Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal: Current Issues for Congress

Report for Congress
Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal:
Current Issues for Congress
Updated May 23, 2002
Julie Kim
Specialist in International Relations
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal:
Current Issues for Congress
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, established by
U.N. Security Council resolutions in 1993, was the first international war crimes
court to be founded since the post-World War II period. It is charged with
prosecuting persons responsible for war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia
since 1991. To date, the Yugoslavia Tribunal has publicly indicted over 100 persons
for crimes relating to the conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Over 40 persons
are currently in proceedings at The Hague. Dozens more are under public or secret
indictment, and the Tribunal’s Chief Prosecutor continues to investigate charges
against additional suspects. The Yugoslavia Tribunal is separate from and
unaffiliated with the International Criminal Court established by the Rome Treaty of

1998, and launched by over 60 countries in April 2002.

On June 28, 2001, former Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic was transferred
to The Hague. The trial for Milosevic, the only head of state to stand before an
international court for war crimes, commenced in February 2002 and is expected to
last a couple of years. Some of Yugoslavia’s new democratic leaders had resisted his
extradition but yielded to international pressure on the eve of an international
conference on financial assistance to Yugoslavia. Pressure was again applied to
Belgrade in April 2002, when the United States suspended bilateral financial
assistance to Serbia because of its limited cooperation with the Tribunal beyond
Milosevic’s transfer. In response, Belgrade passed new legislation to allow the
transfer of war crimes suspects to The Hague and has called on 23 named indicted
suspects to surrender voluntarily or be subject to arrest.
The lingering presence of persons indicted and suspected of war crimes has been
detrimental to the peace process in Bosnia, by most assessments. The two top
remaining indicted suspects, former Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and
Ratko Mladic, remain at large. NATO peacekeeping forces in Bosnia have seized
over twenty alleged war criminals since 1997; however, NATO efforts to seize
Karadzic in eastern Bosnia in early 2002 were unsuccessful.
After Milosevic’s fall from power in late 2000, the Clinton Administration
removed economic sanctions against Serbia and began to provide economic
assistance authorized by Congress to Serbia. However, Congress mandated a deadline
of March 31, 2001, for Belgrade to comply with commitments to cooperate with the
Tribunal, or face a funding cut-off. In April, the Bush Administration certified that
Belgrade was meeting these commitments, but continued to pressure Belgrade to
demonstrate further progress, especially the transfer of Milosevic (which took place
in June). Facing a similar deadline the following year, the Administration held off
certification of Serbian compliance with the Tribunal until May 21, when it cited
recent measures of progress by Belgrade and released remaining unobligated U.S.
assistance to Serbia for FY2002. While it has consistently supported the Yugoslavia
Tribunal over the years, the United States is opposed to the establishment of the
International Criminal Court and formally renounced the ICC treaty in May 2002.

In troduction ......................................................1
Background and Overview of Tribunal Activities.........................3
Current Policy Issues ...............................................6
Milosevic and Tribunal Relations with Yugoslavia....................6
Fall of Milosevic..........................................6
Transfer of Milosevic to The Hague...........................8
Milosevic at The Hague.....................................9
Status of Other Transfers and Other Measures..................10
Dayton Implementation........................................11
Role of International Forces and Tribunal Relations with NATO........14
Tribunal Procedures and Reforms................................18
Other Countries’ Views........................................20
U.S. Policy......................................................21
Congressional Response...........................................25
Appendix 1. ICTY Jurisdiction......................................28

Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal:
Current Issues for Congress
During the course of a brutal war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the U.N. Security
Council founded an international tribunal in 1993 at The Hague (the Netherlands) to
bring to justice individuals responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity
within the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. Stating that the tribunal
would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace, the Security Council
established the court without waiting for a peaceful settlement to the Bosnian
conflict. The Yugoslavia Tribunal was the first war crimes court to be founded since
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals after World War II.1
The war in Bosnia ended in late 1995 with the signing of the Dayton peace
agreement and the deployment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force to Bosnia. A few
years later, violent conflict broke out in the Serbian province of Kosovo, leading
ultimately to a NATO-led air operation and the establishment of an international
protectorate for Kosovo in 1999 and a second NATO-led peacekeeping force in the
Balkans. Though some violence and tensions have continued elsewhere (such as in
Macedonia in 2001), relative peace and greater stability have facilitated Tribunal
activities and investigations into the earlier wars. The number of indicted persons put
in custody at The Hague has gradually but steadily increased. To date, however,
dozens indicted (publicly or secretly) as war criminals remain at large and Tribunal
prosecutors continue to investigate war crimes suspects. In some cases, local
authorities have resisted the transfer of such persons (some of whom have held high
political or military positions) to The Hague. International forces have detained and
transferred several charged with war crimes, but have been unwilling to hunt them
down systematically.
Experience of the past several years has shown that pursuit of justice with regard
to war crimes is not an abstract exercise but one with direct policy consequences. In
Bosnia, persons indicted for war crimes, though barred by the international
community from holding political office, often continue to bear significant political
and economic influence, promote extremist views, or otherwise present obstacles to
progress. In turn, lack of progress in achieving self-sustaining peace reduces the
likelihood of withdrawing international peacekeeping forces. International officials

1 The U.N. Security Council later established the Rwanda Tribunal, which is separate from
the Yugoslavia Tribunal, but which shares the Prosecutor. It has also agreed to establish a
war crimes tribunal for Sierra Leone. None is directly affiliated with the International
Criminal Court, established by the Rome Treaty in 1998, which will come into force on July

1, 2002.

charged with administering former war-torn territories say that the continued
presence of those charged with war crimes “undermines the establishment of rule of
law, inhibits inter-ethnic reconciliation, prevents victims from reaching psychological
closure and holds back region’s political future.”2 Richard Holbrooke, former U.S.
Representative to the U.N. and lead negotiator at the Dayton peace talks, called the
continued presence at large of the top indicted war criminals a “symbol of defiance
against the international community.”3
Another policy consequence has become evident as Yugoslavia’s successor
states have attempted to normalize relations with the international community and
integrate into western institutions. Cooperation by states of the former Yugoslavia
with the Tribunal has in some cases become a precondition to international
acceptance and external financial assistance. Under the Milosevic regime, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s refusal to cooperate at any level with The Hague
kept the FRY from access to international loans and re-entry into international
organizations. Under the controversial leadership of Franjo Tudjman until late 1999,
Croatia maintained a difficult relationship with The Hague Tribunal, which limited
the depth of its relations with the European Union and NATO.
The fate of Slobodan Milosevic, indicted for war crimes, has been a prominent
policy issue since the dramatic end to his regime in late 2000. On the one hand,
international leaders have sought to reward and assist the new democratic
governments in Serbia and Yugoslavia, which preferred to see Milosevic tried at
home for domestic crimes and opposed his extradition. On the other hand, many
consider Milosevic to be the single most culpable war criminal and ultimately
responsible for the highest level of war crimes throughout the former Yugoslavia.
Full cooperation with the Tribunal by Belgrade, assumed to include the transfer of
Milosevic, was a precondition to U.S. support for international economic assistance
to the FRY. Observers differed in their views on how much and how quickly the new
democratic regime in the FRY should fulfill its commitments with respect to the
Tribunal, and what means of influence the international community should exercise
to encourage or compel progress in this area. Milosevic’s swift transfer to The
Hague on June 28, 2001, paved the way the following day for holding an
international donors’ conference for Yugoslavia, which raised over $1 billion in aid
pledges. Milosevic’s trial, the first of its kind for a former head of state, opened on
February 12, 2002, and is expected to last more than one year.
The United Nations established the Yugoslavia Tribunal as an ad hoc court
under a specific and limited mandate. In contrast, the International Criminal Court,
which was officially launched in April 2002, is a standing international judicial body
with much broader jurisdiction separate from the Yugoslavia Tribunal.4 Congress

2 Klein, Jacques Paul, Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, December 12,


3 “Holbrooke Speech on 5th Anniversary of Dayton Agreement,” U.S. Department of State,
November 17, 2000.
4 President Clinton signed the Rome Treaty on December 31, 2000, shortly before leaving
office. For further information on the treaty, see The Rome Statue of the International

has not had to consider ratification of U.S. participation in the Yugoslavia Tribunal,
since it was not established by treaty, and in general has been supportive of the
Yugoslavia Tribunal’s activities. With the Bush Administration as well as many
Members of Congress vehemently opposed to the ICC, some observers have
expressed concern that this position might weaken continued U.S. support for the
operations of the Yugoslavia Tribunal. The Bush Administration has pressed for the
Yugoslavia Tribunal to conclude its mission within the next five to six years.
Background and Overview of Tribunal Activities5
The international Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (formally, the
“International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991") was established by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 827, passed by unanimous vote on May 25, 1993. The resolution invoked
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter relating to acts of aggression and threats to peace and
The Tribunal has the authority to prosecute persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the former Yugoslavia
since 1991. Individuals can be charged with one or more of the following offenses:
grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; violations of the laws or customs6
of war; genocide; and crimes against humanity.
Member states’ obligations to the Tribunal are expressed in several places.
U.N.S.C. Resolution 827 calls upon all states to cooperate fully with the Tribunal and
its organs. Article 29 of the Tribunal’s statute requires that states cooperate with the
Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of war criminals. It says that states
must comply with Tribunal requests for information on the location of persons,
evidence, documentation, and the arrest, detention, and transfer of accused persons
to the Tribunal. Article 9 of the statute states that the Tribunal shares jurisdiction
with the national courts of the former Yugoslav countries, but that The Hague
Tribunal had primacy over them and may request that a national court defer to its
jurisdiction. The Tribunal has neither police forces of its own to arrest war criminals
nor enforcement powers to remedy situations of non-compliance, but it can report
violations to the Security Council. Over twenty states, including the United States,7
have enacted implementing legislation, in accordance with Resolution 827. Such

4 (...continued)
Criminal Court: selected legal and constitutional issues, CRS Report RL30091, February 22,
1999. Neither the Clinton nor the Bush Administration has sought its ratification. The Bush
Administration formally renounced the Rome Treaty in May 2002.
5 For additional background on the creation of the Tribunal and discussion of its statute and
rules, see Bosnia War Crimes: the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and U.S. Policy. CRS Report 96-404F, updated April 23, 1998.
6 See Appendix 1.
7 18 U.S.C. 3181.

legislation usually relates to the detention and extradition of indicted persons, seizure
of evidence, and enforcement of sentences.
The Tribunal comprises three main divisions -- the judicial Chambers (including
three trial chambers and one appeals chamber), the Office of the Prosecutor, and the
Registry. The Tribunal President, since November 16, 1999, is Claude Jorda, of
France. Since September 15, 1999, the Chief Prosecutor is Carla del Ponte, of
Switzerland, who is simultaneously Chief Prosecutor of the Rwanda Tribunal. The
U.N. General Assembly elects fourteen judges who serve four-year terms. In
November 2000, the Security Council approved the appointment of 27 additional
temporary (ad litem) judges in order to improve the efficiency of the court. The U.N.
General Assembly elected the 27 temporary judges for four-year terms on June 12,

2001. Two additional appeals judges were brought in from the Rwanda Tribunal,

bringing to sixteen the total number of ICTY permanent judges. The Tribunal
employs over 1,000 staff.
The Tribunal is financed through a separately assessed account outside of the
regular U.N. budget. Its budget for the last three years was: $94.1 million in 1999,
$95.9 million in 2000, and $96.4 million in 2001.8 The Tribunal also has a trust fund
for collections of voluntary cash and service contributions from member states,
which as of May 2001 held nearly $32 million in contributions.
As of May 2002, over 100 persons have been indicted, over 60 have been
brought into custody, and over two dozen have been found guilty. Over 40 persons
are currently in custody at The Hague. A small number of the indicted has been
acquitted and some have had their judgements overturned in appeal. Sentences for
those found guilty have ranged from five to forty-six years of imprisonment.
Several landmark judgements were issued in 2001. On February 22, the
Tribunal convicted and sentenced three Bosnian Serbs (Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir
Kovac, and Zoran Vukovic) charged with crimes against Bosnian Muslims in the
municipality of Foca in 1992 and 1993. It was the Tribunal’s first conviction of rape
and sexual enslavement as crimes against humanity. On February 26, 2001, the
Tribunal found two Bosnian Croats (Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez) guilty of
crimes relating to the ethnic cleansing campaign against Bosnian Muslims in the
Lasva valley. Kordic was the first civilian leader to face trial. On August 2, the
Tribunal found Radislav Krstic, a Bosnian Serb commander, guilty of carrying out
genocide committed at Srebrenica in July 1995. The judgement was the first
affirming the charge that genocide took place during the Bosnian conflict. On
October 23, an appeals chamber of the Tribunal reversed a conviction for the first
time, overturning a guilty judgement of three Bosnian Croat defendants.
The strategy of the office of the Prosecutor has evolved since the founding of
the court. In view of the non-compliance by the former Yugoslav parties (especially
in the Republika Srpska) in apprehending and turning over persons indicted for war
crimes, the Prosecutor began in mid-1997 to seek sealed indictments. This change
spawned a greater number of arrests of accused individuals (unaware of their indicted

8 ICTY home page, [http://www.un.org/icty]

status) by international forces. Voluntary surrenders also increased after this
development, with some suspects preferring to go before The Hague rather than wait
for arrest.
The focus of the Tribunal’s investigations and indictments has also shifted, by
design, from low-ranking perpetrators to individuals holding the highest military or
political command authority and therefore the greatest responsibility for war crimes.
Because of the very large number of suspected low-level war criminals
(“subordinates who carried out the orders”9), the Tribunal has largely left prosecution
of these individuals to national or local authorities.10 The highest ranking person in
custody is former Serbian and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, who was
transferred in June 2001; his trial commenced in February 2002. Even as the
Prosecutor’s office continues to prepare indictments (for example, against ethnic
Albanians for crimes committed against ethnic Serbs in Kosovo after June 1999), the
Tribunal aims to complete all of its current investigations by 2004. Given its
growing caseload, the Tribunal is also considering transferring some suspects in
custody back to their national authorities for prosecution.
As part of its investigative function, the Tribunal’s Prosecutor’s office has
conducted several exhumations, first in Bosnia, but also in Croatia, Kosovo, and
Macedonia. Forensic teams in Kosovo exhumed remains of 2,730 bodies at 246
grave sites in 1999, and completed work in 2000. In July 2001, Tribunal officials
said that a total of 4,392 bodies in Kosovo had been exhumed. In April 2001, ICTY
forensics investigators began excavating grave sites in Knin, Croatia, a former
stronghold of rebel Serb forces in Croatia. In April 2002, an ICTY forensic team
began exhuming bodies from the Macedonian village of Ljuboten, where
Macedonian security forces allegedly killed ethnic Albanian civilians.
The Tribunal’s most recently published annual report, from September 2001,
said that the two main difficulties facing the court were the number of accused still
at large and the need to find resources to permit the accused to be tried within a
reasonable amount of time.11 The report said that Tribunal activities could conclude
by 2007, if procedural reforms are implemented (see section on Tribunal procedures,
below) and if no further conflict breaks out in the former Yugoslavia. The Bush
Administration has strongly advocated working toward concluding the Tribunal’s
mission within this time frame.

9 ICTY Eighth Annual Report, September 17, 2001.
10 “War crimes tribunal to issue more indictments,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 2000.
11 Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, A/56/352, September 17, 2001.

Current Policy Issues
Since the inception of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, the international community has
maintained that all those indicted as war criminals should either surrender or be
transferred by local police or international forces, and brought to The Hague.
Cooperation with the Tribunal by local authorities has increased in recent months,
leading to the transfer of more war crimes suspects to The Hague. Those in favor of
bringing all remaining indicted suspects to The Hague say that their arrest and
transfer would remove the influence of nationalist hardliners from the local political
environment throughout the former Yugoslavia and thereby assist non-nationalist
forces. It might promote peace implementation efforts and facilitate some
reconciliation among the former warring communities. On the other hand, attempts
by international forces to hunt down accused war criminals may lead to greater
casualties. Loyalists to high-ranking persons charged with war crimes might try to
undermine reformist governments or instigate renewed violence. An influx of
several more indicted persons at The Hague might also overburden the operations of
the Tribunal. Continued international support for the Tribunal is a precondition to
future Tribunal activities. This section examines the current state of play concerning
the Tribunal in several policy dimensions.
Milosevic and Tribunal Relations with Yugoslavia
Even prior to the 1999 Kosovo war, Belgrade’s lack of cooperation with the
Tribunal was a major factor impeding normalized relations between Yugoslavia and
the west. For years, the international community conditioned the lifting of an “outer
wall” of sanctions - which prevented FRY membership in international organizations
and withheld access to multilateral aid - on Belgrade’s meeting international
obligations to cooperate with the Tribunal. Under Milosevic, the FRY remained
intransigent and obstructionist with regard to Tribunal activities. Milosevic
frequently denounced the Tribunal as anti-Serb and a NATO tool. Tribunal officials
repeatedly reported on the FRY’s disregard for its international obligations and
denounced Belgrade’s efforts to bar Tribunal investigators from Yugoslav territory,
including Kosovo.12
Fall of Milosevic. Elated and surprised by Milosevic’s swift fall from power
in October 2000, the international community quickly embraced the new Yugoslav
government under President Vojislav Kostunica in the hopes of consolidating a
democratic transformation of Serbia. Belgrade’s prior contentious relationship with
The Hague Tribunal was long held up as a key factor justifying Serbia’s international
isolation. The Kostunica government expressed interest in improving relations with
the Tribunal, but resisted demands that it extradite Milosevic. Western governments
appeared, at least at first, to be granting the new Yugoslav leadership some leeway
in their demands for handing over indicted war criminals to The Hague. However,
U.S. law and Bush Administration policy set a deadline for Belgrade to demonstrate
cooperation with the Tribunal, using U.S. aid and U.S. support for international aid

12 In addition to the general obligations on cooperating with the Tribunal, several U.N.
Security Council resolutions on Kosovo in 1998 called on the Tribunal to investigate war
crimes in Kosovo and required Belgrade to fully cooperate with its efforts.

as leverage. Above all, the United States sought a commitment by Belgrade to hold
Milosevic accountable for war crimes before the U.N. tribunal.
Shortly after Vojislav Kostunica came to power as FRY President in October
2000, replacing Milosevic, the international community eagerly embraced the FRY
with promises of aid and integration in international organizations. Yugoslavia was
swiftly and without condition reinstated into the United Nations, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Stability Pact for Southeastern
Europe, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. Kostunica’s Democratic Opposition of Serbia
(DOS) party secured a decisive victory in the Serbian parliamentary elections on
December 23, and Zoran Djindjic of the DOS became Serbian Prime Minister.
The new Yugoslav and Serbian governments expressed a keen interest in
addressing the crimes of the Milosevic regime, but with a focus on crimes relating
to corruption, misuse of public funds, electoral fraud, political assassinations, and
other domestic misdeeds. They argued that Milosevic should be held accountable for
these crimes before domestic legal institutions. The ruling DOS was split on whether
Milosevic should eventually be transferred to The Hague, with Kostunica perhaps the
most opposed to extradition and the most critical of the Tribunal, which he claimed
had an anti-Serb bias. Former FRY Prime Minister Zoran Zizic of the Montenegrin
Socialist People’s Party (previously allied with Milosevic’s party) also strongly
opposed extradition. In contrast, the Serbian government under Prime Minister
Djindjic was more amenable to the idea of Milosevic’s extradition. Serbian officials
promoting economic reforms warned that foreign assistance necessary for economic
reforms would be jeopardized unless the FRY accepted full cooperation with the
Yugoslav and Serbian officials pointed to two impediments to Milosevic’s
extradition. First, they said that the Yugoslav constitution did not permit the
extradition of a Yugoslav citizen to a foreign court. Second, Yugoslav authorities
argued that extraditing Milosevic before he faced criminal charges at home would
only make a martyr of the former leader. They also said that the transfer of Milosevic
would be destabilizing to the new Yugoslav and Serbian governments. Some
observers speculated that the DOS sought to maintain good relations with Milosevic-
era holdovers in the army and police, many of whom assisted the DOS in
overthrowing Milosevic, but who are themselves likely suspects for war crimes.
The patience of the international community, meanwhile, began to wear thin in
early 2001. In January, the Yugoslav authorities placed Milosevic under house arrest
and established 24-hour police surveillance on his residence. On April 1, Milosevic
surrendered to Serbian police after a tense two day stand-off between Milosevic’s
armed guards and the police. Milosevic pleaded not guilty to charges of financial
crimes, misuse of power, and resisting arrest. Tribunal officials viewed Milosevic’s
arrest as a positive development. The Tribunal requested that the Yugoslav
authorities serve Milosevic with his arrest warrant based on his indictment for war
crimes. Tribunal prosecutors said they expected Milosevic to be brought to the

13 Beta news agency/BBC Monitoring, January 26, 2001.

Tribunal to face war crimes “within months” or by the end of the year. However,
Serbian and FRY officials made no link between Milosevic’s arrest and his transfer
to The Hague. Moreover, criminal investigations into his domestic financial charges
became stalled over a lack of evidence.
Transfer of Milosevic to The Hague. Prior to Milosevic’s arrest, the
Serbian and Yugoslav governments took limited steps to improve relations with the
Tribunal. First, Blagoje Simic, a Bosnian Serb (living in Belgrade) wanted for war
crimes, surrendered voluntarily to The Hague, the first suspect to do so from Serbia.
On March 20, Serbian and FRY Justice Ministers Vladen Batic and Momcilo Grubac
visited the Tribunal for the first time. They held discussions with the Chief
Prosecutor on the status of the draft law on cooperation with the Tribunal and
pledged to take measures to expel non-FRY citizens indicted for war crimes from
Serbia. On March 23, Yugoslav authorities arrested Milomir Stakic, former Bosnian
Serb mayor of Prijedor and wanted under secret indictment for war crimes, and
transferred him to The Hague. FRY President Kostunica sharply criticized the arrest
and called it “an exception.” In contrast, Tribunal Prosecutor del Ponte called it the
first concrete example of cooperation by Belgrade.
After Milosevic’s April 1 arrest, Belgrade took additional steps relating to war
crimes issues. In April, the Yugoslav military prosecutor announced that nearly 200
Yugoslav Army officers had been charged with war crimes committed in Kosovo.
In May, the Serbian government publicized the exhumations of several mass grave
sites in Serbia holding Kosovo Albanian victims that had been transferred from
Kosovo. With extensive Serbian media coverage, the mass graves for the first time
provided irrefutable evidence of war crimes to the Serbian people. Additional mass
grave sites in Serbia have since been discovered, with as many as 1,000 bodies
unearthed thus far.
The main focus of the government’s agenda with regard to war crimes issues
was draft legislation on cooperation with the Tribunal, which the government argued
was necessary to allow for the extradition of Milosevic or any other indicted suspect
in Yugoslavia. FRY President Kostunica came out in favor of the draft law, although
he made no commitments on Milosevic’s eventual extradition. Tribunal officials
supported passage of the law, but emphasized that the actual transfer of suspects to
The Hague was what was required. The draft law stalled in parliament, however,
when the Montenegrin Socialist People’s Party, one of the federal government
coalition members, opposed it. That party, headed by Predrag Bulatovic, a former
Milosevic ally, pledged to block passage of the bill in the federal parliament.
International pressure continued to build on Belgrade as plans got under way to
hold a critical donors’ conference for Yugoslavia by the end of June, where over $1
billion in aid pledges was expected to be raised. The United States conditioned its
participation in the conference on Belgrade’s further progress in cooperating with the
After dropping the draft bill on June 23, the FRY cabinet instead adopted a
decree formalizing cooperation with the Tribunal, paving the way for the extradition
of indicted war crimes suspects. The decree established the procedure of cooperating
with the ICTY and provided for meeting “international obligations for the state

resulting from U.N. Security Council resolution 827 and the statute of the ICTY,
founded by the United Nations.”14 International leaders welcomed the decree, but
U.S. officials still held out the possibility of not participating in the aid conference
or conditioning the release of any aid funds on further evidence of Belgrade’s
cooperation with the ICTY.
Milosevic’s actual extradition was not expected for several days or even weeks,
given the time expected for Milosevic’s legal challenge to the decree. On June 28,
the Yugoslav constitutional court suspended the decree in order to consider its
constitutionality. In a surprise move, the Serbian government overrode the FRY
court’s order, justifying the decision on the basis of a provision in the Serbian
republic constitution, and handed Milosevic over to ICTY officials on June 28.
Milosevic was flown first to Tuzla, Bosnia, and then on to The Hague.
Explaining the decision to transfer Milosevic on Serbian television, Serbian
Prime Minister Djindjic said that not undertaking this measure would have had major
negative consequences for the country. FRY President Kostunica, who was
reportedly not informed in advance of the transfer, sharply criticized the abrupt
decision, which he called lawless and hasty, with potentially dangerous
consequences. An immediate fallout after Milosevic’s transfer was the downfall of
the DOS-led federal government. DOS’ partner in the federal government, the
Montenegrin Socialist People’s Party, withdrew from the coalition and FRY Prime
Minister Zizic of the Socialist People’s Party (SNP) resigned from his post on June
29. However, a new federal government comprising the same coalition parties was
approved in July. The handover of Milosevic heightened tensions between rivals
Djindjic and Kostunica.
Milosevic at The Hague. Milosevic is the first former head of state to be
tried for war crimes. At several pre-trial hearings held shortly after his transfer in
June 2001, Milosevic challenged the legality of his detention and refused to enter a
plea or accept a court-appointed defense team. He argued that the Tribunal itself was
an illegitimate creation of the U.N. Security Council that had no authority to try him.
The Tribunal rejected his objections and appointed three international lawyers to
provide advice for the defense.
In October and November 2001, the Prosecutor prepared two additional
indictments against Milosevic for alleged war crimes committed during the 1991-
1992 conflict in Croatia and the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia. The Bosnia indictment
included charges of genocide as well as all of the other crimes under the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction. Milosevic is accused of having political control over the Serbian police
and Yugoslav Army forces that took part in the ethnic cleansing campaigns.

14 Agence France-Presse, June 23, 2001.

Summary of ICTY Charges AgainstIn December, a three-judgepanel ruled that Milosevic
Milosevicshould be tried in two separate
Kosovo: The indictment charges Milosevic andproceedings - one for chargesrelating to Croatia and Bosnia,
four aides with five counts of war crimes andand another for the Kosovo
crimes against humanity in the campaign against
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo during January - Juneconflict. Upon appeal, the
1999.Tribunal decided to hold a
single trial for all three
Croatia: The indictment charges Milosevic,indictments, as requested by the
working with others, with individual criminalProsecutor. Chief Prosecutor
responsibility for 32 counts of war crimes, crimesdel Ponte argued that the three
against humanity, and grave breaches of theconflicts together were part of
Geneva Conventions during the forcible removal of“one strategy, one scheme” of
Croat and other non-Serb populations from CroatiaMilosevic’s to create a Greater
between August 1991 and June 1992.Serbia. Combined, Milosevic
Bosnia: The indictment contains 29 counts,faces a total of 66 counts of war
including two for the charge of genocide, andcrimes, crimes against
others for crimes against humanity, grave breacheshumanity, and genocide.
of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of the
laws or customs of war. It charges Milosevic,Milosevic’s trial
working with others, with the joint criminalcommenced in mid-February
enterprise entailing the forcible removal of non-2002. His trial is expected to
Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina from Augustlast at least two years; the
1991 until December 1995.prosecution has one year to
Source: Reuters, 12/11/01; ICTY homepage.present its case. The prosecution
has begun its case with
testimony relating to the
Kosovo indictment, and will later move on to the indictments for the conflicts in
Croatia and Bosnia. Its challenge will be to establish a clear chain of command and
decision-making authority from the conflict areas to Milosevic. Without recognizing
the court’s legitimacy, Milosevic has managed to put on an aggressive defense by
attacking his accusers, NATO, and witnesses for the prosecution (including current
Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova). Observers have speculated that Milosevic’s aim
is to portray himself, as a representative of the Serbian people, a victim of western
aggression and thereby gain sympathy before a domestic Serbian audience.
Status of Other Transfers and Other Measures. In March 2002, the
Serbian government adopted the Tribunal’s statute. On April 11, the Yugoslav
government and parliament approved a bill on cooperation with the Tribunal which
would allow for the extradition of war crimes suspects to The Hague. Hours after
parliament passed the bill, former Serbian Interior Minister and indictee Vlajko
Stojiljkovic fatally shot himself outside of the parliament building as a form of
protest. The Yugoslav government then published a list of 23 suspects indicted by
the ICTY and demanded that they surrender. The list included ten Yugoslav citizens
and thirteen Bosnian Serbs from Croatia or Bosnia. Within days, six of the suspects
declared themselves prepared to go to The Hague. By the end of May, five were in
custody at The Hague: Momcilo Gruban (former Bosnian Serb prison camp warden);
Milan Martic (former Croatian Serb rebel leader); Mile Mrksic (former JNA general);
Dragoljub Ojdanic (former JNA general); and, Nikola Sainovic (former Serbian

Deputy Prime Minister). The sixth, Vladimir Kovacevic, a former JNA officer, was
scheduled to arrive shortly.
For the remaining seventeen indicted suspects, the Yugoslav Justice Ministry
issued indictments for their arrests, though authorities have yet to arrest any. The list
includes top Bosnian Serb suspects Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, neither of
whom is not expected to surrender, and the current Serbian President, Milan
Milutinovic, whom Belgrade authorities claim enjoys immunity while he holds office
(his term expires at the end of the year).
The fourteen others still at large include:15
Ranko Cesic - indicted for killings nearMitar Rasevic - indicted for killings in Foca
Brcko, Bosniaprison, Bosnia
Gojko Jankovic - indicted for rape and tortureSeselin Sljivancanin - indicted for killings at
in Foca, BosniaVukovar, Croatia
Sredoje Lukic - indicted for killings atRadovan Stankovic - indicted for rape and
Visegrad, Bosniatorture in Foca, Bosnia
Milan Lukic - indicted for killings atSavo Todovic - indicted for killings in Foca
Visegrad, Bosniaprison, Bosnia
Zeljko Meakic - indicted for war crimes atMilan Zec - indicted for murder and attacks
Omarska camp, Bosniaon Dubrovnik, Croatia
Vinko Pandurevic - indicted for genocide inDragan Zelenovic - indicted for rape and
Srebrenica massacre, Bosniatorture in Foca, Bosnia
Miroslav Radic - indicted for killings atStojan Zupljanin - indicted for genocide in
Vukovar, Croatiawestern Bosnia
Tribunal officials have urged prompt action by Belgrade on the remaining
transfers and greater cooperation on providing ICTY investigators access to
government archives. They and human rights organizations contend that
Yugoslavia’s cooperation in these areas has not been adequate.16 The Yugoslav
government has recently established a National Council on Cooperation with the
ICTY, which is headed by FRY Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic, and has pledged
greater cooperation with The Hague on all war crimes issues.
Dayton Implementation
Many individuals indicted for war crimes committed in Bosnia, including some
of the highest-ranking former Bosnian Serb leadership, have yet to be held
accountable for crimes allegedly committed during the Bosnian war. International
officials responsible for overseeing peace efforts in Bosnia warn that the continued
presence of war criminals has hindered reconciliation and integration of formerly

15 Reuters, April 23, 2002.
16 See Human Rights Watch, press release, May 21, 2002.

warring communities, and has bolstered hardliners.17 Some observers also argue that
the surrender or capture of the most prominent Bosnian war crimes suspects would
facilitate a swifter termination of the NATO peacekeeping operation in Bosnia.
In November 1995, leaders from Bosnia, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia agreed to a detailed peace agreement negotiated in large part by U.S.
envoy Richard Holbrooke. Signatories to the Dayton accords committed themselves
to cooperate with The Hague Tribunal. Article IX of the General Framework
Agreement states that: "The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved
with implementation of this peace settlement...pursuant to the obligations of all
Parties to co-operate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other
violation of international humanitarian law." Several other provisions in the Dayton
accords repeat the obligation of the parties to cooperate fully with the Yugoslav
Tribunal and allow unrestricted access to Tribunal officials. Annex 4, the constitution
for Bosnia, bars persons indicted by the Tribunal from holding political office in
Primary responsibility for implementation of all aspects of the Dayton accords,
including bringing war criminals to justice, lies with local authorities. Some local
authorities in many parts of Bosnia, however, have been the most resistant to peace
and reform and unlikely to cooperate with the Tribunal. Moreover, Croatian
President Franjo Tudjman and FRY President Slobodan Milosevic, both signatories
to Dayton, did little to promote cooperation with the Tribunal in its allegations of war
crimes committed by Bosnian Croats or Serbs, respectively. Many observers believed
that both Milosevic and Tudjman should have been indicted for their respective roles
in supporting proxy Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb forces during the Bosnian war.
Milosevic was indeed later indicted for crimes committed in Kosovo, Bosnia, and
Croatia; Tudjman died in late 1999 before facing indictment.
Since Dayton, the record of cooperation with the Tribunal by the former
Yugoslav parties has been mixed. For the period of 1999-2000, the Tribunal noted
significantly improved relations with Croatia since the death of Tudjman and the
emergence of a pro-Western integration government in Zagreb. The Tribunal also
reported more modest improvements in its relations with Republika Srpska, although
authorities there had yet to arrest a single war criminal. Several locally elected
leaders in the Republika Srpska are alleged to be under investigation for war
crimes.18 Tribunal officials have called the Republika Srpska the “last safe haven”
for indicted suspects in the former Yugoslavia.
In January 2001, former Bosnian Serb President Biljana Plavsic voluntarily
surrendered herself to The Hague after learning of the existence of an indictment
against her and warrant for her arrest. Her indictment had been issued under seal in
April 2000, shortly after the arrest by SFOR of former Bosnian Serb Assembly

17 For further information on developments in Bosnia, see CRS Report RL30906, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and U.S. Policy, March 28, 2001.
18 The International Crisis Group named individuals in 18 RS municipalities allegedly
connected to war crimes in “War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska,” ICG Balkans
Report No. 103, November 2, 2000.

President Momcilo Krajisnik. Reportedly, NATO military officials warned her that
she would be apprehended by SFOR if she did not go to The Hague voluntarily.19 At
her initial hearing, Plavsic pleaded not guilty to the charges against her. She is to be
tried jointly with Krajisnik. In August 2001, the Tribunal approved her temporary
release prior to her upcoming trial.
In August 2001, Bosnian Federation authorities arrested three former Bosnian
Army commanders charged by the Tribunal with having committed war crimes in
central Bosnia against Bosnian Serbs and Croats in 1993 and 1994. Wanted under
a sealed indictment that had reached the Bosnian government one week earlier, the
three (Gen. Enver Hadzihasanovic, Gen. Mehmed Alagic, and Col. Amir Kubura, all
formerly part of the Bosnian Army’s 3rd Corps), were the first former Bosnian Army
commanders to appear before the court. The arrest fueled speculation that former
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, considered to have been closely involved in the
3rd Corps’ operations during the war, may also be indicted.20 The timing of the
arrests, falling on the same day as the sentencing of Bosnian Serb Gen. Krstic for
genocide, was interpreted by some as an attempt to demonstrate the Tribunal’s even-
handedness vis-à-vis the former warring sides.21
Over six years after Dayton, the Bosnian war’s most prominent of those charged
with war crimes - former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko
Mladic - remain at large. Karadzic is thought to be residing in the Republika Srpska,
occasionally visiting Montenegro, while Mladic is reportedly in Serbia. The
continued presence of Karadzic and Mladic represents the “greatest single failure”
of Dayton, according to former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard
Holbrooke, who negotiated the Dayton accords. In July 2001, some news media
reported that SFOR had attempted (but failed) to seize Karadzic in the Foca region
of eastern Bosnia.22 Additional unsuccessful attempts were reported in February and
March 2002.
In the November 2000 general elections, Karadzic’s party, the nationalist
Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) emerged as the strongest party in the Republika
Srpska, winning 31 of 83 seats in the entity assembly. Tribunal Prosecutor del Ponte
attributed the hardliners’ strong showing in the November 2000 Bosnian elections
to “the lack of resolve shown by the international community with respect to
apprehensions” of indicted war crime suspects.23 After the elections, the international
community exerted pressure on the Bosnian parties to prevent the extreme nationalist
parties (who together won less than 50% of the vote for the first time since Dayton)
from forming governments. International officials threatened to withhold any further
reconstruction aid from entities whose governments included parties supporting war

19 “Former U.S. ally to face U.N. court,” Washington Post, January 10, 2001.
20 The Republika Srpska government has charged Izetbegovic with war crimes and has sent
information to the Tribunal Prosecutor’s office for its investigation into Izetbegovic.
21 “In Bosnia, a wider war-crimes net,” The Christian Science Monitor, August 24, 2001.
22 The Observer (London), July 15, 2001.
23 Address to the Security Council by Carla Del Ponte, November 24, 2000.

criminals, such as the SDS.24 At the behest of the west, RS Prime Minister Mladen
Ivanic of the moderate Party of Democratic Progress removed an SDS member from
his proposed government. In the Federation, a new Alliance for Change moderate
coalition emerged with a slight majority over the formerly dominant Croat and
Muslim nationalist parties.
Following Milosevic’s transfer to The Hague in late June 2001, RS President
Mirko Sarovic expressed a new willingness to improve relations with the Tribunal
and announced that he would submit to parliament a bill on cooperation with the
international Tribunal. On October 2, the Republika Srpska parliament passed a law
on cooperation with the Tribunal by a one-vote majority. While the RS authorities
have yet to detain any indicted war crimes suspects, one Bosnian Serb suspect, Dusan
Knezevic, surrendered on May 18, 2002. Knezevic faces 46 counts of war crimes in
two indictments relating to alleged atrocities committed at two Bosnian prison
camps, Omarska and Keraterm, in 1992.
In May 2002, the international High Representative in Bosnia established a state
court that is to include a war crimes division that would have the capability of
prosecuting war crimes offenses. The judges are likely to be a mix of international
and local judges.
Role of International Forces and Tribunal Relations with
The Tribunal has no military or police forces of its own to detain or arrest those
indicted for war crimes. The primary responsibility for arresting war criminals lies
with the local authorities. Neither SFOR nor KFOR has a mandate with the specific
authority to hunt down war criminals, a task which military commanders generally
see to be more suitable for police. However, SFOR and KFOR units are permitted
to detain indicted persons when they come into contact with them in the course of
their normal duties.25 The NATO forces in Bosnia and Kosovo also provide security
and intelligence assets for Tribunal investigators.
During the one-year term of mission of IFOR (December 1995 to December

1996), NATO forces refrained from arresting any indicted war crimes suspects.

NATO action against war criminals increased once the Tribunal began issuing sealed
indictments, which left suspected war criminals unaware of their indicted status. In
July 1997, SFOR undertook its first operation to detain two suspected Bosnian Serb
criminals, both under sealed indictment. One of the two was killed in the operation.
Since then, SFOR units have detained and transferred to The Hague more than twenty
additional suspects, not including two more who were killed in the course of action.
Nineteen of those currently being detained at The Hague have been arrested by
SFOR. The most prominent war crimes suspect apprehended by SFOR thus far is

24 Reuters news wire, December 18, 2000.
25 In early 1996, NATO and the Tribunal agreed that NATO forces would assist Tribunal
investigators, detain any accused persons they came across, and transfer them to the Hague.

Momcilo Krajisnik, former President of the Bosnian Serb assembly, who was taken
by surprise in a pre-dawn raid on his home in April 2000.
The rise in operations beginning in 1998 to detain and transfer indicted persons
suggested to some observers that SFOR was taking a more aggressive interpretation
of its mandate with regard to war criminals. However, arrests by SFOR have
declined since mid-2000, and SFOR has no authority in Serbia, where several
suspects reside. In February and March 2002, French and German SFOR forces
launched two unsuccessful operations to arrest one of the most wanted indicted
persons, Radovan Karadzic, who was reportedly located in eastern Bosnia. A U.S.
official reportedly blamed a French officer for revealing the operation to the Bosnian
Serbs; NATO has not confirmed the charge, but has begun an inquiry into the
incident. 26
According to Tribunal officials, the arrest policy is tightly controlled by national
governments, which insist on signing off on each mission to apprehend a war
criminal.27 British SAS forces have organized and led most of SFOR’s operations
against war criminals and are viewed to be the most aggressive on this front and
experienced in such operations. The U.S. and French governments, in contrast, are
SFOR’s Arrests of Persons Indicted for War Crimes
(as of 04/25/2002)
Name ofDescriptionDate ofStatus
In d i ctee Deten tion
Simo Drjlaca*Bosnian Serb public security07/10/97killed during
chief in Prijedorarrest attempt
Milan Kovacevic*Bosnian Serb leader in07/10/97died in custody,
Prij edor 01/08/98
Vlatko KupreskicBosnian Croat Defense12/18/97sentenced to 6
Council member involved inyears; on appeal,
attacks on Ahmici-Santicifound not guilty
Anto Furundzija*Bosnian Croat special12/18/97sentenced to 10
commander of military policeyrs; serving
sentence in
Goran JelisicBosnian Serb camp guard at01/22/98sentenced to 40
Lukayrs; awaiting
Miroslav KvockaBosnian Serb commander of04/08/98sentenced to 7 yrs

the Omarska camp
26 AFP newswire, March 4, 2002; The New York Times, March 5, 2002.
27 Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 2000.

Name ofDescriptionDate ofStatus
In d i ctee Deten tion
Mladen RadicBosnian Serb shift04/08/98sentenced to 20
commander at Omarska campyrs; filed appeal
Milojica KosBosnian Serb Omarska camp05/28/98sentenced to 6
shift commanderyrs; filed appeal
MiloradBosnian Serb commander of06/15/98sentenced to 7.5
Krnojelac*Dom campyrs
Stevan TodorovicBosnian Serb police chief in09/27/98sentenced to 10
Bosanski Samacyrs; serving
sentence in Spain
Radislav Krstic*Bosnian Serb Army Drina12/02/98sentenced to 46
Corps commander during fallyrs; filed appeal
of Srebrenicanotice
Dragan GagovicBosnian Serb police chief in01/09/99killed during
Focaarrest attempt
DraganBosnian Serb shift06/07/99sentenced to 3
Kolundzijacommander at Keratermyrs; released in
RadoslavRS Deputy Prime Minister07/06/99trial ongoing
Radomir KovacBosnian Serb military police08/02/99sentenced to 20
commander in Focayrs; appeal
Damir DosenBosnian Serb shift10/25/99sentenced to 5 yrs
commander at Keraterm
Stanislav Galic*Bosnian Serb Army12/20/99trial ongoing
commander in Sarajevo
Zoran VukovicBosnian Serb military police12/23/99sentenced to 12
commander in Focayrs; appeal
Mitar Vasiljevic*Bosnian Serb paramilitary01/25/00awaiting
member in Visegradjudgement
Dragoljub PrcacBosnian Serb Deputy03/05/00awaiting
Commander of Omarskajudgement
MomciloBosnian Serb Assembly04/03/00pre-trial stage

Kraj isni k* President

Name ofDescriptionDate ofStatus
In d i ctee Deten tion
Dragan NikolicBosnian Serb commander at04/21/00pre-trial stage
Susica camp
Dusko SikiricaBosnian Serb camp06/25/00sentenced to 15
commander at Keratermyrs
Janjo JanjicBosnian Serb commander in10/13/00killed resisting
Dragan ObrenovicBosnian Serb commander in04/15/01pre-trial stage
Vidoje BlagojevicBosnian Serb commander in08/10/01pre-trial stage
Momir Nikolic*Bosnian Serb commander in04/01/02pre-trial stage
Currently, 19 of this list are in custody at The Hague.
* under previously sealed indictment
considered to be less willing, for different reasons, to risk their forces in the pursuit
of war criminals in their sectors of SFOR.28 Observers have attributed this limited
political will to Washington’s “zero casualties” policy for its armed forces deployed
in peacekeeping operations, and to France’s longstanding sympathies toward Serbia.29
U.S. and French reluctance to go after Karadzic and others in Bosnia, however, may
have faded, as recent attempts to seize him have demonstrated.
Tribunal officials frequently point to SFOR’s critical role in apprehending
indicted persons. The Tribunal’s annual report of 2000 stated that success in
detaining indicted war crime suspects that year was the direct result of increasing
cooperation of troop-contributing states in collaborating in the arrest of the accused
and in the collection of evidence.30 Since then, however, the Prosecutor has pressed
western governments for greater support and resources for additional captures, and
has repeatedly expressed concern to the Security Council about the declining rate of
arrests of war criminals in Bosnia, with very few occurring since mid-2000. The
Prosecutor has long appealed for the creation of a special task force to pursue
indicted war crimes suspects, but NATO has not supported this proposal.

28 “Is Dayton Failing?: Bosnia Four Years After the Peace Agreement,” International Crisis
Group Balkans Report No. 80, October 28, 1999.
29 The Sunday Telegraph (London), March 26, 2000.
30 Tribunal Report, A/55/150, August 7, 2000, p. 10.

The Tribunal’s relations with NATO countries became strained over The
Hague’s decision to review NATO’s actions during the Kosovo war in 1999. Citing
allegations and information supplied by the Yugoslav and Russian governments as
well as non-governmental organizations that NATO violated international
humanitarian law during Operation Allied Force, the Prosecutor initiated the
investigation process into these charges. Tribunal officials claimed that the court had
jurisdiction over all war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and referred to
the Prosecutor’s duty, under the Tribunal’s statute (Article 18.1), to initiate
investigations, assess information received, and decide whether or not to proceed
with an indictment. In response, the United States declared that “any inquiry into the
conduct of (NATO’s) pilots...(was) completely unjustified.”31 In June 2000, the
Prosecutor concluded that NATO had not deliberately targeted civilians or unlawful
military targets and that therefore there was “no basis for opening an investigation
into these allegations or others related to the NATO bombing.”32
In January 2001, Tribunal Prosecutor del Ponte stated that the use of depleted
uranium munitions by NATO during Allied Force could also fall within the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction, if international investigations and surveys could confirm that
depleted uranium shells directly caused disease among NATO’s soldiers or the local
populations in the former Yugoslavia. Thus far, scientific and medical studies have
not proven any link between exposure to depleted uranium and the onset of disease.
Tribunal Procedures and Reforms
After a slow start, the workload of the Yugoslavia Tribunal has steadily
increased in recent years. An increasing number of indicted suspects have
surrendered or been turned over to The Hague. In addition, the Tribunal Prosecutor
is continuing investigations into many more individuals, including in Kosovo and
Macedonia. Once in custody, individuals may face, on average, 10 months of pre-
trial preparations and over 12 months of the actual trial. A June 1998 report by the
General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that the Tribunal lacked the resource
capacity needed to carry out its existing workload (which has since increased).33
GAO predicted that additional indictments would overwhelm the Tribunal. A 2001
report by the non-governmental Institute for War and Peace Reporting noted that
several trials may have to be repeated, given the Tribunal’s practice of opening trials
as individual indicted persons are transferred to The Hague, rather than waiting for
all of the defendants cited in a particular indictment to come into custody. The report
predicted that new trials for some of the same cases may therefore have to be
launched as more suspects are brought to The Hague. 34

31 “U.S. denounced U.N. probe of NATO bombing,” The Washington Times, December 30,


32 The Prosecutor’s full report is available at www.un.org/icty
33 Former Yugoslavia: War Crimes Tribunal Workload Exceeds Capacity. United States
General Accounting Office. GAO/NSIAD-98-134. June 1998.
34 Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Tribunal Watch, June 4-9, 2001.

In the last few years, the Tribunal has planned for and implemented some
measures to improve the efficiency of its proceedings. In May 2000, Tribunal
President Jorda presented to the Security Council a plan to improve the operations
of the Tribunal.35 Jorda projected that, without the reforms, the Tribunal might
complete its mission by the end of 2016 at the earliest. With the reforms, the
projected caseload could be completed by 2007. The reforms called for speeding up
the pre-trial preparation of cases, increasing trial capacity through the creation of a
pool of additional temporary (ad litem) judges, and amending rules of procedure to
expedite trial proceedings. Other reform options, such as holding trials in alternative
locations, creating a second tribunal, or transferring the ICTY’s caseload to the
International Criminal Court, were not endorsed. The Security Council approved the
changes to the Tribunal’s statute in Resolution 1329 on December 5, 2000. In
January 2001, the Tribunal established a coordinating council and a management
committee to facilitate the work between the Tribunal’s three offices. In June, the
General Assembly elected 27 persons to serve in the pool of ad litem judges.
As a result of these reforms, Tribunal officials have reported that procedures
have become streamlined, the pre-trial phase has been expedited, and the trial
capacity has been enlarged. Tribunal officials aim to complete all investigations by
2004 and finish all trials by 2008 (assuming all remaining accused are arrested in a
timely fashion). The Tribunal has also begun to consider ways to “relocate” cases
involving less prominent suspects to the national courts of the former Yugoslav
states, to allow the ICTY to focus on the highest-profile cases.
Some observers consider premature any projections on closing out proceedings
of the Yugoslavia Tribunal. Political changes in Croatia and Serbia have increased
the Tribunal’s access to additional evidence that has already led to more
investigations and more indictments. No indictments have yet been issued for crimes
committed against ethnic Serbs in Kosovo, or for the ethnic violence in Macedonia.
On February 21, 2001, U.N. Secretary-General Annan recommended that no
termination date for the Tribunal be determined, in view of the fact that peace had not
been restored in the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, Tribunal officials recognize
the need to look to conclude the Tribunal’s mission within a reasonable time frame.
They therefore urge that remaining indicted persons at large be brought before the
Tribunal as soon as possible. Sustaining international support and resources for the
Tribunal will likely be a key challenge if investigations lead to indictments against
substantially more individuals.

35 Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, A/55/382-S/2000/865, September 14, 2000.

Other Countries’ Views
In 1993, all members of the U.N. Security Council, including the Permanent
Five (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States), voted in favor of the
resolution founding the Yugoslavia Tribunal. Tribunal judges and over 1,000 staff
represent 77 countries from around the world. In contrast to the United States, many
of the European NATO allies support the establishment of an International Criminal
Court and have ratified the Rome Treaty.
The United States has been the country most insistent on linking aid and
normalized relations with Serbia to compliance on commitments to the Tribunal.
European countries, in contrast, appeared more eager to dismantle sanctions (which
their leaders argued were ineffective and damaging to neighboring states), and
resume trade and economic relations with the FRY. After Dayton, the European
allies normalized relations with the Milosevic regime, while the United States
continued to withhold diplomatic recognition from the FRY as well as access to
international financial assistance. Since the fall of Milosevic from power in late
2000, the European Union has refrained from explicitly linking EU aid to
Milosevic’s extradition or establishing any cut-off date for economic aid. Visiting
Belgrade in February 2001, EU ministers said that they expected Belgrade to
cooperate fully with The Hague and that Milosevic should be extradited to The
Hague, but gave no specific time frame or deadline for such cooperation to occur.
The EU made plans to go ahead with the June 2001 donors’ conference for
Yugoslavia, with or without the participation of the United States, which had
conditioned its presence on Belgrade’s further progress in cooperating with the
Tribunal. The EU provided about half of the total amount of pledges at the donors’
The Russian government has become increasingly critical of the Tribunal,
especially after the court began to focus on the conflict in Kosovo. Historically,
Russia has had good relations and close ties with Serbia. The Russian government
condemned The Hague’s indictment of Slobodan Milosevic in May 1999, calling it
“politically motivated” and disruptive to international diplomatic efforts (with which
Russia was closely involved) to find a political solution to the conflict.36 Vehemently
opposed to NATO’s Operation Allied Force, Russia supported Milosevic with loans
and fuel deliveries during the conflict. In May 2000, Dragoljub Ojdanic, FRY
Defense Minister (former Army Chief of Staff) and indicted for war crimes by The
Hague, openly attended the inauguration of Russian President Vladimir Putin in
Moscow. Upon international outcry, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that
the invitation to Ojdanic had been issued by mistake. However, Ivanov also harshly
criticized the Tribunal for acting like a political, rather than judicial, institution, with
an anti-Serb bias.37 The Russian government opposed western calls for Yugoslavia
to extradite Milosevic to The Hague. In February 2001, top Russian officials called
for the Tribunal to be shut down, claiming that it had an anti-Serb bias and that it was

36 ITAR-TASS news agency, May 27, 1999.
37 “Russia slams war crimes tribunal,” Financial Times, May 25, 2000.

no longer needed after the emergence of democratic governments in the region. In
June, Russia urged the FRY government not to extradite Milosevic to The Hague.
The Tribunal’s previous Chief Prosecutor, Louise Arbour, had openly criticized
the French government’s level of support to the Tribunal and once called the French
sector of SFOR a “safe haven” for war criminals.38 Of the major western powers
involved in the Balkans, France has the reputation of being the most sympathetic to
the Serbs based on France’s longstanding ties to Serbia. Most of the publicly
indicted war crime suspects at large are Bosnian Serbs who reside in the French
sector of SFOR (MND-SE). In mid-1997, NATO reportedly shelved a plan to
capture Radovan Karadzic in the French sector after the United States discovered that
a French military officer had been holding secret meetings with Karadzic.39 In
contrast to Arbour, current Tribunal Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte has reported
improved Tribunal relations with France. In April 2000, a French commando team
in SFOR raided the home of Momcilo Krajisnik, the highest-ranking war criminal
suspect captured to date. Some media reports speculated that the operation was
carried out in part to quell criticism about French complacence about the presence of
war criminals in its sector. French officials have emphasized France’s longstanding
political and financial support for the Tribunal on a number of occasions. A French
judge, Claude Jorda, took over the Tribunal Presidency in late 1999. Still, Karadzic’s
continued presence at large in the French-led sector leads some observers to question
France’s interest in his capture. Allegations of a French role in revealing SFOR
arrest operations to Radovan Karadzic in early 2002, which have been denied by
Paris, have reinforced this perception.
U.S. Policy
The United States has been a strong supporter of the international Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia since its inception. The Clinton Administration maintained
that the only place for indicted war crime suspects is in The Hague, but generally
remained reluctant to engage U.S. forces in SFOR in operations to seize war
criminals. In mid-1998, the Administration reportedly shelved plans for U.S. troops
in SFOR to detain Radovan Karadzic, although U.S. officials have denied this
report.40 In 2001, a French general also alleged that the United States blocked IFOR41
from arresting Karadzic and Mladic in 1996, despite several opportunities.
In May 22, 1997, President Clinton appointed David Scheffer to be the first U.S.
Ambassador-at-Large for war crimes issues. Ambassador Scheffer handled issues
relating to violations of international humanitarian law worldwide, and led the U.S.
participation in the negotiations on establishing a permanent International Criminal

38 The Daily Telegraph, March 26, 2000.
39 “Secret meetings foiled Karadzic capture plan,” Washington Post, April 23, 1998.
40 “U.S. cancels plans for raid on Bosnia to capture 2 Serbs,” New York Times, July 26,


41 “U.S. not keen to nab Bosnian Serb leaders in 1996,” Agence France-Presse, February 8,


Court.42 With regard to the Balkans, Ambassador Scheffer coordinated U.S. support
for the Yugoslav Tribunal and projects seeking accountability for war crimes in
conflict areas. In January 2001, Secretary of State Albright nominated Scheffer to
become a judge at the Yugoslav Tribunal; in February, however, Albright’s successor
in the Bush Administration, Secretary of State Colin Powell, reversed this decision
and nominated international law expert Theodor Meron to the post. Meron was
elected to the Tribunal in March. Also in March, President Bush nominated Pierre-
Richard Prosper to succeed Scheffer as U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for war crimes
issues. The announcement countered earlier speculation that the Bush
Administration would eliminate this post. The Senate confirmed Mr. Prosper’s
nomination on July 11, 2001.
After bringing Milosevic to Dayton as a peace broker in 1995, the Clinton
Administration gradually distanced itself from the Milosevic regime and worked to
increase diplomatic and economic pressure on Milosevic in response to the Kosovo
war in 1998 and 1999. Belgrade’s poor record of cooperation with the Tribunal and
Milosevic’s 1999 indictment for war crimes were held up as barriers to normal FRY
relations with the United States and access to U.S. aid. Clinton Administration
policy was that Milosevic should be “out of power, out of office, and in The Hague.”
In May 1999, the U.S. State Department launched the War Crimes Rewards Program.
The program, which remains active, offers to pay rewards of up to $5 million for
information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of indicted persons.
U.S. policy on the linkage between sanctions and the Tribunal changed after the
ouster of Milosevic and democratic election of FRY President Kostunica. On
November 17, 2000, the United States established full diplomatic relations with the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the first time since the conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia began. The United States announced a $45 million emergency food aid
package for Serbia.43 Before leaving office, President Clinton lifted remaining
bilateral trade and economic sanctions against Yugoslavia. Some sanctions still
applied to individuals such as Slobodan Milosevic and about 80 of his associates,
preventing them from obtaining U.S. visas or engaging in transactions with U.S.
companies. The measures to lift sanctions against Yugoslavia were taken without
apparent regard for the Administration’s earlier insistence that Belgrade first
demonstrate cooperation with the Tribunal.
Some analysts questioned whether the Bush Administration would continue to
support the Yugoslavia Tribunal, given its steadfast opposition to the International
Criminal Court. A looming legislative deadline of April 1, 2001, for the President
to determine whether or not Belgrade was cooperating sufficiently with the Tribunal

42 The United States voted against the Rome Treaty to establish the International Criminal
Court in July 1998. According to the State Department, the United States determined at the
time that, as created under the statute, the ICC could pose an unacceptable risk to U.S.
military personnel and to the President's ability to deploy forces to protect U.S. and global
interests. However, President Clinton ended up signing the Rome Treaty on December 31,

2000, just before the end of his term.

43 For additional information on U.S. aid to Yugoslavia, see CRS Report RS20737, “The
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: U.S. Economic Assistance,” updated August 16, 2001.

to allow the continuation of U.S. aid to Serbia (see legislative requirement, below)
became a key early indicator of the Bush Administration’s position on the Yugoslavia
Tribunal. In two visits to Washington in February and March 2001, Serbian Prime
Minister Djindjic pleaded Serbia’s case for more time to demonstrate cooperation
with the Tribunal and for the government to pursue domestic legal proceedings
against Milosevic. In March, U.S. Ambassador to the FRY William Montgomery
presented to FRY and Serbian leaders a list of actions that would contribute to a
positive certification on cooperation with the Tribunal by the end of the month. The
list reportedly said that Milosevic should be arrested and imprisoned, and that at least
one indicted persons be transferred to The Hague, among other actions.44
On April 2, the Secretary of State issued a certification that determined that
Yugoslavia had met the criteria to allow the continuation of U.S. aid to Serbia in
FY2001. However, the certification conditioned U.S. support for the June 29
international donors’ conference on Yugoslavia on continued progress toward full
cooperation with the Tribunal.45 In June, the Administration welcomed Belgrade’s
progress in cooperating with the Tribunal and in initiating proceedings for
Milosevic’s extradition. On June 27, Secretary of State Powell decided to send a
U.S. delegation to the June 29 donors’ conference in Brussels. The conference, held
one day after Milosevic was handed over, raised over $1.2 billion in donor pledges.
The United States pledged over $180 million in bilateral assistance.
On June 28, President Bush issued a statement applauding the transfer of
Milosevic to The Hague. Bush pledged U.S. assistance to the people of Yugoslavia
as they undertake difficult democratic and economic reforms. After the start of
Milosevic’s trial in early 2002, the Administration agreed in principle to allow
current and former U.S. officials to provide testimony, if necessary.46
With similar legislative requirements passed for Fiscal Year 2002 (see section
on Congress, below) the debate over U.S. aid to Serbia and Belgrade’s cooperation
with the Tribunal was revived in early 2002. On April 1, 2002, the State Department
announced that Secretary of State Powell had decided to defer a decision on whether
to certify that Yugoslavia had met the criteria, outlined in legislation, for the
continuation of U.S. assistance to Serbia after March 31, 2002. The lack of
certification effectively suspended further allocation of U.S. assistance designated for
Serbia for the rest of Fiscal Year 2002, or about $40 million. The Administration did
not publicly specify what measures must be taken by Belgrade for the Secretary to
be able to certify Yugoslavia’s compliance. It welcomed, however, Yugoslavia’s
publication in April of a list of 23 indicted war crimes suspects that should be turned
over to The Hague. In a letter to President Kostunica dated April 27, President Bush

44 “U.S. makes arrest of Milosevic a condition of aid to Belgrade,” New York Times, March

10, 2001.

45 U.S. Department of State, press statement, April 2, 2001. The President had delegated the
function of providing this determination to the Secretary of State on March 22.
46 The Washington Post, March 21, 2002.

reportedly appealed for greater cooperation with The Hague Tribunal.47 On May 21,
on the occasion of a visit to Washington by Serbian President Zoran Djindjic and
FRY Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic, Secretary of State Powell announced his
certification of Yugoslavia’s cooperation with ICTY. The Secretary noted the recent
number of surrenders that have taken place, Belgrade’s passage of new laws,
indictments issued, and other examples of improved cooperation.
The United States financially supports the Tribunal through annual UN-assessed
contributions and voluntary contributions of goods and services (including cash,
equipment, and detailed personnel). The annual assessed U.S. financial contribution
has increased nearly every year, corresponding to the steady growth in the Tribunal’s
budget. From 1994 through 2002, the U.S. assessed contribution totaled $120
million. In addition, the United States has contributed approximately $13 million to
ICTY’s Voluntary Fund.
Testifying before a House committee in February 2002, Ambassador-at-Large
for War Crimes Issues Pierre-Richard Prosper stated that the Bush Administration’s
goal was to see both the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals reach a successful
conclusion. He called on the Tribunals “to begin to aggressively focus on the end-
game and conclude their work by 2007-2008.”48 He criticized some of the
shortcomings of the Tribunals, such as poor management, high costs, and slow
proceedings. He said that sovereign states should be responsible for criminal
prosecution of war criminals and not be dependent on international tribunals. He said
the United States would assist states to rebuild their own judicial systems to enable
them to hold accountable lower-level perpetrators of war crimes.
Prosper’s statement was the first by the Bush Administration to put forward a
timetable for closing out the war crimes tribunals and appeared to reflect the
Administration’s negative views on future international tribunals as well as the
International Criminal Court (which the Administration formally renounced on May
6). Observers speculate that the Administration will be satisfied with the work of the
Yugoslavia Tribunal once the two most wanted suspects, Radovan Karadzic and
Ratko Mladic, are brought before The Hague.49 Some observers have criticized the
Administration’s talk of winding down the Tribunal’s operations as premature, just
as Milosevic’s trial was getting under way. They note that, in any case, the U.N.
Security Council would need to vote on the issue before closing down the Yugoslavia

47 AP, April 27, 2002.
48 Statement of Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S.
Department of State. February 28, 2002.
49 The Wall Street Journal Europe, March 1, 2002.
50 The New York Times, March 2, 2002.

Congressional Response
Members of Congress have been generally supportive of the Yugoslavia
Tribunal since its founding in 1993. Over the years, some Members have expressed
concern about the slow start with which the Tribunal began its operations and the
continued presence of indicted war crime suspects in Bosnia. In the past, Congress
has passed legislation calling for the United States to provide resources and
intelligence information to the Tribunal. Congress has passed annual legislation
imposing restrictions on U.S. assistance to former Yugoslav states harboring war
criminals. Many in Congress have praised the efforts by NATO forces to seize
indicted suspects in Bosnia. Others have expressed concern about the potential for
“mission creep,” with SFOR forces possibly being exposed to greater danger in their
efforts to pursue war criminals.
In 1999, many Members expressed anger at the Tribunal Prosecutor’s stated
intention to review allegations of war crimes committed by NATO forces (mainly
U.S.) during Operation Allied Force. Former Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Chairman Helms said it was outrageous for a U.N. body to judge the conduct of U.S.
soldiers.51 In addition, support in Congress for the Yugoslavia Tribunal has not
translated into support for the 1998 Rome Treaty that established the International
Criminal Court. After President Clinton signed the Rome Treaty in December 2000,
several Senators said that they would oppose U.S. ratification of the treaty, were it
to come before the Senate.
Each year, Congress responds to the Administration’s request for funding for
the Tribunal in the annual Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State
Appropriations bill (often referred to as CJS appropriations). U.N. - assessed
contributions are provided for in two accounts: Contributions to International
Organizations (CIO) and Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities
(CIPA). In addition, Congress authorizes funds for a U.S. voluntary contribution to
the Tribunal in the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations bill.
For FY2001, appropriators recommended about $66 million for the assessed
contributions to all of the war crimes Tribunals in FY2001 (including the Rwanda
Tribunal and upcoming Cambodia and Iraq Tribunals). The Senate appropriations
committee reported concern that the Tribunal budgets were “out of control.” It also
criticized the Yugoslav Tribunal Prosecutor’s attempt to investigate NATO for52
Operation Allied Force. An estimated $12 million was allocated for the Yugoslavia
Tribunal in the CIO account and $13.5 million for it in the CIPA account for
FY2001. For FY2002, the Administration has increased its request to $16 million
in the CIO account and $17.2 million in the CIPA account. Congress passed H.R.
2500, the FY2002 CJS appropriations bill, with the requested funding levels for the
international tribunals, in November 2001 (P.L.107-77).

51 “Tough U.N. prosecutor faces a political challenge in the U.S.,” Boston Globe, September

25, 2000.

52 Report to accompany H.R. 4690, Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 2001. Senate Committee on
Appropriations. Report 106-404. September 8, 2000.

U.S. Assessed Contributions to ICTY
(over three fiscal years, in $ millions)
FY2001 FY2002 FY2003
(actua l) (estimate) (request)
CIO (int’l
o r ga ni z a t i o ns) 10.6 13.1 14.0
CIPA (int’l
peacekeeping 12.1 17.2 14.7
In the foreign operations appropriations bills for Fiscal Year 2001 and 2002,
Congress authorized the President to draw down up to $30 million of commodities
and services for the U.S. voluntary contribution to the Yugoslavia Tribunal (P.L.

106-429 and P.L. 107-115). The FY2002 foreign operations appropriations bill (P.L.

107-115) included $30 million in drawdown authority.

The 106th Congress also passed legislation regarding the Yugoslav Tribunal that
tied U.S. aid to Belgrade’s cooperation with the war crimes Tribunal. While
welcoming the dramatic changes to the Serbian political scene in October 2000, some
Members have urged that further economic benefits, especially through the
international financial institutions, should hinge on Belgrade’s willingness to
surrender persons indicted for war crimes to The Hague.53
In the Foreign Operations Appropriations law for FY2001 (P.L. 106-429)
Congress provided up to $100 million for assistance for Serbia (Sec. 594).54 The
appropriation marked a dramatic shift from prior legislation that focused primarily
on imposing economic sanctions against Serbia. However, no funds were to be
available after March 31, 2001, unless the President certified that the Yugoslav
government had met certain conditions, among them cooperating with the Yugoslav
Tribunal.55 Cooperation was defined to be access for Tribunal investigators, the
provision of documents, and the surrender and transfer of indictees or assistance in
their apprehension. U.S. support for loans and assistance from international financial
institutions was also subject to these conditions. In the same law (Sec. 564),
Congress, repeating a provision that has been in place since the Dayton agreement,
restricted bilateral and multilateral assistance to countries or entities providing
sanctuary to persons indicted for war crimes. The countries and entities were defined

53 “No handouts without a handover,” New York Times op-ed by Senators Mitch McConnell
and Patrick Leahy, October 16, 2000.
54 For more information on U.S. aid to Yugoslavia, see CRS Report RS20737, The Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia: U.S. Economic Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff, updated June 5, 2001.
55 The other conditions were that the FRY take steps to end support for separatist Republika
Srpska institutions in Bosnia, and take steps to implement policies on respecting minority
rights. The restrictions were not to apply to Montenegro, Kosovo, humanitarian assistance
or assistance to promote democracy in municipalities.

to be Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, the Bosnian Federation, and the
Republika Srpska. The section exempted humanitarian, refugee, and democratization
assistance, as well as some other categories. The Secretary of State may waive the
restrictions under certain conditions (and has done so on numerous previous
occasions, especially in connection with U.S. aid to the Republika Srpska).
The FY2002 appropriations measures included similar provisions. Section 584
of P.L. 107-115 said that “funds appropriated by this Act may be made available for
assistance for Serbia after March 31, 2002,” if the President determined and certified
that Yugoslavia was cooperating with the Tribunal, taking steps to end support to
separatist Bosnian Serbs institutions, and implementing policies on minority rights
and the rule of law. The provision also applied to U.S. support for multilateral loans
and assistance to Yugoslavia The other section relating to restrictions on aid to
countries assisting or harboring war criminals (Section 581) was modified and
streamlined from the previous year’s legislation. It would restrict aid unless the
Secretary of State determined that the relevant countries or entities were cooperating
with the Tribunal and implementing the Dayton accords. Humanitarian and
democratization aid were exempted and the Secretary of State could waive the
provision if such assistance was determined to be in the U.S. national interest.
Members of Congress warmly greeted Slobodan Milosevic’s transfer to The
Hague in June 2001. In the House, Representative Gallegly introduced H.Res. 200,
a bill supporting and commending the Serbian people and their leaders for
Milosevic’s transfer. On July 18, the Senate passed S.Res. 122 (co-sponsored by
Senators McConnell and Leahy), which recognized the courage of Serbia’s
democratic leaders and expressed the Sense of the Senate that the United States
should remain committed to providing assistance to Yugoslavia.
On February 28, 2002, the House International Relations Committee held a
hearing on the U.N. criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Committee
Chairman Hyde and other Members praised some of the Yugoslavia Tribunal’s
achievements, especially the detention of Slobodan Milosevic. They also pointed out
some policy inconsistencies that have become evident, such as U.S. support for these
tribunals but not for the International Criminal Court. The hearing featured
testimony from the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues and a panel of
outside witnesses.

Appendix 1. ICTY Jurisdiction
According to its Statute, the Yugoslavia Tribunal has the authority to prosecute
and try four kinds of crimes:
Article 2: Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, namely the following acts against persons or property protected
under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:
(a) wilful killing;
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile
(f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and
regular trial;
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian;
(h) taking civilians as hostages.
Article 3: Violations of the laws or customs of war
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating
the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified
by military necessity;
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages,
dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to
religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and
works of art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property.
Article 4: Genocide
1. The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing
genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of committing any of the other
acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article.
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

3. The following acts shall be punishable:

(a) genocide;
(b) conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) attempt to commit genocide;
(e) complicity in genocide.
Article 5: Crimes against humanity
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible
for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or
internal in character, and directed against any civilian population:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
(f) torture;
(g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.