Treatment of "Battlefield Detainees" in the War on Terrorism

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In June 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Rasul v. Bush that U.S. courts have jurisdiction to
hear challenges on behalf of persons detained at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, in connection with the war against terrorism. The Court overturned a ruling that no U.S.
court has jurisdiction to hear petitions for habeas corpus on behalf of the detainees because they
are aliens detained abroad, but left questions involving prisoners’ rights and status unanswered.
The 9/11 Commission recommended a common coalition approach to such detention. Congress
enacted the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), P.L. 109-148, to establish standards for
interrogation and to deny detainees access to federal courts to file habeas petitions but allow
limited appeals of status determinations and final decisions of military commissions. Congress
approved the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), P.L. 109-366, to authorize military
commissions for the prosecution of detainees for war crimes.
The Bush Administration earlier deemed all of the detainees to be “unlawful combatants,” who
may, according to Administration officials, be held indefinitely without trial or even if they are
acquitted by a military tribunal. Fifteen of the detainees were designated as subject to the
President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001, making them eligible for trial by military
commission. In answer to the Rasul decision, the Pentagon instituted Combatant Status Review
Tribunals to provide a forum for detainees to challenge their status as “enemy combatants.” The
Pentagon had earlier announced a plan for annual reviews to determine whether detainees may be
released without endangering national security.
The President’s decision to deny the detainees prisoner-of-war (POW) status remains a point of
contention, in particular with respect to members of the Taliban, with some arguing that it is
based on an inaccurate interpretation of the Geneva Convention for the Treatment of Prisoners of
War (GPW), which they assert requires that all combatants captured on the battlefield are entitled
to be treated as POWs until an independent tribunal has determined otherwise. The publication of
executive branch memoranda documenting the internal debate about the status of prisoners
evoked additional criticism of the Bush Administration’s legal position. Finally, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld determined that persons captured in Afghanistan in
connection with the “Global War on Terrorism” are entitled at least to the minimum set of
protections accorded by Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
This report provides an overview of the law of war and the historical treatment of wartime
detainees, in particular the U.S. practice; describes how the detainees’ status might affect their ^th^th
rights and treatment; and summarizes activity of the 108 and 109 Congresses related to
detention in connection with the war against terrorism. The report also summarizes legislative ^th
proposals in the 110 Congress, including H.R. 1 and H.R. 267.

Backgr ound ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Current Status............................................................................................................................3
Critics’ Views............................................................................................................................4
Applicable Law.........................................................................................................................5
The Law of War...............................................................................................................................8
Characterizing the Conflict.......................................................................................................9
Authority to Detain during an International Armed Conflict..................................................12
Prisoners of War................................................................................................................13
Civilian Detainees.............................................................................................................15
Unlawful Belligerents.......................................................................................................15
Interpretation of GPW Article 4..............................................................................................19
GPW Art. 4A(1): Does Al Qaeda Form “Part of” the Armed Forces of a Party to
the Conflict?...................................................................................................................20
GPW Art. 4A(2): Does Al Qaeda “Belong to” a Party to the Conflict?............................20
The Four Criteria..............................................................................................................21
Determining Status under GPW Art. 5....................................................................................29
Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts....................................................................32
Treatment of Detainees at Guantánamo........................................................................................34
Interrogation ............................................................................................................................ 34
Trial and Punishment..............................................................................................................36
POWs ................................................................................................................................ 36
Ci vilians ...................................................................................................................... ...... 38
Unlawful Belligerents.......................................................................................................39
Security Measures...................................................................................................................39
Repatr iati on ............................................................................................................................. 40
Right to Redress......................................................................................................................41
Congress’s Role.............................................................................................................................42

108^th Congress.........................................................................................................................43 ^th

109 Congress.........................................................................................................................44
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.......................................................................................44
The Military Commissions Act of 2006............................................................................45 ^th
110 Congress.........................................................................................................................46
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................47

The U.S. Supreme Court decided at the end of its 2003-2004 term that U.S. courts have
jurisdiction to hear challenges on behalf the approximately 550 persons who were detained at the ¹
U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in connection with the war against terrorism. The
decision overturned the holding of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which had accepted
the Administration’s argument that no U.S. court has jurisdiction to hear petitions for habeas
corpus by or on behalf of the detainees because they are aliens and are detained outside the ²
sovereign territory of the United States. In response to the Court’s ruling, the Department of
Defense (DOD) instituted a new form of tribunal at Guantanamo Bay to allow detainees an
opportunity to contest their designation as “enemy combatants,” similar to the planned
administrative review procedure DOD had announced that would review the necessity of ³
individuals’ continued detention.
Congress approved the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA, or Graham-Levin Amendment) to
establish standards for interrogation and to deny detainees access to federal courts to file habeas
petitions but allow limited appeals of status determinations and final decisions of military ⁴
commissions in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. More than a hundred petitions for habeas
corpus were already pending in the D.C. Circuit. In the case of accused driver and bodyguard for
Osama bin Laden, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a federal judge held the petitioner’s ongoing trial by
military commission to be illegal, leading the government to suspend temporarily the operation of
military tribunals. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals overturned that decision, allowing DOD to ⁵
restart the military commissions, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
Two other district judges issued contradictory opinions as to whether the detainees have any ⁶
rights enforceable in federal court; these decisions also have been appealed. The Administration
has filed motions either to dismiss all of these petitions on the basis that the DTA has curtailed the
courts’ jurisdiction or to convert the cases to appeals subject to the strictures of that Act. The
Supreme Court rejected the government’s argument that the Hamdan case should be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the DTA. Congress responded by passing the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, which, in addition to providing explicit authority for military
commissions, cuts off jurisdiction to hear all habeas cases and other legal actions brought by
aliens in relation to their detention as “unlawful enemy combatants,” including such cases that are ⁷
currently pending.

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The detention and treatment of the suspected enemy combatants at Guantánamo Bay has been a
consistent source of friction for the Bush Administration since it began transporting prisoners
there in January, 2002. After criticism from human rights organizations and many foreign
governments regarding the determination that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 do not apply to ⁸
the detainees there, President Bush shifted position with an announcement that Taliban fighters ⁹
are covered by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, while Al Qaeda fighters are not. Taliban fighters
are not, however, treated as prisoners of war (POW) because they reportedly fail to meet ¹⁰
international standards as lawful combatants. The President had determined that Al Qaeda ¹¹
remains outside the Geneva Conventions because it is not a state and not a party to the treaty.
The President proclaimed, in a previously secret memorandum that was issued February 7, 2002,
that “[a]s a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees
humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner ¹²
consistent with the principles of Geneva.”
The Bush Administration deems all of the detainees to be “unlawful combatants,” who may,
according to Administration officials, be held indefinitely without trial or even despite their
possible acquittal by a military tribunal. The 9/11 Commission, apparently finding the
international discord over the treatment and status of the detainees to be harmful to the U.S. effort
to thwart terrorism, recommended the development of a common coalition approach toward the ¹³
detention and humane treatment of captured terrorists. After the Hamdan decision was
announced, the Department of Defense issued a memorandum announcing that Al Qaeda
detainees were to be considered to be covered by the protections of Common Article 3, and that
DoD regulations pertinent to detainee operations, other than those pertaining to military ¹⁴
commissions, were understood to comply with Common Article 3. Subordinate departments
were requested to review directives and regulations to ensure such compliance.

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Some 380 detainees (including three children under the age of 16¹⁵) have been released from the ¹⁶
detention facilities at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and approximately 85
detainees have been deemed eligible for transfer. The Supreme Court’s Hamdan decision and
Congress’ approval of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of
2006 (“MCA”) may have largely resolved the issue of detainees’ legal status; however, the
treatment of detainees who remain in custody continues to be a source of contention with human
rights groups. Some critics contend that the amendments to the War Crimes Act effectively permit ¹⁷
harsh treatment that falls below the international standard.
The administrative proceedings implemented to review the status of detainees, called the ¹⁸
Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT), appear designed to satisfy the Supreme Court’s
Hamdi ruling, although the government has argued in court that the Guantánamo detainees, as
aliens detained outside the territory of the United States, are not entitled to any process beyond
the initial screening process used to determine whether detainees should be sent to Guantánamo.
Although Congress has not authorized or required CSRT proceedings, it has likely ratified their
use by providing in the MCA a definition of “unlawful enemy combatant” that includes persons
who have been determined to be such by these tribunals and by providing for the limited review
of CSRT determinations in federal court. Critics view the CSRT proceedings as insufficient to
satisfy Hamdi, which many believe applies to all detainees regardless of citizenship and place of ¹⁹²⁰
detention. CSRTs were completed for all detainees and confirmed the status of 520 enemy
combatants. Thirty-eight detainees were determined by CSRTs not to be enemy combatants. The
first round of Administrative Review Boards (ARBs) resulted in decisions to release 14 detainees, ²¹
to transfer 120 detainees, and to continue detaining 329 detainees.

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^A¹^{. For}^aⁿ^ov^e^r^vⁱ^ew^of^am^e^ndm^ents^to^the^W^a^r^C^r^im^e^s^A^c^{t, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^t^R^L³³⁶⁶²^,^T^h^{e Wa}^{r Crimes Act: Cu}^rren^t
^Issu^es^{, by}^Mic^h^a^e^l^J^{ohn G}^a^r^c^ia^.
¹⁸^D^e^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}^D^e^fe^ns^e^proc^e^dur^a^l^rule^s^f^o^{r CSRT}^s^a^r^e^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://w^w^w^.def^eⁿ^s^e^link^.^m^il/ne^w^s^/^A^u^g^2006/
^d20⁰⁶⁰⁸^09C^SR^T^P^r^o^c^e^dur^e^s^.p^df^.
¹⁹^S^ee,^e.^g^.^{, H}^u^m^a^{n R}ⁱ^g^h^ts^Fir^s^{t A}ⁿ^a^l^y^z^e^s^D^O^D^’^s^C^o^m^b^a^t^aⁿ^{t Sta}^t^us^R^e^vⁱ^ew^T^r^ibuna^ls^,^av^ail^able^at
^http:^//w^w^w^.hum^aⁿ^rⁱ^g^h^ts^fⁱ^r^s^t.or^g^/^us^_la^w^/de^t^aⁱ^ne^e^s^/s^ta^tus^_^r^e^vⁱ^ew^_0802⁰⁴^.htm^{; H}^u^m^a^{n R}ⁱ^g^h^ts^W^a^tc^{h, U}^.^S.:^R^e^vⁱ^ew
^P^aⁿ^e^l^s^No^Fⁱ^x^fo^r^Gu^aⁿ^t^áⁿ^a^mo^,^a^v^aila^ble^at^htt^p^://w^ww^.hr^w^.org^/e^ng^lish/^doc^s/20⁰⁴^/^07/^27/^usdom⁹¹^35_^tx^t.htm^(la^s^t
^vi^si^t^e^d^Oct^.¹⁶^,²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.
²⁰^A^s^of^Se^ptem^be^r^{6, 20}⁰⁶^{, t}^h^e¹⁴^“^h^ig^{h v}^a^lue^de^ta^ine^e^s^”^w^{ho w}^e^r^e^tr^aⁿ^s^f^e^r^r^e^d^f^r^om^C^I^A^de^te^{ntion c}^e^nte^r^s^ov^e^r^s^e^a^s^to
^G^u^aⁿ^ta^nam^o^ha^{d n}^o^{t y}^e^{t unde}^r^g^oⁿ^e^C^S^R^T^pr^o^ceedⁱⁿ^gs.^Se^e^P^r^e^s^s^R^e^le^a^s^e^,^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^D^e^f^e^ns^e
^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt O}^r^de^r^e^{d to}^T^a^k^e^C^u^s^t^ody^of^Hⁱ^g^h^-^V^a^l^ue^D^e^ta^ine^e^s⁽^S^e^p^{. 6}^,²⁰⁰⁶⁾^,^av^ai^la^ble^at
^h^t^t^p^:^/^/^www^.^d^efen^selⁱⁿ^k.^mⁱ^l^/^Rel^e^a^s^es/^R^el^ease.^asp^x^?R^el^easeI^D=9⁹⁰⁹^(l^ast^vi^si^t^e^d^No^v.⁷^,²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.
²¹^Se^e^P^r^{ess Rel}^ease,^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^De^f^eⁿ^s^e,^G^u^an^t^aⁿ^a^m^o^Ba^y^Det^aⁱⁿ^{ee A}^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^ratⁱ^v^{e Revi}^e^w^Bo^ar^d^Deci^si^oⁿ^s
^C^o^m^p^le^te^d⁽^F^e^b^{. 9, 20}⁰⁶⁾^,^av^ai^la^ble^at^htt^p^://w^ww^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/re^l^e^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰^6/^nr2⁰⁰⁶⁰²⁰⁹^-1²⁴⁶⁴^.htm^{l (la}^s^{t v}ⁱ^site^d
^N^o^v^.^7,²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.

Some allied countries and human rights organizations criticized the President’s decision as
contrary to international law, arguing it relied on an inaccurate interpretation of the Geneva ²²
Convention for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). The U.N. High Commissioner on
Human Rights (UNHCR) and some human rights organizations argue that all combatants
captured on the battlefield are entitled to be treated as POWs until an independent tribunal has ²³
determined otherwise. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention deemed that the U.S. detention of “enemy combatants,” without determining their ²⁴
status in accordance with international law, may be arbitrary. The UNHCR released a report
criticizing the U.S. detention policy as inconsistent with U.S. obligations under international law, ²⁵
including humanitarian law and human rights treaties.
The European Parliament expressed concern about the U.S. detention of persons in Guantánamo,
in 2002, asking the United Nations to pass a resolution requesting the establishment of a tribunal ²⁶
to clarify the detainees’ legal status. No action was taken on that request, and European Union
countries voted as a bloc against a Cuban resolution calling on the UNHCR to investigate U.S. ²⁷
detention operations at Guantanamo Bay. The European Parliament adopted another resolution
in 2004 calling for detainees to be charged, tried, and treated in accordance with international

²²^T^h^e^G^e^ne^v^a^C^onv^eⁿ^{tion R}^e^la^tiv^e^{to t}^h^e^T^r^e^a^t^m^e^{nt of}^P^r^is^oⁿ^e^r^s^of^W^a^r^,^A^u^g^u^s^t^12,¹⁹⁴⁹^{, 6}^U^.^S.T^.³³¹⁷⁽^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r
^“G^P^W^”).
²³^Se^e^Red^Cro^{ss Dif}^f^{ers o}ⁿ^POWs^{, D}^ETR^O^I^T^F^RE^E^P^RE^S^S^{, Fe}^{b. 9,}²⁰⁰²^{, a}^t^6A^(re^porting^Iⁿ^te^rna^tio^na^l^Com^m^itte^e^o^f^the
^Red^Cro^{ss (ICRC) statem}^en^{t criticizin}^g^Bu^sh^d^ecisioⁿ⁾^;^Afg^h^aⁿ^H^u^m^{an Ri}^gh^ts^is^C^a^us^e^for^c^onc^e^r^n,^W^a^rⁿ^s^To^{p U}^N
^Offic^ial^{, A}^GE^NCE^F^RA^N^C^E^-P^RE^S^S^E^{, Fe}^b.¹²^{, 2}⁰⁰²^,^av^ail^a^b^l^e^at²⁰⁰²^W^L²³³⁸⁵⁰¹^(re^por^ting^(f^orm^e^r)^{UNHCR Chie}^f
^Mary^Ro^bⁱⁿ^s^oⁿ^ag^reed^w^ith^leg^a^{l p}^o^s^iti^oⁿ^o^f^{ICRC reg}^a^rdⁱⁿ^g^G^eⁿ^e^v^a^Coⁿ^v^en^tioⁿ^s^’^ap^p^l^icab^ility^to^d^e^tain^{ees); L}^e^tter
^f^r^o^m^Kenⁿ^e^t^h^Ro^t^h^,^E^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^{e Di}^rect^o^r^Hu^m^aⁿ^Ri^gh^t^s^W^a^t^c^h^,^t^o^C^oⁿ^d^o^l^{eezza Ri}^ce,^Natⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^ecu^ri^t^y^A^d^vi^so^{r (Jan}^.
^{28, 20}⁰²⁾^,^av^ail^able^at^http^://hrw^.org^/pre^ss/20^02/^01/^us0¹²⁸⁰²^-ltr.^h^t^m^(la^s^{t v}ⁱ^site^{d Ma}^rc^{h 2}²^,²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.
²⁴^Se^e^Civ^{il a}ⁿ^d^Pol^itic^al^Rig^h^{ts, I}ⁿ^c^l^udi^{ng t}^h^e^Que^s^ti^on^{of T}^o^rture^a^{nd De}^te^nti^oⁿ^{, R}^e^p^o^r^t^of^the^W^o^r^k^ing^G^r^{oup o}ⁿ
^A^r^bitr^a^r^y^D^e^te^{ntion, U}^.^N^.^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^{on H}^u^m^a^{n R}ⁱ^g^h^ts^{, 59}^th^Se^s^s^{., A}^g^e^nda^Ite^m^11(a⁾^{, a}^t¹⁹^et^seq.^{, E/C}^N^.4^/2⁰⁰^3/8
⁽²⁰⁰²⁾^,^av^ai^la^ble^at^htt^p^://w^w^w^.unhc^hr.c^h.eⁿ^g^lis^h/^is^s^u^e^s^/de^t^eⁿ^ti^on/^a^nnua^l.^htm^(la^s^{t v}ⁱ^s^ite^{d J}^u^ly^{27, 2}⁰⁰⁵^).
^T^h^e^W^o^r^k^ing^G^r^{oup c}^o^nc^lude^s^f^r^om^the^a^bov^e^tha^t^{, s}^o^lo^ng^a^s^a^“^c^o^m^p^e^t^eⁿ^{t tr}^ibuⁿ^a^l^”ⁱⁿ^the
^m^e^aⁿ^ing^of^[^a^r^tic^le^5,^pa^r^a^g^r^a^ph²^,^of^the^t^h^ir^{d G}^e^ne^v^a^C^onv^eⁿ^tioⁿ^]^{, ha}^sⁿ^o^{t is}^s^u^e^d^a^r^u^ling^oⁿ^t^h^e
^c^onte^s^te^{d is}^s^u^e^,^de^ta^ine^e^s^eⁿ^j^o^y^“the^pr^ote^c^tio^{n of}^the^.^{.. C}^onv^eⁿ^ti^oⁿ^”^,^a^s^pr^ovⁱ^d^e^dⁱⁿ^pa^r^a^g^r^a^{ph 2,}
^w^h^eⁿ^c^e^it^m^a^y^be^a^r^g^u^e^d^tha^t^the^y^eⁿ^joy^fⁱ^rstl^y^the^prote^c^tio^{n a}^f^f^o^r^d^e^d^by^{its a}^r^tic^le¹³^(“^P^r^isoⁿ^e^r^s
^o^f^war^m^u^st^at^al^l^tⁱ^m^{es b}^e^h^u^m^an^el^y^t^r^eat^ed^”),^an^d^secoⁿ^d^l^y^t^h^{e ri}^gh^t^t^o^h^a^{ve t}^h^{e l}^a^w^f^u^lⁿ^e^{ss o}^f
^theⁱ^r^de^teⁿ^tio^{n r}^e^vⁱ^e^w^e^d^a^{nd the}^rⁱ^g^h^{t to a}^f^a^ir^tr^ia^l^pr^ov^ide^d^u^nde^r^a^r^tic^le^s^{105 a}^nd¹⁰⁶^of^tha^t
^C^onv^eⁿ^tio^{n (}^not^if^ic^a^{tion of}^c^h^a^r^g^e^s^,^a^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^of^c^ouns^e^l^{, inte}^r^p^r^e^ta^tion,^e^t^c^.⁾^,^s^o^tha^t^t^h^e^a^b^s^e^nc^e
^of^suc^h^rig^h^{ts m}^a^y^re^nde^{r the}^de^te^ntioⁿ^of^the^prisoⁿ^e^r^{s a}^r^bitra^r^y^.
^Id^.^a^t^20-^21.
^A^r^bitr^a^r^y^de^te^{ntion m}^a^y^be^c^onsⁱ^d^e^r^e^d^a^vⁱ^ola^tioⁿ^of^c^u^s^t^om^a^r^y^inte^rⁿ^a^tiona^l^la^w^.^Se^e^Jo^rd^an^J.^P^a^u^s^t,^Ju^di^ci^a^l^P^o^wer
^{to D}^e^te^r^m^ine^the^Sta^t^us^an^{d Ri}^ght^s^{of Pe}^r^s^ons^D^e^taine^d^W^ith^out^Tr^ial^{, 44}^H^AR^V^.^I^NT^’^L^L^.^J^.^{503, 50}^{6 n.6 (2}⁰⁰^3)(c^iting
^num^e^r^{ous inte}^rna^t^io^na^{l tre}^a^tie^{s a}ⁿ^{d de}^cⁱ^sioⁿ^s).
²⁵^U^N^C^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on on H}^u^m^a^{n R}ⁱ^g^h^ts^{, R}^e^por^t^oⁿ^the^Sit^u^a^tio^{n of}^de^ta^ine^e^s^a^t^G^u^aⁿ^tá^na^m^o^B^a^y^,^U^N^doc^.
^E/C^N^.4/²⁰^06/¹²^{0 (}^F^e^b^{. 1}⁵^,²⁰⁰⁶⁾^,^av^ai^la^ble^at^htt^p^://w^ww^.ohc^hr.o^rg^/e^ng^lis^h/bo^die^s^/^c^hr/doc^s/^62c^hr/
^E^.^CN.⁴^.²⁰⁰⁶^.¹²⁰^_^.^p^d^f^(l^ast^vi^si^t^e^d^M^a^rch²³^,²⁰⁰⁶^).^T^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^ed^S^t^at^{es o}^b^j^ect^ed^t^o^t^h^e^l^e^gal^coⁿ^c^l^u^si^oⁿ^s^reach^edⁱⁿ^t^h^e
^r^e^por^t.^S^{ee i}^d^.^,^A^nne^x^I^I⁽^l^e^tte^r^f^r^om^A^m^ba^s^s^a^dor^K^e^vⁱ^{n Edw}^a^r^Mole^y⁾^.
²⁶^Se^e^Eur^ope^aⁿ^P^a^r^l^ia^m^e^{nt R}^e^s^o^lution^on^the^D^e^ta^ine^e^sⁱⁿ^G^u^aⁿ^ta^na^m^o^B^a^y^,^D^o^c^.^P⁵^_T^A^P^R^O^V(²⁰⁰²⁾⁰⁰⁶^{6 (}^F^e^b^{. 7}^,
²⁰⁰²⁾^,^av^ai^la^ble^at^htt^p^://w^ww^.e^u^r^opa^rl.e^u^.^int^(la^s^{t v}ⁱ^site^{d Ma}^rc^h²³^{, 2}⁰⁰⁶^).
²⁷^A^l^ex^a^nde^r^G^.^Hⁱ^gg^ins^,^Gu^an^t^aⁿ^a^mo^B^a^{y: B}ⁱ^d^t^o^revi^{ew U.}^S^.^ba^{se f}^aⁱ^l^s^{, M}^IA^M^I^H^ER^A^L^D^{, A}^p^r^{il 22,}²⁰^{05, a}^t^A^19.

law.²⁸ In June of 2006, the European Parliament adopted a motion urging the United States to ²⁹
close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council adopted a resolution in June, 2003 calling
the detention of persons detained in Guantánamo Bay, Afghanistan, and elsewhere “unlawful,” ³⁰
noting in particular its concern that children are among the detainees, which it reiterated in April ³¹
2005. The Organization of American States’ Inter-American Commission adopted precautionary
measures with respect to the United States, urging it to take “urgent measures” to establish ³²
hearings to determine the legal status of the detainees. The United States declined to comply,
answering that the Commission has no jurisdiction to enforce the Geneva Conventions, and
reiterating the Administration’s position that, there being no doubt as to the status of the ³³
detainees, individual legal procedures to determine the status of the detainees are unnecessary.
On July 28, 2006, the Inter-American Commission adopted a resolution urging the United States ³⁴
to close the detention facility and take other measures. The decision to transfer the prisoners to ³⁵
Guantánamo Bay has also been criticized as an effort to keep them “beyond the rule of law.”
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 create a comprehensive legal regime for the treatment of ³⁶
detainees in an armed conflict. Members of a regular armed force and certain others, including

²⁸^Se^e^Eur^ope^aⁿ^P^a^r^l^ia^m^e^{nt R}^e^s^o^lution^on^G^u^aⁿ^ta^na^m^o^{, D}^o^c^.^P⁶^_T^A⁽²⁰⁰⁴⁾⁰⁰^{50 (}^O^c^t^.²⁸^{, 2}⁰⁰⁴⁾^,^av^ai^l^able^at
^http:^//w^w^w^.e^ur^opa^r^l^.e^u.^int/⁽^l^a^s^t^vⁱ^s^ite^{d Ma}^r^c^{h 2}³^,²⁰⁰⁶⁾⁽ⁱ^ns^is^ti^ng^tha^t^“^e^v^e^r^y^de^ta^ine^e^s^houl^d^be^tr^e^a^t^e^dⁱⁿ
^acco^rd^an^{ce w}ⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^t^e^rn^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^h^u^manⁱ^t^a^ri^an^l^a^w^an^d^t^rⁱ^e^d^wⁱ^t^h^ou^t^d^e^l^a^yⁱⁿ^{a fai}^r^an^d^pu^b^lⁱ^c^h^eariⁿ^g^b^y^{a co}^m^p^et^en^t^,
^inde^pe^nde^nt^aⁿ^d^im^pa^r^tia^{l tr}^ibuⁿ^a^l^{, in}^a^ppl^ic^a^tion^aⁿ^d^de^m^ons^tr^a^tio^{n of}^the^v^e^r^y^va^lue^s^w^e^s^t^a^{nd f}^o^r^”⁾^.
²⁹^Se^e^Eur^ope^aⁿ^P^a^r^l^ia^m^e^{nt R}^e^s^o^lution^on^G^u^aⁿ^ta^na^m^o^{, D}^o^c^.^P⁶^_T^A^-⁽²⁰⁰⁶⁾⁰²^{54 (}^J^une^13,²⁰⁰⁶⁾^,^av^a^ilable^at
^http:^//w^w^w^.e^ur^opa^r^l^.e^u.^int/⁽^l^a^s^t^J^a^{n. 2}²^,²⁰⁰⁷⁾^.
³⁰^P^a^r^lia^m^e^nta^r^y^A^s^s^e^m^b^l^y^of^the^C^ouncⁱ^l^of^Eur^ope^{, R}ⁱ^g^h^ts^of^P^e^r^s^oⁿ^s^H^e^{ld i}ⁿ^t^h^e^C^u^s^t^o^d^y^of^the^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^Sta^t^e^sⁱⁿ
^A^f^g^h^aⁿ^is^ta^{n or}^G^u^aⁿ^tá^na^m^o^B^a^y^,^R^e^s^o^luti^on¹³⁴⁰⁽^J^uⁿ^e²⁷^{, 2}⁰⁰³⁾^,^av^ail^able^at^htt^p^://a^sse^m^b^l^y^.c^oe^.int/^doc^um^eⁿ^ts/
^a^dopte^d^T^e^x^t^/^t^a^03/^ER^ES1³⁴⁰^.^h^tm⁽^l^a^s^{t v}ⁱ^s^ite^{d J}^a^n.^22,²⁰⁰⁷⁾^[^he^r^eⁱⁿ^a^f^te^r^“^C^ounc^{il of}^Eur^o^pe^”^]^.
³¹^P^a^r^lia^m^e^nta^r^y^A^s^s^e^m^b^l^y^of^the^C^ouncⁱ^l^of^Eur^ope^{, L}^a^w^f^ulne^s^s^of^D^e^te^ntions^by^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{in G}^u^aⁿ^tá^na^m^o
^B^a^y^,^R^e^s^o^lutio^{n 1}⁴³³⁽^A^pr^il^26,²⁰⁰⁶⁾^,^av^ail^able^at^http^://a^s^s^e^m^b^l^y^.c^oe^.int/^M^aⁱ^n.a^s^p?^li^nk⁼^/^D^o^c^u^m^e^nts^/^A^dopte^d^T^e^x^t^/
^T^A⁰⁵^/^E^R^E^S¹⁴³³^.h^t^m⁽^l^ast^vi^si^t^e^d^Jan^.²²^,²⁰⁰⁷⁾^.
³²^Se^e^IA^CHR,^P^r^ecau^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^ry^M^eas^u^r^{es Req}^u^e^st^edⁱⁿ^Resp^ect^o^f^t^h^e^Det^aⁱⁿ^{ees i}ⁿ^G^u^an^t^aⁿ^a^m^o^Ba^y^,^C^u^b^a^(Unⁱ^t^e^d
^Sta^t^e^s⁾^,^Ma^r^c^{h 1}²^,²⁰⁰²^{, 4}¹^I^.^L^.^{M. 5}³²⁽²⁰⁰²⁾^{; J}^e^s^s^e^B^r^a^v^in,^P^anel^S^a^y^{s U.}^S.^P^o^lⁱ^{cy on}^Det^aⁱⁿ^{ees i}ⁿ^Cub^a^B^r^ea^ks
^Iⁿ^te^r^nat^io^{nal Law}^{, W}^AL^L^S^T^.^J^{., Ma}^{r. 1}⁴^,²⁰^02,^a^t^B2.
³³^Se^e^R^e^s^pons^e^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{to R}^e^q^u^e^s^{t f}^o^r^P^r^ecau^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^ry^M^easu^r^es—Det^aiⁿ^{ees i}ⁿ^G^u^an^t^aⁿ^a^m^o^Ba^y^,^Cu^b^a^,⁴¹
^I^.^L^.^{M. 1}⁰¹⁵⁽²⁰⁰²⁾^{; Fr}^aⁿ^k^D^a^vⁱ^e^s^,^U^.^S.^St^an^ds^Fir^m^on^Sta^t^us^{of D}^e^taine^e^s^{at C}^u^b^a^B^a^s^e^{, P}^HI^L^A^.^I^N^QUI^RE^R^{, A}^p^r.^14,
²⁰⁰^2,^av^ai^la^ble^at²⁰⁰²^W^L¹⁹⁵⁸³⁵⁶^7.
³⁴^IA^CHR,^On^G^u^an^t^aⁿ^a^m^o^Ba^y^P^r^ecau^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^ry^M^easu^r^es,^Reso^l^u^tⁱ^o^{n No}^.²⁷^/⁰⁶^,^av^a^ila^ble^a^t^ht^tp:/^/w^w^w^.c^idh.or^g^/
^c^o^m^unic^a^dos^/e^ng^lis^h/²⁰⁰^6/^27.⁰⁶^eⁿ^g^.^htm⁽^l^a^s^{t v}ⁱ^s^ite^{d O}^c^{t. 16,}²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.
³⁵^S^ee,^e.^g^.^{, L}^o^r^d^J^ohaⁿ^Ste^y^n,^G^u^aⁿ^ta^nam^o^Bay^:^The^Le^gal^Blac^k^H^o^le^{, T}^w^eⁿ^t^y^-Se^v^eⁿ^{th FA}^Ma^{nn L}^e^c^t^ure^,^British
^Institute^of^Inte^rna^tⁱ^ona^{l a}ⁿ^{d C}^o^m^p^a^r^a^tiv^e^L^a^w^,^{25 Nov}^e^m^b^e^r²⁰⁰³^,^a^t¹⁰^-1^1,^av^ail^able^at^http^://w^ww^.ni^m^j.org^/
^d^o^c^u^m^en^t^s^/^g^u^aⁿ^t^an^am^o^.^p^d^f^(l^ast^vi^si^t^e^d^M^a^rch²³^,²⁰⁰⁶⁾^(no^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^t^h^e^p^r^actⁱ^{ce o}^f^sen^dⁱⁿ^g^p^rⁱ^s^oⁿ^{ers t}^o^rem^o^t^e^p^l^aces
^{to a}^v^oid^the^a^p^plic^a^tioⁿ^of^the^w^r^{it of}^ha^be^as^c^o^r^p^us^ha^{d be}^eⁿ^pr^a^c^t^ic^e^d^{in E}ⁿ^g^l^aⁿ^d^b^u^{t w}^a^s^outla^w^e^{d in}¹⁶⁷⁹⁾^.
³⁶^G^e^nev^a^C^onv^eⁿ^tion^f^o^r^the^A^m^e^l^ior^a^tio^{n of}^the^C^oⁿ^d^iti^on^of^the^W^ounde^d^aⁿ^d^Sic^k^{in A}^r^m^e^{d For}^c^e^s^{in the}^Fie^l^d,
^ope^ne^d^f^o^r^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^t^ur^e^A^u^g^.^12,¹⁹^49,^{6 U}^.^S.T^.³¹¹⁴^{, T}^.^I^.^A^.^{S. N}^o^.³³⁶²^{, 7}⁵^U^.^N^.^T^.^S.³¹⁽^e^nte^r^e^d^int^o^f^o^r^c^e^O^c^{t. 21,}
¹⁹⁵⁰⁾^{; G}^e^ne^v^a^C^onv^eⁿ^tio^{n f}^o^r^th^e^A^m^e^lior^a^tion^of^the^C^o^nditⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^W^ounde^{d, S}ⁱ^c^k^a^{nd S}^h^ipw^r^e^c^k^{ed Me}^m^b^e^r^s^of
^A^r^m^e^{d For}^c^e^s^a^t^Se^a^,^o^p^eⁿ^e^d^f^o^r^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^t^ur^e^A^u^g^.^12,¹⁹^49,^{6 U}^.^S.T^.³²^17,^T^.^I^.^A^.^{S. N}^o^.³³^63,⁷⁵^U^.^N^.^T^.^{S. 85 (}^e^nte^r^e^d
^into^f^o^r^c^e^O^c^{t. 21,}¹⁹⁵⁰⁾^{; G}^e^ne^v^a^C^onv^eⁿ^ti^{on R}^e^la^tiv^e^to^the^T^r^e^a^t^m^e^{nt of}^P^r^is^one^r^s^of^W^a^r^,^ope^ne^d^f^o^r^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^t^ur^e^A^u^g^.
^12,¹⁹⁴⁹^{, 6}^U^.^S.T^.³³^16,^T^.^I^.^A^.^{S. N}^o^{. 3}³⁶⁴^,⁷⁵^U^.^N^.^T^.^{S. 1}³⁵⁽^e^nte^r^e^d^int^o^f^o^r^c^e^O^c^{t. 21}^{, 1}⁹⁵⁰⁾^;^G^e^ne^v^a^C^onv^eⁿ^tion
^R^e^la^tiv^e^{to the}^P^r^ote^c^tio^{n of}^Cⁱ^vⁱ^lⁱ^aⁿ^P^e^r^s^ons^{in T}ⁱ^m^e^of^W^a^r^,^opeⁿ^e^{d f}^o^r^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^t^ur^e^A^u^g^.^12,¹⁹⁴⁹^{, 6}^U^.^S.T^.³⁵¹⁶^,
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

militias and volunteer corps serving as part of the armed forces, are entitled to specific privileges
as POWs. Members of volunteer corps, militias, and organized resistence forces that are not part
of the armed services of a party to the conflict are entitled to POW status if the organization (a) is
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, (b) uses a fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance, (c) carries arms openly, and (d) conducts its operations in accordance ³⁷
with the laws of war. Groups that do not meet the standards are not entitled to POW status, and
their members who commit belligerent acts may be treated as civilians under the Geneva ³⁸
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC). These
“unprivileged” or “unlawful combatants” may be punished for acts of violence for which ³⁹
legitimate combatants could not be punished. Some have argued that there is implied in the
Geneva Conventions a third category comprised of combatants from militias that do not qualify
for POW status but also fall outside of the protection for civilians, who may be lawful in the
sense that they would not necessarily incur criminal liability for engaging in otherwise lawful ⁴⁰
combat. The Bush Administration took the position that the Geneva Conventions do not provide
any protection to “unlawful combatants” and that such persons may be tried by military ⁴¹
commission for any act in furtherance of an unlawful belligerency, but stated that the United
States treats all such detainees in a manner consistent with the Geneva Conventions protections
for prisoners of war.
The White House’s legal position was somewhat clarified by a series of internal documents
released by the White House and DOD in response to allegations of detainee abuse at the Abu ⁴²
Ghraib prison in Iraq. The memoranda document the internal debate about the applicability of

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^T^.^I^.^A^.^{S. N}^o^{. 33}⁶⁵^{, 7}⁵^U^.^N^.^T^.^S.²^{87 (}^eⁿ^t^e^r^e^dⁱⁿ^{to f}^o^r^c^e^O^c^{t. 2}¹^,¹⁹⁵⁰⁾^[^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^r^e^f^e^r^r^e^{d to c}^o^lle^c^t^iv^e^l^y^a^s^the^“¹⁹⁴⁹
^G^e^nev^a^C^onv^eⁿ^tions^”^or^“^C^onv^eⁿ^tio^ns^”^]^.
³⁷^G^P^W^{art. 4}^A⁽²^).
³⁸^G^e^ne^v^a^Conv^eⁿ^tion^Re^la^tiv^e^{to t}^h^e^P^r^ote^c^tⁱ^on^of^Civ^iliaⁿ^P^e^rsoⁿ^s^{in T}ⁱ^m^e^o^f^W^a^r,^A^u^g^.^{12, 1}⁹⁴⁹^,⁶^U.S.T^.³⁵¹⁶^,
^T^.^I^.^A^.^{S. N}^o^{. 33}⁶⁵^{, 7}⁵^U^.^N^.^T^.^S.²^{87 (}^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^“G^C^”⁾^.^S^{ee a}^l^so^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^the^A^r^m^y^{, FM 27-}¹⁰^{, T}^h^e^L^a^w^of^La^nd
^W^a^r^f^ar^{e (h}^ereiⁿ^a^f^t^{er “F}^M²⁷^-¹⁰^{”) p}^a^ra.⁷⁸⁽¹⁹⁵⁶⁾^st^at^es:
^I^f^a^pe^r^s^{on is}^de^te^r^m^ine^d^by^a^c^o^m^p^e^t^eⁿ^{t tr}^ibuna^l^,^a^c^tingⁱⁿ^c^onf^or^mⁱ^t^y^w^ith^A^r^tic^le^{5, G}^P^W^,^no^{t t}^o
^f^a^ll^w^{ithin a}ⁿ^y^of^the^c^a^t^e^g^orie^{s liste}^{d in A}^r^tic^le^{4, G}^P^W^,^he^{is n}^o^t^eⁿ^title^{d t}^o^be^tre^a^t^e^d^a^s^a
^p^rⁱ^s^oⁿ^e^r^o^f^w^a^r.^{He i}^s^,^h^o^w^ev^er,^{a “p}^ro^t^ect^ed^pe^rson”^w^ithin^the^m^e^aⁿ^ing^of^A^r^tic^le^{4, G}^C^.
⁽^inte^rna^l^c^itatⁱ^oⁿ^{s omitte}^d^).
^T^h^e^{Bush A}^d^mⁱ^nistra^{tion d}^o^e^s^no^{t a}^ppe^a^r^e^v^e^r^{to ha}^v^e^c^onsi^d^e^r^e^d^t^h^e^de^ta^ine^e^s^to^be^prote^c^t^e^d^a^s^cⁱ^v^ilia^{ns un}^de^{r the}
^G^C^{, how}^e^v^e^r^.^Se^e^G^e^or^g^e^H^.^A^l^dr^ic^h,^T^h^e^Ta^lib^an,^{Al Q}^a^e^d^a^,^aⁿ^d^the^D^e^te^r^m^inati^on^{of I}^l^le^ga^{l C}^o^m^bat^ants^{, 96}^A^M^.^J.
^I^NT^’^L^L.⁸⁹¹^{, 8}⁹²⁽²⁰⁰²⁾⁽ⁿ^otiⁿ^g^the^la^c^k^of^m^e^{ntion o}ⁿ^t^h^e^be^ha^lf^of^the^A^d^mⁱ^nistra^tion^of^the^a^p^pli^c^a^b^ility^of^the^GC).
³⁹^Se^e^{Maj. Rich}^ar^d^{R. Bax}^t^er,^S^o^-^C^alle^{d ‘U}^npriv^ile^ge^{d Be}^lli^ge^re^nc^y^{’: Spie}^s^{, G}^u^e^rrillas,^an^{d S}^a^b^o^te^u^r^s^{, 28 B}^RI^T^.^Y.^B.
^I^NT^’^L^L^.^323,³^{43 (}¹⁹⁵¹⁾^(e^x^p^laⁱⁿ^ing^tha^t^be^llig^e^r^eⁿ^c^y^is^{not v}ⁱ^ola^tⁱ^v^e^of^inte^rna^tiona^l^la^w^,^{but is}^m^e^re^l^y^unpr^ote^c^t^e^d^by
^it).
⁴⁰^Se^e^W^.^T^hom^a^s^Ma^{llison a}ⁿ^d^Sa^lly^V^.^Ma^llisoⁿ^,^T^h^e^J^u^rⁱ^dⁱ^c^a^l^Sta^t^us^{of I}^r^r^e^g^u^lar^C^o^m^b^ataⁿ^ts^un^de^r^the
^Iⁿ^te^r^nat^io^{nal Law}^{of Ar}^m^e^d^C^o^nf^lic^t^{, 9 C}^AS^E^W.^R^ES^.^J.^I^NT^’^L^L^.^{39, 43}⁽¹⁹⁷⁷⁾⁽^s^ug^g^e^s^ting^a^c^a^t^e^g^or^y^o^f^“^o^the^r
^co^m^b^at^an^t^s^,^su^ch^{as sp}ⁱ^e^s,^sab^o^t^e^u^r^s,^and^t^h^eⁱ^rregu^l^a^{rs w}^h^o^d^o^no^t^m^e^et^t^h^{e ap}^p^lⁱ^cab^l^e^cri^t^e^ri^a^o^f^t^h^{e l}^a^w^o^f^ar^m^e^d
^c^onf^lic^{t [}^w^{ho a}^r^e^]^la^w^f^{ul c}^o^m^b^a^t^aⁿ^tsⁱⁿ^pa^rtic^u^l^a^r^c^onte^x^ts^,^but^...ⁿ^o^{t e}ⁿ^ti^tle^{d t}^o^priv^ile^g^e^{d tre}^a^t^m^e^{nt of}^P^O^W^s^up^on
^cap^t^u^re”).
⁴¹^Milita^ry^Orde^{r, Nov}^e^m^b^e^r^13,²⁰^{01 De}^te^nti^oⁿ^,^T^r^e^a^t^m^e^{nt, a}^{nd T}^rⁱ^a^{l of}^Ce^rtaⁱ^{n Non-Ci}^tiz^eⁿ^{s in}^the^W^a^r^A^g^aⁱ^nst
^T^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^sm^§1(^a⁾^{, 6}⁶^Fe^d^.^R^e^g^.⁵⁷^,⁸³³⁽^N^ov^.^16,²⁰⁰¹⁾^.^T^h^e^M.O^.^a^l^s^o^a^ppe^a^r^s^to^pe^r^m^{it the}^de^te^nt^ioⁿ^w^{ithout tr}^ia^{l of}
^pe^r^s^ons^de^te^r^m^ine^d^{to be}^s^ubje^c^t^t^o^it,^b^u^{t t}^h^is^a^u^t^horⁱ^t^y^ha^s^{not be}^eⁿ^inv^o^k^e^{d w}^{ith r}^e^s^p^e^c^t^t^o^aⁿ^y^of^the^de^ta^ine^e^s^.^Se^e
^C^R^S^R^e^por^t^R^L³¹¹^91,^Te^{rrorism an}^{d t}^h^e^Law^of^W^a^{r: Try}ⁱⁿ^g^Te^{rrorists as W}^a^{r Crimi}^nals^be^fore^M^ilitary
^Co^mmissioⁿ^s^,^by^J^e^nnif^e^r^K^.^Els^e^a^.
⁴²^T^h^e^s^e^doc^um^eⁿ^ts^c^aⁿ^be^f^ound^a^t^htt^p^://w^w^w^2.gw^u.e^du/~ns^a^rc^hiv^/^N^S^A^E^BB/^N^S^A^E^{BB127 (la}^s^{t v}ⁱ^sⁱ^t^e^{d Ma}^rc^{h 2}³^,
²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.

the GPW to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. They do not expressly explain the application of the GPW
to the Taliban, whose members would arguably seem to be eligible for POW status as members of ⁴³
the armed forces of Afghanistan under a plain reading of GPW art. 4A(1), but suggest the view
that the four criteria in GPW art. 4A(2) apply to regular armed forces as a matter of customary ⁴⁴
international law. The documents also suggest that Afghanistan, as a “failed state,” did not have
a functional government with sufficient control over the territory and citizenry to enable it to field ⁴⁵
a regular army. It is unclear why, under this view, the conflict with the Taliban would continue ⁴⁶
to qualify as an international war under GPW art. 2 such that art. 4 would remain relevant.
State practice does not appear to support the conclusion that the armed forces of states or
organized rebel forces have been categorically denied eligibility for POW status on the basis that ⁴⁷
the army did not comply completely with the law of war. Indeed, U.S. practice has been to ⁴⁸⁴⁹
accord POW status generously to irregulars, to support such status for irregular forces at times,
and to raise objections whenever an adversary has sought to deny U.S. personnel POW status
based on a general accusation that the U.S. forces were not in compliance with some aspect of the ⁵⁰
law of war. The Administration also asserted that the Geneva Conventions are obsolete when it ⁵¹⁵²
comes to dealing with terrorists, but that it would continue to follow the treaties’ principles.

⁴³^Se^e^Me^m^o^r^a^ndum^f^r^o^m^Of^fⁱ^c^e^o^f^L^e^ga^{l C}^ouns^e^l^t^o^A^l^be^r^t^{o G}^onz^a^l^e^s^R^e^{: Sta}^t^us^of^T^a^libaⁿ^For^c^e^s^U^nde^r^A^r^tic^le^{4 of}
^the^T^h^ir^{d G}^e^ne^v^a^C^onv^eⁿ^tion^of¹⁹⁴^{9 (}^F^e^b^.^7,²⁰⁰²⁾^[^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^“^O^L^C^Mem^o^R^e^{: T}^a^libaⁿ^”^]^{, a}^t^{2 (}^d^is^mⁱ^ss^ing
^disc^ussion^of^T^a^libaⁿ^u^nde^{r G}^P^W^a^r^{t. 4(A}^{)(1) by}^notiⁿ^g^tha^t^“^t^he^T^a^libaⁿ^ha^v^e^de^sc^ribe^d^the^m^se^lve^s^a^s^a^m^ilitia^{, ra}^the^r
^thaⁿ^t^h^e^a^r^m^e^{d f}^o^rc^e^s^of^A^f^g^h^aⁿ^is^ta^n...”^).
⁴⁴^S^{ee i}^d^.^Am^b^a^ssad^o^r-at-Larg^e^f^o^{r W}^a^{r Cri}^m^{es Is}^su^{es P}ⁱ^e^r^r^e^-^R^ic^ha^r^d^P^r^os^pe^r^c^o^nf^ir^m^e^{d this}^vⁱ^e^w
^Iⁿ^r^e^vⁱ^e^w^ing^[^t^he^]^ne^w^c^h^a^lle^ng^e^[^o^f^the^w^a^r^ag^aⁱ^ns^{t te}^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^]^,^w^e^ha^v^e^c^onc^lude^d^tha^t^the^G^e^ne^v^a
^Conv^eⁿ^tio^ns^{do a}^p^ply^{... t}^o^the^T^a^libaⁿ^le^a^d^e^r^s^w^{ho s}^p^oⁿ^s^o^re^{d te}^rr^o^r^is^m^.^{But, a}^c^a^r^e^f^{ul a}ⁿ^a^l^y^s^is
^thr^o^ug^{h t}^h^e^le^ns^of^the^G^e^ne^v^a^C^onv^eⁿ^ti^{on le}^a^d^s^us^t^o^t^h^e^c^onc^l^u^sⁱ^{on t}^h^a^t^t^h^e^T^a^libaⁿ^de^taⁱⁿ^e^e^s^do
^{not m}^e^e^t^the^le^g^a^{l c}^r^ite^ria^unde^r^A^r^tic^le^{4 of}^the^c^onv^eⁿ^tio^{n w}^h^ic^h^w^{ould ha}^v^e^eⁿ^title^{d t}^h^e^m^to
^P^O^W^s^t^a^t^us^{. T}^h^e^y^a^r^e^{not un}^de^r^a^r^e^s^ponsⁱ^b^le^c^o^m^m^a^{nd. T}^h^ey^{do n}^o^{t c}^o^nd^uc^{t the}ⁱ^r^o^p^e^r^a^tionsⁱⁿ
^acco^rd^an^{ce w}ⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e l}^a^w^s^an^d^cu^st^o^m^{s o}^f^w^a^r.^T^h^e^y^d^oⁿ^o^t^h^a^{ve a f}ⁱ^xed^dⁱ^stⁱⁿ^ctⁱ^v^{e si}^gn
^r^e^c^o^gⁿ^iz^a^b^le^f^r^o^m^a^dis^t^aⁿ^c^e^.^A^{nd the}^y^do^not^c^a^r^r^y^theⁱ^r^a^r^m^s^ope^nly^.^T^h^eⁱ^r^c^onduc^{t a}ⁿ^d^his^t^or^y^of
^a^tta^c^k^ing^cⁱ^v^ilia^{n pop}^ula^tio^ns,^dis^r^e^g^a^r^ding^hum^aⁿ^lif^e^a^{nd c}^onv^eⁿ^tⁱ^ona^l^norm^s^{, a}^nd^prom^oting
^ba^r^b^a^r^ic^p^h^ilos^o^p^h^ie^s^r^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ts^fⁱ^r^m^pr^oof^of^theⁱ^r^de^nie^d^s^t^a^t^us^{. B}^u^{t r}^e^g^a^r^d^le^s^s^of^theⁱ^r
ⁱⁿ^hu^m^aⁿⁱ^t^y^,^t^h^ey^t^o^o^h^a^{ve t}^h^{e ri}^gh^t^t^o^b^e^t^r^eat^ed^h^u^m^an^el^y^.
^Se^e^Sta^t^us^aⁿ^{d T}^r^e^a^t^m^e^{nt of}^T^a^libaⁿ^a^{nd a}^l^-^Q^aⁱ^da^D^e^taⁱⁿ^e^e^s^{, r}^e^m^a^r^k^s^of^A^m^ba^s^s^a^dor^P^r^os^pe^r^,^R^e^m^a^r^k^s^a^t^C^h^a^t^ha^m
^H^ous^e^,^L^oⁿ^d^oⁿ^{, U}ⁿ^ite^{d K}ⁱ^ng^dom^{, Fe}^b.²⁰^{, 2}⁰⁰²^,^av^ail^a^b^l^e^at^htt^p^:/^/w^w^w^.s^ta^t^e^.g^ov^/^s^/w^cⁱ^/^r^m^/²⁰^02/⁸⁴^91.^htm⁽^l^a^s^t
^vⁱ^s^ite^{d Ma}^r^c^{h 2}³^,²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.
⁴⁵^Se^e^Me^m^o^ra^ndum^f^r^o^m^A^ssist^aⁿ^{t A}^ttorne^y^G^e^ne^ra^{l J}^a^y^S.^B^y^be^e^{to A}^l^be^{rto G}^onz^a^l^e^s^a^{nd DOD G}^e^ne^ra^{l Cou}ⁿ^se^l
^W^illia^m^{J Ha}^yⁿ^e^s^{II Re}^:^A^pplic^a^tion^of^T^r^e^a^tie^{s a}^{nd L}^a^{ws to a}^l^Qa^e^d^a^a^{nd T}^a^libaⁿ^De^ta^ine^e^s^(Jaⁿ^.²²^,
²⁰⁰²⁾^[h^ereiⁿ^a^f^t^{er “B}^y^b^{ee M}^e^m^o^”^]^.
⁴⁶^Se^e^infr^a^se^c^tion^oⁿ^“^C^ha^ra^c^t^e^r^iz^ing^the^Co^nf^lic^t.”
⁴⁷^Se^e^W^.^H^a^y^s^P^a^rk^s^,^Spe^cⁱ^al^For^c^e^’^s^W^e^ar^{of N}^on-^St^an^dar^d^Uⁿ^if^or^m^s^{, 4}^C^HI^.^J.^I^NT^’^L^L^.^{493, 51}^0-¹¹⁽²⁰⁰³⁾⁽^notiⁿ^g
^dis^a^g^r^e^e^m^e^{nt a}^m^ong^e^x^pe^r^t^s^,^but^fⁱ^nding^m^o^r^e^s^upp^or^{t i}ⁿ^hⁱ^s^t^or^ic^a^l^c^onte^x^{t a}ⁿ^d^tr^e^a^t^y^la^ng^ua^ge^f^o^r^the^vⁱ^e^w^tha^t
^m^e^m^b^e^r^{s of}^re^g^u^la^{r a}^r^m^e^{d f}^o^rc^e^s^a^r^e^eⁿ^title^{d t}^o^pr^ote^c^tio^{n w}^itho^u^t^re^g^a^{rd to G}^e^ne^v^a^c^r^ite^ri^a^unle^{ss c}^a^p^ture^{d a}^s^sp^ie^s).
⁴⁸^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^dⁱ^s^c^us^sⁱ^on^a^b^o^u^t^pr^oc^e^dur^e^s^a^d^o^p^te^d^d^u^rⁱ^ng^Vie^t^na^m^c^onf^lic^t,^infra^f^o^o^t^no^t^e¹⁹⁴^et^seq^.
⁴⁹^Se^e^H^OWA^R^D^S.^L^EV^IE^,^P^RI^S^ONE^R^S^O^F^W^AR^I^N^I^N^T^E^R^NA^T^I^ONA^L^A^RM^E^D^C^ON^F^L^I^C^T^40-⁴¹⁽¹⁹⁷⁹⁾⁽^notiⁿ^g^tha^t^d^u^rⁱ^ng
^WW^{II, the}^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^c^l^aⁱ^m^e^{d the}^P^h^ilip^pi^ne^re^sistaⁿ^c^e^m^ove^m^e^{nt a}^s^aⁿ^a^d^j^unc^t^of^{its ow}^{n a}^r^m^e^{d f}^o^rc^e^s^).
⁵⁰^Se^e^D.^S^C^H^IN^D^LER^&^J.^T^OM^A^N^,^T^HE^L^AW^S^O^F^A^RME^D^C^ON^F^L^I^C^T^563-9²⁽¹⁹⁸^{1) (re}^p^o^rtiⁿ^g^U^.^{S. a}ⁿ^{d a}^llie^s^’^obje^c^tⁱ^ons
^{to C}^o^m^m^unis^t^c^ountrⁱ^e^s^’^r^e^s^e^r^v^a^tⁱ^ons^t^o^G^P^W^,^w^h^ic^{h r}^e^s^u^lte^dⁱⁿ^th^e^f^a^ilur^e^of^U^.^{S. a}ⁱ^r^m^eⁿ^to^qua^lif^y^f^o^r^P^O^W^s^t^a^t^usⁱⁿ
^Ko^{rea an}^d^Vⁱ^etⁿ^a^m^coⁿ^f^lⁱ^c^t^s^oⁿ^t^h^{e b}^a^si^{s t}^h^ey^{were “}^w^{ar cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^s^”^).
⁵¹^Se^e^Ru^m^s^f^e^l^d^P^r^{ess Con}^f^eren^ce,^s^upr^a^f^o^ot^no^t^e¹⁰^.
⁵²^Se^e^P^r^{ess Release,}^{DOD Jo}ⁱⁿ^{t T}^a^{sk F}^o^{rce Brief}ⁱⁿ^g^oⁿ^Detaⁱⁿ^{ee Operatio}ⁿ^s^{at G}^u^an^tán^a^m^o^Ba^y^(F^eb^.¹³^,²⁰⁰⁴^),
^av^ail^able^at^http^://w^ww^.de^f^eⁿ^se^li^nk^.m^il/^traⁿ^sc^ripts/²⁰^04/^tr20⁰⁴⁰²^13-⁰⁴^43.^htm^l^(la^s^{t v}ⁱ^site^{d July}²⁷^{, 20}⁰⁵^).

With respect to Al Qaeda fighters, the Administration stated it would not apply the Geneva
Conventions because Al Qaeda is a criminal organization and not a state party to the Geneva ⁵³
Conventions. However, the Hamdan decision effectively overruled that decision, finding that at
least Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which provides minimum protection during ⁵⁴
non-international conflicts for all captives, applies to Al Qaeda.

The law of war, also known as the law of armed conflict or humanitarian law, is a subset of
international law that has evolved through centuries of efforts to mitigate the harmful effects of
war. Recognizing the impossibility of eliminating warfare all together, nations in essence have
agreed to abide by rules limiting their conduct in war, in return for the enemy’s agreement to ⁵⁵
abide by the same rules. There are two branches of the law of war: The older of the two
branches, known as “Hague law” after the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, prescribes the
rules of engagement during combat and is based on the key principles of military necessity and ⁵⁶
proportionality. The humanitarian side of the law, known as “Geneva law,” emphasizes human
rights and responsibilities, including the humane and just treatment of prisoners.
The legality and proper justification for resorting to war in the first place are a separate legal
regime. A principal distinction exists between the law of conduct during war—jus in bello—and ⁵⁷
international law regulating when going to war is justified—jus ad bellum. Parties to an armed
conflict retain the same rights and obligations without regard to which party initiated hostilities ⁵⁸
and whether that conduct is justifiable under international law. Otherwise, each party would
routinely regard its enemy as unlawfully engaging in war and would thus feel justified in taking ⁵⁹
whatever measures might be seen as necessary to accomplish its defeat.

⁵³^Se^e^P^r^{ess Rel}^ease,^W^hⁱ^t^e^Ho^u^s^e,^S^t^at^u^s^o^f^Det^aⁱⁿ^{ees at}^G^u^an^t^áⁿ^a^mo^(F^eb.^7,²⁰⁰²^),^av^ail^able^at
^http:^//w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ne^w^s^/r^e^l^e^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰^2/^02/²⁰⁰²⁰²^07-¹³^.ht^m^{l (}^l^a^s^{t v}ⁱ^s^ite^{d J}^u^l^y^27,²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.
⁵⁴^T^h^{e 1}⁹⁴⁹^G^eⁿ^e^{va Co}ⁿ^v^en^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^s^h^{are several}^t^y^p^e^{s o}^f^co^mm^oⁿ^p^r^ovi^si^oⁿ^s^.^T^h^{e f}ⁱ^rst^t^h^{ree art}ⁱ^c^l^e^{s o}^f^each^Coⁿ^v^en^tⁱ^oⁿ
^a^r^e^ideⁿ^tic^a^l^{. C}^o^m^m^{on A}^r^tic^le^{3, f}^ootnote²¹^8,ⁱⁿ^f^r^a,^ha^s^be^eⁿ^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^{d a}^s^“^a^c^onv^eⁿ^ti^on^w^{ithin a}^c^onv^eⁿ^ti^on”^t^o
^pr^ov^ide^a^g^e^ne^r^a^{l f}^o^r^m^ula^c^o^v^e^rⁱ^ng^r^e^s^p^e^c^t^f^o^r^intr^insⁱ^c^h^u^m^a^{n v}^a^lue^s^tha^t^w^{ould a}^l^w^a^y^s^be^{in f}^o^r^c^e^,^w^{ithout r}^e^g^a^r^d^to
^t^h^{e ch}^aract^eri^zatⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^{e p}^a^rtⁱ^e^{s t}^o^{a co}ⁿ^f^lⁱ^c^t^mⁱ^gh^t^gi^{ve i}^t^.^Se^e^J^EA^N^P^IC^TET^,^H^UM^A^N^I^T^A^R^I^AN^L^AW^AN^D^T^H^E^P^R^O^TEC^T^I^O^N
^OF^W^AR^V^IC^TIM^S^{32 (}¹⁹⁷⁵⁾^.^O^r^ig^ina^lly^a^c^o^m^p^r^o^mⁱ^se^be^tw^ee^{n thos}^e^w^{ho w}^a^nte^d^{to e}^x^te^{nd t}^h^e^C^onv^eⁿ^tio^n’^s^pr^ote^c^tioⁿ
^{to a}^{ll i}ⁿ^s^u^r^g^eⁿ^ts^aⁿ^{d r}^e^be^ls^aⁿ^{d t}^h^os^e^w^{ho w}^a^nte^d^to^lim^{it it t}^o^w^a^rs^be^tw^e^eⁿ^sta^t^e^s^{, Com}^m^on^A^r^tic^le^{3 is n}^o^w
^c^onside^r^e^d^to^ha^v^e^a^tta^ine^d^the^st^a^t^{us of}^c^u^stom^a^r^y^inte^rna^tiona^{l la}^w^.^Se^e^K^RI^A^N^G^S^AK^K^I^T^T^I^C^HAI^S^A^R^E^E^,^I^NT^E^R^N^A^T^I^ON^AL
^C^RI^MI^N^A^L^L^AW^{188 (}²⁰⁰¹⁾^.
⁵⁵^Se^e^Ma^llisoⁿ^aⁿ^{d Ma}^llis^on,^sup^r^a^f^ootn^o^te^40,^a^t⁴¹⁽ⁿ^oting^t^h^e^la^w^of^w^a^r^is^de^pe^ndeⁿ^t^f^o^r^its^obs^e^r^v^a^nc^e^{on the}
^c^o^m^m^{on inte}^re^{sts of}^pa^rtic^ipaⁿ^ts)^.
⁵⁶^S^ee^P^IC^TE^T^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^no^te⁵⁴^{, a}^t³¹^(de^s^c^r^ibiⁿ^g^the^pr^incⁱ^p^l^e^tha^t^“^b^e^llig^e^r^eⁿ^{ts sha}^{ll n}^o^{t i}ⁿ^f^lic^{t on}^t^h^eⁱ^{r a}^d^v^e^rsa^r^ie^s
^ha^rm^{out of}^pro^por^tio^{n t}^o^the^ob^je^c^t^of^wa^r^f^a^r^e^,^w^h^ic^{h is}^to^de^stroy^{or w}^e^a^k^eⁿ^the^m^ilita^r^y^stre^ng^{th of the}^eⁿ^e^m^y^”^).
⁵⁷^Se^e^D^OCUM^E^N^T^S^{ON T}^H^E^L^AW^S^O^F^W^AR^{1 (}^A^dam^R^obe^r^t^s^a^{nd R}ⁱ^c^h^a^r^{d G}^u^e^l^f^f^{, e}^d^s^.²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁽^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^“^D^OCUM^E^N^T^S^”).
⁵⁸^Se^e^C^I^V^IL^IA^N^S^IN^W^AR^16-¹⁷⁽^Sⁱ^m^{on C}^h^e^s^te^r^m^aⁿ^{, e}^d^{. 2}⁰⁰¹⁾⁽^e^x^p^l^a^ining^tha^t^the^o^rⁱ^e^s^of^“^j^us^{t w}^a^r^”^w^e^r^e^{to be}^k^e^pt
^sep^a^{rate f}^r^o^m^{jus in be}^ll^oⁱⁿ^pa^rt^t^o^m^a^ke^{it e}^a^s^ie^{r to m}^a^inta^{in le}^g^a^{l pa}^rity^be^t^w^e^eⁿ^pa^rtie^{s, hol}^di^ng^bo^{th side}^{s t}^o^sa^m^e
^r^u^le^s^of^c^ond^uc^t)^.
⁵⁹^Se^e^H^IL^A^I^R^E^M^C^C^OUB^R^E^Y^,²^I^NT^E^R^NAT^I^O^N^A^L^H^U^M^AN^I^T^AR^I^A^N^L^AW^{2 (}¹⁹⁹⁸⁾⁽^p^r^e^dic^ting^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^mⁱ^xⁱ^ng^of^{jus in}^be^ll^o
^a^nd^j^u^s^a^d^be^ll^um^“^...w^oul^{d re}^pre^s^eⁿ^{t a}^re^na^is^s^a^nc^e^of^the^v^e^r^y^w^o^rs^{t f}^e^a^t^ure^s^of^m^e^die^v^a^l^‘jus^{t w}^a^r’^the^o^ry^.”^{); A}^L^L^AN
^R^OS^A^S^,^T^HE^L^EG^A^L^S^TA^T^U^S^O^F^P^RI^S^ONE^R^S^O^F^W^AR^37-^{39 (}¹⁹⁷⁶⁾⁽ⁿ^o^ting^c^ontⁱⁿ^uing^r^e^le^v^a^nc^e^of^this^r^u^le^de^s^p^ite
^o^p^p^o^sⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^on^t^h^e^p^a^rt^o^f^S^o^ci^alⁱ^s^t^st^at^es,^w^h^o^ad^vo^cat^ed^d^eⁿ^yⁱⁿ^{g P}^O^W^st^at^u^s^t^o^t^h^o^s^{e accu}^sed^o^f^“cri^m^e^s^agaiⁿ^s^t
^p^eace”).

If the law of war is to have any effect in restraining the conduct of belligerents, there must be ⁶⁰
both inducements for adherence to it and punishment for failure to adhere. One incentive for
parties to adhere to the rules is the promise that their members will receive humane treatment and
some legal privileges at the hands of the enemy if they are captured. Reciprocity serves as a ⁶¹
primary motivator, but is not an absolute requirement for adherence; a derogation from the rules ⁶²
by one party does not excuse breaches by another, although reprisal in proportion may be ⁶³
permissible. Were this not the case, any deviation from the letter of the law could be invoked to
justify wholesale abandonment of the law of war, causing the conflict to degenerate into the kind
of barbarity the law of war aims to mitigate. Reprisals may not be taken against POWs or other ⁶⁴
protected persons.
Some experts argue that in keeping with the purpose of humanitarian law, that is, to protect
civilians and reduce the needless suffering of combatants, humanitarian law should be interpreted
as broadly as possible in favor of individual rights and protections, to include rights of irregular
combatants who comply to the extent possible with the law of war. Under this view, no one falls
completely outside the protection of the Geneva Conventions during an armed conflict. Others
would adhere rigidly to their interpretation of the letter of the law, denying rights to irregular
combatants in order to deter the formation of resistance movements and to avoid legitimizing
their belligerent acts. Proponents of this view argue the treatment of detainees not clearly covered
by the Conventions is entirely at the discretion of the detaining power. However, states dealing
with insurgents and armed resistance groups have typically denied that a state of war exists,
treating rebels as common criminals and trying them in civil court for any belligerent acts.
In order to determine the legal status of the detainees, it is first necessary to determine whether an
armed conflict exists, and if so, whether that conflict is “international” or “non-international.”
The type of armed conflict depends upon the status of the parties to the conflict and the nature of
the hostilities. The status and rights of individuals depend, in turn, on the relationship of those
individuals to the parties to the conflict. It may also become important to determine the temporal
and geographical boundaries of the armed conflict—for the most part, the Geneva Conventions
would not apply to conduct that occurred prior to the onset or after the end of the armed conflict,

⁶⁰^Se^e^Ma^llisoⁿ^aⁿ^{d Ma}^llis^on,^sup^r^a^f^o^o^t^no^t^e⁴⁰^,^at⁴¹^(no^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^t^h^{e cen}^t^r^al^t^echⁿⁱ^q^u^e^f^o^{r en}^f^o^rciⁿ^g^t^h^{e l}^a^w^o^f^w^a^r
^ha^{s be}^eⁿ^a^sy^ste^m^o^f^inte^rre^la^te^{d rig}^h^{ts a}^nd^du^tie^s).
⁶¹^Se^e^P^IC^TE^T^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^no^te⁵⁴^{, a}^t²¹⁽¹⁹⁷⁵⁾^:
^{It is g}^e^ne^ra^lly^a^d^m^itte^{d tha}^t^theⁿ^on-e^x^e^c^u^tion^of^a^tre^a^t^y^b^y^one^p^a^rt^y^m^a^y^ulti^m^a^te^l^y^re^l^e^a^s^e^the
^othe^r^pa^r^t^y^f^r^o^m^its^oblig^a^tio^ns^,^o^r^jus^tif^y^the^a^nnulm^e^{nt of}^the^tr^e^a^t^y^,^lik^e^a^c^ontr^a^c^t^unde^r
^m^unicⁱ^pa^{l la}^w^s^.^T^h^is^{, how}^e^v^e^r^{, w}^oul^{d n}^o^{t a}^pply^{to the}^G^e^ne^v^a^C^oⁿ^v^e^ntions^{: w}^h^a^t^e^v^e^r^the
^ci^rcu^m^st^an^ces,^t^h^ey^re^maiⁿ^valⁱ^d^an^d^{are no}^t^sub^j^ect^t^o^reci^p^r^o^cⁱ^t^y^.^In^d^eed^,^t^h^{e m}ⁱⁿ^d^ab^s^o^l^u^t^e^l^y
^{rejects th}^{e id}^{ea th}^{at a}^b^e^llig^eren^{t s}^h^o^u^ld^,^f^o^{r in}^stan^ce,^d^e^lib^erately^{ill-treat o}^r^k^ill^p^r^isoⁿ^{ers b}^ecau^se
^the^a^d^v^e^rsa^r^y^ha^{s be}^eⁿ^g^u^ilty^of^s^u^c^h^c^r^im^e^s^.
⁶²^{But se}^e^L^EV^I^E^,^s^upr^a^f^o^o^tⁿ^o^t^e⁴⁹^,^at³¹⁽^st^atⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^c^o^mm^en^t^a^t^o^{rs a}^p^p^{ear t}^o^{agree t}^h^at^“f^e^w^st^at^{es ca}ⁿ^act^u^a^l^l^y^b^e
^e^x^pe^c^t^e^d^{to c}^oⁿ^tin^ue^to^a^pply^the^prov^isio^{ns of}^the^[^G^P^W^]ⁱⁿ^the^a^b^se^nc^e^of^re^cⁱ^proc^ity^de^spite^the^pr^ov^ision^{to t}^h^a^t
^e^ffe^c^t^...”^).
⁶³^Se^e^T^HE^H^AN^D^B^O^O^{K O}^F^H^UM^A^N^I^T^A^R^I^AN^L^AW^I^N^A^RM^E^D^C^ON^F^L^I^C^T^S²⁰⁴^(Di^e^t^e^{r F}^l^eck,^ed^.¹⁹⁹⁵⁾⁽^h^ereiⁿ^a^f^t^er
^“H^AN^D^B^O^O^K^”^)(de^f^ining^r^e^pr^is^als^a^s^“^c^o^e^r^cⁱ^ve^m^e^a^s^ur^e^s^w^h^ic^{h w}^{ould n}^o^r^m^a^l^l^y^be^c^ontr^a^r^y^{to inte}^rⁿ^a^tiona^l^la^w^but
^w^h^ic^{h a}^r^e^ta^k^e^{n in re}^ta^lia^tion^by^one^pa^rty^{to a}^c^o^nf^lic^{t in}^or^de^r^t^o^s^t^{op t}^h^e^a^d^v^e^r^s^a^r^y^f^r^o^m^vⁱ^ola^ting^inte^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^ona^l
^la^w^.^”⁾^.
⁶⁴^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t²^06.

nor would it apply to conduct occurring on the territory of a non-party to the conflict. Whether the
territory on which the punishable conduct occurred is considered “occupied” or “partially
occupied” may also be relevant to determining the status of detainees and the law applicable to ⁶⁵
them.
The Geneva Conventions apply in full to “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is ⁶⁶
not recognized by one of them,” or in “any cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of
a High Contracting Party.” Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to internal ⁶⁷
hostilities serious enough to amount to an armed conflict, although the parties are encouraged to
adopt voluntarily the remaining provisions with respect to each other. In the case of sporadic
violence involving unorganized groups and uprisings, the law of war is not implicated, although
the law of basic human rights continues to apply.
The classification of an armed conflict presents few difficulties in the case of a declared war
between two states. Such a conflict would clearly qualify as an international armed conflict to
which the Geneva Conventions would apply in their entirety. Such conflicts have also become
rare. The term “internal armed conflict” generally describes a civil war taking place within the
borders of a state, featuring an organized rebel force capable of controlling at least some territory.
Internal conflicts may be more difficult to classify as such because states frequently deny that a ⁶⁸
series of violent acts amounts to an armed conflict. Classifying a conflict in which a foreign
state intervenes in an internal armed conflict creates an even more complex puzzle. Some
theorists consider an armed conflict to remain internal where a foreign state intervenes on behalf
of a legitimate government to put down an insurgency, whereas foreign intervention on behalf of ⁶⁹
a rebel movement would “internationalize” the armed conflict. Under this view, the war in
Afghanistan was an internal conflict between the Taliban and Northern Alliance troops until U.S. ⁷⁰
forces intervened, at which point the conflict became international. When the Taliban ceded
control of the government, the conflict may have reverted to an internal conflict, because U.S.
forces then became aligned with the government of the state. Others view virtually any hostilities
causing international repercussions to be international for the purposes of the Geneva ⁷¹
Conventions.

⁶⁵^Se^e^G^C^{sec. III;}^{but s}^e^e^W^.^T^.^Ma^llison^&^R.A^.^Ja^bri,^The^J^u^rⁱ^dic^a^l^C^har^ac^te^rⁱ^s^tic^s^{of Be}^lli^ge^r^e^{nt O}^c^c^upat^io^{n a}ⁿ^d^the
^R^e^so^rt^t^o^R^e^si^st^aⁿ^{ce b}^y^t^h^{e Ci}^vi^lⁱ^aⁿ^P^o^pu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^:^Do^ct^riⁿ^a^l^Devel^o^p^m^en^t^an^{d Con}^tⁱⁿ^uⁱ^t^y^{, 42}^G^EO^.^W^AS^H^.^L.^R^EV^{. 185,}
¹⁸⁹⁽¹⁹⁷^{4) (a}^rg^uing^t^h^a^t^t^h^e¹⁹⁴⁹^G^e^ne^v^a^Conv^eⁿ^tions^re^m^o^v^e^{d the}^tra^d^itio^na^{l d}ⁱ^stinc^tⁱ^oⁿ^be^tw^e^eⁿ^“ⁱ^nv^a^s^ion”^aⁿ^d
^“^b^e^llig^e^r^eⁿ^{t oc}^c^upa^ti^on”^a^s^f^a^{r a}^s^the^tre^a^t^m^e^{nt of}^cⁱ^v^ilia^{ns is c}^onc^e^r^ne^d).
⁶⁶^G^P^W^a^r^{t. 2; G}^C^a^r^{t. 2.}
⁶⁷^Se^e^infr^a^p^p^.^39-⁴¹^.
⁶⁸^Se^e^H^AN^D^B^O^O^K^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te⁶³^{, a}^t^23.
⁶⁹^Se^e^J^o^hⁿ^Em^bry^P^a^rk^e^r^s^{on, J}^r^.,^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^C^o^m^p^li^anc^e^wⁱ^t^h^H^u^m^ani^tarⁱ^an^Law^Re^s^p^e^c^ting^Cⁱ^vⁱ^lians^D^u^rⁱⁿ^g
^O^p^e^r^atio^{n J}^u^s^t^C^aus^e^{, 13}³^M^IL^.^L.^R^EV^{. 31,}^41-^{42 (}¹⁹⁹¹⁾⁽^a^pplyⁱⁿ^g^aⁿ^a^l^y^s^is^{to de}^te^r^m^ine^w^h^e^t^he^r^U^.^{S. i}ⁿ^v^a^sⁱ^{on of}
^P^a^na^m^a^on^be^ha^lf^of^Enda^r^a^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt^m^a^de^c^onf^lic^{t “}ⁱ^nte^r^na^tioⁿ^a^l”^f^o^r^the^pur^pos^e^s^of^G^P^W⁾^.
⁷⁰^Se^e^Do^t^h^{e L}^a^w^s^o^f^W^a^r^A^p^p^l^y^t^o^th^{e W}^a^{r o}ⁿ^T^e^rro^r?,^P^u^b^lic^Me^e^ting^of^the^Am^e^r^ic^aⁿ^Socⁱ^e^t^y^o^f^Inte^rna^tio^na^{l L}^a^w^,
^Fe^{b. 1}³^,²⁰⁰²⁽^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^A^S^I^L^Me^e^ting⁾⁽^c^om^m^e^nts^of^P^r^of^{. R}^o^b^e^r^t^G^o^ldm^aⁿ⁾^.
⁷¹^Se^e^Ma^{j. G}^e^off^r^e^y^{S. Corn a}ⁿ^d^Ma^{j. Mic}^h^a^e^l^Sm^idt,^“T^{o Be}^or^N^o^{t t}^o^Be^{, T}^h^a^t^is^t^h^e^Q^u^e^s^tio^n”:^C^onte^m^p^o^r^a^r^y
^M^ilitary^Ope^r^ati^ons^an^{d t}^h^e^St^atu^s^{of Ca}^pt^ure^d^Pe^rsonⁿ^e^l^{, A}^RMY^L^AW^.^Juⁿ^e¹⁹⁹⁹^(citⁱⁿ^{g inte}^rview^w^ith^{DOD la}^w^o^f
^w^a^{r e}^x^p^e^rt^Ha^{yes P}^a^rks,^w^h^o^ad^vo^cat^{es a p}^u^r^el^y^de^fac^t^o^s^t^aⁿ^da^rd,^w^{ithout re}^g^a^{rd to}^p^o^litic^a^l^f^a^c^t^ors⁾^.

According to the official commentary of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),⁷²
the conditions for an international war are satisfied whenever any difference arises leading to the ⁷³
use of armed force between the militaries of two states. Both the United States and Afghanistan
are signatories to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. If the Taliban was, at the onset of the
conflict, the government of Afghanistan and its soldiers were the regular armed forces, it would
appear that the conflict met the Geneva Conventions’ definition of an international armed
conflict. However, only three states ever recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of
Afghanistan. While it is not necessary for the governments of states engaging in hostilities to ⁷⁴
recognize each other, the rules are less clear where virtually no country recognizes a ⁷⁵
government.
Because the use of force by private persons rather than organs of a state has not traditionally ⁷⁶
constituted an “act of war,” it is arguable that refusing to recognize the Taliban as a de facto
government of a state would preclude the United States from prosecuting the September 11
terrorist attacks as “war crimes.” After all, it has been suggested that international terrorism might
be considered to amount to armed conflict for the purposes of the law of war only if a foreign ⁷⁷
government is involved. The level of state support of terrorism required to incur state ⁷⁸
responsibility under international law is a matter of debate. Denying that any state is involved in
the terrorist acts that precipitated the armed conflict could call into question the United States’
treatment of those attacks as violations of the law of war and for treating the global war on
terrorism as an international armed conflict.
Some observers cite additional policy grounds for treating the armed conflict as international. To
treat it as an internal conflict could have implications for U.S. and allied troops. No one would be
entitled to POW status or “protected person” status under the third and fourth Geneva
Conventions, although Common Article 3 would remain in force for all parties. U.S. and coalition
soldiers may be placed at risk of capture in Afghanistan or elsewhere depending on how the
conflict proceeds. The President’s decision to apply the Geneva Conventions to the Taliban but
deny their application to Al Qaeda as a non-party may be an implicit recognition that the armed
conflict is an international one, at least with respect to the Taliban.

⁷²^Se^e^I^N^TER^N^A^TIO^N^A^L^C^O^M^MIT^TEE^O^F^TH^E^R^ED^C^ROS^S^,^C^OM^M^E^N^T^A^R^Y^{ON T}^H^E^G^EN^EV^A^C^ONV^E^N^T^I^ON^S^(J^.^Pⁱ^c^t^e^t^{, e}^d^.,
¹⁹⁶⁰⁾⁽^h^ereiⁿ^a^f^t^{er “ICRC}^C^OM^M^E^NT^A^R^Y^”⁾^.^T^h^e^{ICRC w}^a^s^ins^t^rum^e^nta^lⁱⁿ^dra^f^ting^the^G^e^ne^v^a^Conve^ntio^ns^aⁿ^d
^coⁿ^tⁱⁿ^u^e^{s t}^o^act^{as a “cu}^st^o^dⁱ^an^”^o^fⁱⁿ^t^e^rn^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^hu^m^aⁿⁱ^t^a^ri^an^l^a^w^.
⁷³^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t²³^.
⁷⁴^G^P^W^{art. 4}^A⁽³^).
⁷⁵^Se^e²^L.^O^PPEN^H^E^I^M^,^I^NT^E^R^N^A^T^I^O^NAL^L^AW^{212 n.}^{2 (}^H^.^L^a^ute^r^pa^c^h^{t e}^d^.,⁷^th^ed^.¹⁹⁵²^)(st^a^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^ru^l^e^{s o}^f^war^f^are
^a^pply^{in re}^la^tion^to^sta^t^e^s^not^re^c^o^gⁿ^iz^e^d^by^the^othe^r^be^llig^e^r^eⁿ^{t, a}^{nd t}^h^a^t^w^h^ile^sta^t^e^h^o^{od m}^a^y^be^c^ontr^o^v^e^rsia^{l, “}^[^t^]^he
^f^a^ct^t^h^at^[^a^st^at^e]^h^a^{s b}^een^reco^gni^zed^{as su}^ch^b^y^S^t^at^es—h^o^w^ever^f^e^w^—^o^t^h^e^{r t}^h^an^t^h^e^o^p^p^o^sⁱⁿ^{g b}^e^l^lⁱ^g^eren^t^,^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^es
^st^roⁿ^g^evi^d^en^{ce t}^h^atⁱ^tⁱ^s^{a S}^t^at^{e a}ⁿ^d^t^h^atⁱ^tⁱ^s^en^tⁱ^t^l^e^d^t^o^b^e^t^r^eat^edⁱⁿ^acco^rd^an^{ce w}ⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e r}^u^l^e^{s o}^f^w^a^rf^ar^e”).
⁷⁶^H^AN^D^B^O^O^K^,^s^upr^a^f^ootno^te⁶³^{, a}^t⁴²^.
⁷⁷^Se^e^L^T^.^C^OL^.^R^IC^H^A^R^D^J.^E^RI^CKS^O^N^,^L^EG^IT^IM^A^T^{E U}^S^{E O}^F^M^IL^I^T^A^R^Y^F^ORCE^A^GA^I^N^S^T^S^TA^TE^-S^PO^N^S^O^R^ED
^I^NT^E^R^N^A^T^I^ON^AL^T^E^RRORI^S^M^66-^{67 (}¹⁹⁸⁹⁾⁽^a^r^g^uing^t^h^a^t^s^t^a^t^e^s^p^oⁿ^s^o^r^e^{d or}^s^t^a^t^e^s^u^p^por^te^{d te}^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^or^g^a^niz^a^tions^m^a^y
^ha^v^e^sta^t^{us un}^de^{r inte}^rⁿ^a^tio^na^{l la}^w^,^w^h^ile^te^{rrorist org}^a^niz^a^tio^{ns n}^o^{t re}^c^o^gⁿ^iz^e^d^a^sⁱⁿ^te^rna^tⁱ^ona^{l e}ⁿ^tⁱ^tie^{s m}ⁱ^g^h^{t be}^{st be}
^de^a^{lt w}^{ith a}^s^c^r^im^ina^l^m^a^tte^rs).
⁷⁸^Se^e^G^r^e^g^or^y^{M. T}^r^a^v^a^lio,^Te^{rrorism, Inte}^rna^tio^nal^L^a^w,^aⁿ^d^the^U^s^e^{of M}^ilitary^F^o^rc^e^{, 1}⁸^W^IS^.^I^NT^’^L^L.^J^.^145,¹⁴⁸
⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁽^c^iti^ng^G^e^ne^r^a^l^A^s^s^e^m^b^l^y^R^e^s^o^lutio^ns²¹^{31 t}^h^a^t^s^t^a^t^e^s^ha^v^e^a^“^duty^{to r}^e^f^r^aⁱ^{n f}^r^o^m^or^g^a^nizⁱ^ng^{, ins}^tig^a^ting^,
^a^ssisting^,^{or pa}^rticⁱ^p^a^tingⁱⁿ^a^c^t^s^of^cⁱ^v^{il strif}^e^{or te}^rrori^{st a}^c^t^{s in a}^not^he^{r sta}^t^e^{or a}^c^q^uie^s^cⁱ^ngⁱⁿ^org^a^niz^e^d^a^c^tiv^itie^s
^w^{ithin its}^te^rrit^o^ry^....”^).

It is also possible to view the conflict with the Taliban as separate from the conflict with Al ⁷⁹
Qaeda. Al Qaeda would have to qualify as a belligerent in its own right, however, which most
observers argue it does not. Because an armed conflict can only exist where (at least) two
belligerents are in opposition, the present hostilities between the United States and Al Qaeda ⁸⁰
would not seem to qualify as an armed conflict under international law. The difficulty under this
view is that it may either lend an air of legitimacy to Al Qaeda or cast doubt on the legality of the ⁸¹
United States’ military actions against Al Qaeda.
Another possibility is that the war on terrorism is forging new international law by recognizing or
creating a new form of armed conflict, in which a state is authorized to use armed force against ⁸²
members of a para-military group in self-defense outside its own territory, not only to deflect
immediate attacks but also to initiate attacks against members of the group and their leaders in
order to weaken or eradicate it, at least so long as force is used on the territory of a consenting
government or territory not under the firm control of any national government. Under this view,
the traditional nexus between the rights and the obligations of belligerents appear to be severed,
so that a state may wage a full-fledged war against persons not entitled to participate.
The treatment of all persons who fall into the hands of the enemy during an armed conflict
depends upon the status of the person as determined under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. ⁸³
Parties to an international armed conflict have the right to intern enemy prisoners of war, as well ⁸⁴⁸⁵
as civilians who pose a danger to the security of the state, at least for the duration of hostilities.
The right to detain enemy combatants is not based on the supposition that the prisoner is “guilty”
as an enemy for any crimes against the Detaining Power, either as an individual or as an agent of

⁷⁹^Se^e^A^l^dr^ic^h,^sup^r^a^f^oot^note³⁸^{, a}^t⁸⁹^{3 (}^v^ie^wⁱ^ng^the^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^on^to^tr^e^a^t^the^c^onf^lic^{t w}^{ith A}^l^Q^a^e^d^a^a^s^a^s^e^pa^r^a^te^c^onf^lic^t
^t^o^b^e^c^o^rrect^).^T^h^{e S}^u^p^r^em^{e Co}^u^r^t^ap^p^{ears t}^o^h^a^{ve accep}^t^e^d^t^hⁱ^s^vi^ewⁱⁿ^Ha^md^aⁿ^.
⁸⁰^Se^e^Jo^rd^{an J.}^P^a^u^s^t^,^Aⁿ^tite^rroris^m^M^ilitary^Commissioⁿ^{s: Co}^urtin^{g Ille}^g^a^lity^{, 23}^M^IC^H^.^J.^I^NT^’^L^L.^{1, 8}^n.1⁶
⁽²⁰⁰¹^)(arguⁱⁿ^g^t^h^at^A^l^Qaed^{a d}^o^e^{s n}^o^t^fⁱ^t^t^h^{e cri}^t^e^ri^{a f}^o^{r an}ⁱⁿ^s^u^rgen^cy^);^A^l^d^rⁱ^c^h^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^note^38,^a^t⁸⁹^{4 (}^a^r^g^uing
^tha^t^A^l^Q^a^e^d^a^is^{not c}^a^p^a^b^le^of^be^ing^pa^r^t^y^{to a}^c^onf^lic^{t to w}^h^ic^h^th^e^G^e^ne^v^a^C^onv^eⁿ^tions^or^P^r^otoc^o^l^s^a^pply⁾^.
⁸¹^Se^e^Jo^rd^an^P^a^u^s^t,^The^r^e^is^N^o^N^e^e^d^to^Re^vⁱ^s^e^the^Law^s^{of W}^a^rⁱⁿ^Lⁱ^ght^of^Se^pte^m^be^r¹¹^th^,^Am^eri^can^S^o^ci^et^y^o^f
^Iⁿ^t^e^rⁿ^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^Law^Tas^k^F^o^r^{ce P}^a^per^,^No^v.²⁰⁰²^,^av^ail^able^at^http^://^www^.^a^sil.org^/ta^skf^o^rc^e^/^pa^ust.^pdf^(a^rg^uing^tha^t
^“[^c]oⁿ^t^r^ary^t^o^t^h^{e assert}ⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^P^r^e^sⁱ^d^en^t^B^u^sh^,^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^ed^S^t^at^{es si}^m^p^l^y^co^u^l^d^no^t^b^e^at^w^a^r^wⁱ^t^h^bⁱ^{n L}^a^d^eⁿ^an^d^A^l
^Qaed^{a as su}^ch^,ⁿ^o^{r w}^o^u^l^dⁱ^t^b^eⁱⁿ^t^h^{e o}^v^eral^lⁱⁿ^t^e^rest^o^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es f}^o^{r t}^h^{e st}^at^u^s^o^f^w^a^{r t}^o^ap^p^l^y^merel^y^t^o
^coⁿ^f^lⁱ^c^t^s^b^e^t^w^een^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es an}^d^A^l^Qaed^a”).
⁸²^Se^e^Mic^h^a^e^l^N.^Sc^hm^itt,^Be^llum^Am^e^r^ic^anum^Re^vⁱ^s^ite^d:^U^.^S.^Se^c^u^r^ity^Str^a^te^gy^an^{d t}^h^e^J^u^s^a^d^Be^ll^u^m^{, 17}^{6 M}^IL^.^L.
^R^EV^{. 364,}³^{87 (}²⁰⁰³⁾⁽^“^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^o^na^{l r}^e^a^c^{tion t}^o^t^h^e^a^tta^c^k^s^of^9/11^a^{nd t}^h^e^m^ilita^r^y^re^s^pons^e^the^y^eⁿ^g^e^nde^re^{d c}^o^m^p^le^te
^t^h^{e t}^r^end^t^o^w^a^rd^{s accep}^t^aⁿ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e u}^s^{e o}^f^f^o^{rce agai}ⁿ^s^t^t^e^rro^ri^st^{s as a f}^o^r^m^o^f^sel^f^-d^e^f^en^se.^”^).
⁸³^Se^e^G^P^W^a^r^{t. 21}^:
^T^h^e^De^ta^ining^Pow^e^r^m^a^y^subje^c^t^prisoⁿ^e^r^{s of}^w^a^r^{to inte}^rⁿ^m^e^{nt. I}^t^m^a^yⁱ^m^pos^e^{on t}^h^e^m^the
^oblig^a^tioⁿ^of^{not le}^a^v^ing^,^be^y^ond^c^e^r^ta^{in lim}^its^{, th}^e^c^a^m^p^w^h^e^r^e^the^y^a^r^e^inte^rⁿ^e^d^,^or^if^the^s^a^id
^c^a^m^p^{is f}^e^nc^e^d^{in, of}^no^{t g}^o^ing^o^u^tside^its^pe^ri^m^e^te^r^.^Subje^c^t^t^o^th^e^pr^ov^is^io^ns^of^the^pr^e^s^eⁿ^t
^C^onv^eⁿ^tio^{n r}^e^la^tiv^e^to^pe^na^{l a}^nd^dis^c^ipli^na^r^y^s^a^nc^tions^{, pr}^is^oⁿ^e^r^s^o^f^w^a^r^m^a^y^{not be}^he^{ld i}ⁿ^c^l^os^e
^coⁿ^fⁱⁿ^emen^t^excep^t^w^h^{ere n}^ece^ss^ar^y^t^o^saf^e^gu^ard^t^h^ei^{r h}^eal^t^h^and^t^h^en^on^l^y^d^u^rⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e con}^tⁱⁿ^u^a^tⁱ^oⁿ
^o^f^t^h^{e ci}^rcu^m^st^an^ces^w^hⁱ^c^h^m^a^k^e^su^ch^coⁿ^fⁱⁿ^em^en^tⁿ^ecessar^y^.
⁸⁴^G^C^art^.⁴²^st^at^es:
^T^h^e^inte^rⁿ^m^e^{nt or}^pla^cⁱ^ngⁱⁿ^a^s^sⁱ^gⁿ^e^d^r^e^sⁱ^de^nc^e^of^pr^ote^c^t^e^d^pe^r^s^oⁿ^s^m^a^y^be^or^de^r^e^{d only}^if^the
^secu^ri^t^y^o^f^t^h^{e Det}^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^P^o^w^e^{r make}^{s i}^t^ab^so^l^u^t^e^l^yⁿ^eces^sar^y^.
⁸⁵^Se^e^G^P^W^a^r^{t. 21}^;^P^IC^TET^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^note⁵⁴^{, a}^t⁴⁷^(“^P^r^is^one^{rs w}^{ill be}^re^le^a^s^e^d^a^{nd re}^pa^tria^te^d^a^s^sooⁿ^a^s^the^r^e^a^r^eⁿ^o
^long^e^r^aⁿ^y^re^a^s^{ons f}^o^{r c}^a^p^tiv^it^y^,^tha^t^{is to}^sa^y^,^a^t^the^e^{nd of}^a^c^tiv^e^hostilitie^s.”⁾^.

the opposing state. POWs are detained for security purposes only, to remove those soldiers from ⁸⁶
further participation in combat. The detention is not a form of punishment. The Detaining Power
may punish enemy soldiers and civilians for crimes committed prior to their capture as well as
during captivity, but only after a fair trial in accordance with the relevant convention and other
applicable international law. Failure to accord prisoners a fair trial is a grave breach under article ⁸⁷⁸⁸

130 of GPW and article 146 of GC.

Neutral and non-belligerent signatory countries also have an obligation to intern members of ⁸⁹
belligerent armed forces under the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The neutral country must treat
these prisoners as POWs, except that certain provisions do not apply, including arts. 8, 10 and 126 ⁹⁰
(relating to visits by representatives of the Protecting Power or international organization acting
in that role), 15 and 30 (maintenance and medical care; in this case costs are to be borne by the
belligerent nations), 58-67 (financial resources) and 92 (penal provisions for unsuccessful ⁹¹
escape). There is no express obligation to arrest and detain persons who are not lawful
combatants and are suspected of having participated in hostilities before crossing a border into
neutral territory.
The privileged status of prisoners of war grew from the concept of military necessity.
Declarations of “no quarter” were forbidden because an enemy soldier who had become hors de
combat—incapacitated due to injury, illness, surrender or capture—no longer posed a danger to
combatants. Killing such persons or causing their needless suffering was considered to serve no
valid military purpose, the objective being the incapacitation rather than the annihilation of

⁸⁶^Se^e^P^IC^TE^T^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^no^te⁵⁴^{, a}^t^46.
⁸⁷^G^P^W^art^.¹³⁰^st^at^es:
^G^r^a^v^{e b}^r^each^{es t}^o^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^{e p}^r^ecedⁱⁿ^{g A}^r^tⁱ^c^l^e^rel^a^t^e^{s sh}^al^l^b^e^t^h^o^s^{e i}ⁿ^vo^l^vⁱⁿ^{g an}^y^o^f^t^h^{e f}^o^l^l^o^wⁱⁿ^g
^a^c^t^{s, if}^c^o^m^m^itte^{d a}^g^aⁱ^{nst pe}^{rsons or}^pro^p^e^r^ty^prote^c^t^e^d^by^the^Con^v^e^{ntion: w}^ilf^{ul k}^illing^,^t^o^rtu^r^e^or
^inh^u^m^a^{n tr}^e^a^t^m^e^{nt, inc}^l^u^d^ing^bⁱ^ol^og^ic^a^l^e^x^pe^rⁱ^m^e^nts^,^wⁱ^l^f^ull^y^c^a^u^sⁱ^ng^g^r^e^a^t^s^u^f^f^e^r^ing^or^s^e^rⁱ^ous
^injur^y^{to b}^ody^or^he^a^l^t^h^{, c}^o^m^p^e^lli^ng^a^pr^is^oⁿ^e^r^of^w^a^{r to se}^rv^e^{in th}^e^f^o^rc^e^s^o^f^the^hosti^le^P^o^w^e^{r, or}
^wⁱ^l^f^ull^y^de^pr^iv^ing^a^pr^is^oⁿ^e^r^of^w^a^r^of^the^rⁱ^g^h^ts^of^f^a^{ir a}^{nd re}^g^u^la^r^tria^{l pre}^s^c^r^ibe^d^{in t}^h^is
^C^onv^eⁿ^tio^n.
⁸⁸^G^C^A^r^tic^le^{147 s}^t^a^t^e^s^:
^G^r^a^v^{e b}^r^each^{es t}^o^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^{e p}^r^ecedⁱⁿ^{g A}^r^tⁱ^c^l^e^rel^a^t^e^{s sh}^al^l^b^e^t^h^o^s^{e i}ⁿ^vo^l^vⁱⁿ^{g an}^y^o^f^t^h^{e f}^o^l^l^o^wⁱⁿ^g
^a^c^t^{s, if}^c^o^m^m^itte^{d a}^g^aⁱ^{nst pe}^rsons^or^pro^p^e^r^ty^prote^c^t^e^d^by^the^pre^s^eⁿ^{t Co}^nv^eⁿ^tio^{n: w}^ilf^{ul k}^illing^,
^tor^t^ur^e^orⁱⁿ^h^u^m^a^{n tr}^e^a^t^m^e^{nt, inc}^l^udi^ng^bi^olog^ic^a^l^e^x^pe^rⁱ^m^e^nts^,^w^ilf^ull^y^c^a^u^sⁱ^ng^g^r^e^a^t^s^u^f^f^e^r^ing^or
^s^e^rⁱ^ousⁱⁿ^jur^y^{to b}^ody^or^he^a^lth^{, u}ⁿ^la^w^f^{ul de}^por^ta^tio^{n or}^tr^aⁿ^s^f^e^r^or^unla^w^f^u^{l c}^onf^inem^eⁿ^{t of}^a
^prote^c^t^e^d^pe^rson,^c^o^m^p^e^lling^a^pr^ot^e^c^t^e^d^pe^rsoⁿ^t^o^se^rv^e^{in the}^f^o^rc^e^s^of^a^hostile^Pow^e^{r, or}
^wⁱ^l^f^ull^y^de^pr^iv^ing^a^pr^ote^c^t^e^d^pe^r^s^on^of^the^rⁱ^g^h^ts^of^f^a^ir^a^{nd r}^e^g^u^la^r^tr^ia^{l pr}^e^s^c^r^ibe^dⁱⁿ^the^pr^e^s^eⁿ^t
^C^onv^eⁿ^tio^n,^ta^kⁱ^ng^of^hos^ta^g^e^s^a^{nd e}^x^te^ns^iv^e^de^s^t^r^u^c^tion^aⁿ^d^a^ppr^o^p^rⁱ^a^tio^{n of}^pr^ope^r^t^y^,^not
^ju^stif^ied^b^y^m^ilitar^yⁿ^ecessit^y^an^d^ca^rried^o^u^t^uⁿ^lawf^u^lly^an^d^w^aⁿ^t^oⁿ^l^y^.
⁸⁹^G^P^W^a^r^{t. 4B(2) re}^quire^s^ne^utra^l^c^ountrⁱ^e^s^{to i}ⁿ^te^rn^pe^rs^oⁿ^s^f^a^lling^w^{ithin the}^prov^isⁱ^ons^of^ov^e^r^a^{ll a}^r^{t. 4,}^tha^t^is^{, w}^ho
^w^{ould be}^eⁿ^title^d^to^POW^sta^t^us.^Se^e^L^EV^IE^,^s^upr^a^f^o^o^t^no^t^e⁴⁹^,^at⁶⁹⁽ⁿ^o^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^p^r^ed^ecesso^r^r^u^l^e^durⁱⁿ^{g WWI}^I
^r^e^s^u^lte^{d in}^theⁱⁿ^te^rⁿ^m^e^{nt of}^m^o^r^e^thaⁿ¹⁰^0,⁰⁰⁰^P^O^W^sⁱⁿ^ne^utr^a^{l c}^o^untrⁱ^e^s⁾^.
⁹⁰^T^h^{e P}^r^o^t^ectⁱⁿ^g^P^o^w^e^{r (P}^P⁾ⁱ^s^{a cl}^assi^{c i}ⁿ^t^e^rn^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^-^l^a^w^d^e^vi^{ce b}^y^w^hⁱ^c^h^S^t^at^{es en}^gagiⁿ^gⁱⁿ^armed^coⁿ^f^lⁱ^c^t^sel^ect
^m^u^tua^l^l^y^a^c^c^e^p^ta^ble^ne^utra^l^na^tio^{ns to se}^rv^e^a^s^theⁱ^{r re}^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^{in c}^o^m^m^unic^a^ting^w^{ith the}^othe^{r be}^llig^e^r^eⁿ^{t p}^o^w^e^r.
^Se^e^G^EO^FFR^EY^B^ES^T^,^W^AR^AN^D^L^AW^S^IN^C^E¹⁹⁴⁵³⁷^{1 (}^r^e^prⁱⁿ^te^d²⁰⁰¹⁾^.^Sinc^e¹⁹^50,^h^o^w^e^ve^r^,^PP^s^ha^v^e^be^eⁿ^a^ppoi^nte^d
^{in o}ⁿ^ly^f^{our insta}ⁿ^c^e^s^.^Se^e^id^.^at³⁷²^.^T^h^{e ICRC g}^eⁿ^e^rally^{carries o}^u^{t t}^h^{e resp}^oⁿ^sibⁱ^l^{ities o}^f^th^e^{PP u}ⁿ^d^e^{r t}^h^e
^C^onv^eⁿ^tio^ns^.
⁹¹^Se^e^L^EV^IE^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te⁴⁹^{, a}^t^69.

enemy.⁹² The privilege of being held as a prisoner of war was not extended to brigands, pirates,
looters and pillagers not associated with the uniformed army of any state. Such persons were
considered common criminals acting for personal gain rather than agents of a state, and they ⁹³⁹⁴
could be summarily shot. (Modern rules require a fair criminal trial).
The first codified set of rules for the protection of prisoners of war was General Orders 100 ⁹⁵
(known as the Lieber Code), adopted by the Union Army during the Civil War. It covered “[a]ll
soldiers of whatever species of arms; all men who belong to the rising en masse of the hostile
country; all those who are attached to the army for its efficiency, and promote directly the object
of war...” as well as “citizens who accompany an army for whatever purpose, such as sutlers, ⁹⁶
editors, or reporters of journals, or contractors, if captured ....” It was forbidden to declare that
every member of a legitimate levy en masse—a spontaneous uprising of citizens in opposition to
an armed invasion—would be treated as a bandit, but once the invading army had established ⁹⁷
itself as occupying force, citizens could not lawfully rise up against it.
Later conventions adopted the Lieber Code for international application and clarified the rules, ⁹⁸
generally expanding their coverage and increasing their protections. The United States Army
Field Manual (FM) 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare is the main source for the Army’s modern
interpretation of the law of war, incorporating reference to relevant international conventions and ⁹⁹
rules of the customary law of war, as well as relevant statutes. Army Regulation (AR) 190-8 ¹⁰⁰
prescribes the treatment to be accorded to prisoners based on their status. The U.S. military also
incorporates the law of war into rules of engagement (ROE) prepared for specific combat ¹⁰¹
operations, providing instructions to soldiers on the lawful handling of prisoners.
The authority to detain enemy combatants continues to rest on a theory of agency or allegiance to
the state. Enemy soldiers are presumed to follow the orders of commanders, therefore, if
hostilities cease, soldiers can be expected to cease their fighting and will no longer pose a threat.
There is thus no longer any military need to keep them in captivity under article 21 of GPW.

⁹²^Se^e^D^ONAL^D^A.^W^ELL^S^,^T^HE^L^AW^S^O^F^L^A^ND^W^AR^F^A^R^E^{127 (}¹⁹⁹²⁾^.
⁹³^S^{ee i}^d^.
⁹⁴^Se^e^R^e^g^u^la^tions^R^e^s^p^e^c^tⁱⁿ^g^the^L^a^w^s^a^{nd C}^u^s^t^om^s^of^W^a^r^{on L}^a^{nd a}^r^t.³⁰^{, A}^nne^x^{to t}^h^e^H^a^g^u^e^C^onv^eⁿ^ti^{on N}^o^{. I}^V
^R^e^s^p^e^c^ting^the^L^a^w^s^a^{nd C}^u^s^t^om^s^of^W^a^r^{on L}^a^{nd, O}^c^{t. 1}⁸^,¹⁹⁰⁷^,³⁶^Sta^t^.²²^{77 (}^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^“^H^a^g^{ue R}^e^g^u^la^tions^”⁾^.
⁹⁵^Un^d^e^{r t}^h^{e l}^a^w^s^an^d^cu^st^o^m^{s o}^f^war,^{a ci}^vi^l^w^a^{r i}^s^co^ver^e^d^b^y^t^h^{e sa}^{me ru}^l^e^{s t}^h^at^app^l^y^t^o^w^a^{rs b}^e^t^w^e^eⁿ^st^at^{es i}^f^t^h^e
^c^onf^lic^{t is re}^c^o^gⁿ^iz^e^d^a^s^a^“^b^e^llig^e^r^eⁿ^c^y^.”^Se^e^O^PP^E^N^H^E^I^M^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^note⁷⁵^{, §}⁵⁹^.
⁹⁶^Se^e^W^E^LLS^{, s}^upr^a^f^ootnote⁹²^{, a}^t¹²^7-²⁸^.
⁹⁷^G^e^ne^r^a^{l O}^r^de^r^s^N^o^{. 10}^{0 pa}^r^a^.⁵²^.
⁹⁸^Se^e^P^IC^TET^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te⁵⁴^{, a}^t²⁵⁽ⁿ^oting^T^h^ir^d^G^e^ne^v^a^C^onv^eⁿ^tion^of¹⁹⁴⁹^ha^s¹⁴³^a^r^tic^le^s^plus^a^nne^x^e^s^;
^c^o^m^p^a^r^e^d^w^{ith 97}ⁱⁿ^the^G^e^ne^v^a^C^onv^eⁿ^tioⁿ^of¹⁹²^{9, a}^nd^the^c^h^a^p^te^r^of^the^H^a^g^u^e^R^e^g^u^la^tions^oⁿ^p^r^is^one^r^s^ha^d^oⁿ^ly
^{17 a}^r^tic^le^s⁾^{. G}^P^W^a^r^t.^{4 w}^a^s^inteⁿ^d^e^d^t^o^e^x^pa^nd^the^c^o^v^e^r^a^g^e^of^the^pr^ote^c^tⁱ^on.^Se^e^id^.^a^t¹⁰^0.
⁹⁹^Se^e^FM^27-¹⁰^,^sup^r^a^f^oot^note³⁸^{, pa}^ra^{. 1}^(listi^ng^tre^a^tie^{s pe}^rtineⁿ^t^to^laⁿ^d^w^a^rfa^re^{to w}^h^ic^{h the}^Unit^e^d^Sta^t^e^s^{is a}
^pa^r^t^y⁾^.
¹⁰⁰^D^e^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}^the^A^r^m^y^,^A^R^190-8,^Ene^m^y^P^r^is^oⁿ^e^r^s^of^W^a^{r, Re}^t^a^ine^d^P^e^rs^o^nne^l,^Civ^ilia^{n I}ⁿ^te^rne^e^s^a^{nd O}^t^he^r
^D^e^ta^ine^e^s⁽¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^.
¹⁰¹^Se^e^L^t^{. Col.}^Ma^rc^L^.^W^a^rre^n,^Ope^r^ation^a^l^Law—A^Co^nc^e^p^{t M}^a^t^u^r^e^s^{, 15}^{2 M}^IL^.^L.^R^EV^{. 33, 5}¹^-⁵^{7 (}¹⁹⁹⁶⁾⁽^e^x^p^laⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g
^f^unc^{tion of}^R^O^E)^.

Civilians in occupied territory or the territory of a belligerent may be interned during war if ¹⁰²
necessary for reasons of security. The Fourth Geneva Convention (GC) protects civilians who
fall into the hands of the enemy, providing protections similar to those afforded POWs under the
GPW. Enemy civilians, that is, those civilians with the nationality of the opposing belligerent
state, have the status of “protected person” under the GC, as long as that state is a party to the ¹⁰³
GC. Nationals of a neutral or co-belligerent states within the territory of a belligerent state are
not entitled to the status of “protected persons” as long as the state of which they are nationals has ¹⁰⁴
normal diplomatic representation with the state in whose hands they are. Presumably, these
civilians would be protected through the diplomatic efforts of their home country and would not
be exposed to the same vulnerabilities as are the citizens of the belligerent states themselves.
However, Common Article 3 provides a set of minimum standards for all persons, whether or not ¹⁰⁵
they are “protected persons.” Furthermore, part II of the GC applies universally without regard ¹⁰⁶
to the nationality of the civilians affected.
Civilians who participate in combat, unlike combatants, are not acting on behalf of a higher
authority with whom peace can be negotiated; therefore, they are not immune from punishment
for belligerent acts. Their conduct is dealt with according to the law of the criminal jurisdiction in
which it occurred, which could mean a civil trial or trial by a military tribunal convened by an
occupying power. The GC does not state that civilians who engage in combat thereby lose their
protection under the Convention. They lose their protection as civilians in the sense that they may
become lawful targets for the duration of their participation in combat, but their status as civilians
does not change according to the Convention. Traditionally, such a person might be regarded as
an “unlawful combatant,” at least if caught while committing a hostile act, and may be tried and
punished in accordance with criminal law.
There is no definition or separate status under the Geneva Conventions for “unlawful
belligerents.” However, the law of war has denied the status of privileged combatant to warriors
who conduct violence for private rather than public purposes or who carry out specific ¹⁰⁷
unprivileged acts. There are traditionally two types of unlawful belligerents: combatants who
may be authorized to fight by a legitimate party to a conflict but whose perfidious conduct
disqualifies them from the privileges of a POW, and civilians who are not authorized as
combatants but nevertheless participate in hostilities, but who do not thereby gain combatant
status.

¹⁰²^G^C^a^r^{t. 42 (}^“^T^h^e^inte^rⁿ^m^e^{nt or}^p^l^a^cⁱ^ng^{in a}^s^sⁱ^gⁿ^e^d^r^e^sⁱ^de^nc^e^of^pr^ote^c^t^e^d^pe^r^s^oⁿ^s^m^a^y^be^or^de^r^e^{d o}ⁿ^ly^if^the
^secu^ri^t^y^o^f^t^h^{e Det}^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^P^o^w^e^{r make}^{s i}^t^ab^so^l^u^t^e^l^yⁿ^eces^sar^y^.^”^).
¹⁰³^G^C^a^r^{t. 4. Som}^e^inte^rpre^{t t}^h^{is t}^o^a^c^t^a^s^aⁿ^e^x^c^e^p^{tion to}^pr^ote^c^t^e^d^p^e^{rson sta}^t^{us f}^o^{r a}^lie^{ns w}^ithiⁿ^a^be^llig^e^r^eⁿ^{t sta}^t^e^’^s
^hom^e^te^r^r^itor^y^{, but n}^o^{t t}^o^a^p^ply^{in oc}^c^upie^d^te^r^rⁱ^t^o^r^y^,^w^h^e^r^e^a^{ll pe}^r^s^ons^a^r^e^pr^ote^c^t^e^d^r^e^g^a^r^d^le^s^s^of^na^tiona^li^ty^{, s}^o^long
^a^s^the^y^a^r^e^{not na}^tⁱ^ona^ls^of^the^oc^c^upy^ing^pow^e^r^or^of^a^s^t^a^t^e^{not a}^pa^r^t^y^{to the}^C^o^nv^eⁿ^tio^ns^.
¹⁰⁴^GC^a^r^t^.^4.
¹⁰⁵^Se^e^infr^a^f^ootn^o^te²¹^{8; G}^e^or^g^e^{H. A}^l^dr^ic^h,^T^h^e^Law^s^{of W}^a^r^on^La^nd^{, 94}^A^M^.^J.^I^NT^’^L^L^.^42,^60-^{61 (}²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁽^c^iti^ng
^inte^rna^tⁱ^ona^{l c}^o^{urt c}^a^s^e^s^f^o^{r the}^p^r^op^ositio^{n t}^h^a^t^Com^m^{on A}^r^tic^le³^sta^t^e^s^c^u^stom^a^r^y^inte^rna^tiona^{l la}^w^w^{ith re}^g^a^{rd to}
^inte^rna^tⁱ^ona^{l a}^r^m^e^{d c}^onf^lic^ts).
¹⁰⁶^Se^e^G^C^a^r^{t. 4 (}^s^ta^ting^“^[^t^]^he^pr^ov^is^ions^of^P^a^r^t^I^I^a^r^e^,^h^o^w^e^ve^r^,^wⁱ^d^e^r^{in a}^p^plic^a^tio^{n, a}^s^de^fⁱ^ne^{d i}ⁿ^A^r^tic^le^13”⁾^.
¹⁰⁷^Se^e^Ma^llisoⁿ^aⁿ^{d Ma}^llis^on,^sup^r^a^f^ootn^o^te^40,^a^t⁴²^.

The first type of unlawful belligerents includes spies, saboteurs and mercenaries. These are
persons who act on behalf of a party to the conflict and probably under its orders, but are
nonetheless denied the status of lawful belligerents. They forfeit their entitlement to combat
immunity, and may be tried and punished according to the law then prevailing for civilians. It has
also been suggested that such persons may be detained without trial in a status other than that of
prisoners of war (or civilian internee), but it appears that such detention was considered punitive ¹⁰⁸
rather than preventive in nature.
Spies and Saboteurs. A spy is one who, in disguise or under false pretenses, penetrates behind
enemy lines of a belligerent to obtain information with the intent of communicating that ¹⁰⁹
information to the hostile party. If captured in the act, a spy may be denied POW treatment, ¹¹⁰
tried and possibly executed. However, if a spy rejoins the army of the hostile party as a lawful
combatant, he is no longer subject to punishment for those acts should he later fall into the hands ¹¹¹
of the enemy. Saboteurs, or enemy agents who penetrate into the territory of an adversary ¹¹²
without openly bearing arms in order to perpetrate hostile acts are subject to similar treatment. ¹¹³
If the acts are directed against civilian targets, they will likely be termed acts of terrorism. ¹¹⁴
Saboteurs retain the protection of the GC, and are entitled to a fair and regular trial before ¹¹⁵
punishment may be administered. If spies and saboteurs were to retain their entitlement to
POW status, belligerents could immunize those they send behind enemy lines by making them ¹¹⁶
members of the armed forces, thus eliminating the inherent risk in such conduct.
GC art. 5 addresses the treatment of spies and saboteurs, applying different standards depending
upon whether the suspect is an alien in the territory of a belligerent state or a person in occupied
territory:
^W^h^er^{e, in}^th^{e ter}^r^ito^r^y^o^f^{a P}^a^r^t^y^to^th^{e co}ⁿ^f^{lict, t}^h^{e latter}^{is sati}^sf^ied^t^h^{at an}ⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vⁱ^d^u^al
^p^r^o^t^ected^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^{is d}^e^fⁱⁿ^itel^y^s^u^sp^ected^o^f^o^r^en^g^a^g^e^dⁱⁿ^acti^v^itie^{s h}^o^st^{ile to}^th^e^secu^rⁱ^t^y^o^f
^th^{e State,}^su^c^hⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vⁱ^d^u^{al p}^e^r^s^oⁿ^sh^a^{ll n}^o^{t b}^e^eⁿ^titled^to^clai^m^s^u^c^h^rⁱ^g^h^{ts a}ⁿ^d^p^r^iv^ile^g^e^s
^uⁿ^d^{er t}^h^{e pres}^eⁿ^t^C^onv^en^tⁱ^on^a^s^w^o^u^l^{d, i}^f^e^x^erci^s^e^{d i}ⁿ^t^h^e^f^a^vou^{r of}^su^c^hⁱⁿ^di^vi^du^al^pers^on^,
^{be pre}^j^u^d^{icial to th}^{e s}^ecu^rit^y^of^s^u^ch^State.

¹⁰⁸^S^ee,^e.^g^.^{, W}^I^LLI^A^M^W^IN^T^H^R^O^P^,^M^IL^ITA^R^Y^L^AW^AN^D^P^RE^CE^DE^N^T^S^{783 (2}^{d. e}^d^{. 2}⁰⁰⁰⁾⁽¹⁸⁸^6)(“^Irre^g^u^la^r^a^r^m^e^{d bodie}^s
^{or pe}^rsoⁿ^{s n}^o^{t f}^o^rm^ing^pa^{rt of}^the^org^a^niz^e^d^f^o^rc^e^s^of^a^be^llig^e^r^eⁿ^{t . . . a}^r^e^not^{in g}^e^ne^ra^{l re}^c^o^gⁿ^iz^e^d^a^s^le^g^iti^m^a^te
^troo^{ps or}^eⁿ^title^{d, w}^h^eⁿ^ta^k^e^{n, t}^o^be^tre^a^t^e^d^a^s^prisoⁿ^e^r^{s of}^w^a^r,^b^u^t^ma^{y up}^on^ca^pt^u^r^{e b}^e^s^u^mma^ri^l^y^p^uⁿⁱ^s^h^e^d^even
^w^{ith de}^ath^.”⁾⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d)^.
¹⁰⁹^Se^e^Hagu^{e R}^e^gu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^sup^r^a^f^o^otn^o^te⁹⁴^{, a}^r^t.²⁹^{. T}^h^e^U^.^S.^c^o^dⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^tion^of^th^{is rule}^{is a}^r^tⁱ^c^l^e¹⁰⁶^of^the^UCMJ,
^c^odifⁱ^e^d^a^t¹⁰^U^.^S.C^.^§⁹^04.^Se^e^al^so^FM²⁷^-1^0,^sup^r^a^f^o^o^tⁿ^o^te³⁸^,^a^t^pa^ra^s^.^75-⁷⁸^.
¹¹⁰^Hagu^{e R}^e^gu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^{, s}^u^pr^a^f^oot^no^te^94,^a^r^{t. 3}⁰^.
¹¹¹^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^r^{t. 3}¹^.
¹¹²^Se^e^FM^27-¹⁰^,^sup^r^a^f^o^o^tⁿ^o^t^e³⁸^{, at p}^a^ra.⁸¹^(citⁱⁿ^g^G^C^{III art. 4}⁾^.
¹¹³^Se^e^Han^s^P^e^{ter G}^a^sser,^Pr^ohibiti^{on of}^Te^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^Ac^tsⁱⁿ^Iⁿ^te^rn^atioⁿ^a^{l Hum}^anit^a^riaⁿ^L^a^w^{, 25}³^I^NT^’^L^R^EV^.^R^ED^C^ROS^S
²⁰⁰⁽¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^,^av^ail^able^at^htt^p^://w^ww^.ic^r^c^.^org^.
¹¹⁴^Se^e^FM^27-¹⁰^,^sup^r^a^f^oot^note³⁸^{, a}^t^pa^r^a^.^73.
¹¹⁵^Se^e^G^C^IV^a^r^{t. 5}^;^FM²⁷^-1^0,^su^p^r^a^f^o^o^t^no^t^e³⁸^,^at^p^a^r^a^.²⁴^8.
¹¹⁶^Se^e^L^EV^IE^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te⁴⁹^{, a}^t^{37 (}^not^ing^tha^t^a^pe^r^s^oⁿ^s^u^s^p^e^c^t^e^d^of^be^ing^a^s^p^y^or^s^a^bote^u^r^w^{ho c}^l^aⁱ^m^s^P^O^W
^sta^t^{us is e}ⁿ^title^{d t}^o^a^de^te^rm^ina^tio^{n by}^a^c^o^m^p^e^t^eⁿ^{t tribu}ⁿ^a^l^u^nde^r^G^P^W^a^r^{t. 5).}

^W^h^{ere in occu}^{pied territor}^y^aⁿⁱⁿ^di^vⁱ^du^al^protect^{ed pers}^onⁱ^s^det^aⁱⁿ^{ed as a s}^p^y^{or s}^a^bot^e^u^r,
^o^r^{as a p}^e^r^s^oⁿ^uⁿ^d^er^d^e^fⁱⁿ^{ite s}^u^sp^icioⁿ^o^f^ac^tivⁱ^t^y^h^o^s^{tile to}^t^h^{e sec}^u^rⁱ^t^y^o^f^t^h^{e Occ}^u^p^yⁱⁿ^g
^P^o^w^e^r^,^su^c^h^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^s^h^{all, in}^t^h^o^s^{e cases}^w^h^er^{e ab}^so^lu^te^mⁱ^litar^y^sec^u^rⁱ^t^y^so^r^e^q^u^ir^{es, b}^e
^reg^a^{rded as}^h^a^vⁱⁿ^g^f^o^rf^ei^t^e^{d ri}^g^h^t^s^of^co^m^m^uni^catⁱ^oⁿ^un^{der t}^h^{e pres}^en^t^C^onv^en^tⁱ^on^.
^In^each^cas^{e, s}^u^c^h^pers^on^s^s^h^a^{ll n}^e^v^e^rt^h^e^les^s^{be treated w}^ith^h^u^m^aⁿⁱ^t^y^{, an}^{d in}^cas^{e of}^trial,
^s^h^al^lⁿ^o^t^{be depri}^v^{ed of}^t^h^e^ri^g^h^t^s^{of f}^aⁱ^r^aⁿ^{d regu}^l^a^{r t}^rⁱ^a^l^pres^cri^b^{ed by}^t^h^{e pres}^ent
^C^onv^en^tⁱ^on^{. T}^h^e^y^sh^al^l^al^s^o^{be g}^r^an^t^e^{d t}^h^e^f^u^l^l^ri^gh^t^s^aⁿ^{d pr}ⁱ^vⁱ^l^e^g^e^s^of^{a prot}^ect^{ed pers}^on
^uⁿ^d^{er th}^{e pres}^eⁿ^{t C}^oⁿ^v^eⁿ^tioⁿ^{at th}^{e earlies}^t^{date cons}^is^teⁿ^t^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e s}^e^c^u^rit^y^o^f^t^h^{e State o}^r
^Occu^p^yⁱⁿ^g^P^o^w^e^{r, as}^th^{e cas}^e^m^a^y^be.
Mercenaries. Mercenaries are persons who are not members of the armed forces of a party to the ¹¹⁷
conflict but participate in combat for personal gain. They may be authorized, or at least
encouraged to fight by a party to the conflict, but their allegiance to the authorizing party is ¹¹⁸
conditioned on payment rather than obedience and loyalty. It is seen as questionable whether
mercenaries can serve as valid agents of a party to the conflict, or are, rather, mere “contract
killers,” especially considering they could just as easily switch sides to accept a better offer; may
be operating in pursuit of different objectives from those of the party to the conflict; and may
have an incentive for keeping the conflict live. In that sense, they are theoretically similar to ¹¹⁹
brigands, looters, and bounty hunters, who may take advantage of hostilities to conduct
unlawful looting for their own enrichment without regard for military necessity or the law of

¹¹⁷^Se^e^P^r^ot^oc^{ol A}^ddi^tio^na^{l t}^o^the^G^e^ne^v^a^C^onv^eⁿ^tions^of^{12 A}^u^g^u^s^t¹⁹⁴^{9, a}^{nd R}^e^la^ti^ng^to^the^P^r^ote^c^tⁱ^on^of^Vic^tim^s^of
^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tio^na^{l A}^r^m^e^{d C}^onf^lic^ts⁽^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^“^P^r^o^toc^o^{l I}^”⁾^,^J^une^8,¹⁹^77,^re^printe^dⁱⁿ¹⁶^I^.^L^.^{M. 13}^91.
^A^r^{t. 47 de}^fⁱ^ne^s^m^e^r^c^eⁿ^a^r^y^a^s^f^o^llow^s^:
^{2. A}^m^e^r^c^eⁿ^a^r^y^is^aⁿ^y^pe^r^s^{on w}^ho:
^{(a) Is sp}^eci^al^l^y^recruⁱ^t^e^d^l^o^cal^l^y^o^r^ab^ro^adⁱⁿ^orde^r^{to f}ⁱ^g^h^{t i}ⁿ^aⁿ^a^r^m^e^{d c}^onf^lic^t;
^{(b) Doe}^s^{, i}ⁿ^f^a^c^t^{, ta}^k^e^a^dire^c^t^pa^{rt in t}^h^e^h^o^stili^tie^s;
^(c^{) Is m}^o^tiv^a^t^e^d^{to ta}^k^e^pa^{rt in t}^h^e^hosti^litie^{s e}^sse^ntia^lly^b^y^the^de^sire^f^o^{r priv}^a^t^e^g^a^{in a}^{nd, i}ⁿ
^f^a^c^t^{, is}^pr^om^is^e^d^{, by}^or^oⁿ^be^ha^lf^of^a^P^a^rty^{to the}^c^o^nf^lic^{t, m}^a^te^ria^l^c^o^m^p^eⁿ^sa^tion
^s^ubs^ta^ntia^lly^{in e}^x^c^e^s^s^of^tha^t^pr^o^m^ise^d^or^paⁱ^d^t^o^c^o^m^b^a^t^aⁿ^ts^of^sⁱ^m^ila^r^r^a^nks^a^{nd f}^unc^tio^nsⁱⁿ
^t^h^{e arm}^e^d^f^o^{rces o}^f^t^h^at^P^a^rt^y^;
⁽^d⁾^I^s^ne^it^he^r^a^na^ti^ona^l^of^a^P^a^r^t^y^{to t}^h^e^c^onf^lic^{t n}^o^r^a^r^e^sⁱ^de^{nt of}^te^r^r^itor^y^c^ontr^o^lle^{d by}^a
^P^a^rty^{to the}^c^onf^lic^t;
^{(e) Is n}^o^t^{a m}^e^m^b^{er o}^f^t^h^{e armed}^f^o^{rces o}^f^{a P}^a^rt^y^t^o^t^h^{e con}^f^lⁱ^c^t^;^an^d
⁽^f⁾^H^a^s^{not be}^eⁿ^s^e^nt^by^a^Sta^t^e^w^h^ic^{h is}^not^a^P^a^r^t^y^{to the}^c^o^nf^lic^{t on}^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^duty^as^a
^me^m^b^{er o}^fⁱ^t^s^ar^m^e^d^f^o^rc^es.
¹¹⁸^Se^e^Lⁱ^e^u^te^na^{nt C}^o^m^m^a^nde^r^G^r^egor^y^P^.^N^o^one^,^The^Hⁱ^s^t^or^y^a^{nd Ev}^oluti^oⁿ^of^the^Law^{of W}^a^r^Prⁱ^o^r^t^o^W^o^r^l^{d W}^a^r^II,
⁴⁷^N^A^VAL^L.^R^EV^.^176,¹^{87 (}²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁽^r^e^c^ount^ing^or^igⁱⁿ^of^pr^ohi^biti^on^{on m}^e^r^c^eⁿ^a^r^ie^s^af^te^r^the^Midd^le^A^g^e^s⁾^.
¹¹⁹^T^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^ha^s^tr^a^d^iti^ona^ll^y^r^e^g^a^r^d^e^d^the^us^e^of^bo^unty^hu^nt^e^r^s^a^{nd pr}^iv^a^t^e^a^s^s^a^s^sⁱ^ns^a^s^unc^iv^iliz^e^d^{. T}^h^e¹⁹¹⁴
^Ru^l^e^{s o}^f^L^aⁿ^d^W^a^r^f^{are st}^at^ed^:
^Cⁱ^v^iliz^e^d^na^tio^ns^l^ook^w^{ith h}^o^r^r^o^r^up^on^r^e^w^a^r^d^s^f^o^r^the^a^s^s^a^s^sⁱ^na^tio^{n of}^eⁿ^e^m^ie^s^,^the^pe^r^p^e^t^r^a^tor^of
^su^ch^an^act^h^a^{s n}^o^cl^ai^m^t^o^b^e^t^r^eat^ed^{as a co}^m^b^at^an^t^,^b^u^t^sh^ou^l^d^{be t}^r^eat^ed^{as a cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^.^S^o^,^t^o^o^,
^the^pr^oc^la^im^ing^of^aⁿ^indivⁱ^d^u^a^l^b^e^long^ing^to^the^hos^tⁱ^l^e^army^,^o^r^{a ci}^tⁱ^zen^o^r^sub^j^ect^o^f^t^h^e^h^o^s^tⁱ^l^e
^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt, a}ⁿ^o^u^t-^la^w^,^w^{ho m}^a^y^be^s^l^aⁱ^{n w}^{ithout tr}^ia^l^by^a^c^a^p^tor^.^T^h^e^a^r^tic^le^inc^l^u^d^e^s^not^oⁿ^ly
^a^s^s^a^ults^upo^{n i}^ndivⁱ^dua^ls^,^but^a^s^w^e^{ll a}ⁿ^y^of^f^e^r^f^o^r^aⁿ^indivⁱ^d^u^a^l^“^d^e^a^d^or^a^liv^e^.^”
^Se^e^R^UL^E^S^OF^L^AND^W^AR^F^A^R^E^par^a^{. 17}^{9 (}^U^.S^{. W}^a^r^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt 19}¹⁷⁾^.

war.¹²⁰ However, merely having a nationality other than that of the party on whose side a soldier ¹²¹
fights does not automatically make that soldier a mercenary.
It has been suggested that non-Afghan members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda might be ¹²²
mercenaries and disqualified from POW privileges on that basis. Based on press reports and
Pentagon statements about the detainees, there is little to suggest that their motives stem from
personal material gain rather than a belief that they are serving a higher power. It appears to be
generally recognized that the fighters do not believe themselves to be serving Afghanistan as a
country but are serving either the Taliban or Al Qaeda, perhaps both, for ideological reasons. The
United States has made it clear that it is not fighting against the Afghan people, but instead
considers the Taliban and Al Qaeda to be the enemies. Since both groups are considered to be
parties to the conflict and their conduct serves as justification for the United States’ combat
operations in Afghanistan, the label of mercenary does not appear appropriate for the groups as a
whole, although some of the individual fighters may prove to be mercenaries.
The second category of unlawful belligerents consists of civilians who carry out belligerent acts
that might well be conducted lawfully by combatants with proper authorization of the state. They
act on their own, albeit perhaps for patriotic or ideological reasons. Because they do not answer to
any higher command, they are not valid agents of a party to the conflict and cannot always be
expected to lay down their arms when hostilities between parties cease. Civilians who engage in
combat lose their protected status and may become lawful targets for so long as they continue to
fight. They do not enjoy immunity under the law of war for their violent conduct and can be tried
and punished under civil law for their belligerent acts. They may also be interned without trial ¹²³
under GC art. 5, but they do not lose their protected status as civilians under the GC. Civilians
who owe loyalty to the detaining power might also find themselves charged with treason or
aiding the enemy.
It would seem that the Taliban and Al Qaeda do not exactly fit the second definition of unlawful
combatants, either. Again, it appears they are considered to be parties to the conflict who may
lawfully be treated as military targets whether or not they are directly participating in the
immediate hostilities. If every Taliban or Al Qaeda fighter is considered a civilian participating in
an armed conflict without authorization who can be tried for ordinary acts of combat, then the
question might be asked whether an armed conflict exists at all, there being no apparent ¹²⁴
legitimate force opposing the United States.

¹²⁰^Se^e^M^C^C^OUB^RE^Y^,^s^upr^a^f^o^o^t^no^t^e⁵⁹^,^at¹⁴^{5 (}ⁿ^o^tⁱⁿ^{g th}^{e “d}ⁱ^s^tu^r^bⁱⁿ^{g” r}^o^le^of^m^e^r^c^eⁿ^a^r^ie^{s in the}^c^o^nf^lic^{t in A}ⁿ^g^o^la^a^s
^“^c^ontra^c^t^k^ille^rs”⁾^.
¹²¹^S^{ee i}^d^.⁽ⁿ^o^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^no^t^al^l^f^o^rei^{gners i}ⁿ^servi^{ce o}^f^ar^med^f^o^{rces o}^f^o^t^h^e^{r co}^un^t^rⁱ^e^{s sho}^u^l^d^b^e^t^r^eat^ed^{as “mercen}^ari^e^s,^”
^{as so}^me^m^a^y^s^e^rve^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e ap}^p^r^oval^o^f^t^h^ei^{r h}^o^m^{e go}^vern^m^eⁿ^t^{s o}^r^f^o^r^m^o^ral^o^rⁱ^d^eo^l^o^gi^cal^reasoⁿ^s^);^L^EV^IE^,^s^upr^a
^f^ootnote⁴⁹^{, a}^t⁷⁵⁽^d^e^s^c^r^ibing^eⁿ^tⁱ^tle^m^e^{nt to}^P^O^W^sta^t^us^of^na^tiona^l^s^of^ne^utra^{l sta}^t^e^s^{or sta}^t^e^s^a^llie^d^w^{ith e}ⁿ^e^m^y^sta^t^e
^a^s^we^ll-se^ttle^{d, w}^h^ile^sta^t^{us of}^indⁱ^vⁱ^dua^{l w}^{ho is a}^na^tio^na^l^of^c^a^p^tu^ring^sta^t^e^{or its a}^l^lⁱ^e^s^{is sub}^j^e^c^t^to^dispu^t^e⁾^.
¹²²^Se^e^Jo^sep^h^S^a^m^u^els,^Unc^onv^eⁿ^ti^ona^{l Priso}ⁿ^e^r^s^{, G}^LO^B^E^&^M^AI^L⁽^T^or^onto)^{, J}^a^n.²⁴^{, 2}⁰⁰²^{, a}^t^A²¹⁽^opi^ning^t^h^a^t^U^.^S.
^tr^e^a^t^m^e^{nt of}^de^ta^ine^e^s^is^c^ons^is^te^{nt w}^{ith G}^e^ne^v^a^P^r^otoc^ols⁾^.
¹²³^Se^e^FM^27-¹⁰^,^sup^r^a^f^oot^note³⁸^{, a}^t^pa^r^a²⁴⁷⁽^t^h^o^s^e^pr^ote^c^t^e^d^by^G^C^a^l^s^o^inc^l^ude^a^ll^pe^r^s^ons^w^ho^ha^v^e^eⁿ^g^a^ge^{d in}
^hostile^{or be}^llig^e^r^eⁿ^t^c^oⁿ^duc^{t bu}^{t w}^ho^a^r^e^not^eⁿ^title^{d to tre}^a^t^m^e^nt^a^s^prisone^rs^of^wa^{r). Ce}^rtaⁱ^{n c}ⁱ^v^ilia^{ns w}^{ho a}^r^e
^s^u^s^p^e^c^t^e^d^of^eⁿ^g^a^gⁱ^ng^{in h}^o^s^tile^c^ond^uc^{t a}^r^e^“ⁿ^o^t^eⁿ^ti^tle^{d t}^o^c^l^aⁱ^m^s^u^c^h^rig^h^ts^a^nd^priv^ile^g^e^s^unde^{r G}^C^a^s^w^{ould, if}
^exerci^s^e^dⁱⁿ^f^a^vo^{r o}^f^su^chⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vi^du^al^p^e^rson^,^b^e^p^r^ej^udⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^t^o^t^h^{e secu}^ri^t^y^o^f^su^ch^S^t^at^e.^”^Id^.^a^t^pa^r^a^.²⁴^8.
¹²⁴^Se^e^dis^c^us^sⁱ^oⁿ^{on “}^C^ha^r^a^c^t^e^r^iz^ing^the^C^onf^lic^t,”^sup^r^a^.

Some argue there is a third category of unlawful belligerents, comprised of all members of
organized groups of irregular fighters that do not, as a whole, meet the criteria to be treated as ¹²⁵
prisoners of war. These groups typically employ unorthodox guerrilla tactics emphasizing ¹²⁶¹²⁷
stealth and surprise, and have received somewhat uneven treatment at the hands of states. In
some conflicts, irregulars who could not prove their affiliation to an official military were ¹²⁸
summarily shot as franc-tireurs. The lack of international consensus with regard to the
treatment of insurgents and partisans contributed to the international impetus to codify the law of
war, but has not been resolved and remains a source of contention among states parties to the ¹²⁹
resulting treaties. Guerrilla tactics do not appear to be in and of themselves violative of ¹³⁰
international law. It could be argued that conventional style warfare conducted by irregular
soldiers is no worse. Under this view, members of irregular armies who carry out ordinarily
lawful belligerent acts, or who have not personally carried out any hostile acts, while not
necessarily entitled to POW privileges, would not be punishable as unlawful combatants. Like
POWs, they would be subject to internment at the hands of the state without necessarily being
charged with a crime. Their detention would be based on membership in the irregular army rather
than citizenship and suspicion of criminal activity.
The issue remains: what set of rules applies to them? Some argue that, in the very least, Common
Article 3 applies as well as other international human rights law. Others argue that neither
peacetime civil law nor the law of war applies, essentially leaving them outside the law
altogether.
Assuming the existence of an international armed conflict prior to the accession of the new
government, both the United States and Afghanistan, as signatories to the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949, were bound to grant POW status to enemy combatants who qualified under
GPW article 4. Captured members of the armed forces, including militias and volunteer corps
serving as part of the armed forces, were entitled to be treated as POWs. Members of other
volunteer corps, militias, and organized resistence forces belonging to a party to the conflict were
entitled to POW status only if the organization met the four criteria in GPW article 4A(2). The ¹³¹
regular armed forces of a state, even if it is a government or “authority” not recognized by the

¹²⁵^Se^e^A^T^R^E^A^T^I^S^E^{ON T}^H^E^J^U^R^ID^IC^A^L^B^AS^I^S^O^F^T^H^E^D^I^S^T^I^NCT^I^ON^B^ETW^E^E^N^L^AW^F^U^L^C^OM^BAT^A^NT^A^ND^U^N^P^R^I^V^I^LEG^ED
^B^E^LLIG^E^R^E^N^T^{7 (}^U^{.S. A}^r^m^y^J^udge^A^d^v^o^c^a^t^e^G^e^ne^r^a^l’^s^Sc^hool¹⁹⁵⁹⁾⁽^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^“^T^REATI^S^E^”⁾⁽^notiⁿ^g^the^G^e^ne^v^a
^Conv^eⁿ^tio^ns^do^not^sta^t^e^tha^t^fⁱ^g^h^te^{rs w}^{ho do}^not^pa^{ss the}^f^our^pa^rt^te^{st of}^a^r^tic^le^{4 a}^r^e^ille^g^a^{l c}^o^m^b^a^t^aⁿ^{ts, a}ⁿ^d^tha^t
^t^h^eref^o^r^e,ⁱ^f^t^h^e^y^{are t}^o^b^e^so^con^sⁱ^d^ered^,ⁱ^tⁱ^s^on^l^y^b^ecau^{se o}^f^cu^st^o^m^ar^yⁱⁿ^t^e^rn^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^l^a^w⁾^.
¹²⁶^Se^e^Ma^llisoⁿ^aⁿ^{d Ma}^llis^on,^sup^r^a^f^ootn^o^te^40,^a^t⁴²^.
¹²⁷^Se^e^ge^ne^r^a^lly^T^RE^AT^I^S^E^,^s^upr^a^f^o^o^t^no^t^e¹²^5,^at¹¹^-⁴²⁽^d^escrⁱ^bⁱⁿ^{g var}^yⁱⁿ^{g t}^r^eat^m^eⁿ^t^gi^venⁱ^r^r^e^gu^l^a^r^s^at^t^h^{e h}^a^nd^{s o}^f
^dⁱ^f^f^eren^t^st^at^es,^an^d^even^b^y^t^h^{e sa}^m^e^st^at^{e d}^u^rⁱⁿ^{g d}ⁱ^f^f^e^ren^t^p^h^a^{ses o}^f^{a co}ⁿ^f^lⁱ^c^t⁾^.
¹²⁸^S^{ee i}^d^.^at⁴⁴^(ci^tⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e exam}^p^l^e^o^f^t^h^{e F}^r^an^co^-^P^r^u^ssi^an^W^a^{r as i}^m^p^e^t^u^{s f}^o^{r ad}^van^cemen^t^sⁱⁿ^t^h^{e l}^a^{w o}^f^w^a^{r al}^l^o^wⁱⁿ^g
^irre^g^u^la^{r f}ⁱ^g^h^te^{rs to qua}^lif^y^a^s^be^llig^e^r^eⁿ^ts).
¹²⁹^Se^e^Ba^x^t^e^r^,^s^upr^a^f^o^ot^no^t^e³⁹^,^a^t³²⁷^(a^rg^uing^t^h^e¹⁹⁴⁹^G^e^ne^v^a^Co^nv^eⁿ^tio^{ns de}^stroy^e^{d w}^h^a^t^little^c^e^r^ta^inty^ha^d
^e^x^iste^{d in the}^la^w^re^g^a^rding^sta^t^{us of}^irre^g^u^la^rs).
¹³⁰^S^{ee i}^d^.^at³³⁷⁽ⁿ^otⁱⁿ^g^dⁱ^stⁱⁿ^ctⁱ^oⁿ^b^e^t^w^een^t^h^o^s^{e f}ⁱ^gh^tⁱⁿ^{g f}^o^{r p}^rⁱ^v^at^{e gai}ⁿ^an^d^t^h^o^s^{e f}ⁱ^gh^tⁱⁿ^{g b}^ecau^{se of}^g^eⁿ^uⁱⁿ^e
^al^l^e^gi^an^{ce t}^o^{a cau}^se).
¹³¹^G^P^W^{art. 4}^A⁽¹^).

opposing party,¹³² need not necessarily satisfy the four criteria in order for their members to be
entitled to POW status under the GPW art. 4A(2). However, members of regular armed forces ¹³³
may be denied POW rights if they are caught as spies or saboteurs behind enemy lines. Under
this view, Taliban soldiers captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan were at least presumptively
lawful combatants entitled to POW status.
Al Qaeda was not claimed as the armed forces of Afghanistan; therefore, its members would have
been entitled to POW status only if it “formed part of” the armed forces of Afghanistan, it
“belonged to” the Taliban and met the four criteria in GPW art. 4A(2), or it were considered “an
authority” not recognized by the United States but nevertheless a party to the conflict. If the
Taliban were not the armed forces of Afghanistan, it would seem that such a determination would
have rendered the conflict non-international from the outset, in which case GPW art. 4 was
entirely irrelevant. However, if the conflict is considered to have been international
notwithstanding the status of the Taliban, then presumably the following analysis would have
applied to the Taliban as well.
The GPW provides little guidance for making the determination whether an armed militia or
volunteer group “forms part of” the regular army of a party to a conflict for the purposes of article

4A(1). The determination may be made in accordance with the national laws of the state party to ¹³⁴

the conflict. The language may have been included in order to ensure that members of the ¹³⁵
United States National Guard, for example, are protected. However, in the case of states with
less developed military organizations, including newly emerging states or new governments, the
determination may not be as clear. If some Al Qaeda combat units were officially incorporated ¹³⁶
into the Taliban army, members of those units could argue that they are entitled to POW status.
Even if Al Qaeda was never part of the armed forces of Afghanistan, its members could qualify as
POWs if Al Qaeda “belonged to” a party to the conflict and it met the criteria under GPW art.
4A(2). Presumably, “belonging to” a party would be a less exacting standard than “forming part
of”its armed forces. It may be that informal and even temporary cooperation between the militia
or volunteer group and regular troops suffices to bring militia members under the protection of ¹³⁷
combatant status. The inclusion of the phrase “organized resistance groups” complicates the

¹³²^G^P^W^{art. 4}^A⁽³^).
¹³³^Se^e^L^EV^IE^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te⁴⁹^{, a}^t^36-^{37 (e}^x^p^laⁱⁿ^ing^t^h^a^t^a^sol^d^ie^{r w}^e^a^r^ing^cⁱ^v^ilia^{n c}^l^othe^{s c}^a^p^t^u^re^{d i}ⁿ^eⁿ^e^m^y^t^e^rritory
^eⁿ^g^a^g^e^{d in sa}^bota^g^e^{or e}^s^pi^ona^g^e^{is no}^m^o^re^eⁿ^title^{d t}^o^P^O^W^tre^a^t^m^e^{nt tha}ⁿ^a^cⁱ^v^iliaⁿⁱⁿ^the^sa^m^e^si^tua^tio^{n, le}^{st sta}^t^e^s
ⁱⁿ^co^rpo^r^at^{e sab}^o^t^e^u^{rs an}^{d sp}ⁱ^e^{s i}ⁿ^t^o^t^h^ei^{r arm}^e^d^f^o^rce^s^t^oⁱ^m^m^uⁿⁱ^{ze t}^h^em^f^o^{r vi}^o^l^atⁱ^oⁿ^s^o^f^t^h^{e l}^a^w^o^f^w^a^r).
¹³⁴^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t³⁶⁽ⁿ^otiⁿ^g^,^h^o^w^e^ve^r^,^th^a^t^s^t^a^t^e^s^m^a^y^{not us}^e^d^o^m^e^s^tic^legis^l^a^tion^to^br^ing^othe^r^w^is^e^unla^w^f^u^{l c}^o^m^b^a^t^aⁿ^ts
^unde^r^the^pr^ote^c^tⁱ^{on of}^the^G^P^W⁾^.
¹³⁵^Se^e^L^EV^IE^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te⁴⁹^{, a}^t^38.
¹³⁶^Se^e^Do^u^g^{las Cassel,}^C^a^s^e^by^C^a^s^e^:^W^{hat D}^e^fine^s^{a PO}^W^?^{, C}^HI^.^T^RI^B^{., Fe}^{b. 3,}²⁰⁰²⁽ⁿ^otiⁿ^g^tha^t^a^t^l^e^a^s^{t one}^A^l
^Qa^e^d^a^ba^tta^lion^{is re}^por^te^dly^inc^o^rpora^t^e^d^int^o^t^h^e^T^a^lib^aⁿ^a^r^m^e^{d forc}^e^s^{, possi}^bly^eⁿ^titling^th^ose^sol^d^ie^{rs to}^P^O^W
^s^t^a^t^us^up^on^c^a^p^tur^e⁾^.
¹³⁷^Se^e^Ma^llisoⁿ^aⁿ^{d Ma}^llis^on,^sup^r^a^f^ootn^o^te^40,^a^t⁵²⁽^s^ug^g^e^s^ting^“^b^e^l^ongⁱⁿ^g^”^e^l^em^eⁿ^{t c}^ould^be^s^a^tis^fⁱ^e^d^by^m^e^r^e^de
^fac^t^o^re^la^ti^onshⁱ^p^be^tw^e^eⁿ^the^irr^e^g^u^la^{r unit a}^{nd a}^sta^t^e⁾^.

interpretation. The phrase was apparently included to address resistance movements of the type ¹³⁸
that sprang up in many occupied territories during World War II. If a militia is fighting on
behalf of a government-in-exile, the question arises as to whether that government is still a party ¹³⁹
to the conflict to which a resistance group might validly belong.
If no party to an international armed conflict claims a partisan group or authorizes it to engage in
combat, there may be insufficient proof that the group is covered. An Israeli court confronted the
question when members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP) sought to
overturn criminal convictions for acts they committed in the West Bank by claiming POW ¹⁴⁰
status. The court upheld the civil convictions, holding that since no government with which
Israel was then at war claimed responsibility for the actions of the PLFP, its members were not
entitled to be treated as POWs. Because the occupied territory of the West Bank previously
belonged to Jordan, a signatory of the GPW, the PLFP could only belong to “a party” if it
belonged to Jordan. Since the group was illegal in Jordan, the court reasoned its members were ¹⁴¹
not protected as POWs.
On the other hand, governments are not always willing to acknowledge their support of irregular
armed groups, meaning a partisan group may have to establish a de facto relationship through ¹⁴²
other means. United States officials have argued that the Taliban and Al Qaeda are intimately ¹⁴³
connected. That connection is arguably what makes the Taliban responsible for the terrorist acts
of Al Qaeda, and thus subject to military action. For that reason, it may be counterproductive for
United States officials to take the position that Al Qaeda never “belonged to” the Taliban for the
purposes of applying GPW art. 4.
The four criteria in GPW art. 4A(2) appear to have been at the center of the debate about the
POW status of detainees. The main issue is whether the four criteria apply only to irregulars, as
the text and structure of the treaty suggests, or whether they form a part of customary

¹³⁸^Se^e^Cassel,^s^upr^a^f^o^ot^no^t^e¹³⁶^,^a^t⁴⁰^n.¹⁵^{1 (}^d^isting^uⁱ^shiⁿ^g^re^sistaⁿ^c^e^m^o^v^e^m^e^{nt in i}ⁿ^te^rna^tⁱ^ona^{l c}^oⁿ^f^lic^t^f^r^om^re^be^l
^g^r^oupsⁱⁿ^cⁱ^v^{il w}^a^r^s^f^o^r^the^pur^p^o^s^e^of^a^r^tic^le⁴⁾^.
¹³⁹^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t⁴¹⁽^c^oⁿ^c^l^u^d^ing^t^h^a^tⁱⁿ^dⁱ^g^e^nous^g^r^ou^ps^r^e^sⁱ^s^tingⁱⁿ^v^a^ding^f^o^r^c^e^s^a^r^e^like^l^y^m^e^aⁿ^{t to}^be^c^o^v^e^r^e^{d, bu}^t
^re^c^o^gⁿ^iz^ing^a^m^big^u^it^y^w^{ith re}^spe^c^t^{to g}^r^o^{ups su}^pp^orti^ng^theⁱⁿ^v^a^di^ng^a^r^m^y^).
¹⁴⁰^Milita^ry^P^r^ose^c^u^t^o^{r v}^.^Ka^sse^m^,^{47 I.L}^.^{R. 4}⁷⁰⁽¹⁹⁷^{1) (e}^x^c^e^r^{pts re}^pr^inte^{d i}ⁿ^D^OCUM^E^N^T^S^ON^P^RI^S^ONERS^O^F^W^AR^,
^doc^um^eⁿ^{t no}^{. 1}⁶⁰⁽^U^.S.^N^a^v^a^{l Wa}^r^C^o^lle^g^e¹⁹⁷⁹⁾⁽^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^“^P^O^W^D^OCUM^E^N^T^S^”).
¹⁴¹^{But se}^e^Ma^llis^{on a}^nd^Ma^llisoⁿ^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te⁴⁰^{, a}^t^71-⁷²⁽^a^r^g^ui^ng^s^t^a^t^us^of^P^F^L^P^u^nde^r^J^o^r^d^aⁿ^ia^{n la}^w^w^a^s^not
^r^e^le^v^a^{nt to the}^que^s^tⁱ^on^of^w^h^e^t^her^{it “}^b^e^l^oⁿ^g^e^{d t}^o^”^a^pa^r^t^y⁾^.
¹⁴²^Se^e^L^EV^IE^,^s^upr^a^f^o^o^t^no^t^e⁴⁹^,^at⁴²^(ci^tⁱⁿ^g^G^P^W^co^mm^en^t^a^r^y^su^g^g^estⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^su^pp^l^y^o^f^ar^m^s^mⁱ^gh^t^b^e^evi^d^en^{ce o}^f
^r^e^la^tions^hi^p)^.
¹⁴³^Se^e^P^r^e^{ss Conf}^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^,^De^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}^De^f^e^nse^,^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^Ru^m^s^f^e^l^d^Me^dia^A^v^a^ila^bility^eⁿ^route^t^o^Ca^m^p^X^-^Ra^y^,
^J^a^{n. 2}⁷^,²⁰⁰^2,^av^ai^la^ble^at^htt^p^://^www^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^traⁿ^sc^ripts/²⁰⁰^2/^t01²⁸²⁰⁰²^_^t0¹²^7sd²^.h^tm^{l (la}^s^{t v}ⁱ^site^{d July}^27,
²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.
^Wⁱ^t^h^resp^ect^t^o^t^h^{e T}^a^lⁱ^b^an^,^t^h^{e T}^a^lⁱ^b^an^al^so^dⁱ^d^no^t^w^{ear u}ⁿⁱ^f^o^rm^s^,^t^h^ey^dⁱ^dⁿ^o^t^h^a^{ve i}ⁿ^si^gnⁱ^a^,^t^h^ey
^did^no^{t c}^a^r^r^y^theⁱ^r^w^e^a^pons^o^p^eⁿ^l^y^{, a}^{nd the}^y^w^e^r^e^tie^{d tig}^htly^a^t^th^e^w^a^is^{t to A}^l^Q^a^e^d^a^.^T^h^ey
^be^ha^v^e^{d lik}^e^the^m^{, the}^y^w^o^r^k^e^d^w^{ith the}^m^{, they}^f^unc^tione^{d w}^{ith t}^h^e^m^{, they}^c^oope^r^a^te^{d w}^ith
^re^s^p^e^c^t^{to c}^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^,^the^y^coope^ra^te^d^w^{ith re}^s^p^e^c^t^{to s}^u^p^p^lie^s^a^{nd a}^m^m^unitio^{n, a}ⁿ^{d t}^h^e^r^e
^is^n’^{t a}ⁿ^y^que^s^tio^{n i}ⁿ^m^y^mⁱ^nd—^I^’^m^{not a}^la^w^y^e^r^{, but t}^h^e^r^e^is^n’^{t a}ⁿ^y^que^s^{tion in}^m^y^mⁱ^{nd but}^tha^t
^the^y^a^r^e^{not, the}^y^w^ould^not^rⁱ^s^e^t^o^the^s^t^a^nda^r^d^of^a^pr^is^oⁿ^e^r^of^w^a^r^.

international law and apply to all combatants.¹⁴⁴ Unfortunately, there is not much legal precedent ¹⁴⁵
that can aid in interpreting and applying the criteria.
The four criteria have their roots in the earliest expressions of the laws of war, beginning with the ¹⁴⁶
Brussels Declaration and continuing nearly unchanged in the Hague Convention Respecting the ¹⁴⁷
Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907, and are repeated in the GPW. However, this may
be more a reflection of nations’ inability to agree on a better formula than an indication of the ¹⁴⁸
solidity of their foundation. The criteria may reflect the customs of war as they existed among
the European countries who signed the original treaties, but were not viewed at the time as ¹⁴⁹
universal. The criteria originated as a compromise between states with strong standing armies ¹⁵⁰
and weaker states whose defense might depend on armed citizens. The only real effect of the
enumeration of the criteria at the Hague Convention was to prohibit ill treatment of those who do ¹⁵¹
not meet them.
Historically, the most important consideration given to POW status has been whether there is ¹⁵²
evidence that they serve a government or political entity that exercises authority over them. For
example, the United States practice as early as 1900, during the Philippine Insurrection following
the Spanish-American War, was to accord prisoner of war status to members of the insurgent
army recognized by the Philippine government who complied “in general” with the four

¹⁴⁴^Se^e^L^EV^IE^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te⁴⁹^{, a}^t^36-^{37 (}^c^om^m^e^nting^tha^t^the^la^c^k^of^c^r^ite^rⁱ^a^unde^r^a^r^tic^le^4A⁽¹⁾^“^d^o^e^s^{not m}^e^aⁿ^tha^t
^m^e^re^m^e^m^b^e^r^{ship in}^the^re^g^u^la^{r a}^r^m^e^{d f}^o^rc^e^s^w^{ill a}^u^tom^a^ti^c^a^l^l^y^eⁿ^title^aⁿⁱ^ndivⁱ^dua^{l w}^{ho is c}^a^p^ture^d^to^[P^OW^]^sta^t^us
^if^his^c^ond^uc^{t pr}^ior^{to a}^{nd a}^t^the^ti^m^e^of^c^a^p^tur^e^ha^v^e^{not m}^e^{t the}^s^e^r^e^quir^e^m^e^nts^.^”⁾^{. H}^o^w^e^v^e^r^,^the^e^x^am^ple^s^he^lis^ts
^ha^v^e^{to d}^o^w^{ith in}^divⁱ^d^u^a^l^s^p^ie^s^a^{nd s}^a^b^o^te^urs^,^tha^t^is^,ⁱⁿ^divⁱ^d^u^a^l^s^o^ldie^rs^w^{ho p}^o^s^e^a^s^cⁱ^v^ilia^ns^{to c}^o^nduc^t^h^o^s^tile
^a^c^tiv^itie^{s be}^hind^eⁿ^e^m^y^line^s^{. It is a}^r^g^u^a^b^ly^a^diffe^re^{nt m}^a^tte^{r to a}^p^ply^the^sta^nda^{rds t}^o^re^g^u^la^{r a}^r^mⁱ^e^s^a^s^a^w^hole^.
¹⁴⁵^Se^e^T^REAT^I^S^E^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te¹²⁵^{, a}^t^86-^{87 (}^p^r^e^dic^tⁱⁿ^g^na^ti^ons^w^ould^be^uⁿ^lik^e^l^y^{to a}^dop^{t de}^fⁱ^niti^on^s^tha^t^mⁱ^g^h^t
^f^o^recl^o^s^e^f^u^t^u^{re op}^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^andⁿ^o^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^p^rⁱ^o^r^p^r^actⁱ^{ce w}^a^{s rel}^a^tⁱ^ve^l^y^u^s^el^es^{s as p}^r^eced^en^t^,^coⁿ^sⁱ^s^tⁱⁿ^g^o^f^{a “co}^l^l^ectⁱ^oⁿ^o^f
^v^a^r^y^ing^a^{nd c}^onf^lic^ting^po^lic^y^decⁱ^sⁱ^ons^m^a^de^{on a}ⁿ^a^d^h^o^c^ba^sⁱ^s^”⁾^.
¹⁴⁶^Se^e^L^EV^IE^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te⁴⁹^{, a}^t^{44 (}^not^ing^tha^t^D^e^c^l^a^r^a^tion^of^B^r^us^s^e^ls^{, ba}^s^e^{d la}^r^g^e^l^y^{on the}^Lⁱ^e^b^e^r^C^ode^,^ne^v^e^r
^en^t^e^redⁱⁿ^t^o^f^o^{rce b}^u^t^served^{as a so}^u^r^{ce f}^o^{r l}^a^t^e^{r co}ⁿ^v^en^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^).
¹⁴⁷^H^a^g^u^e^C^onv^eⁿ^tio^{n N}^o^{. I}^V^R^e^s^p^e^c^ting^the^L^a^w^s^a^{nd C}^u^s^t^om^s^of^Wa^r^{on L}^a^nd,^O^c^{t. 1}⁸^,¹⁹⁰⁷^{, 3}⁶^Sta^t^{. 22}⁷⁷^{, 2}⁰⁵
^C^ons^ol^{. T}^.^S.²⁷^{7. A}^r^tic^le^{1 s}^t^a^t^e^s^:
^T^h^e^la^w^s^{, rig}^h^{ts, a}^nd^dut^ie^{s of}^w^a^{r a}^pply^not^only^{to a}^r^mⁱ^e^s^{, but a}^l^s^o^to^m^ilitia^a^{nd v}^o^l^unte^e^r^c^o^r^p^s,
^f^u^lf^illing^the^f^o^llowⁱ^ng^c^onditi^ons^:
^T^o^be^c^o^m^m^a^nde^{d by}^a^pe^r^s^{on r}^e^s^ponsⁱ^b^le^f^o^r^his^s^u^b^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^t^e^s^;
^T^o^h^a^{ve a f}ⁱ^xed^dⁱ^stⁱⁿ^ctⁱ^v^{e em}^b^l^e^m^re^co^gnⁱ^zab^l^e^at^{a d}ⁱ^st^an^ce;
^T^o^c^a^r^r^y^a^r^m^s^ope^nly^;^a^nd
^T^o^coⁿ^d^u^c^t^t^h^ei^r^op^eratⁱ^oⁿ^sⁱⁿ^acco^rd^an^{ce w}ⁱ^t^h^t^h^e^l^a^w^s^an^d^cu^st^o^m^{s o}^f^war.
^{In c}^o^uⁿ^trie^{s w}^h^e^r^e^m^ilitia^{or v}^o^lu^nte^e^r^c^o^{rps c}^o^nstit^ute^the^a^r^m^y^{, or f}^o^r^m^pa^{rt of}^{it, t}^h^e^y^a^r^e
^inc^l^u^d^e^d^u^nde^r^the^de^nom^ina^tio^{n “}^a^r^m^y^.”
¹⁴⁸^Se^e^T^REAT^I^S^E^,^s^upr^a^f^o^o^t^no^t^e¹²⁵^,^at⁴⁸^(at^t^rⁱ^b^u^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e rel}^u^ct^an^ce^t^o^ado^p^t^an^y^ch^an^{ge i}ⁿ^t^h^{e cri}^t^e^ri^{a t}^o^t^h^e
^se^nsitiv^ity^o^f^the^subje^c^t^).
¹⁴⁹^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t⁹⁵⁽^p^oi^nting^out^tha^t^th^e^r^e^a^s^ons^f^o^r^de^fⁱ^ning^ir^r^e^g^u^la^r^s^a^s^s^u^c^h^a^r^e^the^pr^o^duc^t^of^“^w^e^s^te^rⁿ^mⁱ^nds^,”^a^nd
^t^h^at^t^h^{e “gu}^l^f^b^e^t^w^een^t^h^{e o}^cci^d^eⁿ^t^al^an^{d o}^rⁱ^eⁿ^t^al^con^cep^t^o^f^w^a^{r i}^s^vast^”).
¹⁵⁰^Se^e^id.^at⁷⁽ⁿ^otⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^t^h^{e “f}^o^u^r^cri^t^e^ri^a,^b^eⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^e^p^r^od^u^c^t^o^f^{a co}^m^p^ro^mⁱ^{se o}^f^vi^o^l^en^t^l^y^coⁿ^f^lⁱ^c^tⁱⁿ^{g i}ⁿ^t^e^rest^s,^are
^v^a^g^u^e^a^{nd ope}ⁿ^{to v}^a^ry^ing^inte^rpr^e^ta^tions”⁾^.
¹⁵¹^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t⁵²⁽ⁿ^otiⁿ^g^tha^t^t^h^e^Ha^g^u^e^Conv^eⁿ^ti^on^di^d^{not e}ⁿ^a^c^t^aⁿ^y^ne^w^positiv^e^la^w^,^{but o}ⁿ^ly^a^tte^m^p^te^{d to}^c^odif^y^the
^e^x^isting^rule^{s a}^nd^pro^h^ibi^t^c^e^r^taⁱⁿ^a^c^t^s).
¹⁵²^Se^e^ge^ne^r^a^lly^,^L^e^{ster Nu}^rich^an^d^Ro^g^e^{r W}^.^Barret,^Le^gality^{of G}^u^e^r^r^{illa F}^o^r^c^e^s^unde^r^t^h^e^Laws^of^W^a^r^{, 40}^A^M^.^J.
^I^NT^’^L^L^{563 (}¹⁹⁴⁶⁾⁽^s^ur^v^e^yⁱ^ng^histor^y^of^a^r^m^e^{d c}^onf^lic^{t f}^r^o^m¹⁸⁴⁷^thr^o^ug^{h t}^h^e^Se^c^oⁿ^d^W^o^r^l^d^W^a^r⁾^.

conditions.¹⁵³ Members of guerrilla bands not part of the regular forces were punished severely
for acts of violence. A similar policy was adopted by the British during the South African War,
although the first inclination was to declare that, inasmuch as the newly annexed Orange River ¹⁵⁴
Colony was British territory, inhabitants who took up arms were to be treated as rebels. Foreign
jurists and some prominent British statesman objected to the policy as a “monstrous proclamation ¹⁵⁵
... absolutely opposed to the first principles of international law and history.” A new
proclamation was issued to declare that only those inhabitants who had not been a continuous part
of the fighting would be treated as rebels. British forces punished as “marauders” those who
carried out acts of hostility who did not belong to “an organized body authorized by a recognized ¹⁵⁶
Gove rnme nt.”
On the other hand, toward the end of the Mexican War, in 1847, United States forces changed
from a more tolerant policy toward irregulars to one of utmost severity. By that time, warfare by
bands of guerrillas sanctioned by the late Mexican government had become the primary means of
resistance. Once the war degenerated to the point where the guerrillas more resembled murderers
and highway robbers than soldiers, the U.S. Secretary of War directed General Winfield Scott to ¹⁵⁷
adopt a policy of less forbearance than had hitherto been observed. In 1870, during the Franco-
Prussian War, the German commanders refused to treat any irregular fighters as lawful ¹⁵⁸
combatants, even those who possessed papers proving their affiliation with the government. In
1914, when the German army invaded Belgium, it refused to recognize the citizen defense of yet
unoccupied territories as a valid “people’s war” qualifying for belligerent status because the
Belgian government did not adequately organize the forces and failed to supply the civilian ¹⁵⁹
fighters with proper distinguishing emblems.
It was a fundamental part of the law of war that only combatants authorized to fight on behalf of a
state party to a conflict were allowed to participate in the hostilities. It has never been permitted ¹⁶⁰
to wage war against civilians. Civilians could become lawful military objectives only if and for
so long as they took up arms against a belligerent. The four criteria are meant to ensure that only
persons authorized to fight on behalf of a higher authority who is responsible for their conduct
will participate, excluding civilians as both combatants and targets.
Supporters of granting POW status to Taliban soldiers have argued that the text of the
Conventions should be read literally. That the four criteria are listed only under the sub-paragraph
for volunteer groups and militias not forming part of the regular army of a state indicates that
there is no similar test for those whose status as members of a state military force is not in doubt.
Others, however, have argued that regular soldiers must already meet those criteria under

¹⁵³^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t⁵^{76 (}^d^e^s^c^r^ibiⁿ^g^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^sta^t^e^m^eⁿ^{ts a}^s^w^e^{ll a}^s^pra^c^tic^e^w^{ith re}^g^a^{rd to}^dif^f^e^re^{nt t}^y^pe^{s of}^g^u^e^r^rilla^s).
¹⁵⁴^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t⁵^78.
¹⁵⁵^S^{ee i}^d^.^(c^iting^sta^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t by}^Ja^m^e^{s Bry}^c^e^{in the}^Ho^use^of^Com^m^ons).
¹⁵⁶^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t⁵^79.
¹⁵⁷^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t⁵^70-^71.
¹⁵⁸^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t⁵^73.
¹⁵⁹^Se^e^E^LLER^Y^C.^S^TO^W^A^{LL A}^N^D^H^EN^RY^F.^M^UNRO^,²^I^NT^E^R^N^A^T^I^ON^AL^C^AS^E^S^122-^{23 (}¹⁹¹⁶⁾⁽^c^it^ing^m^e^m^o^rⁱ^a^l^p^ubl^is^he^d
^by^G^e^r^m^aⁿ^Fore^ig^{n Of}^fⁱ^c^e^{on Ma}^y^{10, 19}^15).^T^h^e^r^e^w^e^r^e^re^por^{ts o}^f^G^e^r^m^aⁿ^soldie^{rs i}^ndisc^rimⁱ^na^te^ly^k^illing^Be^lg^iaⁿ
^cⁱ^v^ilia^ns^a^f^te^{r c}^l^aⁱ^mⁱ^ng^the^s^o^ldie^rs^w^e^r^e^fⁱ^re^{d upon}^.^Id^a^t¹^19.^Re^p^o^rte^d^ly^{, by}^the^G^e^r^m^aⁿ^a^c^c^{ount, a}^{ll Be}^lg^ia^{n c}^itiz^eⁿ^s
^h^a^d^b^{een “cal}^l^e^d^ou^t^,^{” even}^t^h^o^s^{e i}ⁿ^t^e^rri^t^o^ri^{es o}^ccupⁱ^ed^b^y^G^e^r^m^an^f^o^rces,^an^d^w^e^re^m^u^rd^eriⁿ^{g Ger}^m^an^so^l^dⁱ^e^{rs af}^t^e^r
^pr^e^t^e^ndi^ng^to^be^f^r^ie^ndly^.^Id^.^a^t¹^20.
¹⁶⁰^Se^e^W^IN^T^H^R^O^P^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^note¹^{08, a}^t⁷^78.

customary international law, and the drafters of the GPW felt it would be superfluous to list the
criteria with regard to regular armies. Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Convention could be read to
apply the four criteria to all military forces. However, inasmuch as that article states that not only
the rights, but the laws and duties of war as well, apply only to the parties it lists, such an
interpretation could lead to the conclusion that regular armies could evade their obligations under
the law of war simply by not fulfilling the four conditions.
According to U.S. military doctrine, the responsible command element is fulfilled if:
^th^{e co}^m^m^aⁿ^d^{er of}^th^{e corps}^is^{a com}^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^{ed of}^{ficer of}^th^e^ar^m^e^{d f}^o^rces^{or is}^{a pers}^on^of
^p^o^s^itioⁿ^an^d^au^t^h^o^r^it^y^o^rⁱ^f^th^e^m^e^m^b^er^{s o}^f^th^e^mⁱ^l^{itia o}^r^v^o^l^uⁿ^t^eer^co^r^p^{s ar}^{e p}^r^o^v^id^ed^w^ith
^docum^ent^s^{, badg}^es^{, or ot}^h^e^r^m^eans^ofⁱ^d^en^tⁱ^fⁱ^catioⁿ^to^sh^o^w^th^a^t^th^e^y^ar^{e o}^f^fⁱ^cer^s,
ⁿ^oⁿ^c^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^ed^of^fⁱ^cer^s^,^{or s}^o^ldiers^s^o^th^at^th^ere^m^a^y^{be n}^o^d^o^u^b^t^t^h^a^t^t^h^ey^a^r^eⁿ^o^t^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^s
^acting^on^th^{eir o}^w^{n res}^ponsⁱ^b^ilit^y^.^S^t^{ate recogn}^ition^,^h^o^wev^e^{r, is}ⁿ^o^{t es}^s^eⁿ^{tial, a}ⁿ^{d an}¹⁶¹
^org^aⁿⁱ^zatⁱ^oⁿ^m^a^y^{be f}^o^r^m^{ed spon}^t^aⁿ^e^ous^l^y^aⁿ^{d el}^ectⁱ^t^s^o^wⁿ^offⁱ^cers^.
The key to the first element is that the subject is acting on behalf of and on the command of a
higher authority. The Secretary of Defense has suggested that the Taliban never fulfilled this
requirement because “they were not organized in military units, as such, with identifiable chains ¹⁶²
of command; indeed, Al Qaeda forces made up portions of their forces.” However, in response
to a reporter who asked whether it was not clear that the Taliban were operating as a cohesive
unit, pointing to previous reports that the U.S. military had successfully attacked “command and
control” elements, Secretary Rumsfeld responded that while such a case could be made for the
first (command) element, it would be difficult to argue the Taliban ever met all four criteria,
suggesting that the first element may not be critical to the determination.
A possible drawback to setting a high standard of conventional military organization to determine
whether the Taliban or Al Qaeda ever met the “responsible command” element is that it could
contradict the justification for targeting them at all. If it had been the case that the Taliban had
insufficient command and control of its forces to distinguish its forces from a lawless mob, it
would have been unlikely that those forces could have posed a significant threat, especially
outside of Afghanistan.
According to FM 27-10, the requirement for a “fixed distinctive sign” is satisfied:
^b^y^t^h^e^w^earⁱⁿ^g^o^f^mⁱ^litar^y^uⁿⁱ^f^o^r^m^{, b}^u^{t les}^s^th^aⁿ^th^{e co}^m^p^lete^uⁿⁱ^f^o^r^m^w^{ill s}^u^f^f^{ice. A}^h^e^l^m^et
^{or h}^eaddres^s^w^hⁱ^c^h^w^o^u^l^d^m^a^{ke t}^h^{e s}ⁱ^l^h^o^u^et^t^e^of^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^di^vⁱ^dual^readi^l^y^di^s^tⁱⁿ^g^uⁱ^s^h^a^b^l^e^f^r^om
^th^{at o}^f^an^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^r^y^ci^v^iliaⁿ^w^o^u^l^d^satis^f^y^t^hⁱ^s^r^e^q^u^ir^e^m^eⁿ^{t. I}^t^{is also}^d^e^sir^a^b^l^{e th}^{at th}^e
ⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vⁱ^d^u^al^m^e^m^b^er^o^f^t^h^e^m^ili^{tia o}^r^v^o^luⁿ^t^eer^corps^w^{ear a badg}^{e or bras}^s^a^{rd perm}^aⁿ^en^t^l^y
^af^fix^e^{d to h}ⁱ^s^clothⁱ^ng^{. It is}ⁿ^o^{t n}^eces^s^a^r^y^{to i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^th^{e e}ⁿ^e^m^y^of^t^h^{e dis}^tⁱⁿ^cti^v^{e s}ⁱ^gn^,¹⁶³
^al^t^h^oughⁱ^t^m^a^y^{be des}ⁱ^rabl^{e t}^o^{do s}^oⁱⁿ^or^{der t}^o^av^oi^{d m}ⁱ^sun^d^ers^t^an^diⁿ^g^.

¹⁶¹^FM^27-^10,^s^upr^a^f^oot^note^38,^pa^r^a^{. 64a}^.
¹⁶²^Se^e^Ru^m^s^f^e^l^d^P^r^{ess Con}^f^eren^ce,^s^upr^a^f^o^ot^no^t^e¹⁰^.
¹⁶³^FM^27-^10,^s^upr^a^f^oot^note^38,^a^t^pa^r^a^{. 64}^b.

The GPW does not clarify what is meant by “fixed” or by “distinctive,” despite the fact that the ¹⁶⁴
same language gave rise to disputes as it was interpreted in earlier treaties. Presumably, the
requirement for a sign to be “fixed” was meant to prevent fighters from removing them easily, but
it is unlikely the requirement was meant to remain in force even when no military operations were ¹⁶⁵
ongoing. Similarly, there is nothing to explain how great a distance must be before the
distinction need no longer be discernible. Methods of locating and of camouflaging military
targets, including soldiers, make it questionable whether the standards are the same today as they
were when the original Conventions were drafted, if such standards ever existed.
The purpose for requiring combatants to distinguish themselves from civilians is to protect
civilians from being targeted. Combatants who are unable to distinguish enemy combatants from
civilians might resort to firing upon all human beings in the area of operations. There may be
other reasons for enforcing the obligation to identify oneself as a combatant that serve tactical
purposes rather than purely humanitarian ends. Requiring irregulars to display a mark aids the
opposing army in targeting them and also impedes the irregulars’ ability to effect a surprise ¹⁶⁶
attack. The use of different uniforms to distinguish the forces also helps leaders identify their ¹⁶⁷
own troops during combat, and to distinguish friendly from enemy soldiers. It has also been
suggested that the requirement to wear a uniform is a remnant of long outdated forms of warfare, ¹⁶⁸
in which closely ranked armies opposed each other across open fields. Modern army uniforms
are designed to make the wearer difficult to distinguish from the surrounding foliage from any
distance. It has been pointed out that the requirement for irregulars is not more stringent than the ¹⁶⁹
standard set by regular armies.
Although the lack of uniform can be detrimental to a soldier who falls into the hands of the ¹⁷⁰
enemy, it has not been the case historically that all fighters lacking a uniform or some other ¹⁷¹
identifying mark have been denied prisoner status. According to FM 27-10, the lack of uniform
brings the following result:
^Me^m^b^er^{s o}^f^th^{e ar}^m^e^d^f^o^r^ces^o^f^{a p}^a^r^t^y^to^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^f^lic^{t an}^d^m^e^m^b^er^{s o}^f^mⁱ^l^itias^o^r^v^o^luⁿ^t^eer
^corps^f^o^r^mⁱⁿ^g^{part o}^f^s^u^c^h^ar^m^e^{d f}^o^rces^los^e^t^h^{eir ri}^g^h^t^to^{be treated as}^pris^on^ers^o^f^w^a^r
^wh^en^{ever th}^{ey d}^e^lib^era^t^{ely co}ⁿ^cea^{l th}^{eir sta}^t^u^sⁱⁿ^o^r^d^e^r^to^p^a^{ss b}^e^hⁱⁿ^d^th^{e milita}^{ry lin}^es^o^f
^th^{e en}^{emy fo}^{r th}^{e p}^u^rp^o^s^{e o}^f^g^a^t^h^e^rin^g^milita^{ry in}^fo^rma^tioⁿ^o^r^fo^{r th}^{e p}^u^r^p^o^{se o}^f^wa^gⁱⁿ^g

¹⁶⁴^Se^e^L^EV^IE^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te⁴⁹^{, a}^t^47.
¹⁶⁵^Se^e^Ma^llisoⁿ^aⁿ^{d Ma}^llis^on,^sup^r^a^f^o^o^t^no^t^e⁴⁰^,^at⁵⁶^-57^(no^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^arm^b^an^d^s^,ⁱⁿ^si^gnⁱ^a^,^o^r^dⁱ^stⁱⁿ^ctⁱ^v^{e h}^ead^{gear ar}^e
^accep^t^a^b^l^{e acco}^rdⁱⁿ^{g t}^o^s^o^m^e^mⁱ^lⁱ^t^a^ry^man^u^a^l^s^).
¹⁶⁶^Se^e^T^REAT^I^S^E^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te¹²⁵^{, a}^t^31.
¹⁶⁷^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t⁷⁶⁽ⁿ^otiⁿ^g^tha^t^unif^o^rm^{s pe}^rf^or^m^e^{d a}^pure^l^y^utilita^riaⁿ^f^u^nc^tio^{n pri}^o^{r t}^o^t^h^e^Fraⁿ^c^o^-^P^russiaⁿ^W^a^r).
¹⁶⁸^Se^e^Ba^x^t^e^r^,^s^upr^a^f^o^ot^no^t^e³⁹^,^at³⁴³^.
¹⁶⁹^Se^e^Ma^llisoⁿ^aⁿ^{d Ma}^llis^on,^sup^r^a^f^ootn^o^te^40,^a^t⁵⁷^.
¹⁷⁰^Se^e^Ba^x^t^e^r^,^s^upr^a^f^o^ot^no^t^e³⁹^,^at³⁴³^.^(“^[^T^]^h^{e c}^h^aract^{er o}^f^t^h^{e cl}^o^t^hⁱⁿ^g^w^o^rn^b^y^t^h^{e accu}^sed^h^a^{s assu}^m^e^d^m^a^j^o^r
ⁱ^m^p^o^r^t^aⁿ^ce.^”).
¹⁷¹^Se^e^ge^ne^r^a^lly^T^RE^AT^I^S^E^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te¹²⁵^.^F^o^r^e^x^am^ple^,^durⁱⁿ^g^t^h^e^Fr^eⁿ^c^h^a^{nd I}ⁿ^dⁱ^aⁿ^W^a^r^,^bo^{th s}ⁱ^de^s^e^m^plo^y^e^d
^s^o^m^e^ir^r^e^g^u^la^r^s^{, w}^{ho did}ⁿ^o^{t w}^e^ar^unif^o^r^m^s^,^a^{nd t}^h^e^s^e^w^e^r^e^a^ppa^r^e^ntly^r^e^g^a^r^d^e^d^a^s^law^f^{ul c}^o^m^b^a^t^aⁿ^t^s^.^Id^.^a^t^18-¹⁹^.
^During^the^A^m^e^rⁱ^c^aⁿ^Re^v^o^lutio^n,^the^Britis^{h a}^r^m^y^tre^a^t^e^d^c^o^lonia^l^irre^g^u^la^{rs be}^long^ing^t^o^m^ilitia^{s a}^s^la^wf^{ul c}^o^m^b^a^t^aⁿ^ts
^d^e^spⁱ^t^e^t^h^ei^r^l^{ack o}^f^uⁿⁱ^f^o^rm^s,^al^t^h^o^u^{gh i}ⁿ^dⁱ^vi^du^al^snⁱ^p^{ers un}^at^t^ached^t^o^aⁿ^y^Am^eri^can^f^o^rces^{were s}^o^m^e^tⁱ^m^e^s
^execu^t^e^d^.^Id^.^a^t^20-^21.^In^the^S^p^aⁿ^ish^P^e^nins^ula^r^W^a^{r (18}^07-¹⁸^14),^the^Freⁿ^c^h^tre^a^t^e^d^a^{ll i}^rre^g^u^la^{rs a}^s^ille^g^a^l
^c^o^m^b^a^t^aⁿ^ts^{, e}^v^eⁿ^thos^e^tha^t^m^e^{t the}^f^our^c^oⁿ^d^iti^ons^e^m^bodie^dⁱⁿ^la^te^r^tr^e^a^tie^s^.^S^{ee i}^d^.^at²³^-23^.

^wa^{r b}^y^d^e^stru^ctioⁿ^o^f^life^o^r^p^r^o^p^e^rty.^P^u^ttin^g^oⁿ^ci^v^iliaⁿ^clo^t^h^e^s^o^r^t^h^e^uⁿⁱ^f^o^r^m^o^f^t^h^e^eⁿ^em^y¹⁷²
^{are ex}^a^m^ples^o^f^con^ceal^m^eⁿ^t^of^th^{e s}^t^a^t^us^of^a^m^e^m^b^{er of}^t^h^{e arm}^e^d^f^o^rces^.
For a combatant to engage in hostilities while disguising his identity in order to deceive the ¹⁷³
enemy thus could amount to perfidious conduct in violation of the law of war. Guerrillas and
terrorists therefore lose any claim they might have to protected status if they place the civilian
populace at risk. However, a soldier not engaging in hostilities probably has not committed a ¹⁷⁴
violation by using civilian disguise merely to evade detection by the enemy. Soldiers who
belong to armies that do not wear full uniforms are not necessarily engaging in perfidious conduct ¹⁷⁵
as long as they bear arms openly and do not hide their belligerent status.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has suggested that the Taliban never fulfilled the requirement
because they “did not wear distinctive signs, insignias, symbols or uniforms. To the contrary, far
from seeking to distinguish themselves from the civilian population of Afghanistan, they sought ¹⁷⁶
to blend in with civilian non-combatants, hiding in mosques and populated areas.” Critics of
the Defense Department’s position point out that neither the Taliban nor the Northern Alliance
had ever worn uniforms or any distinctive sign, other than the black turban reportedly worn by
members of the Taliban and distinctive headscarves worn by members of the Northern ¹⁷⁷
Alliance. The failure to wear what Western commanders might regard as proper military dress
may be more a matter of custom than perfidy. Since most of the hand-to-hand combat was
conducted by the Northern Alliance, with U.S. forces supplying intelligence and fire support from
the air or at a great distance, the critics argue, the Pentagon’s position that the lack of uniforms ¹⁷⁸
makes “unlawful combatants” of the Taliban force is less persuasive. The very success of the
armed forces in quickly routing the enemy with virtually no U.S. casualties may also make the
argument somewhat more difficult to sustain. Finally, critics have pointed out that U.S. Special
Forces troops have been known to operate occasionally in civilian dress, or even to use the ¹⁷⁹
uniform of the enemy for the purpose of infiltrating enemy territory.

¹⁷²^FM^27-^10,^s^upr^a^f^oot^note^38,^a^t^pa^r^a^{. 74}⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d.)
¹⁷³^P^e^rf^{idious c}^o^nd^uc^{t re}^f^e^{rs to a}ⁿ^a^c^{t tha}^t^“ⁱ^nv^ite^[^s^]^t^h^e^c^onfⁱ^d^en^{ce of}^an^ad^versar^{y t}^o^l^ead^hⁱ^m^t^o^b^e^lⁱ^e^{ve t}^h^at^h^eⁱ^s
^en^titled^t^o^receiv^e^{, o}^r^is^o^b^l^ig^ed^t^o^acco^rd^p^r^o^t^ecti^oⁿ^uⁿ^d^e^{r th}^{e r}^u^le^{s o}^fⁱⁿ^tern^atioⁿ^a^{l law}^a^p^p^licab^{le i}ⁿ^arm^e^d^coⁿ^f^lict,
^w^{ith inte}^{nt t}^o^be^tra^y^tha^t^c^onf^ideⁿ^c^e^....”^Se^e^B^AS^I^C^R^UL^E^S^OF^T^H^E^G^EN^E^V^A^C^ONVE^N^T^I^ONS^A^ND^T^H^E^I^R^A^D^D^IT^IO^N^A^L
^P^ROT^O^COL^S²⁴^{(ICRC ed}^{. 1}⁹⁸³^).
¹⁷⁴^Se^e^Ba^x^t^e^r^,^s^upr^a^f^o^o^tⁿ^o^te³⁹^{, a}^t³⁴⁰^-4^{1 (n}^otiⁿ^g^pro^b^a^b^le^distinc^tⁱ^on^be^tw^e^eⁿ^hostileⁱⁿ^te^{nt a}ⁿ^{d se}^e^k^ing^{to e}^s^c^a^p^e⁾^.
¹⁷⁵^S^ee,^e.^g^.^T^REAT^I^S^E^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^not^e¹²⁵^{, a}^t^55-^{59 (}^d^e^s^c^r^ibing^t^h^e^v^e^r^y^unc^onv^eⁿ^tiona^l^c^o^m^m^a^ndos^of^the^B^o^e^r
^Re^public^,^w^h^ic^{h Brita}ⁱⁿ^tre^a^t^e^d^a^s^la^wf^{ul c}^o^m^b^a^t^aⁿ^{ts de}^spite^the^f^a^c^t^tha^t^t^h^e^y^w^o^re^cⁱ^v^ilia^{n c}^l^othi^ng^a^{nd e}^m^ploy^e^d
^g^u^e^rrilla^ta^c^tic^{s in the}^la^tte^{r p}^h^a^s^e^of^the^Boe^r^W^a^r).
¹⁷⁶^Se^e^Ru^m^s^f^e^l^d^P^r^{ess Con}^f^eren^ce,^s^upr^a^f^o^ot^no^t^e¹⁰^.
¹⁷⁷^Se^e^Robe^rt^{K. G}^o^ldm^a^{n a}^{nd Bria}^{n D. T}^itte^m^o^re^,^Unpriv^ile^ge^{d C}^o^mbataⁿ^ts^an^{d t}^h^e^Hostili^tie^{s in}^Af^gha^nist^an:^Theⁱ^r
^Stat^us^aⁿ^d^Rig^h^ts^U^nde^r^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^ati^ona^{l H}^u^m^anit^a^rⁱ^aⁿ^an^{d H}^u^m^a^{n R}ⁱ^ghts^Law^,^Am^e^r^ic^an^Soc^ie^ty^o^f^Iⁿ^te^r^natio^na^{l L}^a^w^,
^T^a^s^k^Fo^{rce o}ⁿ^T^e^rro^rism^P^a^p^e^{r 2}³^{(Dec. 2}⁰⁰²^),^av^ail^able^at^http^://^www^.^a^sil.org^/ta^skf^o^rc^e^/^g^o^ldm^a^n.pdf^(la^s^{t v}ⁱ^site^d
^J^u^ly^{27, 2}⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^c^om^m^e^nting^tha^t^“^bot^{h m}^ode^s^of^dr^e^s^s^,^w^h^ile^pe^r^h^a^p^sⁿ^o^{t i}^d^e^a^l^{, a}^r^e^,ⁿ^one^the^l^e^s^s^,^s^u^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^eⁿ^{t to}^s^a^tis^f^y^the
^pr^incⁱ^ple^of^dis^tⁱⁿ^c^tio^{n u}^nde^r^c^u^r^r^eⁿ^{t la}^w^.^”⁾^.
¹⁷⁸^Id^.^(“Itⁱ^s^al^so^so^m^e^w^h^at^dⁱ^siⁿ^g^en^u^o^u^s^f^o^{r t}^h^{e A}^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^ratⁱ^o^{n t}^o^{press t}^hⁱ^s^p^a^rtⁱ^c^u^l^ar^p^oⁱⁿ^t^b^ecau^{se i}^f^t^h^{e No}^rt^h^e^rn
^A^llia^nc^e^c^l^e^a^rl^y^kⁿ^e^w^how^{to ide}ⁿ^tify^the^eⁿ^e^m^y^,^th^eⁿ^{so to}^{o di}^{d t}^h^eⁱ^{r U.S.}^a^llie^{s in}^the^fⁱ^e^l^d.”⁾^.
¹⁷⁹^Se^e^Ga^r^y^L.^W^a^l^s^h^,^Role^{of t}^h^e^J^udge^Adv^o^c^a^teⁱⁿ^S^p^e^cⁱ^{al O}^p^e^r^a^tⁱ^ons^{, 19}^89-^A^U^G^A^RMY^L^AW^{. 4, 6-}^{7 (}ⁿ^otiⁿ^g^tha^t
^w^h^ile^us^e^of^the^eⁿ^e^m^y^unif^o^r^m^dur^ing^ba^tt^le^is^f^o^r^b^id^deⁿ^by^the^la^w^of^wa^{r, U.S. p}^o^lic^y^a^llow^s^use^of^the^eⁿ^e^m^y
^unif^o^rm^f^o^{r inf}^iltra^{tion of}^eⁿ^e^m^y^line^s^).

The requirement of carrying arms openly serves a similar purpose to that of the fixed distinctive
sign, to prevent perfidious conduct in violation of the law of war. FM 27-10 describes this
requirement in the negative. It is:
ⁿ^o^{t s}^a^tisfⁱ^{ed b}^y^th^{e carr}^yⁱⁿ^g^of^w^eapons^con^{cealed abou}^{t th}^{e pers}^on^{or if}^t^h^eⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vⁱ^d^u^a^l^s^hⁱ^d^e
^th^eir^w^eapon^s^on^t^h^{e approach}^of^th^{e en}^e^m^y^.
The ICRC notes the distinction between “carrying arms ‘openly’ and carrying them ‘visibly’ or
‘ostensibly,’” stating the provision “is intended to guarantee the loyalty of the fighting (sic), it is
not an attempt to prescribe that a hand-grenade or a revolver must be carried at belt or shoulder ¹⁸⁰
rather than in a pocket or under a coat.” The paramount concern “is that the enemy must be
able to recognize partisans as combatants in the same way as members of regular armed forces, ¹⁸¹
whatever their weapons.”
It is unclear whether arms must be carried in the open at all times or only during the conduct of
actual hostilities. Since surprise attacks are not per se unlawful, it seems that ordinary ruses of
war that involve camouflage or the concealing of arms to hide preparation for battle would be
permissible, while perfidious attacks carried out with weapons disguised as harmless equipment
might not be allowed.
It may also be valid to question whether the requirement is the same during offensive operations
for both the attacker and the attacked. To impose the same requirements on those who suddenly
find themselves in battle, denying POW status on the basis that a particular combatant had a
weapon concealed somewhere or was not at the time in uniform would seem to give the attacker a
clear advantage and even greater incentive to launch surprise attacks against an unprepared
enemy.
According to FM 27-10:
^T^hⁱ^s^con^dⁱ^tⁱ^{on i}^s^fu^l^fⁱ^l^l^e^{d i}^f^mos^t^of^t^h^e^m^e^m^b^{ers of}^t^h^e^body^obs^erv^e^t^h^{e l}^a^w^s^aⁿ^{d c}^u^s^t^o^m^s
^of^w^a^{r, n}^o^t^w^it^hs^tan^dⁱⁿ^g^th^{e f}^a^c^t^th^{at th}^{e i}ⁿ^divⁱ^d^u^al^m^e^m^b^{er con}^cern^e^d^m^a^y^h^a^v^e^co^m^m^itt^e^d
^a^w^a^r^crⁱ^m^{e. Me}^m^b^er^{s o}^f^m^ilit^{ias an}^d^v^o^luⁿ^t^eer^co^r^p^{s s}^h^o^u^l^d^b^e^esp^eciall^y^w^a^rⁿ^ed^a^g^ain^s^t
^e^m^plo^y^m^e^{nt of}^treach^er^y^,^denⁱ^{al of}^qu^arters^,^m^a^lt^r^e^a^t^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^p^rⁱ^s^oⁿ^e^r^s^o^f^w^a^r^,^w^o^uⁿ^d^e^d^,^aⁿ^d
^d^ead^{, im}^p^r^o^p^e^{r co}ⁿ^d^u^c^{t to}^w^a^rd^f^l^ag^{s o}^f^tru^{ce, p}^illag^e^{, a}ⁿ^d^uⁿⁿ^eces^sar^y^vⁱ^o^l^en^{ce an}^d
^d^e^str^u^ctioⁿ^.
The ICRC interprets the condition similarly:
^P^a^rtis^an^s^{are ... requ}^{ired to res}^p^{ect th}^{e Gen}^e^v^a^C^oⁿ^v^eⁿ^tioⁿ^s^t^o^th^{e fu}^lles^t^ex^teⁿ^t^pos^sⁱ^{ble. In}
^p^a^r^ticu^l^ar^{, th}^e^y^m^u^s^t^coⁿ^f^o^r^m^toⁱⁿ^terⁿ^atioⁿ^a^{l a}^g^r^e^e^m^eⁿ^ts^su^ch^{as t}^h^o^s^e^w^h^ich^p^r^o^h^ib^{it t}^h^e
^u^s^{e o}^f^cert^aⁱⁿ^w^eapons^(g^a^s^{). In}^al^l^t^h^ei^{r operat}ⁱ^oⁿ^s^{, t}^h^e^y^m^u^s^t^{be gu}ⁱ^d^{ed b}^y^t^h^e^m^o^ral
^cr^iterⁱ^a^w^h^ich^,ⁱⁿ^t^h^{e ab}^sen^ce^o^f^w^r^itteⁿ^p^r^o^v^isioⁿ^s^,^m^u^{st d}ⁱ^r^{ect th}^{e co}ⁿ^s^cieⁿ^{ce o}^f^m^aⁿ^;ⁱⁿ
^l^a^uⁿ^c^hⁱⁿ^g^a^t^t^a^c^k^s^,^t^h^e^y^m^u^s^tⁿ^o^t^c^a^u^s^e^vⁱ^o^l^eⁿ^c^e^aⁿ^d^su^f^f^erⁱⁿ^g^dⁱ^sp^r^o^p^o^r^tioⁿ^a^te^to^th^e^mⁱ^litar^y

¹⁸⁰^Se^e^ICRC^C^O^MME^N^T^A^R^Y^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^note⁷²^{, a}^t⁶¹^.
¹⁸¹^S^{ee i}^d^.

^r^e^s^u^l^t^whⁱ^c^h^t^h^e^y^m^a^y^r^e^a^s^oⁿ^a^b^l^y^h^o^p^e^t^o^a^c^hⁱ^e^v^e^.^T^h^e^y^m^a^yⁿ^o^t^attack^ci^v^iliaⁿ^s^o^r^dⁱ^sar^m^e^d
^pers^on^s^an^d^m^u^st^{, i}ⁿ^al^l^t^h^ei^{r operat}ⁱ^oⁿ^s^{, res}^p^ect^t^h^{e pri}ⁿ^ci^pl^e^s^of^h^oⁿ^o^u^r^an^{d l}^o^y^a^l^t^y^as^t^h^e^y¹⁸²
^ex^{pect th}^{eir e}ⁿ^e^m^ie^s^{to do.}
The condition is said to be vital to the recognition of irregular fighters, because states cannot be
expected to adhere to the law of war to fight an enemy that is not likewise bound. However, the
somewhat lenient stance just quoted reflects the fact that the “concept of the laws and customs of ¹⁸³
war is rather vague and subject to variation as the forms of war evolve.” The imprecision of the
condition could lead to its abuse; a relatively minor violation of the law of war could be used as a
pretext to deny POW status to an entire army, which would arguably give the members of an
irregular army little incentive to follow any of the rules if adherence to a particular rule is outside ¹⁸⁴
their capability.
One of the unresolved issues, then, is whether the criteria apply to each soldier as an individual or
to the army as a whole. In other words, does the violation of a rule by one soldier result in the
failure to qualify for POW status for the rest of the group, even though some members might
scrupulously follow all of the rules? Can individual soldiers still qualify for POW status even
though their leaders do not strictly enforce the rules over all subordinates? A member of a regular
force does not lose his right to be treated as a POW by violating the law of war, so it might seem
inconsistent to give members of irregular groups who might otherwise qualify harsher treatment.
However, a capturing power is probably inclined to insist that each individual detainee meet all ¹⁸⁵
four conditions before receiving treatment as a POW.
With regard to whether a regular army forfeits the right to have its members treated as POWs by
failing to follow the laws of war, U.S. practice has been to comply with the Conventions even
when the opposing side of a conflict does not. The United States treated North Korean and
Chinese prisoners as POWs during the armed conflict in Korea, despite the near total disregard of ¹⁸⁶
its provisions on the part of the Communists. The United States also treated North Vietnamese
and some Vietcong prisoners as POWs, despite North Vietnam’s denial that the GPW applied at ¹⁸⁷
all, along with its threatened policy of treating downed U.S. airmen as not eligible for POW
status and trying them as war criminals.

¹⁸²^S^{ee i}^d^.
¹⁸³^S^{ee i}^d^.
¹⁸⁴^Se^e^Ma^llisoⁿ^aⁿ^{d Ma}^llis^on,^sup^r^a^f^ootn^o^te^40,^a^t⁶⁰^(sug^g^e^sting^tha^t^“^{it is}^be^tte^{r to}^ha^v^e^irre^g^u^l^a^{rs ad}^h^e^{re as m}^u^ch
^{as p}^o^ssi^b^l^{e rat}^h^{er t}^h^{an no}^t^at^al^l^”⁾^.
¹⁸⁵^Se^e^L^EV^IE^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te⁴⁹^{, a}^t^44-^45,^e^m^pha^sⁱ^zⁱ^ng^tha^t:
^[^M^{]ost Ca}^pt^uriⁿ^g^P^o^w^e^{rs w}^{ill de}^ny^the^be^ne^f^its^a^{nd sa}^f^e^g^u^a^r^{ds of}^the^Co^nv^eⁿ^tio^{n t}^o^aⁿ^y^suc^h
^indivⁱ^d^u^a^l^w^{ho is}^{in a}ⁿ^y^m^a^nne^r^de^lin^que^ntⁱⁿ^c^o^m^p^lia^nc^e^.^I^t^m^u^s^t^a^l^s^o^be^e^m^pha^sⁱ^z^e^d^tha^t^if^aⁿ
^indivⁱ^d^u^a^l^is^f^o^uⁿ^d^to^ha^v^e^f^a^ile^{d to m}^e^e^t^the^f^{our c}^ond^itio^ns^{, t}^h^is^m^a^y^m^a^k^e^hi^m^aⁿ^unpr^iv^ile^g^e^d
^co^m^b^at^an^t^b^u^tⁱ^t^do^{es no}^t^pl^{ace h}ⁱ^m^at^t^h^{e co}^m^p^l^e^t^e^merc^y^o^f^hⁱ^{s cap}^t^o^r,^t^o^do^wⁱ^t^h^{as t}^h^{e cap}^t^o^r
^a^r^bitra^r^ily^de^te^r^m^ine^s^{. He}^{is still}^eⁿ^title^{d t}^o^t^h^e^g^e^ne^ra^{l pro}^t^e^c^tion^of^the^la^w^of^w^a^r,^w^h^ic^{h m}^e^aⁿ^s
^tha^t^he^m^a^y^{not be}^s^ubje^c^t^e^d^t^oⁱⁿ^hum^aⁿ^tre^a^t^m^e^nt,^suc^h^a^s^t^o^rture^,^a^{nd he}^{is e}ⁿ^title^{d t}^o^be^tr^ie^d
^be^f^o^r^e^pe^na^{l s}^a^nc^tio^ns^a^r^e^im^pos^e^d^.
¹⁸⁶^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t³⁰⁽ⁿ^otiⁿ^g^tha^t^no^ne^of^the^pa^r^tie^s^ha^{d y}^e^{t a}^c^c^e^d^e^d^{to t}^h^e^tr^e^a^tie^s^{but a}^ll^ha^{d a}^g^r^e^e^d^to^be^b^oun^d^by^theⁱ^r
^h^u^m^anⁱ^t^a^ri^an^p^rⁱⁿ^ci^p^l^es).
¹⁸⁷^S^{ee i}^d^.

Article 5 of GPW states: “Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy,” belong to any of the categories in
article 4 for POWs, “such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such
time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.” President Bush has declared
with respect to the detainees that there is no ambiguity: they are “unlawful combatants” and are
not entitled to POW status. Some critics argue, and one federal court has agreed, that even if most
of the detainees fail to meet the criteria for POW status, a declaration by the executive to that ¹⁸⁸
effect does not equate to a decision by a “competent tribunal.”
The GPW does not indicate how an article 5 tribunal should be constituted or in whose mind the
doubt must arise in order to compel the institution of such a tribunal. The provision is new to the ¹⁸⁹

1949 GPW and was inserted at the request of the ICRC. Prior to the inclusion of this language,

summary decisions were often made by soldiers of relatively low rank on the battlefield, leading
to instances where a captive could be presumed unlawful and executed on the spot, with any ¹⁹⁰
investigation to follow. Under the 1949 GPW, combatants are presumed to be entitled to POW ¹⁹¹
status unless formally declared otherwise. The United States has in the past interpreted this ¹⁹²
language as requiring an individual assessment of status before privileges can be denied. Any
individual who claims POW status is entitled to an adjudication of that status. An individual who
has not committed a belligerent act and thus claims to be an innocent civilian arguably has the
right to have that claim adjudicated.
The conflict in Vietnam, with its high frequency of irregular warfare, brought about the first ¹⁹³
implementation of written procedures for art. 5 tribunals. The United States Military Assistance
Command (MACV) first issued a directive pertaining to the determination of POW status in ¹⁹⁴

1966. Under the MACV directive, the captured North Vietnamese Army and Vietcong fighters ¹⁹⁵

were accorded POW status upon capture. For prisoners who were not obviously entitled to ¹⁹⁶
POW status, a tribunal of three or more officers was convened to determine their status.
“Irregulars” were divided into three groups: guerrillas, self-defense force, and secret self-defense
force. Members of these groups could qualify for POW status if captured in regular combat, but

¹⁸⁸^H^a^m^d^aⁿ^v^.^Rum^s^f^e^{ld, 34}^{4 F.}^Su^p^p^.2^{d 1}⁵²^,¹⁶²^(D^.D^.C.²⁰⁰⁴⁾^,^rev’d⁴¹³^F.^3d³³⁽^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁵⁾^,^r^ev’d⁵⁴^{8 U}^.^S^.
^{__ (}²⁰⁰⁶⁾^{. T}^h^e^Su^pre^m^e^{Court di}^{d n}^o^{t re}^solv^e^the^issue^,^b^u^{t s}^u^g^g^e^s^t^e^d^the^pe^titi^one^{r c}^o^uld^pre^s^eⁿ^{t a}^r^g^u^m^e^{nt on}^re^m^a^nd
^a^s^{to his e}^ligⁱ^b^ility^f^o^{r P}^O^W^sta^t^u^s^.
¹⁸⁹^Se^e^ICRC^C^O^MME^N^T^A^R^Y^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^note⁷²^{, a}^t⁷⁷^.
¹⁹⁰^Se^e^L^EV^IE^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te⁴⁹^{, a}^t^56.
¹⁹¹^Se^e^Ba^x^t^e^r^,^s^upr^a^f^o^o^tⁿ^o^te³⁹^{, a}^t³⁴³^-⁴^{4 (}^“^T^h^e^judicⁱ^a^l^de^te^r^m^ina^{tion w}^h^ic^{h is}^ne^c^e^s^s^a^r^y^bef^o^r^e^a^pe^r^s^{on m}^a^y^be
^tre^a^t^e^d^a^s^aⁿ^un^priv^ile^g^e^{d be}^llig^e^r^eⁿ^{t is in}^c^onse^q^ue^nc^eⁿ^o^t^a^de^te^rm^ina^{tion of}^g^u^ilt^but^of^sta^t^{us o}ⁿ^l^y^a^{nd, f}^o^{r the}
^pur^pos^e^s^of^inte^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^ona^l^la^w^,^{it is}^s^u^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^eⁿ^{t to a}^s^c^e^r^ta^{in w}^h^e^t^he^r^th^e^c^ond^uc^{t of}ⁱⁿ^divⁱ^d^u^a^l^ha^s^be^eⁿ^s^u^c^h^a^s^to^de^ny
^hⁱ^m^th^{e statu}^s^o^f^th^{e p}^r^isoⁿ^e^r^o^r^o^f^th^{e p}^eace^f^u^{l civ}^ilian^.^”).
¹⁹²^S^{ee i}^d^{; FM 27-}¹⁰^,^sup^r^a^f^oot^no^te^38,^a^t^pa^ra^.⁷¹^(“^[^A^rtic^le⁵^]^a^p^pli^e^{s to a}ⁿ^y^pe^{rson n}^o^{t a}^ppe^a^r^ing^t^o^be^eⁿ^title^{d to}
^prisone^r-^of^-wa^r^sta^t^{us w}^{ho ha}^{s c}^o^m^m^itte^{d a}^be^llig^e^r^eⁿ^{t a}^c^t^or^ha^{s e}ⁿ^g^a^g^e^{d in h}^o^stile^a^c^tiv^itie^{s in a}ⁱ^d^of^the^a^r^m^e^d
^f^o^rc^e^s^a^{nd w}^{ho a}^sse^{rts tha}^t^he^{is e}ⁿ^title^d^to^tre^a^t^m^e^{nt a}^s^a^prisone^r^of^wa^{r or c}^onc^e^rⁿⁱ^ng^w^hom^aⁿ^y^othe^{r d}^o^u^b^t^of^a^lik^e
^na^ture^e^x^ists.”^).
¹⁹³^Se^e^PO^W^D^OCUM^E^N^T^S^,^s^upr^a^f^o^o^t^no^t^e¹⁴^0,^at⁷²^2.
¹⁹⁴^Se^e^MA^C^V^Dⁱ^r^e^c^tiv^e^20-⁵^,¹⁷^M^a^y¹⁹⁶⁶^.
¹⁹⁵^Se^e^MA^C^V^Dⁱ^r^e^c^tiv^e^381-⁴⁶^{, D}^e^c^.^27,¹⁹⁶⁷^aⁿ^ne^x^A^,^re^printe^{d in}⁶²^A^M^.^J.^I^NT^’^L^L^{765 (}¹⁹⁶⁸⁾^.
¹⁹⁶^Se^e^F^RE^DE^RI^C^L.^B^ORC^H^,^J^UDGE^A^DV^OC^A^T^E^S^I^N^C^OM^BAT^{21 (}²⁰⁰¹⁾^.

were denied such status if caught in an act of “terrorism, sabotage or spying.”¹⁹⁷ Those not treated
as POWs were treated as civil defendants, and were accorded the substantive and procedural ¹⁹⁸¹⁹⁹
protections of the GC. This approach met with the approval of the ICRC.
In Grenada, where U.S. forces were opposed by Cuban military personnel and the Grenadian
People’s Revolutionary Army, the conflict was treated as international in nature and all captives ²⁰⁰
were treated as prisoners of war until a more accurate determination could be made. Detained
persons were later classified as POWs, retained persons, or civilian internees, and were allowed ²⁰¹
to communicate with their next of kin within seven days of capture. Seventeen former members
of the government who were accused of taking part in the coup attempt, however, were initially ²⁰²
detained incommunicado and interrogated on board U.S. vessels. After hostilities ceased they
were transferred to revolutionary courts that were financed by the United States and staffed by
judges and lawyers from various Caribbean nations. All were found guilty. Amnesty International ²⁰³
alleged that the trials were unfair and the verdicts relied on coerced statements. The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) later determined that the Government of the
United States had violated Articles I (right to life, liberty and security of person), XVII (the right
to recognition of juridical personality and civil rights) and XXV (right to be protected from
arbitrary arrest and the right to humane treatment in custody) of the American Declaration on the ²⁰⁴
Rights and Duties of Man. The IACHR did not examine the fairness of the trials because the
United States no longer had custody of the accused by the time they were tried.
The current procedures for determining the status of detainees is prescribed in United States
Army Regulation (AR) 190-8. The regulation divides persons captured on the battlefield into four
groups: enemy prisoners of war (EPW), retained personnel (RP - medical personnel, chaplains,
and Red Cross representatives), civilian internees (CI), and other detainees (OD - whose status
has not yet been determined but who are to be treated as EPW in the meantime). Ordinarily, a
preliminary determination of each captive’s status would be made by military police with the
assistance of military intelligence personnel and interpreters during the processing procedure at ²⁰⁵
the battlefield division collection point. Where a captive’s status cannot be adequately
determined, the captive will be temporarily assigned the designation of “OD” until a tribunal can
be convened to make a final determination. In the meantime, the OD is kept with the EPWs and
accorded the same treatment.
AR 190-8 sec.1-6 prescribes the procedures for determining whether persons who have
committed belligerent acts or engaged in hostile activities in aid of enemy armed forces are
entitled to POW status, when such status is in doubt, in accordance with GPW art. 5. A tribunal

¹⁹⁷^Se^e^MA^C^V^Dⁱ^r^e^c^tiv^e^381-⁴⁶^.
¹⁹⁸^Se^e^Ma^llisoⁿ^aⁿ^{d Ma}^llis^on,^sup^r^a^f^ootn^o^te^40,^a^t⁷³^.
¹⁹⁹^S^{ee i}^d^.^{at 7}⁴^(q^u^o^tin^g^co^m^m^en^d^a^tioⁿ^b^y^{ICRC rep}^r^esen^tativ^{e in}^Sa^ig^oⁿ⁾^.
²⁰⁰^Se^e^B^ORCH^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^note¹⁹^6,^a^t^65-^{66 (}ⁿ^o^ting^t^h^a^t^the^brie^f^na^ture^of^the^h^o^stility^pha^seⁱⁿ^tha^t^c^onf^lic^{t m}^a^de^it
^dif^fⁱ^c^u^{lt to c}^l^a^ssify^the^c^a^p^tiv^e^s^uⁿ^{til a}^f^te^rwa^r^d).
²⁰¹^S^{ee i}^d^.
²⁰²^Se^e^T^h^e^G^r^eⁿ^a^d^a^{17: T}^h^e^L^a^s^t^of^the^C^o^l^d^W^a^r^P^r^is^oⁿ^e^r^s^?^{, A}^m^ne^sty^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tiona^{l R}^e^p^o^r^t^32/⁰⁰^1/2⁰^{03 (}²³^O^c^tobe^r
²⁰⁰³⁾^,^av^ai^la^ble^at^htt^p^://w^e^b^.a^mⁿ^e^s^ty^.org^/^libra^ry^/ⁱ^nde^x^/^ENGA^M^R³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰³^(la^s^{t v}ⁱ^site^{d Ju}^ly^27,²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.
²⁰³^S^{ee i}^d^.
²⁰⁴^Se^e^Iⁿ^te^r^-^A^m^e^rⁱ^c^aⁿ^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^{on on H}^u^m^a^{n R}ⁱ^g^h^ts^{, R}^e^por^{t N}^o^.¹⁰^9/9⁹^{, C}^a^s^e¹⁰^.9⁵¹^{, C}^o^a^r^{d e}^t^a^l^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s
⁽^{29 Se}^pte^m^be^r¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^.
²⁰⁵^Se^e^FM^3-1⁹^.⁴⁰^Milita^ry^P^o^lic^e^Inte^rnm^e^nt/Re^s^e^ttle^m^e^{nt (I/R) Op}^e^r^a^tions.

composed of three commissioned officers established by a general courts-martial convening
authority holds an open (to the extent allowed by security concerns) proceeding to decide by
majority vote on the preponderance of evidence whether the detainee is an EPW, RP, innocent
civilian, or civilian who “for reasons of operational security, or probable cause incident to
criminal investigation, should be detained.” It is unclear whether there are any specific time limits
for a final determination. The regulation states that
^[^p^]^e^r^s^oⁿ^s^w^h^o^h^a^v^e^b^een^d^e^ter^mⁱⁿ^ed^b^y^{a co}^m^p^eten^{t tr}^ib^uⁿ^a^lⁿ^o^{t to}^b^e^en^titled^to^p^rⁱ^s^oⁿ^e^r^o^f
^w^a^{r s}^t^a^t^us^m^a^yⁿ^o^t^{be ex}^ec^u^t^{ed, i}^m^pri^s^oⁿ^{ed, or ot}^h^e^r^wⁱ^s^{e pen}^a^lⁱ^zed^wⁱ^t^h^ou^t^f^u^rt^h^e^r
^p^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^s^to^d^e^ter^mⁱⁿ^e^w^h^{at acts t}^h^e^y^h^a^v^e^co^mm^itted^an^d^w^h^a^t^p^eⁿ^a^lt^y^sh^o^u^ld^b^e²⁰⁶
ⁱ^m^pos^ed.
These procedures do not appear to apply in what the Army calls Military Operations Other than ²⁰⁷
War (MOOTW). In U.S. operations in Somalia and Haiti, for example, captured persons were
termed “detainees” and were treated “in accordance with the humanitarian, but not administrative ²⁰⁸
or technical standards of the GPW.” Human rights advocates reportedly found the living
conditions acceptable, but criticized the uncertain nature of the detention. None of the detainees ²⁰⁹
was ever tried by military commission as unlawful combatants.
During Operation Just Cause in Panama, members of the Panamanian armed forces were termed ²¹⁰
“detainees” but were reportedly treated as POWs. U.S. forces also detained a large number of
common criminals and patients from a mental hospital, as well as some members of the Noriega ²¹¹
government. After hostilities had ceased, a three-officer tribunal was set up to classify the
prisoners. Four thousand of the prisoners were turned over to the new Endara government, while ²¹²
100 prisoners of special interest were retained by U.S. forces. Some of the latter group were
transferred to the United States for civilian trials, but most were turned over to the Panamanian
government. General Manuel Noriega, taken prisoner during the operation and removed to the
United States for trial on drug charges, eventually succeeded in having a court accord him ²¹³
recognition as a POW. The court did not agree with the Administration that since Gen. Noriega
was being treated as a POW, there was no need to decide whether he was entitled to that status ²¹⁴
under international law. The court stated:
^T^h^{e g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^’^s^p^o^s^itioⁿ^p^r^o^v^id^{es n}^o^ass^u^r^aⁿ^c^e^s^th^{at t}^h^{e g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^w^illⁿ^o^{t at so}^m^e
^p^oⁱⁿ^tⁱⁿ^t^h^e^f^u^t^u^r^e^d^ecid^e^th^a^t^No^rⁱ^eg^a^isⁿ^o^{t a}^P^O^W^,^an^d^th^er^e^f^o^r^{e n}^o^t^en^t^itled^to^t^h^e
^prot^ectⁱ^oⁿ^s^of^Gen^e^v^a^{III. T}^hⁱ^s^w^o^u^l^d^s^e^e^m^t^o^{be j}^u^st^t^h^{e t}^{ype of}^sⁱ^t^u^atⁱ^oⁿ^Geⁿ^e^v^a^III^w^a^s
^desⁱ^gn^{ed to pr}^{otect ag}^ain^s^{t. B}^ecau^s^e^of^t^h^{e is}^s^u^es^pres^{ented in con}ⁿ^ectⁱ^oⁿ^wⁱ^th^t^h^e^G^eⁿ^e^r^a^l’^s

²⁰⁶^A^R^190-⁸^c^h^.^1-⁶⁽^g⁾^.
²⁰⁷^Se^e^W^a^rren^,^s^upr^a^f^o^o^tⁿ^o^te¹^01,^a^t^{58 (}ⁿ^o^ting^t^h^a^t^d^u^ring^MOOT^Wⁱⁿ^P^a^na^m^a^{, Som}^a^lia^{, a}^{nd Ha}^{iti, c}^a^p^ture^d
^b^e^llig^eren^{ts w}^e^{re n}^o^t^en^titled^to^P^O^W^statu^s^b^ecau^se^none^w^a^s^inv^o^lv^e^d^{in a}ⁿ^inte^rⁿ^a^tio^na^{l a}^r^m^e^{d c}^onf^lic^{t or}^c^a^p^tur^e^d
^{in oc}^c^u^pie^d^te^r^r^itor^y⁾^.^A^c^our^{t la}^te^r^r^u^le^{d t}^h^a^t^t^h^e^eⁿ^g^a^g^e^m^e^{nt in}^P^a^na^m^a^am^ounte^d^t^o^aⁿ^inte^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^{l a}^r^m^e^{d c}^onf^lic^t.
^Se^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^N^o^rie^g^a^,⁸⁰⁸^F.S^u^p^p^.7⁹¹^(S.D^.F^la^{. 1}⁹⁹²^).
²⁰⁸^Se^e^W^a^rren^,^s^upr^a^f^o^o^tⁿ^o^te¹^01,^a^t^58-^59.
²⁰⁹^S^{ee i}^d^.
²¹⁰^S^{ee i}^d^.
²¹¹^Se^e^B^ORCH^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^note¹⁹^{6, a}^t¹⁰^4-⁰⁵^.
²¹²^Id^.
²¹³^Se^e^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^{es v.}^No^ri^ega,⁸⁰⁸^F^.^S^u^p^p^.⁷⁹¹⁽^S^.^D^.^F^l^a^.¹⁹⁹²^).^T^h^{e ch}^an^{ge i}ⁿ^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^st^at^u^s^dⁱ^d^not^h^a^{ve an}^y^e^ffect
^on^his^pr^is^on^s^e^nteⁿ^c^e^.
²¹⁴^Id^.^a^t⁷⁹^4.

^f^u^rt^h^e^{r conf}ⁱⁿ^e^m^eⁿ^{t a}ⁿ^{d treat}^m^e^{nt, it s}^e^e^m^s^{appropriate—e}^v^eⁿⁿ^eces^s^a^r^y^{—to addres}^s^th^e
^iss^u^{e o}^f^Def^eⁿ^d^an^t’^{s stat}^u^s^.^A^r^ticle^{s 2}^,⁴^,^an^d⁵^o^f^Gen^e^v^a^I^I^I^estab^lish^th^{e sta}ⁿ^d^a^r^d^f^o^r
^d^e^ter^mⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^w^h^o^{is a P}^O^W^.^M^u^{st t}^h^{is d}^e^ter^mⁱⁿ^atioⁿ^a^w^{ait so}^m^e^kⁱⁿ^d^o^f^f^o^r^m^a^l^c^o^m^p^l^aⁱⁿ^t^b^y
^Def^eⁿ^d^an^{t o}^r^{a la}^w^s^u^{it p}^r^eseⁿ^ted^oⁿ^hⁱ^{s b}^e^h^a^l^f^?^Iⁿ^vⁱ^e^w^o^f^th^{e is}^su^e^s^p^r^esen^tl^y^r^a^ised^b^y
^D^e^f^eⁿ^d^aⁿ^t^,^th^e^C^o^u^r^t^thⁱⁿ^k^sⁿ^o^t^.
During the first Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. military did not set up camps for prisoners of war; ²¹⁵
instead, prisoners were processed by the Army and turned over to Saudi Arabia for detention. ²¹⁶
The Army conducted 1,191 art. 5 tribunals. During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, U.S.
military forces conducted “preliminary screenings” to determine whether the roughly 10,000
persons detained in connection with the invasion had committed a hostile act or obviously fell
into one of the categories defined in AR 190-8 for detainees. Formal art. 5 tribunals were
conducted pursuant to AR 190-8 only in the rare case when doubt as to status remained after the ²¹⁷
initial screening.
Non-international armed conflicts are governed by Common Article 3 of the Geneva ²¹⁸²¹⁹
Conventions, any applicable rules of the customary international law of war, and any

²¹⁵^Se^e^B^ORCH^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^note¹⁹^{6, a}^t¹⁷^1.
²¹⁶^Se^e^L^AW^O^F^W^AR^W^OR^KS^H^O^P^D^ESK^B^O^O^K^{, T}^HE^C^EN^TE^{R F}^O^R^L^{AW AND}^M^IL^ITA^R^Y^O^PE^R^A^T^I^O^N^S^{, J}^UDG^E^A^DVOC^AT^E
^G^EN^ER^A^L^’^S^S^CH^OO^L^{, U}^.^{S. A}^RMY⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
²¹⁷^T^HE^C^EN^TER^F^O^R^L^AW^AN^D^M^IL^ITA^R^Y^O^PE^R^A^TI^O^N^S^(CLA^MO),^L^E^GAL^L^E^SSO^N^S^L^EA^RN^E^D^F^R^O^M^A^F^GHANI^S^T^A^N^A^N^D
^I^RA^Q^{: V}^OL^U^M^E^{I, M}^AJ^O^R^C^OM^BAT^O^PER^A^TIO^N^S⁽^{11 S}^EPTEM^B^E^R²⁰⁰¹^TO^{1 M}^AY²⁰⁰³⁾⁴⁵⁽²⁰⁰⁴⁾^.
²¹⁸^C^o^m^m^{on A}^r^tic^le^{3 of}^the^G^e^ne^{va C}^onv^eⁿ^ti^ons^of¹⁹^{49 s}^t^a^t^e^s^:
^In^t^h^{e case o}^f^armed^coⁿ^f^lⁱ^c^tⁿ^o^t^o^f^anⁱⁿ^t^e^rn^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^c^h^aract^{er o}^ccu^rriⁿ^gⁱⁿ^t^h^{e t}^e^rri^t^o^ry^o^f^oⁿ^e^o^f^t^h^e
^Hi^gh^Coⁿ^t^ractⁱⁿ^g^P^a^rtⁱ^e^s,^each^P^a^rt^y^t^o^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^f^lⁱ^c^t^sh^al^l^b^e^bo^un^d^t^o^ap^pl^y^,^{as a}^mⁱⁿⁱ^m^u^m^,^t^h^e
^f^o^llowⁱ^ng^pr^ov^is^ions^:
^1.^P^e^rsoⁿ^{s ta}^kⁱ^ngⁿ^o^a^c^tiv^e^pa^{rt in}^the^h^o^stilit^ie^{s, inc}^l^udi^ng^m^e^m^b^e^r^{s of}^a^r^m^e^{d f}^o^rc^e^s^w^{ho ha}^v^e^la^id
^d^o^wⁿ^t^h^ei^{r arm}^s^an^d^t^h^o^s^{e p}^l^{aced h}^o^r^s^d^e^co^m^b^at^b^y^si^ckn^e^ss,^w^ounds^,^de^te^nti^on,^or^aⁿ^y^othe^r
^c^a^u^s^e^{, s}^h^a^{ll in a}^l^l^cⁱ^r^c^um^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^s^be^tr^e^a^t^e^d^hum^aⁿ^e^l^y^,^w^{ithout a}ⁿ^y^a^d^v^e^r^s^e^dis^tinc^tio^{n f}^o^u^nde^d^oⁿ
^race,^co^l^o^u^r^,^relⁱ^gⁱ^oⁿ^o^r^f^aⁱ^t^h^,^sex,^bⁱ^rt^h^o^r^w^eal^t^h^,^o^r^an^y^o^t^h^e^{r si}^mⁱ^l^a^{r cri}^t^e^ri^a.
^T^o^t^hⁱ^s^end^,^t^h^{e f}^o^l^l^o^wⁱⁿ^g^act^{s are}^an^d^s^h^al^l^rem^aⁱⁿ^p^r^o^hⁱ^bⁱ^t^e^{d at}^any^tⁱ^{me an}^dⁱⁿ^an^y^p^l^ace
^w^h^at^so^ev^{er w}ⁱ^t^h^resp^ect^t^o^t^h^{e abo}^v^e-^m^eⁿ^tⁱ^oⁿ^e^d^p^e^rsoⁿ^s^:
^(a^{) V}ⁱ^o^l^eⁿ^c^e^to^lif^e^a^{nd pe}^rsoⁿ^{, i}ⁿ^pa^rtic^ula^r^m^u^rde^r^of^a^{ll k}ⁱ^nds^{, m}^u^tila^ti^on,^c^r^ue^{l tre}^a^t^m^e^{nt a}^nd
^torture^;
⁽^b⁾^T^a^kⁱ^ng^of^hos^ta^g^e^s^;
^(c^{) O}^u^tra^g^e^s^upon^pe^rs^oⁿ^a^l^dⁱ^gⁿ^it^y^,^{in pa}^rtic^ula^r^h^u^m^ilia^ting^a^nd^de^g^r^a^d^ing^tre^a^t^m^e^nt;
⁽^d⁾^T^h^e^pa^s^sⁱ^ng^of^s^e^nteⁿ^c^e^s^a^{nd t}^h^e^c^a^r^r^y^ing^out^of^e^x^e^c^u^tions^w^ithou^{t pr}^e^v^io^us^ju^dg^m^e^nt
^proⁿ^o^unc^e^d^by^a^re^g^u^la^rl^y^c^onstitute^{d c}^o^{urt, a}^f^f^o^rding^a^{ll t}^h^e^ju^dicⁱ^a^l^g^u^a^r^aⁿ^te^e^s^w^h^ic^{h a}^r^e
^reco^gnⁱ^zed^{as i}ⁿ^dⁱ^s^p^en^sab^l^{e b}^y^ci^vi^lⁱ^zed^p^e^o^p^l^e^s.
^{2. T}^h^e^w^ounde^{d a}ⁿ^{d s}ⁱ^c^k^s^h^a^{ll be}^c^o^lle^c^t^e^d^aⁿ^d^c^a^r^e^d^f^o^r^.
^Aⁿⁱ^m^pa^rtia^{l hum}^aⁿ^ita^riaⁿ^b^ody^{, suc}^h^a^s^the^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^ona^{l C}^o^m^m^itt^e^e^of^the^R^e^{d C}^r^os^s^,^m^a^y^of^f^e^r
^{its se}^rv^ic^e^s^{to the}^P^a^rtie^{s to}^the^c^o^nf^lic^t.
^T^h^{e P}^a^rtⁱ^e^{s t}^o^t^h^{e con}^f^lⁱ^c^t^sh^ou^l^d^f^u^rt^h^e^{r en}^d^eavo^u^r^t^o^b^rⁱⁿ^{g i}ⁿ^t^o^f^o^rce,^b^y^m^e^an^{s o}^f^sp^eci^al
^a^g^r^e^em^eⁿ^ts^{, a}^{ll or}^pa^r^t^of^the^othe^r^pr^ov^is^io^ns^of^the^pr^e^s^eⁿ^{t C}^o^nv^eⁿ^tio^n.
^T^h^{e ap}^p^lⁱ^catⁱ^o^{n o}^f^t^h^e^p^r^ecedⁱⁿ^g^p^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^sh^al^lⁿ^o^t^aff^ect^t^h^{e l}^e^g^a^l^st^at^u^s^o^f^t^h^e^P^a^rtⁱ^e^{s t}^o^t^h^e
^c^onf^lic^t.
²¹⁹^{1 J}^EA^N^-M^AR^I^E^H^E^N^CK^A^E^RT^S^A^N^D^L^OUI^S^E^D^OS^WA^L^D^-B^EC^K^{, I}^NT^E^R^NA^T^I^O^N^A^L^C^O^M^MITT^EE^O^F^TH^E^R^ED^C^ROS^S^,
^C^US^T^O^M^A^RY^I^NT^E^R^NA^T^I^O^N^A^L^H^U^M^AN^I^T^AR^I^A^N^L^AW^299-³⁸^{3 (}²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^“^C^US^T^O^M^A^RY^I^H^L^”⁾⁽^outliⁿⁱ^ng
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

applicable obligations under human rights treaties.²²⁰ In addition, although the United States has
not ratified Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War ²²¹
Victims (“Protocol I”), the United States has previously taken the view that many of its ²²²
provisions have attained the status of customary international law.
Common Article 3 does not itself provide authority to detain individuals suspected of being
combatants or of presenting a security risk to the detaining state, nor does it differentiate between
“lawful” and “unlawful combatants.” Rather, it states that the application of its provisions has no
effect on the legal status of the non-state party (or parties) to the conflict. In other words, the
recognition that Common Article 3 applies to a conflict does not constitute a recognition of
belligerency on the part of a state, and a state may therefore prosecute insurgents for treason and ²²³
other offenses against its laws without according them combatant immunity. On the other hand,
under customary international law, the laws of war are not implicated unless a conflict constitutes ²²⁴
a belligerency—that is, an armed conflict between two belligerents. If a party to the conflict
does not qualify as a belligerent under international law, detention and prosecution of its members
are carried out according to domestic law, which in turn must comply with Common Article 3 and
applicable human rights obligations of the state. Thus, it appears that human rights treaties are
more relevant with respect to internal armed conflicts than they are in cases of international ²²⁵
armed conflict.
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions provides that
^An^y^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^w^h^o^h^a^{s ta}^k^eⁿ^p^a^r^tⁱⁿ^h^o^stili^ties,^w^h^o^isⁿ^o^{t en}^title^d^to^p^rⁱ^s^oⁿ^e^r^-^o^f^-^w^a^r^s^t^a^t^u^s^aⁿ^d
^w^{ho does}ⁿ^o^{t ben}^e^f^{it f}^r^o^m^m^o^{re f}^a^v^o^u^r^{able treat}^m^eⁿ^tⁱⁿ^accordan^{ce w}ⁱ^t^h^th^{e Fou}^r^t^h
^Coⁿ^v^en^tⁱ^oⁿ^sh^al^l^h^a^v^e^th^e^rⁱ^g^h^{t at a}^{ll ti}^m^e^{s to}^t^h^{e p}^r^o^t^ectioⁿ^o^f^A^r^{ticle 7}⁵^o^f^t^h^is²²⁶
^P^r^otoc^ol....
Article 75 of Protocol I provides in part:

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^f^unda^m^e^nta^l^rⁱ^g^h^ts^a^pplic^a^b^leⁱⁿ^non^-ⁱ^nte^r^na^tio^na^{l a}^s^w^e^{ll a}^s^inte^rⁿ^a^tiona^{l a}^r^m^e^{d c}^onf^lic^ts⁾^.
²²⁰^Id^{. a}^t²⁹^9-³⁰⁶⁽^o^utli^ning^hum^aⁿ^rⁱ^g^h^ts^ob^lig^a^tions^t^h^a^t^c^o^nti^nue^t^o^a^pply^dur^ing^a^r^m^e^{d c}^onf^lic^t)^.
²²¹^P^r^ot^oc^{ol A}^dditⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^to^the^G^e^ne^v^a^C^onv^eⁿ^tio^ns^of^A^u^g^.^12,¹⁹⁴⁹^,^a^{nd R}^e^la^ting^t^o^t^h^e^P^r^o^t^e^c^tion^of^Vic^tim^s^of
^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tio^na^{l A}^r^m^e^{d C}^onf^lic^ts⁽^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^“^P^r^o^toc^o^{l I}^”⁾^,^J^une^8,¹⁹^77,¹¹²⁵^U^.^N^.^T^.^S.^{3. A}^c^c^o^r^d^ing^t^o^its^te^r^m^s^,
^P^r^otoc^{ol I}^a^pplie^s^t^oⁱⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^ona^l^a^r^m^e^{d c}^onf^lic^ts^a^s^de^fⁱ^ne^{d in the}^G^e^nev^a^C^onv^eⁿ^tions^,^bu^{t c}^l^a^r^if^ie^{s tha}^t^t^h^e^s^e^inc^l^u^d^e
^“ar^m^e^d^coⁿ^f^lⁱ^c^t^sⁱⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^h^p^e^op^l^e^{s are f}ⁱ^gh^tⁱⁿ^{g agai}ⁿ^s^t^co^l^oⁿⁱ^al^domⁱⁿ^atⁱ^oⁿ^an^{d al}ⁱ^eⁿ^o^ccu^p^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^and^agaiⁿ^s^t^raci^st
^re^gⁱ^m^e^s^{in the}^e^x^e^r^cⁱ^s^e^o^f^theⁱ^{r ri}^g^h^{t of}^s^e^lf^-de^t^e^r^mⁱ^na^tion....”^Id^{. a}^r^{t. 1.}
²²²^For^a^dis^c^us^sⁱ^oⁿ^of^the^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^pos^it^io^{n r}^e^g^a^r^d^ing^th^e^s^t^a^t^us^of^P^r^ot^oc^{ol I}^,^s^e^e^g^e^ne^r^a^lly^Mic^h^a^e^l^J^.
^Ma^the^s^on,^Se^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^Oⁿ^e^:^The^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^{d St}^ate^s^Posⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^oⁿ^t^h^e^Re^lati^on^{of C}^u^s^t^om^ar^y^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tio^nal^Law^{to t}^h^e¹⁹⁷⁷
^Pr^otoc^o^l^s^Ad^diti^on^{al t}^o^t^h^e¹⁹⁴⁹^G^e^ne^v^a^C^onv^eⁿ^ti^ons^{, 2}^A^M^.^U.^J.^I^NT^’^L^L.^&^P^OL^’^Y^{419 (}¹⁹⁸⁷⁾^.
²²³^Se^e^O^PPEN^H^E^I^M^,^s^upr^a^f^o^ot^no^t^e⁷⁵^,^{§ 59}^{a (no}^tⁱⁿ^g,^ho^w^e^v^e^r,^t^h^at^“so^l^oⁿ^g^{as t}^h^{e i}ⁿ^su^rgen^t^s^t^h^em^s^e^l^v^{es ab}ⁱ^d^{e b}^y^t^h^e
^prov^isio^{ns of}^the^C^onv^eⁿ^ti^{on a}^nd^{so lo}^ng^a^s^the^y^re^f^r^aⁱ^{n f}^r^o^m^c^o^m^m^itting^a^c^t^{s of}^wa^{nton m}^u^rde^r^aⁿ^{d ot}^he^{r of}^f^e^nc^e^s
^am^ountiⁿ^g^{to w}^a^r^c^r^im^e^s^{it is}^{in a}^c^c^o^r^d^aⁿ^c^e^w^{ith the}^s^p^irⁱ^t^of^the^C^onv^eⁿ^ti^{on t}^h^a^t^tr^ia^ls^a^{nd e}^x^e^c^u^tio^ns^f^o^r^tr^e^a^s^on
^s^houl^d^be^r^e^duc^e^d^{to a}ⁿⁱ^ndis^p^eⁿ^s^a^ble^mⁱⁿⁱ^m^u^m^r^e^quir^e^{d by}^theⁿ^e^c^e^ssitie^{s of}^the^situa^tion”^).
²²⁴^G^a^bor^R^ona^,^Iⁿ^te^re^sting^Time^{s fo}^{r Inte}^rnat^io^{nal H}^u^ma^nitari^an^La^w^:^C^hal^le^nge^s^fr^om^the^“W^ar^oⁿ^Te^r^r^o^r^,^”²⁷
^F^LE^TC^H^E^R^F.^W^OR^L^D^A^FF^{. 55, 5}⁹^-^{61 (}²⁰⁰³⁾⁽ⁿ^oting^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^hum^aⁿⁱ^t^a^r^ia^{n la}^w^“^c^onc^e^p^{t of}^a^‘^p^a^r^ty^’^sug^g^e^s^t^s^a^mⁱⁿⁱ^m^u^m
^le^v^e^{l of}^org^a^niz^a^{tion re}^qu^ire^d^t^o^eⁿ^a^b^le^the^eⁿ^tity^{to c}^a^rry^{out the}^o^b^lig^a^tions^of^la^w^”^);^id^{. a}^t⁶⁹^(a^rg^uing^tha^t^k^illi^ng^s
^a^{nd de}^te^ntio^ns^of^pe^r^s^oⁿ^s^o^u^ts^ide^the^c^onte^x^t^of^hum^aⁿ^ita^rⁱ^aⁿ^la^w^r^e^m^a^{ins subje}^c^t^to^the^m^o^re^re^stric^tiv^e^le^g^a^{l re}^gⁱ^m^e^s
^of^inte^rna^tio^na^{l a}ⁿ^{d d}^o^m^e^stic^c^rⁱ^m^ina^l^a^{nd hum}^aⁿ^rig^h^{ts la}^w⁾^.
²²⁵^Se^e^R^OS^AS^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^note⁵⁹^{, a}^t^40.
²²⁶^P^r^ot^oc^{ol I}^a^r^{t. 4}⁵⁽³⁾^.

^An^y^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^ar^r^e^sted^{, d}^e^tain^ed^o^rⁱⁿ^terⁿ^ed^f^o^r^actioⁿ^s^r^e^lated^to^th^{e ar}^m^e^d^coⁿ^f^lic^{t s}^h^all^b^e
^inf^o^r^m^{ed pro}^m^ptl^y^,^{in a la}^ng^uag^e^h^e^uⁿ^d^ers^t^aⁿ^ds^{, o}^f^t^h^{e reas}^on^s^w^h^y^t^h^es^e^m^e^a^s^u^r^es^h^a^ve
^been^t^a^k^eⁿ^.^Ex^ceptⁱⁿ^cas^e^s^{of arres}^t^or^det^eⁿ^tⁱ^oⁿ^f^o^{r pen}^a^l^off^eⁿ^c^e^s^{, s}^u^c^h^pers^on^s^sh^al^l^be
^releas^ed^wⁱ^t^h^th^e^mⁱⁿⁱ^m^u^m^d^e^la^y^pos^sⁱ^{ble an}^{d in}^any^e^v^ent^as^s^oon^as^th^{e circum}^s^t^an^ce^s²²⁷
^j^u^stif^yⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e ar}^r^e^{st, d}^e^ten^tioⁿ^o^rⁱⁿ^terⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^h^a^v^e^cea^sed^to^ex^ist.

The Department of Defense defends its treatment of the detainees at the Guantánamo Naval
Station as fully complying with the principles of the Geneva Convention, and view the treatment ²²⁸
as compliant with Common Article 3 as well as standards set by Congress in the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006. DOD also points to the
Combatant Status Review Tribunals as evidence that the detainees have received a determination
of their status that roughly corresponds to what they would receive from a “competent tribunal”
under GPW art. 5. Critics of the policy respond that the U.S.’ position regarding the
inapplicability of the Geneva Conventions could be invoked as precedent to defend the poor
human rights practices of other regimes, and it could lead to harsh treatment of U.S. service
members who fall into enemy hands during this or any future conflict. Under the critics’ view, if
the Administration can accomplish its goals by applying the GPW criteria in article 4 to
determine by means of a competent tribunal which of the detainees is entitled to POW status, the
foreign policy and humanitarian benefits would be worth the cost.
The perceived implications of granting POW status appear to have played a role in the decision-
making process, with Administration officials emphasizing the detrimental impact of treating the
detainees as POWs on the U.S.’ ability to fight the war against terror. Some of the issues are
discussed below.
One argument cited frequently in the press for denying POW status to the detainees is that the ²²⁹
U.S. military would no longer be able to interrogate them in an effort to gain intelligence. The

²²⁷^Id^.^art⁷⁵⁽³⁾^.^A^d^dⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^l^y^,^A^r^tⁱ^c^l^e⁷⁵⁽¹⁾^p^r^o^hⁱ^bⁱ^t^s^t^h^{e f}^o^l^l^o^wⁱⁿ^g^act^{s “at}^an^y^tⁱ^m^e^an^dⁱⁿ^an^y^p^l^{ace wh}^at^so^ever,
^w^h^e^t^he^{r c}^o^m^m^itte^{d by}^cⁱ^v^ilia^{n or by}^m^ilita^r^y^a^g^eⁿ^ts”^:
⁽^a⁾^Vio^l^eⁿ^c^e^to^the^lif^e^,^he^a^lth^{, or}^phy^sⁱ^c^a^l^or^m^e^nta^l^w^e^ll-^be^ing^of^pe^r^s^ons^,ⁱⁿ^pa^r^tic^ula^r^:
^{(i) Mu}^r^d^er;
⁽ⁱⁱ⁾^T^o^r^t^ur^e^of^a^{ll k}ⁱⁿ^d^s^,^w^h^e^t^he^r^phy^sⁱ^c^a^l^or^m^e^nta^l;
^{(iii) Cor}^pora^l^pu^nishm^e^{nt ; a}ⁿ^d
^(iv⁾^Mutila^ti^on;
^{(b) Outra}^g^e^s^up^on^pe^rsoⁿ^a^l^digⁿⁱ^t^y^{, in pa}^rtic^ul^a^r^h^u^m^ilia^ting^a^nd^de^g^r^a^d^ing^tre^a^t^m^e^{nt, e}ⁿ^f^o^rc^e^d
^p^r^o^s^tit^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^aⁿ^d^aⁿ^y^f^o^r^m^o^fⁱⁿ^d^ecen^{t assau}^lt;
⁽^c⁾^T^h^e^ta^kⁱ^ng^of^hos^ta^g^e^s^;
⁽^d⁾^C^o^l^l^e^c^tiv^e^punis^h^m^e^nts^;^a^nd
^{(e) T}^h^reat^{s t}^o^co^mmⁱ^t^an^y^o^f^t^h^{e fo}^regoⁱⁿ^{g act}^s.
²²⁸^Se^e^Eng^l^aⁿ^d^Me^m^o^r^a^ndum^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te^{14 (}^a^s^s^e^r^ting^t^h^a^t^tr^e^a^t^m^e^{nt of}^de^ta^ine^e^s^is^hum^aⁿ^e^a^nd,^w^{ith the}
^e^x^c^e^p^{tion of}^the^m^ilita^ry^c^o^m^mⁱ^s^{sions f}^o^u^nd^by^the^Supre^m^e^Cour^{t ot}^he^rw^ise^,^c^o^m^p^lia^{nt w}^{ith Com}^m^{on A}^r^tic^le^3).
²²⁹^{For m}^o^re^on^m^ilita^r^y^inte^rrog^a^tio^{n, se}^e^{CRS Re}^p^o^{rt RL}³²⁵⁶^7,^L^a^w^f^ulne^s^s^o^f^Iⁿ^te^r^r^o^gat^io^{n Te}^c^h^niq^u^e^s^unde^r^t^h^e
^Gen^eva^Coⁿ^ven^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^by^J^e^nnif^e^r^K^.^Els^e^a^.

GPW requires prisoners to give only a few personal facts, including name, rank, and serial
number. Most armies undoubtedly forbid their soldiers from divulging any more information than
what is required; however, there is no prohibition against the detaining power asking for more ²³⁰
information. It is forbidden to use mental or physical coercion to extract information from ²³¹
prisoners, but tactics such as trickery or promises of improved living conditions are not ²³²
foreclosed. Article 17 of GPW provides that “[p]risoners of war who refuse to answer may not
be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.” ²³³
Torture is not permitted in the case of any detainee, regardless of that person’s status.
Similar language was contained in the 1929 Geneva Convention.²³⁴ Despite the reports of
widespread abuse of prisoners of war at the hands of enemy interrogators, there is very little case ²³⁵
precedent defining the boundaries of acceptable conduct. A British military court convicted ²³⁶
several German Luftwaffe officers of improperly interrogating British POWs at a special
interrogation camp, where it was charged the officers used excessive heating of cells in order to
induce prisoners to give war information of a kind they were not bound by the Convention to
disclose. The charges also alleged the officers had threatened prisoners that their failure to
provide sufficient answers could be seen by the Gestapo as evidence that the prisoners were ²³⁷
saboteurs. The military court expressed its agreement with the defense’s position that
interrogation was not unlawful under the Geneva Convention then in force, that obtaining
information by trick was likewise not unlawful, and that interrogation of a wounded prisoner was
not itself unlawful without evidence that methods used amounted to physical or mental ill-²³⁸
treatment.
It appears to be a common practice for militaries to interrogate prisoners as soon as possible after ²³⁹
capture to exploit their knowledge concerning tactical positions and plans. There is no express
right to counsel during such interrogation; however, the case may be different where the ²⁴⁰
information sought is of the type that could incriminate the prisoner personally for any crime.
The GPW forbids the use of coercion to induce a POW to admit guilt, and POWs who are ²⁴¹
accused of crimes have the right to counsel. It may thus be argued that POWs are entitled to

²³⁰^Se^e^ICRC^C^O^MME^N^T^A^R^Y^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^note⁷²^{, a}^t¹⁶⁴^.
²³¹^G^P^W^a^r^{t. 17.}
²³²^Se^e^L^EV^IE^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te⁴⁹^{, a}^t¹⁰⁸^.
²³³^G^C^a^r^{t. 31 pr}^oh^ibits^the^us^e^of^ph^y^s^ic^a^l^or^m^e^nta^l^c^o^e^r^cⁱ^{on t}^o^obtaⁱ^{n inf}^o^r^m^a^tion.^S^{ee a}^l^so^C^onv^eⁿ^ti^{on A}^g^aⁱ^ns^t
^T^o^r^t^ur^e^a^{nd O}^t^he^r^C^r^ue^l,^Iⁿ^hum^aⁿ^or^D^e^g^r^a^d^ing^T^r^e^a^t^m^e^{nt or}^Puni^s^h^m^e^{nt, J}^un.^26,¹⁹⁸⁷^,¹⁴^{65 U}^.^N^.^T^.^{S. 85.}
²³⁴^G^e^nev^a^P^r^is^oⁿ^e^r^s^of^W^a^r^C^onv^eⁿ^tioⁿ^of¹⁹²^{9 a}^r^t.^{5 s}^t^a^t^e^dⁱⁿ^pa^r^t^:
^N^o^pr^e^s^s^u^r^e^s^h^a^ll^be^e^x^e^r^te^{d on}^p^r^is^one^r^s^to^o^b^ta^{in inf}^o^rm^a^tion^re^g^a^rdin^g^the^sit^u^a^tioⁿ^of^theⁱ^r
^a^r^m^e^{d f}^o^r^c^e^s^or^theⁱ^r^c^o^uⁿ^tr^y^.^P^rⁱ^s^one^r^s^w^{ho r}^e^f^u^s^e^{to r}^e^ply^m^a^yⁿ^o^{t be}^thr^e^a^t^eⁿ^e^d^,^ins^u^lte^d,^or
^exp^o^s^ed^t^o^uⁿ^p^l^easan^tⁿ^{ess o}^r^dⁱ^sa^d^v^an^t^a^{ges o}^f^an^y^kiⁿ^d^w^h^at^so^ev^er^.
²³⁵^Se^e^PO^W^D^OCUM^E^N^T^S^,^s^upr^a^f^o^o^t^no^t^e¹⁴^0,^at⁷⁰^8.
²³⁶^Se^e^T^r^ia^{l of}^Eric^{h Killing}^e^{r a}ⁿ^d^Four^Othe^rs,^{3 L}^R^TW^{C 67,}^excerp^t^s^re^printe^{d in}^PO^W^D^OCUM^E^N^T^S^,^s^upr^a^f^o^ot^no^t^e
¹⁴⁰^{, d}^o^c^.^no.⁷⁰^{, a}^t²⁹^1.
²³⁷^S^{ee i}^d^.
²³⁸^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t²^92.
²³⁹^Se^e^ICRC^C^O^MME^N^T^A^R^Y^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^note⁷²^{, a}^t¹⁶³^.
²⁴⁰^Se^e^L^EV^IE^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te⁴⁹^{, a}^t¹⁰⁹^{, n}⁴²⁽^a^r^g^uing^t^h^e^“ⁱ^nte^r^r^o^g^a^ti^on^of^a^pr^is^one^r^of^w^a^r^{in a}^s^e^a^r^{ch f}^o^r^ta^c^tic^a^l
^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion of}^im^m^e^dia^t^e^ur^g^e^nc^y^c^a^nnot^be^e^qua^te^d^to^theⁱⁿ^te^r^r^o^g^a^{tion of}^aⁿⁱ^ndivⁱ^d^u^a^l^a^r^r^e^s^t^e^d^f^o^r^que^s^tⁱ^oni^ngⁱⁿ
^c^onne^c^tio^{n w}^{ith t}^h^e^p^o^s^sⁱ^ble^c^o^m^mⁱ^s^s^{ion of}^a^c^r^im^e^...”^).
²⁴¹^G^P^W^art^.⁹⁹^st^at^{es i}ⁿ^p^a^rt^:
^N^o^m^o^r^a^{l or}^p^h^y^s^ic^a^l^c^o^e^r^cⁱ^{on m}^a^y^be^ex^e^r^te^{d on a}^pr^is^one^r^of^w^a^r^{in or}^de^r^t^oⁱⁿ^duc^e^him^{to a}^d^m^it
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

some form of exclusionary rule to keep a forced confession from introduction into evidence at
trial.
Common Article 3 does not supply separate rules or standards for interrogation, but the
prohibition on ill-treatment continues to apply during interrogations. Therefore, “violence to life
and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;” the use of
hostages; and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment”
are prohibited in connection with interrogation. Article 75 of Protocol I prohibits “violence to the
life, health, or physical or mental well-being of persons,” including physical and mental torture,
and proscribes “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment,
enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault”; the use of hostages; and threats to
commit any of these prohibited acts.
Trial and punishment of detainees may call for different procedural guidelines depending on the
status of the detainee and whether the offense was committed prior to capture or during ²⁴²
captivity. Further, there is a distinction between crimes and mere disciplinary violations with
respect to the nature and severity of punishment permitted. The Geneva Conventions do not
permit collective punishment without an individual determination of guilt, nor confinement ²⁴³
without a hearing.
The military has jurisdiction to try enemy POWs and civilians, including “unlawful belligerents,” ²⁴⁴
for violations of the law of war. However, the military does not appear to have jurisdiction to
try detainees for pre-capture acts not committed within occupied territory or in connection with ²⁴⁵
the armed conflict, as described below.
According to GPW article 102:
^A^pris^on^{er of}^w^a^{r can}^{be v}^a^lidl^y^s^e^nten^{ced on}^l^y^if^t^h^{e s}^eⁿ^t^eⁿ^c^e^h^a^s^been^pron^ouⁿ^{ced b}^y^t^h^e
^s^a^m^e^co^u^r^ts^according^{to th}^e^s^a^m^e^procedu^r^{e as}ⁱⁿ^t^h^{e ca}^s^e^of^m^e^m^b^ers^o^f^t^h^{e ar}^m^e^d^f^o^rces

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^hⁱ^m^s^el^f^guⁱ^l^t^y^o^f^t^h^{e act}^o^f^w^hⁱ^c^h^h^eⁱ^s^accu^sed^.
^N^o^pr^is^one^r^of^w^a^r^m^a^y^be^c^onv^ic^te^{d w}^ithout^ha^vⁱ^ng^ha^{d a}ⁿ^o^p^p^o^r^t^unity^to^pr^e^s^eⁿ^{t his}^de^f^e^nc^e^a^nd
^t^h^{e assi}^st^an^{ce o}^f^{a q}^u^a^lⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^ad^vocat^{e o}^r^co^un^sel^.
²⁴²^Se^e^{CRS Rep}^o^{rt RL}³¹⁶⁰⁰^,^T^h^e^De^partmeⁿ^{t o}^f^De^fe^nse^Rule^{s f}^o^r^M^ilitary^Commissioⁿ^{s: An}^aly^s^{is o}^f^Proc^e^dur^al
^Rule^{s a}^{nd C}^o^mp^arison^with^Pro^p^o^se^{d Le}^gisl^ati^on^an^{d t}^h^e^Unif^orm^Code^{of M}^ilit^ary^J^u^stic^e^{, by}^J^eⁿⁿ^if^e^r^K^.^Els^e^a^.
²⁴³^Se^e^G^P^W^{art. 8}⁷^{; G}^C^{III art. 3}³^.
²⁴⁴^Se^e¹⁰^U.S.C.^§⁸²^{1 (re}^c^o^gⁿ^izⁱⁿ^g^c^onc^urreⁿ^t^jurⁱ^sdic^ti^on^of^m^ilita^r^y^c^{ourts ov}^e^r^of^f^e^nde^rs^{or of}^f^e^nse^s^de^sigⁿ^a^t^e^d^by
^s^t^a^t^ute^or^t^h^e^la^w^of^w^a^r⁾^;^{10 U}^.^S.^C^.^§⁸¹^{8 (}^r^e^c^o^gⁿ^iz^ing^c^o^ur^ts^-^m^a^r^tⁱ^a^l^jurⁱ^s^d^ic^tio^{n ov}^e^r^vⁱ^ola^tⁱ^ons^of^the^la^w^of^w^a^r
^c^o^m^m^itte^{d b}^y^aⁿ^y^pe^{rson). F}^o^{r a}^brie^f^ov^e^r^vⁱ^e^w^c^o^m^p^a^r^ing^jurisdic^tion^aⁿ^d^pr^oc^e^dure^a^m^ong^v^a^{rious c}^{ourts, se}^e^CRS
^R^e^por^{t R}^L³¹²⁶^2,^Se^le^c^t^e^d^Pr^oc^e^dur^al^S^a^fe^g^uar^dsⁱⁿ^Fe^de^r^a^{l, M}^ili^tar^y^{, a}^{nd I}ⁿ^te^rⁿ^atio^na^{l C}^o^ur^ts^,^by^J^e^nnif^e^r^K^.^Els^e^a^.
²⁴⁵^For^e^x^a^m^ple^,^s^o^m^e^of^the^de^ta^ine^e^s^a^lle^g^e^dl^y^w^e^r^e^a^r^r^e^s^t^e^d^outsⁱ^de^the^z^o^ne^of^ope^r^a^ti^ons^,^{in B}^o^sⁿ^ia^{, f}^o^r^s^u^s^p^ic^ioⁿ
^of^inv^o^lv^em^eⁿ^{t in A}^l^Q^a^e^d^a^te^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^pl^ots^.^S^o^m^e^obs^e^r^v^e^r^s^be^lie^v^e^tha^t^the^s^e^pr^is^one^r^s^c^aⁿ^on^ly^be^cha^r^g^e^{d a}^s^c^o^m^m^on
^c^r^im^ina^l^{s a}^{nd not a}^s^unla^w^f^u^{l be}^llig^e^r^eⁿ^ts.

^of^th^{e Detai}ⁿ^ing^P^o^w^e^{r, an}^{d if}^{, f}^u^rt^h^e^r^m^{ore, th}^{e prov}^is^ioⁿ^s^of^t^h^{e pres}^en^{t C}^h^{apter h}^a^v^e^been
^obs^erv^e^d.
Further, Article 84 provides:
^Inⁿ^o^circ^um^s^t^aⁿ^ces^w^h^ate^v^er^s^h^all^{a pris}^on^{er o}^f^w^a^{r be tried}^b^y^{a cou}^r^{t o}^f^aⁿ^y^kⁱⁿ^d^w^h^ic^h
^d^o^e^{s no}^t^o^ffe^r^t^h^e^e^s^seⁿ^tⁱ^a^l^gua^r^a^nt^e^e^s^o^fⁱⁿ^d^e^p^e^nd^eⁿ^c^e^aⁿ^dⁱ^m^p^a^r^tⁱ^a^lⁱ^t^{y a}^s^ge^ne^r^a^l^l^y
^recogⁿⁱ^{zed, an}^{d, i}ⁿ^particu^l^ar,^th^{e procedu}^r^{e of}^w^h^{ich does}^{not af}^f^o^{rd th}^e^accus^e^{d th}^{e ri}^gh^ts
^an^d^m^e^aⁿ^s^of^de^f^eⁿ^{ce prov}ⁱ^d^e^d^f^o^{r i}ⁿ^A^r^tⁱ^c^l^e^105.
Other procedural guarantees under the GPW include a prohibition on punishment for ex post facto ²⁴⁶²⁴⁷
crimes, prompt notification of the charges and a speedy trial, notification to the Protecting ²⁴⁸
Power of the impending trial at least three weeks in advance, right to counsel of the POW’s ²⁴⁹
own choosing or appointed counsel, trial in the presence of a representative of the Protecting

²⁴⁶^G^P^W^a^r^{t. 99.}
²⁴⁷^G^P^W^art^.¹⁰³^st^at^es:
^J^udicⁱ^a^lⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tig^a^tions^r^e^la^ting^to^a^pr^is^one^r^of^w^a^r^s^h^a^{ll be}^c^ond^uc^t^e^{d a}^s^r^a^pidly^a^s^cⁱ^r^c^um^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^s
^p^e^rmⁱ^t^an^d^so^t^h^at^hⁱ^s^t^rⁱ^a^l^sh^al^l^t^a^{ke p}^l^{ace as s}^{oon a}^s^p^o^s^sⁱ^ble^.^A^pr^is^one^r^of^w^a^r^s^h^a^{ll not}^be
^c^onf^ine^d^w^h^ile^a^w^a^iting^tria^{l unle}^{ss a}^m^e^m^b^e^r^of^th^e^a^r^m^e^{d f}^o^rc^e^s^of^the^De^ta^ining^Pow^e^r^w^ould^be
^so^coⁿ^fⁱⁿ^edⁱ^f^h^e^w^e^{re a}^ccu^sed^o^f^{a si}^mⁱ^l^a^{r o}^f^f^eⁿ^ce,^{or if}^{it is e}^sse^ntia^{l to}^{do s}^oⁱⁿ^the^inte^re^{sts of}
ⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^secu^ri^t^y^.^Inⁿ^o^ci^rcu^m^st^aⁿ^{ces sh}^a^{ll this c}^onf^ine^m^eⁿ^{t e}^x^c^e^e^d^thre^e^m^onths.
²⁴⁸^G^P^W^a^r^{t. 10}^{4 re}^q^u^ire^s^the^f^o^ll^owing^inf^o^rm^a^{tion to}^be^re^p^o^rte^d^t^o^t^h^e^P^r^ote^c^tⁱⁿ^g^P^o^w^e^{r (}^{see su}^p^r^a^f^ootn^o^te⁹⁰⁾^aⁿ^d
^P^O^W^’^{s rep}^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^v^{e b}^e^f^o^{re a t}^rⁱ^a^l^can^co^mm^en^c^e^:
^{1. S}^u^rⁿ^a^m^e^a^{nd f}ⁱ^r^s^{t na}^m^e^s^of^the^pr^is^oⁿ^e^r^of^w^a^r^,^his^r^a^nk^{, his}^a^r^m^y^{, r}^e^gⁱ^m^e^nta^l^{, pe}^r^s^ona^{l or}^s^e^rⁱ^a^l
^num^be^r^,^his^da^te^of^bir^t^{h, a}ⁿ^{d h}ⁱ^s^pr^of^e^s^sⁱ^{on or}^tr^a^d^e^,^if^aⁿ^y^;
²^.^P^l^{ace o}^fⁱⁿ^t^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^o^r^coⁿ^fⁱⁿ^e^m^en^t^;
^{3. S}^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^{tion of}^the^c^h^a^r^g^e^or^c^h^a^r^g^e^s^{on w}^h^ic^{h the}^pr^is^oⁿ^e^r^of^w^a^r^is^to^be^a^r^r^a^ig^ne^{d, g}ⁱ^vⁱ^ng^the
^le^g^a^{l prov}^{isions a}^p^plic^a^b^le^;
⁴^.^Desigⁿ^atioⁿ^o^f^th^{e co}^u^r^{t w}^h^ich^w^{ill tr}^y^th^{e case; lik}^e^w^is^{e th}^{e d}^a^{te an}^d^p^l^{ace f}ⁱ^x^e^d^f^o^{r th}^{e o}^p^enⁱⁿ^g
^of^the^tria^l.
^T^h^e^s^a^m^e^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion s}^h^a^ll^b^e^m^a^de^by^the^D^e^ta^ining^Pow^e^{r to the}^pr^isone^{r’s re}^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^.
²⁴⁹^G^P^W^a^r^{t. 10}^{5 pr}^ov^ide^s^:
^T^h^e^pr^is^one^r^of^w^a^r^s^h^a^{ll be}^eⁿ^tit^l^e^{d to a}^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^by^one^of^his^pr^is^one^r^c^o^m^r^a^d^e^s^{, to de}^f^e^nc^e^by^a
^qua^lif^ie^{d a}^d^v^o^c^a^t^e^{or c}^o^unse^l^of^hⁱ^{s ow}^{n c}^hoic^e^,^t^o^t^h^e^c^a^lling^of^w^itne^sse^{s a}^{nd, if}^he^de^e^m^s
ⁿ^ecessar^y^,^t^o^t^h^{e servi}^{ces o}^f^{a co}^m^p^et^en^tⁱⁿ^t^e^rp^ret^e^r.^{He sh}^al^l^b^e^ad^vi^sed^o^f^t^h^{ese ri}^gh^t^s^b^y^t^h^e
^De^ta^ining^P^o^w^e^{r in d}^u^e^tim^e^be^f^o^re^the^tria^l.
^Fa^iling^a^c^h^oⁱ^c^e^by^the^prisoⁿ^e^r^o^f^w^a^{r, the}^P^r^ot^e^c^ting^Pow^e^{r sha}^{ll f}ⁱ^{nd him}^aⁿ^a^d^v^o^c^a^t^e^{or c}^o^unse^l^,
^an^d^sh^al^l^h^a^{ve at}^l^east^oⁿ^e^w^{eek a}^tⁱ^t^s^dⁱ^s^p^o^s^al^f^o^{r t}^h^{e pu}^rpo^s^e.^T^h^{e Det}^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^P^o^w^e^{r sh}^al^l^d^e^lⁱ^v^er
^{to t}^h^e^sa^id^Pow^e^{r, on re}^q^u^e^s^{t, a}^li^{st of}^pe^rsons^qua^lif^ie^{d to}^pre^s^eⁿ^{t t}^h^e^de^f^e^nc^e^.^Fa^iling^a^c^hoic^e^of
^an^ad^vo^cat^{e o}^r^couⁿ^s^el^b^y^t^h^{e p}^rⁱ^s^oⁿ^e^{r o}^f^w^a^{r o}^r^t^h^e^P^r^o^t^ectⁱⁿ^g^P^o^w^e^r,^t^h^{e Det}^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^P^o^w^e^{r sh}^al^l
^a^ppoi^{nt a}^c^o^m^p^e^t^eⁿ^{t a}^d^v^o^c^a^t^e^or^c^ouns^e^l^t^o^c^o^nd^uc^{t t}^h^e^de^f^e^nc^e^.
^T^h^e^a^d^v^o^c^a^t^e^or^c^ouns^e^l^c^o^nd^uc^ti^ng^the^de^f^e^nc^e^on^be^ha^lf^of^the^pr^is^one^r^of^w^a^r^s^h^a^{ll ha}^v^e^a^t^his
^dis^pos^a^l^a^pe^rⁱ^o^d^of^tw^{o w}^e^ek^s^a^t^le^a^s^{t be}^f^o^r^e^the^opeⁿⁱ^ng^of^the^trⁱ^a^{l, a}^s^w^e^{ll a}^s^the^ne^c^e^s^s^a^r^y
^f^a^{cilities to}^p^r^e^p^{are th}^{e d}^e^f^eⁿ^{ce o}^f^th^{e accu}^sed^.^He^m^a^y^,ⁱⁿ^p^a^rticu^l^a^r^{, f}^r^eel^y^vⁱ^{sit th}^{e accu}^sed^an^d
^inte^rv^ie^w^hi^m^{in priv}^a^t^e^.^He^m^a^y^a^l^{so c}^onf^e^r^w^{ith a}ⁿ^y^w^itne^sse^{s f}^o^r^t^h^{e d}^e^f^eⁿ^ce,ⁱⁿ^cl^udⁱⁿ^g
^prisone^rs^of^w^a^{r. He}^sha^{ll ha}^v^e^the^be^ne^f^{it of}^the^s^e^f^a^c^ilitie^{s until}^t^h^e^te^rm^of^a^ppe^a^l^{or pe}^titi^on^ha^s
^e^x^pir^e^d.
^P^a^r^tic^ula^r^s^of^the^c^h^a^r^g^e^or^c^h^a^r^g^e^s^{on w}^h^ic^{h t}^h^e^pr^is^one^r^of^w^a^r^is^to^be^a^r^r^a^ig^ne^{d, a}^s^w^e^{ll a}^s^the
^d^o^c^u^m^en^t^s^w^hⁱ^c^h^{are gen}^e^ral^l^y^c^o^mm^uⁿⁱ^cat^ed^t^o^t^h^{e accu}^sed^b^y^vi^rt^u^e^o^f^t^h^{e l}^a^w^sⁱⁿ^f^o^{rce i}ⁿ^t^h^e
^ar^m^e^d^f^o^{rces o}^f^t^h^{e Det}^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^P^o^w^e^r,^sh^al^l^b^e^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^cat^ed^t^o^t^h^{e accu}^sed^p^rⁱ^s^oⁿ^e^r^o^f^w^a^{r i}ⁿ^a
^la^ng^ua^g^e^w^h^ic^{h he}^u^nde^r^s^taⁿ^d^s^,^a^{nd i}ⁿ^g^o^od^tim^e^be^f^o^r^e^the^opeⁿⁱⁿ^g^of^the^tr^ia^{l. T}^h^e^s^a^m^e
^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^t^h^{e sam}^e^ci^rcu^m^st^an^{ces sh}^al^l^b^e^m^a^d^e^t^o^t^h^{e ad}^vo^cat^{e o}^r^couⁿ^s^el^con^d^u^c^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^e
^de^f^e^nc^e^{on be}^ha^lf^of^the^pr^is^one^r^of^w^a^r^.
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Power,²⁵⁰ the right to appeal a decision,²⁵¹ and if convicted, the right to serve the sentence under ²⁵²
humane conditions. Special Provisions apply in case the offense is punishable by death. A
POW sentenced to death may not be executed until six months after the Protecting Power has ²⁵³
received the required notification under art. 107. The court must be informed that the POW
owes no allegiance to the Detaining Power, encouraging the court to exercise leniency in ²⁵⁴
sentencing on that basis.
A belligerent state may exercise jurisdiction over civilians in occupied territory subject to section
III of the GC. However, the penal laws of the occupied territory remain in force unless the
Occupying Power repeals or suspends them “in cases where they constitute a threat to its security ²⁵⁵
or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention.” The Occupying Power may also
institute such laws that are essential to maintaining order and security, and to carrying out its ²⁵⁶²⁵⁷
obligations under the GC, but these may not be enforced retroactively. In addition, “[n]o
sentence shall be pronounced by the competent courts of the Occupying Power except after a ²⁵⁸
regular trial.” All accused persons have the right to be “promptly informed, in writing, in a
language which they understand, of the particulars of the charges preferred against them, and ²⁵⁹
shall be brought to trial as rapidly as possible.” The accused has the right to counsel of choice ²⁶⁰
and an interpreter, the right to present evidence necessary to his defense, and the right to appeal ²⁶¹
a sentence. These provisions apply not only in occupied territory but also, by analogy, to ²⁶²
persons interned on the territory of the Detaining Power.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^T^h^e^re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^of^the^P^r^ote^c^t^ing^P^o^w^e^{r sha}^{ll be}^eⁿ^t^itle^d^{to a}^tte^{nd t}^h^e^tria^l^of^the^c^a^s^e^,^unle^ss,
^e^x^c^e^p^tiona^lly^{, this is he}^ldⁱⁿ^c^a^m^e^r^a^{in t}^h^e^inte^re^st^o^f^S^t^at^{e secu}^ri^t^y^.^In^su^c^h^{a case t}^h^{e Det}^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g
^P^o^w^e^{r sh}^al^l^ad^vi^{se t}^h^e^P^r^o^t^ectⁱⁿ^{g P}^o^w^e^{r acco}^rdⁱⁿ^gl^y^.
²⁵⁰^Id^.^(“^T^h^e^re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^of^the^Prote^c^ting^P^o^w^e^{r sha}^{ll be}^eⁿ^title^d^t^o^a^tte^nd^the^tria^{l of}^the^c^a^s^e^,^uⁿ^le^ss,
^e^x^c^e^p^tiona^lly^{, this is he}^ldⁱⁿ^c^a^m^e^r^aⁱⁿ^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^t^e^rest^o^f^S^t^at^{e secu}^ri^t^y^.^”^).
²⁵¹^G^P^W^a^r^{t. 10}^6:
^Ev^e^r^y^pr^is^one^r^of^w^a^r^s^h^a^{ll ha}^v^e^{, in t}^h^e^s^a^m^e^m^a^nne^r^a^s^the^m^e^m^b^er^s^of^the^a^r^m^e^d^f^o^r^c^e^s^of^the
^De^ta^ining^P^o^w^e^{r, the}^rig^h^t^of^a^p^p^e^a^l^{or pe}^titi^on^f^r^om^aⁿ^y^se^nteⁿ^c^e^proⁿ^o^unc^e^d^up^on^him^,^w^{ith a}
^vⁱ^ew^{to the}^q^u^a^s^hi^ng^or^r^e^vⁱ^sⁱ^ng^o^f^the^s^e^nteⁿ^c^e^or^the^r^e^opeⁿⁱ^ng^of^the^tr^ia^{l. H}^e^s^h^a^l^l^be^f^u^lly
^inf^o^rm^e^d^of^{his rig}^h^{t to a}^p^pe^a^l^or^pe^titio^{n a}ⁿ^d^of^the^tim^e^li^m^{it w}^{ithin w}^h^ic^{h he}^m^a^y^{do so.}
²⁵²^G^P^W^a^r^{t. 10}^8:
^S^eⁿ^t^en^{ces p}^r^on^ouⁿ^{ced o}ⁿ^p^rⁱ^s^oⁿ^e^{rs o}^f^{war a}^f^t^e^{r a co}ⁿ^vⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^h^a^{s b}^e^co^m^e^d^u^l^y^en^f^o^rceab^l^e^,^sh^al^l^b^e
^servedⁱⁿ^t^h^{e sam}^e^est^a^b^lⁱ^s^h^m^en^t^s^an^d^uⁿ^d^e^{r t}^h^{e sam}^e^coⁿ^dⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^asⁱⁿ^t^h^{e case o}^f^m^e^m^b^{ers o}^f^t^h^e
^a^r^m^e^{d f}^o^rc^e^s^o^f^the^De^ta^ining^Po^w^e^r.^T^h^e^s^e^c^onditio^{ns sha}^l^l^{in a}^l^l^c^a^s^e^s^c^onf^or^m^{to the}
^r^e^quir^e^m^e^nts^of^he^a^{lth a}^nd^hum^aⁿ^ity^.
²⁵³^G^P^W^a^r^{t. 10}^1.
²⁵⁴^G^P^W^a^r^{t. 10}^0.
²⁵⁵^G^C^a^r^{t. 64}
²⁵⁶^Id^.
²⁵⁷^Se^e^id.^art^.⁶⁵^-66
²⁵⁸^Id^.^a^r^t⁷¹^.
²⁵⁹^Id^.
²⁶⁰^G^C^{. a}^r^{t. 72.}
²⁶¹^Id^.^a^r^t.⁷³^.
²⁶²^Id^.^a^r^t.¹^{26 (}^a^pplyⁱ^ng^a^r^ts^{. 71-}⁷⁶^by^aⁿ^a^l^ogy^{to inte}^rⁿ^e^e^sⁱⁿ^the^na^ti^ona^{l te}^rrit^o^ry^of^the^De^ta^ining^P^o^w^e^{r). It is}
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Protected persons have the additional right to have the Protecting Power notified of the charges²⁶³ ²⁶⁴
and may have a representative of that power attend the trial. If a protected person is sentenced
to death, the sentence may not be carried out prior to six months after the Protecting Power is ²⁶⁵
notified of the sentence.
Chapter IX applies to civilian internees, and provides protection against duplicate punishment.²⁶⁶
Violations of camp disciplinary rules may also be punished, but they are not to be treated as
crimes. Internees may not be punished for a simple disciplinary breach, including attempted ²⁶⁷²⁶⁸
escape, by confinement in a penitentiary.
The term “unlawful belligerents” is not found in the Geneva Conventions. Therefore, rules
applicable to the trials of unlawful belligerents depend on whether the person charged is
considered to be a civilian or whether a separate standard, found outside of the Geneva
Conventions, applies. If the minimum standards outlined in Common Article 3 apply, the
following are forbidden:
^T^h^{e pas}^sⁱⁿ^g^of^s^eⁿ^t^eⁿ^ces^an^d^th^{e carry}ⁱⁿ^g^ou^{t of}^ex^ec^u^tions^wⁱ^th^o^u^{t prev}^iou^s^j^u^dgm^eⁿ^t
^pron^ouⁿ^{ced b}^y^{a regu}^larl^y^co^ns^tit^u^t^{ed cou}^r^{t, a}^f^f^o^rdin^{g all}^th^e^j^u^{dicial gu}^araⁿ^tees^w^h^{ich are}
^recogⁿⁱ^{zed as}ⁱⁿ^di^s^p^en^s^a^{ble b}^y^civⁱ^{lized peoples}^.
Many nations impose upon their soldiers the duty to make every effort to escape from captivity if ²⁶⁹
they should fall into the hands of the enemy. At the same time, the Detaining Power will ²⁷⁰
undoubtedly seek to take all possible precautions to prevent escape. The Geneva Conventions
regulate the use of deadly force to prevent an escape, requiring warning prior to the firing of any ²⁷¹
shots. Attempted escape or aiding and abetting such an attempt is treated as a disciplinary
matter only; once an escape is deemed to be “successful,” in the case the prisoner is recaptured,

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^a^r^g^u^a^b^le^tha^t^th^is^pr^ov^is^ion^w^oul^{d a}^l^s^o^eⁿ^c^o^m^p^a^s^s^de^ta^ine^e^s^a^t^G^u^aⁿ^tá^na^m^o^B^a^y^,^a^lthoug^{h t}^h^e^ba^s^e^is^not^te^c^hnic^a^lly
^{U.S. territ}^o^ry^.
²⁶³^Id^.^a^r^t⁷¹^.
²⁶⁴^Id^.^a^r^t⁷⁴^.
²⁶⁵^Id^.^a^r^t⁷⁵^.
²⁶⁶^Id^.^a^r^{t. 11}^8.
²⁶⁷^G^C^a^r^{t. 122.}
²⁶⁸^Id^.^a^r^t.¹^24.
²⁶⁹^Se^e^L^EV^IE^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te⁴⁹^{, a}^t⁴⁰³^.
²⁷⁰^S^{ee i}^d^.⁽ⁿ^o^tin^g^P^O^W^s^w^{ill lik}^el^y^b^e^p^l^acedⁱⁿ^en^clo^s^u^r^{es m}^a^d^e^“as^escap^e-p^r^o^o^f^{as h}^u^m^an^l^y^p^o^ssib^l^e^”^).
²⁷¹^G^P^W^a^r^{t. 42}^pr^ovⁱ^d^e^s^:
^T^h^e^us^e^of^w^e^a^pons^a^g^aⁱ^ns^{t pr}^is^oⁿ^e^r^s^of^w^a^r^,^e^s^pe^cⁱ^a^l^l^y^a^g^aⁱ^ns^{t tho}^s^e^w^{ho a}^r^e^e^s^ca^ping^or
^at^t^e^m^p^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^o^escap^e,^sh^al^l^coⁿ^s^tⁱ^t^u^t^e^an^ext^r^em^e^measu^r^e,^w^hⁱ^c^h^shal^l^al^w^a^{ys b}^e^p^r^eced^ed^b^y
^w^a^rnⁱⁿ^{gs ap}^p^r^o^p^rⁱ^a^t^e^t^o^t^h^{e ci}^rcumst^an^ces.

no punishment is permitted.²⁷² A prisoner who has attempted escape may be subjected to ²⁷³
extraordinary surveillance measures.
With respect to civilian detainees, the Geneva Conventions permits parties to a conflict to take
“such measures of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a ²⁷⁴
result of the war.” However, the most severe measure of control permissible is assigned ²⁷⁵²⁷⁶
residence or internment, and collective punishment is proscribed. Confinement is restricted ²⁷⁷
to those awaiting disciplinary proceedings or criminal trials. Persons detained under Common
Article 3 may not be punished without trial.
It is unclear where the line between security measures and punitive measures lies. POWs are ²⁷⁸
entitled to living quarters similar to those of their guards. In contrast, press reports have
described the facilities at Guantánamo Bay as similar to a “high security prison.” The present
living conditions may be subject to criticism as punitive measures. The Department of Defense
has added a new medium-security facility, known as Camp 4, with cells that can hold up to 20
detainees, to house those deemed to pose less of a threat to the United States but who cannot yet
be repatriated.
The Conventions allow prisoners to be searched and weapons confiscated, but personal property ²⁷⁹
must be returned to them once internment ends. U.S. Army regulations require detainees to be
searched for weapons and other contraband immediately after their capture, prior to a
determination of the captive’s status.
One argument advanced to support denying POW status to the detainees is that the United States
would be required to return them to their countries of origin once hostilities cease. Some
observers argue that this may not in practice be such an immediate requirement, and question
whether hostilities will have ceased when U.S. troops have ceased combat operations in
Afghanistan.

²⁷²^Id^{. a}^r^t.⁹¹^-9^5.
²⁷³^G^P^W^a^r^{t. 92;}^G^C^a^r^{t. 12}^0.
²⁷⁴^G^C^a^r^{t. 27.}
²⁷⁵^Id^{. a}^r^t.⁴¹^.
²⁷⁶^Id^{. a}^r^t.³³^.
²⁷⁷^Se^e^id^.^a^r^{ts. 1}²²^(lim^iting^c^onf^ine^m^eⁿ^{t in c}^o^nj^unc^ti^{on w}^ith^disc^ipli^na^ry^inv^e^sti^g^a^{tion, i}ⁿ^c^l^u^d^ing^e^s^c^a^p^e^s^a^nd
^a^tte^m^p^te^{d e}^s^c^a^p^e^s^{, to f}^ourte^eⁿ^da^y^s^{) a}^{nd 1}^{24 (c}^oⁿ^fⁱ^ne^m^e^{nt f}^o^{r disc}^iplina^r^y^inf^r^a^c^{tion n}^o^{t t}^o^be^c^a^rrie^d^o^u^{t i}ⁿ^c^r^im^ina^l
^p^eⁿⁱ^t^eⁿ^tⁱ^a^ry^).^“Un^l^a^w^f^u^l^coⁿ^fⁱⁿ^emen^t^”^o^f^{a p}^r^o^t^ect^ed^p^e^rsonⁱ^s^{a g}^r^{ave b}^r^each^.^Id^.^ar^t¹⁴^7.
²⁷⁸^G^P^W^a^r^{t. 25}^pr^ovⁱ^d^e^s^:
^P^r^is^one^rs^of^wa^{r sha}^{ll be}^q^u^a^r^te^re^{d u}^nde^{r c}^o^nd^itio^ns^a^s^f^a^v^oura^b^le^a^s^those^f^o^{r the}^f^o^rc^e^s^of^the
^D^e^ta^ining^P^o^w^e^{r w}^{ho a}^r^e^bille^te^d^{in t}^h^e^s^a^m^e^a^r^e^a^.^T^h^e^s^a^{id c}^onditⁱ^ons^s^h^a^{ll m}^a^ke^a^llow^a^nc^e^f^o^r
^t^h^{e h}^a^bⁱ^t^s^an^{d cu}^st^o^m^{s o}^f^t^h^{e p}^rⁱ^s^oⁿ^e^{rs an}^{d sh}^al^lⁱⁿⁿ^o^{case b}^e^p^r^ej^u^dⁱ^ci^al^t^o^t^h^ei^{r h}^eal^t^h^.
^T^h^e^f^o^r^e^g^o^ing^pr^ov^is^io^ns^s^h^a^l^l^a^p^ply^{in pa}^r^tic^ula^r^t^o^t^h^e^d^o^r^m^itorⁱ^e^s^of^pr^is^one^r^s^of^w^a^r^a^s^r^e^ga^r^d^s
^b^o^t^h^t^o^t^a^l^su^rf^{ace an}^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^m^u^m^c^u^bⁱ^{c sp}^ace,^and^t^h^{e gen}^e^ralⁱⁿ^st^al^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^b^e^ddⁱⁿ^{g and}^bl^an^ket^s^.
^T^h^{e p}^r^emⁱ^s^{es p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^ed^f^o^{r t}^h^e^u^s^{e o}^f^p^rⁱ^s^on^{ers o}^f^w^a^{r i}ⁿ^dⁱ^vi^d^u^a^l^l^y^o^r^co^l^l^ectⁱ^v^el^y^,^sh^al^l^b^e^en^tⁱ^r^el^y
^pr^ote^c^t^e^d^f^r^om^da^m^pne^s^s^a^{nd a}^d^e^qua^te^ly^he^a^t^e^d^a^{nd lig}^hte^d^{, i}ⁿ^pa^r^tic^ula^r^be^tw^e^eⁿ^dus^k^a^nd^lig^hts
^o^u^t^.^A^l^l^p^r^ecau^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^m^u^st^b^e^t^a^keⁿ^agaiⁿ^s^t^t^h^e^d^aⁿ^g^{er o}^f^fⁱ^re.
²⁷⁹^Se^e^L^EV^IE^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te⁴⁹^{, a}^t¹¹⁰^.

Under GPW art. 21, internment of POWs must cease when no longer necessary. According to
GPW art. 118, repatriation must occur “without delay at the cessation of active hostilities.” The
language of the 1929 Geneva Convention was not as adamant, requiring only that parties should
provide, in armistice agreements, for repatriation of prisoners to occur “with the least possible ²⁸⁰
delay after cessation of hostilities.” However, there is an exception for prisoners who are ²⁸¹
charged with or have been convicted of an indictable crime. There is also case law suggesting ^th
the obligation to repatriate is not automatic and immediate. The 9 Circuit declined to grant
freedom to a POW captured in Italy during the Second World War, who sought release partly on ²⁸²
the grounds that hostilities had ceased. The court noted that no peace treaty had yet been
negotiated between Italy and the United States, and was not swayed by the fact that Italy had by
that time changed sides. It appears to have remained international state practice to provide for ²⁸³
repatriation of prisoners of war by express agreement.
Interned civilians must also be released “as soon as the reasons which necessitated [their] ²⁸⁴
internment no longer exist,” which will occur “as soon as possible after the close of ²⁸⁵
hostilities.” There is an exception for internees against whom penal proceedings are pending or ²⁸⁶
who have been convicted and sentenced for non-disciplinary offenses. These internees may be
detained “until the close of such proceedings and, if circumstances require, until the completion ²⁸⁷
of the penalty.”A study by the International Committee of the Red Cross concluded that
customary international law imposes similar rules with respect to persons deprived of their liberty ²⁸⁸
in the context of Common Article 3.
The proper treatment of prisoners is the responsibility of the detaining power and the individuals
directly responsible for their conditions. Mistreatment of prisoners of war may incur liability
under both international norms and the UCMJ. It is possible that the refusal to hold tribunals to ²⁸⁹
determine the legal status and rights of detainees may also contravene the law of war.

²⁸⁰^Se^e¹⁹²⁹^G^e^ne^v^a^C^onv^eⁿ^{tion R}^e^la^tiv^e^{to the}^T^r^e^a^t^m^e^{nt of}^P^r^is^one^r^s^of^W^a^r^a^r^{t. 75, 4}⁷^S^t^a^t^{. 2}⁰²¹⁽^J^uly^{27, 1}⁹²⁹⁾^.
²⁸¹^Se^e^G^P^W^a^r^{t. 11}^9:
^P^rⁱ^s^oⁿ^e^rs^o^f^{war agai}ⁿ^s^t^w^h^o^m^crⁱ^mⁱⁿ^al^p^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^{gs f}^o^{r an}ⁱⁿ^dⁱ^ct^a^b^l^e^o^f^f^eⁿ^{ce ar}^{e p}^eⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^m^a^{y b}^e
^d^e^tain^ed^uⁿ^t^{il t}^h^{e en}^d^o^f^su^ch^p^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^s^{, an}^d^,^ifⁿ^ecessar^y^{, u}ⁿ^til^t^h^{e co}^m^p^letioⁿ^o^f^th^e
^pun^is^hm^eⁿ^{t. T}^h^e^s^a^m^e^s^h^a^{ll a}^pply^to^pr^is^oⁿ^e^r^s^of^w^a^r^a^l^r^e^a^d^y^c^onv^ic^te^{d f}^o^r^aⁿⁱⁿ^dic^t^a^b^le^of^f^e^nc^e^.
²⁸²^Se^e^In^re^T^e^r^r^ito,¹⁵^{6 F.}^2d¹^{42 (}⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁴⁶⁾^.
²⁸³^S^ee,^e.^g^.^PO^W^D^OCUM^E^N^T^S^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te¹⁴^{0, a}^t⁷⁹^{6, (}^notiⁿ^g^th^a^t^{it to}^ok^ne^a^r^ly^t^w^{o y}^e^a^r^{s a}^f^te^{r hostilitie}^s^be^tw^e^eⁿ
^P^a^kⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^aⁿ^{d I}^ndia^eⁿ^de^{d i}ⁿ¹⁹⁷¹^be^f^o^r^e^P^a^kⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^{i pr}^is^one^r^s^of^w^a^r^w^e^r^e^r^e^pa^tr^ia^te^d)^.
²⁸⁴^G^C^a^r^{t. 132.}
²⁸⁵^Id^.^a^r^t.¹^33.
²⁸⁶^G^C^a^r^{t. 133.}
²⁸⁷^Id^.
²⁸⁸^Se^e^I^C^US^T^O^M^A^RY^IHL^,^s^upr^a^f^o^o^t^no^t^e²¹^9,^at⁴⁵^1.
²⁸⁹^F^aⁱ^l^u^{re t}^o^af^f^o^rd^{a p}^rⁱ^s^oⁿ^e^{r a reg}^u^l^a^{r t}^rⁱ^a^lⁱⁿ^acco^rd^an^{ce w}ⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e 19}²⁹^G^eⁿ^e^{va Co}ⁿ^v^en^tⁱ^oⁿ^resu^l^t^edⁱⁿ^so^m^e
^c^onv^ic^tions^by^pos^t-^W^o^r^l^{d W}^a^r^I^I^tr^ib^una^ls^{. J}^a^paⁿ^,^f^o^r^e^x^am^ple^,^a^dopte^d^a^p^o^lic^y^pr^oc^la^im^ing^eⁿ^em^y^aⁱ^r^m^eⁿ^w^ho
^pa^r^tic^ipa^t^e^dⁱⁿ^bom^bing^r^a^ids^a^g^aⁱ^ns^{t J}^a^pa^ne^s^e^te^r^r^itor^y^{to be}^vⁱ^ola^t^or^s^of^the^la^w^of^w^a^r^a^{nd s}^ubje^c^t^t^o^e^x^e^c^u^tion.^T^h^is
^“^E^ne^m^y^Air^m^eⁿ^A^c^t”^re^sulte^{d in}^the^de^a^t^hs^of^m^aⁿ^y^c^a^p^ture^{d Am}^e^r^ic^aⁿ^f^lie^{rs a}^f^te^{r a}^lle^ge^dl^y^sha^m^tria^ls.^Se^e^T^r^ia^{l of}
^Lⁱ^e^u^te^na^{nt G}^e^ne^ra^{l Shig}^e^r^{u Sa}^w^a^da^a^{nd T}^h^re^e^Othe^rs,^{5 L}^R^T^W^{C 1}^{(U.S. M}^ilita^ry^Com^mⁱ^{ssion, S}^h^aⁿ^g^h^aⁱ¹⁹⁴⁶^),
^re^printe^{d i}ⁿ^PO^W^D^OCUM^E^N^T^S^,^supr^a^f^ootn^o^te¹⁴⁰^,^d^o^c^.^no.⁷⁸⁽^f^our^J^a^pa^ne^s^e^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^s^c^onv^ic^te^{d of}^de^ny^ing^f^a^ir^tr^ia^l
^{to c}^a^p^tu^re^{d “}^D^oo^little^Raⁱ^d^e^r^s”^{); T}^r^ia^{l of}^Lⁱ^e^u^te^na^{nt G}^e^ne^ra^{l Ha}^ruk^e^{i Isa}^y^a^m^a^a^{nd Se}^v^e^{n Othe}^{rs, 5}^L^R^T^W^{C 60 (U.S.}
^Milita^ry^Com^mⁱ^{ssion, Sha}ⁿ^g^h^aⁱ¹⁹⁴⁶^),^re^prin^te^{d i}ⁿ^PO^W^D^OCUM^E^N^T^S^,^s^upr^a^f^o^o^t^no^t^e¹⁴^0,^do^c.ⁿ^o^.⁸²⁽^c^on^vi^ctⁱ^oⁿ^f^o^r
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Detainees have the right to protest their treatment to the detaining power or to a neutral power or ²⁹⁰
organization serving as the protecting power, and may not be punished for having asserted a ²⁹¹
grievance, even where it is considered unfounded. (In this case, the role of protector appears to
be filled by the International Committee of the Red Cross.) Other signatory states are obligated to ²⁹²
“ensure respect” for the Conventions “in all circumstances,” meaning that other states may
issue diplomatic challenges on behalf of the detainees, and may even find a cause of action in ²⁹³
domestic courts to challenge the detention. Under the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military
Commissions Act, the detainees have limited recourse to federal courts to challenge their status as ²⁹⁴
“enemy combatants,” but they are prohibited from invoking their rights under the Geneva
Conventions in connection with such a challenge.

The Constitution provides Congress with ample authority to legislate the treatment of battlefield
detainees in the custody of the U.S. military. The Constitution empowers Congress to make rules ²⁹⁵²⁹⁶
regarding capture on land or water, to define and punish violations of international law, and ²⁹⁷
to make regulations to govern the armed forces. Congress also has the constitutional ²⁹⁸
prerogative to declare war, a power it did not formally exercise with regard to the armed
conflict in Afghanistan. By not declaring war, Congress has implicitly limited some presidential ²⁹⁹
authorities.
Despite the constitutional powers listed above, Congress has not generally taken an active rule in
prescribing the treatment of prisoners of war. Existing statutes concerning enemy prisoners of war
are limited to providing for the use of DOD funds to pay expenses incident to the maintenance, ³⁰⁰
pay, and allowances of persons in custody of any military department, to provide for the
disposition of the remains of enemy prisoners of war and interned enemy aliens who die in the

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^“^p^e^r^m^itting^a^{nd pa}^rtic^ipa^tⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^aⁿ^ille^g^a^{l a}ⁿ^d^f^a^lse^tria^l”^of^Am^e^rⁱ^c^aⁿ^P^O^W^s^).
²⁹⁰^G^P^W^a^r^{t. 78.}
²⁹¹^Id^.
²⁹²^GP^{W a}^r^t^.¹^.
²⁹³^Suc^h^a^s^u^{it w}^a^{s dism}^isse^{d in G}^r^e^a^{t Brita}^in.^Se^e^Jo^hn^Ch^a^p^m^aⁿ^,^‘^T^alib^an’^Br^ito^{n L}^o^s^e^s^Hⁱ^s^C^o^ur^{t Bi}^d^,^DA^I^L^Y
^E^XP^RE^S^S^(Unite^{d King}^d^o^m⁾^{, Ma}^{r. 16,}²⁰⁰²^{, a}^t⁴⁷^{. T}^h^e^m^o^the^r^of^a^British^de^ta^ine^e^bro^u^g^h^{t a}^c^a^s^e^c^l^aⁱ^mⁱ^ng^he^{r son,}
^one^of^the^de^ta^ine^e^s^he^ld^a^t^G^u^aⁿ^ta^na^m^o^Ba^y^,^ha^s^w^r^ong^l^y^be^eⁿ^de^nie^d^P^O^W^sta^t^{us, w}^a^{s inte}^rrog^a^te^{d by}^British
^secu^ri^t^y^s^e^rvi^c^{es an}^d^h^a^{s b}^een^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^l^e^gal^rep^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^.^T^h^{e Hi}^gh^Cou^r^t^rej^ect^ed^t^h^{e ch}^al^l^eⁿ^g^{e as essen}^tⁱ^a^l^l^y^a
^“^politic^a^l^que^sti^on,”^but^c^r^itic^iz^e^d^the^Uni^t^e^d^St^a^t^e^s^{’ c}^o^nd^uc^{t w}^{ith r}^e^spe^c^t^{to the}^de^ta^ine^e^s^.^Se^e^A^bba^sⁱ^v^.^Se^c^’^y^of
^Sta^t^e^,^[²⁰⁰²^]^EW^C^A^Cⁱ^v^1598,^re^printe^dⁱⁿ⁴²^I^.^L^.^{M. 35}⁸⁽²⁰⁰³⁾^.
²⁹⁴^R^a^s^u^{l v}^.^B^u^s^h^{, 5}⁴²^U^.^S.⁴^{66 (}²⁰⁰⁴⁾^.^H^o^w^e^v^e^r^,^C^ong^r^e^s^s^ha^s^sⁱ^nc^{e e}ⁿ^a^c^t^e^d^the^D^e^ta^ine^e^T^r^e^a^t^m^e^{nt A}^c^{t o}^f²⁰⁰^5,^P.L^.
¹⁰⁹^-1⁴⁸^,^title^X^,^aⁿ^d^th^{e M}ⁱ^litary^Co^mm^issioⁿ^s^{Act, P.L}^.¹⁰⁹^-³⁶⁶^,^w^h^ich^lim^{it th}^{e d}^e^tain^{ees’ access}^to^co^u^r^ts.^Se^e^infra
^f^ootnote³¹⁹^et^seq^.^,^and^acco^m^p^aⁿ^yⁱⁿ^g^t^e^xt^.
²⁹⁵^U.^S^.^C^ONS^T^{. a}^r^{t. I}^,^§^{8, c}^l^.¹¹
²⁹⁶^Id^.^a^r^t.^I,^{§ 8}^,^c^l^.¹⁰^.
²⁹⁷^Id^.^a^r^t.^I,^{§ 8}^,^c^l^.¹⁴^.
²⁹⁸^Id^.^a^r^t.^I,^{§ 8}^,^c^l^.¹¹^.
²⁹⁹^Se^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³¹¹³³^,^D^e^c^l^ar^ati^ons^{of W}^a^r^an^{d A}^u^th^or^iz^ati^o^ns^for^t^h^e^U^s^e^{of M}^ili^tar^y^F^o^r^c^e^:^Hⁱ^s^t^or^ic^al
^Bac^k^g^r^o^uⁿ^d^a^nd^Le^ga^{l I}^m^plic^atio^ns^{, by}^J^e^nnif^e^r^K^.^Els^e^a^a^{nd R}ⁱ^c^h^a^r^{d F. G}^r^im^m^e^tt.
³⁰⁰^{10 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁹⁵⁶⁽⁵⁾^.

custody of a military department,³⁰¹ to penalize those who aid the escape of an enemy prisoner,³⁰²
and to exempt prisoners of war from the entitlement to claim of compensation for injury or death ³⁰³
resulting from war-risk hazard. However, prisoners of war are covered under the jurisdiction of ³⁰⁴
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
The Administration has asserted that the war on terror is a new kind of conflict, requiring a new
set of rules and definitions. It has been observed that the nature of the hostilities and U.S.
objectives borrow some characteristics from the realm of law enforcement and others from a
model based on conventional war. Consequently, the role of Congress might be seen as
particularly important in providing a definition and a set of boundaries to shape how such a war is
to be fought. Courts have not been receptive to the argument that the President has the inherent
authority to determine how to pursue the war against terrorism. However, Congress’s enactment
of the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act, by restricting the Guantanamo
Bay detainees’ access to U.S. courts, may limit the opportunity for any judicial testing of whether
executive actions comply with congressional authorization.

Several measures were introduced during the 108^th Congress to address the detention of persons
detained in connection with the war on terrorism. Legislation to authorize the President to
convene military tribunals under certain circumstances was not enacted. However, the National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2005, PL 108-375 (October 28, 2004) (“NDA”) provided
measures to ensure the proper treatment of all prisoners held in connection with the war on ³⁰⁵
terrorism, including the prisoners in military custody at Guantanamo Bay.
The NDA emphasizes that the policy of the United States is to ensure that no detainee in its
custody is subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and to promptly
investigate and prosecute instances of abuse, to ensure that U.S. personnel understand the
applicable standards, to accord detainees whose status is in doubt the protection for prisoners of
war under the Geneva Conventions, and to “expeditiously process and, if appropriate, prosecute
detainees in the custody of the United States, including those in the custody of the United States
Armed Forces at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.” (Sec. 1091). It also requires the military to implement,
within 150 days of the passage of the act, a policy to ensure detainees are treated in accordance
with the obligations set forth in section 1091, (Sec. 1092), and to submit copies of regulations to
Congress along with a report setting forth steps taken to implement section 1092. (Sec. 1093).
The NDA also requires DOD to submit an annual report giving notice of any investigation into
any violation of laws regarding the treatment of detainees, aggregate data relating to the detention
operations of the Department of Defense, including how many persons are held and in what
status, and how many have been transferred to the jurisdiction of other countries. The NDA does
not address the treatment of persons in custody of the CIA.

³⁰¹^{10 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁴⁸³^.
³⁰²^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁷⁵^7.
³⁰³^{42 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁷⁰¹^.
³⁰⁴^Se^e¹⁰^U^.^S.C^.^§⁸⁰²⁽^a⁾⁽⁹⁾^.
³⁰⁵^For^m^o^r^e^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³²³⁹^5,^U.^S^.^T^r^ea^t^m^en^t^o^f^P^rⁱ^s^on^{ers i}ⁿ^Ir^a^q^:^S^e^l^ect^ed^L^e^ga^l^Issu^es^{, by}
^J^e^nnif^e^r^K^.^Els^e^a^.

Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 as part of both the FY2006 defense ³⁰⁶³⁰⁷
appropriations and authorization acts. In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act of
2006, P.L. 109-163, requires the Secretary of Defense to establish a uniform policy with respect
to the role of military medical and behavioral science personnel in the interrogation of detainees,
which was to be reported to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2006 (§ 705). The
House of Representatives passed language in its foreign relations authorization bill for FY2006
and FY2007 (H.R. 2601) to express the sense of the Congress affirming the necessity of
interrogation operations at Guantanamo Bay.
The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) requires uniform standards for interrogation of ³⁰⁸
persons in the custody of the Department of Defense and expressly bans cruel, inhuman, or ³⁰⁹
degrading treatment of detainees in the custody of any U.S. agency. The prohibited treatment is
defined as that which would violate the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, as the Senate has interpreted “cruel, inhuman, or degrading” treatment banned by ³¹⁰
the U.N. Convention Against Torture. The provision does not create a cause of action for
detainees to ask a court for relief based on inconsistent treatment, and it divests the courts of
jurisdiction to hear challenges by those detained at Guantanamo Bay based on their treatment or ³¹¹
living conditions. It also provides a legal defense to U.S. officers and agents who may be sued ³¹²
or prosecuted based on their treatment or interrogation of detainees. This language appears to
have been added as a compromise, because the Administration reportedly sought to have the
Central Intelligence Agency excepted from the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment on the grounds that the President needs “maximum flexibility in dealing with the global ³¹³
war on terrorism.”

³⁰⁶^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^Em^e^r^g^e^nc^y^Supple^m^eⁿ^ta^{l A}^ppr^opr^ia^tio^ns^{to A}^ddr^e^s^s^H^u^r^rⁱ^c^aⁿ^e^sⁱⁿ^the^G^u^l^f^of^Me^xⁱ^c^o^{, a}^nd
^P^aⁿ^d^e^m^ic^Inf^l^ue^nz^a^A^c^{t of}²⁰⁰⁶^,^T^itle^X^,^P^.^L^.¹⁰^9-1^48,¹¹⁹^Sta^t^.²⁶⁸⁰⁽²⁰⁰^5).
³⁰⁷^N^a^tiona^{l D}^e^f^e^ns^e^A^u^thoriz^a^tion^A^c^t^f^o^{r Fis}^c^a^l^Y^e^a^r²⁰⁰⁶^{, T}^itle^X^I^V^,^P.L^.¹^09-¹⁶^3,¹¹^{9 ST}^A^T^{. 313}^{6 (2}⁰⁰^6).
³⁰⁸^Se^c^tion¹⁴⁰²^of^P^.^L^.¹^09-¹⁶^{3 re}^q^u^ire^s^{DoD t}^o^f^o^llow^the^A^r^m^y^Fie^l^{d Ma}ⁿ^u^a^l^f^o^{r in}^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^inte^rro^g^a^tion.^Se^e
^D^EP^A^R^TM^E^N^{T O}^F^T^H^E^A^RMY^F^IE^LD^M^AN^U^A^L^34-^52,^I^NT^E^L^L^I^GE^NC^E^I^NT^E^R^R^O^GA^T^I^O^N⁽¹⁹⁹²⁾^,^av^aila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^4.a^r^m^y^.^m^il/^oc^pa^/^r^e^por^ts^/A^r^m^y^I^G^D^e^t^aⁱ^ne^eA^bus^e^/^FM3⁴^-^52I^nte^l^Iⁿ^te^r^r^o^g^a^ti^on.^pdf⁽^S^e^p^.^1,²⁰⁰⁴⁾^.^For^aⁿ
^aⁿ^a^l^y^s^is^of^the^a^ppr^ov^e^dⁱⁿ^te^r^r^o^g^a^tion^pr^oc^e^dur^e^s^{, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^p^o^r^t^R^L³²⁵⁶^7,^L^a^w^f^ulne^s^s^of^Iⁿ^te^r^r^o^g^a^tio^{n Te}^c^h^niq^u^e^s
^unde^r^t^h^e^G^e^ne^v^a^C^onv^eⁿ^ti^ons^,^b^y^Je^nnif^e^r^K^.^Els^e^a^.
³⁰⁹^Se^c^tion¹⁴⁰³^of^P^.^L^.¹^09-¹⁶^3.^Se^e^,^Inte^rrog^a^ti^{on of}^De^ta^ine^e^s^:
^Overvi^{ew o}^f^t^h^{e McCa}ⁱⁿ^A^m^end^m^en^t^{, by}^Mic^h^a^e^l^J^o^hⁿ^G^a^rc^ia^.
³¹⁰^Se^c^tion¹⁴⁰³⁽^d⁾^of^P.L^.¹⁰^9-¹⁶³^.^For^m^o^r^e^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³²⁴³^8,^U^.^N^.^C^o^nv^eⁿ^tio^{n Ag}^ai^ns^t
^Tor^t^ur^e⁽^C^AT)^:^O^v^e^r^vⁱ^e^w^and^Ap^plic^ati^oⁿ^to^Iⁿ^te^r^r^o^gati^oⁿ^Te^c^hni^que^s^,^by^Mic^h^a^e^l^J^{ohn G}^a^r^c^ia^.
³¹¹^Se^c^tion¹⁴⁰⁵^of^P^.^L^.¹^09-¹⁶^{3 (}^d^eⁿ^yⁱ^ng^a^lie^{ns in m}^ilita^r^y^c^u^stody^priv^ile^g^e^{to f}^ile^w^r^{it of}^ha^be^a^s^c^o^{rpus or “}^aⁿ^y
^othe^{r a}^c^tio^{n a}^g^aⁱ^ns^{t t}^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^a^t^e^s^{or its}^a^g^eⁿ^ts^re^la^ting^{to a}ⁿ^y^a^s^pe^c^t^of^the^[^ir^{] de}^te^nt^io^n...”^).
³¹²^Se^c^tion¹⁴⁰⁴^of^P^.^L^.¹^09-¹⁶^{3 p}^r^ov^ide^s^a^de^f^e^nse^{in litig}^a^tio^{n re}^la^t^e^{d to “}^s^pe^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^ope^ra^tio^na^{l pra}^c^tic^e^s^,”^inv^o^lv^ing
^de^te^ntio^{n a}ⁿ^{d i}ⁿ^te^r^r^o^g^a^tio^{n w}^h^e^r^e^the^de^f^e^nda^nt
^did^no^{t k}^now^tha^t^t^h^e^pr^a^c^tic^e^s^w^e^r^e^unla^w^f^u^{l a}^{nd a}^pe^r^s^on^of^or^di^na^r^y^se^ns^e^a^{nd u}^nde^r^s^taⁿ^d^ing
^w^{ould n}^o^{t k}ⁿ^o^w^the^pr^a^c^tic^e^s^w^e^r^e^unla^w^f^u^{l. G}^{ood f}^a^{ith r}^e^lia^nc^e^oⁿ^a^d^vⁱ^c^e^of^c^ouns^e^l^s^h^ou^ld^be^aⁿ
^im^por^ta^{nt f}^a^c^t^or^{, a}^m^ong^othe^r^s^{, t}^o^c^onsⁱ^d^e^rⁱⁿ^a^s^s^e^s^sⁱ^ng^w^h^e^t^he^r^a^pe^r^s^on^of^or^di^na^r^y^s^e^ns^e^a^nd
^unde^r^s^taⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^w^ould^ha^v^e^k^now^{n the}^pr^a^c^tic^e^s^to^be^uⁿ^la^w^f^ul.
³¹³^Se^e^Eric^Sc^hm^itt,^E^xcep^tⁱ^oⁿ^S^oug^h^tⁱⁿ^Det^aⁱⁿ^{ee A}^b^u^s^{e B}^aⁿ^{, N}^.^Y^.^T^IM^ES^{, O}^c^{t. 25, 2}⁰⁰⁵^{, a}^t¹⁶^.

The DTA also includes a modified version of the Graham Amendment (S.Amdt. 2516 to S. 1042, ³¹⁴
“the Graham-Levin Amendment”), which requires the Defense Department to submit to the
Armed Services and Judiciary Committees the procedural rules for determining detainees’ ³¹⁵
status. The amendment neither authorizes nor requires a formal status determination, but it does
require that certain congressional committees be notified 30 days prior to the implementation of
any changes to the rules. As initially adopted by the Senate, the amendment would have required
these procedural rules to preclude evidence determined by the board or tribunal to have been
obtained by undue coercion; however, the conferees modified the language so that the tribunal or
board must assess, “to the extent practicable ... whether any statement derived from or relating to
such detainee was obtained as a result of coercion” and “the probative value, if any, of any such
stat ement.”
The DTA also eliminates the federal courts’ statutory jurisdiction over habeas claims by aliens ³¹⁶
detained at Guantanamo Bay, but provides for limited appeals of status determinations made ³¹⁷
pursuant to the DoD procedures for Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs). The
Supreme Court interpreted the act to find that at least some habeas corpus claims pending on the ³¹⁸
day of enactment were not affected. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear appeals of any status determination made by a “Designated Civilian Official,”
but the review is limited to a consideration of whether the determination was made consistently
with applicable DoD procedures, including whether it is supported by the preponderance of the
evidence, but allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor of the government. The procedural rule
regarding the use of evidence obtained through undue coercion applies prospectively only, so that
detainees who have already been determined by CSRTs to be enemy combatants may not base an
appeal on the failure to comply with that procedure. Detainees may also appeal status
determinations on the basis that, “to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are
applicable, whether the use of such standards and procedures to make the determination is
consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Jurisdiction ceases if the detainee
is transferred from DoD custody.
After the Court’s decision in Hamdan, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA), which amends the DTA provisions regarding appellate review and habeas corpus ³¹⁹
jurisdiction. It expands the DTA to make its CSRT review provisions the exclusive remedy for

³¹⁴¹⁵^{1 C}^ONG^.^R^EC^{. S}¹²⁶⁶⁷⁽^d^a^ily^{ed. N}^o^v^.¹⁰^{, 2}⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽ⁱ^ntr^o^duc^e^d^by^Se^{n. G}^r^a^h^am^{, pa}^s^s^e^{d by}^r^o^{ll c}^a^ll^v^o^te^{, 49}^-⁴²⁾^,^a^s
^am^e^nde^{d by}^S.A^m^{dt. 252}^4,¹⁵^{1 C}^ONG^.^R^EC^.^S¹²⁷⁷¹⁽^d^ai^l^y^ed^.^No^v.¹⁴^,²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.
³¹⁵^T^h^e^am^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t re}^f^e^rs^{to both}^th^e^Com^b^a^t^aⁿ^{t Sta}^t^us^Re^vⁱ^e^w^T^r^ibuna^ls^(“^CSRT^s^”^{), the}^initia^{l a}^d^mⁱ^nis^t^ra^tiv^e
^p^r^o^ced^u^r^e^t^o^c^oⁿ^fⁱ^r^m^t^h^{e d}^e^t^aⁱⁿ^{ees’ st}^at^u^s^{as en}^emy^co^m^b^at^an^t^s^,^and^t^h^{e A}^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^ratⁱ^v^{e Revi}^e^w^Bo^a^r^d^s^,^w^hⁱ^c^h^w^e^re
^e^s^ta^blis^he^{d t}^o^pr^ov^ide^aⁿ^nua^{l r}^e^vⁱ^e^w^tha^t^the^de^ta^ine^e^s^’^c^onti^nue^{d d}^e^te^ntion^is^w^a^r^r^a^nte^d^.
³¹⁶^For^m^o^r^e^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion a}ⁿ^d^aⁿ^a^l^y^s^is^of^the^D^T^A^,^s^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³³¹⁸^0,^Eⁿ^{emy Co}^mba^t^an^t^Det^aⁱⁿ^{ees: Ha}^b^e^a^s
^C^o^r^pus^C^hal^le^nge^sⁱⁿ^Fe^de^r^a^{l C}^o^ur^t^{, by}^J^e^nnif^e^r^K^.^Els^e^a^a^{nd K}^eⁿⁿ^e^t^{h R}^.^T^hom^a^s^.
³¹⁷^Se^c^tion¹⁴⁰⁵⁽^e⁾^.^Se^n.^Bⁱ^ng^a^m^aⁿ^of^f^e^r^e^{d a}^s^e^c^ond-^de^g^r^e^e^am^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t to}^e^lim^ina^t^e^the^pr^ov^is^io^n,^bu^t^{it w}^a^s^not
^a^dopte^d^.
³¹⁸^H^a^m^d^aⁿ^v^.^R^u^m^s^f^e^{ld, 54}^{8 U}^.^S^.^_^_⁽²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.^For^aⁿ^ov^e^r^vⁱ^e^w^o^f^the^Supr^e^m^e^C^our^t^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^on,^s^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^t
^R^S²²⁴⁶^6,^H^a^mdaⁿ^v^.^Rumsfe^{ld: M}^ilita^ry^Commissioⁿ^{s in}^the^‘Gl^o^{bal W}^a^r^on^Te^rrorism’^{, by}^J^e^nnif^e^r^K^.^Els^e^a^.
³¹⁹^Milita^ry^Com^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^ons^A^c^{t of}^{2006 (}^M^CA^{), P}^.^L^.¹⁰^9-3^66.^For^a^d^e^s^c^ription^of^the^pr^oc^e^dure^s^a^s^s^o^cⁱ^a^t^e^d^w^{ith the}^s^e
^m^ilita^r^y^c^o^m^mⁱ^{ssions, se}^e^{CRS Re}^{port RL}³³⁶⁸^8,^The^M^ilit^ary^Co^{mmissions Ac}^{t o}^f²⁰⁰⁶^{: A}^naly^s^is^{of Proc}^e^d^ural^Rule^s
^and^Com^parisoⁿ^wit^h^Pre^vⁱ^o^u^{s D}^{OD Rule}^{s a}^{nd t}^h^e^Uni^f^{orm Co}^de^{of M}^ilit^ary^J^u^stic^e^{, by}^J^e^nnif^e^r^K^.^Els^e^a^.

all aliens detained as enemy combatants, not just those housed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.³²⁰ The
MCA revokes U.S. courts’ jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions by all aliens in U.S.
custody as enemy combatants, including lawful enemy combatants, regardless of the place of
custody. This amendment takes effect on the date of its enactment and applies to “all cases,
without exception, pending on or after the date of [enactment] which relate to any aspect of the
detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained by the United
States since September 11, 2001.” Section 5 of the MCA specifically precludes the application of ³²¹
the Geneva Conventions to habeas or other civil proceedings.
The MCA sets forth detailed definitions of crimes that constitute “grave breaches” of Common ³²²
Article 3. In addition, the Act provides that the President shall have the authority to interpret ³²³
the meaning of the Geneva Conventions. The intended effect of this provision is somewhat
unclear. Although the President generally has a role in the negotiation, implementation, and ³²⁴
domestic enforcement of treaty obligations, this power does not generally extend to ³²⁵
“interpreting” treaty obligations, a role more traditionally associated with courts. Instead, the
language appears to be intended to establish the authority of the President within the Executive ³²⁶
Branch to issue interpretative regulations by Executive Order, although the President and the
Department of Defense have traditionally exercised such authority without specific legislation.

The House of Representatives passed the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations
Act of 2007 (H.R. 1), which contains a reporting requirement, § 1433, with respect to the
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission that the United States “should work with friends to
develop mutually agreed-on principles for the detention and humane treatment of captured
international terrorists who are not being held under a particular country’s criminal laws” drawing
from Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The Secretary of State would be required to
report, within 90 days of enactment and every 180 days thereafter, on any progress toward
implementing the above recommendation, including a “description of the steps taken to
implement such recommendations and achieve such policy goals,” when the recommendations
are expected to be implemented, and any allocation of resources or other actions by Congress that
the Secretary of State considers necessary to implement such recommendations and achieve such

³²⁰^T^h^e^fⁱ^na^{l de}^cⁱ^{sions of}^m^ilita^r^y^c^o^m^mⁱ^{ssions a}^r^e^a^l^{so a}^ppe^a^l^a^b^le^.^Se^e^{CRS Re}^port^RL³³¹^80,^Ene^m^y^C^o^m^bat^an^t
^D^e^taine^e^s^:^H^abe^as^C^o^r^p^us^C^h^all^e^nge^sⁱⁿ^Fe^de^r^a^{l C}^our^t^.
³²¹^MC^A^{§ 5(}^a⁾^pr^ov^ide^s^tha^t^“^N^{o p}^e^r^s^{on m}^a^y^inv^o^k^e^the^G^e^ne^v^a^C^o^nv^eⁿ^tio^ns^or^aⁿ^y^pr^otoc^ols^the^r^e^t^{o in}^aⁿ^y^ha^be^a^s
^co^rp^u^s^o^r^o^t^h^e^{r ci}^vi^l^actⁱ^oⁿ^o^r^p^r^oceedⁱⁿ^{g t}^o^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^e^s^,^o^r^{a cu}^rrent^o^r^f^o^rm^{er o}^f^fⁱ^cer,^e^m^p^l^o^y^ee,^m^e^m^b^er
^o^f^t^h^{e A}^r^m^e^d^F^o^rces,^o^r^o^t^h^e^{r agen}^t^o^f^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es i}^s^{a p}^a^rt^y^{as a so}^u^r^{ce o}^f^ri^gh^t^sⁱⁿ^an^y^co^u^r^t^of^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es
^o^rⁱ^t^s^S^t^at^{es o}^r^t^e^rri^t^o^ri^es.^”
³²²^Se^e^{CRS Rep}^o^{rt RL}³³⁶⁶²^,^T^h^e^Wa^{r Crimes Act: Cu}^rren^t^Issu^es^,^by^Mic^h^a^e^l^J^{ohn G}^a^r^c^ia^.
³²³^M^C^A^§⁶⁽^a)(3^)(A^{) p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^{es t}^h^at^“t^h^e^P^r^esi^d^en^t^h^a^{s t}^h^{e a}^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^t^y^f^o^{r t}^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^ed^S^t^at^{es t}^oⁱⁿ^t^e^rp^ret^t^h^e^m^e^anⁱⁿ^{g an}^d
^a^pplic^a^tioⁿ^of^the^G^e^ne^va^C^onv^eⁿ^tio^ns^aⁿ^{d to}^pr^om^ulg^a^te^hig^h^e^r^s^t^a^nda^r^d^s^aⁿ^{d a}^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e^r^e^g^u^la^tions^f^o^r^vⁱ^ola^tⁱ^ons
^o^f^t^r^eat^y^o^b^lⁱ^g^atⁱ^oⁿ^s^w^hⁱ^c^h^{are not}^{grave b}^r^each^{es o}^f^t^h^e^G^eⁿ^e^v^a^Coⁿ^v^en^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^.^”
³²⁴^S^ee,^e.^g^.^{, i}^d^{. (}^P^r^e^sⁱ^de^{nt is}^gⁱ^v^e^{n p}^o^w^e^r^{to pr}^om^ulg^a^te^hig^h^e^r^s^t^a^nda^r^d^s^aⁿ^d^a^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e^r^e^g^u^la^tions^f^o^r^vⁱ^ola^tions
^of^tre^a^t^y^oblig^a^tions).
³²⁵^S^ee,^e.^g^.^{, MC}^A^{§ 6(}^a⁾⁽³⁾⁽^B⁾⁽^“^N^o^f^o^r^e^ig^{n or}^inte^rⁿ^a^tio^na^{l s}^o^ur^c^e^of^la^w^s^h^a^{ll s}^upply^a^ba^sⁱ^s^f^o^r^a^r^u^le^of^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^{on i}ⁿ
^the^c^our^ts^of^the^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^Sta^t^e^sⁱⁿⁱⁿ^te^r^p^r^e^ting^t^h^e^pr^ohi^biti^ons^e^num^e^r^a^t^e^d^{in s}^u^bs^e^c^tion⁽^d⁾^of^s^u^c^h^s^e^c^tion²⁴⁴¹^.”⁾^.
³²⁶^MCA^§⁶⁽^a)(3^)(B).

policy goals. The Comptroller General would then report on whether the recommendations have
been implemented and whether the policy goals described in such subsection have been achieved.
A measure has been introduced in the House of Representatives, Military Commissions Habeas
Corpus Restoration Act of 2007 (H.R. 267), that would restore habeas corpus jurisdiction to
federal courts for aliens detained as “enemy combatants.” H.R. 267 would not restore jurisdiction
for any other action in court related to the such detention, but would maintain appellate
jurisdiction for challenges to military commission final decisions and challenges to CSRT review
decisions.
^J^eⁿⁿⁱ^fe^r^K^.^E^l^se^a
^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e A}^t^torn^e^y
^j^e^ls^ea@^crs^.^loc.g^o^v^{, 7-}⁵⁴⁶⁶