Trends in Welfare, Work and Economic Well-Being of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2006

Trends in Welfare, Work, and the Economic
Well-Being of Female-Headed Families
with Children: 1987-2006
Updated January 29, 2008
Thomas Gabe
Specialist in Social Policy
Domestic Social Policy Division

Trends in Welfare, Work, and the Economic Well-Being
of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2006
Summary
More than a decade has passed since repeal of the nation’s major cash welfare
program assisting low-income families with children and its replacement with a
program of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). TANF ended the 61-
year-old federal entitlement program to poor families with children, Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC). A major purpose of TANF is to end dependence
of needy families on government assistance by limiting the time they may receive
federal assistance (five-year maximum, or fewer years under state option), and by
promoting job preparation, work, and marriage. TANF gives states increased
flexibility to design programs to assist needy families with children over what existed
under AFDC. The majority of families assisted by TANF, and its predecessor AFDC
program, are poor and low-income single-parent families, headed mostly by women.
This report examines trends in welfare, work and the economic well-being of
female-headed families with children, the principal group affected by the replacement
of AFDC with TANF. The report presents analysis of 20 years of U.S. Census
Bureau Current Population Survey (CPS) data, the principal source of information
for U.S. family income and poverty statistics. The analysis spans the run-up in
welfare caseloads that began in 1989 to reach an all-time high in 1994, and the
historic caseload declines that have since followed. Over the period studied, a variety
of economic, demographic, and public policy and program changes, besides TANF,
are likely to have affected welfare, work and the economic well-being of single-
mother families. This report does not attempt to untangle these possible effects.
The analysis shows that there has been a dramatic transformation with regard
to welfare, work and poverty status of single mothers over the past 20 years. Many
of these changes began before the passage and implementation of TANF, but have
continued, perhaps to an even greater extent, since. The analysis shows that single
mothers are more likely to be working in recent than in past years, and that they are
less likely to receive cash welfare or to be poor. However, reductions in poverty have
not been as large as the large declines in welfare and the increased rates of work that
have occurred. The analysis indicates that welfare receipt rates among poor families
headed by single mothers have dropped considerably.
Among single mothers whose incomes place them in the bottom fifth of all such
mothers, income from earnings supplemented by the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) has grown markedly since 1993, but has been insufficient to offset concurrent
losses in cash welfare and food stamp benefits. While single mothers are less
dependent on welfare in most recent than in past years, increased work has not
resulted in marked gains in net income for these lowest-income families. The report
suggests that full-time full-year work may be necessary, but not sufficient, to raise
single mothers’ family incomes above poverty. U.S. income support policy will
continue to be challenged to promote economic self-support through work and to
reduce poverty and welfare dependency among families headed by single mothers.
This report will be updated annually, when new Census Bureau data are released.

Contents
In troduction ......................................................1
Overview ........................................................4
Single Mothers’ Employment Rates...................................7
Welfare Receipt Among Single Mothers................................8
Poor Single Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status.........................12
Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Single Mothers’ Poverty Status..14
Effect of Earnings and Other Nonwelfare Cash Income on Poverty......16
Effect of Cash Welfare on Poverty...............................16
Effect on Poverty of Counting Selected Income Sources Not Included
in the “Official” Poverty Measure............................16
Effect of Food Stamps on Poverty............................16
Effect of Taxes and Tax Credits on Poverty....................17
Effect of Unrelated Household Member’s Income on Poverty......17
Degree of Poverty Among Poor Single Mothers.........................18
Sources and Level of Income Among Lower-Income Single Mothers........20
Conclusions and Policy Implications..................................25
Appendix A: Cash Welfare Under-Reporting on the CPS.................29
Appendix B: Family Income to Poverty Ratios: Cutoffs for Income Quintiles.31
Appendix C: Support Tables........................................38
Data Note...................................................38
List of Figures
Figure 1. Single Mothers: Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt, 1987 to 2006...5
Figure 2. Welfare, Work and Poverty Status Among Single Mothers,
1987 to 2006.................................................6
Figure 3. Employment Rates of Single and Married Mothers,
by Age of Youngest Child, March 1988 to March 2007................7
Figure 4. Single Mothers: Cash Welfare Recipiency Rates,
by Pre-Transfer Income* Poverty Status, 1987 to 2006................9
Figure 5. Cash Welfare Recipiency Rates Among Single-Mother Families,
by Pre-Transfer Income* Poverty Status, 1987 to 2006...............10

Figure 6. Food Stamp Recipiency Rates Among Single Mothers,
by Household Income Relative to Household Low-Income Threshold,
1987 to 2006................................................11
Figure 7. Poor Single Mothers: Work and Welfare Status During the Year,
1987 to 2006................................................13
Figure 8. Effects of Earnings, Transfers and Taxes on Family Poverty
and Household Low-Income Status of Single Mothers, 1987 to 2006....15
Figure 9. Poverty Gap* Percentiles Based on Cash Income Among
Poor Single-Mother Families, 1987 to 2006........................19
Figure 10. Poverty Gap* Percentiles Based on Net After-Tax Cash Income
(Including the EITC) and the Value of Food Stamps, Among Poor
Single-Mother Families, 1987 to 2006............................20
Figure 11. Bottom Income Quintile* of Single-Mother Families:
Average Annual Income by Source, 1987 to 2006 (in 2006 dollars)......23
Figure 12. Second Income Quintile* of Single-Mother Families:
Average Annual Inocme by Source, 1987 to 2006 (in 2006 dollars)......24
Figure 13. Working Single Mothers’ Job Attachment, by Welfare and
Poverty Status: 2006..........................................26
Figure 14. Hourly Wage Rates* of Working Single Mothers
in March 2007, by Welfare and Poverty Status in 2006
(Median and Inter-Quartile Range)...............................28
Figure 15. AFDC/TANF Cases: CPS Estimates Versus Administrative
Caseload Counts (Annual Monthly Average), 1987 to 2006............29
Figure B-1. Income to Poverty Percentiles of Mother-Only Families
Based on Ranking of Families by Family Cash Income Relative
to Family Poverty Income Thresholds, 1987 to 2006.................32
Figure B-2. Income to Poverty Percentiles of Mother-Only Families,
Based on Ranking of Families by Combined After-Tax and Food Stamp
Income Relative to Family Poverty Income Thresholds, 1987 to 2006....33
Figure B-3. Income to Poverty Percentiles of Mother-Only Families
Based on Ranking of Families by Household Combined After-Tax
and Food Stamp Income Relative to Household Poverty Income
Thresholds, 1987 to 2006.......................................34
List of Tables
Figure A-1. Support Table 1. AFDC/TANF Cases: CPS versus Administrative
Caseload Counts, Annual Monthly Average, 1987 to 2006............30
Figure B-1 Support Table. Income to Poverty Percentiles of Mother-Only
Families Based on Ranking Families by Family Cash Income Relative
to Family Poverty Income Thresholds, 1987 to 2006.................35
Figure B-2 Support Table. Income to Poverty Percentiles of Mother-Only
Families Based on Ranking of Families by Combined After-Tax
and Food Stamp Income Relative to Family Poverty Income Thresholds,

1987 to 2006................................................36

Figure B-3 Support Table. Income to Poverty Percentiles of Mother-Only
Families Based on Families Ranked by Household Combined After-Tax
Food Stamp Income Relative to Household Poverty Income Thresholds,
1987 to 2006................................................37
Figure 1 Support Table. Single Mothers: Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt,
1987 to 2006................................................39
Figure 2 Support Table. Welfare, Work and Poverty Status Among Single
Mothers, 1987 to 2006.........................................40
Figure 3 Support Table. Employment Rates of Single Mothers and Married
Mothers by Age of Youngest Child, March 1988 to March 2007........41
Figures 4 and 5 Support Table. Single-Mother Family Cash Welfare Recipiency
Rates, by Pre-Transfer Income Poverty Status,* 1987 to 2006..........42
Figure 6 Support Table. Food Stamp Recipiency Rates Among
Single-Mother Families, by Household Income Relative to Household
Poverty Threshold, 1987 to 2006.................................43
Figure 7 Support Table. Poor Single Mothers: Work and Welfare Status
During the Year, 1987 to 2006...................................44
Figure 8 Support Table. Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family
Poverty and Household Low-Income Status on Single Mothers,
1987 to 2006................................................45
Figure 9 Support Table. Poverty Gap Percentiles* Based on Cash Income
Among Poor Single-Mother Families, 1987 to 2006..................46
Figure 10 Support Table. Poverty Gap Percentiles* Based on Cash Income,
Food Stamps, and Net Taxes Including the EITC Among Poor
Single-Mother Families, 1987 to 2006............................47
Figure 11 Support Table. Bottom Income Quintile* of Single Mother Families:
Average Annual Income by Source, 1987 to 2006...................48
Figure 12 Support Table. Second Income Quintile* of Single Mother Families:
Average Annual Income by Source, 1987 to 2006...................49

Trends in Welfare, Work, and the
Economic Well-Being of Female-Headed
Families with Children: 1987-2006
Introduction
More than a decade has passed since repeal of the nation’s major cash welfare
program assisting low-income families with children and its replacement with a
program of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). TANF, signed into
law as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) (P.L. 104-193), replaced the 61-year-old Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program, a federal entitlement program to low-income
families with children. TANF eliminated the federal entitlement to assistance that
existed under AFDC, replacing an open-ended matching grant program with a fixed-
dollar block grant program and imposing a maximum five-year lifetime limit receipt
of federally-funded assistance (states may impose shorter limits than the maximum).
TANF gives states increased flexibility to design programs to assist needy families
with children over what existed under its predecessor program. A major purpose of
TANF is to end dependence of needy families on government assistance by limiting
the time they may receive assistance, and by promoting job preparation, work, and
marriage. The majority of families assisted by TANF, and its predecessor AFDC
program, are poor and low-income single-parent families, headed mostly by women.
This report examines trends in welfare, work and economic well-being of
female-headed families with children, the principal group affected by the replacement
of AFDC with TANF. The report presents data from Congressional Research Service
(CRS) analysis of U.S. Bureau of the Census March Current Population Survey
(CPS), the principal source of information for U.S. family income and poverty
statistics. The analysis is based on CPS data collected from March 1988 to March
2007. The earliest year’s data precedes the passage of the Family Support Act of
1988 (P.L. 100-485), the last major nationwide reform to the AFDC program prior
to its repeal under TANF. The data series begins before the most recent run-up in
cash welfare caseloads that occurred under AFDC in the late-1980s and early 1990s.
It captures the caseload increase to its peak, in 1994, and the historic caseload decline
that followed.
Over the period examined in this report, a variety of economic and demographic
factors, and policy interventions are generally thought to have affected cash welfare
caseloads. Increased numbers of single-mother families, especially never-married
mothers who are prone to poverty and receipt of welfare, as well as the ill effects of
an economic recession (July 1990 to March 1991) are generally thought to have

contributed to the increase in the AFDC caseload from mid-1989 to March 1994.¹
The 10-year long economic expansion (from March 1991 to March 2001), the longest
in U.S. history, presented a most favorable economic climate to provide jobs to
mothers who otherwise might rely on welfare, and is considered to have contributed
to declines in welfare caseloads. The economic recession that followed (March to
November 2001) is likely to have contributed to the subsequent leveling off of TANF
caseloads² and increases in Food Stamp program caseloads.
A variety of welfare policy interventions are likely to have affected welfare
caseloads by conditioning benefits on new behavioral requirements. For example,
the 1988 Family Support Act extended work requirements (which could include work
preparation activities, such as education and training) from mothers with a child as
young as 6 to mothers with a child as young as 3. (Under the law, states had the
option of extending work requirements to mothers with a child as young as 1.) In the
years immediately preceding passage of the 1996 welfare law, states experimented
with changes to welfare policy under waiver authority granted to the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).³ Among the features of state
programs tested under waiver authority granted by the Secretary were efforts to
strengthen work requirements, experiments requiring a “work first” approach rather
than “training first, followed by work,” time limits, strengthened sanctions for
noncompliance with welfare rules, and capping of welfare benefits for a new baby
conceived or born while a mother was receiving welfare. After the passage of the
1996 welfare reform law, many states adopted these and many other approaches first
tried under welfare waivers.
In addition, a number of other policy interventions are generally thought to have
promoted work compared to welfare over the period examined in this report.
Expanded eligibility and funding for child care has helped make work possible for
mothers who otherwise might have difficulty finding child care. For example, the
1988 Family Support Act expanded eligibility for child care assistance in the form
of transitional child care assistance for families working their way off AFDC. In
1990, federally funded child care assistance was extended to low-income families
deemed to be at risk of receiving welfare under the Child Care and Development
Block Grant (CCDBG).⁴ Expansions to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in

1990 (phased-in 1991 and 1992) and in 1993 (phased-in 1994 through 1996)

expanded the credit’s “work bonus” to families with children, amounting to as much

¹ See for example, CRS Report 93-7, Demographic Trends Affecting Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) Caseload Growth, by Thomas Gabe (archived report, available
upon request); and Peskin, Janice. Forecasting AFDC Caseloads, with an Emphasis on
Economic Factors. Congressional Budget Office Staff Memorandum, July 1993.
² See CRS Report RL32760, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block
Grant: Responses to Frequently Asked Questions, by Gene Falk.
³ Section 1115 of the Social Security Act grants the Secretary authority to waive compliance
of states with certain sections of the Social Security Act for state experiments or
demonstrations which the Secretary judges to promote specific objectives of the act.
⁴ See CRS Report RL30785, The Child Care and Development Block Grant: Background
and Funding, by Melinda Gish.

as 40 cents on each dollar earned for a low-income family with two children.⁵ Over
the period examined in this report, the minimum wage was increased four times.⁶
Additionally, most states allowed inflation to substantially erode the real value of
welfare benefits over this period, diminishing the value of welfare relative to work.⁷
Furthermore, since the passage of TANF, most states have increased financial work
incentives for families receiving cash assistance by allowing families to keep more
of their cash welfare benefit as their earnings increase.⁸
Untangling the effects of demographic factors, the economy, welfare policy and
other policy interventions on single-mothers’ work behavior, welfare receipt,
income, and poverty status, is beyond the scope of this report. Others have attempted
to parcel out these effects with mixed success and differing conclusions as to the
relative impacts of each.⁹ In contrast to these efforts, this report is intended to simply
describe changes in single mothers’ welfare, work, income and poverty status that
have occurred over the past 20 years. The analysis which follows relies on data from
the U.S. Bureau of the Census Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to

⁵ For a description of the EITC, see CRS Report RL31768, The Earned Income Tax Credit:
An Overview, by Christine Scott. For an analysis of the possible effects of the EITC on
welfare receipt and mothers’ work, see Meyer, Bruce D., and Dan T. Rosenbaum. Welfare,
the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the Labor Supply of Single Mothers. NBER Working
Paper No. 7363, September 1999. (Hereafter cited as Meyer and Rosenbaum, Welfare, the
Earned Income Tax Credit.)
⁶ The federal minimum wage increased from $3.35 per hour to $3.80 per hour, effective
April 1990, to $4.25 per hour, effective April 1991, to $4.75 per hour, effective October
1996, and $5.15 per hour, effective September 1997. For an analysis of possible effects of
minimum wage increases on welfare participation, see Turner, Mark. The Effects of
Minimum Wages on Welfare Recipiency. Paper presented at the National Association for
Welfare Research and Statistics, August 1998.
⁷ Maximum TANF benefits available for a family of three in the median state in January
2005 were 32% below the maximum level available to a family under AFDC in January
1987, after adjusting for the effects of price inflation. In only one state (Alabama) were
TANF benefits higher in January 2005 than in January 1987.
⁸ For a discussion of changes in work incentives under TANF compared to AFDC see CRS
Report RL30579, Welfare Reform: Financial Eligibility Rules and Cash Assistance Amounts
under TANF, by Craig Abbey. (Archived report, available upon request.)
⁹ See, for example, Council of Economic Advisors, Technical Report: Explaining the
Decline in Welfare Receipt, 1993-1996, A Report by the Council of Economic Advisers,
Washington, D.C., April 1997, and Technical Report: The Effects of Welfare Policy and the
Economic Expansion on Welfare Caseloads: An Update, A Report by the Council of
Economic Advisers, Washington, D.C. August 1999; Ziliak, James P., Figlio, David N.,
Davis, Elizabeth E., and Connolly, Laura S. “Accounting for the Decline in AFDC
Caseloads, Welfare Reform or the Economy? The Journal of Human Resources, vol.
XXXV, no. 3, pp. 570-586. Moffitt, Robert A. “The Effect of Pre-PRWORA Waivers on
AFDC Caseloads and Female Earnings, Income, and Labor Force Behavior, in Economic
Conditions and Welfare Reform.” Danziger, Sheldon (ed.), Kalamazoo, Mich. W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1999; O’Neill, June E. and Hill, Anne M.
“Gaining Ground? Measuring the Impact of Welfare Reform on Welfare and Work.” Civic
Report No. 17., Manhattan Institute, New York, New York, 2001.

the CPS.¹⁰ Over the period examined, the CPS/ASEC data provides a comparatively
consistent approach for assessing changes in the economic status of single-mothers
and their families. The CPS/ASEC asks questions about family composition in
March, family members’ labor force and employment status in the month, and
retrospective accounting of income and labor force participation during the prior
year. The data presented in this report capture family composition from March 1988
to March 2007, and family income and poverty status from 1987 to 2006, providing
a representative cross-section of families headed by single mothers in each year.¹¹
Overview
CPS data show an increase in cash welfare receipt (AFDC, TANF, or other
assistance) among single mothers during the late 1980s and early 1990s and a
decrease in the mid-to-late 1990s. The CPS data generally correspond to the caseload
rise and fall documented by administrative program data, but underestimate the
caseload statistics to some extent.¹² Figure 1 shows that the total number of single
mothers increased from 8.4 million in 1989, to about 9.9 million in 1993, an increase
of 1.5 million, or 17%. From 1993 through 2000, the number of single mothers
remained fairly stable, ranging between 9.7 and 10.1 million. Since 2000, the
number of single mothers has increased by over one million, from 10 million in 2000,
to 10.9 million in 2006.
The number of single mothers in families reporting receipt of cash welfare on
the CPS increased from 2.5 million in 1989, to 3.4 million in 1993, an increase of
900,000, or 36% over the four-year period. Compared to 1993, the peak year of
welfare receipt, the number of single mothers reporting cash welfare was down to
just under one million (991,000) in 2006 — a 71% decline from 1993 (the bottom-
shaded portion in Figure 1).¹³ Over the same period, the number of poor single
mothers who reported receiving no cash welfare increased from 1.722 million in
1993 to 3.120 million in 2006 — an 81% increase over the period (the middle-shaded
area in Figure 1).

¹⁰ The CPS/ASEC was formerly known as the March Supplement to the Current Population
Survey, as data for the social and economic supplement were collected in March of each
year. Beginning in 2001, the Census Bureau expanded the CPS sample for collecting social
and economic supplementary data to include some households interviewed in February and
April. Most of the households in the ASEC are still interviewed in March, and estimates for
the full ASEC continue to be controlled to independent population estimates for March.
¹¹ Unlike longitudinal surveys, the CPS does not follow the same families from year to year.
Longitudinal surveys allow for the study of how individual families’ circumstances change
over time.
¹² See Appendix A, which compares CPS estimates to AFDC/TANF caseload counts.
¹³ Administrative caseload statistics show the caseload as peaking in March 1994, with
nearly 5.1 million cases. By March 2006, the caseload had dropped to 1.8 million cases; a

65% decline from its March 1994 peak.

Figure 2 provides an overview of single mothers’ welfare, work and poverty
status from 1987 to 2006. The figure shows that since 1993, the share of single
mothers who worked at some time during the year has increased markedly and that
the share who received cash welfare (AFDC or post-1996 TANF) has declined¹⁴
significantly, as has the share who are poor under the official poverty definition.
The figure illustrates that while both cash welfare recipiency rates and poverty rates
for single mothers have generally fallen since 1993, single mothers’ welfare
recipiency rate has fallen faster than their poverty rate. More recently, since 2000,
the poverty rate of single mothers has increased, but cash welfare receipt has not. A
growing share of single mothers are poor, but are receiving no cash welfare
assistance.
Figure 1. Single Mothers:
Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt, 1987 to 2006

¹¹^{Number (}ⁱ^{n millions)}
¹⁰
⁹
⁸
^N^eⁱ^t^he^{r poor nor r}^ecei^vⁱⁿ^g^cas^h^w^e^l^f^ar^e
⁷
⁶
⁵
⁴
³
^Po^o^r^,^b^u^tⁿ^o^t^r^ecei^vⁱⁿ^g^cas^h^w^e^l^f^ar^e
²^R^ecei^vⁱⁿ^g^cas^h^w^e^l^f^ar^e,
ⁱⁿ^c^l^udi^{ng t}^hos^e^w^{ho a}^r^e^not^poor
¹
⁰
⁷⁹⁸⁸⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁹⁹¹⁹⁹²⁹⁹³⁹⁹⁴⁹⁹⁵⁹⁹⁶⁹⁹⁷⁹⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁰⁰^r⁰⁰¹⁰⁰²⁰⁰³⁰⁰⁴⁰⁰⁵⁰⁰⁶
¹⁹⁸¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹²²²²²²²
^Year
^Source:^P^r^{epared by}^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^ice^(C^R^S^).^B^a^s^e^d^on^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s
^Bu^reau^{1988 t}^o²⁰⁰⁷^C^u^rr^eⁿ^t^P^o^p^u^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^r^v^e^y⁽^C^P^S⁾^A^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t
^(A^S^E^C⁾^dat^a^.
^r=R^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.
¹⁴ The “official” U.S. Census Bureau definition counts cash, pre-tax, income against poverty
thresholds that vary by family size and composition. In 2006, for example, a single mother
with one child would be considered poor if her income were below $13,896, and if she had
two children, below $16,242.

Figure 2 shows that during the 1987 to 1993 period, the share of single mothers
who worked at any time during the year held steady, at just below 70% in most
years; since 1993, the share working increased each year until reaching 83% in 2000.
The share of single mothers working dropped to just over 77% in 2006. During the

1987 to 1993 period, roughly one out of three single mothers received cash welfare.

In 1993, the most recent peak year of welfare receipt on the CPS, about 35% of single
mothers received cash welfare; since then the cash welfare receipt rate has declined
substantially. In 2006, only about 9% of single mothers received cash welfare — just
about one-quarter of the1993 rate. The figure shows that the poverty rate among
single mothers fell from about 45% in 1993 to about 32% in 2000. Since 2000, the
poverty rate of single mothers has increased to35%.
Figure 2. Welfare, Work and Poverty Status
Among Single Mothers, 1987 to 2006

^100%^P^e^r^cent^100%^P^e^r^cent
^90%^90%
^Sⁱⁿ^g^l^{e m}^o^th^{ers w}^h^o^w^o^rked^{at an}^{y ti}^m^e^d^u^rⁱⁿ^g^th^{e year}
^80%^80%
^70%^70%
^60%^60%
^50%^50%
^P^o^ver^{ty r}^a^te
^40%^40%
^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^30%^30%^R^ecei^ved^cash^w^e^l^f^are
^*^*^R^ecei^ved^cash^w^e^l^f^{are b}^u^t^d^u^rⁱⁿ^g^th^{e year}
^*^*^20%^20%^dⁱ^dⁿ^o^t^w^o^{rk d}^u^rⁱⁿ^g^year
^*^*
^*^*^*^*^*^*^10%^10%^W^o^rked^an^d^recei^ved^cash^w^e^l^f^{are d}^u^rⁱⁿ^g^year
^0%^0%
⁷⁹⁸⁸⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁹⁹¹⁹⁹²⁹⁹³⁹⁹⁴⁹⁹⁵⁹⁹⁶⁹⁹⁷⁹⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁰⁰^r⁰⁰¹⁰⁰²⁰⁰³⁰⁰⁴⁰⁰⁵⁰⁰⁶
¹⁹⁸¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹²²²²²²²
^Ye^a^r
^Source:^P^r^{epared by}^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^ice^(C^R^S^{). B}^a^s^e^{d on}^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s
^Bu^reau^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t
^(A^S^E^C⁾^dat^a^.
^r=R^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

Single Mothers’ Employment Rates
While welfare receipt has declined, dramatic gains in single mothers’
employment have occurred since 1993. Figure 3 shows employment rates of single
and married mothers by age of youngest child in March, from 1988 to 2007 The
chart shows that gaps that had existed between single and married mothers’
employment have virtually been eliminated in recent years, with single mothers now
being more likely than their married counterparts to be working.
Figure 3. Employment Rates of Single and Married Mothers,
by Age of Youngest Child, March 1988 to March 2007

^100%^Per^c^en^{t employ}^ed^100%^Per^c^en^{t employ}^ed
^95%
^90%^90%
^85%
^80%^80%
^75%^A^g^{e 6 t}^o¹⁷
^70%^70%
^65%^A^g^{e 3 t}^o⁵
^60%^60%
^55%^Un^d^e^{r ag}^{e 3}
^50%^50%
^45%
^40%^40%
^35%
^30%^30%^M^a^r^rⁱ^{ed m}^o^t^h^er^s
^25%^Si^ngl^{e m}^o^t^h^er^s
^20%^20%
^15%
^10%^10%
^5%
^0%^0%
⁸⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁹⁹¹⁹⁹²⁹⁹³⁹⁹⁴⁹⁹⁵⁹⁹⁶⁹⁹⁷⁹⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰¹^r⁰⁰²⁰⁰³⁰⁰⁴⁰⁰⁵⁰⁰⁶⁰⁰⁷⁰⁰⁸⁰⁰⁹
¹⁹⁸¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹²²²²²²²²²²
^Year
^Source:^P^r^epared^by^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^).^B^a^s^e^d^on ^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s
^B^u^r^eau¹⁹⁸⁸^t^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t
^(A^S^E^C⁾^dat^a^.
^r=R^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.
The increase in employment among single mothers with young children has
been most dramatic. Among mothers with a child under the age of 3, their
employment rate increased from a recent low of 35.1% in March 1993 to a high of
59.1% in March 2000, a 24 percentage point increase over the period. Their
employment rate fell to 53.7% in March 2005 but rebounded to 57.0% in March 2006
and fell slightly in March 2007, to 56.5%. Single mothers with a youngest child aged
3-5 also experienced marked employment gains over the mid-to-late 1990s. Their
employment rate grew from a recent low of 54.1% in March 1992, to 72.7% by

March 2000, an 18.6 percentage point increase over the period. By March 2007, the
employment rate of single mothers with a youngest child aged 3-5 was 68.6%, still
about 4 percentage points less than its March 2000 peak, but 5.6 percentage points
above that of their married counterparts (63.0%). Single mothers whose youngest
child was of school age (age 6-17) had employment rates about equal to those of their
married counterparts over the 1988-2006 period.
A healthy economy during much of the 1990s, combined with a transformed
welfare system, improvements to the EITC, and increases in the minimum wage, are
among factors thought to have encouraged work among single mothers. TANF, and
the AFDC waivers that preceded it, transformed cash assistance from a needs-based
entitlement to a program of temporary assistance, encouraging work and personal
responsibility. Imposition of work requirements, time limits, and sanctions, and in
most states, more generous earnings disregards, all serve to encourage work, either
in lieu of welfare or, for a temporary period, in conjunction with welfare. The EITC,
which is conditioned on earnings, is thought to encourage work among most groups,
especially single parents who were not working, or who were marginally attached to
the labor market. Increases in the EITC, passed by Congress in 1993 and phased in
between 1994 and 1996, have increased the financial incentive for single mothers to
work.¹⁵ Other factors, such as increased funding for child care subsidies, may also
have contributed to making work possible for more single mothers.
Given their greater attachment to the work force in recent years, one might
expect single mothers to be more severely impacted by downturns in the economy
than in years past. Evidence from the most recent recession (March to November
2001) shows a declining employment rate and increased incidence in poverty among
single mothers since 2000. The employment rate among single mothers has yet to
rebound seven years after having reached a historic high, and their poverty rate has
yet to show significant movement back toward it historic low, reached seven years
ago. In contrast, in the previous recession (July 1990 to March 1991), single mothers
also experienced declining employment and an increased incidence in poverty
(although their employment rate was lower and their poverty rate higher than today).
However, in the previous recession, employment rebounded sooner (after three
years), and the poverty rate increase abated within two years, and began to fall once
again after three.
Welfare Receipt Among Single Mothers
Figure 4 shows that cash welfare recipiency rates among single mothers overall,
and among poor single mothers based on their pre-transfer income (i.e., cash income
excluding cash welfare), remained fairly steady during the 1987-1993 period, but
have fallen considerably since. Among single mothers overall, about one-third
received cash welfare during the late-1980s and early 1990s, with a low of about 30%
in 1989 and a peak of about 35% in 1993. Cash welfare recipiency rates among

¹⁵ Meyer and Rosenbaum, in Welfare, the Earned Income Tax Credit, op. cit., attribute 60%
of the increase in single mothers weekly and annual employment between 1984 and 1996
to the EITC.

single mothers began to fall after 1993, falling to 10% in 2002 — a drop in the rate
from nine years earlier of more than two-thirds. With the exception of 2003, cash
welfare recipiency rates have remained around 10% since 2002. The apparent rise
in the 2003 recipiency rate may be an aberration in CPS measurement, as
administrative caseload data showed no such increase. See Appendix A for further
discussion of CPS and administrative data caseload trends. In 2006, only about 9%
of single mothers were receiving cash welfare.
Recent declines in cash welfare recipiency rates have not simply been due to
diminished need for assistance, as recipiency rates have fallen even among mothers
who would appear to be in economic need, based on their pre-transfer income
relative to poverty. For example, Figure 4 shows that among single mothers who
were poor based on their pre-transfer cash income (i.e., income before counting cash
welfare), the share who received cash welfare generally held relatively steady,
around 63%, in most years over the 1987-93 period. Since 1993, the cash welfare
recipiency rate among single mothers with pre-transfer income below poverty has
fallen dramatically. In 2006, only about one in five (20.2%) single mothers with pre-
transfer income below poverty received cash assistance.
Figure 4. Single Mothers: Cash Welfare Recipiency Rates,
by Pre-Transfer Income* Poverty Status, 1987 to 2006

^100%^Percen^t^100%^Percen^t
^90%^90%
^80%^80%
^70%^70%^{Cash w}^e^l^f^ar^{e r}^eci^pi^{ency r}^a^t^e^am^ong
^si^ngl^{e m}^o^t^h^{ers w}ⁱ^t^h^pre-^t^r^ansf^erⁱⁿ^com^e^{* bel}^o^w^povert^y
^60%^60%
^50%^50%
^40%^40%
^30%^30%
^C^{ash w}^e^l^f^{are reci}^pi^{ency rat}^e^al^l^si^ngl^{e m}^o^t^h^ers
^20%^20%
^10%^10%
^0%^0%
⁷⁹⁸⁸⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁹⁹¹⁹⁹²⁹⁹³⁹⁹⁴⁹⁹⁵⁹⁹⁶⁹⁹⁷⁹⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁰⁰^r⁰⁰¹⁰⁰²⁰⁰³⁰⁰⁴⁰⁰⁵⁰⁰⁶
¹⁹⁸¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹²²²²²²²
^Y^ear
^Source:^P^r^epared^by^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{). B}^a^s^e^{d on} ^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s
^Bu^reau^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t
^(A^S^E^C⁾^dat^a^.
^*^P^r^e-^tran^s^f^{er in}^com^e^is^cas^hⁱⁿ^com^e^oth^e^{r th}^an^cas^h^w^e^lf^{are pay}^m^en^ts^.
^r=R^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

Figure 5 shows cash welfare recipiency rates in greater detail by families’ level
of financial need, as measured by families’ levels of pre-transfer income relative to
poverty. The figure shows that cash welfare recipiency rates have fallen considerably
in recent years even among single mothers who might be considered especially needy
by having very low levels of pre-transfer income relative to poverty. For example,
the top line of Figure 5 shows that nearly 90% of single mothers with no pre-transfer
income reported receiving cash assistance from 1987 to 1990. However, after 1990
the reported rate of cash welfare recipiency among this group began drifting
downwards, falling to 77% by 1996, and afterwards falling abruptly to just 35% by
2001. In 2002 and 2003, there was a marked increase in cash welfare receipt for this
group (up to 44.2% in 2003), but by 2006, cash welfare receipt for this group
dropped to 31%. Similarly, for single mothers with very low pre-transfer income
relative to poverty (below 25% of poverty), and for families with pre-transfer
incomes between 25 and 50% of poverty, cash welfare recipiency rates also show
dramatic declines after 1996: for the former group from 72% in 1996 to 29% in

2006, and for the latter group from 60% in 1995 to 23% in 2005 and 2006.

Figure 5. Cash Welfare Recipiency Rates
Among Single-Mother Families,
by Pre-Transfer Income* Poverty Status, 1987 to 2006

^100%^Per^cen^t^r^eceivⁱⁿ^g^cash^w^e^lf^ar^e
^90%^{$0 i}ⁿ^p^r^e-^t^r^an^s^f^erⁱⁿ^co^m^e
^80%
^70%^Pr^e-^t^r^an^s^f^erⁱⁿ^co^m^e^>^$0^but^be^l^o^w²⁵^%^of^pov^e^r^t^y
^60%
^Pr^e-^t^r^an^s^f^erⁱⁿ^co^m^e^b^e^t^w^een^25%^an^d^50%
^50%^of^pov^e^r^t^y
^40%
^30%^Pr^e-^t^r^an^s^f^erⁱⁿ^co^m^e^b^e^t^w^een^50%^an^d^100%^o^f^p^o^v^er^t^y
^20%
^10%
^0%
⁷⁹⁸⁸⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁹⁹¹⁹⁹²⁹⁹³⁹⁹⁴⁹⁹⁵⁹⁹⁶⁹⁹⁷⁹⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁰⁰^r⁰⁰¹⁰⁰²⁰⁰³⁰⁰⁴⁰⁰⁵⁰⁰⁶
¹⁹⁸¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹²²²²²²²
^Y^ear
^Source:^P^r^epared^by^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{). B}^a^s^e^{d on} ^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s
^Bu^reau^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t
^(A^S^E^C⁾^dat^a^.
^*^P^r^e-^tran^s^f^{er in}^com^e^is^cas^hⁱⁿ^com^e^oth^e^{r th}^an^cas^h^w^e^lf^{are pay}^m^en^ts^.
^r=R^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

Likewise, food stamp recipiency rates among low-income households have also
fallen in recent years, although the declines have not been as dramatic as the declines
in cash welfare recipiency rates shown above. Figure 6 shows that in 1994, 71% of
single-mother families with household income below 130% of poverty (the Food
Stamp Program’s gross income qualifying limit) reported receiving food stamp
benefits; by 2000 the share had fallen to about 50%, but has increased since, reaching
57% in 2004, and then falling to 56.1% in 2005, and to 54.2% on 2006. Among
those with household incomes below 50% of the low-income threshold in 1994, 80%
reported food stamp receipt; in 2001 just 61% reported food stamp receipt; by 2004,
their food stamp recipiency rate had increased to 68.2%, and stood at 66.9% in 2006.
Figure 6. Food Stamp Recipiency Rates
Among Single Mothers, by Household Income
Relative to Household Low-Income Threshold, 1987 to 2006

^100%^{Food s}^t^a^m^{p re}^cⁱ^pi^eⁿ^c^y^ra^te
^90%
^80%
^H^o^u^seh^o^l^dⁱⁿ^co^m^e^{as a %}^o^f
^70%^lo^w^-ⁱⁿ^co^{me t}^h^resh^o^l^d^:
^L^{ess t}^h^an^50%
^60%
^L^{ess t}^h^an^130%
^50%^50%^t^o^{less t}^h^an^130%
^40%
^30%
^20%
^10%
^0%
⁷⁹⁸⁸⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁹⁹¹⁹⁹²⁹⁹³⁹⁹⁴⁹⁹⁵⁹⁹⁶⁹⁹⁷⁹⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁰⁰^r⁰⁰¹⁰⁰²⁰⁰³⁰⁰⁴⁰⁰⁵⁰⁰⁶
¹⁹⁸¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹²²²²²²²
^Y^ear
^Source:^P^r^{epared by}^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{). B}^a^s^e^d^on ^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s
^Bu^reau^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^r^v^e^y⁽^C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t
^(A^S^E^C⁾^dat^a^.
^r=R^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

CPS statistics do not capture the full impact of the 2001 recession (March to
November 2001) on food stamp caseloads. Food Stamp program statistics indicate
that in FY2006, food stamp caseloads were up 55% from FY2000.¹⁶
To at least some extent the declining cash welfare and food stamp recipiency
rates shown in Figures 4 through 6 are likely due to increased under-reporting of
welfare receipt on the CPS. Worsened reporting of cash welfare on the CPS makes
it difficult to gauge how much of the drop in welfare receipt among female-headed
families with children represents eligible families who do not receive assistance
rather than families who do not report actual welfare aid on the CPS. See Appendix
A for a brief analysis of the possible extent of under-reporting of cash welfare on the
CPS.
Poor Single Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status
Although poverty rates among single mothers have declined in recent years,
there is a greater likelihood today than in years past that a poor single mother will be
working, rather than receiving welfare. As shown above, poor single mothers are less
likely to be receiving cash welfare in recent than in earlier years (Figures 4 and 5).
Similarly, like all single mothers, poor single mothers are also now more likely to be
working than not. Changes in poor mothers’ participation in work and welfare status
first became evident in the early-to-mid 1990s, with rates of employment increasing
after 1992 and rates of welfare receipt declining after 1993 (see Figure 7, 2 darkest
lines). A crossover point was reached by 1996, when the chances that a poor single
mother would be working exceeded the chances that she would be receiving welfare.
Figure 7 shows that the share of poor single mothers who received cash welfare
at any time during the year fell from just over 60% in the 1987-93 period, to about
19% in 2006. The rate of decline in welfare receipt among poor single mothers has
been greatest since 1996, a period coinciding with the passage and implementation
of national welfare reform legislation. Similarly, the share of poor single mothers
who were working at any time during the year increased from around 44% in 1992,
to a peak of 64% in 1999, but dropped since, to about 54% in 2006.
The share of poor single mothers who relied on cash welfare without working
dropped from a peak of 43% in 1991, to about 11% in 2006 (a 75% drop from the
1991 rate). The share of poor single mothers who worked without relying on cash
welfare has increased from a recent low of nearly 25% in 1993, to about 47% in
2006. The share of poor single mothers who combined work and welfare over the
year, which had remained relatively constant over most of the period at around 20%,
fell to about 8% in 2006.

¹⁶ In FY2000, 17.194 million people were receiving food stamps, based on monthly average
participation rates. In FY2006, monthly average food stamp participation had reached
26.672 million participants. These statistics reflect all households who received food
stamps, not just female-headed families. See [http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/fssummar.htm].

The share of poor single mothers who reported that they neither worked nor
received cash welfare during the year (the dotted line in Figure 7) has increased from
a low of about 12% in 1991 to about 35% in 2006. This surprising combination may
reflect a mix of circumstances, including income or support from other sources such
as family members, support from unrelated household members (which is not
included in the official poverty measure), and other means of support from outside
the household not captured on the CPS. It may also reflect income reporting
problems on the CPS, especially with regard to welfare income.¹⁷ Finally, welfare
diversion and sanction policies may have contributed to the increased number of poor
mothers neither working nor receiving welfare.
Figure 7. Poor Single Mothers:
Work and Welfare Status During the Year, 1987 to 2006

^100%^P^ercen^t
^90%
^80%
^70%
^60%
^W^o^rk^{ed du}^riⁿ^g^y^e^a^r
^50%
^W^o^rk^{ed du}^riⁿ^g^y^e^a^r^,^di^{d n}^o^{t recei}^v^e^ca^s^h^wel^f^a^r^e
^40%
⁾⁾⁾^Nei^t^h^{er wo}^rk^ed,ⁿ^o^{r recei}^v^e^d^ca^s^h^wel^f^a^{re du}^riⁿ^g^th^{e y}^e^a^r
⁾⁾⁾^30%
⁾
⁾⁾⁾^20%^Recei^v^e^{d ca}^s^h^wel^f^a^{re du}^riⁿ^g^y^e^a^r
⁾⁾⁾⁾⁾⁾⁾⁾⁾⁾^Recei^v^e^{d ca}^s^h^wel^f^a^{re du}^riⁿ^g^y^e^a^r^,^di^{d n}^o^{t wo}^rk
^10%^W^o^rk^{ed a}ⁿ^{d recei}^v^e^{d ca}^s^h^wel^f^a^{re du}^riⁿ^g^y^e^a^r
^0%
^r⁰⁰¹⁰⁰²⁰⁰³⁰⁰⁴⁰⁰⁵⁰⁰⁶
¹⁹⁸⁷¹⁹⁸⁸¹⁹⁸⁹¹⁹⁹⁰¹⁹⁹¹¹⁹⁹²¹⁹⁹³¹⁹⁹⁴¹⁹⁹⁵¹⁹⁹⁶¹⁹⁹⁷¹⁹⁹⁸¹⁹⁹⁹²⁰⁰⁰²²²²²²
^Ye^a^r
^Source:^P^r^{epared by}^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^).^B^a^s^e^d^on ^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s
^Bu^reau¹⁹⁸⁸^t^o²⁰⁰⁷^C^u^r^r^eⁿ^t^P^o^p^u^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^r^v^e^y⁽^C^P^S⁾^A^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t
^(A^S^E^C⁾^dat^a^.
^r=R^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.
¹⁷ See Appendix A on CPS under-reporting.

Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes
on Single Mothers’ Poverty Status
As shown earlier, in Figure 2, single mothers’ poverty status has improved
since 1993. Changes in the economy and changes in welfare policy and other
programs, such as the EITC, have both direct and indirect effects on income and
poverty. However, the official U.S. poverty measure counts only family cash income
(excluding capital gains and lump sum or one-time payments) against a family’s
poverty threshold (which varies by family size and composition) to determine
whether a family is counted as poor. The definition does not include the value of in-
kind benefits, such as food stamps, school lunches, or public housing subsidies, nor
does it include the effects of taxes or tax credits such as the EITC. Inclusion of in-
kind benefits and the EITC provides a more comprehensive income definition than
the official definition. Additionally, other unrelated household members may
contribute to the family’s economic well-being, but determining the extent to which
resources are shared among unrelated household members is often difficult.
Figure 8 shows the effects of income from these other sources on poverty
among all single mothers. Components of family income are sequentially added and
measured against families’ poverty thresholds, as one moves from the top line of the
chart to subsequent lines below:
^!Line 1: The top line shows the percent of single mothers who
would be counted as poor if only family earnings were counted
against the poverty line.
^!Line 2: The second line down includes other sources of cash
income, in addition to earnings, that were already counted above
(e.g., social security payments, unemployment compensation,
workers compensation, interest and dividends, inter-family
transfers). However, this line does not include cash welfare.
^!Line 3: The third line down adds cash welfare to the other sources
already mentioned, and with those sources, represents the income
definition used in the official poverty measure.
Lines 4 through 6 include food stamps, taxes (including the effects of the EITC
and the partially refundable Child Tax Credit) and income of other unrelated
household members that are not included under the “official” U.S. Bureau of the
Census poverty definition:
^!Line 4: The fourth line down shows the market value of food
stamps when added to cash income and compared to the family
poverty threshold.
^!Line 5: The fifth line down shows the effect of adding the value of
the EITC plus the partially refundable Child Tax Credit and state
refundable credits, less federal and state income taxes and payroll
taxes, to line 4.
^!Line 6: The bottom (dashed) line shows the effects of counting all
income in the household in which the single mother lives, not just
that of her related family members, and comparing it to an unofficial

“household low-income threshold.” The household low-income
threshold used here applies family poverty income thresholds, which
are based on family size and composition, to households, based on
household size and composition. It must be noted that official
poverty measurement is based on a family concept, which assumes
that family members share income and economies of scale that result
from shared living arrangements. It is generally agreed among
researchers that assumptions regarding income sharing and shared
economies of scale among related family members, who have ties
based on blood, marriage, and adoption, do not apply to the same
extent among unrelated household members. Consequently, these
estimates of household low-income status likely overstate the effect
of household income on reducing poverty among families headed by
single mothers.
Figure 8. Effects of Earnings, Transfers and Taxes
on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status
of Single Mothers, 1987 to 2006

^60%^Per^cent^poor
^55%
^50%
^45%^P^o^o^r^b^ased^oⁿ^:^E^a^rn^edⁱⁿ^co^m^e^oⁿ^l^y
^40%
⁺⁺⁺⁺⁺^{+ cash}ⁱⁿ^co^m^e^o^t^h^e^{r th}^an^cash^w^e^l^f^are
⁺⁺^35%^{+ cash}^w^e^l^f^{are (Offi}^ci^al^P^o^{verty Defi}ⁿⁱ^ti^oⁿ⁾
⁺^30%^{+ f}^{ood s}^t^a^m^ps
⁺⁺⁺^{+ E}^I^T^C^{+ Ch}ⁱ^l^d^T^{ax Cred}ⁱ^t^l^{ess F}^I^CA^an^dⁱⁿ^co^m^e^taxes
⁺^25%^H^ous^e^hol^{d I}ⁿ^c^o^m^e^B^e^l^o^w^Low^-^I^nc^om^e^T^h^re^s^hol^d:
⁺⁺⁺⁺⁺⁺⁺⁺^H^ousehol^{d cash + f}^{ood st}^am^{ps + E}^I^T^C^{+ C}^hⁱ^l^{d T}^{ax C}^r^edi^t^l^{ess F}^I^CA^an^dⁱⁿ^co^m^e^taxes
^20%
^15%
^10%
^5%
^0%
^r⁰⁰¹⁰⁰²⁰⁰³⁰⁰⁴⁰⁰⁵⁰⁰⁶
¹⁹⁸⁷¹⁹⁸⁸¹⁹⁸⁹¹⁹⁹⁰¹⁹⁹¹¹⁹⁹²¹⁹⁹³¹⁹⁹⁴¹⁹⁹⁵¹⁹⁹⁶¹⁹⁹⁷¹⁹⁹⁸¹⁹⁹⁹²⁰⁰⁰²²²²²²
^Ye^ar
^Source:^P^r^epared^by^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^).^B^a^s^e^d^on ^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s
^B^u^r^e^au^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t
^(A^S^E^C⁾^dat^a^.
^r=R^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

In viewing Figure 8, note that the trend in earnings is the principal factor
affecting the declining trend in poverty, whereas the other income sources, with the
exception of the EITC, affect the level of poverty, more than its trend, over time.
Evidence of this effect is that most lines in the chart, with the exception of the EITC,
roughly run parallel to the ones above.
Effect of Earnings and Other
Nonwelfare Cash Income on Poverty
Figure 8 shows that between 1993 and 2000, single mothers’ poverty, based on
family earnings alone, fell from 56.2% to 40.8% (line 1). As a result of the economic
recession, their “earned-income poverty rate” rose from 2001 through 2004, and in

2006, at 44.5%, was still above its historic low in 2000. Adding other cash income,

except cash welfare, to family earnings (line 2), reduces poverty in 1993 from 56.2%
(line 1) to 47.4% (line 2), and in 2006 from 44.5% to 35.7%.
Effect of Cash Welfare on Poverty
Cash welfare benefits have only a small impact on the poverty rate, as these
benefits generally are not sufficient, even when combined with other cash income,
to lift families above the federal poverty threshold. In the vast majority of states the
level of earnings or other cash income at which states’ cash welfare benefits under
TANF become unavailable for a family are well below the poverty line. For
example, in January 2003, in only seven states could a single mother with two
children have earnings above the poverty line and still continue to receive TANF
cash assistance.¹⁸ Consequently, cash welfare benefits have little impact on the
poverty rate. The addition of cash welfare (line 3, representing the official income
definition for measuring poverty) reduces poverty only slightly: from 47.4% (line 2)
to 45.2% (line 3) in 1993, and from 35.7% to 35.1% in 2006. Nonetheless, cash
welfare benefits can have a significant impact on the level of poor families’ incomes,
affecting the degree to which their incomes fall below the poverty income standard.
This impact is not captured by changes in the poverty rate as shown above in Figure

Effect on Poverty of Counting Selected Income Sources
Not Included in the “Official” Poverty Measure
The following three measures include income from sources not included under
the “official” U.S. Bureau of the Census poverty definition: food stamps, taxes
(including the effects of the EITC and the partially refundable Child Tax Credit) and
income of other unrelated household members.
Effect of Food Stamps on Poverty. The fourth line from the top in Figure
8 shows the effect on the poverty rate of single mothers by counting the value of food
stamps. The line shows that food stamps reduce the poverty rate of single mothers

¹⁸ See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, 2004 Green Book, Table 7-16
(TANF Phaseout Points), pp. 7-51 to 7-53. Washington, DC, March 2004.

from about 2 to 3 percentage points over the period (compare the reduction in poverty
from line 3 to line 4).
Effect of Taxes and Tax Credits on Poverty. As noted above, the net
effect of the EITC¹⁹ and the Child Tax Credit²⁰ (after counting the effect of reductions
in income from federal and state income taxes and FICA taxes) (line 5), when added
to total family cash income and food stamps (line 4), causes a divergence in trend
from the lines above. This is especially notable after 1993. A major expansion of
the EITC, passed by Congress in 1993 and phased in between 1994 and 1996,
increased the amount of the EITC work bonus families might receive. The anti-
poverty effectiveness of the EITC was approximately three times greater in 2006 than
in 1993. In 1993, the after-tax poverty rate (counting food stamps) among single
mothers dropped from 42.7% (line 4) to 40.7% (line 5), a 2.0 percentage point
(4.7%) reduction. In 2006, the EITC in combination with the Child Tax Credit (after
counting estimated tax payments) reduced poverty from 32.9% to 27.9%, a 5.0
percentage point (15.2%) reduction. The bulk of this reduction is the result of the
EITC, as the Child Tax Credit is comparatively small for most families headed by
single mothers with adjusted gross incomes near the poverty line.
As receipt of the EITC is conditioned on earnings, the growing impact of the
EITC in part reflects the rise in work rates among single mothers. Among those who
are working and poor (before counting the EITC), the EITC helps lift the income of
some above the poverty line. Although the EITC expansion provided additional
income to low-income families who were already working, it may also have helped
induce increased employment among family heads with low to moderate earnings
potential, and thus contributed to the decline in poverty based on earned income only
that has occurred since 1993 (shown as the top line in the chart).
Note too, that to the extent that changes in cash welfare programs in recent years
have encouraged work (such as work requirements and increased earnings
disregards), these changes may have had an indirect effect on poverty by increasing
earnings and, through earnings, making the EITC available to a greater number of
families.
Effect of Unrelated Household Member’s Income on Poverty. The
household low-income line (bottom line) shows that if all household members’
income is counted, as though shared equally among household members, the poverty
rate among single mothers would drop by at most 3 to 4 percentage points over the
1987 to 2006 period. Using the household, as opposed to the family, as the economic
unit for determining poverty reduces the post in-kind transfer, post-tax, poverty rate
in 1993 from 40.7% (line 5) to 36.8% (line 6) and, in 2006, from 27.9% to 23.7%.
Again, this is most likely an overstatement of the possible effect that shared

¹⁹ Note that the value of the EITC on the CPS is based on Census Bureau imputations, rather
than actual reported tax credits. Also, the EITC is different from most sources of income,
as most families receive the EITC as a lump sum refund.
²⁰ For a discussion of the Child Tax Credit, see CRS Report RS21860, The Child Tax Credit,
by Gregg A. Esenwein.

household living arrangements might have on single mothers’ poverty status because
of uncertainty about the extent to which such income is actually shared.
Degree of Poverty Among Poor Single Mothers
As noted above, the poverty rate measures only the percent of families whose
incomes fall below their respective poverty thresholds, based on family size and
composition. Although the poverty rate provides an overall indication of the level
of need in the population, it does not measure the extent of need among poor
families. Figures 9 and 10 show two different measures of the “poverty gap” among
poor families headed by single mothers — that is, the degree to which poor families’
incomes fall below the poverty income level. In these figures the poverty gap is
depicted as family income as a percent of poverty among poor families. Figure 9
is based on the cash income poverty measure, whereas Figure 10 is based on cash
income plus the value of food assistance and taxes (including the EITC and the Child
Tax Credit). Note that the families depicted in Figure 10 are a subset of those
included in Figure 9, as they are families who remain poor after considering food
stamps and taxes (including the EITC and the Child Tax Credit) — the effects of
which are not counted in Figure 9. In each figure the extent of poverty among poor
families is depicted at various percentiles, based on families ranked by family income
as a percent of poverty.
Figures 9 and 10 show that the median family income as a percent of need (i.e.,
poverty) among poor families has remained relatively steady over the past 18 years.
Based on “official” cash income, for purposes of measuring poverty, the median
family income as a percent of need among poor families headed by single mothers
has ranged from a low of 48% to a high of 53% over the period (Figure 9). Looking
at just the subset of single-mother families who were poor based on a more
comprehensive income definition that includes food stamps and taxes (including the
EITC and Child Tax Credit), the median family income as a percent of need was
somewhat higher over the period, ranging from a high of 66% of poverty in 1991, to
a low of 56% of poverty in 2004. (Figure 10).
Both Figures 9 and 10 show recent declines in income relative to poverty for
the poorest families headed by single mothers. For example, Figure 9, shows that
for the bottom fifth of poor single mothers, family income relative to poverty fell
from a recent high of 28% of poverty in 1996, to a low of 15% of poverty in 2005.
Looking at the subset of single-mother families that were poor based on the more
comprehensive income definition (cash, food stamps, and taxes (including the EITC
and Child Tax Credit)), the bottom fifth have seen a decline in relative economic
well-being from a high of 43% of poverty in 1994, to a low of 22% of poverty in

2006 (Figure 10).

Figure 9. Poverty Gap* Percentiles Based on Cash Income
Among Poor Single-Mother Families, 1987 to 2006

^100%^{Income as a per}^cent^of^pov^er^t^y
^90%
^80%^{Top 20 per}^cent
^70%
^60%^{Top 40 per}^cent
^50%^M^e^{dian (}^50t^{h P}^e^r^cent^ile)
^40%^B^o^t^t^o^{m 40 per}^cent
^30%
^20%
^B^o^t^t^o^{m 20 per}^cent
^10%
^0%
^r⁰⁰¹⁰⁰²⁰⁰³⁰⁰⁴⁰⁰⁵⁰⁰⁶
¹⁹⁸⁷¹⁹⁸⁸¹⁹⁸⁹¹⁹⁹⁰¹⁹⁹¹¹⁹⁹²¹⁹⁹³¹⁹⁹⁴¹⁹⁹⁵¹⁹⁹⁶¹⁹⁹⁷¹⁹⁹⁸¹⁹⁹⁹²⁰⁰⁰²²²²²²
^Ye^a^r
^Source:^P^r^{epared by}^th^e^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^al^R^e^s^earch^Serv^ice^(C^R^S^).^B^a^s^e^{d on}^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s
^Bu^reau^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t
^(A^S^E^C⁾^dat^a^.
^*^P^o^o^r^f^a^m^ilies’^cashⁱⁿ^co^m^e^{as a p}^e^r^cen^{t o}^f^f^a^m^ilies’^p^o^v^er^ty^th^r^e^sh^o^l^d^s^.
^r=R^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

Figure 10. Poverty Gap* Percentiles Based on
Net After-Tax Cash Income (Including the EITC) and the Value
of Food Stamps, Among Poor Single-Mother Families, 1987 to 2006

^100%^Iⁿ^com^e^{as a per}^cent^of^pover^t^y
^90%
^{Top 20 per}^cent
^80%
^70%^{Top 40 per}^cent
^60%^M^e^{dian (50th P}^e^r^centile)
^50%^B^o^{ttom 40 per}^cent
^40%
^30%
^20%^B^o^{ttom 20 per}^cent
^10%
^0%
⁷⁹⁸⁸⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁹⁹¹⁹⁹²⁹⁹³⁹⁹⁴⁹⁹⁵⁹⁹⁶⁹⁹⁷⁹⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁰⁰^r⁰⁰¹⁰⁰²⁰⁰³⁰⁰⁴⁰⁰⁵⁰⁰⁶
¹⁹⁸¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹²²²²²²²
^Year
^Source:^P^r^epared^by^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{). B}^a^s^e^{d on}^an^aly^s^is^of^U.S.^C^eⁿ^s^u^s
^Bu^reau^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^r^r^e^nt^P^opu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t
^(A^S^E^C⁾^dat^a^.
^*^P^{oor f}^a^m^ilies^’^bas^e^{d on}^cas^h^af^ter-^taxⁱⁿ^com^e^an^d^th^e^m^a^rk^et^v^a^lu^e^of^f^{ood s}^t^am^ps^as^{a percen}^{t of}
^f^a^m^ilies’^p^o^v^er^ty^th^r^e^sh^o^l^d^s^.
^r=R^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.
Sources and Level of Income
Among Lower-Income Single Mothers
The composition and level of income among the single-mother families at the
bottom of the income distribution has changed markedly in recent years, reflecting
increased earnings supplemented by increased EITC and reductions in cash welfare
and food stamps. Single mothers with the lowest incomes, depicted as the bottom
fifth (bottom quintile) of single mothers ranked by their families’ incomes, by 1999
had more than doubled their earnings since 1994. However, these earnings gains,
even when supplemented by the EITC, have not been sufficient to offset losses in
cash welfare and food stamps that have occurred since 1994 — the year in which
their income was highest. Earnings of single mothers in the bottom income quintile
peaked in 2000 but fell each year through 2005. In 2006, average earnings of single

mothers in the bottom income quintile increased somewhat over 2005. In spite of
their greater earnings, average total income of single mothers in the bottom income
quintile in 2006 was still well below their 1994 income level, which marked a peak
over the 20 years depicted.
Single mothers ranked in the bottom 20% to 40% by income (second quintile)
also experienced significant earnings gains since 1994. For these families, earnings
gains supplemented by the EITC have more than offset reductions in cash welfare
and food stamps over the period, resulting in higher overall income in most recent
years than in 1994. After reaching a peak in 2000, average total income among
mothers in the second quintile has fallen somewhat due to reduced earnings and
EITC, presumably as a result of 2001 economic recession.
Figures 11 and 12 examine sources of income among the bottom quintile
(bottom 20%) and the second lowest quintile (bottom 20% to 40%) of single-mother
families, respectively, based on their pre-tax cash income relative to poverty. The
income to poverty ratios demarcating the break points at which a family qualifies as
being in the bottom and second from the bottom quintiles are shown in Appendix B.
The charts show the average annual income, in 2006 dollars, from the following
sources: cash public assistance (AFDC, TANF, and General Assistance (GA));
Supplemental Security Income (SSI); food stamps (market value); child support and
alimony; other cash income other than earnings; net earnings (earnings net of the
employee share of FICA payroll taxes and any federal or state income taxes); the
EITC; the Child Tax Credit, and state refundable tax credits. The employee share of
FICA payroll taxes, and any federal or state income tax payments are also shown as
negative values. Note that these estimates are based on year-to-year income
comparisons of cross-sectional survey data, rather than a comparison of incomes for
the same families over time.
Figure 11 shows declining reliance on cash welfare and food stamps since 1994,
and increased reliance on earnings, supplemented by the EITC, among families
headed by single mothers in the bottom income quintile. However, earnings gains,
even when supplemented by the EITC, have not been sufficient to offset the losses
in income from cash welfare and food stamps since 1994. Average earnings for these
families peaked in 2000, but total family income ($8,405) still fell short of that
attained in 1994 ($8,654). Since 2000, average earnings fell each year through

2005. Increased food stamp benefits since 2000 have helped to bolster families’

income somewhat, but cash welfare benefits have continued to erode. In 2006,
average total income ($7,587) of single mother families in the bottom income
quintile was only slightly above the 20-year low ($7,322) observed in 2004, and well
below the 20-year peak ($8,654) observed in 1994.
Average cash welfare and food stamp benefits reported by single mothers in the
bottom quintile have fallen since 1994. In 1994, combined average AFDC and
General Assistance benefits were $3,075 for this population; by 2006 combined
TANF and General Assistance had fallen to $854, 25% of their 1994 value.
Similarly, in 1994, average food stamp benefits amounted to $2,996; by 2006 they
amounted to $2,113 — 71% of their 1994 value. In spite of earnings and
supplemented EITC benefits being higher in 2006 than two decades earlier,
reductions in cash welfare and food stamp benefits have resulted in lower average

total income for single mothers at the bottom of the income distribution (i.e., bottom
income quintile).
The growing importance of the EITC as an earnings supplement can be
illustrated by comparing the average EITC as a share of average earnings shown in
Figure 11. Legislative expansions to the EITC in 1990 (phased in between 1991 and
1992) and in 1993 (phased in from 1994 through 1996) expanded the credit’s “work
bonus” to families with children, amounting to a supplement of as much as 40 cents
on each dollar earned. In 1990, the average EITC depicted in Figure 11 amounted
to about 13% of average earnings of mothers in the bottom income quintile. By
1993, the EITC “work bonus” increased to 18% of earnings, and then doubled to
37% of earnings by 1996, once legislative expansions had completely phased in. In
addition to providing needed income to low-income working families, the EITC has
also likely encouraged work and increased earnings.
Figure 12 is similar to Figure 11, but shows average income by source for the
second quintile of single-mother families, ranked by their income relative to poverty.
The chart shows comparatively large gains in average total income from 1993 to
1995, due largely to increased earnings and EITC. During this short period, average
total net income increased from $14,095 to $17,851 — a gain of nearly 27%.
Earnings of single-mother families in the second income quintile peaked in 2000 at
$12,095 (in 2006 dollars) — more than three times what they earned in 1993.
However, from 2000 to 2005 average earnings, and consequently average EITC,
declined among these families. Food stamps have helped to offset recent earnings
losses somewhat, growing by 66% from 2000 to 2005, whereas cash welfare support
continued to diminish over the same period. In 2006, earnings and the EITC
increased somewhat compared to 2005, but income from all other sources fell and
taxes increased, resulting in lower net average income in 2005 than in 2006.
Average total income among single mother families in the second quintile
reached its highest level over the 20-year period examined in 2000. In 2000, the
peak-income year, earnings in combination with the EITC more than offset the loss
in combined cash assistance and food stamps that occurred over the 1995 to 2000
period. Over the period, the gain in average net earnings, in combination with EITC
($6,099), more than offset the $3,519 loss in combined cash assistance and food
stamps. By 2000, average net earnings ($12,095) accounted for 60% of these
families’ incomes ($20,250) and cash assistance ($739) accounted for just under 4%.
In contrast, in 1987, earnings accounted for about 28% of this group’s income
($4,160 in earnings out of a total net income of $14,857), and cash assistance
($5,142) comprised about 35%. In 2000, average total income for families in the
second quintile ($20,250) was 36% above that in 1987 ($14,857).

Figure 11. Bottom Income Quintile* of Single-Mother Families:
Average Annual Income by Source, 1987 to 2006
(in 2006 dollars)

^Net^Iⁿ^co^me
^$9,000^$8,⁶⁵⁴^$8,⁶⁰¹^$8,⁵⁵²
^$332^$499^Tota^l^(N^e^{t) Inc}^o^m^e^$8,⁰²⁶^$7,⁹⁵⁰^$8,²⁷³^$8,⁴⁰⁵^$8,³¹¹
^$640^$7,⁶⁹⁹^$7,⁸⁰⁴^$7,⁹³⁸^$7,⁹²³
^$122^$949^$1,⁰³¹^$898^$8,000^$7,³⁹⁰^$7,⁷³⁶^$7,⁵⁶⁸^$7,⁵⁸⁷
^$1,¹⁹⁵^$130^$136^$135^$143^$567^$775^$7,³⁹²^$7,⁴¹⁴^$7,³²² **^$7,³⁵³
^$975^$852^$1,⁵⁰³^$139^$140^$932^$722****
^$975^$1,⁰⁴¹^$836^$804^$1,⁷²⁷^$595^$547^$678^$7,000^EI^TC
^$491^$345^$464^$1,¹⁶¹^$1,⁴⁹⁴
^$274^$224^$191^$303^$550^$385^$448^$540^$543^$1,⁹⁹⁴^$2,⁵⁵⁰^$2,⁴⁸⁸
^$262^$240^$264^$349^$432^$503^$2,⁷⁶⁰^$2,⁵⁹⁸^$1,⁹⁷⁶^$1,⁸⁶⁷^$1,⁸²⁵^$2,⁰⁷³^$6,000^Earnⁱⁿ^g^s⁽ⁿ^et^o^f^t^axes)
^$253^$389^$735
^$315^$709^$5,000
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL30797}^$2,⁷²²^$2,⁵⁶⁷^$2,⁶²⁵^$2,⁸⁷³^$2,⁹⁹⁶
^g/w^$2,³⁶⁴^$2,⁷⁴⁰^$2,⁶⁷⁸^$2,⁵⁸⁹^$266^$736^$775^$1,⁰⁷⁸^$856^$810^$891^$894^Othe^r^inc^o^m^e
^s^.or^$2,⁵³⁹^$414^$695^$4,000
^le^ak^$2,³⁹³^$570^$543^$648^$552^$581^$⁵⁴¹^$503^C^h^{ild s}^uppor^t/a^lim^ony
^$128^$120^$109^$110^$289^$2,¹¹⁵
^://wiki^$99^$179^$185^$338^$1,⁸²⁶^$3,000
^h^ttp^$285^$247^$1,⁶⁸³^$1,⁸¹⁷^$1,⁹¹⁴^$2,⁰⁹⁸^$2,⁰⁷⁵^$2,¹¹³
^$1,⁷⁴⁹^{Food Sta}^m^ps
^$334^$2,000
^$3,³¹⁵^$2,⁹⁴²^$3,⁰⁹⁵^$3,²⁸³^$3,²²⁹^$2,⁸⁰⁹^$2,⁹⁵⁴^$3,⁰⁷⁵^$364
^$2,⁷⁷⁹^$2,⁴⁶⁷^$477^$478^$491^$438
^$2,²⁰¹^$1,⁷⁴⁴^$452^$483^$492^$1,000^SSI
^$1,⁴³²^$1,¹⁰⁹^$928^$1,⁰⁸³
^$890^$820^$832^$754^AF^DC,^T^ANF^,^G^A
^$0^T^axes
¹⁹⁸⁷¹⁹⁸⁸¹⁹⁸⁹¹⁹⁹⁰¹⁹⁹¹¹⁹⁹²¹⁹⁹³¹⁹⁹⁴¹⁹⁹⁵¹⁹⁹⁶¹⁹⁹⁷¹⁹⁹⁸¹⁹⁹⁹^2000r²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰⁵²⁰⁰⁶
Year
^S^o^u^rce:^P^r^{epared by}^t^h^{e Co}^ng^ressi^oⁿ^al^{Research S}^e^rvⁱ^{ce (CRS}^).^{Based o}ⁿ^anal^y^sⁱ^s^o^f^U^.^S^.^{Census Bureau 1988 t}^o^{2007 Current}^P^o^pul^atⁱ^o^{n S}^urv^e^y^(CP^S⁾^A^nnual^S^o^ci^al^{and Eco}^no
^S^uppl^em^ent^(A^S^E^{C) dat}^a^.
^{* Q}^uⁱⁿ^tⁱ^l^{es based o}ⁿ^rankⁱⁿ^g^o^f^ratⁱ^o^{s o}^f^famⁱ^l^y^cash,^pre-^t^a^xⁱⁿ^co^m^e^,^r^e^l^a^tiv^{e to}^p^o^v^e^r^t^y^.^Ta^{xes i}ⁿ^cl^{ude federal}^{and st}^at^{e i}ⁿ^co^m^e^t^a^{xes and F}^I^CA^t^a^xes.
^*^{* F}^e^deral^chi^l^{d credi}^t^(partⁱ^a^l^l^y^refundabl^{e po}^rtⁱ^o^{n) am}^o^untⁱⁿ^g^t^o^{$123 i}ⁿ^2004,^{and $3 i}ⁿ^{2005 and 2006,}^pl^{us S}^t^at^{e refundab}^l^eⁱⁿ^co^m^e^t^a^{x credi}^t^s^am^o^untⁱⁿ^g^t^o^{$24 i}ⁿ^2004,^$²⁵
^{2005 and $33 i}ⁿ^2006.
^{r Rev}ⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d o}ⁿ^{expanded CP}^S^s^a^m^p^l^e^{and 2000 decennial}^cens^u^s^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^hts^.

Figure 12. Second Income Quintile* of Single-Mother Families:
Average Annual Inocme by Source, 1987 to 2006
(in 2006 dollars)

^Net^Iⁿ^co^me
^$21,000^$20,²⁵⁰
^$20,000^Tota^l^(N^e^{t) Inc}^o^m^e^$19,⁷²⁰^$19,⁷⁰⁸**^$19,³⁶⁸**^$19,³⁵⁴^$19,⁰¹⁷
^$2,⁷⁴²^$2,⁶⁵³^$2,⁷²³^$19,000^$18,⁰⁸⁹^$18,⁹⁷³^$18,⁷⁷²^C^h^{ild Ta}^x^C^r^e^d^it^$438^$280^$277**
^$2,⁷⁴⁴^$2,²⁹⁸^$2,²⁰⁹^$2,⁵⁴⁹^$2,⁵⁸⁸^$18,000^EI^TC^$17,⁸⁵¹^$17,⁰⁰⁵
^$1,⁸¹¹^$2,⁵⁷²^$17,000^$16,⁴⁸⁵
^$1,⁹²⁰^$2,²⁹⁹^$15,000^$16,000^$15,⁴³⁴^$14,⁸⁵⁷^$15,¹⁸⁴^$15,⁰⁵²
^$458^$475^$583^$570^$678^$1,³²²^$14,⁰⁹⁵^$14,³²⁰^$14,⁴⁶²^$13,⁹⁷³
^$673^$663^$14,000
^$13,000
^$4,¹⁶⁰^$4,¹¹⁴^$5,²⁹⁸^$4,⁹⁷⁵^$6,⁹²⁶^$12,000
^$4,³⁹²^$4,²⁵⁹^$3,⁹⁷⁶^$5,²²⁴^$6,⁵³⁵^$7,⁴¹⁸^$9,⁰⁶⁵^$12,⁰⁹⁵^$11,²⁴⁵^$11,³⁵⁸^$10,⁶³⁹^$10,³⁴²^$10,⁰⁴⁵
^$10,⁶¹²^$10,²⁴⁶^$11,000^Earnⁱⁿ^g^s⁽ⁿ^et^o^f^t^axes)
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL30797}^$1,⁹⁹⁷^$10,000
^g/w^$1,⁸²⁷^$1,⁷⁴⁶^$1,⁷⁶⁹^$1,⁶⁹⁹^$1,⁷⁰⁴^$1,⁷⁸⁵^$9,000
^s^.or^$492^$433^$560^$560^$471^$550^$1,⁷⁶⁵^$2,¹⁸⁸^$8,000
^le^ak^$2,⁰²¹^$2,⁰¹⁹^$625^$702^$734^$2,⁰¹⁸^$7,000
^$1,⁷⁴⁸^$2,¹²³^$2,²²³^$2,¹³⁶^$2,¹³³^$751^$1,⁹⁹²^$6,000
^://wiki^$588^$534^$677^$555^$568^$2,⁰⁰⁴^$2,⁰⁵⁰^$904^$2,⁰⁴³^$1,⁸³⁸^$2,²⁶⁴^$2,¹⁸²^$2,⁴⁵⁴^$2,³⁸⁸^$5,000
^h^ttp^$547^$833^$973^$1,⁷²⁷^$659^$2,¹¹¹^$2,⁴⁴⁸^$2,³⁸²^$4,000^Othe^r^inc^o^m^e
^$1,¹²⁴^$961^$1,⁵¹⁸^$1,²⁷⁰^$848^$1,⁰⁹³^$1,⁰⁹⁹^$1,⁰⁸¹^$954^$890
^$5,¹⁴²^$4,⁹¹⁸^$4,⁵⁷¹^$4,⁵⁰⁰^$4,⁴³¹^$4,⁰²⁹^$4,¹⁵⁵^$918^$921^$857^$1,⁰⁵⁴^$1,²⁵⁴^$1,³⁴³^$1,⁰¹¹^$1,⁰³⁸^$3,000^C^h^{ild s}^uppor^t/a^lim^ony
^$3,⁴⁴⁵^$3,⁰¹⁷^$2,⁵⁷⁴^$1,⁰²⁵^$914^$899^$692^$967^$809^$865^$1,²²⁸^$2,000^{Food Sta}^m^ps
^$1,⁹⁵⁵^$1,⁴⁵⁵^$1,⁰⁹⁶^$809^$743^$696^$868^$780^$1,000^SSI
^$739^$709^$580^$619^$717^$477^$0^AF^DC,^T^ANF^,^G^A
^-$1,000^T^axes
¹⁹⁸⁷¹⁹⁸⁸¹⁹⁸⁹¹⁹⁹⁰¹⁹⁹¹¹⁹⁹²¹⁹⁹³¹⁹⁹⁴¹⁹⁹⁵¹⁹⁹⁶¹⁹⁹⁷¹⁹⁹⁸¹⁹⁹⁹^2000r²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰⁵²⁰⁰⁶
Year
^S^o^u^rce:^P^r^{epared by}^t^h^{e Co}^ng^ressi^oⁿ^al^{Research S}^e^rvⁱ^{ce (CRS}^).^Based^oⁿ^anal^y^sⁱ^s^o^f^U^.^S^.^{Census Bureau 1988 t}^o^{2007 Current}^P^o^pul^atⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(CP^S⁾^A^nnual^S^o^ci^al^and
^Ecoⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^S^uppl^em^ent^(A^S^E^{C) dat}^a^.
^{* Q}^uⁱⁿ^tⁱ^l^{es based o}ⁿ^rankⁱⁿ^g^o^f^ratⁱ^o^{s o}^f^famⁱ^l^y^cash,^pre-^t^a^xⁱⁿ^co^m^e^,^r^e^l^a^tiv^{e to}^p^o^v^e^r^t^y^.^Ta^{xes i}ⁿ^cl^{ude federal}^{and st}^at^{e i}ⁿ^co^m^e^t^a^{xes and F}^I^CA^t^a^xes.
^{** S}^t^at^{e refundabl}^{e i}ⁿ^co^m^e^t^a^{x credi}^t^s^,^am^o^untⁱⁿ^g^t^o^{an est}ⁱ^m^at^{ed $103 i}ⁿ^2004,^{and $114 i}ⁿ^{2005 and $144 i}ⁿ^2006.
^{r Rev}ⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d o}ⁿ^{expanded CP}^S^s^a^m^p^l^e^{and 2000 decennial}^cens^u^s^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^hts^.

Conclusions and Policy Implications
CRS analysis of 20 years of U.S. Census Bureau CPS data shows a dramatic
transformation in single mothers’ welfare, work, and poverty status over the period.
CPS data generally follow the upsurge in the AFDC caseload evidenced by
administrative/program statistics that occurred in the late-1980s and early 1990s, and
the historic declines that followed. Increases in the number of families headed by
single mothers during the late-1980s and early 1990s are likely to have contributed
to the rapid growth in cash welfare caseloads under the AFDC program that occurred
over the period. The number of single mothers increased from about 8.2 million in
1987 to 9.9 million in 1993. Cash welfare caseloads peaked in March 1994, and have
dropped dramatically since, whereas the number of single mothers stayed close to
10 million in most years since 1994. In 2006, the number of single mothers reached

10.9 million, but the number reporting receipt of cash welfare has continued to fall.

Economic conditions certainly contributed to the welfare caseload increase that began
in the late 1980s and the historic declines since 1994. A number of policy
interventions have helped to increase the economic returns to work and to encourage
work over welfare. Increases to the EITC and the minimum wage, and erosion of
most states’ welfare benefit levels due to inflation, have helped to increase the
economic returns to work compared to welfare in recent years. States’ extension of
work requirements to mothers with younger children, increased welfare sanction
authority, and adoption of time-limits on welfare receipt, first experimented with
under AFDC waiver authority and now widely adopted by states under TANF, have
helped to transform the welfare system from an entitlement program to a program
that emphasizes self-support, primarily through work, and personal responsibility.
The CPS data show that single mothers are considerably more likely to be
working, and less likely to be poor or receiving welfare in most recent than in earlier
years (Figure 2). Although many of these changes precede passage of the 1996
welfare law, reductions in welfare receipt have since been especially large. Since
1996, poor single mothers are more likely to work during the year than to receive
welfare (Figure 7). However, reductions in poverty among single mothers have not
been as large as the concurrent declines in cash welfare receipt and increased work
among single mothers in recent years. Moreover, CPS data indicate that welfare
receipt rates among very poor families based on their pre-transfer income (i.e.,
income other than welfare) have dropped considerably in recent years (Figure 5).
Among single-mother families whose incomes are lowest (the bottom 20% of
single-mothers based on family income relative to poverty), income from earnings
has grown markedly since 1993 but has failed to offset losses in cash welfare and
food stamp benefits which have occurred since (Figure 10). While single mothers
are less dependent on welfare in most recent than in past years, increased work has
not resulted in marked gains in net income for the bottom fifth of single mothers,
ranked by family income relative to poverty. In 2006, average income of these
families was well below its 2000 level (its most recent high-water mark), and only
slightly above its 2004 level, which marked the lowest level observed in the 20 years
examined.
The CPS data show that although welfare receipt and poverty among single
mothers has declined in recent years, mothers receiving welfare are now more likely

to be working, and poor mothers are now less likely to be receiving welfare and more
likely to be working than in past years. Prospects of single mothers working their
way off welfare and out of poverty hinge in large part on their finding full-time,
stable employment at a sufficient wage.
CPS data show that most single mothers work full-time schedules (35 or more
hours per week) when they work (See Figure 13). In 2006, among single mothers
who combined welfare and work during the year, 59% worked full-time schedules
— not that much different from working poor single mothers who did not receive
welfare, of whom 61% worked full-time schedules. However, mothers who worked
and received cash welfare were considerably less likely to have worked full-year (50
to 52 weeks) (30%) than their working poor counterparts who did not receive cash
welfare (52%).
Figure 13. Working Single Mothers’ Job Attachment,
by Welfare and Poverty Status: 2006

¹^00%^Pe^r^c^eⁿ^t^P^a^rt^-^tⁱ^m^e^,^p^a^rt^-^y^e^a^r
^8.^2%^4.^9%
^6.^5%^21.^8%^90%^P^a^r^t^-^t^im^e^,^f^u^ll-^y^e^a^r
¹⁰^.⁰^%³¹^.⁴^%^P^a^r^t^-tⁱ^m^e,^p^a^r^t^-^y^ea^r
¹⁰^.⁶^%^80%^F^u^ll-^t^im^e^,^pa^r^t^-^y^e^a^r
¹³^.⁷^%
^17.^7%^70%
^9.^3%^60%^P^a^r^t^-^t^im^e^,^f^u^ll-^y^e^a^r
^25.^9%^50%
⁷⁸^.⁰^%³⁹^.¹^%^40%^F^u^ll-^t^im^e^,^f^u^ll-^y^e^a^r^F^u^ll-^tⁱ^m^e^{, p}^a^r^t^-^y^e^a^r
⁶⁸^.²^%
^30%
^34.^6%^20%
²⁰^.²^%^10%^F^u^ll-^tⁱ^m^e^{, f}^u^ll-^y^e^a^r
^0%^W^o^r^k^ed^a^nd^rec^eⁱ^v^ed^P^o^o^r^,^r^e^c^eⁱ^v^ed^no^N^e^a^r^p^o^o^r^Iⁿ^c^o^m^e^abo^v^e¹⁵⁰^%^o^f
^c^a^s^h^w^e^l^f^a^r^{e du}^ri^ng^t^h^{e y}^ear^ca^s^h^w^e^l^f^a^r^e⁽¹⁰⁰^%^{- 150}^%^o^f^p^o^v^er^t^y⁾^,^no^c^a^s^h^p^o^v^e^r^t^y,ⁿ^o^c^a^sh^wel^f^ar^e
^we^l^f^a^r^e
^W^e^l^f^ar^{e an}^d^p^o^v^er^t^y^s^t^at^u^s
^Source:^P^r^epared^by^th^e^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{). B}^a^s^e^{d on}^an^aly^s^is^of^U.S.^C^eⁿ^s^u^s
^Bu^reau^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t⁽^A^SE^C)
^dat^a^.
^N^O^TE:^D^e^t^aⁱ^l^s^m^a^yⁿ^o^t^s^u^m^t^o^100%^du^{e t}^o^rouⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^.
One policy challenge to reduce poverty and welfare dependency among single
mothers may be to assist mothers in moving to full-time, full-year work. However,
full-time full-year work is likely necessary, but not sufficient, for some single
mothers to have incomes above poverty and not rely on cash welfare. About one in
five (21.3%) single mothers who combined work and welfare worked full-time, full-
year, and one in three (32.8%) poor single mothers who did not receive welfare

worked full-time full-year. (See Figure 13). For these mothers, full-time attachment
to a job was insufficient to move them off of welfare or out of poverty. Single
mothers with incomes somewhat above poverty (100% to 150% of poverty) were
much more likely to have worked full-time full-year (59.1%) than working poor
mothers not receiving welfare (32.8%) and nearly 3 times as likely as mothers who
combined work and welfare during the year (21.3%).
In March 2007, most working single mothers who were poor or received cash
welfare earned more than the federal statutory minimum wage of $5.15 per hour
applied at that time.²¹ Figure 14 shows that in March 2007, the median hourly wage
of single mothers who were either poor or received welfare during the prior year was
estimated at $8.50 per hour;²² half of such mothers earned more, and half earned less.
The middle 50% of such mothers earned between $7.00 and $11.00 per hour
(denoted by the inter-quartile range). Working mothers who were near poverty
(between 100% and 149% of poverty) and did not receive cash welfare in the prior
year earned 95 cents per hour more than their poor or welfare-reliant counterparts,
at the median hourly wage ($9.45 per hour); 50 percent of these near poor working
mothers earned between $8.00 and $11.71 per hour.
Combined with their somewhat higher wages, near-poor single mothers are
more likely to work full-time full-year than their counterparts who receive cash
welfare or are poor. Clearly full-time full-year work lessens the chances that a single
mother and her children will be poor or receive cash welfare, but does not completely
eliminate those chances. Among single mothers who did not work full-time full-
year, 61% were poor or received cash welfare in 2006, compared to only 13% who
worked full-time full-year (not shown in figures).
Single mothers have lost economic ground since the 2001 recession. Their
situation is likely to worsen if the economy falters. The bottom fifth of single
mothers, ranked by income relative to poverty, appear economically worse off than
before passage of the 1996 welfare reform law, on the basis of their measured
income. In 2004, their total income was at the lowest level measured over the 20
years examined. Single mothers ranked in the bottom 20% to 40% based on income
relative to poverty have also failed to recoup income losses since the 2001 recession,
but their measured incomes are still well above pre welfare reform levels. Among

²¹ P.L. 110-28, enacted on May 25, 2007, raised the federal minimum wage to $5.85,
effective July 2007, and in subsequent years to $6.65, effective July 2008, and $7.25,
effective July 2009.
²² The CPS asks questions about hourly wage rates of hourly workers for only about one
fourth of the CPS sample who are leaving the survey — a group technically referred to as
the “outgoing rotation group.” (The CPS interviews households for eight months. After four
months of interviews, a household leaves the survey for four months, and afterwards is
interviewed for an additional four months, after which the household leaves the survey
permanently. In March, selected questions, such as hourly wage rates, are asked only of
households who have been in the survey for four or eight months, and will be leaving the
survey in the following month (either temporarily or permanently)). The estimates of hourly
earnings shown in Figure 14 are based on hourly wages of hourly workers, and for other
workers, estimated hourly earnings based on reported gross weekly earnings divided by
usual hours worked.

families headed by single mothers their incidence of poverty has increased from a
historic low of 31.8% in 2000, to 35.1% in 2006.
A strong economy may be necessary, but not sufficient, to markedly reducing
poverty among families headed by single mothers. Absent significant increases in
single mothers’ job attachment or hourly earnings, income supports in the form of
child support, earnings supplements, such as the EITC, food, housing, and medical
assistance, as well as cash welfare, are likely to continue to play important roles in
addressing the needs of single-mother families. A challenge for these and other
approaches will be to reduce basic unmet needs and at the same time promote
economic self-sufficiency. Current signs of a faltering economy spotlights this
challenge.
Figure 14. Hourly Wage Rates* of Working Single Mothers
in March 2007, by Welfare and Poverty Status in 2006
(Median and Inter-Quartile Range)

^Hou^r^l^y^wage^r^a^t^e
^$25^.⁰⁰
^$²^0.¹⁰^$20^.⁰⁰
^$1^5.⁰⁰^$15^.⁰⁰
^$1^1.⁰⁰^$1^1.⁷¹^$¹^0.³⁸^$10^.⁰⁰⁷⁵^t^h^p^e^r^c^en^tⁱ^l^e
^$9^.⁴⁵^Me^dⁱ^aⁿ
^$8^.⁰⁰^$8^.⁵⁰
^$7^.⁰⁰²⁵^t^h^p^e^r^c^en^tⁱ^l^e
^$5^.⁰⁰
^$0^.⁰⁰^Po^o^r^o^r^Nea^r^po^or^Iⁿ^c^o^m^e¹⁵⁰^%^of^pov^e^r^t^y^an^d^a^b^o^v^e,
^re^c^eⁱ^v^{ed wel}^f^ar^e⁽¹⁰⁰^%^t^o¹⁴^9%^o^f^po^v^e^r^t^y⁾^no^wel^f^ar^e^re^c^eⁱ^v^ed^no^wel^f^ar^e^re^c^eⁱ^v^e^d
^Source:^P^r^{epared by}^th^e^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^al^R^e^s^earch^Serv^ice^(C^R^S^).^B^a^s^e^{d on}^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s
^B^u^r^eau^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t⁽^A^S^E^C⁾
^dat^a^.
^*^H^o^ur^l^y^w^a^ge^fo^r^ho^ur^l^y^w^a^ge^w^o^r^k^e^r^s,^aⁿ^d^e^s^tⁱ^m^a^t^e^d^ho^ur^l^y^w^a^ge^e^q^ui^va^l^e^nt^,^b^a^se^d^oⁿ^r^e^p^o^r^t^e^d
^gr^o^{ss w}^e^e^k^l^y^earni^{ngs d}ⁱ^vi^d^e^d^b^y^usua^l^ho^ur^{s w}^o^r^k^e^d^,^fo^r^CP^{S o}^u^t^g^oⁱ^{ng r}^o^t^a^tⁱ^o^{n gr}^o^u^p⁽^a^p^p^r^o^xⁱ^m^a^t^e^l^y
^1/^4t^h^of^t^h^{e C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^l^e^).

Appendix A: Cash Welfare
Under-Reporting on the CPS
A comparison of AFDC/TANF administrative statistics and CPS-estimated
caseload counts suggests that the CPS undercounts actual cases and that the CPS
undercount has worsened in recent years. Figure A-1 shows that from 1987 to 1991,
the CPS accounted for roughly 80% of the AFDC administrative caseload count, but²³
in 2006 the CPS captured only about 54%. Worsened reporting of cash welfare on
the CPS makes it difficult to gauge how much of the drop in welfare receipt among
single mothers represents eligible families who do not receive assistance, rather than
families who do not report actual welfare aid on the CPS.
Figure 15. AFDC/TANF Cases:
CPS Estimates Versus Administrative Caseload Counts
(Annual Monthly Average), 1987 to 2006

^N^u^m^b^er^{(in m}^illions)^P^e^r^cent
^5.0^100%
^4.5^90%
^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^ra^tⁱ^v^e^c^ount⁽^l^e^f^t^a^xⁱ^s⁾
^4.0^80%
^C^{PS as a p}^e^r^cen^t^o^f^a^d^mⁱ^nis^t^ra^tⁱ^v^e^c^ount
^3.5^70%⁽^rⁱ^g^h^t^axi^s)
^3.0^60%
^CP^S^c^ount⁽^l^e^f^t^a^xⁱ^s⁾
^2.5^50%
^2.0^40%
^1.5^30%
^1.0^20%
^0.5^10%
^0.0^0%
⁷⁹⁸⁸⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁹⁹¹⁹⁹²⁹⁹³⁹⁹⁴⁹⁹⁵⁹⁹⁶⁹⁹⁷⁹⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁰⁰^r⁰⁰¹⁰⁰²⁰⁰³⁰⁰⁴⁰⁰⁵⁰⁰⁶
¹⁹⁸¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹²²²²²²²
^Y^ear
^Source:^P^r^{epared by}^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{). B}^a^s^e^{d on}^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s
^B^u^r^e^a^u^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t
^(A^SEC⁾^d^a^{ta an}^d^Dep^a^rtm^eⁿ^t^o^f^Health^an^d^Hu^m^aⁿ^Serv^{ices (DHHS) caselo}^a^d^d^a^ta.
^{r R}^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.
²³ The CPS estimates are for all adults reporting receipt of AFDC or TANF during the year,
converted to an estimate of an annual monthly average, based on the number of months over
the year recipients reported receiving assistance. For a detailed discussion of cash welfare
under-reporting on the CPS and other surveys see Bavier, Richard. Accounting for increases
in failure to report AFDC/TANF receipt. Unpublished manuscript. Washington, DC.
Office of Management and Budget, 2000.

Figure A-1. Support Table 1. AFDC/TANF Cases: CPS versus
Administrative Caseload Counts, Annual Monthly Average,
1987 to 2006
(numbers in millions)
^Pers^ons^reporting^{AFDC a}^{nd T}^ANF
^{AFDC o}^r^T^ANF^a^c^a^se^{s ba}^se^{d o}ⁿ^b^{CPS as}^{a percent of}
^Yea^r^{receipt on the CPS}^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rati^{ve d}^a^ta^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rati^{ve total}
¹⁹⁸⁷^3.039^3.719^81.7
¹⁹⁸⁸^3.056^3.691^82.8
¹⁹⁸⁹^2.901^3.738^77.6
¹⁹⁹⁰^3.226^3.995^80.8
¹⁹⁹¹^3.554^4.434^80.2
¹⁹⁹²^3.596^4.765^75.5
¹⁹⁹³^3.844^4.949^77.7
¹⁹⁹⁴^3.551^4.972^71.4
¹⁹⁹⁵^3.193^4.734^67.8
¹⁹⁹⁶^3.022^4.380^69.0
¹⁹⁹⁷^2.355^3.690^63.8
¹⁹⁹⁸^1.892^3.007^62.9
¹⁹⁹⁹^1.464^2.515^58.2
²⁰⁰⁰^1.320^2.181^60.5
^2000r^1.392^2.181^63.8
²⁰⁰¹^1.216^2.075^58.6
²⁰⁰²^1.140^2.023^56.3
²⁰⁰³^1.346^2.001^67.3
²⁰⁰⁴^1.160^1.958^59.3
²⁰⁰⁵^1.227^1.876^65.4
²⁰⁰⁶^0.955^1.764^54.1
^Source:^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^al^R^e^s^earch^S^e^rvⁱ^{ce (C}^R^S^{) es}^tⁱ^m^at^es^bas^e^{d on}^U^.^S^.^Bu^reau^of^t^h^e^C^eⁿ^s^u^s¹⁹⁸⁸
^t^o^{2006 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS⁾^A^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t⁽^A^SE^C)^d^a^t^a^aⁿ^d
^{U.S. Dep}^a^rtm^eⁿ^t^o^f^Health^an^d^Hu^m^aⁿ^Serv^{ices (DHHS) A}^F^DC^an^d^T^A^{NF caselo}^a^d^d^a^ta.
^a.^Es^tim^ated^av^erag^{e m}^oⁿ^t^h^l^yⁿ^u^m^{ber bas}^e^{d on}ⁿ^u^m^{ber of}^m^oⁿ^t^h^s^C^P^S^res^pon^den^t^sⁱⁿ^dicated^th^ey
^receiv^e^{d A}^F^DC^{or T}^A^{NF du}^rin^g^th^{e y}^ear.
^{b. A}^v^erag^{e m}^oⁿ^t^h^l^yⁿ^u^m^{ber of}^A^F^DC^cas^esⁱⁿ^th^{e 50 s}^t^ates^an^{d th}^{e Dis}^t^{rict of}^C^o^lu^m^b^ia.
^{r = R}^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

Appendix B: Family Income to Poverty Ratios:
Cutoffs for Income Quintiles
Figure B-1 shows the income relative to poverty cutoffs for defining the first
and second income quintiles depicted in Figures 11 and 12. The dark lines represent
the level of family cash income (i.e., the income definition for measuring poverty
under the official U.S. Bureau of the Census poverty definition) as a percent of
poverty which defines the bottom fifth and bottom two-fifths of single-mother
families, ranked by family relative to poverty. The lighter-shaded lines show other
income percentiles relative to poverty. The figure shows, for example that the
bottom fifth of single-mother families ranked by official cash income relative to
poverty had family income below 42% of poverty in 1992. By 2002, the relative
income of the bottom fifth (20^th percentile) of single-mother families increased to

66% of the poverty line, but by 2006 stood at 59% of poverty. Similarly, the second-

fifth (between the 20^th and 40^th percentiles) of single-mother families had family
income above 42% of poverty but below 85% of poverty in 1992. By 2002, the
second-fifth of single mother families had family incomes above 66% of poverty but
below 123% of poverty. In 2006, the second-fifth of single mother families declined,
and ranged between 59% and 113% of poverty. The figure shows that the bottom

10% of single-mother families has shown essentially no improvement over the 20-

year period.
Figures B-2 and B-3 are similar to Figure B-1, but depict single-mother
families’ income rankings based on alternative definitions of income relative to
poverty. Figure B-2, for example, ranks families based on family after-tax income
(including the EITC) plus food stamps, whereas Figure B-3 ranks families based on
household after-tax income plus food stamps, relative to a household poverty income
threshold based on household size and composition. In both cases, Figures B-2 and
B-3 show comparatively better income position relative to poverty than does Figure
B-1, which uses the official poverty income definition. For example, in 2006, the
bottom fifth of single-mother families had incomes below 59% of poverty under the
official poverty income definition, shown in Figure B-1. When taxes, including the
EITC, and food stamps are considered the bottom fifth of single-mother families had
incomes below 78% of poverty (shown in Figure B-2), and if household after-tax
income and food stamps are counted against a revised household poverty threshold,
the bottom 20% of single-mother families have incomes below 89% of poverty
(shown in Figure B-3). Although the alternate income definitions also result in
improved income standing relative to the official poverty income definition for the
bottom 10% of single-mother families, the trend over the 20-year period shows little
improvement.

Figure B-1. Income to Poverty Percentiles of Mother-Only Families
Based on Ranking of Families by Family Cash Income
Relative to Family Poverty Income Thresholds, 1987 to 2006

^200%^Incom^e^{as a percent of pov}^erty
^190%
^180%
^170%
^160%
^150%^{50th percentile}
^140%
^130%
^120%
^110%^{40th percentile}
^100%^{Poverty Line}
^90%^{30th percentile}
^80%
^70%
^60%^{20th percentile}
^50%
^40%
^30%^{10th percentile}
^20%
^10%
^0%
⁷⁹⁸⁸⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁹⁹¹⁹⁹²⁹⁹³⁹⁹⁴⁹⁹⁵⁹⁹⁶⁹⁹⁷⁹⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁰⁰^r⁰⁰¹⁰⁰²⁰⁰³⁰⁰⁴⁰⁰⁵⁰⁰⁶
¹⁹⁸¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹²²²²²²²
^Y^ear
^Source:^P^r^{epared by}^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{). B}^a^s^e^{d on}^an^aly^s^is^of^U.S.^C^eⁿ^s^u^s
^Bu^reau^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^r^r^e^nt^P^opu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t
^(A^S^E^C⁾^dat^a^.
^{r R}^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

Figure B-2. Income to Poverty Percentiles of Mother-Only Families,
Based on Ranking of Families by Combined After-Tax and
Food Stamp Income Relative to Family Poverty Income Thresholds,

1987 to 2006

^200%^In^co^m^e^{as a p}^e^rcen^t^o^f^p^o^v^ert^y
^190%
^180%
^170%
^160%^50t^h^p^e^rcen^t^ile
^150%
^140%
^130%^40t^h^p^e^rcen^t^ile
^120%
^110%^30t^h^p^e^rcen^t^ile
^100%^P^o^v^e^r^ty^Li^ne
^90%
^80%^20t^h^p^e^rcen^t^ile
^70%
^60%
^50%
^40%^10t^h^p^e^rcen^t^ile
^30%
^20%
^10%
^0%
⁷⁹⁸⁸⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁹⁹¹⁹⁹²⁹⁹³⁹⁹⁴⁹⁹⁵⁹⁹⁶⁹⁹⁷⁹⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁰⁰^r⁰⁰¹⁰⁰²⁰⁰³⁰⁰⁴⁰⁰⁵⁰⁰⁶
¹⁹⁸¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹²²²²²²²
^Y^ear
^Source:^P^r^{epared by}^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{). B}^a^s^e^{d on}^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s
^B^u^r^e^a^u^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t
^(A^S^E^C⁾^dat^a^.
^{r R}^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

Figure B-3. Income to Poverty Percentiles of Mother-Only Families
Based on Ranking of Families by Household Combined After-Tax and
Food Stamp Income Relative to Household Poverty Income
Thresholds, 1987 to 2006

^200%^In^co^m^e^{as a p}^e^rcen^t^o^f^p^o^v^ert^y
^190%
^180%
^170%^50t^h^p^e^rcen^t^ile
^160%
^150%
^140%^40t^h^p^e^rcen^t^ile
^130%
^120%^30t^h^p^e^rcen^t^ile
^110%
^100%^P^o^v^e^r^ty^Li^ne
^90%^20t^h^p^e^rcen^t^ile
^80%
^70%
^60%^10t^h^p^e^rcen^t^ile
^50%
^40%
^30%
^20%
^10%
^0%
⁷⁹⁸⁸⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁹⁹¹⁹⁹²⁹⁹³⁹⁹⁴⁹⁹⁵⁹⁹⁶⁹⁹⁷⁹⁹⁸⁹⁹⁹⁰⁰⁰^r⁰⁰¹⁰⁰²⁰⁰³⁰⁰⁴⁰⁰⁵⁰⁰⁶
¹⁹⁸¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹²²²²²²²
^Y^ear
^Source:^P^r^epared^by^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{). B}^a^s^e^{d on}^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s
^Bu^reau^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^P^o^p^u^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t
^(A^S^E^C⁾^dat^a^.
^{r R}^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s

Figure B-1 Support Table. Income to Poverty Percentiles of
Mother-Only Families Based on Ranking Families by Family
Cash Income Relative to Family Poverty Income Thresholds,
1987 to 2006
Income as a percent of poverty defined at each percentile

10^th 20^th 30^th 40^th 50^th

Year P ercentile P ercentile P ercentile P ercentile P ercentile
1987 29.3 46.7 65.6 87.2 116.5
1988 27.8 44.5 65.0 86.2 121.7
1989 29.6 49.3 69.5 94.2 126.8
1990 29.6 47.3 66.5 88.8 120.7
1991 27.3 44.9 63.4 85.3 114.2
1992 26.5 42.5 62.0 84.7 113.5
1993 28.2 44.4 61.0 84.2 114.6
1994 30.1 48.2 67.9 91.8 122.9
1995 31.9 53.2 74.3 99.8 130.0
1996 31.9 50.6 72.8 100.5 130.0
1997 29.3 51.4 73.9 100.2 130.3
1998 29.5 54.5 82.0 106.9 138.3
1999 32.1 61.0 87.2 119.0 148.0
2000 37.2 70.5 96.7 125.7 155.0
2000r 34.2 65.3 93.7 125.3 156.2
2001 29.1 64.0 92.9 122.9 154.1
2002 32.3 65.5 94.3 122.7 157.4
2003 28.3 60.4 87.7 120.1 154.8
2004 26.4 57.3 85.6 117.1 151.4
2005 27.7 55.6 86.2 115.6 148.6
2006 27.3 58.5 86.2 112.5 145.4
^Source:^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{) es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s^B^u^reau
^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Pop^u^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t⁽^A^SE^C)
^dat^a^.
^{r = R}^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

Figure B-2 Support Table. Income to Poverty Percentiles of
Mother-Only Families Based on Ranking of Families by
Combined After-Tax and Food Stamp Income Relative to Family
Poverty Income Thresholds, 1987 to 2006
Income as a percent of poverty defined at each percentile

10^th 20^th 30^th 40^th 50^th

Year P ercentile P ercentile P ercentile P ercentile P ercentile
1987 47.2 65.3 80.6 97.5 119.3
1988 43.8 61.8 79.6 97.1 123.7
1989 47.4 66.2 83.5 102.7 127.8
1990 46.7 65.1 81.7 100.2 122.8
1991 46.9 64.5 80.1 97.6 121.3
1992 43.8 61.5 78.4 98.7 121.7
1993 45.7 62.9 78.7 98.2 122.4
1994 50.0 68.2 85.8 108.8 132.6
1995 51.5 72.6 93.3 117.4 139.1
1996 51.8 71.3 92.2 118.1 139.6
1997 45.4 71.4 94.3 117.7 139.7
1998 48.2 75.0 101.1 124.6 148.1
1999 50.1 80.1 105.9 131.2 153.7
2000 55.3 89.4 112.6 135.7 157.8
2000r 50.1 83.5 110.5 135.2 158.1
2001 46.7 82.8 110.0 133.9 157.3
2002 50.1 82.3 110.9 134.8 160.1
2003 42.8 76.7 104.9 132.4 160.9
2004 42.8 75.9 105.0 134.3 159.5
2005 44.3 76.6 106.4 134.3 158.0
2006 44.6 77.9 105.6 130.0 157.1
^Source:^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{) es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s^B^u^reau
^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^Sur^v^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t⁽^A^SE^C)
^dat^a^.
^{r = R}^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

10^th 20^th 30^th 40^th 50^th

Year P ercentile P ercentile P ercentile P ercentile P ercentile
1987 51.1 69.3 85.6 104.5 130.1
1988 49.1 67.5 85.0 105.1 132.2
1989 52.1 71.9 89.1 111.9 138.3
1990 52.8 70.2 87.8 108.7 134.0
1991 52.3 70.1 86.3 108.2 134.7
1992 49.4 67.6 86.3 108.1 132.7
1993 50.9 68.7 84.9 107.6 132.6
1994 54.5 74.0 94.7 119.9 143.6
1995 57.2 79.7 102.4 126.7 149.8
1996 57.2 78.7 102.0 126.3 149.8
1997 54.0 79.4 104.4 128.7 152.3
1998 56.4 83.2 109.8 135.3 160.2
1999 58.6 90.2 117.1 143.0 168.9
2000 65.4 99.5 122.8 148.6 171.4
2000r 61.6 95.3 121.1 148.2 173.0
2001 57.3 93.0 120.0 144.2 168.7
2002 59.2 93.3 121.2 146.6 174.3
2003 56.1 88.5 117.3 144.8 173.1
2004 53.6 89.3 118.5 146.4 172.2
2005 55.7 88.1 118.8 145.1 169.8
2006 58.3 89.1 117.3 142.0 168.8
^Source:^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{) es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s^B^u^reau
^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^r^r^eⁿ^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t⁽^A^SE^C)
^dat^a^.
^{r = R}^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

Appendix C: Support Tables
Data Note
The March 2002 CPS and subsequent surveys reflect an expanded sample of
households compared to prior year surveys and use population control totals from the
2000 decennial census to weight the sample up to U.S. population totals. Prior year
surveys included in this report were based on 1990 decennial census-derived weights,
or for the March 1987 through March 1990 CPS, 1980 decennial census-derived
weights. Shortly after release of the March 2002 CPS, the Census Bureau released
a revised March 2001 CPS. The revised data reflect an expanded sample, not
included in the original release of the March 2001 CPS, and weights derived from the
2000 decennial census, as opposed to the 1990 decennial census contained in the
original release of the March 2001 CPS. The revised March 2001 CPS estimates are
deemed to be preferred to those from the original release due to the larger sample size
from which they’re derived and the use of more recently derived population-based
weights. Data from both the original and revised March 2001 CPS are included in
this appendix for comparison, but the analysis and figures in the body of this report
are based on the revised data.

Figure 1 Support Table. Single Mothers: Poverty and Cash
Welfare Receipt, 1987 to 2006
(in thousands)
Number ofNumberPoor but notNeither poor nor
mother onlyreceivingreceivingreceiving
Year f amilies AF DC/ TANF AF DC/ TANF AF DC/ TANF
1987 8,193 2,719 1,399 4,076
1988 8,321 2,737 1,380 4,204
1989 8,400 2,537 1,452 4,411
1990 8,745 2,901 1,456 4,387
1991 9,031 3,101 1,554 4,375
1992 9,567 3,300 1,691 4,575
1993 9,860 3,439 1,722 4,700
1994 9,837 3,166 1,754 4,916
1995 9,887 2,862 1,818 5,207
199610,052 2,6691,9465,437
1997 9,874 2,225 2,211 5,438
1998 9,881 1,872 2,253 5,756
1999 9,741 1,543 2,216 5,981
2000 9,425 1,174 2,100 6,151
2000r 9,712 1,215 2,251 6,246
200110,044 1,0642,5016,479
200210,206 1,0252,577 6,604
200310,411 1,2532,610 6,448
200410,442 1,0542,890 6,498
200510,476 1,1022,837 6,537
200610,938 9913,120 6,827
^Source:^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{) es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s^B^u^reau
^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t⁽^A^SE^C)
^dat^a^.
^{r = R}^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

Figure 2 Support Table. Welfare, Work and Poverty Status
Among Single Mothers, 1987 to 2006
Percent who received AFDC/TANF
Percent whoPercent poorduring the year
worked(“officialDid not workWorked
Yearduring yeardefinition”)Totalduring yearduring year
1987 67.3 44.7 33.2 21.8 11.4
1988 68.9 43.9 32.9 21.1 11.8
1989 70.1 41.7 30.2 20.1 10.1
1990 69.8 43.7 33.2 20.9 12.3
1991 68.7 45.4 34.3 22.0 12.3
1992 67.2 45.4 34.5 22.2 12.3
1993 68.1 45.2 34.9 21.8 13.1
1994 71.4 42.7 32.2 18.8 13.4
1995 73.0 40.2 28.9 16.5 12.4
1996 75.1 39.8 26.6 14.6 12.0
1997 77.3 40.0 22.5 11.4 11.1
199879.637.318.9 8.2 10.7
199982.034.015.8 6.5 9.3
200083.430.912.5 5.6 6.9
2000r82.731.812.5 5.3 7.2
200181.132.410.6 5.1 5.5
200280.332.210.0 4.6 5.4
200378.733.912.0 6.1 5.9
200477.734.910.1 5.2 4.9
200577.634.710.5 6.6 3.9
200677.335.1 9.1 4.7 4.4
^Source:^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{) es}^tim^ates^bas^e^d^on^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s^B^u^reau
^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^S^o^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t⁽^A^SE^C)
^dat^a^.
^{r = R}^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

Figure 3 Support Table. Employment Rates of Single Mothers
and Married Mothers by Age of Youngest Child,
March 1988 to March 2007
(percent of single mothers employed in March)
^{Single m}^o^thers^M^a^{rried m}^o^thers
^{With a}^Yo^ung^est^Yo^ung^est^Yo^ung^est^{With a}^Yo^ung^est^Yo^ung^est
^child^child^child^child^child^child^child^Yo^ung^est
^under^{under a}^g^e^aged^{3 to}^aged^under^{under a}^g^e^aged^{child a}^g^e^d
^Yea^r^{age 18}³⁵^{6 to 17}^{age 18}³^{3 to 5}^{6 to 17}
¹⁹⁸⁸^57.4^35.1^52.9^69.1^61.8^50.7^58.1^69.6
¹⁹⁸⁹^58.2^37.9^53.1^70.0^63.0^51.4^60.8^70.6
¹⁹⁹⁰^60.3^38.0^61.0^70.9^63.4^52.7^60.9^70.8
¹⁹⁹¹^58.1^36.6^55.7^70.2^63.1^52.7^60.5^70.5
¹⁹⁹²^57.3^35.2^54.1^69.8^63.9^53.1^59.4^71.9
¹⁹⁹³^57.3^35.1^54.8^70.1^63.9^53.2^59.4^71.9
¹⁹⁹⁴^58.0^37.7^55.2^69.3^65.5^56.0^61.2^72.6
¹⁹⁹⁵^61.1^43.1^58.5^70.5^67.1^57.4^63.9^73.4
¹⁹⁹⁶^63.5^44.7^60.4^72.9^67.6^58.2^63.3^74.2
¹⁹⁹⁷^65.6^51.5^64.3^72.0^68.5^58.3^64.4^75.2
¹⁹⁹⁸^68.8^54.8^63.7^76.4^67.9^58.3^64.1^74.2
¹⁹⁹⁹^70.7^55.8^69.8^77.1^67.9^57.0^63.1^75.1
²⁰⁰⁰^72.8^59.1^72.7^78.5^68.4^56.8^66.0^75.0
²⁰⁰¹^73.0^56.1^74.4^79.8^68.5^57.1^64.7^75.4
^2001r^72.5^57.6^71.3^79.1^68.0^56.0^64.2^75.1
²⁰⁰²^71.2^57.9^71.0^76.3^66.7^54.9^61.7^74.1
²⁰⁰³^69.6^54.8^69.3^75.4^66.3^53.5^61.7^74.2
²⁰⁰⁴^69.7^54.1^69.5^75.7^65.3^52.4^62.3^72.7
²⁰⁰⁵^68.9^53.7^66.7^75.7^65.9^54.9^61.9^72.8
²⁰⁰⁶^69.6^57.0^68.0^75.1^66.1^55.4^61.8^73.1
²⁰⁰⁷^70.0^56.5^68.6^76.0^67.3^56.9^63.0^74.2
^Source:^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^ice^(C^R^S^{) es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s^B^u^reau
^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Pop^u^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t⁽^A^SE^C)
^dat^a^.
^{r = R}^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

CRS-42
Figures 4 and 5 Support Table. Single-Mother Family Cash Welfare Recipiency Rates,
by Pre-Transfer Income Poverty Status,* 1987 to 2006
^Sing^le-^m^o^t^{her f}^a^m^{ilies w}ⁱ^t^h^pre-^t^r^aⁿ^sf^{er inco}^m^e^belo^w^po^v^ert^y
^Pre-trans^f^{er incom}^e^from^Pre-trans^f^{er incom}^e
^{All sing}^le-^m^o^t^her^{0$ i}ⁿ^p^re-tran^s^f^er^Pre-trans^f^{er incom}^e^25%^{to b}^e^l^o^w^50%^of^from^50%^{to b}^e^l^o^w
^f^a^m^ilies^To^t^a^l^inco^m^e^b^e^l^o^w^25%^{of p}^overty^poverty^100%^{of p}^overty
^AFDC/T^ANF^AFDC/T^ANF^AFDC/T^ANF^AFDC/T^ANF^AFDC/T^ANF^AFDC/T^ANF
^Num^b^er^recipiency^Num^b^er^recipiency^Num^b^er^recipiency^Num^b^er^recipiency^Num^b^er^recipiency^Num^b^er^recipiency
^r⁽ⁱⁿ^000s⁾^{rate (%)}⁽ⁱⁿ^,^000s⁾^{rate (%)}⁽ⁱⁿ^000s⁾^{rate (%)}⁽ⁱⁿ^000s⁾^{rate (%)}⁽ⁱⁿ^000s⁾^{rate (%)}⁽ⁱⁿ^000s⁾^{rate (%)}
^8,193^33.2³^,820^63.4¹^,020^88.7¹^,003^77.0⁶⁰⁹^59.9¹^,179^31.8
^8,321^32.9³^,816^63.8¹^,055^89.5⁹⁷⁰^73.8⁷²³^53.3¹^,064^36.8
^8,400^30.2³^,672^60.5¹^,022^85.7⁸⁷¹^72.8⁵⁹³^55.6¹^,183^32.2
^8,745^33.2⁴^,029^63.8¹^,142^88.4⁹⁰⁹^75.1⁶⁷⁷^60.4¹^,294^35.9
^9,031^34.3⁴^,276^63.6¹^,215^87.3⁹⁷³^79.2⁶⁸⁹^63.6¹^,391^32.4
^9,567^34.5⁴^,536^62.7¹^,159^85.2¹^,102^73.5⁸¹⁹^56.4¹^,450^40.1
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL30797}^9,860^34.9⁴^,679^63.2¹^,104^84.7¹^,180^78.3⁹⁰⁹^60.0¹^,477^37.3
^g/w^9,837^32.2⁴^,474^60.8⁹⁶¹^82.⁰¹^,058^75.2⁸³⁵^61.0¹^,618^38.7
^s^.or^9,887^28.9⁴^,181^56.5⁷⁵³^80.3⁹⁴¹^73.2⁸⁶²^59.7¹^,625^34.2
^le^ak^10,052^26.6⁴^,168^53.3⁷⁷⁶^76.⁶⁸³⁸^71.9⁹⁹⁴^52.2¹^,560^32.4
^9,874^22.5⁴^,119^46.3⁶⁸⁵^68.⁴⁸⁴⁶^62.6⁸⁴³^46.2¹^,736^30.0
^://wiki^9,881^18.9³^,834^41.2⁵⁵⁴^61.3⁷⁷⁸^55.7⁸⁰⁶^45.1¹^,682^26.2
^h^ttp^9,741^15.8³^,443^35.6³⁷⁸^56.5⁷¹¹^46.0⁷³⁶^37.9¹^,617^25.2
^9,425^12.5³^,025^30.6³⁵⁰^51.8⁴⁸²^43.8⁶⁵¹^36.5¹^,536^19.2
^9,712^12.5³^,184^29.3⁴¹²^45.9⁵⁶¹^42.6⁶⁵⁶^33.5¹^,553^18.4
^10,044^10.6³^,348^25.3⁴⁹¹^34.⁸⁶²³^33.4⁶⁴⁰^30.7¹^,587^17.1
^10,206^10.0³^,359^23.3⁴¹³^42.⁶⁶¹⁵^32.3⁶⁵⁷^24.7¹^,665^14.8
^10,411^12.0³^,591^27.3⁵⁷⁸^44.²⁶⁵⁹^39.7⁷⁰¹^29.6¹^,641^15.7
^{10,442 10.1}³^,725^22.4⁵⁸¹^37.⁵⁶³⁴^31.1⁷⁵⁴^23.3¹^,750^14.0
^{10,476 10.5}³^,719^23.7⁶¹²^35.³⁵⁹⁹^35.5⁸²⁴^23.0¹^,679^15.7
^10,938^9.1³^,909^20.2⁵⁹⁶^30.8⁶⁵²^28.7⁷⁵⁰^23.2¹^,907^12.7
^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^al^R^e^s^earch^S^e^rvⁱ^{ce (C}^R^S^{) es}^tⁱ^m^at^es^bas^e^{d on}^an^al^y^sⁱ^s^of^U^.^S^.^C^eⁿ^s^u^s^Bu^reau^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^r^r^e^nt^P^o^p^u^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey⁽^C^P^S⁾^A^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c
^em^en^t^(A^S^E^C⁾^dat^a^.
^{Details m}^a^yⁿ^o^{t su}^m^to^to^{tals d}^u^{e to}^r^o^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^.
^ily^pov^erty^s^t^atu^s^bas^e^{d on}^cas^hⁱⁿ^com^e^oth^e^{r th}^an^cas^h^w^e^lf^are.
^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

Figure 6 Support Table. Food Stamp Recipiency Rates Among
Single-Mother Families, by Household Income Relative to
Household Poverty Threshold, 1987 to 2006
^Hou^s^eh^ol^dⁱⁿ^com^e^b^e^l^o^w^130%^{of p}^overty
^H^o^useho^l^{d inco}^m^e^H^o^useho^l^{d inco}^m^e
^{All sing}^le-^m^o^t^her^l^e^s^s^th^an^50%^of^from^50%^{to b}^e^l^o^w
^f^a^m^ilies^To^t^a^l^poverty^130%^{of p}^overty
^Food^Food^Food^Food
^st^a^m^p^Num^b^er^st^a^m^p^Num^b^er^st^a^m^p^Num^b^er^st^a^m^p
^Num^b^er^recipiency⁽ⁱⁿ^recipiency⁽ⁱⁿ^recipiency⁽ⁱⁿ^recipiency
^Yea^r⁽ⁱⁿ^000s⁾^rate^000s⁾^rate^000s⁾^rate^000s⁾^rate
¹⁹⁸⁷^8,193^35.8⁴^,063^65.7¹^,595^76.1²^,469^59.0
¹⁹⁸⁸^8,321^36.3⁴^,121^65.7¹^,706^75.1²^,414^59.0
¹⁹⁸⁹^8,400^33.9³^,917^63.7¹^,466^76.9²^,451^55.8
¹⁹⁹⁰^8,745^37.1⁴^,265^68.4¹^,651^79.4²^,614^61.4
¹⁹⁹¹^9,031^39.1⁴^,472^68.8¹^,736^79.9²^,736^61.7
¹⁹⁹²^9,567^41.1⁴^,756^70.9¹^,970^79.8²^,787^64.5
¹⁹⁹³^9,860^42.5⁴^,990^70.8¹^,955^80.7³^,034^64.4
¹⁹⁹⁴^9,837^40.2⁴^,673^70.9¹^,786^80.3²^,887^65.1
¹⁹⁹⁵^9,887^37.2⁴^,494^66.5¹^,539^77.3²^,955^60.9
¹⁹⁹⁶^10,052^35.8⁴^,545^65.0¹^,633^76.8²^,912^58.4
¹⁹⁹⁷^9,874^32.4⁴^,392^61.5¹^,642^73.1²^,750^54.6
¹⁹⁹⁸^9,881^29.8⁴^,193^56.7¹^,491^69.5²^,703^49.6
¹⁹⁹⁹^9,741^24.9³^,746^51.5¹^,274^63.3²^,472^45.4
²⁰⁰⁰^9,425^22.3³^,420^49.8¹^,013^66.3²^,407^42.9
^2000r^9,712^22.9³^,526^50.3¹^,128^64.6²^,398^43.6
²⁰⁰¹^10,044^23.5³^,780^50.1¹^,281^60.6²^,499^44.8
²⁰⁰²^10,206^24.6³^,809^51.6¹^,268^65.2²^,541^44.8
²⁰⁰³^10,411^25.6³^,969^53.7¹^,367^64.1²^,602^48.2
²⁰⁰⁴^10,442^27.0⁴^,005^57.0¹^,465^68.2²^,540^50.6
²⁰⁰⁵^10,477^27.8⁴^,139^56.1¹^,507^65.9²^,632^50.4
²⁰⁰⁶^10,938^26.3⁴^,303^54.2¹^,455^66.9²^,948^48.0
^Source:^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{) es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^an^aly^s^is^of^U.S.^C^eⁿ^s^u^s^B^u^reau
^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^S^o^ci^al^an^{d Econ}^omⁱ^c^S^u^ppl^em^en^t^(A^S^E^C⁾
^dat^a^.
^No^te:^{Details m}^a^yⁿ^o^{t su}^m^to^to^{tals d}^u^{e to}^r^o^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^.
^{r = R}^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

Figure 7 Support Table. Poor Single Mothers: Work and
Welfare Status During the Year, 1987 to 2006
^Received^Work^{ed but}
^cas^h^Work^ed^{did no}^t^Neither
^Num^b^er^Received^we^l^f^a^r^e^Co^m^b^ined^{at an}^y^{receive cas}^h^w^o^rk^{ed, nor}
^{of p}^oor^cas^h^but^did^wo^r^k^aⁿ^d^ti^m^e^w^e^{lfare at}^received
^sing^le^we^l^f^a^r^e^no^t^w^o^rk^we^l^f^a^r^e^during^an^{y ti}^m^e^we^l^f^a^r^e
^m^o^thers^during^during^{over the}^th^{e year}^during^t^h^e^during^t^h^e
^Yea^r⁽ⁱⁿ^000s⁾^{year (%}⁾^{year (%}⁾^{year (%}⁾^(%)^{year (%}⁾^{year (%}⁾
¹⁹⁸⁷^3,661^61.8^43.3^18.5^42.2^23.7^14.5
¹⁹⁸⁸^3,650^62.2^43.0^19.2^43.5^24.3^13.5
¹⁹⁸⁹^3,506^58.6^42.7^15.9^43.1^27.2^14.2
¹⁹⁹⁰^3,821^61.9^41.4^20.5^46.0^25.5^12.6
¹⁹⁹¹^4,101^62.1^43.3^18.8^44.3^25.5^12.5
¹⁹⁹²^4,339^61.0^42.1^18.9^43.6^24.7^14.3
¹⁹⁹³^4,456^61.4^41.5^19.8^44.3^24.5^14.1
¹⁹⁹⁴^4,203^58.3^37.8^20.5^47.3^26.8^14.9
¹⁹⁹⁵^3,971^54.2^34.2^20.0^49.7^29.7^16.1
¹⁹⁹⁶^4,005^51.4^31.1^20.3^52.6^32.2^16.4
¹⁹⁹⁷^3,946^44.0^24.5^19.5^57.8^38.3^17.7
¹⁹⁹⁸^3,685^38.9^19.2^19.7^60.4^40.7^20.4
¹⁹⁹⁹^3,314^33.1^15.4^17.8^64.3^46.5^20.3
²⁰⁰⁰^2,911^27.9^14.4^13.5^63.8^50.3^21.9
^2000r^3,090^27.2^13.6^13.6^61.6^48.1^24.8
²⁰⁰¹^3,259^23.2^12.9^10.4^58.6^48.2^28.6
²⁰⁰²^3,284^21.5^11.8^9.8^59.0^49.2^29.3
²⁰⁰³^3,525^26.0^14.7^{11.2 56.5}^45.3^28.7
²⁰⁰⁴^3,648^20.8^12.1^8.7^55.3^46.6^32.6
²⁰⁰⁵^3,640^22.1^13.2^8.9^54.0^45.1^32.8
²⁰⁰⁶^3,841^18.8^11.0^7.8^54.4^46.7^34.6
^Source:^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{) es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^an^aly^s^is^of^U.S.^C^eⁿ^s^u^s^B^u^reau
^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(CP^S⁾^A^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t⁽^A^SE^C)
^dat^a^.
^{r = R}^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

CRS-45
Figure 8 Support Table. Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty
and Household Low-Income Status on Single Mothers, 1987 to 2006
^{Percent poor bas}^e^{d on:}
^{Preceding colum}ⁿ⁺^:^Preceding^{Preceding colum}ⁿ⁺^:^Fam^ily^Hous^{ehold cas}^h^incom^e
^Fa^m^ily^{Preceding colum}ⁿ⁺^:^Fa^m^ily^ca^{sh w}^e^lf^a^r^e^columⁿ⁺^:^{EITC plus Child Ta}^x^Credit^{+ f}^o^o^d^st^a^m^{ps + EITC + Child Ta}^x
^earned^Fa^m^ily^ca^{sh inco}^m^e^(“offi^ci^al^p^overty^Fa^m^ily^f^o^o^d^a^{nd sta}^t^{e refunda}^{ble credits}^{Credit + sta}^t^{e refunda}^{ble credits less}
^Yea^r^inco^m^e^oⁿ^ly^oth^{er th}^an^w^e^l^f^are^inco^m^e^”⁾^st^a^m^ps^{less FICA a}^{nd inco}^m^e^t^a^x^e^s^{FICA a}^{nd inco}^m^e^ta^x^e^s
¹⁹⁸⁷^53.9^46.6^44.7^42.3^41.1^38.2
¹⁹⁸⁸^53.8^45.9^43.9^42.2^41.3^37.9
¹⁹⁸⁹^52.2^43.7^41.7^39.7^39.2^35.5
¹⁹⁹⁰^53.8^46.1^43.7^41.5^39.9^36.1
¹⁹⁹¹^55.2^47.4^45.4^42.8^41.3^37.0
¹⁹⁹²^55.3^47.4^45.4^42.5^40.6^36.5
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL30797}¹⁹⁹³^56.2^47.4^45.2^42.7^40.7^36.8
^g/w¹⁹⁹⁴^53.9^45.5^42.7^39.8^36.5^32.1
^s^.or¹⁹⁹⁵^51.0^42.3^40.2^36.9^32.5^29.2
^le^ak¹⁹⁹⁶^49.8^41.5^39.8^37.1^32.9^29.3
^://wiki¹⁹⁹⁷^50.6^41.7^40.0^37.7^32.6^28.3¹⁹⁹⁸^47.9^38.8^37.3^35.2^29.7^26.2
^h^ttp¹⁹⁹⁹^43.6^35.3^34.0^32.2^27.5^23.6
²⁰⁰⁰^40.1^32.1^30.9^29.3^24.2^20.3
^2000r^40.8^32.8^31.8^30.5^25.8^21.8
²⁰⁰¹^41.9^33.3^32.4^30.9^26.2^22.5
²⁰⁰²^42.2^32.9^32.2^30.5^25.5^22.3
²⁰⁰³^42.9^34.5^33.9^32.2^28.3^24.0
²⁰⁰⁴^44.3^35.7^34.9^32.5^28.1^23.7
²⁰⁰⁵^44.0^35.5^34.7^32.6^27.7^23.7
²⁰⁰⁶^44.5^35.7^35.1^32.9^27.9^23.7
^Source:^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^al^R^e^s^earch^S^e^rvⁱ^{ce (C}^R^S^{) es}^tⁱ^m^at^es^bas^e^{d on}^an^al^y^sⁱ^s^of^U^.^S^.^C^e^nsus^B^u^r^e^a^u¹⁹^{88 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey⁽^C^P^S⁾^A^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d
^Econ^omⁱ^c^S^u^ppl^em^en^t^(A^S^E^C⁾^dat^a^.
^{r = R}^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

CRS-46
Figure 9 Support Table. Poverty Gap Percentiles* Based on
Cash Income Among Poor Single-Mother Families, 1987 to 2006
^Me^dⁱ^aⁿ^th
^Y^e^ar^Bottom^20%^Bottom^40%⁽⁵⁰^percentile)^T^{op 40%}^T^o^{p 20%}
¹⁹⁸⁷^27.2^43.4^51.1^60.0^78.2
¹⁹⁸⁸^26.1^40.7^48.1^57.1^74.9
¹⁹⁸⁹^25.6^42.1^50.9^58.9^77.1
¹⁹⁹⁰^27.4^43.0^50.0^58.9^76.1
¹⁹⁹¹^25.6^42.5^50.5^58.6^75.2
¹⁹⁹²^24.2^39.3^48.0^56.6^75.1
¹⁹⁹³^26.2^41.0^49.0^56.7^73.6
¹⁹⁹⁴^27.6^43.8^50.7^58.7^76.3
¹⁹⁹⁵^27.7^45.8^53.3^60.3^79.7
¹⁹⁹⁶^27.7^43.5^50.5^58.9^77.7
¹⁹⁹⁷^22.3^42.9^51.3^60.7^78.6
¹⁹⁹⁸^22.6^42.5^51.5^60.3^81.2
¹⁹⁹⁹^23.4^43.1^52.8^62.0^80.1
²⁰⁰⁰^23.5^45.5^54.8^66.3^82.9
^2000r^19.0^42.9^52.6^61.5^81.2
²⁰⁰¹^16.4^41.0^51.7^62.3^81.9
²⁰⁰²^18.9^41.6^53.0^63.6^81.9
²⁰⁰³^16.4^39.4^50.6^61.4^80.1
²⁰⁰⁴^15.6^39.0^{50.0 60.5}^79.3
²⁰⁰⁵^15.3^39.2^48.8^57.6^79.3
²⁰⁰⁶^16.6^41.2^51.4^61.2^80.0
^Source:^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{) es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s^B^u^reau
¹^{988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t⁽^A^SE^C)
^dat^a^.
^*^P^o^o^r^f^a^m^ilies’^cashⁱⁿ^co^m^e^{as a p}^e^r^cen^{t o}^f^f^a^m^ilies’^p^o^v^er^ty^th^r^e^sh^o^l^d^s^.
^{r = R}^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

CRS-47
Figure 10 Support Table. Poverty Gap Percentiles* Based on
Cash Income, Food Stamps, and Net Taxes Including the EITC
Among Poor Single-Mother Families, 1987 to 2006
^Me^dⁱ^aⁿ^th
^Y^e^ar^Bottom^20%^Bottom^40%⁽⁵⁰^percentile)^T^{op 40%}^T^o^{p 20%}
¹⁹⁸⁷^43.1^59.1^66.1^72.7^85.4
¹⁹⁸⁸^37.7^55.9^63.8^71.1^85.0
¹⁹⁸⁹^40.1^58.6^65.4^72.3^85.4
¹⁹⁹⁰^41.1^58.9^65.1^71.3^84.8
¹⁹⁹¹^42.6^59.3^65.6^72.1^84.8
¹⁹⁹²^38.6^56.0^61.9^68.6^83.0
¹⁹⁹³^40.5^56.7^63.4^69.6^82.6
¹⁹⁹⁴^42.7^59.0^65.1^71.1^84.3
¹⁹⁹⁵^40.3^58.5^65.2^71.4^85.0
¹⁹⁹⁶^41.2^58.0^64.0^70.8^84.3
¹⁹⁹⁷^34.7^54.3^62.8^70.3^85.0
¹⁹⁹⁸^30.7^53.9^61.5^68.4^84.6
¹⁹⁹⁹^31.3^53.1^61.6^70.0^84.8
²⁰⁰⁰^30.2^54.0^62.6^70.2^86.8
^2000r^26.7^51.0^61.0^69.3^85.1
²⁰⁰¹^22.4^48.6^58.9^68.3^85.4
²⁰⁰²^27.2^50.8^59.5^67.0^83.4
²⁰⁰³^24.4^47.7^57.7^67.3^84.9
²⁰⁰⁴^25.7^47.1^56.2^65.7^83.5
²⁰⁰⁵^25.2^48.8^58.0^66.7^83.3
²⁰⁰⁶^22.2^49.1^60.1^68.5^84.1
^Source:^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{) es}^tim^ates^bas^e^d^on^an^aly^s^is^of^{U.S. C}^eⁿ^s^u^s^B^u^reau
^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^r^v^e^y^(C^PS^{) A}^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^Sup^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t⁽^A^SE^C)
^dat^a^.
^*^P^o^o^r^f^a^m^ilies’^cashⁱⁿ^co^m^e^{as a p}^e^r^cen^{t o}^f^f^a^m^ilies’^p^o^v^er^ty^th^r^e^sh^o^l^d^s^.
^{r = R}^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

CRS-48
Figure 11 Support Table. Bottom Income Quintile* of Single Mother Families:
Average Annual Income by Source, 1987 to 2006
(in 2006 dollars)
^{Federal and}
^st^a^t^e^AFDC,^Food
^inco^m^e^T^ANF,^Supplem^ent^a^l^st^a^m^ps^Child^Gr^o^s^s^Ref^und-^Ref^und-^To^t^a^l
^tax^e^s^an^d^G^e^neral^Security^(m^ark^e^t^suppo^rt^aⁿ^d^Oth^e^r^f^a^m^ily^a^b^{le child}^ab^l^e^s^t^ate^inco^m^e^net^o^f
^r^{FICA ta}^x^e^s^Assist^aⁿ^c^e^Inco^m^e⁽^SSI)^val^u^e⁾^a^lim^oⁿ^y^inco^m^e^earnings^E^I^T^C^tax^credit^tax^credits^tax^e^s
^-⁹⁶³^,315¹²⁸^2,722²⁷⁴⁴⁹¹^1,071¹²²ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^8,026
^-¹⁰³^2,942⁹⁹^2,364²⁵³⁴³²^1,264¹³⁹ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^7,390
^-⁸⁶³^,095¹²⁰^2,567²⁶²⁵⁵⁰^1,061¹³⁰ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^7,699
^-⁹¹³^,283¹⁰⁹^2,625²²⁴³⁸⁵^1,133¹³⁶ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^7,804
^-⁷⁵³^,229¹¹⁰^2,873¹⁹¹³⁴⁵⁹²⁷¹³⁵ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^7,736
^-⁷²²^,809¹⁷⁹^2,740²⁴⁰⁴⁴⁸⁹⁰⁸¹⁴⁰ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^7,392
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL30797}^-⁷²²^,954¹⁸⁵^2,678²⁶⁴⁵⁴⁰⁸⁷⁶¹⁴³ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^7,568
^g/w^-¹⁰²^3,075²⁸⁹^2,996³⁰³⁴⁶⁴^1,297³³²ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^8,654
^s^.or^-¹²⁴^2,779³³⁸^2,589³⁴⁹⁵⁴³^1,628⁴⁹⁹ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^8,601
^le^ak^-¹⁴⁹^2,467²⁸⁵^2,539³⁸⁹⁵⁰³^1,875⁶⁴⁰ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^8,552
^-¹²⁷^2,201²⁴⁷^2,393³¹⁵⁷³⁵^1,621⁵⁶⁷ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^7,950
^://wiki^-¹⁷⁷^1,744³³⁴^2,115²⁶⁶⁷⁰⁹^2,171⁷⁷⁵ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^7,938
^h^ttp^-²²³^1,432³⁶⁴^1,826⁴¹⁴⁷³⁶^2,773⁹⁴⁹ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^8,273
^-³⁰²^1,177⁵⁷⁰^1,710⁶¹⁸⁶⁶⁵^3,645^1,217ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^9,300
^-²⁴¹^1,109⁴⁷⁷^1,683⁵⁷⁰⁷⁷⁵^3,001^1,031ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^8,405
^-²²⁶⁹²⁸⁴⁷⁸^1,749⁵⁴³⁶⁹⁵^2,824⁹³²ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^7,923
^-²²⁹⁸⁹⁰⁴⁹¹^1,817⁶⁴⁸^1,078^2,717⁸⁹⁸ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^8,311
^-¹⁴⁶^1,083⁴³⁸^1,914⁵⁵²⁸⁵⁶^2,122⁵⁹⁵ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^7,414
^-¹⁵⁷⁸²⁰⁴⁵²^2,098⁵⁸¹⁸¹⁰^2,024⁵⁴⁷¹²³²⁴^7,322
^-¹⁴⁴⁸³²⁴⁸³^2,075⁵⁴¹⁸⁹¹^1,968⁶⁷⁸³²⁵⁷^,353
^-²⁰⁵⁷⁵⁴⁴⁹²^2,113⁵⁰³⁸⁹⁴^2,277⁷²²³³³⁷^,587
^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^al^R^e^s^earch^S^e^rvⁱ^{ce (C}^R^S^{) es}^tⁱ^m^at^es^bas^e^{d on}^an^al^y^sⁱ^s^of^U^.^S^.^C^eⁿ^s^u^s^Bu^reau^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Pop^u^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^Sur^v^e^y⁽^C^P^S⁾^A^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c
^em^en^t^(A^S^E^C⁾^dat^a^.
ⁱⁿ^{tiles b}^a^sed^oⁿ^r^aⁿ^kⁱⁿ^g^o^f^r^a^tio^{s o}^f^f^a^m^ily^cash^p^r^e-^taxⁱⁿ^co^m^e^r^e^lativ^{e to}^p^o^v^er^ty^{. T}^a^x^e^{s in}^clu^d^{e f}^e^d^e^r^a^{l an}^d^{state in}^co^m^e^tax^e^{s an}^d^FI^CA^tax^e^s.
^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.

CRS-49
Figure 12 Support Table. Second Income Quintile* of Single Mother Families:
Average Annual Income by Source, 1987 to 2006
(in 2006 dollars)
^{Federal and}^AFDC,^Food
^s^t^{ate incom}^e^T^ANF,^Supplem^ent^a^l^st^a^m^ps^Child^Gr^o^s^s^Ref^und-^Ref^und-^To^t^a^l
^tax^e^s^an^d^G^e^neral^Security^(m^ark^e^t^suppo^rt^aⁿ^d^Oth^e^r^f^a^m^ily^a^b^{le child}^ab^l^e^s^t^ate^inco^m^e^net^o^f
^r^{FICA ta}^x^e^s^Assist^aⁿ^c^e^Inco^m^e⁽^SSI)^val^u^e⁾^a^lim^oⁿ^y^inco^m^e^earnings^E^I^T^C^tax^credit^tax^credits^tax^e^s
^-³⁴⁶^5,142⁵⁸⁸^2,021⁴⁹²^1,977^4,160⁴⁵⁸ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^14,857
^-³⁵⁴^4,918⁵³⁴^2,019⁴³³^1,827^4,469⁴⁷⁵ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^14,320
^-⁴⁵⁹^4,571⁶⁷⁷^1,748⁵⁶⁰^1,746^5,757⁵⁸³ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^15,184
^-⁴⁶⁶^4,500⁵⁵⁵^2,123⁵⁶⁰^1,769^5,442⁵⁷⁰ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^15,052
^-³⁸⁶^4,431⁵⁶⁸^2,223⁴⁷¹^1,699^4,777⁶⁷⁸ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^14,462
^-³⁷⁷^4,029⁵⁴⁷^2,136⁶²⁵^1,704^4,636⁶⁷³ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^13,973
^-³⁴⁹^4,155⁸³³^2,133⁵³⁰^1,785^4,325⁶⁶³ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^14,095
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL30797}^-⁴⁶³^3,445⁹⁷³^2,004⁷⁰²^1,765^5,687^1,322ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^15,434
^g/w^-⁶⁵³^3,017^1,124^2,050⁷³⁴^2,188^7,579^1,811ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^17,851
^s^.or^-⁶⁰⁹^2,574⁹⁶¹^1,727⁷⁵¹^2,018^7,143^1,920ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^16,485
^le^ak^-⁶⁵⁷^1,955⁹¹⁸^1,518⁹⁰⁴^1,992^8,075^2,299ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^17,005
^-⁸²⁸^1,455^1,025^1,270⁶⁵⁹^2,043^9,893^2,572ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^18,089
^://wiki^-⁹⁹⁷^1,096⁹¹⁴⁹²¹⁸⁴⁸^1,838^11,609^2,744ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^18,973
^h^ttp^-¹^,196⁷⁹⁴^{689 753}^1,010^2,142^13,711^2,809ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^20,713
^-¹^,166⁷³⁹⁷⁴³⁸⁰⁹^1,011^2,111^13,261^2,742ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^20,250
^-¹^,086⁷⁰⁹⁸⁹⁹⁸⁵⁷^1,093^2,246^12,331^2,653ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^19,720
^-¹^,082⁵⁸⁰⁶⁹⁶⁸⁶⁵^1,038^2,448^12,439^2,723ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^19,708
^-⁸⁶⁵⁸⁰⁹⁶⁹²^1,054^1,099^2,182^11,504^2,298ⁿ^/^aⁿ^/^a^18,772
^-⁹²¹⁶¹⁹⁸⁶⁸^1,254^1,081^2,454^11,263^2,209⁴³⁸¹⁰³^19,368
^-⁹¹⁹⁷¹⁷⁹⁶⁷^1,343⁹⁵⁴^2,388^10,964^2,549²⁷⁷¹¹⁴^19,354
^-¹^,083⁴⁷⁷⁷⁸⁰^1,228⁸⁹⁰^2,382^11,329^2,588²⁸⁰¹⁴⁴^19,017
^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^al^R^e^se^a^r^c^h^Se^r^vⁱ^c^e^(C^R^S^{) es}^tⁱ^m^at^es^bas^e^{d on}^an^al^y^sⁱ^s^of^U^.^S^.^C^eⁿ^s^u^s^Bu^reau^{1988 t}^o^{2007 C}^u^rren^t^Popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^rv^ey⁽^C^P^S⁾^A^nnua^l^So^cⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^d^E^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c
^em^en^t^(A^S^E^C⁾^dat^a^.
ⁱⁿ^{tiles b}^a^sed^oⁿ^r^aⁿ^kⁱⁿ^g^o^f^r^a^tio^{s o}^f^f^a^m^ily^cash^p^r^e-^taxⁱⁿ^co^m^e^r^e^lativ^{e to}^p^o^v^er^ty^{. T}^a^x^e^{s in}^clu^d^{e f}^e^d^e^r^a^{l an}^d^{state in}^co^m^e^tax^e^{s an}^d^FI^CA^tax^e^s.
^e^vⁱ^s^e^{d es}^tim^ates^bas^e^{d on}^ex^pan^d^{ed C}^P^S^s^a^m^p^{le an}^{d 2000 decen}ⁿⁱ^{al cen}^s^u^s^-^deriv^e^{d w}^e^ig^h^t^s^.