely on the Public Switch
Network or the internet.
Identifying Critical Assets, Assessing Vulnerability and Risk,
and Prioritizing Protective Measures
Among the activities assigned to the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 were:
!access, receive, analyze, and integrate information from a variety of
sources in order to identify and assess the nature and scope of the
terrorist threat;
!carry out comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of key
resources and critical infrastructure, of the United States including
risk assessments to determine risks posed by particular types of
!integrate relevant information, analyses, and vulnerability
assessments in order to identify priorities for protective and support
Furthermore, according to the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of
Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, the Department of Homeland Security: (a)
“in collaboration with other key stakeholders, will develop a uniform methodology
for identifying facilities, systems, and functions with national-level criticality to help
establish protection priorities;” (b) “ will build a comprehensive database to catalog
these critical facilities, systems, and functions;” and (c) “will also maintain a
comprehensive, up-to-date assessment of vulnerabilities and preparedness across
critical sectors.” Furthermore, these efforts “will help guide near-term protective
actions and provide a basis for long-term leadership focus and informed resource
Following September 11, 2001, owners/operators of critical infrastructure
assets, to varying degrees, began identifying critical assets, assessing their
vulnerabilities to attack, and developed security plans or beefed up protections. For
example, the Federal Transit Authority assessed the vulnerabilities of the nation’s
largest mass transit systems. The freight rail companies developed additional
security measures to coincide with the level of threat identified by DHS’s color-
coded National Alert System. Drinking water authorities, through the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (P.L. 107-188), were required to conduct
vulnerability assessments and to develop security plans based on those assessments.
Port facilities and maritime vessels were required by the Maritime Transportation
Security Act (P.L. 107-295) to do the same. The American Petroleum Institute, the
North American Electric Reliability Council, and other industry associations offered
guidance to their respective members on how to conduct vulnerability assessments
and to manage their risk from possible attack. However, DHS’s ability to coordinate
this activity developed more slowly, and its ability to develop a uniform methodology

that would allow it to generate a set of national priorities awaited the release of its
NIPP, described above.
Nevertheless, during this same time, DHS has engaged in at least two other sets
of activities that have, also to varying degrees, identified critical assets, assessed their
vulnerabilities, and provided assistance to increase protection of these sites.
Shortly before the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, as part of
Operation Liberty Shield53, what was then called the Protective Services Division of
the newly-formed Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate,
identified a list of 160 assets or sites, including chemical and hazardous materials
sites, nuclear power plants, energy facilities, business and finance centers, and more,
that it considered critical to the nation based on their vulnerability to attack and
potential consequences. During the course of the year, that list grew to 1,849 assets
or sites.54
According to testimony before the House Appropriations Committee on April

1, 2004, then-Undersecretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection,

Frank Libutti, made reference to 1700 sites identified by DHS as being high priority
sites.55 According to the testimony, DHS intended to visit each of these sites to
assess their vulnerabilities to various forms of attack and to meet with local law
enforcement officials to assist them in developing Buffer Zone Protection Plans
(BZPPs). BZPPs focus on protections that can be taken “outside the fence,”
including how to identify threatening surveillance, patrolling techniques, and how to
assert command and control if an incident should occur. DHS has provided training
and technical assistance to help state and local law enforcement entities develop their
own BZPPs. The BZPP activity is now integrated into the State and Local Grants
Program. In addition to these “outside the fence” activities, DHS has conducted Site
Assistance Visits (SAVs) at selected sites, on a voluntary basis, to discuss with
owners and operators vulnerabilities and protective measures that can be taken
“inside the fence.” SAVs form an integral part of the “comprehensive reviews
(CRs)” which DHS is performing on both nuclear power facilities and high-priority
chemical facilities. Once these two sectors are completed, DHS is planning to
conduct comprehensive reviews of other sectors. According to the FY2009 budget
justification for the Infrastructure Protection and Information Security (IPIS)
Program, DHS planned on beginning a CR of California’s water system in FY2008.
In addition to its selection of high priority sites and subsequent site visits,
vulnerability assessments, and buffer zone protection plans, DHS, through its Office
of Grants and Training, also has been supporting infrastructure protection at the state
and local level through its State and Local Grant Programs. Specific grant programs

53 Operation Liberty Shield was a comprehensive national plan to protect the homeland
during operations in Iraq.
54 See, Department of Homeland Security. Office of the Inspector General. Progress in
Developing the National Asset Database. OIG-06-04. June 2006.
55 According to the Department’s Inspector General report, these 1,700 assets refer to the

1,849 assets identified in its research.

include the State Homeland Security Formula-based Grants, the Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) Grants (both of which primarily support first responder needs, but
include certain infrastructure protection expenditures), Port Security Grants, Rail and
Transit Security Grants, Intercity Bus Security Grants, and Highway (Trucking)
Security Grants. The Buffer Zone Protection Plan grants have been added to this set
of programs. Before receiving funds, grants recipients must identify specific critical
infrastructure assets, conduct threat and vulnerabilities assessments, and develop a
plan for how they intend to use grant funds to reduce those vulnerabilities through
eligible expenditures.56
Issues and Discussion
Congressional interest in critical infrastructure protection is focused, principally,
on reviewing the progress and effectiveness of DHS’s efforts.
Identifying Critical Assets, Functions, and Systems
There has been some debate about the progress and effectiveness of DHS’s
efforts at identifying high priority assets. For example, when developing the initial
list of priority sites during Operation Liberty Shield, certain utility operators, when
presented a list of what DHS considered to be critical electric power assets, noticed
that some of the entries were not currently in use.57 According to the DHS Inspector
General, DHS itself determined that its early list of priority sites was unreliable.58
Over time, according to the DHS Inspector General, this initial priority list
evolved into what became the National Asset Database, which, as of January 2006,
contained over 77,000 entries. While DHS apparently made progress on the
reliability of the information contained in the Database, it continued to draw criticism
for including thousands of assets that many believe have more local importance than
national importance. There is some confusion as to what the National Asset
Database is meant to be. Critics of the Database assume it is a continuation of DHS’s
list of high priority sites. DHS asserts that it is an inventory of assets, from which
critical assets may be drawn.59 Perhaps in response to these criticisms, the National
Asset Database is evolving into what is called the Infrastructure Data Warehouse.
In his response to the Inspector General’s report, the Undersecretary for
Preparedness stated that DHS does not intend to have one definitive prioritized list

56 For more information on the grant programs, see CRS Report RL33583, Homeland
Security Grants: Evolution of Program Guidance and Grant Allocation Methods; and CRS
Report RS22805, FY2009 Appropriations for State and Local Homeland Security, both by
Shawn Reese.
57 Based on personal communication with industry official, September 29, 2003.
58 Department of Homeland Security. Office of the Inspector General. Progress in
Developing the National Asset Database. Op. cit., p. 16.
59 For more discussion of the issues associated with the National Asset Database see, CRS
Report RL33648, Critical Infrastructure: The National Asset Database, by John Moteff.

of critical assets. He further stated that it would not be possible or useful to develop
one.60 However, the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protections has stated that
DHS does maintain a list of roughly 600 high priority sites, which it uses to focus
DHS operations, resource allocation and grants.61
The number of assets making onto this high-priority list has apparently grown.62
Implementation of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) is suppose to
contribute to the identification of assets that are most critical to the nation. Also, the
FY2009 IPIS budget justification document mentions the intention to begin
conducting High-Risk Infrastructure Cluster vulnerability assessments. These
assessments would focus on high priority sites identified through the Urban Area
Security Initiative program.
Assessing Vulnerabilities and Risk
Assuming DHS does maintain a list of high priority assets, it is not clear how
many of these have been visited, had their vulnerability and risk assessed, or have
had buffer zone protection plans or other protective measures developed and
implemented to-date. Directorate budget requests report some figures, but the
reporting is not consistent nor standardized from year to year. Also, reference to
high-priority sites in earlier years may not refer to the same list of high-priority sites
currently under consideration.
According to the Directorate’s FY2006 budget request, between 150 and 180
SAVs had been conducted during FY2004. According to its FY2007 budget request,
200 were conducted in FY2005, and another 150 were expected to be conducted per
year after that. The FY2008 budget request was silent on how many SAVs were
conducted subsequent to FY2005. The FY2009 budget request stated that 110 SAVs
were conducted in FY2007.
According to the Senate Appropriation Committee’s report accompanying the
FY2005 DHS appropriation,63 150 vulnerability assessments of high valued sites
were expected to be completed in FY2004, and another 400 to be assessed in
FY2005. According to the IA/IP FY2006 budget request, vulnerability assessments
had been conducted at 50 high-priority sites during FY2004. The FY2007 budget
request is silent on how many vulnerability assessment were completed in FY2005.
The FY2008 budget request stated that vulnerability assessments had been conducted

60 Department of Homeland Security. Office of the Inspector General. Progress in
Developing the National Asset Database. Op. cit., p. 31.
61 USA Today. “Database is Just the 1st Step,” by Robert Stephan. July 21, 2006. p. 8A.
62 In testimony before the Senate Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector
Preparedness and Integration, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, July 12, 2007, the Assistant Secretary stated that this list has grown to about 2,500
assets. The list is divided into Tier 1 (most critical), and Tier 2 (significantly critical) sites,
based on analysis conducted by the Office of Infrastructure Protection.
63 U.S. Congress. Senate. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2005.
Report accompanying S. 2537. S.Rept. 108-280. June 17, 2004. p. 77.

at 66 high-priority sites in FY2006, presumably in addition to those conducted in
prior years.
According to the IA/IP FY2006 budget request, 800 BZPP’s had been
implemented by the end of the calender year 2004. The FY2006 budget request also
stated that the Directorate planned to ensure that 1000 BZPPs would be implemented
in FY2005. The FY2007 budget request stated that BZPPs had been implemented
at over 1800 high priority sites in FY2005. The FY2008 budget request stated that
BZPP’s for 1620 sites were submitted (presumably to the Office of Grants and
Training) and approved for grants in FY2006. The number of sites for which BZPPs
have been prepared or approved exceed the roughly 600 sites currently considered
high-priority by the Directorate. Now that the BZPP program has been integrated
with the other state and local grant programs, the 1600 to 1800 sites referred to above
may include sites not necessarily considered high-priority by the Directorate.
DHS’s Performance Budget Overview for FY2008 for the Directorate presents
a different perspective on the number of site visits, vulnerability assessments and
BZPPs that have been, or will be, completed and implemented at high priority sites
by the end of FY2008. DHS’s Performance Budget Overview matches specific
programs with specific performance measures. The Infrastructure Protection and
Risk Management Program (referred to in the FY2007 Performance Budget
Overview as the Infrastructure Protection Program and apparently referring to the
non-cyber and non-communications related activities of the Infrastructure Protection
and Information Security Program in the budget) has three performance measures
listed: the percentage of high priority sites at which BZPP’s have been implemented;
the percentage of high-priority sites for which vulnerability assessments have been
conducted and corresponding resource allocations made; and the percentage of high-
priority sites at which at least two protective measures have been implemented. The
targets and actual percentages for each of these measures are listed in the Table
below.64 According to this performance based budget review, by FY2007 nearly all
high-priority sites have had vulnerability assessments and at least two protective
measures implemented. However, as additional high-priority sites are identified, the
goal is to maintain a 95% performance for assessment and implemented

64 The Department of Homeland Security. Annual Performance Report, FY2007-FY2009
noted that these three metrics would be retired after FY2007 and replaced with a single
metric beginning with FY2008 data.

Table 3. Performance Measures for the Infrastructure Protection
and Risk Management Program
Measure FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009
Percent of high-priority [sites] fortarget70%28%65%70%
which a BZPP has been implementedactual18%58%90%*N/A
Percent of high-priority [sites] attarget10%15%25%30%
which a vulnerability assessment has
been conducted, and makeactual14%15%95%*N/A
corresponding resource allocation
Percent of high-priority [sites] attargetNone10%20%25%
which at least two protective measuresactualNone14%90%*N/A
have been implemented
Percent of high-priority [sites] where a95%*95%*
vulnerability assessment has been
conducted and enhancement(s) have
been implemented
Source: Department of Homeland Security. National Protection and Programs Directorate. FY2008.
Strategic Context. Congressional Justification. 2007.
Notes: An * indicates that data was taken from the DHS Annual Performance Report, FY2007-
FY2009. There is a two-year lag in reporting data.
Allocating Resources
It is a matter of policy, as articulated in the documents discussed above, that
federal resources should focus on those critical infrastructure assets that, if attacked,
pose the greatest risks to the nation.
Risk, in the context of critical infrastructure and terrorism, can be defined as the
potential consequences associated with a particular kind of attack or event against a
particular target, discounted by the likelihood that such an attack or event will occur
(threat) and the likelihood that the target will sustain a certain degree of damage
(vulnerability). Threat includes not only the identification of specific adversaries, but
also their intentions and capabilities (both current and future). Consequences include
lives and property lost, short term financial costs, longer term economic costs,
environmental costs, etc. Given this definition, risk is not threat, nor vulnerability
to a threat, nor the estimated consequences associated with a specific attack, but65

some integration of the three.
65 Note, that in many cases these factors may not be independent. In other words, the
likelihood that a particular asset may be attacked may increase if it is perceived to have a
high vulnerability and/or the consequences of the attack are great. For more discussion of
how risks can be assessed and its implications for decision making, see CRS Report
RL32561, Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Assessing, Integrating,
and Managing Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Consequences, by John Moteff.

According to the NIPP, the allocation of resources is to be a two step process.
First, those critical assets which pose the greatest risk to the nation if attacked (i.e.,
those assets that score highest when integrating threat, vulnerability, and
consequences) are to be given the highest priority. The second step is to identify and
support those protective measures that are likely to provide the greatest risk reduction
for any given investment.
Federal resources are spent in a number of ways, including agencies’ internal
budgets for operations and programs, grants to states and localities, and research and
development funding for universities and industry. The most publicized debates on
the allocation of federal resources focuses primarily on grants to states and localities.
The formula-based State Homeland Security Grants, mentioned above, has been
criticized by some for allocating more dollars per capita to states that some perceive
as having lower risks than other states. Congress has been at odds on if, or how, to
modify the allocation of those funds. The other grant programs mentioned above
(i.e., Urban Area Security Initiative grants and the sector specific grants) are
discretionary. According to DHS, allocation of these funds are based on a calculation
not only of risk, but also on need. With the allocation of FY2006 Urban Area
Security Initiative grants, some cities which perceive themselves as having greater
risk (or at least being more at threat or could suffer greater losses) received less
funding than they did the previous year, while other cities perceived as having lower
risks saw their funds increased. DHS stated that one reason for this was the way it
determined the unmet needs of the area and the programs proposed by the areas to
address those needs. Faced with criticism from those cities and states that received
a drop in funds, DHS stated it would rework its grant review process.66 In addition,
Congress has requested that the Government Accountability Office review the
validity, relevance, reliability, timeliness and availability of the risk factors used by
DHS in its discretionary grant programs.67 Meanwhile, Congress continues to set its
own priorities by specifying the amount of funds that go to each of these grant
Also, it is not clear to what extent the NIPP process influences the allocation of
resources to states and localities. DHS states that information contained in the
National Asset Database is reviewed in making these grant allocation decisions.
However, these grant programs are managed by the Office of Grants and Training,
which apparently assesses risks independent of the NIPP. Similarly, port security
grants, while managed by the Office of Grants and Training, are influenced largely
by the review of vulnerability assessments and security plans performed by the Coast

66 DHS’s solution was establish multiple tiers, with urban areas competing for funds within
their tier. Tier 1 urban areas are those considered to have a greater likelihood of being
targeted or have a large number of probable targets (including number of people).
67 For a detailed discussion of the risk assessment process used to allocate grant funds to
urban areas, see CRS Report RL33858, The Department of Homeland Security’s Risk
Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Todd Masse,
Siobhan O’Neil, and John Rollins.

Information Sharing
Information sharing in the context of homeland security encompasses a very
complex network of proposed connections. There is information sharing between
federal agencies, especially between intelligence agencies, and between intelligence
and law enforcement agencies. There is information sharing between federal
agencies and their state and local counterparts. There is information sharing between
federal, state, and local agencies and the private sector. There is information sharing
within and between the private sectors. And there is information sharing between all
of these entities and the public. A multitude of mechanisms have been established to
facilitate all of this information sharing. While the multitude of mechanism may
cause some concern about inefficiencies, a highly connected, in some cases
redundant, network may not be a bad thing. A primary concern is if these
mechanisms are being used and are effective.
In the past, information flow between all of these stakeholders has been
restrained, or non-existent, for at least three reasons: a natural bureaucratic reluctance
to share information, technological difficulties associated with compatibility, and
legal restraints to prevent the misuse of information for unintended purposes.
However, in the wake of September 11, given the apparent lack of information
sharing that was exposed in reviewing events leading up to that day, many of these
restraints are being reexamined and there appears to be a general consensus to change
them. Some changes have resulted from the USA PATRIOT Act (including easing
the restrictions on sharing of information between national law enforcement agencies
and those agencies tasked with gaining intelligence of foreign agents). The
legislation establishing the Department of Homeland Security also authorizes efforts
to improve the ability of agencies within the federal government to share information
between themselves and other entities at the state and local level. The Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) reorganized the entire
intelligence community, in part to improve the level of communication and
coordination between the various intelligence organizations.68 The legislation also
required the President to establish an information sharing environment (ISE) for
the sharing of terrorism information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and
tribal entities, and the private sector.
While the federal government is trying to increase the amount of information
shared among appropriate stakeholders, it is also trying to maintain a tight control
(short of classification) on who gets to see what information. A variety of
designations have been given to information the federal government wishes to control
(critical infrastructure information (see below), homeland security information,
terrorism information, sensitive security information). A catch-all term for these and
other designations of controlled information is “sensitive but unclassified.”
Since much of what is considered to be critical infrastructure is owned and
operated by the private sector, critical infrastructure protection relies to a large extent
on the ability of the private sector and the federal government to share information.

68 See also CRS Report RL32366, Terrorist Identification, Screening, Tracking Under
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, by William J. Krouse.

However, it is unclear how open the private sector and the government have been in
sharing information. The private sector primarily wants from government
information on specific threats which the government may want to protect in order
not to compromise sources or investigations. In fact, much of the threat assessment
done by the federal government is considered classified. For its part, the government
wants specific information on vulnerabilities and incidents which companies may
want to protect to prevent adverse publicity or to keep confidential company
practices. The private sector, too, is concerned about whether providing this
information might lead to future regulatory action or other liabilities. Successful
information sharing will depend on the ability of each side to demonstrate it can hold
in confidence the information exchanged.
Sharing information between government and the private sector is made more
complex by the question of how the information will be handled within the context
of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). In particular, the private sector is
reluctant to share the kind of information the government wants without it being
exempt from public disclosure under the existing FOIA statute. The Homeland
Security Act (P.L. 107-296, Sec. 214) exempts information defined as critical
infrastructure information from FOIA (as well as providing other protections).
Similar FOIA exemptions are offered in other legislation. For example, the Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (P.L. 107-188, Sec. 401, see
below) exempts certain security-related information from FOIA. Even with these
protections in statute, it is uncertain how much information on assets, vulnerabilities,
incidents, etc. is being shared with DHS, or how useful it is.69
The FOIA exemptions for critical infrastructure information (CII) and other
types of sensitive but unclassified information is not without its critics. The non-
government-organizations that actively oppose government secrecy are reluctant to
expand the government’s ability to hold more information as classified or sensitive.
These critics, and others, feel that the protections offered to CII and other types of
sensitive but unclassified information is too broad and believe that controls are
stifling public debate and oversight, as well as impeding technological advances that
could benefit both security and the economy.70

69 In February 2005, DHS acknowledged the receipt of 29 submissions of CII documents,
22 of which were approved as CII by DHS. See DHS Finally Speaks on CII at
[]. Site last viewed on January 15,

2008. In previously cited testimony (before the Senate Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State,

Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, July 12, 2007), the Assistant
Secretary for Infrastructure Protection stated that since the final rule governing
implementation of the CII program was released, DHS has received about 5,400
70 For a discussion of sensitive but unclassified information — not only science and
technology information, but other types of information held by, or given to, the federal
government — see CRS Report RL33303, “Sensitive But Unclassified Information” and
Other Controls: Policy and Options for Scientific and Technical Information, by Genevieve
J. Knezo.

As a general statement of policy, owners and operators of critical infrastructure
are to work with the federal government on a voluntary basis. Sharing information
with the federal government about vulnerability assessments, risk assessments, and
the taking of additional protective actions is meant to be voluntary.
However, the degree to which some of the activities are mandated varies across
sectors. In some cases, sectors are quite regulated. Nuclear power plants must meet
very specific standards for assessing their vulnerabilities to very specific types of
attacks and to take the necessary actions to address those vulnerabilities. The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission enforces these regulations. The Maritime
Transportation Security Act (P.L. 107-295) requires facilities at ports, and certain
vessels, to conduct vulnerability assessments and to develop and implement security
plans (including naming a security officer who is responsible for developing and
implementing these plans). The vulnerability assessments and security plans are
reviewed by the Coast Guard. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness Act (P.L. 107-188) requires community drinking water systems to
conduct vulnerability assessments and to incorporate the results of those assessments
into their emergency response plans. The vulnerability assessments must be
submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA must also
receive certification that the emergency response plans have been appropriately
modified to reflect the vulnerability assessments. This same Act also amended the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to require all facilities engaged in
manufacturing, processing, packing, or holding food for consumption to register with
the Department of Health and Human Services. In addition, the Food and Drug Act
was amended to require regulations specifying the types of information these
facilities needed to keep on record for a specified amount of time to assist the
Secretary in determining if a food product has been adulterated and represents a
public health problem. The FY2006 DHS appropriation bill (P.L. 109-295, Sec.
550), authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to issue interim final regulations
requiring vulnerability assessments and security plans for certain chemical facilities,
except those covered by the Maritime Transportation and Security Act, other relevant
acts affecting drinking water authorities, or those operated by the Department of
Energy, the Department of Defense, or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
At the other end of the spectrum are sectors such as information and
telecommunication, oil and gas, and commercial (i.e., malls and office buildings)
where similar activities (i.e., vulnerability assessments, etc.) are encouraged but not

Federal Funding for Critical Infrastructure Protection
The Homeland Security Act requires the President’s Budget to include a budget
analysis of homeland security activities across the federal government. For purposes
of its analysis, OMB categorizes funding according to the mission areas defined in
the National Strategy for Homeland Security. These are: intelligence and warning;
border and transportation security; domestic counter-terrorism; critical infrastructure
and key asset protection; defending against catastrophic events; and emergency
preparedness and response. While there is a separate category for critical
infrastructure protection, activities included in some of the other mission areas can
also be relevant or necessary for critical infrastructure protection. Table A.1. below
shows the funding figures for the critical infrastructure protection mission area taken
from the FY2009 budget analysis.
Much of this funding is spent by agencies to protect their own critical
infrastructure. It also includes funds that agencies may spend working with states,
local governments, and private owners/operators to reduce their respective
vulnerabilities. DHS activities include both of these, as well as activities associated
with coordinating the national effort.
Other mission areas include activities that might also be considered part of the
effort to protect critical infrastructure. For instance, the intelligence and warning
mission area includes threat analysis, risk analysis, and the sharing of that
information with other stakeholders, including states, localities, and the private
sector, each of which factor into critical infrastructure protection. Border and
transportation security includes activities associated with protecting airports, sea
ports, and other transportation modes.
In many cases, funding for homeland security (and critical infrastructure
protection) is buried within a number of different accounts, activities, programs, and
projects. It is not possible to track budget requests or Congressional appropriations
in each of these mission areas to this level of detail. Agencies may not know
themselves until they allocate their appropriations. However, once appropriations are
allocated, agencies must report homeland security-related allocations down to the
budget account level. OMB provides a breakdown of funding to this level in its
supplemental documentation.71

71 See []. Last
viewed April 2, 2008.

Table A.1. Critical Infrastructure Protection Funding by Department
($ in millions)
F Y 2006 F Y 2006 F Y 2007 F Y 2007 F Y 2008 F Y 2008 F Y 2009
Department actualsupplementalenactedsupplementalenactedsupplementalrequest
riculture 90.7 34.2 64.0 59.3
11150.5 862.3 11254.0 11966.2 12058.3
y 1520.6 1537.6 1607.1 1626.0
181.7 185.4 180.2 199.6
eland Security2698.33107.3222.03035.53768.4
iki/CRS-RL30153stice 541.1 545.0 6.5 494.3 15.8 571.4
g/wansportation 131.9 155.5 166.1 162.7
s.oreterans Affairs262.5217.7221.9277.4
212.6 199.2 193.9 203.0
http 317.2 357.4 350.4 364.0
174.6 191.9 215.0 220.3
encies 651.7 0.1 603.0 601.6 654.1
al 17933.2 862.4 18388.2 228.5 19096.1 15.8 20164.5
OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government, FY2009 Analytical Perspectives. Cross-Cutting Programs. Chapter 3. Homeland Security Funding Analysis. p. 27. FY2006 figures
n from FY2008 Analytical Perspectives.

FY2009 Budget Request and Appropriations for Infrastructure
Protection and Information Security Program and Other
Relevant DHS Budget Activities
Just as it is difficult to account for all the federal activities associated with
critical infrastructure protection in the federal government, it is also difficult to track
the critical infrastructure protection activities within the Department of Homeland
Security. Funding for activities related to critical infrastructure protection is found
in numerous places within the Department, including the National Protection and
Programs Directorate, the Transportation Security Administration, the Coast Guard,
Secret Service, the Science and Technology Directorate, Office of Grants and
Training, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Much of the funding for the
organizations and activities discussed in the body of this report can be found in the
Infrastructure Protection and Information Security (IPIS) Program. Below (Table
A.2), is the FY2009 budget request and enacted appropriations for the IPIS72
In the past, the IPIS budget supported eight program or project activities (PPAs)
— nine in FY2007 with the establishment of the Office of Emergency
Communications and transfer of programs to that office. In the FY2008 budget
request, those activities not specifically focused on cyber security and
telecommunications activities were consolidated into a single Infrastructure
Protection PPA. Table A.2 compares the old IPIS PPA structure with the new PPA
structure. However, the FY2007 figures cannot be compared directly with the figures
for FY2008 and FY2009. Beginning with the FY2008 budget request, NPPD
realigned some expenses that do not allow a direct comparison. For example, the
FY2008 budget request transferred expenses, such as rents and related facility costs,
and information technology support, which had previously been charged to individual
IPIS PPAs, to the Directorate’s Management and Administration budget activity (not
shown in the table below, and not to be confused with the “old” IPIS Management
and Administration PPA listed in the table). The FY2008 budget request also
distributed salaries and related expenses to each of the IPIS PPAs. In prior years, all
IPIS-related salaries and expenses were part of the IPIS Management and
Administration PPA. Other changes include the transfer of the Biosurveillance PPA
to the Office of Health Affairs (part of the Secretary’s consolidation of bio-defense
activities) and the addition of activities associated with the Office of Emergency
Communications (directed by the Post-Katrina Act).

72 The IPIS budget activity supports many of the same (though slightly restructured)
infrastructure protection activities that have evolved from the days of the “old” Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate.

Table A.2 Funding for the Infrastructure Protection and
Information Security Program
($ in millions)
Infrastructure Protection and Information Security Budget Activity
FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2009 FY2009 Fina l
Program/Project revised enacted Request House Sena t e FY2009
Activ ity enacted Apprn. Apprn. Apprn.
Management and
ad ministr a tio n 7 7
Critical infrastructure
outreach and
partnerships 101
Critical infrastructure
identification and
evalua tion 6 9
Natio na l
infr astr uc tur e
simulation and
analysis center25
B io sur ve illanc e 1
Protective actions44
I nfr astr uc tur e
Protection 272272312298314
Cyber security
(National Cyber
Security Division)92210293299319314
Natio na l
security/eme rgency
teleco mmunicatio ns
( N atio na l
Co mmuni c a t i o ns
System) 143 136 236 147 143 141
Office of Emergency
Co mmunicatio ns 35 35 38 38 48 38
Total IPIS587654841846808807
Source: Department of Homeland Security. National Protection and Programs Directorate.
Infrastructure Protection and Information Security. FY2009 Congressional Justification. February 2008.
House of Representatives. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2009. H.Rept. 110-
862. Senate. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2009. S.Rept. 110-396.
Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr. Obey, Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations,
Regarding the Amendment of the House of Representatives to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 2368.
Division D Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009.

While consolidating a number of PPAs into a single Infrastructure Protection (IP)
PPA, the Directorate continues to aggregate specific programs and activities within
the IP PPA. The specific programs and activities are divided into three areas:
Identification and Analysis, Coordination and Information Sharing, and Risk
Reduction Activities. A discussion of funding at the project level is beyond the scope
of this report.
In addition to the IPIS program within the National Protection and Programs
Directorate, other areas in DHS support infrastructure protection. A major component
of support for critical infrastructure protection within the Department are the State
Homeland Security Grants, the Urban Area Security Initiative Grants, and the
Transportation and Infrastructure Protection Grants (which include ports, rail,
trucking, mass transit, and intercity bus), all administered by the Office of Grants,
relocated with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The State
Homeland Security Grants and the Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants primarily
support first responder capabilities, but funding can also be spent on critical
infrastructure protection expenses (such as the purchase of cameras, sensors, etc.).
For FY2009, the Administration requested $200 million for State Homeland Security
Grants, $825 million for the Urban Area Security Initiative, and $405 million for
ports, rail and public transportation, bus, and trucking security grants. Congress
appropriated (in the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2009, P.L. 110-329) $890 million, $837 million, and $820
million respectively for these grant programs. The latter included $400 million each
for the port and the rail and public transportation grant programs. The Administration
did not request any funds for BZPP grants, but Congress appropriated $50 million.
For more information on these grants, see CRS Report RS22805, FY2009
Appropriations for State and Federal Homeland Security.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for overseeing
the security of the nation’s transportation sectors (as directed by the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, P.L. 107-71). The Administration’s total budget request
for FY2009 was $7.1 billion (excluding offsetting receipts). Aviation security
consumes a large fraction of the TSA budget, including support for: passenger and
baggage screening; the purchase, installation, and operation of explosive detection
equipment; and airport perimeter security; air marshals; crew vetting; etc. TSA also
receives funds for surface transportation security and security-related support
activities. Congress appropriated $7.0 billion. For more information on issues
associated with transportation security, see CRS Report RL33512, Transportation
Security Issues for the 110th Congress.
The Science and Technology Directorate budget supports research and
development in a number of areas relevant to critical infrastructure protection. This
includes research and development in cyber security, risk analysis, explosive
detection, blast protection, modeling and simulation, safe cargo containers, defense
against man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and more. The Directorate
also works with the Office of Infrastructure Protection to develop and maintain a
National Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D Plan. It is difficult to determine how
much funding is devoted overall to critical infrastructure protection-related research,
given the budget structure of the programs. According to OMB’s cross-cutting

supplemental document cited above, the S&T Directorate characterized $37.8 million
of its FY2009 request as protecting critical infrastructure and key assets.
To track the funding for these programs, the reader should see CRS Report
RL34004, Homeland Security Department: FY2008 Appropriations, coordinated by
Jennifer E. Lake and Blas Nuñez-Neto.