Tibet, China, and the 107th Congress: Issues for U.S. Policy

CRS Report for Congress
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Tibet, China, and the 107 Congress:
Issues for U.S. Policy
Updated March 12, 2002
Kerry Dumbaugh
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Tibet, China, and the 107 Congress:
Issues for U.S. Policy
Summary
The political and cultural status of Tibet remains a difficult issue in U.S.-China
relations and a matter of debate among U.S. policymakers. Controversy continues
over Tibet’s current political status as part of China, the role of the Dalai Lama and
his Tibetan government-in-exile, and the impact of Chinese control on Tibetan
culture and religious traditions. These controversies have prompted recurring U.S.
congressional action in support of Tibet’s status and traditions. This report briefly
reviews Tibet’s historical status and discusses current issues. It will be updated
regularly.

Contents
In troduction ..................................................1
Brief Historical Background of Tibet ..............................1
Tibet and U.S. Policy Since the 1980s .............................2
Efforts to Create a Special Envoy for Tibet......................5
Current Issues on Tibet: Implications for the United States.............6
Status of the Dalai Lama’s Negotiations with China...............6
Economic Development in Tibet..............................7
World Bank Project Loan...................................7
China’s “Patriotic Education” and Other Campaigns..............7
The Panchen Lama Succession...............................8^th
Tibet and the 107 Congress.....................................9
H.R. 1646/S. 1401, Authorizing Appropriations for State, Justice,
and Commerce........................................9
H.R. 1779/S. 852: The Tibetan Policy Act of 2001................9
H.R. 2506, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L. 107-115)...10
Appendix A: Tibet-related Interest Groups........................11
International Campaign for Tibet (ICT)........................11
The Committee of 100 for Tibet.............................11
The Tibet Information Network (TIN).........................12

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Tibet, China, and the 107 Congress:
Issues for U.S. Policy
Introduction
The political and cultural status of Tibet remains a difficult issue in U.S.-China
relations, and appropriate U.S. actions remain matters of debate among U.S.
policymakers. Controversy continues over Tibet’s current political status as part of
China, the role of the Dalai Lama and his Tibetan government-in-exile, and the
impact of Chinese control on Tibetan culture and religious traditions. These
controversies have prompted recurring U.S. congressional actions in support of
Tibet’s status and traditions — actions that are routinely denounced by the Chinese
government in Beijing.
This report briefly reviews Tibet’s historical status, discusses current issues
within Tibet and as components of U.S.-China relations, and discusses Bush^th
Administration views and pending legislation in the 107 Congress.
Brief Historical Background of Tibet
Tibetan history is notable in two particular respects. One is the extraordinarily
pervasive influence of Buddhism in all aspects of daily life. At one time, a sizeable
number of Tibet’s male population were monks and lamas, and eventually this
ecclesiastical group became Tibet’s temporal rulers as well as its spiritual leaders.
The Dalai Lama, believed to be the reincarnation of Tibet’s patron deity, is the
highest and most revered among this ruling monastic theocracy.
The second noteworthy aspect of Tibetan history is the ambiguity and
disagreement surrounding Tibet’s long political relationship with China. Tibetans
generally view Tibet as an historically independent nation that had a close
relationship with a succession of Chinese empires. A succession of Chinese
governments, on the other hand, have claimed Tibet as a political and geographical
part of China.¹ In 1949-1951, the newly established communist government of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) backed up this claim by sending military troops
to occupy Tibet. Since then, Tibet has been under active Beijing rule as its
westernmost province, Xizang (the Tibet Autonomous Region). Much of the PRC’s
tenure there has been troubled, particularly during the tumultuous Cultural
Revolution (1966-1976) when most monasteries, palaces, and other aspects of
Tibetan Buddhism and culture were either damaged or destroyed. The International

¹ Such claims have been made by previous Chinese dynasties, the Republic of China
government under Chiang Kai-shek (now the government on Taiwan), and the communist
government of the People’s Republic of China.

Campaign for Tibet claims that over 1 million Tibetans died during the first 30 years
of PRC rule.²
In 1959, at the age of 24, the Dalai Lama fled Tibet and went into exile in India
with a group of his followers. He remains there today, along with a Tibetan refugee
community of tens of thousands, and he is still widely regarded as the spiritual leader
of the Tibetan people, their foremost advocate, and a figure of international stature.
He has steadfastly maintained that Tibet is an independent country under illegal
occupation by Chinese government forces. But he has also been willing to negotiate
with Beijing, and has advanced a number of fairly moderate proposals regarding
Tibet’s future status. The Chinese government condemns the Dalai Lama’s political
activities and his leadership of a “government-in-exile,” although it recognizes him
as a major religious figure.
Tibet and U.S. Policy Since the 1980s
In the late 1980s, Tibet became a recurring issue in congressional consideration
of matters relating to China. A number of factors have contributed to Members’
greater interest. These include: the Dalai Lama’s and the Tibetan community’s
ongoing political activities; reports of human rights abuses and China’s continuing
repressive social and political controls in Tibet; and the lack of consensus among
U.S. policymakers over what U.S. policy should be toward China. On matters
involving Tibet — as on many matters involving China — congressional views have
often been at odds with those of the White House. As a matter of official policy, the
U.S. government recognizes Tibet as part of China and has always done so, although
some dispute the historical consistency of this U.S. position.³ Since normalization
of relations with the PRC in 1979, a succession of both Republican and Democratic
U.S. Administrations have favored policies of engagement with China. In the
process, they frequently have sought to minimize areas of potential tension with
Beijing where Chinese leaders have taken strong positions, such as on the question
of Tibet’s political status.

² There are varying estimates for how many Tibetans may have died as a direct consequence
of Chinese rule. The figure of 1.2 million is the figure generally used by the Tibetan
government-in-exile. Warren W. Smith, author of The Tibetan Nation (p. 607) calculates
that the number of deaths is closer to 600,000.
³ Some assert that past U.S. actions which treated Tibet as if it were an independent state in
effect signaled U.S. recognition. Michael C. van Walt van Praag, for instance, in The Status
of Tibet: History, Rights, and Prospects in International Law, (Westview Press, Boulder
Colorado, 1987) states that “Washington supported Tibet and treated it as an independent
State, even recognizing its de facto (italics included) independence...” p. 139. In the daily
press briefing of October 8, 1987, responding to a question concerning what year the United
States formally recognized Tibet as a part of China, the State Department’s Public Affairs
office issued the following statement: “We have never recognized Tibet as a sovereign state
independent of China. We first made the statement that we considered Tibet to be a part of
China in 1978; however, our earlier formulations were not inconsistent with the statement,
and we have never challenged China’s claim. No third country recognizes Tibet as a state
independent of China.”

The Dalai Lama himself has been the most charismatic and renowned advocate
for the Tibetan people over the past decade. He has a number of supporters in the
U.S. Congress.⁴ The Dalai Lama’s and his exiled community’s efforts to gain
international support for Tibet’s cause took a major step forward in 1986-1987, when
a series of meetings between Tibetan and Western supporters in New York,
Washington, and London launched what has become known as Tibet’s “international
campaign.”⁵ The goal of this campaign was to garner Western and principally U.S.
support for Tibet’s situation, and ultimately to bring this international pressure to
bear on Beijing to make satisfactory political concessions. One result of this new
strategy, the U.S. Congress in 1987 began to put pressure on the White House to
protect Tibetan culture and accord Tibet greater status in U.S. law, despite Beijing’s
strong objections.
Two events of particular importance occurred in 1987. First, on September 21,
the Dalai Lama made his first political speech in the United States, at the invitation
of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. In that speech, the Dalai Lama made
a five-point proposal for resolving the Tibet question that was well-received in the
United States and had significant consequences on congressional attitudes toward
Tibet. Second, Congress put non-binding measures into place in 1987 declaring that
the United States should make Tibet’s situation a higher policy priority and should
urge China to establish a constructive dialogue with the Dalai Lama.⁶
This language, not the first that Congress had passed regarding Tibet,⁷
nevertheless, marked the beginning of a significant increase in congressional activity
on Tibet’s status.⁸ From this point on, congressional supporters sought to mention
Tibet separately whenever possible in legislation relating to China. In 1990, in
considering foreign relations authorization legislation that contained the so-called
“Tiananmen sanctions,” Congress singled out Tibet for special mention in sense-of-
Congress language that closely resembled the “five points” the Dalai Lama had
proposed two years earlier and, in the same legislation, mandated the Voice of

⁴ These have included Representatives Charlie Rose, Ben Gilman, and Tom Lantos, and the
late Senator Claiborne Pell.
⁵ These three cities are all still centers for Tibet-related offices and information networks.
According to Dr. Melvyn Goldstein, professor of anthropology at Case Western Reserve
University, the details of how the “international campaign” strategy was formed have not
yet been documented. Goldstein, Melvyn, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet,
and the Dalai Lama, University of California Press, 1997. pp. 76 and 138.
⁶ President Reagan signed into law H.R. 1777, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of
FY88-89, on December 22, 1987 (P.L. 100-204); section 1243 contains language on Tibet.
In 1985, 91 Members of Congress reportedly had also sent a letter to China’s President, Li
Xiannian, expressing support for continued talks with the Dalai Lama.
⁷ Congress considered a number of non-binding measures in the 1980s concerning Tibet.
In 1986, Congress listed “Tibet” as an independent country in H.R. 5548, legislation dealing
the Export-Import Bank. This bill was approved on October 15, and became P.L. 99-472.
⁸ According to a legislative database, in the four years prior to 1987, only 6 measures had
been introduced in Congress concerning Tibet, whereas the 1987 legislation was one of 14
measures introduced in 1987-1988. [http://thomas.loc.gov]

America to begin broadcasts in the Tibetan language.⁹ In 1994, Congress enacted a
number of Tibetan-related provisions in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of
FY1994-1995, including:
^!a provision mandating that Tibet be listed separately in the State
Department’s annual report, “Country Reports on Human Rights”;
and
^!a provision mandating the State Department to issue a report on the
“state of relations between U.S. and those recognized by Congress
as the true representatives of the Tibetan people; the Dalai Lama, his
representatives, and the Tibetan Government in exile, and on
conditions in Tibet.”¹⁰
Congressional efforts to raise the profile of Tibet over the last ten years or more
have been resisted or mitigated by successive U.S. Administrations, but generally in
a low profile, non-confrontational manner. As early as 1986, when Congress passed
legislation authorizing Export-Import Bank funding which listed Tibet as a separate
country, President Reagan signed the legislation into law.¹¹ In his remarks, however,
the President said:
I note that Tibet is listed as a country in section 8. The United States recognizes
Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China. I interpret Tibet’s inclusion as¹²
a separate country to be a technical oversight.
In other respects, however, consistent congressional pressure has contributed
to U.S. Administrations acknowledging, however subtly, the position of the Tibetan
community-in-exile. Thus, President George Bush in 1991 became the first U.S.
President to meet with the Dalai Lama, while President Bill Clinton met with the
Dalai Lama several times in casual “drop-by” meetings. Although these meetings
were deliberately low-key and informal, they nevertheless offended Chinese leaders,
as did the Clinton Administration’s decision, after having opposed the Special
Envoy position for four years, to compromise by establishing the position of Special
Coordinator for Tibet.

⁹ This bill, H.R. 3792, was enacted as P.L. 101-246, and contains the “Tiananmen sanctions”
on China that are still largely in effect. Its provisions on Tibet stated that U.S. policy toward
China should be explicitly linked with the situation in Tibet, specifically to include lifting
of martial law in Lhasa and other parts of Tibet; opening Tibet to foreigners, including the
press and international human rights organizations; release of political prisoners; and
conduct of negotiations between representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese
government.
¹⁰ Established pursuant to Section 536 of the Foreign Relations Authorizations Act, H.R.

2333, enacted as P.L. 103-236.

¹¹ H.R. 5548 was approved on October 15, and became P.L. 99-472.
¹² “Statement on Signing the Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1986,” October 15,
1986, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, Book II, June

28 to December 31, 1986, pp. 1390-1391.

Efforts to Create a Special Envoy for Tibet. During the early years of the
Clinton Administration, Congress began considering measures to establish the
position of a U.S. Special Envoy for Tibet, with ambassadorial rank. In introducing
such a measure in 1994, Senator Claiborne Pell stated he believed it was necessary
to further focus White House attention on issues involving Tibet:
I recall how difficult it was to engage previous administrations in serious,
knowledgeable discussions on Tibet...A Special Envoy for Tibet would ensure
that this important element of United States-China relations was continually¹³
reflected in policy discussions on a senior level.
While legislation to create a Special Envoy for Tibet was never enacted,
provisions similar to those in the 1994 legislation were also introduced as sections
of authorization bills in the 104^th and the 105^th Congresses.¹⁴ In each case, the
provision called for the Special Envoy to have ambassadorial rank and to actively
promote negotiations between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government. Clinton
Administration officials opposed these provisions, primarily because of concerns
about the creation of an ambassadorial rank position for an entity (Tibet) that the
United States recognizes as part of China rather than as an independent country in its
own right.
On October 31, 1997, in a move seen as a compromise to appeal to proponents
of the “Special Envoy” position, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright designated
a Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues within the State Department and named
Gregory Craig to serve in the position concurrently with his job as Director of Policy
Planning. Although the new Special Coordinator position did not come with
ambassadorial rank, its creation nevertheless suggested there would be a higher level
of official attention on issues involving Tibet. Consequently, the 105^th Congress
dropped the Special Envoy provision from subsequent legislation.¹⁵

¹³ Statement by Senator Pell, Congressional Record, October 7, 1994, p. S14878. Senator
Pell’s bill, S. 2554, was not enacted; nor was H.R. 5254, a similar bill introduced in the
House on October 7, 1994, by Representative Howard Berman.
¹⁴ In the 104^th Congress, that legislation was the American Overseas Interests Act of 1995
(H.R. 1561-Gilman, and S. 908-Helms). President Clinton vetoed this legislation on April

12, 1996; the House override vote on April 30,1996 failed to achieve the two-thirds^th

necessary for passage (234-188). Similar legislation in the 105 Congress, H.R. 1486, was
replaced by three separate bills after consideration by the House Rules Committee on June
3, 1997: H.R. 1757, authorizing appropriations for the State Department for FY1998-1999
(and containing the Tibet Special Envoy provision); H.R. 1758, the European Security Act
(NATO enlargement); and H.R. 1759, a foreign aid authorization and reform bill. The
Special Envoy provision was dropped from this separate legislation before final passage.
¹⁵ On January 20, 1999, the position of Special Coordinator for Tibet was assumed by Julia
Taft, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration. She
stepped down on January 19, 2001. On May 17, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell
announced that Paula Dobriansky, Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs, would serve
as the next Special Coordinator for Tibet.

Current Issues on Tibet: Implications for the United States
The Bush Administration appears to have taken a somewhat higher profile on
Tibet than its predecessors, and one less mindful of Beijing’s views. On May 17,
2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell appointed Paula Dobriansky, Undersecretary
of State for Global Affairs, as the next U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibet. As
Undersecretary, Ms. Dobriansky is the highest-ranking of the three U.S. officials who
have held the Coordinator position. In a further higher profile move, Secretary of
State Powell met personally with the Dalai Lama during the latter’s visit to
Washington on May 22, 2001, reportedly to discuss “human nature, religious values,
and the situation in Tibet.” This was followed by a personal meeting on May 23,

2001, between President Bush and the Dalai Lama.

But there remain long-standing difficulties over basic issues involving Tibet,
including Tibet’s geographic area, the number of Tibetans living there, and the
number of ethnic Han Chinese residents. There are ethnic frictions between Tibetans
and Chinese living in close proximity, with all the burdens of social discrimination
and economic disparity that often accompany such frictions. And the still deep-
rooted influence of religion in Tibet — as a way of life, a cultural identity, and an
institutional force — clashes continually with the secular traditions and bureaucratic
requirements of the Chinese communist government system. Among these
entrenched tensions, a number of issues in particular have U.S. policy implications:
Status of the Dalai Lama’s Negotiations with China. Although a
specific mission of the U.S. Special Coordinator on Tibet is to promote talks between
the PRC and the Dalai Lama, there has been no progress on this front, and no
negotiations are currently scheduled or being planned. In the past, both the PRC and
the Dalai Lama maintained that they were willing to hold discussions about Tibet’s
future. The Dalai Lama himself — whose views on the subject are more cautious
and diplomatic than those of many of his followers — generally speaks of Tibetan
interests within the context of rule by China. He has spoken of a future Tibet that is
part of China, but which also has “cultural autonomy” within the Chinese system.
But the Dalai Lama also has insisted that there should be no preconditions for any
discussions he has with Beijing; instead, the negotiators should be able to address
every issue in contention. The PRC continues to insist that discussions with the
Dalai Lama should have several preconditions, including: an absolute ban on the
subject of independence for Tibet; and the Dalai Lama’s public acknowledgment that
Tibet and Taiwan are both part of China.
Some speculate that the Dalai Lama may have grown increasingly pessimistic
about his ability to achieve a solution to Tibet’s situation. He has implied that the
moderate approach he has been pursuing has failed because of China’s unwillingness
to hold free-ranging talks, and has hinted that time may be running out for a
negotiated settlement. Some are concerned that traditional Tibetan culture and values
increasingly are being overwhelmed by the growing Chinese presence in Tibet. They
worry about some of the educated and bilingual Tibetan elite, trained by the Chinese
communists, who are now serving in government positions in Tibet and who
therefore have more of a vested interest in the status quo. And they worry that
continued delay in achieving a negotiated settlement increases the possibility that
frustrated Tibetans may resort to violence.

Economic Development in Tibet. Chinese government policies on
economic development in Tibet appear to have helped raise the living standards of
Tibet generally, but at a high cost to Tibet’s traditions and cultural identity. These
policies reportedly have disrupted traditional living patterns and contributed to
tensions between Tibetans and Chinese immigrants. In an apparent effort to assuage
Tibetan resentment, Beijing has spent substantial sums restoring Buddhist temples
in Tibet. At a large conference conducted on Tibet in 1994, Chinese officials
adopted plans to increase economic activity in Tibet by 10% per year and continue
substantial economic subsidies to help Tibet’s backward economy. Since then, the
PRC has moved ahead with a number of major economic development and
infrastructure projects.
The Dalai Lama and other Tibetans are concerned that Chinese economic
activity in Tibet disrupts cultural identity, in part by encouraging large migrations of
non-Tibetans into the region — both technical personnel to work on the projects
themselves, and entrepreneurs seeking new economic opportunities. Some have even
suggested that Beijing has consciously pursued an economic development strategy
in Tibet as a way to “solve” its Tibet problem, by ensuring that the Tibetan economy
is tied more tightly into that of China’s eastern provinces. The tensions inherent in
balancing economic development priorities and cultural preservation concerns will
continue to influence how American policymakers view China’s Tibet policies.
World Bank Project Loan. Controversy arose in 1999 over a World Bank
loan that was approved for China on June 24, 1999. One portion of the $160 million
“Western Poverty Reduction” loan, totaling $40 million, would have financed
construction of a dam, irrigation system, and poverty alleviation activities in an area
of Qinghai Province which many Tibetans consider part of historical Tibet.
According to the Bank’s estimates, this portion of the project also involved
resettlement of approximately 58,000 people, most of whom are non-Tibetan, into
this area of Qinghai. Critics of the loan maintained that the resettlement plans would
reduce the overall share of the population that ethnic Tibetans now have in this
region. Faced with strong criticism, the Bank suspended its final commitment on the
Qinghai portion of the loan pending completion of an investigation by an
independent Inspection Panel. That panel found that although the Bank had violated
some of its own rules in making the loan, China nevertheless should take remedial
steps to address some valid criticisms. On July 7, 2000, China withdrew its
application for the loan, and since then has used its own funds to carry out the
project.
China’s “Patriotic Education” and Other Campaigns. In 1991, two
years after the Tiananmen Square crackdown, China launched a “patriotic education”
campaign in an effort to promote loyalty to the communist regime. In the mid-1990s,
the campaign became a government tool in efforts to control monastic activity in
Tibet and discredit the Dalai Lama among Tibetans. Under the guise of “patriotic
education,” teams of Chinese officials visit Tibetan monasteries and subject Tibetan
monks to education and training. The campaign requires monks to sign a declaration
attesting to a number of “patriotic” statements, including rejection and denunciation
of the Dalai Lama; acceptance of China’s choice for the Panchen Lama (see next
section); recognition that Tibet is part of China; and a promise not to listen to Voice

of America broadcasts. Reportedly there has been widespread and intensive
resistance to this campaign.
In addition to this campaign, in January 1999, Chinese officials began a three-
year campaign to foster atheism in Tibet. According to a U.S. government report, a
Chinese propaganda official in Tibet described the new campaign in a television
interview, saying “intensifying propaganda on atheism plays an extremely significant
role in promoting economic construction...and to help peasants and herdsmen free
themselves from the negative influence of religion.”¹⁶
Finally, there are reports that the Chinese government has initiated a new
campaign to target and undermine the Dalai Lama. According to a Hong Kong
newspaper report, in late May 2001, at the Fourth Tibet Work Forum, PRC
authorities discussed how to cope with what they referred to as the “convergence and
collaboration of five evil forces” — defined as Tibetan independence, Xinjiang
independence, Taiwan independence, the Falun Gong movement, and the pro-
democracy movement.¹⁷ According to reports, the goal of the campaign is to lessen
the Dalai Lama’s influence in Tibet by defining him as a “loyal tool of the Western
anti-Chinese forces.”¹⁸
The Panchen Lama Succession. In 1995, controversy arose over the
selection of the successor to the Panchen Lama, the second most important spiritual^th
leader among Tibetans. When the Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959, the 10 Panchen
Lama remained behind, living in China until his death in 1989. Tibetans believe that
when a high-ranking spiritual leader dies, his soul is then reincarnated to await
rediscovery by special “search committees.” In May 1995, the Dalai Lama
announced that after years of searching — using search committees sanctioned by the
Chinese government — Gendhun Choekyi Nyima, a 6-year-old boy living in Tibet,
had been found to be the legitimate reincarnation of the deceased Panchen Lama.
Beijing officials reportedly were furious that the Dalai Lama made his
announcement unilaterally. They regarded it as a challenge to Beijing’s authority to
have a final say in this important decision. PRC officials responded by maintaining
that only they had the authority to name this spiritual leader. Consequently, in
November 1995, Chinese leaders rejected the Dalai Lama’s choice and announced
they had discovered the “real” Panchen Lama — 5-year-old Gyaltsen Norbu, son of
a communist yak herder. On November 29, 1995, he was officially enthroned as the
11^th Panchen Lama in a ceremony attended by Tibetan monks and senior Chinese
communist leaders. Immediately thereafter, both boys and their families were taken
into custody by Chinese authorities and held in undisclosed locations in China. In
June 1999, Gyaltsen Norbu, the boy recognized by Beijing, returned to Tibet for the
first time, reportedly under heavy military protection. Gendhun Choekyi Nyima, the
boy recognized by the Dalai Lama, apparently remains under house arrest and has not
been seen since. The monk who headed the official search party, Chadrel Rinpoche,

¹⁶ “Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999: Tibet,” September 9, 1999.
¹⁷ Hong Kong Ming Bao, in Chinese, May 19, 2001, translated in FBIS online.
¹⁸ Ibid.

was arrested and sentenced to six years in jail for collaborating with the Dalai Lama.
He reportedly was released from prison just prior to President Bush’s February 2002
visit to Beijing and placed under house arrest.
Tibet and the 107^th Congress
Several Members of the 107^th Congress appear to be continuing and expanding
upon their efforts to focus more U.S. attention on Tibet. On March 7, 2002, the
House International Relations Committee held hearings on U.S. policy considerations
in Tibet. At that hearing, the U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibet, Under Secretary of
State Paula Dobriansky, testified about the U.S. agenda with respect to Tibet and her
progress to date, including her accompaniment of President Bush during his visits to
China in 2001 and 2002.¹⁹ In addition, provisions on Tibet have been included in the
following legislation:
H.R. 1646/S. 1401, Authorizing Appropriations for State, Justice,
and Commerce. Although free-standing legislation has been introduced in the^th
107 Congress on Tibet, it is likely that the State Department authorization act will
be the vehicle for passage of Tibet-related legislation. Both H.R. 1646 (H.Rept. 107-
57) and S. 1401 (S.Rept. 107-60) provide a number of the same provisions contained
in the free-standing Tibetan Policy Act described below (H.R. 1779/S. 852),
including opening a U.S. consular office in Lhasa; Tibetan language training for U.S.
foreign service officers; U.S. support for economic development on the Tibetan
Plateau; and separate entries for Tibet in various mandated reporting requirements.
In addition, both the authorizing bills provide for $500,000 in each of fiscal years
2002 and 2003 for the “Ngawang Choephel Exchange Programs” (the former
“programs of educational and cultural exchange between the United States and the
people of Tibet”). The authorizing bills also differ in certain other respects, such as
in the type of reporting requirement they impose (semi-annually for S. 1646, annually
for S. 1401); or the $2,000,000 in funding that H.R. 1646 alone provides for
migration and refugee assistance for Tibetan refugees.
H.R. 1779/S. 852: The Tibetan Policy Act of 2001. This legislation was
introduced in both the House and Senate on May 9, 2001 (H.R. 1779 by
Representative Tom Lantos, and S. 852 by Senator Dianne Feinstein). The bills
introduce a number of sense-of-Congress proposals, including: that the United States
should “initiate steps” to encourage a negotiated agreement between Beijing and the
Dalai Lama; that the United States-European Parliamentary Group should encourage
Sino-Tibetan dialogue; that the United States should seek unconditional release for
political prisoners in Tibet; and that the United States should oppose any efforts in
the United Nations either to prevent consideration of issues involving Tibet or to
prevent the participation of the Dalai Lama or his representatives in U.N. fora. Other
major provisions of the legislation include:
^!reaffirmation of the view that Tibet is an illegally occupied country;

¹⁹ The text of the three witnesses’ testimony can be found at the Committee’s website:
[http://www.house.gov/international_relations/].

^!semi-annual reports to Congress on the status of Sino-Tibetan
discussions;
^!separate listing for Tibet in all mandated U.S. country-by-country
reports;
^!a statutory mandate for a Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues in
the State Department (as opposed to leaving such an appointment to
presidential discretion);
^!expansion of the duties of the Congressional-Executive Commission
on the People’s Republic of China (CECPRC) to include reports on
the progress of PRC/Dalai Lama negotiations;
^!authorization of $2 million in U.S. funds for Tibetan migration and
refugees assistance in each of the three fiscal years from FY2002-
FY2004;
^!policy declarations that the U.S. should encourage NGOs and
international organizations to undertake projects designed to assist
Tibetans to become self-sufficient and raise their standard of living;
^!support for projects in Tibet by the U.S. EximBank, Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and Trade Development
Agency (TDA);
^!the United States should seek to open in Lhasa, Tibet a branch office
of the U.S. Consulate General in Chengdu, to monitor developments
in Tibet;
^!Tibetan language training for U.S. foreign service officers; and
^!the United States should seek a meeting with and the release of the
boy the Dalai Lama announced as the 11^th Panchen Lama.
H.R. 2506, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L. 107-115). Section 526 of the Act
provides $3 million for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to support activities
preserving Tibet’s cultural traditions and promoting sustainable development and
environmental conservation in Tibet. The bill was presented to the President on
January 1, 2002, and was signed into law on January 10, 2002.

Appendix A: Tibet-related Interest Groups
International Campaign for Tibet (ICT). Apart from the Dalai Lama, a
number of interest groups established both in the United States and abroad since the
mid-1980s have worked to bring the Tibetan cause to the attention of the
Administration, the international community, and Members of Congress. These
groups remain important forces of influence on the political scene in 2001. Among
the most visible advocates for the Tibetan cause is the U.S.-based International
Campaign for Tibet (ICT), formed in 1988. Although the ICT pursues broad human
rights issues involving Tibet, its primary goals concern Tibet’s political and
international status — specifically, to help Tibet regain independence from China,
which the ITC regards as an illegal occupying power. Through its work, the ITC
hopes to create sufficient international support for Tibet to force China to begin
serious talks with the Dalai Lama about Tibet’s future status. The ITC has offices
in Washington and Amsterdam. Although it occasionally receives small grants (for
instance, from the National Endowment for Democracy), the ITC is largely
dependent on donations from private individuals.
International Campaign for Tibet
1825 K St. N.W., Suite 520
Washington, D.C. 20006
Ph: (202) 785-1515
[ h ttp://www.savetibet.org/ ]
The Committee of 100 for Tibet. In a similar vein, the Committee of 100
for Tibet, formed in 1992, seeks to put Tibet on the international agenda, and to
encourage international support for a free, independent Tibet. According to its self-
description, the Committee maintains “uncompromising support of the Tibetan
peaceful struggle for independence,” and it “cooperates with and complements the²⁰
work of other organizations working for Tibet and the Tibetan people.” The
Committee tries to disseminate news about Tibet through the World Tibet Network
News (WTN) and the Tibet News Digest.
The Committee’s membership (of approximately 100) is an international one,
and draws heavily from the actor/artist community (including Richard Gere, Joan
Baez, John Cleese, Marvin Hamlisch, and Catherine Ingram); the Nobel Laureate
community (13 Nobel prize winners, including Desmond Tutu and Elie Wiesel); and
current and former U.S. officials (House International Relations Committee
Chairman Ben Gilman, Representative Charlie Rose, former Attorney General
Ramsey Clark, and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jean Kirkpatrick).
Membership also includes officials associated with other Tibetan activist
organizations, including Lodi Gyari, president of the International Campaign for
Tibet; Rinchen Dharlo, representative of the Dalai Lama to North America; and
Tsewang Phuntso, president of the Tibetan Youth Congress.

²⁰ Taken from the group’s website, which also includes a complete list of the group’s
membership. [http://www.tibet.org/Tibet100/]

The Committee of 100 for Tibet
P.O. Box 60612
Palo Alto, CA 94306-0612
[ http://www.tibet.org/ Tibet100/]
The Tibet Information Network (TIN). A third group, the Tibet
Information Network (TIN — formed in October 1987) describes its goal as
providing “...information and research material to anyone with an interest in Tibet
irrespective of their opinions, and is not affiliated to governments or any other
organisations (sic).” ²¹ TIN is based in London, with a U.S. office in Jackson,
Wyoming, and maintains it is not associated with any government organizations or
other Tibet-related organizations. Since its inception, TIN has been providing reports
on social, economic, and political developments in Tibet, based on both official
Chinese and Tibetan sources, and on independent observations from foreign visitors.
In addition to its website, TIN offers its “News subscribers” about 35 faxed or e-
mailed news reports annually, plus periodic book length studies, and moderate length
briefing papers. Subscribers to its TIN Publications Service receive mailed copies
of more in-depth reports a minimum of four times a year.
Tibet Information Network USA
P.O. Box 2270
Jackson, WY 83001
Ph: (307) 733-4670
[ http://www.tibetinfo.net/]

²¹ Quote taken from the TIN website: [http://www.tibetinfo.net/admin/f_a_q.htm#1]