Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors

Report for Congress
Andean Regional Initiative (ARI):
FY2002 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors
Updated February 14, 2002
K. Larry Storrs
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Andean Regional Initiative (ARI):
FY2002 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors
Summary
In April and May 2001, the Bush Administration proposed $882.29 million in
FY2002 economic and counter-narcotics assistance, as well as extension of trade
preferences and other measures, for Colombia and regional neighbors in an initiative
called the “Andean Regional Initiative” (ARI).
Critics of the Andean Regional Initiative argue that it is a continuation of what
they regard as the misguided approach of Plan Colombia assistance approved in
2000, with an overemphasis on military and counter-drug assistance, and with
inadequate support for human rights and the peace process in Colombia. Supporters
argue that it continues needed assistance to Colombia, while providing more support
for regional neighbors and social and economic programs.
In action on the FY2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (H.R. 2506),
the House passed the bill on July 24, 2001, with $826 million for the ARI, of which
$675 million is for the counter-narcotics “Andean Counterdrug Initiative” (ACI)
portion, a reduction of $56 million from the President’s ACI request. The Senate
passed the bill on October 24, 2001, with $698 million for the ARI, of which $547
million is for the ACI, a reduction of $184 million from the President’s ACI request.
The conference version of H.R. 2506, as approved by the House on December 19,
and the Senate on December 20, includes $625 million for the ACI, $106 million less
than the President’s ACI request, with $215 million earmarked for AID programs and
a variety of conditions, including an alteration of the cap on military and civilian
contractors serving in Colombia. In February 2002 budget submissions, the Bush
Administration allocated $645 million to the ACI account for FY2002, including $20
million transferred from the general International Narcotics Control account.
In action on the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2002-FY2003, the
House passed H.R. 1646 on May 16, 2001, with four reporting requirements on
activities in Colombia and a prohibition on the issuance of visas to illegal armed
groups in Colombia. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out S. 1401
on September 4, 2001, with a requirement for a report that outlines a comprehensive
strategy to eradicate all opium cultivation at its source in Colombia. No further
action occurred on either of these bills in the first session of the 107^th Congress.
In action on the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002, the House
passed H.R. 2586 on September 25, 2001, with a cap of 500 on the number of U.S.
military personnel in Colombia, with some exceptions. This provision was not
retained in the conference version of S. 1438 which was passed by both chambers on
December 13, 2001.
In action on the Andean Trade Preference Act, on November 16, 2001, the
House passed H.R. 3009, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act,
which would extend and expand the ATPA through December 31, 2006. The Senate
Finance Committee reported a more limited version, S. 525, on November 29, 2001,
in the context of other legislation.

Contents
President Bush’s Andean Regional Initiative Request for FY2002............1
Situation in Colombia and Neighboring Countries........................5
Colombia ....................................................5
Peru ........................................................7
Bolivia ......................................................8
Ecuador .....................................................9
Brazil ......................................................10
Venezuela ...................................................11
Panama .....................................................12
Major Legislative Activity in 2001 on Andean Regional Initiative Issues.....12
Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY2002.......................12
House Action............................................12
Senate Action............................................16
Conference Action........................................19
Foreign Relations Authorization, FY2002-FY2003..................21
House Action............................................21
Senate Action............................................23
National Defense Authorization Act, FY2002.......................23
House Action............................................23
Extension of Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA)..................24
House Action............................................24
Senate Action............................................24
Appendix A. Map Showing Andean Regional Initiative Countries...........25
Appendix B. Bush Administration’s FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative
(ARI) Request by Purpose and Functional Accounts..................26
Appendix C. FY2000-FY2001 U.S. Assistance to Colombia..............27
Appendix D. Controversy over Spray Eradication Efforts in Southern
Colombia ...................................................28
Appendix E. Bush Administration’s Andean Regional Initiative (ARI)
FY2002 Request and FY2002 Allocations by Purpose and by Functional
Accounts ...................................................32
Appendix F. Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) FY2002 Allocations and
FY2003 Funding Request by Purpose and Functional Accounts.........33

Andean Regional Initiative (ARI):
FY2002 Assistance for
Colombia and Neighbors
President Bush’s Andean Regional Initiative
Request for FY2002
In April 2001 budget submissions, President Bush requested $882.29 million
in FY2002 economic and counter-narcotics assistance for Colombia and regional
neighbors in an initiative called the “Andean Regional Initiative,” with $731 million
of the counter-narcotics assistance called the “Andean Counterdrug Initiative.”
According to the Administration, there are two distinctive features of this program,
compared to Plan Colombia assistance,¹ both of which aim to promote peace and to
stem the flow of cocaine and heroin from the Andean region. The differences are that
the assistance for economic and social programs is roughly equal to the assistance for
counter-narcotics programs, and that more than half of the assistance is directed at
regional countries that are experiencing the spill-over effects of illicit drug and
insurgency activities.²
In the presentation of the International Affairs budget, the Administration noted
that the Andean Counterdrug Initiative would build upon the resources provided in
the FY2000 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Plan Colombia and
ongoing regional funding. It set as counter-narcotics goals to reduce Colombian coca
production by 30% in 2000-2002, to eliminate all illicit coca production in Bolivia
by the end of 2002, to negotiate revised coca and poppy control goals with the new

¹ “Plan Colombia” refers to the $1.3 billion in FY2000 emergency supplemental
appropriations approved by the 106^th Congress in the FY2001 Military Construction
Appropriations bill (H.R. 4425, P.L. 106-246) for counternarcotics and related efforts in
Colombia and neighboring countries. There was no limitation on the fiscal year in which
the funding could be obligated or spent; see Appendix C for a chart on the obligation of this
and other funding to Colombia in FY2000 and FY2001. For more detail, see CRS Report
RL30541, Colombia: Plan Colombia Legislation and Assistance (FY2000-FY2001).
² President Bush also requested $31.250 million from the International Affairs account for
international narcotics control funding for Other Western Hemisphere countries, with $12
million for Mexico, $12.5 million for the Latin American Regional program, $4 million for
Guatemala, $1.550 million for Jamaica, and $1.2 million for the Bahamas. He also
committed to fully fund the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act as incorporated into
the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1998 (P.L.
105-277) by providing $278 million to upgrade drug interdiction efforts of the U.S. Coast
Guard and Customs Service in Transportation and Administration of Justice accounts. See
the Administration’s February 2001 Blueprint for New Beginnings, and April budget
submission documents.

Peruvian Government, and to set aggressive and achievable goals by mid-August

2001 with other countries in the region.

In presenting the broader Andean Regional Initiative to Andean regional leaders
at Summit of the Americas III in Quebec City, Canada, in mid-April 2001, President
Bush said: “The United States is responsible to fight its own demand for drugs. And
we will expand our efforts to work with producer and transit countries to fortify their
democratic institutions, promote sustainable development, and fight the supply of
drugs at the source .... The United States appreciates the difficult challenges [Andean
countries] face in fighting drugs – and stands ready to be their partner.”³
Requested ARI funding of $882.29 million for FY2002 is to be distributed as
follows, taking into account only international affairs funding:
Colombia: $399 million
^!Socio-economic aid: $146.5 million for programs such as alternative
development, judicial reform, human rights, anti-corruption
measures, and support for the peace process.
^!Counter-narcotics aid: $252.5 million for aviation and infrastructure
support for air assets provided under Plan Colombia, training and
equipping security forces, and interdiction and eradication efforts.
Peru: $206.15 million
^!Socio-economic aid: $128.15 million for alternative development,
promotion of democracy, health and education programs.
^!Counter-narcotics aid: $78 million for upgrading helicopters and
riverine interdiction efforts, eradication, and demand reduction and
policy development.
Bolivia: $143.48 million
^!Socio-economic aid: $88.48 million for programs such as alternative
development, judicial reform, poverty alleviation, health and
environment.
^!Counter-narcotics aid: $55 million for ground-based and air
interdiction support, eradication efforts, counter-narcotics training,
and narcotics awareness and prevention programs.
Ecuador: $76.48 million
^!Socio-economic aid: $56.48 million for border area development,
poverty reduction, judicial reform, and environmental programs.
^!Counter-narcotics aid: $20 million for northern border security, law
enforcement and border checkpoints, and sea and airport control
efforts.

³ See U.S. Department of State International Information Programs Washington File, Fact
Sheet: U.S. Andean Regional Initiative, April 21, 2001, and Appendix A in this report.

Brazil: $26.18 million
^!Socio-economic aid: $11.18 million for health and environmental
programs.
^!Counter-narcotics aid: $15 million for training and equipping border
counter-narcotics forces, and for drug awareness and demand
reduction programs.
Panama: $20.5 million
^!Socio-economic aid: $8.5 million for judicial reform, watershed
management, and economic growth opportunities.
^!Counter-narcotics aid: $12 million for upgrading interdiction and
law enforcement forces, and for modernizing criminal justice
institutions.
Venezuela: $10.5 million
^!Socio-economic aid: $0.5 million for legal and judicial reform.
^!Counter-narcotics aid: $10 million for law enforcement and
interdiction reforms, efforts to counter money-laundering, and
demand reduction.
Another aspect of the Andean Regional Initiative is U.S. support for the
extension and broadening of the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA), expiring in
December 2001, that gives duty free or reduced-rate treatment to the products of
Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia. This was the centerpiece appeal of Colombian
President Pastrana at his mid-April 2001 meeting with the President Bush, and the
U.S. President replied that he favored extension of the Act and would work with
Congress to broaden the coverage. President Bush repeated that pledge when he met
with Andean leaders at the Summit of the Americas meeting in Canada. Colombia
especially wants textiles and apparel to be covered, while Ecuador wants tuna to be
covered. The countries are looking for parity with Central American and Caribbean
preferences, provided in the U.S.-Caribbean Trade Partnership Act approved in 2000,
in order to prevent a diversion of trade and investment from the Andean region to
Mexico, Central America, or the Caribbean.⁴
In a mid-May 2001 briefing on the Andean Regional Initiative, Administration
spokesmen noted that democracy is under pressure in all regional countries, that
economic development is in doubt, and that Andean countries pose a direct national
security threat because they produce virtually all of the world’s cocaine and
increasing amounts of heroin. The policy makers suggested three overarching goals
in the Andean Ridge that could be called the three D’s – democracy, development,
and drugs. The first goal is to promote and support democracy and democratic
institutions by support for judicial reform, anti-corruption measures, human rights
improvement, and the peace process in Colombia. The second goal is to foster
sustainable economic development and trade liberalization through alternative

⁴ For information on ATPA see CRS Report RL30790, The Andean Trade Preference Act:
Background and Issues for Reauthorization, by J.F. Hornbeck. For information on the U.S.-
Caribbean Trade Partnership Act and other regional free trade agreements, see CRS Issue
Brief IB95017, Trade and the Americas, by Raymond J. Ahearn.

economic development, protection of the environment, and renewal of the Andean
Trade Preference Act (ATPA). The third goal is to significantly reduce the supply
of illegal drugs to the United States at the source, while simultaneously reducing U.S.
demand, through eradication, interdiction and other efforts.⁵
The Administration’s Andean Regional Initiative if enacted as requested will
significantly increase funding to some Latin American drug producing countries. It
would place Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia among the top eight U.S. foreign aid
recipients in FY2002, with Colombia in third place, Peru in fifth place, and Bolivia
in eighth place.⁶
Critics of the Andean Regional Initiative argue that it is a continuation of what
they regard as the misguided approach of Plan Colombia approved in 2000, with an
overemphasis on military and counter-drug assistance, and with inadequate support
for human rights and the peace process in Colombia. They argue that support for the
military will weaken and undermine the peace process as the only viable solution,
particularly if the military’s ties to the para-military groups and human rights abuse
are not ended. They also argue that forced eradication of crops through aerial
spraying will cause environmental damage and internal displacement in the entire
region, and is likely to fail ultimately as new sources of supply emerge elsewhere.
Supporters argue that the Andean Regional Initiative continues needed assistance to
Colombia when Plan Colombia assistance is just beginning to take effect, while
providing more support for endangered regional neighbors and more assistance for
social and economic programs.⁷

⁵ See U.S. Department of State International Information Programs Washington File, Fact
Sheet: U.S. Policy Toward the Andean Region, and Transcript: State Department Briefing
on Andean Regional Initiative, May 17, 2001, also available at the following website
[http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/].
⁶ See CRS Report RL31011, Appropriations for FY2002: Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs, p. 9, by Larry Nowels. For more information on past
international narcotics control efforts by the United States, see CRS Issue Brief IB88093,
Drug Control: International Policy and Options, by Raphael Perl.
⁷ For critical comments, see statements on the Center for International Policy’s Colombia
Project website [http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/] under CIP Analyses, under U.S.
Military and Police Aid (especially Other Groups’ Analyses) and under U.S. Government
Information (especially Legislators). For supportive comments, see statements on the same
website under U.S. Military and Police Aid (especially Other Groups’ Analyses), and U.S.
Government Information (especially statements from Officials and Legislators).

Situation in Colombia and Neighboring Countries
The Andean Regional Initiative is designed to provide assistance to seven⁸
important countries in the broadly defined Andean region, or what the
Administration has called the Andean Ridge: Colombia (the major producer of
cocaine and the central challenge); Peru and Bolivia (where past successes in
reducing cocaine production could be threatened by expected progress in Colombia);
Ecuador (the most exposed neighbor because of its proximity to Colombian areas
controlled by drug producers and guerrillas); and Brazil, Venezuela and Panama
(where the threat is primarily confined to common border areas with Colombia).
This area has some of the most heavily populated countries in Latin America,
including the first (Brazil), third (Colombia), fifth (Peru), sixth (Venezuela), and
eighth (Ecuador) most populous. It includes three major drug producing countries
(Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru) where virtually all the world’s cocaine, and more than
two thirds of the heroin consumed in the U.S. East Coast are produced. It also
includes two major oil producing countries (Venezuela and Ecuador) which supply
significant quantities of oil to the United States and are members of the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). While the designated countries have
diverse trading relationships, the United States is the major trading partner by far for
all of them. For the five traditional Andean countries (Colombia, Venezuela,
Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia) the Andes mountain range that runs through South
America poses geographical obstacles to intra-state and inter-state integration, but the
countries are linked together in the Andean Community economic integration pact.
While Colombia and Venezuela have largely European-Indian mixed race (mestizo)
populations, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador have significant indigenous populations.
Colombia
With a population of 42.8 million, Colombia is the third most populous country
in Latin America after Brazil and Mexico, with a largely mixed race (mestizo)
population, and a spacious territory separated by three parallel mountain ranges. It
is known for a long tradition of democracy, but also for continuing violence,
including guerrilla insurgency dating back to the 1960s, and persistent drug
trafficking activity. Negotiated settlements were achieved with some of the guerrilla
groups in the 1980s, but fell apart by 1990 when former guerrillas participating in
political activities were assassinated. Recent administrations have had to deal with
a complicated mix of leftist guerrillas, rightist para-military forces, and drug
traffickers associated with both forces.
President Andres Pastrana was elected and inaugurated in 1998 for a four year
term largely on the basis of pledges to bring peace to the country by negotiating with
the guerrillas, strengthening the Colombian military and counter-narcotics forces, and

⁸ Panama and Brazil are not normally considered to be part of the Andean region; Bolivia
is an Andean country but it does not share a border with Colombia. For usage of the term
“Andean Ridge” see citations under Plan Colombia on the website of the State Department’s
International Information Programs [http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/].

seeking international support for these efforts and other reforms to address the
country’s unusually serious economic difficulties.⁹
In 1999, President Pastrana, with U.S. assistance, developed a $7.5 billion plan
called Plan Colombia, with $4 billion to come from Colombia and $3.5 billion to
come from international donors, although funding from Colombia and the
international community has been lagging. In response to Colombian requests, the
Clinton Administration developed and the U.S. Congress approved a $1.3 billion
package of assistance in 2000, also called Plan Colombia assistance. Some $860.2
million or 67% of this assistance was to support programs in Colombia, with $416.9
million for helicopter, training, and other assistance to three Colombian Army
counternarcotics battalions. This plan was targeted mainly at Colombia and expenses
for big ticket items were weighted toward support for military and counter-narcotics
activities, although there was funding for alternative development, governance, and
human rights programs, and conditions to encourage an improvement in the
military’s human rights performance.¹⁰
President Pastrana is approaching the end of his term, which expires in August
2002, and the selection process to determine his successor is under way. While peace
talks had been reinvigorated by President Pastrana’s direct talks with Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla leader Manuel Marulanda in February
2001, prospects are still very uncertain. Although many elements of Plan Colombia
counter-drug assistance were just beginning to be put in place, the State Department
reported in March 2001 that Colombian production of cocaine had increased 11% in
the year 2000. Despite the FARC’s murder in late September 2001 of the popular
former Minister of Culture, President Pastrana decided in early October 2001 to
extend the demilitarized zone through January 20, 2002, after the FARC agreed to
stop random highway kidnappings and to discuss a ceasefire. Shortly thereafter,
however, the Army accused the FARC of kidnapping six people on a highway in
Narino province, and killing four others in an attack on a small town there.
While international support for Plan Colombia had been lagging, with European
countries previously pledging only about $200 million for social development (not
military) projects, the shift in focus of the U.S. Andean Regional Initiative gained
wider diplomatic support. In part because of the change in emphasis, the
international community pledged an additional $580 million at the third meeting of
the International Support Group for the Peace Process in Colombia on April 30,
2001, although some double counting may be involved. The European Union
pledged $297 million, the United States pledged $146 million, the Andean
Development Corporation pledged $100 million, and other countries pledged $37
million.

⁹ For information on the multi-faceted conditions in Colombia, see CRS Report RL30330,
Colombia: Conditions and U.S. Policy Options, by Nina M. Serafino.
¹⁰ For information on U.S. “Plan Colombia” assistance in FY2000-FY2001, including all
Congressional action and congressionally imposed conditions, see CRS Report RL30541,
Colombia: Plan Colombia Legislation and Assistance (FY2000-FY2001), by Nina M.
Serafino. This report also contains charts detailing U.S. assistance to Colombia since 1989.

Under the FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, Colombia would have
received $399 million, with $146.5 million in socio-economic aid for programs like
alternative development, judicial reform, human rights, anti-corruption measures, and
support for the peace process; and $252.5 million in counter-narcotics aid for
aviation and infrastructure support for air assets provided under Plan Colombia,
training and equipping security forces, and interdiction and eradication efforts.
Under final allocations for FY2002, Colombia received $380.50 million, with $137
million in economic and social programs, and $243.50 million in counter-narcotics
aid.
Peru
With a population of 25.7 million (45% Indian, 37% mestizo, 15% European),
Peru is the fifth most populous country in Latin America. It has been in flux since
the constitutionally questionable third term re-election in June 2000 of President
Alberto Fujimori. Although President Fujimori had considerable support during his
presidency (1990-2000) for restoring the economy, defeating the guerrilla insurgency,
and reducing drug trafficking activity, he was criticized for corruption, human rights
violations, and authoritarian tendencies. The political uncertainty in Peru was
compounded when President Fujimori suddenly resigned and fled into exile in
December 2000, following allegations of corruption associated particularly with
security chief Vladimiro Montesinos.
Peru was governed by Acting President Valentin Paniagua during a transition
period until president-elect Alejandro Toledo was inaugurated as President on July
28, 2001, following the well regarded two-round presidential elections in April and
June 2001. Toledo, a longtime anti-Fujimori opposition leader, was elected on June
3, 2001, with 53% of the valid vote, against former left-leaning Peruvian President
Alan Garcia with 47% of the vote.¹¹ President Toledo has promised to end
corruption and to stabilize the economy, and most observers worry that the
expectations of the populace, especially poor, indigenous groups, are almost
impossible to achieve.
Representatives of Peru and the United States launched an investigation into the
circumstances and procedures leading to an accident on April 20, 2001, when a
Peruvian military plane shot down a small plane, killing an American missionary
woman and her infant daughter, after a CIA surveillance plane indicated that the
small craft might be involved in drug trafficking activities. As a result of this
accident, U.S. surveillance of drug-related flights in Peru and Colombia were
suspended pending clarification of procedures. The State Department released the
report of the U.S.-Peruvian investigative team on August 2, 2001, concluding that
“communications systems overload” and “cumbersome procedures” played a role in
the accident.
Peru is viewed as a success story in counter-narcotics efforts because six years
of joint U.S.-Peru air and riverine interdiction operations, aggressive eradication

¹¹ For more details, see CRS Report RL30918, Peru: Recovery from Crisis, by Maureen
Taft-Morales.

efforts, and promising alternative development programs have reduced coca
production by 70%. However, Peruvian spokesmen have worried about spillover
effects of illicit drug activities from Colombia into Peru, and a possible increase in
coca production. They have denounced Colombian plantings of coca and poppies in
Peru, and international trafficking of arms through Peru to FARC guerrillas in
Colombia. Because of these threats, Peru has moved a fleet of MI-17 helicopters
from its border with traditional rival Ecuador, where tensions have diminished, to the
border with Colombia.
As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental funding, Peru
received $25 million for KMAX helicopters for the Peruvian National Police, and
benefitted from regional interdiction funding .
Under the FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, Peru would have
received $206.15 million in assistance, with $128.15 in socio-economic aid for
alternative development, promotion of democracy, health and education programs;
and $78 million in counter-narcotics aid for upgrading helicopters and riverine
interdiction efforts, eradication, and demand reduction and policy development.
Under final allocations for FY2002, Peru received $194.87 million, with $119.87
million in economic and social programs, and $75 million in counter-narcotics aid.
Bolivia
With a population of 7.9 million (roughly 60% indigenous and 40% mestizo and
European), Bolivia is the eleventh most populous country in Latin America. It has
been governed by President Hugo Banzer, elected and inaugurated in 1997, who was
serving the second time as President, this time as a democratically elected President,
following his earlier period of military rule in the 1970s. In late June 2001, President
Banzer was diagnosed with lung and liver cancer and flew to the United States for
treatment. Banzer resigned on August 6, and Vice President Jorge Quiroga became
President on August 7, 2001, vowing to continue the economic reforms and to rid the
country of coca production in line with his predecessor’s promises.
With a large indigenous population, Bolivia experienced a significant social
revolution under one party in the 1950s with sweeping land reform, universal
suffrage, rural education, and nationalization of the country’s important tin mines.
The period of military control ran from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s and was
followed by a series of ineffective and largely corrupt governments with linkages to
drug traffickers. Beginning in the mid-1990s, reformist governments in Bolivia
carried out major privatization programs and put the country on a sound economic
footing. President Banzer continued the economic reforms and set the goal of
eliminating illegal coca cultivation and narco-trafficking during his five year term.
While Bolivia is actively involved with the Andean Community, it is an associate
member of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) formed by Brazil, Argentina,
Paraguay and Uruguay. In support of Bolivia’s counter-narcotics efforts, the United
States has provided significant interdiction and alternative development assistance
and it has forgiven all of Bolivia’s debt for development assistance projects, and most
of the debt for food assistance.

Bolivia, like Peru, is viewed by many as a counter-narcotics success story, with
joint air and riverine interdiction operations, successful eradication efforts, and
effective alternative development programs reducing coca cultivation to the lowest
level in five years, with a net reduction of approximately 70%. Bolivia does not have
a common border with Colombia, but the principal concern in Bolivia is that the
successes of the last few years could be turned back and coca cultivation and drug
trafficking could return to Bolivia to meet world-wide demand if counter-narcotics
efforts are successful in Colombia. Some critics have also charged that, while
eradication has been successful in dramatically reducing coca cultivation, it has hurt
the overall economy.
As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental funding, Bolivia
received $25 million for regional interdiction assistance and $85 million in
alternative development assistance.
Under the FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, Bolivia would have
received $143.48 million. This would have included $88.48 million in socio-
economic aid for programs such as alternative development, judicial reform, poverty
alleviation, health and environment; and $55 million in counter-narcotics aid for
ground-based and air interdiction support, eradication efforts, counter-narcotics
training, and narcotics awareness and prevention programs. Under final allocations
for FY2002, Bolivia received $122.96 million, with $74.46 million in economic and
social assistance, and $48.50 million in counter-narcotics aid.
Ecuador
With a population of 12.6 million, Ecuador is the eighth most populous country
in Latin America. While more than half of the population is mixed race mestizo,
about a quarter of the population is indigenous. Ecuador is the most exposed
neighbor in the region because it is situated adjacent to southern Colombian areas
that are guerrilla strongholds and heavy drug producing areas. Ecuador is led by
President Gustavo Noboa, the former Vice President who took office in January
2000, after an uprising by elements of the military and indigenous groups. He is the
fifth president in five years, with several of the previous presidents leaving as a result
of corruption charges. The country has experienced hyperinflation for several years
in the past, and is still struggling with economic austerity following dollarization of
the currency in early 2000.
According to press reports, Colombian guerrillas pass into Ecuadoran territory
for rest, recuperation, and medical treatment, and there are reports that Colombians
are buying ranches and farms in the Ecuadoran border region, possibly for drug
cultivation. Ecuadoran officials say they have uncovered and destroyed several small
cocaine processing labs in the area. The Ecuadoran border region is experiencing a
constant flow of Colombian refugees into the poor areas, and fighters with
Colombian paramilitary organizations have been arrested for running extortion rings

in Ecuadorian border regions. The FARC has been accused of kidnaping people in
Ecuador, although the FARC denies the allegations.¹²
As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental funding
Ecuador received $20 million in U.S. assistance, of which $12 million was to support
drug interdiction efforts, and $8 million was for alternative development assistance.
Another $61.3 million has been allocated for the construction of a Forward Operating
Location in Manta, Ecuador for counter-narcotics aerial surveillance. There have
been numerous press reports that Ecuadoran officials have been requesting
significantly increased U.S. assistance for some time.
Under the FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, Ecuador would have
received a total of $76.48 million in assistance, with $56.48 million in socio-
economic aid for border area development, poverty reduction, judicial reform, and
environmental programs; and $20 million in counter-narcotics aid for northern border
security, law enforcement and border checkpoints, and sea and airport control efforts.
Under final allocations for FY2002, Ecuador received $46.86 million, with $31.85
million in economic and social programs, and $15 million in counter-narcotics aid.
Brazil
With a population of 170 million (of European, African, and mixed stock),
Brazil is the largest and most populous country in Latin America, with most of the
population concentrated in the more developed southeastern areas of the country and
along the Atlantic coast. The country is led by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso
who is approaching the end of his second and final term. He is credited with leading
the country into a period of growth after ending years of inflation with his Real Plan
and after weathering the international financial crisis with IMF assistance in late
1998 and 1999. New presidential elections are approaching in 2002, with doubts
about whether the governing coalition can hold together and carry out needed
reforms. Brazilians have long been concerned about the sparsely populated territory
in the huge Amazon region, and they have been fearful historically of foreign designs
and intervention in this territory.
In an effort to exercise control over this vast territory Brazil has constructed a
$1.4 billion radar project called the Amazon Vigilance System, or SIVAM from its
acronym in Portuguese, and it has offered to share data from this system with
neighbors and the United States. It has established a military base at Tabatinga, with
25,000 soldiers and policemen, with air force and navy support, to deal with spillover
effects from Colombia. Press accounts suggest evidence of Colombian drug
traffickers encouraging indigenous communities in Brazil to plant coca, and the
threat of FARC incursions along the border. In one example in late 1998, the FARC
captured a city on the Colombian border, forcing Colombian troops to withdraw into
Brazilian territory, before recapturing the city. In another example, a plane from
Suriname with arms for FARC guerrillas was discovered when it was forced to make
an emergency landing in Brazil.

¹² For more information, see CRS Report RS20494, Ecuador: International Narcotics
Control Issues, by Raphael Perl.

Brazil is not an illicit drug producing country, but it is a growing transit area for
cocaine moving from the Andean Ridge to Colombia. Although Brazil was not
designated as a recipient of Plan Colombia assistance, under the FY2002 Andean
Regional Initiative request, it would have received $26.18 million. This would have
included $11.18 million in socio-economic aid for health and environmental
programs; and $15 million in counter-narcotics aid for training and equipping border
counter-narcotics forces, and for drug awareness and demand reduction programs.
Under final allocations for FY2002, Brazil would receive $18.63 million.
Venezuela
With a population of 23.5 million (of largely mestizo stock), Venezuela is the
sixth most populous country in Latin America. The country is presently led by
President Hugo Chavez, a former disgruntled military leader and a populist, who was
initially elected in late 1998 on a campaign to rewrite the constitution, rid the country
of corruption, and more adequately meet the needs of the people. During 1999, at
Chavez’s request, Venezuelan voters approved the creation of a National Constituent
Assembly, elected members of the new assembly, and approved the newly written
constitution which lengthened and expanded presidential powers. On July 30, 2000,
in a so-called mega-election, President Chavez easily won election to a new six year
term of office.¹³ Because of his previous attacks on the legislature and other
institutions, many observers fear that he has authoritarian tendencies somewhat like
those of disgraced former President Fujimori in Peru. Chavez has established close
ties with Fidel Castro and other leftist leaders, and he often employs anti-U.S.
rhetoric. He has denounced Plan Colombia as a U.S.-dominated military strategy,
and he has denied the United States overflight rights over Venezuela territory.
Reports persist that he has established friendly relations with Colombian guerrillas.
At the April 2001 Summit of the Americas in Quebec City, President Chavez
reserved the position of Venezuela in the Declaration of leaders committing to move
forward to achieve a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by January 2005, and
he also expressed alternative views on U.S. policy and Plan Colombia.
Venezuela is not an illicit drug producing country but it is a transit route for
cocaine and heroin from neighboring Colombia to the United States and Europe.
Despite various policy disagreements with the United States, the Chavez government
has cooperated with the United States in counter-narcotics efforts. While Venezuela
was not designated specifically as a recipient of Plan Colombia assistance, under the
FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, it would have received $10.5 million.
This amount would have included $0.5 million in socio-economic aid for legal and
judicial reform; and $10 million in counter-narcotics aid for law enforcement and
interdiction reforms, efforts to counter money-laundering, and demand reduction.
Under final allocations for FY2002, Venezuela would receive $5.5 million.

¹³ For more details, see CRS Report RS20978, Venezuela under Chavez: Political
Conditions and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan; and Scott Wilson, “Chavez’s
Unfinished Revolution; Venezuelan’s Accomplishments Fall Short of His Rhetoric,”
Washington Post, May 21, 2001, p. A1.

Panama
With a population of 2.8 million (of largely mestizo and West Indian stock),
Panama is the twentieth most populous country in Latin America. Its history has
been heavily influenced by its strategic location and the transit of commerce through
the Panama Canal in the center of the country where the major cities are located. It
is led by Mireya Moscoso, elected and inaugurated in 1999, who has been dealing
with economic difficulties in Panama, and Panamanian responsibilities for the
Panama Canal since the U.S. withdrawal on the last day of 1999. Despite
considerable effort in the period leading up to the U.S. withdrawal, Panama was
unwilling to allow the United States to retain a formal military presence in Panama
for counter-narcotics surveillance purposes.¹⁴ This forced the United States to
develop the Forward Operating Locations in El Salvador, Aruba/Curacao and
Ecuador as substitute locations for such activities. Panama has been the scene of
cross-border incursions by Colombian guerrillas and by Colombian paramilitary
groups, and there is some evidence that paramilitary groups are being founded in
Panama, with support from Colombian groups, because of the perception that the
Panamanian government has left some areas unprotected.
Panama is not an illicit drug producing country, but it is a major transshipment
point for illicit drugs, especially cocaine, smuggled from South America. In recent
years Panama has cooperated with the United States in bilateral counter-narcotics
efforts, seizing significant amounts of illicit drugs and passing anti-money laundering
legislation. While Panama was not designated as a recipient of Plan Colombia
assistance, under the FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, it would have
received $20.5 million. This would have included $8.5 million in socio-economic
aid for judicial reform, watershed management, and economic growth opportunities;
and $12 million in counter-narcotics aid for upgrading interdiction and law
enforcement forces, and for modernizing criminal justice institutions. Under final
allocations for FY2002, Panama is to receive $13.50 million.
Major Legislative Activity in 2001 on
Andean Regional Initiative Issues
Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY2002
House Action. On July 10, 2001, the House Appropriations Committee
approved H.R. 2506, with a reduction of $55 million in the ACI portion of the ARI,
after defeating several amendments to reduce the funding even more. On July 24,
2001, the House approved H.R. 2506, reducing counter-drug assistance by an
additional $1 million, and approving amendments relating to caps on personnel in
Colombia and a required report on the April 20 accidental shootdown of a missionary
plane in Peru. As passed by the House, the bill provides $826 million for the ARI,

¹⁴ For more detail, see CRS Report RL30981, Panama-U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan
and M. Angeles Villarreal.

of which $675 million is for the ACI, a reduction of $56 million from the President’s
request.
Subcommittee Action. On June 27, 2001, the House Appropriations
Committee’s Foreign Operations Subcommittee marked up and passed a $15.2
billion FY2002 foreign operations funding bill, which contained funding for the Bush
Administration’s Andean Regional Initiation (ARI). The subcommittee action
funded the entire bill at the level requested by the President, but considerably reduced
funding for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative portion of the ARI.
The subcommittee action would provide $55 million less than the President’s
$731 million request for the State Department’s International Narcotics Control
“Andean Counterdrug Initiative” portion, funding that account at $676 million. The
subcommittee did not specify which among the initiative’s programs were to be
affected by the funding reduction. This would reduce funding for the total ARI from
$882 million to $827 million.
Two amendments regarding Colombia were offered and withdrawn during the
subcommittee mark-up. The Pelosi amendment would have limited funding for
Colombia’s military to no more than $52 million, and transferred the other
approximately $100 million of funding requested for the Colombian military to a
Child Survival account for infectious diseases. The Rothman amendment would have
placed a temporary moratorium on U.S. supported fumigation efforts in Colombia
until the State Department presented Congressional appropriations committees with
conclusive evidence that the United States and Colombian governments had
commenced implementation of viable alternative development plans in 75% of all
communities that have signed alternative development pacts.
Committee Action. On July 10, the House Appropriations Committee passed
H.R. 2506, retaining the subcommittee-approved $827 million funding level for the
ARI, with the $676 million funding level for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative. The
Committee provided no explanation in the report (H.Rept. 107-142) for its action, but
recommended there that the $55 million reduction “should be evenly distributed
among all programs, projects, and activities referred to in the Administration’s
request for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative.” The bill itself recommends a limit
of $14.24 million for administrative expenses. As reported by the committee, the bill
also would exempt any programs supported through the ACI funds from the cap of
300 on civilian contractors established by the Plan Colombia legislation (Section
3204(b)(1)(B), P.L. 106-246). (It does not, however, exempt the cap of 500 on the
number of U.S. military personnel in Colombia established by the same legislation.)
The bill would also exempt ACI funds from the prohibition under Section 482 (b) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, on the use of funds for the
procurement of weapons and ammunition, with exceptions for counternarcotics
activities. The exceptions, requiring an advance notification to Congress, apply to
the defensive arming of aircraft used for counternaroctics activities, and the provision
of firearms and related ammunition for defensive purposes to Department of State
employees or contract personnel engaged in such activities. The Section 482(b)
exemption was also contained in the Plan Colombia legislation.

The full committee rejected two Colombia-related amendments: (1) the Pelosi
amendment, which had been withdrawn in subcommittee, to transfer approximately
$100 million from the Colombian military to the Child Survival account, failed 22
to 39; and (2) the Obey amendment, to withdraw all Andean counter-drug funding
and shift it to domestic drug treatment and prevention programs, failed 18 to 43.
In H.Rept. 107-142, however, the Committee adopted language requiring the
Secretary of State to report to the appropriations committees by January 1, 2002, and
quarterly thereafter, on the human health and environmental effects of the materials
used in aerial eradication of coca and opium poppy in Colombia, and of the spraying
of those illegal narcotic crops in Colombia. “Such reports shall include a description
of the areas sprayed, materials and methods used, compliance with the spray
guidelines, and the human and environmental impacts of such spraying.”
The Committee also requested two semi-annual reports from the Secretary of
State, both beginning March 1, 2002. One would provide information on all aircraft,
vehicles, boats, and lethal equipment transferred to military and police forces under
the ACI. This report is also to include the number of U.S. military personnel
deployed or assigned to duty in the Andean region or other countries using fund
provided under the ACI during the previous 180 days, and the length, purpose, costs,
and risks of their deployment or assignment. Another would provide information on
“the specific efforts being made by AID, the State Department and the Colombian
government to expedite the delivery of non-cash assistance to communities in
Colombia that have signed pacts to voluntarily eradicate their coca crops.” This
report is to include the percentages of available alternative development funds
disbursed to Colombian communities that have signed such pacts.
The Appropriations Committee report also contains extensive language on
Colombia and other Andean countries. On Colombia, the Committee stated that it
believes that a negotiated settlement “offers the only viable resolution to the complex
conflict” in Colombia, and that efforts to reduce the cultivation of illegal crops “will
continue to face enormous challenges” until a peace accord is reached. The
Committee strongly urged the Secretary of State “to work with all parties in the talks
to encourage rapid progress toward a firm and lasting peace.” Noting that “stronger
trade between Colombia and the United States is crucial to managing the
vulnerabilities of the Colombian economy,” the Committee urged the President “to
seek renewal and expansion of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA).” It
expressed concern that alternative development projects were not being implemented
in a timely fashion in Southern Colombia.
For the Andean region in general, the Committee report called on the
Department of State to ensure that all U.S. laws regarding human rights, including
Section 556 of the bill, “are strictly applied in Colombia and each of the Andean
nations.” Regarding Bolivia, the Committee took “special note” of the country’s
progress in counternaroctics efforts, and stated that its “enormous success” was due
“in large part, to the support of the U.S. Government.” It urged the Administration
to continue to strongly support Bolivia “when deciding on its allocation of aid.”
Floor Action. On July 24, the House adopted H.R. 2506, by a vote of 381-46.
It reduced the ACI account by $1 million from the level approved by the

Appropriations Committee, to $675 million, despite efforts to reduce it by much
larger amounts, and altered committee provisions regarding the cap on civilian
contractors. (See the first bullet under approved amendments, below.)
In floor action on July 24, three amendments pertaining to the ARI were
approved, two were defeated, and two were withdrawn. Nine others, which had been
printed in the record and therefore were eligible for debate under the initial rule were
barred from debate under an order of procedure adopted in the course of floor
consideration.
The three amendments approved were:
^!An amendment offered by Rep. Conyers to allow the President to
waive the 300 person cap on civilian contractors set by the Plan
Colombia legislation, provided that the President certifies that the
aggregate ceiling of 800 personnel (for military personnel and
civilian contractors combined) set by that legislation would not be
exceeded, and if Congress is informed of the extent to which the 300
civilian contractor limitation is exceeded. Agreed to by voice vote.
^!Amendment 44 offered by Rep. Hoekstra to withhold $65 million of
ACI funds until the Secretary of State submits to Congress a full
report on the April 20, 2001, aircraft shootdown by the Peruvian Air
Force in which U.S. missionary Veronica “Roni” Bowers and her
daughter were killed. Agreed to by voice vote.
^!A substitute Kolbe amendment (to amendment 12 offered by Rep.
Crowley) to transfer $1.0 million from the ACI to the International
Disaster Assistance account. (The Rep. Crowley amendment would
have transferred $10 million.)
The two amendments defeated were:
^!Amendment 26, offered by Rep. Lee, to transfer $60 million to the
Child Survival and Health Programs fund, where it was to be
available for HIV/AIDS programs. Of the $60 million, $38 million
would be taken from the ACI. Failed 188-240.
^!Amendment 27, offered by Rep. McGovern, to reduce ACI funding
by $100 million, and transfer half of that funding to the infectious
diseases account to combat tuberculosis and the other half to the
child survival and maternal health account. (In a floor speech, Rep.
McGovern stated that the intent of the amendment was that the full
$100 million should be cut from funding for the Colombian
military.) Failed 179-249.

The two amendments withdrawn were:
^!Amendment 47 offered by Rep. Jackson-Lee to transfer $100 million
from the ACI to the Child Survival and Health Programs Fund.
Withdrawn by unanimous consent.
^!Amendment 11 offered by Mr. Conyers to prohibit the use of funds
provided as part of Plan Colombia and the ACI for aerial fumigation
to eradicate illicit crops in Colombia. Withdrawn by unanimous
consent.
On July 19, during the first day of consideration of H.R. 2506, two amendments
regarding Colombia were offered and withdrawn after points of order were raised.
^!Rep. Souder offered and withdrew Amendment 35 to earmark $27
million of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
funds for the purchase of two Buffalo transport/supply aircraft for
the Colombian National Police, $12 million for the purchase of six
Huey II patrol helicopters for the Colombian Navy, and $5 million
for assistance in purchasing operating fuel for drug interdiction
along Colombia’s north coast and its on rivers. In effect, this would
supplement funding for Andean regional counterdrug efforts that
would be made available through the ACI.
^!Rep. Delahunt offered and withdrew Amendment 17 to require
quarterly reports from the Secretary of State on the implementation
of the Colombian national security legislation passed by the
Colombian Congress on June 20, 2001. According to Rep.
Delahunt, that legislation “contains ambiguous provisions that could
threaten civilian oversight of the military in Colombia and place at
risk the progress that has ben made toward reforming the military...”
Senate Action. The Senate Appropriations Committee marked up its version
of the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill on July 26, and reported out H.R. 2506,
with an amendment in the nature of a substitute (S.Rept. 107-58) on September 4,
2001, reducing ACI funding by $164 million, and imposing conditions on the safety
of aerial fumigation programs in Colombia, and requiring reports on human rights
conditions in the country. The Senate passed H.R. 2506 on October 24, 2001, after
defeating on a point of order an amendment to fund the ACI and the ARI at the level
requested by the President, and approving two amendments that transferred $20
million from the ACI to other programs. As passed by the Senate, the bill provides
$698 for the ARI, of which $547 is for the ACI, a reduction of $184 million from the
President’s request, and includes conditions on the safety of aerial fumigation and the
implementation of alternative development programs..
Committee Action. In the July 26 mark-up, the Senate Appropriations
Committee cut $164 million from the President’s requested ACI funding, and
earmarked not less than $200 million of the total of $567 million that would remain
in that account for direct apportionment to the U.S. Agency for International

Development (AID) for economic and social programs. The ACI cut would bring
total ARI funding down to $718 million.
The committee bill would condition the release of funds to purchase chemicals
used for the aerial coca fumigation program. To release those funds, the Secretary
of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services and with the Surgeon General, would have to determine and report to
Congress on the human health and safety effects of the chemicals and the manner of
their application. Specifically, the Secretary would have to report that 1) “the
chemicals used in the aerial fumigation of coca, [and]...the manner in which they are
being applied, do not pose an undue risk to human health or safety;” and 2) that the
fumigation “is being carried out according to the health, safety, and usage procedures
recommended by the Environmental Protection Agency, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, and the manufacturers of the chemicals.” The Secretary
would also have to report that “effective mechanisms are in place to evaluate the
claims of local citizens that their health was harmed or their licit agricultural crops
were damaged by such aerial coca fumigation, and provide fair compensation for
meritorious claims.”
In contrast to House action, the Senate Appropriations Committee incorporated
by reference in its bill the Plan Colombia legislation’s cap of 500 on the number of
U.S. military personnel and 300 on the number of U.S. civilian contractors in
Colombia (Section 3204(b) of P.L. 106-246). The Committee also included a Plan
Colombia human rights restriction, requiring the immediate return to the United
States of any helicopter purchased with ACI funds that “is used to aid or abet the
operations of any illegal self-defense groups or illegal security cooperative.” Like the
House, however, it would waive the restrictions of Section 482(b) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961. The Committee would limit by law funding for Department
of State administrative expenses to $14.24 million, whereas the House bill merely
recommends that limit.
In the report accompanying the bill (S.Rept. 107-58), the Committee stated that
it “recognizes some progress on human rights” in Colombia, but also expressed
concern about “the surge in paramilitary violence, persistent reports of cooperation
between the military and the paramilitaries, and the impunity of military officers who
order or commit atrocities.” It stated that the U.S. government should make it a
priority to promote “far more aggressive action...by the Colombian Government and
the military, to thwart it.” Deploring the “ongoing abuses by the FARC,” the
Committee called on other nations, “particularly Mexico and the Scandinavian
countries, to exert greater influence on the FARC to repudiate these tactics and
participate seriously in negotiations toward a settlement of the conflict.”
The Committee also called for the Secretary to State to submit to the
appropriations committees reports containing information on several areas of human
rights and other concerns. The Committee would expect the first report within 60
days of enactment and every 120 days after that.
This report would include information on two human rights topics for which
reporting was also required by the Plan Colombia legislation. These are:

^!the extent to which the Colombian armed forces have suspended
members credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of
human rights, and are providing civilian prosecutors and judicial
authorities requested information on the nature and cause of
suspension; and
^!the extent to which the Colombian armed forces are cooperating
with civilian authorities, including providing access to witnesses and
relevant military information, in prosecuting and punishing in
civilian courts those members credibly alleged to have committed
gross violations of human rights or aided or abetted paramilitary
groups.
Two other human rights topics are also to be included:
^!the extent to which the Colombian armed forces are severing links,
including intelligence sharing, at the command, battalion, and
brigade levels, with paramilitary groups, and executing outstanding
arrest warrants for members of such groups; and
^!the extent to which attacks against human rights defenders, trade
unionists, and government prosecutors, investigators and civilian
judicial officials are being investigated, and alleged perpetrators
brought to justice.
The report would also be expected to provide information on the actions taken by the
United States, Colombia, and other governments to promote and support peace
negotiations, and on financial support for Plan Colombia provided by the Colombian
government and the international community.
A second report including information on other areas of human rights concerns
would be expected only if national security legislation passed by the Colombian
Congress on June 20, 2001, were to become law. In that case, the Secretary of State
would be expected to submit a report within 90 days of enactment of the security law
and 120 days thereafter on incidents of and any rising trend in arbitrary and
prolonged incommunicado detention by members of the Colombian armed forces and
police; an assessment of the effectiveness of investigations conducted by military
personnel under the new security law compared to investigations by civilian
authorities; and an analysis of the security law’s implications for Colombia’s
commitments under international treaties.
The Committee also expressed concern in its report about the spill-over effects
of the Colombian narcotics trade into Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru.
Floor Action. After considering H.R. 2506 for two days, the Senate approved
the measure on October 24, 2001, largely retaining the basic features of the bill
relating to the ARI as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee. Five
amendments relating to the ARI were approved, with the last two reducing ACI
funding by $20 million; and one amendment, seeking to restore funding cuts, was
defeated on a point of order.

The five amendments that were approved were:
^!Senate Amendment 1929 by Senator Leahy that not less than $101
million of ACI funds be made available for Bolivia, and not less
than $35 million of ACI funds be made available for Ecuador.
^!Senate Amendment 1942 by Senator Helms that up to two million
of ACI funds be made available to support democracy-building
activities in Venezuela.
^!Senate Amendment 1951 by Senators Feingold and Wellstone that
added another condition relating to aerial fumigation upon which the
Secretary of State is to report, namely that alternative development
programs be in place in areas where fumigation is being
implemented.
^!Senate Amendment 1960 by Senators Hutchison and Inouye that
reduced ACI funding by $10 million, and made those funds available
for the prevention, treatment, and control of tuberculosis.
^!Senate Amendment 1961 by Senator Bingaman that reduced ACI
funding by $10 million, and made those funds available for relief
and reconstruction assistance for victims of earthquakes and drought
in El Salvador and elsewhere in Central America.
The amendment that was defeated on a point of order was Senate Amendment
1950 by Senators Graham, Hagel, and Dodd to increase funding for the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative to $731 million, the amount of the President’s request, which
would have effectively overridden the Committee-reported cut of $164 million in that
portion of the ARI. Proponents of the amendment argued that full support was
necessary to assist troubled Colombia and to deal with the flow of drugs to the
United States. Opponents argued that extensive assistance was being provided to the
region, that needs elsewhere in the world were great, and that evidence of progress
was lacking despite the major contribution of resources in recent years. A point of
order was raised by Senator Leahy that the amendment was in violation of the
Congressional Budget Act for failing to identify offsets for the proposed $164 million
increase in funding, and a motion by Senator Graham to waive the requirements of
the Budget Act was defeated 27-72, thereby defeating the amendment.
Conference Action. The conference version of H.R. 2506 (H.Rept. 107-345)
was passed by the House on December 19, and by the Senate on December 20, 2002.
It was signed into law (P.L. 107-115) on January 10, 2002. It includes $625 million
for the “Andean Counterdrug Initiative” (ACI) portion of the Andean Regional
Initiative. (This is $50 million less than the House’s $675 million, but $78 million
more than the Senate’s $547 million in ACI funding.) Of the conference version
amount, $215 million is earmarked for U.S. Agency for International Development
(AID) economic and social programs, and no more than $14.2 million may be used
for administrative expenses of the Department of State, and no more than $4.5
million for AID’s administrative expenses.

Authority is also provided to transfer up to $35 million to the ACI from other
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds in this and in prior
foreign operations appropriations acts, subject to regular notification procedures.
The managers’ statement of the conference report (H.Rept. 107-345) notes that, “In
the event of such a transfer, the managers intend for the funds to support interdiction,
alternative development, or other economic assistance to the Andean countries. The
managers emphasize that there are other funds for Andean nations in this Act that
may be made available for the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI).”
The conference version of H.R. 2506 contains several conditions on the use of
funds. These include the following.
^!Fumigation and Alternative Development. No funds can be used for
aerial coca fumigation programs until the Secretary of State reports
to the Appropriations Committees on four matters: the first, after
consultation with the heads of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Department of Agriculture, and if appropriate, the Center
for Disease Control and Prevention, is that such programs are being
carried out according to EPA regulatory controls that pertain to
programs in the United States; the second, after consultation with the
Colombian government, is that such programs are in accordance
with Colombian laws; the third is that the chemicals used in the
fumigation programs and the manner in which they are applied do
not pose unreasonable risks or adverse effects to human beings or to
the environment; and the last is that procedures are in place to
provide fair compensation for valid claims by local citizens that their
health was harmed or their licit agricultural crops were damaged by
such spraying. (As of the date of this report, these funds are on hold
awaiting the Secretary’s report. The status of this hold will be
tracked in RL31383, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002
Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors.)
The funds are not to be available after six months from the date of
enactment unless alternative development programs have been put
in place in consultation with communities and local authorities.
^!Peruvian Interdiction. No funds can be used for a Peruvian air
interdiction program until 30 days after the Secretary of State and
the CIA Director certify to Congress that enhanced safeguards and
procedures are in place for any air interdiction program that permits
the shootdown of aircraft.
^!Limitations on Personnel in Colombia. Limits on U.S. personnel in
Colombia established for previous Plan Colombia funding are
modified, with a cap of 400 set on both the number of U.S. military
personnel and U.S. civilian contractors supported by funding from
the ACI account.
^!Helicopters. Any helicopter procured with this funding is to be
immediately returned to the United States if it is used to aid or abet

the operations of any illegal self-defense group or illegal security
cooperative.
^!Human Rights. Section 567 (a) of the bill provides that the
Secretary of State must determine and certify to Congress that the
Colombian armed forces are meeting three human rights criteria
before any of the funds by this act or prior foreign operations
appropriations acts can be made available to Colombia’s armed
forces. These criteria are: (1) that the Colombian Commander
General is suspending soldiers and officers credibly alleged to have
committed gross violations of human rights or to have aided or
abetted paramilitary groups ; (2) that the Colombian armed forces
are cooperating with civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities in
prosecuting and punishing in civilian courts any members credibly
alleged to be involved in such offenses; and (3) that the Colombian
armed forces are taking steps to sever links with paramilitary groups
and to execute outstanding orders for the capture of their members.
(As of the date of this report, these funds are on hold awaiting the
Secretary’s certification. The status of this hold will be tracked in
RL31383, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002 Supplemental
and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors.) After such
a determination and certification, no more than 60% of such funds
can be made available to the Colombian armed forces through May
31, 2002. After June 1, 2002, the balance of such funds may be
obligated if the Secretary determines and certifies that the
Colombian armed forces are continuing to meet those criteria. Every
120 days after the bill’s enactment, the Secretary must report to the
appropriations committees regarding the Colombian armed forces’
observance of these criteria.
^!Denial of Visas to Supporters of Colombian Illegal Armed Groups.
No alien shall be issued a visa if the Secretary of State has
determined that he or she (1) has willfully provided any support to
either of Colombia’s two major leftist guerrilla groups (the FARC
and the ELN) or to the rightist illegal self-defense group (the AUC),
or (2) has committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the commission of gross violations of human rights
in Colombia, unless the issuance of such a visa is necessary to
support the Colombian peace process or for urgent humanitarian
reasons.
Foreign Relations Authorization, FY2002-FY2003
House Action. The House International Relations Committee reported out
H.R. 1646 on May 4, 2001, with four reporting requirements on Colombia and a
prohibition on the issuance of visas to illegal armed groups in Colombia. The bill
was passed by the House on May 16, 2001, without additions or modifications in
that area. The required reports relate to the elimination of Colombian opium, the
effects of Plan Colombia on Ecuador, alternative development and resettlement
programs, and the Colombianization of counter-narcotics activities.

Committee Action. H.R. 1646 was introduced by Representative Hyde on
April 27, 2001, with two reporting requirements concerning the elimination of
Colombian opium poppy crops and the effect of Plan Colombia on Ecuador (see
below for details). The measure was referred to the House Committee on
International Relations. When the Committee marked up the bill on May 2, it
adopted by voice vote two amendments offered by Representative Delahunt: the first
imposed reporting requirements on Department of State activities and on the
“Colombianization” of counternarcotics activities; the second prohibited the issuance
of visas to supporters of Colombian illegal armed groups (see below for details). The
bill was reported out amended (H.Rept. 107-57) by the Committee on May 4.
Floor Action. After floor consideration on May 10 and 16, with no additional
amendments on Colombia or the Andean region, H.R. 1646 was approved by the
House on May 16, and sent to the Senate on May 17, with the following provisions
relating to the Andean Regional Initiative:
^!Reporting Requirement Concerning Elimination of Colombian
Opium. Sec. 204 requires the Secretary of State, through the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, to submit,
not later than 60 days after enactment, a report which outlines a
comprehensive strategy to address the crisis of heroin in the United
States due to opium originating from Colombia, including
destruction of opium at its source.
^!Reporting Requirement Concerning Effect of Plan Colombia on
Ecuador. Sec. 211 requires the Secretary of State, through the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, to submit,
not later than 60 days after enactment, a report which outlines a
comprehensive strategy to address the spillover effect of Plan
Colombia on Ecuador.
^!Reporting Requirement on Department of State Activities. Sec.
213 (a) requires the Secretary of State to submit within 180 days of
enactment, and every 180 days thereafter, a report on State
Department funded and authorized activities to promote alternative
development, recovery and resettlement of internally displaced
persons, judicial reform, the peace process, and human rights. This
report would include summaries of activities undertaken during the
previous 180 days, estimated timetables for the next period, an
explanation of any delays in meeting planned timetables, and an
assessment of steps to be taken to correct such delays.
^!Reporting Requirement on the “Colombianization” of U.S.
Funded Counternarcotics Activities. Sec. 213 (b) states that U.S.
policy “encourages” the transfer of counternarcotics activities in
Colombia now carried out by U.S. businesses under agreements with
the State Department to Colombian nationals, “in particular
personnel of the Colombian antinarcotics police, when properly
qualified personnel are available.” It also requires the Secretary of
State to report within 90 days of enactment and subsequently not

later than March 1 on the counternarcotics activities carried out by
U.S. businesses under State Department agreements. The report
must include the names of such businesses, the total State
Department payments to each business, a statement justifying the
agreement, an assessment of risks to personnel safety and potential
involvement in hostilities incurred by employees of each such
business, and a plan to provide for the transfer of these activities to
Colombians.
^!Denial of Visas to Supporters of Colombian Illegal Armed
Groups. Sec. 236 prohibits the issuance of visas to any alien who
the Secretary of State determines has wilfully provided direct or
indirect support to either of the two leftist guerrilla groups (the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, i.e., the FARC, and the
National Liberation Army, i.e., the ELN) or to the rightist United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (the AUC); or “has wilfully
conspired to allow, facilitate, or promote the illegal activities of any
of those groups. A waiver is provided for cases where a visa “is
necessary to support the peace process in Colombia, for urgent
humanitarian reasons, for significant public benefit, or to further the
national security interests of the United States.”
Senate Action. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the
Senate version of the Foreign Relations Authorization for FY2002-FY2003 (S. 1401)
on August 1, 2001, and reported out the bill on September 4, 2001, with a
requirement for a report outlining a strategy to eradicate opium in Colombia.
Committee Action. The Committee on Foreign Relations reported out S.
1401 on September 4, 2001, with a provision in section 606, similar to a provision
in the House version of the bill, requiring the Secretary of State to submit to
appropriate congressional committees within 60 days after enactment a report that
outlines a comprehensive strategy to eradicate all opium at its source in Colombia.
National Defense Authorization Act, FY2002
House Action. The House Armed Services Committee marked up H.R. 2586
on August 1, 2001, and reported out the bill (H.Rept. 107-194) on September 4,
2001, with a provision containing a cap on U.S. military personnel in Colombia, and
this was retained when the House approved the bill on September 25, 2001.
Committee Action. As reported by the House Armed Services Committee,
the FY2002 defense authorization bill, H.R. 2586, would cap the number of U.S.
military personnel on duty in Colombia that could be supported from Department of
Defense funding at 500. This provision, Section 1208, would exclude any military
personnel in Colombia (1) serving tours of duty of 30 days or less for the purpose
of rescuing or retrieving U.S. military or government personnel, (2) serving with the
U.S. Embassy in Colombia as an attache or as part of the security assistance office
or Marine Corps security group, (3) participating in natural disaster relief efforts, or
(4) traveling through Colombia but not involved in operations there.

Floor and Conference Action. After floor consideration on September 20,

24-25, the House approved H.R. 2586 on September 25, 2001, with the Committee-

reported cap on military personnel in Colombia. The Senate bill, S. 1438, had no
corresponding provision. This House provision was not retained in the conference
version of S. 1438 (S.Rept. 107-333), which passed by both chambers on December

13, 2001.

Extension of Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA)
(For details on this legislation, see the CRS Trade Briefing Book section on the
Andean Trade Preference Act, [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebtra127.html].)
House Action. On October 5, 2001, the House Ways and Means Committee
ordered reported H.R. 3009, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act,
that would extend the ATPA through December 31, 2006. On November 16, 2001,
the House passed H.R. 3009, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act,
which would offer expanded trade benefits to the Andean region through December

31, 2006.

Committee Action. On October 5, 2001, the House Ways and Means
Committee approved and ordered reported H.R. 3009, the Andean Trade Promotion
and Drug Eradication Act, that would extend the ATPA through December 31, 2006,
and provide duty-free treatment to selected apparel, tuna, and other products
previously excluded. The bill would also expand the conditions countries would have
to meet to remain eligible for program benefits.
Floor Action. On November 16, 2001, the House passed H.R. 3009, the
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, which would offer expanded
trade benefits to the Andean region through December 31, 2006.
Senate Action. The Senate Committee on Finance reported out a version of
H.R. 3009 on November 29, 2001, but no floor action has been taken thus far.
Committee Action. On November 29, 2001, the Senate Committee on
Finance reported out an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 3009
(containing the substance of S. 525). This version would extend the ATPA through
February 28, 2006, and provide expanded benefits, but more limited benefits than the
House-passed version.

Appendix A. Map Showing Andean Regional
Initiative Countries
(Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela)

CRS-26
Appendix B. Bush Administration’s FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) Request
by Purpose and Functional Accounts
($ millions)
ARI Proposed FundingARI Proposed Funding
By Purpose By Account
International
ryTotal ARIEconomic/Counter-NarcoticsChildEconomicForeign
Social/narcotics andControl(AndeanDevelopmentAidSurvival andSupportMilitary
Governance Securi t y Counterdrug Di s e as e s F und Financing
Initiative)
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL31016}
^g/w399.00 146.50 252.50 399.00 0 0 0 0
^s^.or
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^://wikiazil 26.18 11.18 15.0 15.00 3.38 7.80 0 0
^h^ttp76.48 56.48 20.00 39.00 6.48 0 30.00 1.00
nama 20.50 8.50 12.00 11.00 4.50 0 4.00 1.00
128.15 78.00 156.00 28.65 10.50 10.00 1.00
uela 10.50 0.50 10.00 10.00 0 0 0.50 0
882.29 439.79 442.5 731.0 68.09 24.7 54.5 4.00
^A^R^{I R}^e^f^e^ren^{ce S}^h^eet^{, 150 A}^ccouⁿ^t^{, prov}ⁱ^d^{ed by}^t^h^{e D}^e^part^m^eⁿ^t^of^S^t^at^{e, May}^{14, 2001.}

CRS-27
Appendix C. FY2000-FY2001 U.S. Assistance to Colombia
(Obligations and authorizations, $ millions)
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Appendix D. Controversy over Spray Eradication
Efforts in Southern Colombia
The following discussion of the controversy over spray eradication (i.e., fumigation)
of illegal coca crops in southern Colombia was prepared in response to the controversy
over this effort in southern Colombia. This short synopsis of available information on the
effects of fumigation of coca crops in Colombia is only meant to provide a summary of
various claims; it is not a judgment on their validity.
In its U.S.-supported coca eradication program, the government of Colombia
sprays coca crops from aircraft with a mixture of the herbicide glyphosate,
manufactured by the U.S. company Monsanto and marketed as “Roundup,” and two
additives or “adjuvants.”¹⁵ According to the State Department (in its report of
January 23, 2001, submitted to Congress consistent with the provisions of the
Statement of Managers accompanying Title III, Chapter 2 of the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act. P.L. 106-246, which provided funding for Plan
Colombia), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has found that “the use of
glyphosate, as labeled for use in the U.S., is acceptable provided that the regulatory
controls required by the EPA – the labeled instructions – are followed.” The State
Department also claims that the ingredients in the two additives (COSMO FLUX-
411F, a surfactant, and COSMO-iN-D, an anti-foaming additive¹⁶), both produced
in Colombia, are on an EPA list of acceptable chemicals “for use on food crops when
the label instructions are followed.” This report states an EPA review of “adequate
scientific studies” shows that when properly used glyphosate “will not cause adverse
effects in humans,” and “does not cause risks of concern for birth defects, mutagenic
effects, neurotoxic effects, reproductive problems, or cancer.” It does, however, state
that “splashes” of glyphosate “can cause transient irritation to skin and
eyes,”although at the same level of irritation as baby shampoo according to one cited
study. For its conclusion that there are “no grounds to suggest concern for human
health” from the spray mixture used in Colombia, the State Department cited a
recent study published in Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology.¹⁷

¹⁵ The active ingredient in Roundup is isopropylamine salt of N-(phosphonomethyl) glycine,
commonly known as glyphosate, Chemical Abstract Registration Number 38641-94-0, EPA
Registration Number 000524-004445. “Adjuvant” is a term for an ingredient that facilitates
or modifies the action of the principal ingredient.
¹⁶ COSMO FLUX-411F, according to the State Department report, “increases the herbicide
penetration through the waxy layer of the coca leaf by allowing ore of the spray to stick to
the plant. When more of the spray solution sticks to the plant, the herbicide becomes more
effective which means it can be applied in smaller doses.” COSMO-IN-D “is used to
minimize the foam created by the mixture-circulating pump inside the aircraft spray hopper”
in order to avoid the creation of a vacuum within the spray pressure pump which could shut
off the spray system during flight.
¹⁷ Gary M. Williams, Robert Kroes, and Ian C. Munro. Safety Evaluation and Risk
Assessment of the Herbicide Roundup and its Active Ingredient, Glyphosate, for Humans.
Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology. Vol. 31, No. 2, April 2000. Available through
[http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/12301.htm] from a hyperlink at the bottom of the text
of the State Department’s January 23, 2001 report. This publication is the official journal
(continued...)

Since spraying began in December 2000 in Colombia’s Putumayo province
(where it is now indefinitely suspended), however, there have been many allegations
that the spray mixture has caused extensive harm to humans, other crops, and
livestock. The ill health effects on thousands of children and adults most commonly
reported in the areas of Putumayo fumigation include fever, eye and gastrointestinal
irritation, and skin and bronchial irritation and infections. There have also been
allegations of increased incidence of brain damage in children in these areas since
fumigation was started. In addition, critics claim, many crops other than coca have
been sprayed, depriving peasants of food crops and other sources of income, and
livestock reportedly have suffered ill effects, including hair loss in cattle from
moderate exposure, abortion among pregnant cows (possibly due, one source notes,
from stampedes caused by the noise of overhead helicopters) and the death of fowl
from spraying or drinking contaminated water. (The effects on livestock and fowl
are taken from the “Counter-Fact Sheet” of February 9, 2001, prepared by Acción
Andina, which is a non-governmental organization, and posted online at
[ http://usfumigation.org/ Literature/FactSheets/ContraDoS/AA-IPS-RAPAL%20F
act%20Sheet%20-English.htm].) Supporters of aerial fumigation, however, state
that negative health and environmental effects can be attributed to drug producers
themselves, whom, they claim, also use Roundup to suppress weeds around coca
bushes, and who pollute Colombian rivers with chemicals used in processing and
refining coca into cocaine in their drug labs.
Some U.S. officials assert that many of the complaints come from those with an
interest in continuing coca production, especially as aerial spraying of coca crops has
taken place for many years in other areas of Colombia without the outcry that the
spraying in Putumayo has produced. However, according to a Washington Post
article of January 7, 2001, about the spraying in Putumayo: “Until recently, spraying
focused almost entirely on remote industrial-sized coca and poppy plantations....Now
the planes are targeting more populous farming areas ... where coca ... is often grown
side by side with corn, yucca, pineapple and livestock. Often it shares a plot next to
the farmer’s tin-roofed shack.” (“Aerial Attack Killing More than Coca,” by Scott
Wilson.) Regarding crop damage, the Post reporter stated that his “inspection of
fields in the area suggested that food crops have been hit at least as hard as coca.”
Critics have attributed food crop damage to the side-by-side plantings of legal and
illegal crops in Putumayo, but also charge that spray planes fly higher than normal
for crop dusting operations elsewhere in order to avoid ground fire, and under
unacceptable wind conditions, thus leading to the dispersion of spray beyond
intended targets.¹⁸

¹⁷ (...continued)
of the International Society of Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology.
¹⁸ One website’s ([http://www.farmsource.com]) discussion of the use of Roundup
(accessed through the Monsanto website, [http://www.monsanto.com]) notes that Roundup
should “only be applied from aircraft when the potential for drift to adjacent sensitive areas
(e.g. residential areas, bodies of water, known habitat for threatened or endangered species,
non-target crops) is minimal (e.g. when the wind is blowing away from sensitive areas).” It
gives detailed instructions for aerial applications, including the maintenance of an
appropriate buffer zone from “any desirable vegetation or crops,” i.e., normally some 100
(continued...)

Some analysts, however, have noted that complaints of ill effects to humans and
animals may not be entirely inconsistent with State Department assertions of safety
under controlled circumstances as the health and environmental effects could vary
depending on the exact formulation of the spray mix, the manner of its application,
and the conditions under which it was used. Some critics have argued that Roundup
is not being applied in a manner consistent with U.S. usages and with the
manufacturer’s recommendations, and that not all issues related to ingredients used
in the mixture applied in Colombia have been explored.
^!The World Wildlife Fund, in an October 30, 2000 statement,
“Comments on Glyphosate,” states that existing studies “may not be
adequate to assess the impacts resulting from Plan Colombia’s actual
use of glyphosate (aerial applications, product formulation,
frequency and rate of application, etc.), especially given the soils,
topography, climatic conditions (temperature, rainfall, etc.) plant and
animal species found in Colombia.” (Available online from the
WWF at: [http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/103001.htm]).
^!In a February 9, 2001 statement calling for the end of aerial
eradication, representatives of three non-governmental organizations
claimed that “there is evidence that herbicide concentrations much
higher than ones recommended are being applied in Colombia” and
that “there are no toxicological studies ... regarding the effects of
mixing the Cosmoflux-4111F surfactant with pesticides.”¹⁹ The
statement also noted that Roundup Ultra (which opponents say is the
actual variety of Roundup being used in Colombia, although the
State Department report cited above does not refer to either trade
name) “contains other ingredients besides glyphosate and the two
adjuvants.” The World Wildlife Fund, in the October 2000
statement cited above, found that studies on the effects of Roundup
“focus on the pesticide active ingredient alone, not the combination
of inert ingredients actually applied, thereby giving an incomplete
assessment of the toxic threat,” and asserted that “the inert
ingredients mixed with the Roundup to increase its effectiveness can
be as, or more, toxic to humans, wildlife and foodwebs than the
pesticide itself.” The Monsanto website states that the “new
ingredients” in Roundup Ultra are on an EPA approved list (#4B),
but the specific “new” ingredients are not named.
^!An analysis by agronomist Elsa Nivia, identified as associated with
the non-governmental Red de Acción en Plaguicidas y Alternativas -
América Latina, RAP-AL. PAN-Colombia (Pesticide Action

¹⁸ (...continued)
feet, but 500 feet if the wind is blowing up to five miles an hour, and more at greater
windspeeds.
¹⁹ Forced Aerial Eradication of Illicit Crops: A Reply to the State Department, signed by
Ricardo Vargas M. of Acción Andina Colombia, Martin Jelsma of Transnational Institute,
TNI, and Elsa Nivia of RAPALMIRA. Posted at [http://www.usfumigation.org].

Network), claims that the aerial fumigation of illegal crops in
Colombia with Roundup is “very different from the recommended
agricultural use in the United States,” citing the concentration as 26
times greater than that recommended, with negative effects
intensified by the use of Cosmoflux 411F. Even though the authors
of the report cited by the State Department had found glyphosate and
Roundup to be at most mildly toxic, Ms. Nivia’s conclusion from
their discussion of the effects of accidental and occupational
exposures to higher concentrations, and of the doses that proved
lethal in people attempting suicide, is that higher than recommended
concentrations or applications could help to explain the severe ill
effects reported in the fumigated areas. (See Las fumigaciones
aéreas sobre cultivos ilícitos si son peligrosas - Algunas
aproximaciones, by Elsa Nivia. Paper given at a conference on The
Wars in Colombia: Drugs, Guns and Oil, held at the University of
California at Davis, May 17-19, 2001, accessible through
[ http://www.usfumigation.org] .)
The State Department is funding a study, with design assistance supplied by the
Center for Disease Control (CDC) and the EPA, of the health effects of aerial
eradication in Putumayo Department. Results are anticipated by late 2001.

CRS-32
Appendix E. Bush Administration’s Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) FY2002 Request and
FY2002 Allocations by Purpose and by Functional Accounts
($ millions)
^A^R^I^FY^{2002 A}^l^l^o^cati^on^s^A^R^I^FY^{2002 A}^l^l^o^cati^on^s
^{By Pu}^r^p^os^e^{By Account}
^T^o^ta^{l ARI}^To^t^a^l^ARI^Iⁿ^ternational
^unt^ry^FY²⁰⁰²^FY²⁰⁰²^E^c^on^omⁱ^c^/^Co^unt^er-^Narcotics^Control^Dev^e^lo^p-^Child^E^c^on^omⁱ^c^Foreign
^Request^Allo^ca^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^So^cia^l^/^narcotics^and⁽^A^ndeaⁿ^meⁿ^t^S^u^r^vi^val^an^d^Suppo^rt^M^ilit^a^r^y
^G^overnance^Security^Counterdrug^Aid^Disea^s^es^F^und^Fⁱ^na^ncing
^Init^ia^tⁱ^v^e⁾
^l^o^m^bⁱ^a^399.00^380.50^137.00^243.50^380.50⁰⁰⁰⁰
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL31016}ⁱ^vⁱ^a^143.48^122.96^74.46^48.50^81.00^12.05^19.41^10.00^0.5*
^g/w^l^26.18^18.63^N^A^*^*^N^A^*^*^6.00^3.93^8.70⁰⁰
^s^.or^u^a^d^o^r^76.48^46.86^31.85^15.00^25.00^6.86⁰^15.00⁰
^le^ak
^a^m^a^20.50^13.50^N^A^*^*^N^A^*^*^5.00^4.50⁰⁴^.00⁰
^://wiki
^h^ttp^206.15^194.87^119.87^75.00^142.50^14.17^23.20^15.00⁰
ⁿ^ezu^el^a^10.50^5.5^N^A^*^*^N^A^*^*^5.00⁰⁰^0.50⁰
^tal^s^882.29^782.82^N^A^*^*^N^A^*^*^645.00^41.51^51.31^44.5⁰^.50
^O^f^fⁱ^{ce of}^t^h^{e S}^ecret^ary^of^S^t^at^{e. In}^t^e^rn^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^A^f^f^aⁱ^r^s^F^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ¹⁵⁰^Fⁱ^s^cal^Y^ear²⁰⁰³^Bu^dg^et^R^e^qu^es^t^S^u^m^m^a^ry^an^d^Hⁱ^g^h^lⁱ^g^h^t^s^.^F^e^bru^a^ry^{2002. T}^h^{e A}^R^I^doesⁿ^o^tⁱⁿ^cl^u^d^e
^ation^a^{l Military}^Edu^cation^an^{d T}^r^ainⁱⁿ^g^(IMET⁾^f^uⁿ^d^s^.^T^h^es^{e w}^{ill ran}^g^eⁱⁿ^{FY2002 f}^r^om^an^es^tim^{ated $170,000}^f^o^r^P^aⁿ^a^m^a^t^{o an}^es^tⁱ^m^at^{ed $1,180,000 f}^o^{r C}^o^l^o^m^bⁱ^a^{. Prepared}
ⁱⁿ^a^{M. S}^e^rafⁱⁿ^o^{, S}^p^eci^alⁱ^s^tⁱⁿ^In^t^e^rn^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^ecu^ri^t^y^A^f^f^aⁱ^r^s^,^C^R^S^,^F^e^bru^a^ry^{12, 2002.}
^h^{e A}^R^{I f}^o^{r FY2002 als}^o^{did n}^o^{t in}^clu^d^{e Fore}^igⁿ^Military^Fin^aⁿ^{ce Fu}ⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^{(FMF). T}^h^{e s}^m^{all am}^ouⁿ^t^f^o^{r B}^o^liv^{ia is}ⁱⁿ^cl^ud^{ed h}^e^r^e^,^e^v^eⁿ^t^h^o^{ugh i}^t^w^a^{s no}^t^sp^e^cⁱ^fi^c^a^l^l^y^fo^r
ⁿ^t^ern^a^rcotics^pu^rpos^es^{, in}^{order to f}^ac^{ilitate com}^p^aris^on^s^w^ith^th^{e FY2003 requ}^es^{t, w}^h^ichⁱⁿ^clu^d^es^{FMF f}^o^{r A}ⁿ^dean^R^e^gⁱ^on^{al I}ⁿ^itiativ^{e co}^uⁿ^t^rⁱ^es.
^A^{= Not A}^v^{ailable. A}^break^dowⁿ^by^pu^rpos^{e is}ⁿ^o^{t av}^{ailable f}^o^{r B}^r^{azil, P}^aⁿ^a^m^a^an^{d Ven}^ezu^{ela as}^th^{e INL}^fⁱ^g^u^r^es^f^o^{r th}^os^{e co}^uⁿ^t^ri^es^w^a^sⁿ^o^t^brok^en^dowⁿ^by^pu^rpos^e.

CRS-33
ppendix F. Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) FY2002 Allocations and FY2003 Funding Request
by Purpose and Functional Accounts
($ millions)
ARI FY2003 Request byARI FY2003 Request by Account
Purpose
Total ARITotal ARIFY2003
ryFY2002Request
Allocations Econom ic/ Count er- International Economic Foreign
Social/ narcotics Narcotics DevelopmentAi d* Support Military
Governanceand SecurityControl (ACI)FundFinancing
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL31016}380.50 537.0 164.0 373.0 439.0 0 0 98.0
^g/wlivia 122.96 132.6 82.6 50.0 91.0 30.6 10.0 1.0
^s^.or
^le^akazil 18.63 29.5 17.5 12.0 12.0 17.5 0 0
^://wiki46.86 65.1 43.1 22.0 37.0 7.1 20.0 1.0
^h^ttpnama 13.50 20.5 10.5 10.0 9.0 7.0 3.5 1.0
186.6 119.6 67.0 135.0 40.6 10.0 1.0
uela 5.5 8.5 0.5 8.0 8.0 0 0.5 0
782.82 979.8 437.8 542.0 731.0 102.8 44.0 102.0
^O^f^fⁱ^ce^of^t^h^e^S^ecret^ary^of^S^t^at^{e, R}^e^s^o^u^r^ces^{, Pl}^an^s^an^{d Pol}ⁱ^c^y^.^In^t^e^rn^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^A^f^f^aⁱ^r^s^F^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^{150 S}^u^m^m^a^ry^an^{d H}ⁱ^g^h^lⁱ^g^h^t^s^,^Fⁱ^s^c^al^Y^{ear 2003 Bu}^dg^et^R^e^qu^es^t^.^T^h^{e A}^R^{I t}^o^t^a^l^s
^o^{t in}^clu^d^{e In}^tern^ation^a^{l Military}^Edu^cation^an^{d T}^r^ainⁱⁿ^g^f^uⁿ^d^s^,^w^h^ich^ran^g^eⁱⁿ^th^{e FY2003 requ}^es^{t f}^r^om^{$200,000 f}^o^{r P}^aⁿ^a^m^a^t^o^{$1,180,000 f}^o^{r C}^o^l^o^m^bⁱ^a^{. Prepared by}^Nⁱⁿ^a
^e^rafⁱⁿ^o^{, S}^p^eci^alⁱ^s^tⁱⁿ^In^t^e^rn^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^ecu^ri^t^y^A^f^f^aⁱ^r^s^,^F^e^bru^a^ry^{12, 2002.}
^clu^d^es^f^uⁿ^d^s^prev^iou^s^ly^{cited u}ⁿ^d^{er C}^h^{ild Su}^rv^iv^{al an}^{d Dis}^eas^es^.