Budget Reconciliation Procedures: The Senate's "Byrd Rule"

The Budget Reconciliation Process:
The Senate’s “Byrd Rule”
Updated March 20, 2008
Robert Keith
Specialist in American National Government
Government and Finance Division



The Budget Reconciliation Process:
The Senate’s “Byrd Rule”
Summary
Reconciliation is a procedure under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 by
which Congress implements budget resolution policies affecting mainly permanent
spending and revenue programs. The principal focus in the reconciliation process has
been deficit reduction, but in some years reconciliation has involved revenue
reduction generally and spending increases in selected areas. Although reconciliation
is an optional procedure, it has been used most years since its first use in 1980 (19
reconciliation bills have been enacted into law and three have been vetoed).
During the first several years’ experience with reconciliation, the legislation
contained many provisions that were extraneous to the purpose of implementing
budget resolution policies. The reconciliation submissions of committees included
such things as provisions that had no budgetary effect, that increased spending or
reduced revenues when the reconciliation instructions called for reduced spending
or increased revenues, or that violated another committee’s jurisdiction.
In 1985 and 1986, the Senate adopted the Byrd rule (named after its principal
sponsor, Senator Robert C. Byrd) on a temporary basis as a means of curbing these
practices. The Byrd rule has been extended and modified several times over the
years. In 1990, the Byrd rule was incorporated into the Congressional Budget Act of

1974 as Section 313 and made permanent (2 U.S.C. 644).


A Senator opposed to the inclusion of extraneous matter in reconciliation
legislation may offer an amendment (or a motion to recommit the measure with
instructions) that strikes such provisions from the legislation, or, under the Byrd rule,
a Senator may raise a point of order against such matter. In general, a point of order
authorized under the Byrd rule may be raised in order to strike extraneous matter
already in the bill as reported or discharged (or in the conference report), or to
prevent the incorporation of extraneous matter through the adoption of amendments
or motions. A motion to waive the Byrd rule, or to sustain an appeal of the ruling of
the chair on a point of order raised under the Byrd rule, requires the affirmative vote
of three-fifths of the membership (60 Senators if no seats are vacant).
The Byrd rule provides six definitions of what constitutes extraneous matter for
purposes of the rule (and several exceptions thereto), but the term is generally
described as covering provisions unrelated to achieving the goals of the reconciliation
instructions.
The Byrd rule has applied to 17 reconciliation measures considered by the
Senate from 1985 through the present. There have been 53 points of order and 42
waiver motions considered and disposed of under the Byrd rule, largely in a manner
that favored those who opposed the inclusion of extraneous matter in reconciliation
legislation (43 points of order were sustained, in whole or in part, and 33 waiver
motions were rejected).
This report will be updated as developments warrant.



Contents
In troduction ..................................................1
Legislative History of the Byrd Rule...............................2
Current Features of the Byrd Rule.................................4
Definitions of Extraneous Matter..............................6
Exceptions to the Definition of Extraneous Matter................6
Implementation of the Byrd Rule..................................7
Points of Order...........................................12
Waiver Motions..........................................13
Years in Which the Byrd Rule Was Not Invoked................13
Byrd Rule Controversies.......................................14
Impact on House-Senate Relations in 1993 and 1994.............14
Effects on Tax-Cut Legislation..............................17th
Rules Changes in the 110 Congress Barring Deficit Increases.....20
Appendix A. Text of the Byrd Rule..............................40
List of Tables
Table 1. Reconciliation Measures Enacted Into Law or Vetoed: 1980-2007...8
Table 2. Reconciliation Acts: Summary of Points of Order and Waiver
Motions Under the Byrd Rule...................................10
Table 3. Listing of Actions Under the Senate’s Byrd Rule, by Act:

1985-2007 ..................................................22



The Budget Reconciliation Process:
The Senate’s “Byrd Rule”
Introduction
Reconciliation is a process established under Section 310 of the Congressional1
Budget Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344), as amended. The purpose of reconciliation is to
change substantive law so that revenue and mandatory spending levels are brought
into line with budget resolution policies. Reconciliation generally has been used to
reduce the deficit through spending reductions or revenue increases, or a combination
of the two. In recent years, however, the reconciliation process also has encompassed
revenue reduction generally and spending increases in selected program areas.
Reconciliation is a two-step process. Under the first step, reconciliation
instructions are included in the budget resolution, directing one or more committees
in each House to develop legislation that changes spending or revenues (or both) by
the amounts specified in the budget resolution. If more than one committee in each
House is given instructions, each instructed committee submits reconciliation
legislation to its respective Budget Committee, which incorporates all submissions,
without any substantive revision, into a single, omnibus budget reconciliation
measure. Reconciliation procedures during a session usually have applied to multiple
committees and involved omnibus legislation.
Under the second step, the omnibus budget reconciliation measure is considered
in the House and Senate under expedited procedures (for example, debate time in the
Senate on a reconciliation measure is limited to 20 hours and amendments must be
germane). The process culminates with enactment of the measure, thus putting the
policies of the budget resolution into effect.
Reconciliation, which was first used by the House and Senate in 1980, is an
optional procedure, but it has been used in most years. Over the period covering
from 1980 to the present, 19 reconciliation bills have been enacted into law and three
have been vetoed.
During the first several years’ experience with reconciliation, the legislation
contained many provisions that were extraneous to the purpose of reducing the
deficit. The reconciliation submissions of committees included such things as
provisions that had no budgetary effect, that increased spending or reduced revenues,
or that violated another committee’s jurisdiction.


1 For a detailed discussion of the reconciliation process, see CRS Report RL33030, The
Budget Reconciliation Process: House and Senate Procedures, by Robert Keith and Bill
Heniff Jr.

In 1985 and 1986, the Senate adopted the Byrd rule (named after its principal
sponsor, Senator Robert C. Byrd) as a means of curbing these practices. Initially, the
rule consisted of two components, involving a provision in a reconciliation act and
a Senate resolution. The Byrd rule has been modified several times over the years.
The purpose of this report is to briefly recount the legislative history of the Byrd
rule, summarize its current features, and describe its implementation from its
inception through the present.
Legislative History of the Byrd Rule
During the first five years that the Byrd rule was in effect, from late 1985 until
late 1990, it consisted of two separate components — (1) a provision in statute
applying to initial Senate consideration of reconciliation measures, and (2) a Senate
resolution extending application of portions of the statutory provision to conference
reports and amendments between the two Houses. Several modifications were made
to the Byrd rule in 1986 and 1987, including extending its expiration date from
January 2, 1987, to January 2, 1988, and then to September 30, 1992, but the two
separate components of the rule were preserved. In 1990, these components were
merged together and made permanent when they were incorporated into the
Congressional Budget Act (CBA) of 1974 as Section 313. There have been no
further changes in the Byrd rule since 1990.
The Byrd rule originated on October 24, 1985, when Senator Robert C. Byrd,
on behalf of himself and others, offered Amendment No. 878 (as modified) to S.

1730, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985.2


The Senate adopted the amendment by a vote of 96-0.3 In this form, the Byrd rule
applied to initial Senate consideration of reconciliation measures.
Senator Byrd explained that the basic purposes of the amendment were to
protect the effectiveness of the reconciliation process (by excluding extraneous
matter that often provoked controversy without aiding deficit reduction efforts) and
to preserve the deliberative character of the Senate (by excluding from consideration
under expedited procedures legislative matters not central to deficit reduction that
should be debated under regular procedures). He opened his remarks by stating:
... we are in the process now of seeing ... the Pandora’s box which has been
opened to the abuse of the reconciliation process. That process was never meant
to be used as it is being used. There are 122 items in the reconciliation bill that
are extraneous. Henceforth, if the majority on a committee should wish to
include in reconciliation recommendations to the Budget Committee any
measure, no matter how controversial, it can be brought to the Senate under an


2 For a detailed legislative history of the Byrd rule, see the following print of the Senate
Budget Committee: Budget Process Law Annotated — 1993 Edition, by William G.rdst
Dauster, 103 Cong., 1 sess., S. Prt. 103-49, October 1993, notes on pp. 229-246.
3 The Senate’s consideration of and vote on the amendment occurred on pp. S14032-S14038
of the Congressional Record (daily ed.) of October 24, 1985.

ironclad built-in time agreement that limits debate, plus time on amendments and
motions, to no more than 20 hours.
It was never foreseen that the Budget Reform Act would be used in that way. So
if the budget reform process is going to be preserved, and more importantly if we
are going to preserve the deliberative process in this U.S. Senate — which is the
outstanding, unique element with respect to the U.S. Senate, action must be taken4
now to stop this abuse of the budget process.
The Byrd amendment was included in modified form in COBRA of 1985 (P.L.
99-272), which was not enacted into law until April 7, 1986, as Section 20001 (100
Stat. 390-391). The Byrd rule, in this form, thus became effective on April 7. As
originally framed, the Byrd rule was set to expire on January 2, 1987.
Over the years, the SenateFigure 1. Laws and Resolutions
has expanded and revised theEstablishing the Byrd Rule


Byrd rule through the adoption
of two resolutions and the
inclusion of provisions in fourP.L. 99-272, Consolidated Omnibus
laws. Figure 1 lists the lawsBudget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Section
and resolutions that have2001 (100 Stat. 390-391), April 7, 1986.
established and revised the Byrdthst
rule.S.Res. 286 (99 Congress, 1 Session),
December 19, 1985.
On December 19, 1985,thnd
the Senate adopted by voiceS.Res. 509 (99 Congress, 2 Session),
vote a resolution (S.Res. 286),October 16, 1986.
sponsored by Senator Alan
Simpson and others, thatP.L. 99-509, Omnibus Budget
extended the application ofReconciliation Act of 1986, Section 7006 (100
portions of the statutoryStat. 1949-1950), October 21, 1986.
provision to conference reports
and amendments between theP.L. 100-119, Increasing the Statutory
two Houses. Because theLimit on the Public Debt, Section 205 (101
enactment of COBRA of 1985Stat. 784-785), September 29, 1987.
was delayed until early 1986,
the portion of the Byrd ruleP.L. 101-508, Omnibus Budget
dealing with conference reportsReconciliation Act of 1990, Section 13214
became effective first. The(104 Stat. 1388-621 through 1388-623),
provisions of S.Res. 286 wereNovember 5, 1990.
set to expire on the same date as
the provision in COBRA ofP.L. 105-33, Balanced Budget Act of

1985 (January 2, 1987).1997, Section 10113(b)(1) (111 Stat. 688),


August 5, 1997.
In the following year, the
Senate was involved in two
actions affecting the Byrd rule. First, the Senate adopted S.Res. 509 by voice vote
4 See the remarks of Senator Robert C. Byrd on p. S14032 of the Congressional Record
(daily ed.), October 24, 1985.

on October 16, 1986. The measure, offered by Senator Alan Simpson and others,
modified S.Res. 286 in a technical fashion. Second, the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986 was enacted into law, as P.L. 99-509, on October 21,
1986. Section 7006 of the law made several minor changes in the Byrd rule and
extended its expiration date by one year — until January 2, 1988.
Further changes in the Byrd rule were made in 1987. These changes were
included in a measure increasing the statutory limit on the public debt, modifying
procedures under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
and making other budget process changes (P.L. 100-119, signed into law on
September 29; see Title II (Budget Process Reform)). Section 205 of the law added
an item to the list of definitions of extraneous matter in the Byrd rule and extended
its expiration until September 30, 1992.
In 1990, Congress and the President agreed to further modifications of the
budget process by enacting the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990 (Title XIII
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990). Section 13214 of the law made
significant revisions to the Byrd rule and incorporated it (as permanent law) into the
CBA of 1974 as Section 313 (2 U.S.C. 644).
Finally, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1997 (Title X of the Balanced Budget
Act of 1997) made minor technical changes in Section 313 of the CBA of 1974 to
correct drafting problems with the BEA of 1990.
Current Features of the Byrd Rule
A Senator opposed to the inclusion of extraneous matter in reconciliation
legislation has two principal options for dealing with the problem. First, a Senator
may offer an amendment (or a motion to recommit the measure with instructions)
that strikes such provisions from the legislation. Second, under the Byrd rule, a
Senator may raise a point of order against extraneous matter.
The Byrd rule is a relatively complex rule5 that applies to two types of
reconciliation measures considered pursuant to Section 310 of the CBA of 1974 —
reconciliation bills and reconciliation resolutions.6 (A reconciliation resolution could


5 Some of the complexities of the Byrd rule are examined in: (1) Riddick’s Senate
Procedure (S.Doc. 101-28, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 1992), by Floyd M. Riddick and Alan S.
Frumin, pp. 624-626; and (2) Budget Process Law Annotated — 1993 Edition, by William
G. Dauster, op. cit., beginning on p. 198.
6 Part of the Byrd rule, Section 313(a), also applies to reconciliation measures considered
pursuant to Section 258C of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985. This section, which has never been invoked, provides for the consideration of
reconciliation legislation in the fall in order to achieve deficit reductions that would obviate
the need for an expected sequester under the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) requirement (or,
previously, the deficit targets). The PAYGO requirement effectively expired at the end ofth
the 107 Congress (see CRS Report RS21378, Termination of the “Pay-As-You-Go”
(PAYGO) Requirement for FY2003 and Later Years, by Robert Keith.) All of the
(continued...)

be used to make changes in legislation that had passed the House and Senate but had
not yet been enrolled and sent to the President. The practice of the House and Senate
has been to consider only reconciliation bills.)
In general, a point of order authorized under the Byrd rule may be raised in order
to strike extraneous matter already in the bill as reported or discharged (or in the
conference report), or to prevent the incorporation of extraneous matter through the
adoption of amendments or motions. A point of order may be raised against a single
provision or two or more provisions (as designated by title or section number, or by
page and line number), and may be raised against a single amendment or two or more
amendments. The chair may sustain a point of order as to all of the provisions (or
amendments) or only some of them.
Once material has been stricken from reconciliation legislation under the Byrd
rule, it may not be offered again as an amendment.
A motion to waive the Byrd rule, or to sustain an appeal of the ruling of the
chair on a point of order raised under the Byrd rule, requires the affirmative vote of
three-fifths of the membership (60 Senators if no seats are vacant).7 A single waiver
motion can: (1) apply to the Byrd rule as well as other provisions of the
Congressional Budget Act; (2) involve multiple as well as single provisions or
amendments; (3) extend (for specified language) through consideration of the
conference report as well as initial consideration of the measure or amendment; and
(4) be made prior to the raising of a point of order, thus making the point of order
moot.
When a reconciliation measure, or a conference report thereon, is considered,
the Senate Budget Committee must submit for the record a list of potentially
extraneous matter included therein.8 This list is advisory, however, and does not bind
the chair in ruling on points of order.
Determinations of budgetary levels for purposes of enforcing the Byrd rule are
made by the Senate Budget Committee.
Definitions of Extraneous Matter. Subsection (b)(1) of the Byrd rule
provides definitions of what constitutes extraneous matter for purposes of the rule.


6 (...continued)
reconciliation measures considered by the Senate thus far have originated pursuant to
Section 310 of the CBA of 1974.
7 In the Senate, many points of order under the CBA of 1974 require a three-fifths vote of
the membership to waive (or to sustain an appeal of the ruling of the chair). Most of these
three-fifths waiver requirements are temporary, but in the case of the Byrd rule it isth
permanent. Section 503 of the FY2004 budget resolution (H.Con.Res. 95, 108 Cong.),
adopted on April 11, 2003, extended the expiration date for the temporary requirements to
September 30, 2008.
8 For an example of such a list, see the remarks of Senator Pete Domenici regarding the
conference report on the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 in the Congressional Record (daily
ed.) of July 31, 1997, at pp. S8406-S8408.

The Senate Budget Committee, in its report on the budget resolution for FY1994,
noted:
‘Extraneous’ is a term of art. Broadly speaking, the rule prohibits inclusion in
reconciliation of matter unrelated to the deficit reduction goals of the9
reconciliation process.
A provision is considered to be extraneous if it falls under one or more of the
following six definitions:
!it does not produce a change in outlays or revenues;
!it produces an outlay increase or revenue decrease when the
instructed committee is not in compliance with its instructions;
!it is outside of the jurisdiction of the committee that submitted the
title or provision for inclusion in the reconciliation measure;
!it produces a change in outlays or revenues which is merely
incidental to the non-budgetary components of the provision;
!it would increase the deficit for a fiscal year beyond the “budget
window” covered by the reconciliation measure;10 and
!it recommends changes in Social Security.
The last definition complements a ban in Section 310(g) of the CBA of 1974
against considering any reconciliation legislation that contains recommendations
pertaining to the Social Security. For purposes of these provisions, Social Security
is considered to include the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI)
program established under Title II of the Social Security Act; it does not include
Medicare or other programs established as part of that act.
Exceptions to the Definition of Extraneous Matter. Subsection (b)(2)
of the Byrd rule provides that a Senate-originated provision that does not produce a
change in outlays or revenues shall not be considered extraneous if the chairman and
ranking minority members of the Budget Committee and the committee reporting the
provision certify that —


9 See the report of the Senate Budget Committee to accompany S.Con.Res. 18, Concurrent
Resolution on the Budget, FY1994 (S.Rept. 103-19, March 12, 1993), p. 49.
10 The “budget window” refers to the period covered by the budget resolution, and to any
reconciliation directives included therein and the resultant reconciliation legislation.
Beginning in the late 1980s, the budget resolution is required to cover at a minimum the
“budget year” (the fiscal year beginning on October 1 in the session that the budget
resolution is adopted) and the four following fiscal years (the “outyears”). In addition,
budget resolutions sometimes cover the “current year” (the fiscal year preceding the budget
year) and up to five additional outyears. Accordingly, the longest budget window that has
applied to a budget resolution and associated reconciliation legislation covered 11 years,
including the current year.

!the provision mitigates direct effects clearly attributable to a
provision changing outlays or revenues and both provisions together
produce a net reduction in the deficit; or
!the provision will (or is likely to) reduce outlays or increase
revenues: (1) in one or more fiscal years beyond those covered by
the reconciliation measure; (2) on the basis of new regulations, court
rulings on pending legislation, or relationships between economic
indices and stipulated statutory triggers pertaining to the provision;
or (3) but reliable estimates cannot be made due to insufficient data.
Additionally, under subsection (b)(1)(A), a provision that does not change
outlays or revenues in the net, but which includes outlay decreases or revenue
increases that exactly offset outlay increases or revenue decreases, is not considered
to be extraneous.
The full text of the Byrd rule in its current form is provided in Appendix A.
Implementation of the Byrd Rule
Congress and the President considered 22 omnibus reconciliation measures (as
shown in Table 1) between calendar year 1980, when the reconciliation process was11
first used, and the present. As stated previously, 19 of these measures were enacted
into law and three were vetoed (by President Clinton). The Byrd rule has been in
effect during the consideration of the last 17 of these 22 measures, covering calendar
years 1985 through 2007. The Byrd rule had not been established when the first five
reconciliation bills were considered.
Table 1. Reconciliation Measures Enacted Into Law or Vetoed:

1980-2007


11 The Senate also considered two measures linked to the reconciliation process. On
December 15, 1975, the Senate considered, amended, and passed H.R. 5559, the Revenue
Adjustment Act of 1975, which reduced revenues by about $6.4 billion pursuant to a budget
resolution instruction. The measure was not regarded as a reconciliation bill when it was
considered by the House, but it was considered under reconciliation procedures in the
Senate. The President vetoed the measure later in the year and the House sustained his veto.
See the remarks of Senator Russell Long and the presiding officer on p. 40540 and the
remarks of Senator Edmund Muskie and others on pp. 40544-40550 in the Congressional
Record of December 15, 1975, regarding the status of H.R. 5559 as a reconciliation bill.
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-369) was regarded as a reconciliation bill
when it was considered in the House, but was stripped of that classification when it was
considered in the Senate (in April and May of 1984). The House also has considered
reconciliation measures that were not considered in the Senate.
For more information on the consideration of reconciliation measures, see CRS Report
RL30458, The Budget Reconciliation Process: Timing of Legislative Action, by Robert
Keith.

Public St at ut es- a t - Large Dat e
Reconciliation ActLawCitationEnacted
Number(or Vetoed)
Byrd Rule Not in Effect
1Omnibus Reconciliation Act96-49994 Stat. 2599-269512-05-80
of 1980
2Omnibus Budget97-3595 Stat. 357-93308-13-81
Reconciliation Act of 1981
3Tax Equity and Fiscal97-24896 Stat. 324-70709-03-82
Responsibility Act of 1982
4Omnibus Budget97-25396 Stat. 763-80709-08-82
Reconciliation Act of 1982
5Omnibus Budget98-27098 Stat. 157-16204-18-84
Reconciliation Act of 1983
Byrd Rule in Effect (Partially for COBRA of 1985)
6Consolidated Omnibus Budget99-272100 Stat. 82-39104-07-86
Reconciliation Act of 1985
7Omnibus Budget99-509100 Stat. 1874-10-21-86
Reconciliation Act of 19862078
8Omnibus Budget100-203101 Stat. 1330, 1-12-22-87
Reconciliation Act of 1987472
9Omnibus Budget101-239103 Stat. 2106-12-19-89
Reconciliation Act of 19892491
10Omnibus Budget101-508104 Stat. 1388, 1-11-05-90
Reconciliation Act of 1990630
11Omnibus Budget103-66107 Stat. 312-68508-10-93
Reconciliation Act of 1993
12Balanced Budget Act of 1995 — (H.R. 2491, vetoed)12-06-95
13Personal Responsibility and104-193110 Stat. 2105-08-22-96
Budget Reconciliation Act of2355
1996
14Balanced Budget Act of 1997105-33111 Stat. 251-78708-05-97
15Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997105-34111 Stat. 788-110308-05-97
16Taxpayer Refund and Relief — (H.R. 2488, vetoed)09-23-99
Act of 1999

17Marriage Tax Relief — (H.R. 4810, vetoed)08-05-00


Reconciliation Act of 2000

Public St at ut es- a t - Large Dat e
Reconciliation ActLawCitationEnacted
Number(or Vetoed)
18Economic Growth and Tax107-16115 Stat. 38-15006-07-01
Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001
19Jobs and Growth Tax Relief108-27117 Stat. 752-76805-28-03
Reconciliation Act of 2003
20Deficit Reduction Act of 2005109-171120 Stat. 4-18402-08-06
21Tax Increase Prevention and109-222120 Stat. 345-37305-17-06
Reconciliation Act of 2005
22College Cost Reduction and110-84121 Stat. 784-82209-27-07
Access Act of 2007
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
The Byrd rule was fully in effect during the consideration of all but the first of
the 17 reconciliation bills. During consideration of that bill, the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985, the Byrd rule applied to the
consideration of the conference report, but not to initial consideration of the bill.
The 17 reconciliation bills considered and passed by the House and Senate
during this period stemmed from reconciliation directives in 15 different budget
resolutions. Two budget resolutions, in 1997 (for FY1998) and 2005 (for FY2006),
led to the enactment of two reconciliation measures in each year.
As Table 2 shows, there have been 53 points of order and 42 waiver motions,
for a total of 95 actions, considered and disposed of under the Byrd rule.12 (There is
not a one-to-one correspondence between points of order and waiver motions. A
point of order can be raised under the Byrd rule without a waiver motion being
offered; conversely, a waiver motion can be offered without a point of order having
been raised.)


12 The Byrd rule is only one of many point-of-order provisions in Titles III and IV of the
CBA of 1974, as amended (2 U.S.C. 644). In some instances, points of order or waiver
motions are made under the act by general reference only (such as a Senator raising a point
of order “under Title III of the Act”) rather than by specific reference to the provision(s)
involved. When only general references are made, it usually is impossible to determine (by
reference to debate in the Congressional Record alone) which provision of the act is
involved. Consequently, this report reflects only those instances when specific reference
was made to Section 313 of the act or to the Byrd rule and may undercount somewhat the
actual number of actions involving the rule.

CRS-10
Table 2. Reconciliation Acts: Summary of Points of Order and Waiver Motions Under the Byrd Rule
PublicCalendarPoints of OrderWaiver MotionsTotalPoints
LawYear(s)of
(orofOrderTo Strike Provision(s) FromTo Bar Consideration
VetoedSenateandBill or Conference Reportof Amendment
Bill ) Ac t i on WaiverTotal Approved Rejected Total
Num b e r MotionsSust a ined Fell To t a l Sust a ined Fell To t a l

99-2721985 — — — — — — — — — — —


iki/CRS-RL30862
g/w99-5091986112 — — — 21124
s.or
leak100-2031987 — — — — — — — 1 — 11
://wiki101-2391989 — — — — — — — — — — —
http101-50819903142 — 261239
103-6619932243 — 37 — 4411
19954 — 44 — 48 — 7715
104-19319964151 — 1613410
105-3319972243 — 3723512

105-3419971236 — 6926817



CRS-11
PublicCalendarPoints of OrderWaiver MotionsTotalPoints
LawYear(s)of
(orofOrderTo Strike Provision(s) FromTo Bar Consideration
VetoedSenateandBill or Conference Reportof Amendment
Bill ) Ac t i on WaiverTotal Approved Rejected Total
Num b e r MotionsSust a ined Fell To t a l Sust a ined Fell To t a l
19991 — 12 — 231347
2000 — 112 — 23 — 225
iki/CRS-RL30862107-162001 — — — — — — — — — — —
g/w
s.or108-272003 — — — 1 — 11 — 112
leak
109-17120051 — 1 — — — 1 — 112
://wiki
http109-2222005- — — — — — — — — — — —
2006

110-842007 — — — — — — — — — — —


Total19102924 — 24539334295
: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service from data provided in the Legislative Information System.



On the whole, the points of order and waiver motions were disposed of in a
manner that favored by a large margin those who opposed the inclusion of extraneous
matter in reconciliation legislation, as discussed in more detail below.13
Five of the six definitions of extraneousness (the exception being
recommending changes in Social Security) have been cited as bases for points of
order under the Byrd rule. The most common basis, that the provision or amendment
did not change outlays or revenues, was cited as the sole basis in 32 instances and as
one of two bases in three other instances. None of the other bases were cited in more
than six instances. (In some instances, the basis for the point of order was not cited.)
The Byrd rule has been used primarily during initial consideration of a
reconciliation measure. It was invoked only five times — twice in 1993, once in

1995, once in 1997, and once in 2005 — during consideration of a conference report.


In 1993, two points of order against matter characterized as extraneous in a
conference report were rejected by the chair. In both instances, the chair’s ruling was
upheld upon appeal. The two motions to appeal the chair’s rulings were defeated by
identical votes, 43-57. In 1995, two sections were struck from a conference report
and the two chambers had to resolve the final differences with a further amendment
between them. In 1997, a section in the conference report was retained following a
successful vote (78-22) to waive a point of order. Finally, in 2005, three provisions
were struck from a conference report (another provision was retained), necessitating
action on a further amendment between the two chambers.
As shown in Table 2, points of order and waiver motions under the Byrd rule
have occurred more frequently in the 1990s (81) compared to the 1980s (5) or the
2000s (9 so far). The middle years of the decade of the 1990s, covering calendar
years 1993 through 1997, was especially active in this regard, accounting for 65 of
the total 81 points of order and waiver motions during that decade.
Points of Order. In total, 53 points of order were raised and disposed of
under the Byrd rule. Points of order generally were raised successfully; 43 were
sustained (in whole or in part), enabling Senators to strike extraneous matter from the
legislation in 19 cases and to bar the consideration of extraneous amendments in 24
cases.
Ten of the points of order fell, either upon the adoption of a waiver motion or
upon the ruling of the chair.
One point of order was withdrawn and is not counted in Table 2.
In two instances, a point of order was not raised because a waiver motion
previously had been offered and approved, thus making the point of order moot.
In many instances, a point of order was raised against multiple provisions,
sections, or titles of the bill, sometimes covering a variety of different topics. In a


13 It is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately determine the deterrent effect of the Byrd
rule, so this aspect is not addressed in this report.

few cases, the Chair ruled that most, but not all, of the provisions violated the Byrd
rule.
Waiver Motions. A total of 42 motions to waive the Byrd rule, to permit the
inclusion of extraneous matter, were offered and disposed of by the Senate. Waiver
motions generally were not offered successfully; 9 were approved and 33 were
rejected.
Two other waiver motions were withdrawn and a third waiver motion was
changed to a unanimous consent request; they are not counted in Table 2.
Eight of the nine successful motions were used to protect committee-reported
language in the bill or language in the conference report; only one motion to protect
a floor amendment was successful.
Eight of the successful waiver motions exceeded the required 60-vote threshold
by between two votes and 21 votes; on average, they exceeded the threshold by 12
votes. The remaining successful waiver motion was approved by voice vote.
With regard to the 33 unsuccessful waiver motions, 32 of them fell short of the
threshold by between one vote and 43 votes; on average, they fell short of the
threshold by 12 votes. The remaining unsuccessful waiver motion was rejected by
voice vote. Fifteen of the unsuccessful waiver motions garnered at least 51 votes.
Table 3, at the end of this section, provides more detailed information on points
of order and waiver motions made under the Byrd rule from 1985 through 2007.
Years in Which the Byrd Rule Was Not Invoked. In five instances (in
1985, 1989, 2001, 2003, and 2006), the Senate considered reconciliation legislation
without taking any actions under the Byrd rule. No points of order were raised, or
waiver motions offered, under the Byrd rule during consideration of the conference
report on the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, which
began on December 19, 1985; as previously mentioned, this was the first instance in
which the Byrd rule applied.
In 1989, no actions involving the Byrd rule occurred, in large part because the
Senate leadership chose to use an amendment rather than the Byrd rule to deal with
extraneous matter in the bill. On October 13, 1989, during consideration of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation of 1989, the Senate adopted Mitchell Amendment
No. 1004 by voice vote. The amendment struck extraneous matter from the bill; its
stated purpose was “to strike all matter from the bill that does not reduce the
deficit.”14
In 2001 and 2003, no actions under the Byrd rule were taken during
consideration of two significant revenue-reduction measures, the Economic Growth


14 See the Congressional Record (daily ed.) of October 13, 1989, p. S13349. The Senate
leadership used an amendment for similar purposes during consideration of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981.

and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003. The potential application of the Byrd rule to the
measures was averted by the inclusion of “sunset” provisions that limited the
duration of the tax cuts, thereby preventing deficit increases beyond the applicable
budget windows.
Finally, the Senate considered two reconciliation bills in 2005. During
consideration of the conference report on the spending reconciliation bill, the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005, in late 2005, a point of order under the Byrd rule was raised
successfully. The revenue reconciliation bill, the Tax Increase Prevention and
Reconciliation Act of 2005, was initially considered in late 2005, but action on the
conference report carried over into 2006. The potential application of the Byrd rule
in 2006 to the conference report was avoided because the tax cuts extending beyond
the budget window were offset so that no deficit increases occurred in that period.15
Byrd Rule Controversies
Although the Byrd rule has advocates in the House and Senate, its use
sometimes has engendered much controversy, especially between the two Houses.
Impact on House-Senate Relations in 1993 and 1994. In 1993 andrd
1994, during the 103 Congress, the stringent application of the Byrd rule by the
Senate significantly influenced the final shape of the reconciliation act and later
affected the deliberations of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress.
The House considered its version of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, H.R. 2264, on May 27. The Senate considered its version, S.1134, on June 23
and June 24 (after completing consideration of S. 1134, the Senate amended and
passed H.R. 2264 for purposes of conference with the House). Senator Pete
Domenici, ranking minority member of the Senate Budget Committee, inserted a list
of potentially extraneous matters included in S. 1134 in the Congressional Record16
of June 24 (at p. S7984). The list identified more than a dozen sections in five titles
of the bill as possibly being in violation of the Byrd rule, specifically Section

313(b)(1)(A) (i.e., producing no change in outlays or revenues).


At the House-Senate conference stage, the Senate leadership directed the
parliamentarian and Senate Budget Committee staff to thoroughly review the
legislation to identify any provisions originating in the House or Senate that might


15 Senate action on the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 is discussed
in CRS Report RL33132, Budget Reconciliation Legislation in 2005-2006 Under the
FY2006 Budget Resolution, by Robert Keith.
16 This requirement was added by Section 13214 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990. Consequently, its first application was to consideration of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993.

violate the Byrd rule.17 As a result of this review, many provisions were deleted from
the legislation in conference.
During Senate consideration of the conference report, Senator James Sasser,
Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, discussed this process:
... with regard to the Byrd rule, we worked very hard and very faithfully over a
period of well over a week in going over this bill to try to clarify and remove
items that might be subject to the Byrd rule.
As the distinguished ranking member indicated, I think over 150 items were
removed from the reconciliation instrument here, because it was felt that they
would be subject to the Byrd rule....
I might say some of our House colleagues could not understand, and I do not
blame them because there were a number of things that were pulled out of this
budget reconciliation that had been voted on and passed by large majorities in
both houses. But simply because they violated the Byrd rule, we had to go to the
chairmen of the appropriate House committees and tell them they had to come
out. They simply did not understand it. I think it made them perhaps have a little
less high esteem for some of us here in the Senate...In the final analysis, their
leadership had to demand that some of these provisions subject to the Byrd rule18
come out.
During House consideration of the conference report, several Democratic
Members criticized the Byrd rule and discussed its impact on the legislation. For
example, Representative Dan Rostenkowski, chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, stated:
... I also have to express my grave concerns regarding the other body’s so-called
Byrd rule. As a result of this procedural rule, policies that would have
significantly improved the Medicare Program could not even be considered.
Over 80 pages of statutory language were stripped out of the Medicare title.
Staff wasted countless hours, scrutinizing every line to ensure that there is
nothing that would upset our friends at the other end of the Capitol. Even more
absurd is the fact that most of the items stripped were minor and technical
provisions that received bipartisan support when they passed both the House and
the Senate last year.
I hope that Members on both sides of the aisle share my grave concerns about
how this rule has been used, and its impact on reconciliation. I sincerely hope


17 See the discussion of “Preemptive Editing of the Conference Report” in Budget Process
Law Annotated — 1993 Edition, by William G. Dauster, op. cit., pp. 245-246. Also, see (1)
Richard E. Cohen, “Running Up Against the ‘Byrd Rule’,” National Journal, September 4,
1993, p. 2151; (2) George Hager, “The Byrd Rule: Not an Easy Call,” Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report, July 31, 1993, p. 2027; and (3) Mary Jacoby, “Senate
Parliamentarian Purges Budget Bill of Measures That Could Violate Byrd Rule,” Roll Call,
August 5, 1993, p. 9.
18 See the remarks of Senator Sasser in the Congressional Record (daily ed.) of August 6,

1993, p. S10662.



that this rule will be reconsidered before we ever return to the reconciliation19
process again.
Controversy over the Byrd rule persisted during late 1993 and into 1994. The
Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, co-chaired by Representative Lee
Hamilton and Senator David Boren, was slated to make recommendations on
congressional reform, including changes in the budget process, in December of 1993.
Representative Martin Olav Sabo, chairman of the House Budget Committee, wrote
to Co-Chair Hamilton in October, telling him that “widespread use [of the Byrd rule]
this year was extremely destructive and bodes ill for the reconciliation process in the
future.” Further, he stated that “the use of mechanisms like the Byrd rule greatly
distorts the balance of power between the two bodies” and that strict enforcement of
the Byrd rule “requires that too much power be delegated to unelected employees of20
the Congress.”
Chairman Sabo attached two Budget Committee staff documents to his letter:
(1) a 29-page listing of reconciliation provisions “dropped or modified” in conference
in order to comply with the Byrd rule, and (2) a three-page statement identifying
specific problems caused by the rule (including a bar against including authorizations
savings in reconciliation, the forcing of piecemeal legislation, incentives to use
counterproductive drafting techniques to mitigate effects, and a bar against provisions
achieving savings or promoting efficiency when the Congressional Budget Office
was unable to assign particular savings to them).
The Senate Members of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress
recommended in their final report that a provision clarifying “that the ‘Byrd rule’ is
permanent, applies to conference reports, requires sixty votes to waive, and applies21
to extraneous matters” be included in a broad reform bill. Legislation embodying
the Senate recommendations (S. 1824) was introduced on February 3, 1994 (the
recommendation pertaining to the Byrd rule was set forth in Section 312 of the bill).
The House Members of the Joint Committee did not include any recommendations
regarding the Byrd rule in their report or legislation (H.R. 3801, also introduced on
February 3, 1994).
The day after the two reform bills were introduced, the chairmen of 15 House
committees wrote to Speaker Tom Foley. They urged him to meet with Senate


19 See the remarks of Representative Rostenkowski in the Congressional Record (daily ed.)
of August 5, 1993, p. H6126. He discusses specific programs dropped from the conference
report because of the Byrd rule p. H6124. Also, see the remarks that same day of
Representatives de la Garza (p. H6143), Vento (p. H6235), and Stenholm (p. H6257).
20 Letter from Representative Martin Olav Sabo to Representative Lee H. Hamilton, October

26, 1993, 2 pp..


21 See Organization of the Congress, Final Report of the Senate Members of the Joint
Committee on the Organization of Congress, S.Rept. 103-215, vol. I, December 1993, pp.

14 and 15.



Majority Leader George Mitchell in order to get Section 312 of S. 1824, dealing with
the Byrd rule, removed from the reform package.22
On July 19, 1994, Chairman Sabo introduced H.R. 4780. The bill would have
amended the CBA of 1974 to make the Byrd rule “applicable to the Senate only,”
chiefly by removing references to conference reports in Section 313 of the act.23
None of the three bills cited above were acted upon before the 103rd Congress
adjourned.
Effects on Tax-Cut Legislation. During the 106th Congress, the budget
resolutions for FY2000 and FY2001 included reconciliation instructions directing the
House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees to develop legislation
implementing substantial reductions in revenue.24 The reconciliation instructions in
the two budget resolutions called for total revenue reduction over five years of $142
billion and $150 billion, respectively.25 Neither budget resolution included any
instructions regarding spending. This marked the first time that the House and
Senate had recommended substantial reductions in revenue through the reconciliation
process without offsetting savings to be achieved in spending programs. Any
resultant reconciliation legislation was expected under these budget resolutions to
reduce large surpluses, not to incur or worsen deficits.
In each of these two years, there was controversy in the Senate regarding the
appropriateness of using reconciliation procedures under circumstances that
worsened the federal government’s fiscal posture. Some Senators argued that the use
of reconciliation, with its procedural restrictions that sharply curtail debate time and
limit the offering of amendments in comparison to the usual Senate procedures, could
be justified only when it was necessary to reduce or eliminate a deficit (or to preserve
or increase a surplus). Other Senators maintained that reconciliation is neutral in its
orientation — the language in Section 310 of the CBA of 1974 refers to “changes”
in spending and revenue amounts, not increases or decreases — and is intended to
expedite the consideration of important and potentially complex budgetary
legi slation.


22 The letter is discussed in: Karen Foerstel, “Byrd Rule War Erupts Once Again,” Roll
Call, February 24, 1994, pp. 1 and 13.
23 See the following article for a discussion of the Sabo bill: Mary Jacoby, “Sabo Bill
Would Kill Byrd Rule For Good,” Roll Call, July 25, 1994, p. 12.
24 See Sections 104 and 105 of H.Con.Res. 68, the FY2000 budget resolution (the
conference report was H.Rept. 106-91, April 14, 1999), and Sections 103 and 104 of
H.Con.Res. 290, the FY2001 budget resolution (the conference report was H.Rept. 106-577,
April 12, 2000). The FY2001 budget resolution also included reconciliation instructions
directing the House Ways and Means Committee to develop legislation reducing the debt
held by the public.
25 The instructions in the FY2000 budget resolution covered 10 fiscal years, while the
instructions in the FY2001 budget resolution covered five fiscal years. The reconciliation
instructions in the FY2000 budget resolution also provided for total revenue reductions of
$778 billion over 10 years.

Against the backdrop of the larger issue of the appropriate use of reconciliation
under these circumstances, Senators also debated in particular the impact of the Byrd
rule on the scope of the resultant tax-cut legislation. One of the determinants of
extraneousness under the Byrd rule is whether the legislation reduces revenues or
increases spending in the net beyond the budget window (i.e., the period to which the
reconciliation instructions apply). Changes in tax law, however, often are made on
a permanent basis. As a consequence, reconciliation legislation recommending
permanent tax cuts may run afoul of the Byrd rule.
During consideration of the Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999 and the
Marriage Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2000, the Byrd rule was used successfully
to ensure the inclusion of sunset provisions in the bills, limiting the effectiveness of
the tax cuts to the period covered by the reconciliation instructions.26
During the first session of the 107th Congress, the Senate again addressed these
issues as it considered H.R. 1836, largely embodying President Bush’s proposal for
a $1.6 trillion tax cut.27 In addition to debating the appropriateness of using the
reconciliation process to expedite tax-cut legislation, Senators argued for and against
the inclusion of the 10-year “sunset” provision necessary to achieve compliance with
the Byrd rule. Some Senators maintained that permanent changes in tax law should
be allowed under reconciliation procedures, just as they often are customarily made
in freestanding tax legislation. Other Senators praised the value of being able to
reexamine such significant modifications in budgetary policy in future years when
economic circumstances may have changed materially.
The sunset provision was retained in the final version of the legislation, as
Section 901 (115 Stat. 150) of P.L. 107-16, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001.
In 2003, during the first session of the 108th Congress, the Byrd rule influenced
the form of revenue reconciliation directives in the FY2004 budget resolution
(H.Con.Res. 95).28 Initially, House and Senate leaders indicated that they would
settle on a conference agreement instructing the House Ways and Means Committee
to reduce revenues through reconciliation by $550 billion or more for the period
covering FY2003-FY2013 and the Senate Finance Committee to reduce revenues by
$350 billion for the same period. A majority of Senators had indicated their
opposition to revenue reductions greater than $350 billion.


26 Proceedings under this aspect of the Byrd rule, in the case of the Taxpayer Refund and
Relief Act of 1999, occurred on July 28, 1999; see the remarks of Senators Roth, Moynihan,
Conrad, Gramm, and others in the Congressional Record (daily ed.) of that date on pp.
S9478-S9484. With regard to the Marriage Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2000, see the
remarks of Senator Roth in the Congressional Record of July 14, 2000, on pp. S6782-S6784.
27 See, for example, the remarks of Senator Robert C. Byrd, “Reconciliation Process
Reform,” in the Congressional Record (daily ed.), February 15, 2001, pp. S1532-S1536, and
opening remarks of Senator Byrd and others during Senate consideration of H.R. 1836 in
the Congressional Record (daily ed.), May 17, 2001, beginning on p. S5028.
28 See H.Rept. 108-71 (April 10, 2003).

The use of dual reconciliation instructions in the budget resolution would enable
the leadership to secure passage of the budget resolution while leaving open the
possibility that a subsequent conference on the differing versions of the revenue
reconciliation measure passed by the two Houses might reach an acceptable
compromise between these two amounts.
However, it soon became apparent that, if the Senate initially passed a revenue
reconciliation measure consistent with the directive in the budget resolution (i.e.,
reducing revenues by $350 billion), the later consideration of a conference agreement
reflecting a compromise level of revenue reductions greater than $350 billion could
violate the Byrd rule. In particular, Section 313(b)(1)(B) defines as extraneous any
provision reported by a committee that reduces revenues (or increases outlays) if the
net effect of all of the committee’s provisions is that it fails to achieve its
reconciliation instructions. Proposing revenue reductions greater than the level of
reductions set in the reconciliation instructions would be considered a failure to
achieve the instructions.
In order to resolve the problem, the conference agreement on the FY2004
budget resolution instructed both the House Ways and Means Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee to reduce revenues by $550 billion over FY2003-FY2013,
but a point of order barred the initial consideration in the Senate of a reconciliation
measure (as distinct from a conference report) containing revenue reductions in
excess of $350 billion for this period.29 The FY2004 budget resolution further
provided that the Senate point of order could be waived only by the affirmative vote
of three-fifths of the Members duly chosen and sworn (i.e., 60 Senators, if no seats
are vacant). This procedural formulation strengthened the position of those who
favored initial Senate passage of a reconciliation measure limited to $350 billion in
revenue reductions, but removed the potential Byrd rule hurdle should a majority of
Senators later choose to support a conference agreement providing as much as $550
billion in revenue reductions.30
Senator Max Baucus, the ranking minority member of the Senate Finance
Committee, questioned whether the directive to the committee should be regarded as


29 The reconciliation directives are set forth in Section 201 of H.Con.Res. 95; the Senate
point of order is set forth in Section 202. A portion of the reconciled amounts is set forth
as outlay increases in order to accommodate changes in tax programs (e.g., refundable tax
credits) that are scored as outlays. Consequently, the aggregate instruction of $550 billion
is actually $535 billion in revenue reductions and $15 billion in outlay increases in the
House, and $522.524 billion in revenue reductions and $27.476 billion in outlay increases
in the Senate.
30 For further discussion of this matter, see CRS Report RL31902, Revenue Reconciliation
Directives in the FY2004 Budget Resolution, by Robert Keith. Also, see (1) “Concessions
to Moderates Imperil Early GOP Tax Cutting Accord,” by Andrew Taylor, CQ Weekly,
April 12, 2003; and (2) “Grassley Promises GOP Moderates Final Tax Cut Will Not Top
$350 Billion,” by Bud Newman, BNA’s Daily Report for Executives, Monday, April 14,

2003, p. G-7.



$350 billion or $550 billion.31 Ultimately, Senator Charles Grassley, chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee, indicated that he had reached agreement with other
Senators to adhere to the $350 billion level in the conference on the reconciliation
measure, notwithstanding the fact that the limitation in Section 202 of the budget
resolution only applied to initial consideration of the measure.32 The resultant
reconciliation measure (H.R. 2), according to final estimates of the Congressional
Budget Office and Joint Tax Committee, contained $349.7 billion in revenue
reductions and related outlay changes.33 The bill, which became P.L. 108-27, the
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, on May 28, 2003, included
sunset provisions in Section 107 (117 Stat. 755-756) and Section 303 (117 Stat. 764).
During the 109th Congress, the House and Senate considered separate revenue
and spending reconciliation bills pursuant to the FY2006 budget resolution. The
budget resolution provided for a revenue reconciliation bill that reduced revenues by
up to $70 billion over the five-year budget window (FY2006-FY2010) used in the
budget resolution. The conference agreement on the revenue reconciliation bill, H.R.

4297, recommended significant revenue reduction beyond the budget window,


principally with respect to extensions of current capital gains and dividends
provisions through December 31, 2010.34 Instead of incorporating sunset provisions
in order to comply with the Byrd rule, as had been done in the past, the conferees
included offsets of the revenue losses. The JCT estimated the total revenue loss over
ten years (FY2006-FY2015) at $69.084 billion, an amount nearly $900 million
smaller than the five-year revenue loss. The measure became P.L. 109-222, the Tax
Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, on May 17, 2006.
Rules Changes in the 110th Congress Barring Deficit Increases. Inth
the 110 Congress, the House and Senate adopted rules changes barring the
consideration of legislation that would lead to deficit increases.
First, the House and Senate adopted rules barring the use of reconciliation in a
manner that would increase the deficit. As part of the changes in the budget process
included in the rules package for the 110th Congress, H.Res. 6, the House included
a ban (in Section 402) against the consideration of a budget resolution containing
reconciliation directives that would increase the deficit (or reduce the surplus) over
the six-year or 11-year periods beginning with the current fiscal year. The Senate


31 See the remarks of Senator Max Baucus in the Congressional Record (daily ed.) of April
11, 2003, pp. S5296-S5298, in which he inserts a letter from Senate Parliamentarian Alan
Frumin to Senate Democratic Leader Thomas Daschle regarding the potential application
of the Byrd rule to the consideration of reconciliation legislation.
32 See the remarks of Senator Grassley in the Congressional Record (daily ed.) of April 11,

2003, pp. S5295-S5296.


33 See the CBO cost estimate on H.R. 2 (108th Cong.) of May 23, 2003, available at
[http://www.cbo.gov].
34 Although the capital gains and dividends provisions would sunset on December 31, 2010,
they would incur revenue losses in succeeding years (e.g., in FY2012, a $12.698 billion
revenue loss for the capital gains provision and a $6.326 billion revenue loss for the
dividends provision).

included a similar ban for the same two time periods in the FY2008 budget resolution
(Section 202 of S.Con.Res. 21).
Second, the House adopted a “pay-as-you-go” (PAYGO) rule at the beginning
of the 110th Congress (also as a part of H.Res. 6), requiring that changes in legislation
affecting direct spending or revenues be deficit neutral; shortly thereafter, the Senate
revised its long-standing PAYGO in a manner that conforms closely to the new
House rule.35 Both rules enforce the PAYGO requirement over the six-year and 11-
year periods used in the new reconciliation rules described above.
Finally, the Senate established a point of order in the FY2008 budget resolution
(Section 203 of S.Con.Res. 21) against legislation that would increase the deficit by
more than $5 billion in any of the four consecutive 10-year intervals beginning with
FY2018. In the pending budget resolution for FY2009, the Senate proposes to revise
the point of order so that it applies to legislation making any increase in the deficit
(i.e., without regard to a threshold) in any of the four consecutive 10-year intervals
beginning with FY2019 (Section 201 of S.Con.Res. 70).
The recent rules changes pertaining to deficit control presumably make it much
less likely that the Senate would consider reconciliation legislation potentially in
violation of the Byrd rule’s prohibition against deficit increases beyond the budget
window.


35 The House PAYGO rule is discussed in CRS Report RL33850, The House’s “Pay-As-
You-Go” (PAYGO) Rule in the 110th Congress: A Brief Overview, by Robert Keith. The
Senate PAYGO rule is discussed in CRS Report RL31943, Budget Enforcement Procedures:
Senate Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) Rule, by Bill Heniff Jr. Both rules are discussed in CRS
Report RL34300, Pay-As-You-Go Procedures for Budget Enforcement, by Robert Keith.

CRS-22
Table 3. Listing of Actions Under the Senate’s Byrd Rule, by Act: 1985-2007
Object of Point of OrderaBasis of Point of Order bSubject MatterWaiver Motion cDisposition of Point of Order
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-272; 4/7/1986) d
a. To Strike Provision(s) from Bill or Conference Report
[none]
b. To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
iki/CRS-RL30862[not applicable]
g/w
s.ornibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-509; 10/21/1986)
leak
a. To Strike Provision(s) from Bill or Conference Report
://wiki
httpSection 403Outlay increase whenConservation programsRejected, 32-61Sustained; section stricken
committee not in(September 19, 1986)
compliance
p. 139, line 1-p. 161, line 17;Outside committee’sProgram fraud civilApproved, 79-15Fell
and p. 162, lines 1-24jurisdictionremedies(September 19, 1986)
b. To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
[none]



CRS-23
Object of Point of OrderaBasis of Point of Order bSubject MatterWaiver Motion cDisposition of Point of Order
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-203; 12/22/1987)
a. To Strike Provision(s) from Bill or Conference Report
[none]
b. To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
Byrd-Dole Amendment No.[specific basis not cited][various topics]Approved, 81-13[none raised]
1254; Kassebaum Amendment
iki/CRS-RL30862No. 1259; and Gramm
g/wAmendment No. 1260
s.or e
leaknibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-239; 12/19/1989)
://wikia. To Strike Provision(s) from Bill or Conference Report
http
[none]
b. To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
[none]



CRS-24
Object of Point of OrderaBasis of Point of Order bSubject MatterWaiver Motion cDisposition of Point of Order
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508; 11/5/1990)
a. To Strike Provision(s) from Bill or Conference Report
Section 7405(j)Outside committee’sApportionment of highwayNoneSustained; subsection stricken
jurisdictionfunds between states(October 17, 1990)
p. 1017, line 5-p. 1018, line 19;Budgetary changes merelyOccupational Safety andNoneSustained; provisions stricken
and p. 1018, line 22-p. 1019,incidental to non-Health Administration(October 18, 1990)
line 18budgetary components(OSHA) penalties
iki/CRS-RL30862
g/wSections 4003-4016No change in outlays orHarvesting of timber in theNoneSustained; sections stricken
s.orrevenuesTongass National Forest in(October 18, 1990)
leak Al a s ka
://wikiTitle III, Subtitle B (asNo change in outlays orNational aviation noiseApproved, 69-31Fell
httpmodified)revenuespolicy, limitations on(October 18, 1990)


airport improvement
program revenues, high
density traffic airport rules,
and related matters

CRS-25
Object of Point of OrderaBasis of Point of Order bSubject MatterWaiver Motion cDisposition of Point of Order
b. To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
Graham Amendment No. 3025No change in outlays orAuthorize Federal DepositRejected, voice voteSustained; amendment fell
revenuesInsurance Corporation(October 18, 1990)
(FDIC) to develop risk-
based insurance system
Symms Amendment No. 3039No change in outlays orDeposit of all increasedRejected, 48-52Sustained, amendment fell
revenuesmotor fuel taxes (other than(October 18, 1990)
iki/CRS-RL30862taxes on railroads) intoHighway Trust Fund
g/w
s.ornibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-66; 8/10/1993)
leak
a. To Strike Provision(s) from Bill or Conference Report
://wiki
httpSection 1105(c)No change in outlays orCommercial use of bovineRejected, 38-60Sustained; subsection stricken
revenuesgrowth hormone in other(June 24, 1993)
countries
Section 7801; Section 7803(a)No change in outlays orChildhood immunizationsNoneSustained; most provisions stricken f
(proposing in part new Sectionsrevenuesand tax return preparer(June 24, 1993)


2106 and 2108(b)(2) of thestandards
Social Security Act); and
Section 8252(a)(2), (b), and (c)

CRS-26
Object of Point of OrderaBasis of Point of Order bSubject MatterWaiver Motion cDisposition of Point of Order
Section 13631(b) (proposing inNo change in outlays orChildhood immunizationsNoneFell. Motion to appeal Chair’s ruling
part a new Section 1928 of therevenues; budgetaryrejected, 43-57
Social Security Act)changes merely incidental(August 6, 1993)
to non-budgetary
components
Section 1106(a)Budgetary changes merelyImposition of domesticNoneFell. Motion to appeal Chair’s ruling
incidental to non-content requirements onrejected, 43-57
budgetary componentsU.S. cigarette(August 6, 1993)
iki/CRS-RL30862 manufacturers
g/wb. To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
s.or
leakDomenici/Nunn AmendmentNo change in outlays orExtend discretionary capsRejected, 53-45Sustained; amendment fell
://wikiNo. 544revenueson defense, international,and domestic spending(June 24, 1993)
httpthrough FY1995
Bradley Amendment No. 542No change in outlays orSeparate enrollmentRejected, 53-45Sustained; amendment fell
revenuesrequirement for(June 24, 1993)
appropriations and tax
expenditures
Gramm Amendment No. 557No change in outlays orRestoration of maximumRejected, 43-55Sustained; amendment fell
revenuesdeficit amounts(June 24, 1993)



CRS-27
Object of Point of OrderaBasis of Point of Order bSubject MatterWaiver Motion cDisposition of Point of Order

1995 (H.R. 2491; vetoed 12/6/1995)


a. To Strike Provision(s) from Bill or Conference Report
Section 7171No change in outlays orRaising the age of MedicareNoneSustained; section stricken
revenueseligibility(October 27, 1995)
Section 7191(a)No change in outlays orBar against the use ofRejected, 55-45Sustained; subsection stricken
revenuesfederal funding of abortions(October 27, 1995)
under Medicaid
iki/CRS-RL30862
g/w49 provisions in various titles[various bases cited][various topics, dealingRejected, 53-46Sustained against 46 provisions,
s.orof the billprimarily with welfarewhich were stricken; not sustained
leakreform]against 3 provisions, which remained
in bill
://wiki(October 27, 1995)
http
Section 8001 (proposing in partNo change in outlays orApplication of antitrust ruleRejected, 54-45Sustained; provisions stricken from
a new Section 1853(f) to therevenues; budgetaryto provider-sponsoredconference report
Social Security Act) andchanges merely incidentalorganizations(November 17, 1995)


Section 13301to non-budgetary(MedicarePlus) and
componentsexemption of physician
office laboratories.

CRS-28
Object of Point of OrderaBasis of Point of Order bSubject MatterWaiver Motion cDisposition of Point of Order
b. To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
Dorgan Amendment No. 2977[specific basis not cited]Ending deferral for U.S.Rejected, 47-52Sustained; amendment fell
shareholders on income of(October 26, 1995)
controlled foreign
corporations attributable to
imported property
Specter Modified AmendmentNo change in outlays orExpressing sense of theRejected, 17-82Sustained; amendment fell
iki/CRS-RL30862No. 2986revenuesSenate regarding a flat tax(October 27, 1995)
g/wBumpers Amendment No.No change in outlays orProhibition against theRejected, 49-50Sustained; amendment fell
s.or3028revenuesscoring of assets sales as(October 27, 1995)
leakbudget savings
://wikiByrd/Dorgan Amendment No.No change in outlays orIncrease time limit onRejected, 47-52Sustained; amendment fell
http2942revenuesdebate in Senate on(October 27, 1995)


reconciliation legislation

CRS-29
Object of Point of OrderaBasis of Point of Order bSubject MatterWaiver Motion cDisposition of Point of Order
ersonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193; 8/22/1996)
a. To Strike Provision(s) from Bill or Conference Report
Section 2923 (proposing a newOutlay increase whenMedicaid supplementalNoneSustained; provision stricken
Section 1511 of the Socialcommittee not inumbrella fund(July 18, 1996)
Security Act), p. 772, line 13-p.compliance
785, line 22
Section 408(a)(2)No change in outlays orFamily cap (no additionalRejected, 42-57Sustained; provision stricken
iki/CRS-RL30862revenuescash assistance for children(July 23, 1996)
g/wborn to families receiving
s.or assistance)
leak
Section 2104No change in outlays orSocial services provided byApproved, 67-32Fell
://wikirevenuescharitable or private(July 23, 1996)
http organizations
Section 2909No change in outlays orAbstinence educationRejected, 52-46Sustained; provision stricken
revenuesprograms(July 23, 1996)

22 provisions in various titles[various bases cited]Various topics involving theNoneSustained against 21 provisions,


of the billFood Stamp, School Lunch,which were stricken from the bill; not
and Child Nutritionsustained against 1 provision, which
programs and welfareremained in the bill
reform(July 23, 1996)



CRS-30
Object of Point of OrderaBasis of Point of Order bSubject MatterWaiver Motion cDisposition of Point of Order
b. To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
First Modified Amendment No.No change in outlays orExpressing the sense ofRejected, 55-43Sustained; amendment fell

4914revenuesCongress that the President(July 19, 1996)


should ensure approval of
state welfare reform waiver
requests
iki/CRS-RL30862 1997 (P.L. 105-33; 8/5/1997)
g/wa. To Strike Provision(s) from Bill or Conference Report
s.or
leakSection 5611No change in outlays orRaising the age of MedicareApproved, 62-38Fell
revenueseligibility(June 24, 1997)
://wiki
httpSection 5822Budgetary changes merelyEnrollment eligibility[waiver motionSustained; provision stricken
incidental to non-(Welfare-to-Work Grantwithdrawn](June 25, 1997)
budgetary componentsProgram)
Section 1949(a)(2)No change in outlays orBar against the use ofNone[point of order withdrawn]
revenuesfederal funding of abortions
under Medicaid
Sections 5713, 5833, and 5987Outside committee’s[various topics]NoneSustained; sections stricken
jurisdiction(June 25, 1997)



CRS-31
Object of Point of OrderaBasis of Point of Order bSubject MatterWaiver Motion cDisposition of Point of Order
Section 5001No change in outlays orEstablishment of aApproved, 62-37Fell
revenuesMedicare Choice program(June 25, 1997)
(balanced billing
protection)
b. To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
Levin Amendment No. 482No change in outlays orAllowing vocationalRejected, 55-45Sustained; amendment fell
revenueseducational training to be(June 25, 1997)
iki/CRS-RL30862counted as a work activityunder the Temporary
g/wAssistance for Needy
s.orFamilies program
leak
://wikiKennedy Amendment No. 490Increase in deficit orreduction of surplus inStudent loan programsRejected, 43-57Sustained; amendment fell(June 25, 1997)
httpfiscal year beyond those
covered by instructions
Kennedy Amendment No. 504[no basis cited]Immediate transfer toRejected, 38-62Sustained; amendment fell
Medicare Part B of certain(June 25, 1997)


home health benefits

CRS-32
Object of Point of OrderaBasis of Point of Order bSubject MatterWaiver Motion cDisposition of Point of Order
Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34; 8/5/1997)
a. To Strike Provision(s) from Bill or Conference Report
Section 602No change in outlays orDistrict of Columbia[waiver motionSustained; section stricken
revenuesGovernment reformwithdrawn](June 26, 1997)
Section 702(d)No change in outlays orIntercity passenger railApproved, 77-21Fell
revenuesfunding(June 27, 1997)
iki/CRS-RL30862Section 1604(f)(3)No change in outlays orCrediting of new cigaretteApproved, 78-22Fell
g/wrevenuestax against “global(July 31, 1997)
s.or settlement”
leak
b. To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
://wiki
httpGramm Amendment No. 566No change in outlays orBalanced budgetRejected, 37-63Sustained; amendment fell
revenuesenforcement procedures(June 27, 1997)
Bumpers Amendment No. 568[no basis cited]Prohibition against scoring,Rejected, 48-52Sustained; amendment fell
for budget purposes,(June 27, 1997)


revenues from sale of
certain federal lands

CRS-33
Object of Point of OrderaBasis of Point of Order bSubject MatterWaiver Motion cDisposition of Point of Order
Craig Amendment No. 569No change in outlays orProhibition in PAYGORejected, 42-58Sustained; amendment fell
revenuesbudget process against(June 27, 1997)
using tax increases to pay
for mandatory spending
increases
Brownback/Kohl AmendmentNo change in outlays orBalanced budgetRejected, 57-43Sustained; amendment fell
No. 570revenuesenforcement procedures(June 27, 1997)
iki/CRS-RL30862First Amendment No. 571No change in outlays orrevenuesBalanced budgetenforcement proceduresRejected, 59-41Sustained; amendment fell(June 27, 1997)
g/w
s.orAbraham Amendment No. 538No change in outlays orReservation of futureRejected, 53-47Sustained; amendment fell
leakrevenuesrevenue windfalls for tax or(June 27, 1997)


://wikideficit reduction
http

CRS-34
Object of Point of OrderaBasis of Point of Order bSubject MatterWaiver Motion cDisposition of Point of Order
r Refund and Relief Act of 1999 (H.R. 2488; vetoed 9/23/1999)
a. To Strike Provision(s) from Bill or Conference Report
Section 1502Increase in deficit orGeneral extension ofRejected, 51-48Sustained; section stricken
reduction of surplus inrevenue-reduction(July 28, 1999)
fiscal year beyond thoseprovisions
covered by instructions
Section 202Increase in outlaysEnhancement of the EarnedApproved, voice vote[none raised]
iki/CRS-RL30862Income Tax Credit for
g/wmarried couples
s.or
leakb. To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
://wikiBingaman Amendment No.No change in outlays orExpressing the sense of theRejected, 48-52Sustained; amendment fell
http1462revenuesSenate regarding investment(July 30, 1999)
in education
First Amendment No. 1467No change in outlays orExpressing the sense of theRejected, 54-46Sustained; amendment fell
revenuesSenate regarding the(July 30, 1999)


Medicare Reserve Fund

CRS-35
Object of Point of OrderaBasis of Point of Order bSubject MatterWaiver Motion cDisposition of Point of Order
Reconciliation Act of 2000 (H.R. 4810; vetoed 8/5/2000)
a. To Strike Provision(s) from Bill or Conference Report
Section 4Increase in outlaysEnhancement of the EarnedOn July 17, the waiverFell
Income Tax Credit formotion (made on July(July 17, 2000)
married couples14) was changed to a
unanimous consent
request and agreed to
iki/CRS-RL30862b. To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
g/w
s.orRoth Amendment No. 3864Increase in deficit orStriking the sunsetRejected, 48-47Sustained; amendment fell
leakreduction of surplus inprovision in the legislation(waiver motion also(July 17, 2000)
fiscal year beyond thoseapplied to amendment
://wikicovered by instructionslisted below)
http
Roth Amendment No. 3865Increase in deficit orStriking the sunsetRejected, 48-47Sustained; amendment fell
reduction of surplus inprovision in the legislation(waiver motion also(July 17, 2000)


fiscal year beyond thoseapplied to amendment
covered by instructionslisted above)

CRS-36
Object of Point of OrderaBasis of Point of Order bSubject MatterWaiver Motion cDisposition of Point of Order
ic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-16; 6/7/2001)
a. To Strike Provision(s) from Bill or Conference Report
[none]
b. To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
[none]
iki/CRS-RL30862rowth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-27; 5/28/2003)
g/w
s.ora. To Strike Provision(s) from Bill or Conference Report
leak[none]
://wikib. To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
http
Sessions Amendment No. 639Increase in deficit orApplying the sunsetRejected, 51-49Sustained; amendment fell
reduction of surplus inprovision to the revenue(May 15, 2003)
fiscal year beyond thoseincrease provisions
covered by instructions
icit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171; 2/8/2006)
a. To Strike Provision(s) from Bill or Conference Report
Section 5001(b)(3) and (b)(4),No change in outlays orRequiring the Secretary ofRejected, 52-48Sustained against first three
a portion of Section 6043(a),revenues (SectionHealth and Human Services(waiver motionprovisions, which were stricken from



CRS-37
Object of Point of OrderaBasis of Point of Order bSubject MatterWaiver Motion cDisposition of Point of Order
and Section 74045001(b)(3) and (b)(4)),to submit to Congress byapplied to first threethe bill; not sustained against Section
and budgetary changesAugust 1, 2007, a report onprovisions, but did not7404, which remained in the bill
merely incidental to non-the plan for the hospitalapply to Section(December 21, 2005)


budgetary components (avalue based purchasing7404)
portion of Section 6043(a)program under Medicare
and Section 7404)(Section 5001(b)(3);
requiring the Medicare
Payment Advisory
Commission to submit to
iki/CRS-RL30862Congress by June 1, 2007, a
g/wreport that includes detailed
s.orrecommendations on a
leakstructure of value based
payment adjustments for
://wikihospital services under
httpMedicare (Section
5001(b)(4); the negligent
standard for hospitals and
physicians who treat
Medicaid patients (a portion
of Section 6043(a); and
eligibility for foster care
maintenance payments and
adoption assistance (Section

7404)



CRS-38
Object of Point of OrderaBasis of Point of Order bSubject MatterWaiver Motion cDisposition of Point of Order
b. To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
[none]
revention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-222; 5/17/2006)
a. To Strike Provision(s) from Bill or Conference Report
[none]
iki/CRS-RL30862b. To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
g/w[none]
s.or
leakuction and Access Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-84; 9/27/2007)
://wikia. To Strike Provision(s) from Bill or Conference Report
http
[none]
b. To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
[none]
he Byrd rule is Section 313 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended (2 U.S.C. 644). There are many point-of-order provisions in Titles III and IV of the act. In some
instances, points of order or waiver motions are made under the act by general reference only (such as a Senator raising a point of order “under Title III of the Act”) rather than
by specific reference to the provision(s) involved. When only general references are made, it usually is impossible to determine (by reference to debate in the Congressional
Record alone) which provision of the act is involved. Consequently, this table reflects only those instances when specific reference was made to Section 313 of the act or to the



CRS-39
Byrd rule. The object of a point of order under the Byrd rule may be to strike one or more provisions (as designated by title or section number, or by page and line number) in
a reconciliation measure or a conference report thereon, or to bar consideration of one or more amendments thereto.
provision is regarded as extraneous under the Byrd rule if it:
(1)does not produce a change in outlays or revenues;
(2)produces an outlay increase or revenue decrease when the instructed committee is not in compliance with its instructions;
(3)is outside of the jurisdiction of the committee that submitted the title or provision for inclusion in the reconciliation measure;
(4)produces a change in outlays or revenues which is merely incidental to the non-budgetary components of the provision;
(5)would increase the deficit for a fiscal year beyond those covered by the reconciliation measure; or
(6)recommends changes in Social Security.
The Byrd rule sets forth specific exceptions to the criteria to determine extraneousness.
der the Byrd rule, a successful waiver motion requires the affirmative vote of three-fifths of the membership (60 Senators, if no seats are vacant). A single waiver motion can:
iki/CRS-RL30862(1) apply to the Byrd rule as well as other provisions of the CBA of 1974; (2) involve multiple as well as single provisions or amendments; (3) extend (for specified language)
g/wthrough consideration of the conference report as well as initial consideration of the measure or amendment; and (4) be made prior to the raising of a point of order, thus making
s.orthe point of order moot.
leak
n October 24, 1985, Senator Robert C. Byrd offered an amendment containing the Byrd rule to the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985, which
://wikithe Senate adopted. In this form, the Byrd rule applied to initial Senate consideration of reconciliation measures. On December 19, 1985, the Senate adopted S.Res. 286, which
httpextended the application of portions of the provision in COBRA of 1985 to conference reports and amendments between the two Houses. Because the enactment of COBRA
of 1985 was delayed until early 1986, the portion of the Byrd rule dealing with conference reports became effective first. Senate consideration of the conference report on COBRA
of 1985, and amendments between the two Houses thereon, occurred beginning on December 19, 1985. Therefore, only the portion of the Byrd rule dealing with conference
reports and amendments between the two Houses applied during the consideration of COBRA of 1985. No actions were taken under the rule.
October 13, 1989, during consideration of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, the Senate adopted Mitchell Amendment No. 1004 by voice vote. The amendment
struck extraneous matter from the bill; its stated purpose was to strike all matter from the bill that does not reduce the deficit”; (see the Congressional Record (daily ed.) of Oct.
13, 1989, p. S13349).
he point of order was not sustained against that part of Section 7803(a) proposing a new Section 2106 of the Social Security Act.



Appendix A. Text of the Byrd Rule
(Section 313 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974)
EXTRANEOUS MATTER IN RECONCILIATION LEGISLATION
Sec. 313.(a)In General. — When the Senate is considering a reconciliation
bill or a reconciliation resolution pursuant to Section 310, (whether that bill or
resolution originated in the Senate or the House) or Section 258C of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 upon a point of order being made
by any Senator against material extraneous to the instructions to a committee which
is contained in any title or provision of the bill or resolution or offered as an
amendment to the bill or resolution, and the point of order is sustained by the Chair,
any part of said title or provision that contains material extraneous to the instructions
to said Committee as defined in subsection (b) shall be deemed stricken from the bill
and may not be offered as an amendment from the floor.
(b)Extraneous Provisions. — (1)
(A) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a provision of a reconciliation
bill or reconciliation resolution considered pursuant to Section 310 shall be
considered extraneous if such provision does not produce a change in outlays
or revenues, including changes in outlays and revenues brought about by
changes in the terms and conditions under which outlays are made or revenues
are required to be collected (but a provision in which outlay decreases or
revenue increases exactly offset outlay increases or revenue decreases shall not
be considered extraneous by virtue of this subparagraph);
(B)any provision producing an increase in outlays or decrease in revenues
shall be considered extraneous if the net effect of provisions reported by the
Committee reporting the title containing the provision is that the Committee
fails to achieve its reconciliation instructions;
(C)a provision that is not in the jurisdiction of the Committee with
jurisdiction over said title or provision shall be considered extraneous;
(D)a provision shall be considered extraneous if it produces changes in
outlays or revenues which are merely incidental to the non-budgetary
components of the provision;
(E)a provision shall be considered to be extraneous if it increases, or
would increase, net outlays, or if it decreases, or would decrease, revenues
during a fiscal year after the fiscal years covered by such reconciliation bill or
reconciliation resolution, and such increases or decreases are greater than outlay
reductions or revenue increases resulting from other provisions in such title in
such year; and
(F)a provision shall be considered extraneous if it violates Section

310(g).



(2)A Senate-originated provision shall not be considered extraneous under
paragraph (1)(A) if the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Committee
on the Budget and the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Committee
which reported the provision certify that:
(A)the provision mitigates direct effects clearly attributable to a provision
changing outlays or revenues and both provisions together produce a net
reduction in the deficit;
(B)the provision will result in a substantial reduction in outlays or a
substantial increase in revenues during fiscal years after the fiscal years covered
by the reconciliation bill or reconciliation resolution;
(C)a reduction of outlays or an increase in revenues is likely to occur as
a result of the provision, in the event of new regulations authorized by the
provision or likely to be proposed, court rulings on pending litigation, or
relationships between economic indices and stipulated statutory triggers
pertaining to the provision, other than the regulations, court rulings or
relationships currently projected by the Congressional Budget Office for
scorekeeping purposes; or
(D)such provisions will be likely to produce a significant reduction in
outlays or increases in revenues but, due to insufficient data, such reduction or
increase cannot be reliably estimated.
(3)A provision reported by a committee shall not be considered extraneous
under paragraph (1)(C) if
(A)the provision is an integral part of a provision or title, which if
introduced as a bill or resolution would be referred to such committee, and the
provision sets forth the procedure to carry out or implement the substantive
provisions that were reported and which fall within the jurisdiction of such
committee; or
(B)the provision states an exception to, or a special application of, the
general provision or title of which it is a part and such general provision or title
if introduced as a bill or resolution would be referred to such committee.
(c)Extraneous Materials. — Upon the reporting or discharge of a
reconciliation bill or resolution pursuant to Section 310 in the Senate, and again upon
the submission of a conference report on such reconciliation bill or resolution, the
Committee on the Budget of the Senate shall submit for the record a list of material
considered to be extraneous under subsections (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(1)(E) of
this section to the instructions of a committee as provided in this section. The
inclusion or exclusion of a provision shall not constitute a determination of
extraneousness by the Presiding Officer of the Senate.



(d)Conference Reports. — When the Senate is considering a conference
report on, or an amendment between the Houses in relation to, a reconciliation bill
or reconciliation resolution pursuant to Section 310, upon —
(1)a point of order being made by an Senator against extraneous material
meeting the definition of subsections (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E),
or (b)(1)(F), and
(2)such point of order being sustained, such material contained in such
conference report or amendment shall be deemed stricken, and the Senate shall
proceed, without intervening action or motion, to consider the question of
whether the Senate shall recede from its amendment and concur with a further
amendment, or concur in the House amendment with a further amendment, as
the case may be, which further amendment shall consist of only that portion of
the conference report or House amendment, as the case may be, not so stricken.
Any such motion in the Senate shall be debatable for 2 hours. In any case in
which such point of order is sustained against a conference report (or Senate
amendment derived from such conference report by operation of this
subsection), no further amendment shall be in order.
(e)General Point of Order. — Notwithstanding any other law or rule of the
Senate, it shall be in order for a Senator to raise a single point of order that several
provisions of a bill, resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report violate this
section. The Presiding Officer may sustain the point of order as to some or all of the
provisions against which the Senator raised the point of order. If the Presiding
Officer so sustains the point of order as to some of the provisions (including
provisions of an amendment, motion, or conference report) against which the Senator
raised the point of order, then only those provisions (including provisions of an
amendment, motion, or conference report) against which the Presiding Officer
sustains the point or order shall be deemed stricken pursuant to this section. Before
the Presiding Officer rules on such a point of order, any Senator may move to waive
such a point of order as it applies to some or all of the provisions against which the
point of order was raised. Such a motion to waive is amendable in accordance with
the rules and precedents of the Senate. After the Presiding Officer rules on such a
point of order, any Senator may appeal the ruling of the Presiding Officer on such a
point of order as it applies to some or all of the provisions on which the Presiding
Officer ruled.