Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile
Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law
Updated January 8, 2007
Dianne E. Rennack
Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation
Sanctions: Selected Current Law
Summary
The use of economic sanctions to stem weapons proliferation acquired a new
dimension in the 1990s. While earlier legislation required the cutoff of foreign aid
to countries engaged in specified nuclear proliferation activities and mentioned other
sanctions as a possible mechanism for bringing countries into compliance with goals
of treaties or international agreements, it was not until 1990 that Congress enacted
explicit guidelines for trade sanctions related to missile proliferation. In that year a
requirement for the President to impose sanctions against U.S. persons or foreign
persons engaging in trade of items or technology listed in the Missile Technology
Control Regime Annex (MTCR Annex) was added to the Arms Export Control Act
and to the Export Administration Act of 1979. Subsequently, Congress legislated
economic sanctions against countries that contribute to the proliferation of chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons in a broad array of laws.
This report offers a listing and brief description of legal provisions that require
or authorize the imposition of some form of economic sanction against countries,
companies, or persons who violate U.S. nonproliferation norms. For each provision,
information is included on what triggers the imposition of sanctions, their duration,
what authority the President has to delay or abstain from imposing sanctions, and
what authority the President has to waive the imposition of sanctions.
This report also includes a list of legislation pending before the 110^th Congress
that, if enacted, would be relevant in the use of economic sanctions as a part of U.S.
nonproliferation policy.

Contents
Background ......................................................1
Pending Before the 110^th Congress....................................2
Selected Current Law: Sanctions Provisions.............................2
18 U.S.C. (Relating to Criminal Procedure).........................2
Arms Export Control Act........................................4
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.....................................13
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination
Act of 1991.............................................14
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998..........15
Export Administration Act of 1979...............................16
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945.................................19
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961..................................22
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2006...................................26
Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation
Act of 2006.............................................27
International Emergency Economic Powers Act.....................28
Iran Sanctions Act............................................29
Iran Freedom Support Act......................................30
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992.......................31
Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act of 2000............32
Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990......................................34
National Emergencies Act......................................35
North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999.........................36
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978............................36
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994.......................37
Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of

2003 ...................................................39

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile
Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current
Law
Background
The use of economic sanctions to stem weapons proliferation acquired a new
dimension in the 1990s.¹ While earlier legislation required the cutoff of foreign aid
to countries engaged in specified nuclear proliferation activities and mentioned other
sanctions as a possible mechanism for bringing countries into compliance with goals
of treaties or international agreements,² it was not until 1990 that Congress enacted
explicit guidelines for trade sanctions related to missile proliferation. In that year a
requirement for the President to impose sanctions against U.S. persons or foreign
persons engaging in trade of items or technology listed in the Missile Technology
Control Regime Annex (MTCR Annex) was added to the Arms Export Control Act
and to the Export Administration Act of 1979. Subsequently, Congress legislated
economic sanctions against countries that contribute to the proliferation of chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons in a broad array of laws.
This report offers an alphabetic listing and brief description of legal provisions
that require or authorize the imposition of some form of economic sanction on
countries, companies, or persons who violate U.S. nonproliferation norms.³ For each
provision, information is included on what triggers the imposition of sanctions, their
duration, what authority the President has to delay or abstain from imposing
sanctions, and what authority the President has to waive the imposition of sanctions.

¹ For a more general discussion on the use of sanctions in foreign policy, see CRS Report
97-949, Economic Sanctions to Achieve U.S. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide
to Current Law, by Dianne E. Rennack and Robert D. Shuey. For a broader discussion on
issues related to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and missiles, see CRS Report
RL30699, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: The Current Situation
and Trends, by Sharon Squassoni.
² The International Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978 sought to increase international participation in and adherence with the International
Atomic Energy Agency and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, respectively, and, to that end,
authorized the President to enter into international discussions, including the imposition of
sanctions against those who abrogate or violate these international agreements.
³ The list is arranged alphabetically, with references to the U.S. Code and Legislation on
Foreign Relations where applicable. Legislative history of pertinent amendments is also
given, in italics.

Pending Before the 110^th Congress
Of the several legislative proposals before the 110^th Congress that pertain to or
have some implication for the control of weapons of mass destruction, the following
bill relates to nonproliferation and have specific implications for the use of economic
sanctions in foreign policy or national security matters:
^I^N^THE^H^OU^S^E
^H.R^.¹^I^m^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^tⁱⁿ^{g th}^{e 9/}^{11 C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^R^ecom^m^eⁿ^d^a^ti^on^s^A^c^{t of 2007.}^T^itle
^XI^I^estab^lish^e^{s tw}^o^en^{tities — an}^Of^fⁱ^{ce o}^f^th^{e U.S. Co}^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^to^r^f^o^r^th^e
^P^r^ev^en^tion^of^W^eapon^s^of^Mas^s^Des^t^ru^ction^P^r^olif^eration^an^{d T}^e^rroris^m^{, an}^d
^{a C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^on^t^h^{e Prev}^en^tⁱ^oⁿ^of^Weapon^s^of^Mas^s^D^e^s^t^ru^ctⁱ^oⁿ
^P^r^o^lif^er^atioⁿ^an^d^T^e^r^r^o^r^ism^{— th}^{at w}^o^u^l^d^lik^ely^h^a^v^e^so^m^e^r^o^{le in}^san^c^tioⁿ^s^-
^r^e^lated^p^o^licies.

^T^{itle XI}^I^I^—^Nu^{clear Black}^M^a^rk^{et Cou}ⁿ^t^er-T^erroris^m^{Act of 2007}^—
ⁱ^m^p^o^s^e^s^m^a^nd^a^t^o^r^y^sa^nc^tⁱ^o^{ns o}ⁿ^aⁿ^y^fo^r^eⁱ^{gn p}^e^r^s^oⁿ^fo^und^t^o^e^nga^geⁱⁿ^t^h^e
^tran^s^f^{er of}ⁿ^u^c^{lear en}^rich^m^eⁿ^t^{, reproces}^sⁱⁿ^g^,^an^{d w}^eapon^s^techⁿ^o^log^y^,
^equⁱ^pm^en^{t, an}^{d m}^a^terials^{to a n}^oⁿ^-ⁿ^u^c^lear-^w^eapon^s^t^{ate, to a s}^t^{ate n}^o^{t in}
^com^p^lian^{ce w}^ith^certain^IA^EA^s^t^an^dards^,^{or w}^h^en^s^u^ch^m^a^terials^are
^ot^h^e^rwⁱ^s^{e res}^t^ri^ct^{ed u}ⁿ^d^{er N}^u^cl^{ear S}^u^pplⁱ^e^rs^G^r^ou^{p g}^uⁱ^delⁱⁿ^es^{(§ 1311). T}^h^e
^P^r^esid^en^{t is r}^e^q^u^ir^ed^toⁱⁿ^str^u^{ct all U.}^{S. g}^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^ag^en^cies^{to m}^a^k^e^ev^ery
^e^ffo^r^t^t^o^p^e^r^s^ua^d^e^fo^r^eⁱ^{gn go}^ve^rⁿ^m^e^nt^{s a}ⁿ^d^r^e^l^e^va^nt^c^o^r^p^o^r^a^tⁱ^o^{ns no}^t^t^o
^en^g^a^g^eⁱⁿ^an^y^b^u^sin^e^{ss tr}^an^sactioⁿ^w^ith^{a f}^o^r^e^igⁿ^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^{, o}^r^su^b^s^id^iar^y^{, u}ⁿ^d^er
^s^u^ch^s^aⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^{(§ 1322). T}^h^{e Pres}ⁱ^d^en^t^s^h^al^l^s^u^s^p^en^{d an}^{d proh}ⁱ^bⁱ^t^ex^port
^licen^{ses u}ⁿ^d^er^th^{e A}^r^m^s^Ex^p^o^r^{t Co}ⁿ^t^r^o^{l A}^c^{t to}^an^y^co^uⁿ^t^r^y^id^en^tif^ied^{as a}
^“ⁿ^u^c^l^{ear prol}ⁱ^f^eratⁱ^oⁿⁿ^e^t^w^ork^h^o^s^t^couⁿ^t^ry^{” (§§ 1332, 1333).}

^T^{itle XI}^{V —}^9/^{11 C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^Iⁿ^tern^ati^oⁿ^a^l^I^m^p^l^em^en^tati^on^A^c^{t of 2007}
^{— ex}^ten^d^{s w}^a^iv^er^au^th^o^r^ityⁱⁿ^cu^r^r^eⁿ^t^law^,^allo^wⁱⁿ^g^aid^to^P^a^kⁱ^stan^uⁿ^til
^O^c^t^{ober 1, 2008 (§ 1442).}

^Int^r^{oduced Januar}^{y 5, 2007, by Repr}^es^ent^a^tⁱ^{ve T}^hom^ps^{on. Ref}^e^r^r^e^{d t}^o
^{multiple committees}^{. Agr}^{eed to in the Hous}^{e on Januar}^{y 9, 2007, by a vote}
^{of 299 - 128 (}^R^{oll no. 15)}^{. Received in the Senate and r}^e^fer^r^e^{d to the}
^C^o^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee on H}^o^m^e^l^{and Secur}ⁱ^t^y^{and G}^o^ver^nm^ent^a^l^Af^f^aⁱ^r^s^.
Selected Current Law: Sanctions Provisions

18 U.S.C. (Relating to Criminal Procedure)

18 U.S.C. 229-229F (part I, chapter 11) makes it generally unlawful for a
person knowingly “(1) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or
indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any
chemical weapon; or (2) to assist, induce, in any way, any person to violate paragraph
(1), or to attempt or conspire to violate paragraph (1).” The sections establish
criminal and civil penalties, and terms of criminal forfeiture.
Sec. 201 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998
(Division I of P.L. 105-277; approved October 21, 1998) enacted these sections to
bring the criminal and civil penalties section of United States Code into conformity
with the requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Sec. 211 of that Act,

furthermore, authorized the President to suspend or revoke export privileges of
anyone found in violation of 18 U.S.C. 229. P.L. 109-306 (enacted Oct. 6, 2006)
made a technical correction.
18 U.S.C. 832 makes it an offense to attempt to willfully participate in or
knowingly provide material support or resources to a nuclear weapons program or
other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program of a foreign terrorist power.
Such an offense is punishable by imprisonment of not more than 20 years. The
section also makes it an offense to develop, possess, or attempt or conspire to
develop or possess, a radiological weapon, to threaten to use, or use, such a weapon
against any person in the United States, and any U.S. national regardless of where
he/she may be, or against property owned or used by the United States. Such offense
is punishable by imprisonment for “any term of years or for life.”
Sec. 6803(c) of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement Act
of 2004 (title VI, subtitle I, of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004; P.L. 108-458; approved December 17, 2004) added sec. 832.
18 U.S.C. 2332a makes it an offense to use, threaten to use, attempt or conspire
to use WMD against a national of the United States or within the United States. A
“weapon of mass destruction” is a destructive device as defined in 18 U.S.C. 921 —
any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas bomb, grenade, mine, or rocket or missile
of a certain size, any type of weapon of a certain size that delivers its projectile by
explosion or other propellant — and any weapon that delivers toxic or poisonous
chemicals, biological agent, toxin, or vector, radiation, or radioactivity. One found
to have used a WMD “shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, and if
death results, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for
life.”
Sec. 60023(a) of P.L. 103-322 (108 Stat. 1980) added sec. 2332a. The section
was substantially reworked by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (P.L. 104-132; approved April 24, 1996). The Chemical Weapons Convention
Implementation Act of 1998 (division I of P.L. 105-277; approved October 21, 1998)
exempted chemical weapons from application of this section of 18 U.S.C., and in its
place enacted chapter 11B of part I of 18 U.S.C. (secs. 229 through 229F, above) to
establish criminal and civil penalties in conformity with the Chemical Weapons
Convention. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-188; approved June 12, 2002) made technical
changes. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement Act of 2004
(title VI, subtitle I, of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004;
P.L. 108-458; approved December 17, 2004) expanded the means of delivering the
WMD to include the U.S. mail service and variations on “foreign commerce,”
included attacks against property, and changed the section heading from “Use of
certain weapons of mass destruction” to “Use of weapons of mass destruction,”
consolidating WMD-related offenses in this chapter and section.

Arms Export Control Act⁴
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended, authorizes U.S.
government military sales, loans, leases, and financing, and licensing of commercial
arms sales to other countries. The AECA requires the President to coordinate such
actions with other foreign policy considerations, including nonproliferation, and
states guidelines by which the President determines eligibility of recipients for
military exports, sales, leases, loans, and financing.
Section 3(f) (Eligibility; 22 U.S.C. 2753(f)) prohibits U.S. military sales or
leases to any country that the President determines is in material breach of binding
commitments to the United States under international treaties or agreements
regarding nonproliferation of nuclear explosive devices and unsafeguarded special
nuclear material.
Subsec. (f) was added by sec. 822(a)(1) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention
Act of 1994 (title VIII of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994
and 1995; P.L. 103-236; approved April 30, 1994).
Section 38 (Control of Arms Exports and Imports; 22 U.S.C. 2778)
authorizes the President, “in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign
policy of the United States,” to control the import and export of defense articles and
services, to provide foreign policy guidelines to U.S. importers/exporters, and to
promulgate the United States Munitions List (USML) constituting what defense
articles and services are regulated. Section 38(c) establishes that any person who
willfully violates any provision of the section (or of section 39 relating to the
reporting of fees, contributions, gifts, and commissions paid by those involved in
commercial sales of defense articles or services) may be fined not more than $1
million (for each violation), imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. Section
38(e) authorizes the Secretary of State to assess civil penalties and initiate civil
actions against violators; any civil penalty for violations under this section is capped
at $500,000. Section 38(j) authorizes the President to exempt a foreign country from
licensing requirements under the AECA when that country commits to a binding
bilateral agreement with the United States to establish export controls on a par with
export controls in U.S. law and regulations.
Section 38 was added by sec. 212(a)(1) of the International Security Assistance
and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329; approved June 30, 1976).
Subsec. (c) was added by the 1976 amendment; the fine and imprisonment terms
were amended, however, by sec. 119(a) of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83; approved August 8, 1985).
Formerly, fine was “not more than $100,000,” and period of imprisonment was not
more than two years. Subsec. (e) was added by the 1976 amendment. Sec. 119(b)
of P.L. 99-83, in 1985, however, added the language that caps civil penalties, and
sec. 1303 of the Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Security Assistance Act of 1999
(division B of the Nance/Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 2000-

⁴ P.L. 90-629; approved October 22, 1968; 22 U.S.C. 2751 and following. Legislation on
Foreign Relations Through 2005, vol. I-A, p. 420.

2001; H.R. 3427, enacted by reference in P.L. 106-113), gave civil action authority
to the Secretary of State. Previously the section referred to such authority in the
Export Administration Act, which resides with the Secretary of Commerce and was
capped in that Act at $100,000. Sec. 102(a) of the Security Assistance Act of 2000
(P.L. 106-280; approved October 6, 2000) limited the President’s authority to
exempt a foreign country from certain licensing exceptions in subsec. (f), and added
subsec. (j). Sec. 6910 of the Prevention of Terrorist Access to Destructive Weapons
Act of 2004 (subtitle J, title VI, of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004; P.L. 108-458; 118 Stat. 3774) expanded requirements on the President
to develop mechanisms to identify persons subject to various Public Laws that
restrict transactions related to WMD.
Section 40 (Transactions With Countries Supporting Acts of International
Terrorism; 22 U.S.C. 2780) prohibits exporting or otherwise providing munitions,
providing financial assistance to facilitate transfer of munitions, granting eligibility
to such transfers, issuing licenses for such transfers, or facilitating the acquisition of
munitions to a country the government of which “has repeatedly provided support for
acts of international terrorism.” The section includes in its definition of acts of
international terrorism, “all activities that the Secretary [of State] determines willfully
aid or abet the international proliferation of nuclear explosive devices to individuals
or groups, willfully aid or abet an individual or groups in acquiring unsafeguarded
special nuclear material, or willfully aid or abet the efforts of an individual or group
to use, development, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire chemical, biological,
or radiological weapons.”
The President may rescind the Secretary’s determination (sec. 40(f)) by
reporting to the Speaker of the House and the Chairperson of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, before issuing the rescission, that the leadership and policies
of the country in question have changed, the government is not supporting
international terrorism, and the government has issued assurances that it will not
support international terrorism in the future. Congress may block the rescission of
the terrorist determination by enacting a joint resolution. The President, however,
may unilaterally waive any or all of the prohibitions in this section if he determines
to do so is essential to the national security interests of the United States, and so
reports to Congress.
Those found to be in violation of the section face criminal prosecution with
penalties of as much as a $1 million fine and imprisonment of not more than ten
years. Civil penalties for violations under this section, similar to those in sec. 38, are
capped at $500,000; the Secretary of State has the authority to assess civil penalties
and initiate civil actions against violators.
Section 40 was added by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism
Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-399; approved August 27, 1986), and later amended and
restated by the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-
222; approved August 27, 1986). Sec. 822(a)(2)(A) of the Nuclear Proliferation
Prevention Act of 1994 (title VIII of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1994 and 1995; P.L. 103-236; approved April 30, 1994) added a definition of
acts of international terrorism that would lead the Secretary of State to make a
determination. The same section added definitions “nuclear explosive device” and

“unsafeguarded special nuclear material”. Sec. 321 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (P.L. 102-138; approved October 28,
1991), made technical changes to the guidelines for Congress’s passage of a joint
resolution relating to the section. Sec. 1303 of the Arms Control, Nonproliferation
and Security Assistance Act of 1999 (division B of the Nance/Donovan Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, FY 2000-2001; H.R. 3427, enacted by reference in P.L.
106-113) gave civil action authority to the Secretary of State. Previously the section
referred to such authority in the Export Administration Act, which resides with the
Secretary of Commerce and was capped in that Act at $100,000. Sec. 1204 of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228; approved
September 30, 2002), expanded the definitions to make the sanctions applicable to
an individual or group in pursuit of chemical, biological, or radiological weapons.
Sections 72 and 73 (Denial of the Transfer of Missile Equipment or
Technology by U.S. Persons; 22 U.S.C. 2797a; Transfers of Missile Equipment
or Technology by Foreign Persons; 2797b), require sanctions against any U.S.
citizen or any foreign person whom the President determines to be engaged in
exporting, transferring, conspiring to export or transfer, or facilitating an export or
transfer of, any equipment or technology identified by the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) that “contributes to the acquisition, design, development,
or production of missiles in a country that is not an MTCR adherent...”
Sanctions vary with the type of equipment or technology exported, and are
increasingly severe where the type of equipment or technology is more controlled.
Worst-case sanctions may be imposed for not less than two years, and include denial
of U.S. government contracts, denial of export licenses for items on the U.S.
Munitions List, and a prohibition on importation into the United States.
The law allows several exceptions, wherein some or all of the sanctions may not
be imposed against foreign persons:
^!if an MTCR adherent with jurisdictional authority finds the foreign
person innocent of wrongdoing in relation to the transaction;
^!if the State Department issues an advisory opinion to the individual
stating that a transaction would not result in sanctions;
^!if the export, transfer, or trading activity is authorized by the laws of
an MTCR adherent and not obtained by misrepresentation or fraud,
except when the activity in question is conducted by an entity
subordinate to a government of an independent state of the former
Soviet Union, and when the President determines that government
has knowingly transferred missiles or missile technology in a
manner inconsistent with MTCR guidelines;
^!if the export, transfer, or trade is made to an end-user in a country
that is an MTCR adherent;

^!in the case of foreign persons fulfilling contracts for defense services
or defense articles; then the President will not prohibit importations
if
— the articles or services are considered essential to U.S.
national security,
— the President determines that the provider is a sole
supplier and the articles or services are essential to U.S.
national security, or
— the President determines that the articles or services are
essential to U.S. national security under defense
cooperation agreements or NATO Programs of
Cooperation;
^!in the case of foreign persons importing products or services into the
United States in fulfillment of contracts entered into before the
President announces intentions to impose sanctions, then the
President will not prohibit importations; or
^!in the case of foreign persons providing spare parts, component parts
essential to U.S. products or production, routine service and
maintenance, essential information and technology.
Sanctions are not imposed, or those imposed may be lifted, against individuals
when the President certifies that a foreign government, which is an MTCR adherent,
has adequately attended to the violation through some judicial process or
enforcement action.
The President may waive the sanction, for either a U.S. citizen or foreign
person, if he certifies to Congress that it is essential to the national security of the
United States, or that the individual provides a product or service essential to U.S.
national security, and that person is a sole source provider of the product or service.
Section 1703 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991
(P.L. 101-510; approved November 5, 1990) added sections 71-74. In section 72,
sec. 734(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995
(P.L. 103-236; approved April 30, 1994), added paragraph about “presumption” in
guidelines for Presidential determination on transfers of MTCR Annex materials.
In sec. 73, sec. 323(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992
and 1993 (P.L.102-138; approved October 28, 1991), added assisting another
country in acquiring missiles to the list of sanctionable acts; sec. 1136 of the Arms
Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1999 (title XI of the Nance/Donovan Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001; H.R. 3427, enacted by
reference in P.L. 106-113; approved November 29, 1999) added potential limitation
on independent states of the former Soviet Union and the President’s certification
pertaining to judicial attention by MTCR adherents. Sec. 734(b) of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 added the Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to those with whom the Secretary of State
consults when administering the policy. This language, however, was struck out to
conform with agency reorganization, particularly that of ACDA being incorporated
into the State Department, by sec. 1136 of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation

Act of 1999. Sec. 1408 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1996 (P.L. 104-106; approved February 10, 1996) made technical changes to
reporting requirements relating to issuing a waiver.
Section 73B (Authority Relating to MTCR Adherents; 22 U.S.C. 2797b-2)
authorizes the President to impose sanctions against a foreign person,
notwithstanding that person’s operating in compliance with the laws of an MTCR
adherent or that person exporting to an end-user in a country that is an MTCR
adherent, if the country of jurisdiction over that foreign person is a country (1) that
has entered into an understanding with the United States after January 1, 2000, (2)
for which the United States retains the right to impose sanctions against those in the
country’s jurisdiction for exporting of controlled items that contribute to the
acquisition, design, development, or production of missiles in a country that is not
an MTCR adherent.
Sec. 1137 of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1999 (title XI of the
Nance/Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001;
H.R. 3427, enacted by reference in P.L. 106-113; approved November 29, 1999)
added sec. 73B, and made supporting amendments in sec. 73 relating to conditions
of applicability, and sec. 74, defining “international understanding.”
Section 74 (Definitions; 22 U.S.C. 2797c) provides definitions of terms that
also affect how the sanctions may be applied. For example, while the MTCR is a
policy statement originally announced on April 16, 1987, by the United States, the
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan, the term “MTCR
adherent” in this law is much more broadly defined, to include the countries that
participate in the MTCR “or that, pursuant to an international understanding to which
the United States is a party, controls MTCR equipment or technology in accordance⁵
with the criteria and standards set forth in the MTCR.” Within that definition, the
term “international understanding” has been further defined to limit its applicability
or to broaden the President’s authority to impose sanctions. As another example, the
term “person” has changed over time. The law formerly included as part of the
definition of “person,” “countries where it may be impossible to identify a specific
governmental entity.” This has been amended to refer to “countries with non-market
economies (excluding former members of the Warsaw Pact).” The same definition
formerly restricted government activity relating to development of aircraft; this now
refers specifically to military aircraft.
Sec. 323 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and
1993 (P.L. 102-138; approved October 28, 1991), amended the definition of
“person” to target China — the “Helms amendment” — and narrowed the definition
of “person” to include activities of a government affecting the development of,
among other things, “military aircraft” (formerly referred to “aircraft”). Sec.

⁵ See also sec. 73A of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2797b-1), which requires the President to notify
Congress when U.S. action results in any country becoming an MTCR adherent. The
section also requires an independent assessment to be submitted to Congress by the Director
of Central Intelligence covering the newly designated MTCR adherent and several
proliferation issues.

1136(a) of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1999 (title XI of the
Nance/Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001;
H.R. 3427, enacted by reference in P.L. 106-113; approved November 29, 1999)
added the definition of “international understanding,” a term used in the course of
defining “MTCR adherent.”
Section 81 ([CBW] Sanctions Against Foreign Persons; 22 U.S.C. 2798)
requires imposition of sanctions to deny government procurement, contracts with the
U.S. government, and imports from foreign persons who knowingly and materially
contribute, through exports from the United States or another country, or through
other transactions, to foreign efforts to use, develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise
acquire chemical or biological weapons. Foreign persons are sanctionable if the
recipient country has used chemical or biological weapons in violation of
international law, has used chemical or biological weapons against its own people,
or has made preparations to engage in such violations. Foreign persons are
sanctionable if the recipient country has been determined to be a supporter of
international terrorism, pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, or
if the President has specifically designated the country as restricted under this
section.
The President may delay the imposition of sanctions for up to 180 days if he is
in consultation with the sanctionable person’s government to bring that government
to take specific and effective steps to terminate the sanctionable activities. The
President may not be required to impose sanctions if the sanctionable person
otherwise provides goods needed for U.S. military operations, if the President
determines that the sanctionable person is a sole source provider of some good or
service, or if the President determines that goods and services provided by the
sanctionable person are essential to U.S. national security under defense cooperation
agreements. Exceptions are also made for completing outstanding contracts, the
purchase of spare or component parts, service and maintenance otherwise not readily
available, information and technology essential to U.S. products or production, or
medical or other humanitarian items.
The President may terminate the sanctions after 12 months if he determines and
certifies to Congress that the sanctioned person no longer aids or abets any foreign
government, project, or entity in its efforts to acquire biological or chemical weapons
capability. The President may waive the application of a sanction after a year of its
imposition if he determines it is in U.S. national security interests to do so. Not less
than 20 days before a national security waiver is issued, the President must notify
Congress, fully explaining the rationale for waiving the sanction.
Sec. 81 was added by sec. 305 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control
and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (title III of P.L. 102-182; approved December

4, 1991.)⁶

⁶ Two versions of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination
Act of 1991 were enacted. Title V of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1992 and 1992 (P.L. 102-138; approved October 28, 1991) enacted the first. Later in the
(continued...)

Section 101 (Nuclear Enrichment Transfers; 22 U.S.C. 2799aa) (similar to
former section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) prohibits foreign
economic or miliary assistance to any country that the President determines delivers
or receives nuclear enrichment equipment, materials, or technology. The prohibition
is not required if the countries involved in the transaction agree to place all materials,
equipment, or technology under multilateral safeguard arrangements. The
prohibition is not required, furthermore, if the recipient country has an agreement
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding safeguards.
The President may waive the sanctions if he determines, and certifies to the
Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that denying
assistance would have a serious adverse effect on vital U.S. interests, and he has been
assured that the country in question will not acquire, develop, or assist others in
acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. Congress may negate a certification by
enacting a joint resolution stating its disapproval.
Sec. 826(a) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (title VIII of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; P.L. 103-236;
approved April 30, 1994) added secs. 101 and 102. Similar language, however,
previously had been in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as secs. 669 and 670.
Sec. 669, popularly referred to as the Symington amendment, was added by sec. 305
of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L.
94-329; approved June 30, 1976). The section was amended and restated by sec. 12
of the International Security Assistance Act of 1977 (P.L. 95-92; approved August
4, 1977), which also added sec. 670 to the law. Sec. 669 was further amended by
secs. 10(b)(4) and 12 of the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-
384; approved September 26, 1978). Sec. 737(b) of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-113; approved December 29, 1981)
amended and restated both secs. 669 and 670. Sec. 1204 of the International
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83; approved August
8, 1985), made further changes to sec. 670 before both sections were repealed in

1994 and similar language was incorporated into the AECA.

Section 102 (Nuclear Reprocessing Transfers, Illegal Exports for Nuclear
Explosive Devices, Transfers of Nuclear Explosive Devices, and Nuclear
Detonations; 22 U.S.C. 2799aa-1) (similar to former section 670 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961) prohibits foreign economic or military assistance to
countries that the President determines deliver or receive nuclear reprocessing
equipment, material, or technology to or from another country; or any non-nuclear-
weapon state that illegally exports, through a person serving as that country’s agent,
from the United States items that would contribute to nuclear proliferation.

⁶ (...continued)
same session, title III of P.L. 102-182 (a trade act otherwise unrelated to nonproliferation
issues) repealed the first version and enacted a new Chemical and Biological Weapons
Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. This report refers only to the second
enactment — that which currently stands in law.

The President may waive the sanctions if he determines, and certifies to the
Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that
terminating assistance would adversely impact on the United States’ nonproliferation
objectives, or would jeopardize the common defense and security. Congress may
negate a certification by enacting a joint resolution stating its disapproval.
The section further prohibits assistance (except humanitarian or food
assistance), defense sales, export licenses for U.S. Munitions List items, other export
licenses subject to foreign policy controls (except medicines or medical equipment),
and various credits and loans (except Department of Agriculture credits and support
to procure food and agriculture commodities) to any country that the President has
determined (A) transfers a nuclear explosive device to a non-nuclear-weapon state;
(B) is a non-nuclear-weapon state and either (i) receives a nuclear explosive device;
or (ii) detonates an nuclear explosive device; (C) transfers to a non-nuclear-weapon
state any design information or component that is determined by the President to be
important to, and known by the transferring country to be intended by the recipient
state for use in, the development or manufacture of any nuclear explosive devices;
or (D) is a non-nuclear-weapon state and seeks and receives any design information
or component that is determined by the President to be important to, and intended by
the recipient state for use in, the development or manufacture of any nuclear
explosive device.
In any of these latter four instances, sanctions are mandatory once the President
has determined that an event has occurred. If the event has to do with transferring
a nuclear explosive device to a non-nuclear-weapon state, or a non-nuclear-weapon
state receiving or detonating a nuclear explosive device, the President may delay the
imposition of sanctions for 30 days (of congressional continuous session) if he
determines that the immediate imposition of sanctions “would be detrimental to the
national security of the United States,” and so certifies to the Speaker of the House
and the Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
If the President makes such a determination, he may further waive the
imposition of sanctions if the Congress, within those 30 days after the first
determination, takes up a joint resolution under expedited procedure,⁷ that states:
That the Congress having received on ________ a certification by the President
under section 102(b)(4) of the Arms Export Control Act with respect to
________, the Congress hereby authorizes the President to exercise the waiver
authority contained in section 102(b)(5) of that Act.
With passage of a joint resolution authorizing him to exercise further waiver
authority, the President may waive any sanction that would otherwise be required in
instances involving the transferring of a nuclear explosive device to a non-nuclear-
weapon state, or a non-nuclear-weapon state receiving or detonating a nuclear
explosive device. To exercise this waiver, the President determines and certifies in
writing to the Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

⁷ Sec. 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976,
P.L. 94-329, states what is required under “expedited procedure.” See Legislation on
Foreign Relations Through 2005, vol. I-A, p. 883.

“that the imposition of such sanction would be seriously prejudicial to the
achievement of United State nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the
common defense and security.”
Alternatively, if Congress does not take up a relevant joint resolution within the
30 days, the sanctions enter into effect. Section 102 does not state the means for
otherwise suspending or terminating the sanctions.⁸
For legislative history of the origin of and early changes to this section, see
discussion following sec. 101, above. Section 102, and sec. 670 before it, is
popularly referred to as the Glenn amendment. Sec. 2(a) of the Agriculture Export
Relief Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-194; approved July 14, 1998) broadened the kinds of
exchanges that are exempt from the application of sanctions to include medicine,
medical equipment, and Department of Agriculture financing.⁹

⁸ Sanctions under sec. 102 were applied to India and Pakistan after each country tested
nuclear explosive devices in May 1998. Congress has enacted six laws after the sanctions
were imposed to ease their application or authorize the President to waive their application.
See the Agriculture Export Relief Act of 1998 (P.L.105-194; approved July 14, 1998), India-
Pakistan Relief Act of 1998 (title IX of P.L. 105-277; approved October 21, 1998), the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000, title IX (P.L. 106-79; approved October
25, 1999); P.L. 107-57 (approved October 27, 2001; 115 Stat. 403), which authorizes the
provision of foreign assistance to Pakistan to October 2003; P.L. 108-447 (of which division
D is the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2005; approved December 8, 2004), which amends P.L. 107-57 to extend foreign assistance
to Pakistan to October 1, 2005; and P.L. 108-458 (of which title VII is the 9/11 Commission
Implementation Act of 2004; approved December 17, 2004), which seeks to amend P.L.
107-57 to extend foreign aid to Pakistan to October 1, 2006. This amendment, however, is
not executable for technical reasons. Section 534 of the Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-102; approved
November 14, 2005), however, extends the authority of P.L. 107-57 through FY2006,
“notwithstanding the date contained in section 6” of that Act. Authorities contained in P.L.

109-102, in turn, are continued into FY2007 by division B of P.L. 109-289, as amended.

⁹ Medicine and food were further exempted from the application of sanctions in most cases
with the enactment of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000
Act (P.L. 106-387; approved October 28, 2000). For further discussion, see CRS Report
RL33499, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Status
and Implementation, by Remy Jurenas.

Atomic Energy Act of 1954¹⁰
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 declares U.S. policy for the development, use,
and control of atomic energy. The Act authorizes the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to oversee the export of special nuclear materials and nuclear
technology in accordance with bilateral and international cooperation agreements
negotiated by the Department of State. The Act defines the nature and requirements
of those cooperative agreements and the procedure by which Congress reviews them.
The Act states export licensing criteria for nuclear materials and sensitive equipment
and technology.
Section 129 (Conduct Resulting in Termination of Nuclear Exports; 42
U.S.C. 2158) prohibits the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment, or sensitive
technology from the United States to any non-nuclear-weapon state that the President
finds to have detonated a nuclear explosive device, terminated or abrogated
safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), materially violated
an IAEA safeguards agreement, or engaged in manufacture or acquisition of nuclear
explosive devices. The section similarly prohibits transfers to any country, or group
of countries, that the President finds to have violated a nuclear cooperation agreement
with the United States, assisted, encouraged, or induced a non-nuclear-weapon state
to engage in certain activities related to nuclear explosive devices, or agreed to
transfer reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology to a non-nuclear-weapon
state, except under certain conditions.
The President may waive the restriction if he determines that the prohibition
would hinder U.S. nonproliferation objectives or jeopardize the common defense and
security. Sixty days before a determination is issued, the President is required to
forward his reasons for waiving the sanctions to Congress, which may block the
waiver by adopting a concurrent resolution. Congress may alternatively counter the
Presidential determination with passage of a joint resolution within 45 days of the
President’s action.

¹⁰ P.L. 83-703; approved August 30, 1954; 42 U.S.C. 2011 and following.
P.L. 99-183, a joint resolution approving an Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Between
the United States and China, (approved December 16, 1985; 99 Stat. 1174), required
Presidential certification that China was not violating section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954. On January 12, 1998, President Clinton made such a determination, also certifying
that China had met nuclear weapons nonproliferation standards stated in section
902(a)(6)(B)(i) of P.L. 101-246 (22 U.S.C. 2151 note; often referred to as the “Tiananmen
Square sanctions”). See Presidential Determination No. 98-10 (63 F.R. 3447; January 23,

1998).

Section 104 of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation
Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-401; approved December 18, 2006) authorizes the President to
exempt a proposed U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement from requirements of sec. 123
a.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), and to waive secs. 128 and 129
of that Act as each would apply to India, provided the standards stated in sec. 104(b) of that
Act are met.

The section, as amended August 8, 2005, also prohibits the export, transfer, or
licensing for export or transfer, of nuclear materials, nuclear equipment, or sensitive
nuclear technology that could be applied to the design or construction of a nuclear
reactor or nuclear weapon, to any country the government of which is cited as a
supporter of acts of international terrorism, pursuant to sec. 620A(a) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, sec. 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, or sec.

40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act.

The President may waive the restriction if he determines that to do so will not
result in any increased risk that the targeted country will acquire a nuclear weapon,
nuclear reactor, or any materials or components of a nuclear weapon. The
President’s authority to waive sanctions also requires his determination and
certification that the government of the country in question has not aided or abetted
in the international proliferation of nuclear explosive devices or the acquisition of
unsafeguarded nuclear materials within the past year, “has provided adequate,
verifiable assurances that it will cease its support for acts of international terrorism,”
that waiving imposition is in the vital U.S. national security interest, or is “essential
to prevent or respond to a serious radiological hazard in the country...that may or
does threaten public health and safety.”
Sec. 307 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242; approved
March 10, 1978) added sec. 129. Sec. 632(a) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L.
109-58; approved August 8, 2005) added authorities related to restricting exports
to a country the government of which is found to be a supporter of acts of
international terrorism.
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare
Elimination Act of 1991¹¹
The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act
of 1991 mandates U.S. sanctions, and encourages international sanctions, against
countries that use chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law.
Section 307 (Sanctions Against Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons; 22
U.S.C. 5605) requires the President to terminate foreign assistance (except
humanitarian, food, and agricultural assistance), arms sales and licenses, credits,
guarantees, and certain exports to a government of a foreign country that he has
determined has used or made substantial preparation to use chemical or biological
weapons. Within three months, the President must determine and certify to Congress
that the government: is no longer using chemical or biological weapons in violation
of international law; is no longer using such weapons against its own people; has
provided credible assurances that such behavior will not resume; and is willing to
cooperate with U.N. or other international observers to verify that biological and
chemical weapons are not still in use. Without this three-month determination,
sanctions are required affecting multilateral development bank loans, U.S. bank loans
or credits, exports, imports, diplomatic relations, and aviation access to and from the
United States.

¹¹ P.L. 102-182; approved December 4, 1991; 22 U.S.C. 5601-5606.

The President may lift the sanctions after a year, with a determination and
certification to Congress that the foreign government has met the conditions listed
above, and that it is making restitution to those affected by its use of chemical or
biological weapons.
The President may waive the imposition of these sanctions if he determines and
certifies to Congress and the appropriate committees that such a waiver is essential
to U.S. national security interests.
The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act
of 1991 was enacted as title III of P.L. 102-182 (a law dealing with trade issues
otherwise unrelated to nonproliferation). No amendments have been enacted.¹²
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998¹³
The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 implements
the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was originally signed on January 13,
1993, and to which the United States became a party on April 29, 1997.¹⁴ The
Convention bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical
weapons, requires the destruction of existing weapons and related materials,
establishes an international verification regime, and requires export controls and
punitive measures to be leveled for noncompliance.
Section 103 (Civil Liability of the United States; 22 U.S.C. 6713) requires a
wide range of sanctions to be imposed, for a period of not less than ten years, on an
individual who is a member of, or affiliated with, the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons “whose actions or omissions the United States has been held
liable for a tort or taking...”; or a foreign company or an individual affiliated with that
company, “which knowingly assisted, encouraged, or induced, in any way, a foreign
person” affiliated with the Organization “to publish, divulge, disclose, or make
known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by the Convention any United
States confidential business information” including:
^!no arms export transactions — sales of items on U.S. Munitions
List, transactions under Arms Export Control Act; no licenses for
goods or services covered by foreign policy controls under the
Export Administration Act of 1979;
^!U.S. opposition to support in international financial institutions;

¹² Two versions of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination
Act of 1991 were enacted. Title V of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1992 and 1992 (P.L. 102-138; approved October 28, 1991) enacted the first. Later in the
same session, title III of P.L. 102-182 (a trade act otherwise unrelated to nonproliferation
issues) repealed the first version and enacted a new Chemical and Biological Weapons
Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. This report refers only to the second
enactment — that which currently stands in law.
¹³ Division I of P.L. 105-277; approved October 21, 1998; 112 Stat. 2681-856. See also 18
U.S.C. 229 et seq.
¹⁴ See S.Res. 75, 105^th Congress, 1^st Session.

^!no U.S. Export-Import Bank transactions;
^!prohibition on U.S. private banks engaging with sanctioned person;
^!assets in United States to be frozen by Presidential action; and
^!no rights to land aircraft in the United States (other than in cases of
emergency).
The Secretary of State is further required to deny a visa to any individual affiliated
with the Organization who divulges any confidential U.S. business if that disclosure
results in financial loss or damages.
The section requires the President to impose similar sanctions on any foreign
government found by the President to have similarly divulged such information, with
the sanctions imposed for not less than five years. Foreign countries are further
subject to:
^!no U.S. economic assistance (other than humanitarian assistance),
military assistance, foreign military financing, grant military
education and training, military credits, guarantees; and no export
licensing for commercial satellites.
Sanctions may be suspended if the sanctioned entity fully and completely
compensates the U.S. government to cover the liability. The President, alternatively,
may waive the sanctions if he determines and notifies Congress that U.S. national
security interests are served by such a waiver.
Export Administration Act of 1979¹⁵
The Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) authorizes the executive branch
to regulate private sector exports of particular goods and technology to other
countries. The EAA coordinates such actions with other foreign policy
considerations, including nonproliferation, and determines eligibility of recipients for
exports. Section 5 (National Security Controls; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404) authorizes
the President to curtail or prohibit the export of any goods or services for national
security reasons: to comply with other laws regarding a potential recipient country’s
political status or political stability; to cooperate with international agreements or

¹⁵ P.L. 96-72; approved September 29, 1979; 50 U.S.C. App. 2401 and following. Authority
granted by the Export Administration Act was continued to August 20, 2001, by the Export
Administration Modification and Clarification Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-508; approved
November 13, 2000). Approaching another expiration, President Bush invoked authority
granted his office pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and
National Emergencies Act, to issue Executive Order 13222 (August 17, 2001; 66 F.R.

44025), extending authorities of the Export Administration Act for one year. On August 14,

2002, the President issued a notice to extend the authority of that Executive Order another
year (67 F.R. 53721). Since then, Executive Order 13222 has been extended annually in
Presidential notices. Such steps have precedent: the Export Administration Act expired in
September 1990, to be renewed by Executive Order until Congress passed reauthorizing
legislation in 1993. Since 1990, the authorities of the Act have been made available by
either Executive Order, determinations renewing those Orders, or short-term legislative
extensions.

understandings; or to protect militarily critical technologies. Section 6 (Foreign
Policy Controls; 50 U.S.C. app. 2405) similarly authorizes the President to curtail
or prohibit the export of goods or services for foreign policy reasons. Within section
6, for example, section 6(j) establishes the State Department’s list of countries found
to be supporting acts of international terrorism, a list on which many other
restrictions and prohibitions in law are based.¹⁶ Section 6(k) restricts exportation of
certain crime control equipment. Section 6(l) restricts exportation for a list of dual
use goods and technology. Section 6(m) restricts exportation for a list of goods and
technology that would directly and substantially assist a foreign government or group
in acquiring the capability to develop, produce, stockpile, or deliver chemical or
biological weapons.
Section 11A (Multilateral Export Control Violations; 50 U.S.C. app. 2410a)
requires the President to prohibit, for two to five years, the U.S. government from
contracting with, or procuring goods or services from, a foreign person who has
violated any country’s national security export regulations in accordance with the
agreement of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(COCOM),¹⁷ and that the violation results “in substantial enhancement of Soviet and
East Bloc capabilities in submarines or antisubmarine warfare, ballistic or
antiballistic missiles technology, strategic aircraft, command, control,
communications and intelligence, or other critical technologies.” The President also
is required generally to prohibit importation of products from the sanctioned person.
The President may impose sanctions at his discretion if the first but not the second

¹⁶ Many laws link the support of acts of international terrorism with WMD activities.
Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), for example, defines acts of
international terrorism, in part, as “all activities that the Secretary [of State] determines
willfully aid or abet the international proliferation of nuclear explosive devices to
individuals or groups, willfully aid or abet an individual or groups in acquiring
unsafeguarded special nuclear material, or willfully aid or abet the efforts of an individual
or group to use, development, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire chemical, biological,
or radiological weapons.” See that Act and sec. 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2371), in Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2005, vol. I-A, pages 496,

334, respectively.

¹⁷ The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) agreed to cease
to exist on March 31, 1994. Member nations agreed to retain current control lists until a
successor organization is established. On December 19, 1995, the United States and 27
other countries, including NATO participants and Russia, agreed to establish a new
multilateral export control arrangement. In July 1996, thirty-three countries gave final
approval to the Wassenaar Arrangement for Export Controls for Conventional Arms and
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (“Wassenaar Arrangement”). On January 15, 1998, the
Bureau of Export Administration (BXA — now the Bureau of Industry and Security, or BIS)
of the Department of Commerce issued an interim rule to implement the Wassenaar
Arrangement list of dual-use items and revisions to the Commerce Control List required by
implementation of the Wassenaar Arrangement (63 F.R. 2452). BXA issued a final rule on
July 23, 1999 (64 F.R. 40106), and a revision to that rule where it pertains to national
security controls on July 12, 2000 (65 F.R. 43130). On December 1, 2000, participants in
the Wassenaar Arrangement agreed to adopt new standards for controlling exports of
electronics, computers, and telecommunications technology. A current version of the
Commerce Control List may be found at 15 CFR part 774, with an overview at 15 CFR part

738. See [http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/ear_data.html].

condition exists. In this case, the restrictions may be in place no longer than five
years.
Sanctions may not be required for some goods if contracts with the sanctionable
person meet U.S. operational military requirements, if the President determines that
the sanctionable person is a sole source provider of an essential defense article or
service, or if the President determines that such articles or services are essential to
U.S. national security under defense coproduction agreements. The President also
may not be required to apply sanctions if he determines that a company affiliated
with the sanctionable person had no knowledge of the export control violation. After
sanctions have been in place for two years, the President may modify terms of the
restrictions under certain conditions, and if he notifies Congress.
Sec. 2444 of the Multilateral Export Control Enhancement Amendments Act
(title II, subtitle D, part II of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988;
P.L. 100-418; approved August 23, 1988) added sec. 11A. The section has not been
amended.
Section 11B (Missile Proliferation Control Violations; 50 U.S.C. app.
2410b) is similar to sections 72 and 73 of the AECA, but authorizes sanctions against
U.S. persons and foreign persons who engage in commercial transactions that violate
missile proliferation controls. The section requires sanctions against any U.S. citizen
whom the President determines to be engaged in exporting, transferring, conspiring
to export or transfer, or facilitating an export or transfer of, any equipment or
technology identified by the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex. Sanctions
vary with the type of equipment or technology exported; worst-case sanctions deny
export licenses for goods on controlled pursuant to the Export Administration Act
for not less than two years.
The President may waive the imposition of sanctions if he certifies to Congress
that the product or service to be restricted is essential to U.S. national security, and
that the provider is a sole source provider.
The section further requires sanctions against any foreign person whom the
President determines to be engaged in exporting, transferring, conspiring to export
or transfer, or facilitating an export or transfer of, any MTCR equipment or
technology that contributes to the design, development, or production of missiles in
a country that is not an MTCR adherent. Sanctions vary with the type of equipment
or technology exported; worst-case sanctions deny licenses for transfer to the foreign
person items otherwise controlled by the Export Administration Act for not less than
two years. The President may also prohibit importation into the United States of
products produced by the foreign person.
The law allows several exceptions, wherein some or all of the sanctions may not
be imposed against foreign persons. These exceptions are nearly identical to those
found in sections 72 and 73 of the AECA. The President may waive the imposition
of sanctions for national security reasons, but must notify Congress beforehand. The
Presidential authority to restrict importation is conditional in a manner identical to
that in section 73 of the AECA.

The definition of “MTCR adherent” in section 11B is also identical to that in
section 74 of the AECA. The definition of “person,” however, retains its earlier
form, applying to all “countries where it may be impossible to identify a specific
governmental entity,” and not adopting the narrower reference to military aircraft but
referring to government activity relating to development of aircraft generally.
Sec. 1702(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991
(P.L. 101-510; approved November 5, 1990) added sec. 11B. The section has not
been amended.
Section 11C (Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation Sanctions; 50
U.S.C. app. 2410c), similar to section 81 of the AECA, authorizes the President to
apply procurement and import sanctions against foreign persons that he determines
knowingly contribute to the use, development, production, stockpile, or acquisition
of chemical or biological weapons by exporting goods or technology from the United
States or any other country.
The President may delay the imposition of sanctions for up to 180 days if he is
in consultation with the sanctionable person’s government to bring that government
to take specific and effective steps to terminate the sanctionable activities. The
President may not be required to impose or maintain sanctions if the sanctionable
person otherwise provides goods needed for U.S. military operations, if the President
determines that the sanctionable person is a sole source provider of some good or
service, or if the President determines that goods and services provided by the
sanctionable person are essential to U.S. national security under defense cooperation
agreements. Exceptions are also made for completing outstanding contracts, the
purchase of spare or component parts, service and maintenance otherwise not readily
available, information and technology essential to U.S. products or production, or
medical or other humanitarian items.
The President may terminate the sanctions after 12 months, if he determines and
certifies to Congress that the sanctioned person no longer aids or abets any foreign
government, project, or entity in its efforts to acquire biological or chemical weapons
capability. The President may waive the application of a sanction after a year of its
imposition, if he determines it is in U.S. national security interests to do so. Not less
than 20 days before a national security waiver is issued, the President must notify
Congress, fully explaining the rationale for waiving the sanction.
Sec. 505(a) of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare
Elimination Act of 1991 (title III of P.L. 102-182; approved December 4, 1991)
added sec. 11C. No amendments have been enacted.
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945¹⁸
The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 establishes the Export-Import Bank of the
United States and authorizes the Bank to finance and facilitate exports and imports

¹⁸ P.L. 79-173; approved July 31, 1945; 12 U.S.C. 635 and following.

and the exchange of commodities and services between the United States and foreign
countries.
Section 2(b)(1)(B) (12 U.S.C. 635(b)(1)(B)) generally states the United States’
policy of administering loan programs through the Export-Import Bank. The section
provides that the Bank will deny applications for credit for nonfinancial or
noncommercial considerations only when the President determines it is in the U.S.
national interest to deny credit to advance U.S. policies in international terrorism —
including taking into account a nation’s lack of cooperation in efforts to eradicate
terrorism — nuclear proliferation, environmental protection, and human rights.
Sec. 2(b)(1) was amended and restated in 1972 (P.L. 92-126) and again in 1974
(P.L. 93-646). The language pertaining to “international terrorism, nuclear
proliferation,...” was added by sec. 1904 of the Export-Import Bank Act Amendments
of 1978 (title XIX of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control
Act of 1978; P.L. 95-630; approved November 10, 1978). The Export-Import Bank
Reauthorization Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-189; approved June 14, 2002) added a
reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948 (sec. 15), added language
pertaining to a nation’s lack of cooperation with efforts to eradicate terrorism (sec.
17), and added enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Arms Export
Control Act, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or the Export
Administration Act of 1979, as justification for denying Export-Import Bank
financing (sec. 21). Numerous technical changes were made by P.L. 107-189, as
well.
Section 2(b)(4) (12 U.S.C. 635(b)(4)) provides that the Secretary of State can
determine, and report to Congress and to the Export-Import Bank Directors, if:
^!any country has agreed to IAEA nuclear safeguards but has
materially violated, abrogated, or terminated such safeguards after
October 26, 1977;
^!any country has entered into a cooperation agreement with the
United States concerning the use of civil nuclear energy, but has
violated, abrogated, or terminated any guarantee or other
undertaking related to that agreement after October 26, 1977;
^!any country has detonated a nuclear explosive device after October

26, 1977, but is a not a nuclear-weapon state;

^!any country willfully aids or abets, after June 29, 1994, any non-
nuclear-weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or to
acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material; or
^!any person knowingly aids or abets, after September 23, 1996, any
non-nuclear-weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or
to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material.

If such a determination is made relating to a person, the Secretary is urged to consult
with that person’s government to curtail that person’s activities. Consultations are
allowed 90 days, at the end of which the Secretary will report to Congress as to their
progress. After the 90 days, unless the Secretary requests an additional 90 days, or
unless the Secretary reports that the violations have ceased, the Export-Import Bank
will not approve any transactions to support U.S. exports to any country, or to or by
any person, for which/whom a determination has been made. The imposition of
sanctions may also be waived if the President, 45 days before any transaction is
approved, certifies that the violations have ceased, and that steps have been taken to
ensure the questionable transactions will not resume. The President may also waive
the imposition of sanction if he certifies that to impose them would have a serious
adverse effect on vital U.S. interests, or if he certifies that the objectionable behavior
has ceased.
Sec. 2(b)(4) was added by sec. 3(b) of P.L. 95-143; approved October 26, 1977.
Sec. 825 of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (title VIII of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; P.L. 103-236; approved
April 30, 1994) added “(as defined in section 830(4) of the Nuclear Proliferation
Prevention Act of 1994), or that any country has willfully aided or abetted any non-
nuclear-weapons state (as defined in section 830(5) of that Act) to acquire any such
nuclear explosive device or to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material (as
defined in section 830(8) of that Act)” to define “nuclear explosive device” and to
broaden what acts are sanctionable. This is often referred to as a “Glenn
Amendment” (but not to be confused with “the Glenn Amendment,” which, by all
accounts, would be sec. 102 of the AECA). The section was further amended and
restated by sec. 1303 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997
(P.L. 104-201; approved September 23, 1996). Sec. 1303(b) of that Act further
required the President to report to Congress within 180 days “his recommendations
on ways to make the laws of the United States more effective in controlling and
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The report
shall identify all sources of government funds used for such nonproliferation
activities.”
Section 2(b)(12) (12 U.S.C. 635(b)(12)) requires the President to notify the
Export-Import Bank if he determines “that the military or Government of the Russian
Federation has transferred or delivered to the People’s Republic of China an SS-N-22
missile system and that the transfer or delivery represents a significant and imminent
threat to the security of the United States... Upon receipt of the notice and if so
directed by the President of the United States, the Board of Directors of the Bank
shall not give approval to guarantee, insure, extend credit, or participate in the
extension of credit in connection with the purchase of any good or service by the
military or Government of the Russian Federation.”
Sec. 12 of the Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-121;
approved November 26, 1997) added paragraph 12.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961¹⁹
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) authorizes U.S. government foreign
aid programs including development assistance, economic support funding,
numerous multilateral programs, housing and other credit guaranty programs,
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, international organizations, debt-for-nature
exchanges, international narcotics control, international disaster assistance,
development funding for Africa, assistance to states of the former Soviet Union,
military assistance, international military education and training, peacekeeping,
antiterrorism, and various regional enterprise funds.
Section 307(c) (Withholding of United States Proportionate Share for
Certain Programs of International Organizations; 22 U.S.C. 2227) requires that
foreign assistance the United States pays in to international organizations and
programs not be used for programs in certain countries. The section exempts the²⁰
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from this limitation, except for
particular projects the IAEA finances in Cuba. U.S. proportionate support to the
IAEA, in particular, is not available to any IAEA project relating to the Juragua
Nuclear Power Plant near Cienfugeos, Cuba, or the Pedro Pi Nuclear Research
Center in Cuba, unless Cuba: ratifies the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons or the Treaty of Tlatelelco and is in compliance with terms of the treaty;
negotiates full-scope safeguards of the IAEA not later than two years after treaty
ratification; and “incorporates internationally accepted nuclear safety safeguards.”
Section 307 was added to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by sec. 403 of the
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83;
approved August 8, 1985). The countries to which it is applied has changed over
time; the countries for which program funding is currently restricted are Burma,
North Korea, Syria, Libya, Iran, Cuba, and the Palestine Liberation Organization
(though application to the PLO has been waived under other legislation in the course
of peace negotiations), and communist countries listed under sec. 620(f) of the Act

¹⁹ P.L. 87-195; approved September 4, 1961; 22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. See Legislation on
Foreign Relations Through 2005, vol. 1-A, p. 15. See also chapter 9 in this Act, relating to
“Nonproliferation and Export Control Assistance,” added by sec. 301 of the Security
Assistance Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-280; approved October 6, 2000), further amended by the
Russian Federation Debt for Nonproliferation Act of 2002 (division B, title VIII, subtitle B,
of P.L. 107-228; approved September 30, 2002), and the Security Assistance Act of 2002
(division B of P.L. 107-228; approved September 30, 2002), codified at 22 U.S.C. 2349bb
et seq. This chapter does not impose sanctions; instead it makes assistance available to
friendly countries to ultimately “enhance the nonproliferation and export control
capabilities...by providing training and equipment to detect, deter, monitor, interdict, and
counter proliferation”.
²⁰ Sec. 307(d) of this Act, however, imposes no sanctions but requires the Secretary of State
to report to Congress whenever he/she determines “that programs of the International
Atomic Energy Agency in Iran are inconsistent with United States nuclear nonproliferation
and safety goals, will provide Iran with training or expertise relevant to the development of
nuclear weapons, or are being used as a cover for the acquisition of sensitive nuclear
technology”. Added to sec. 307 by sec. 1342 of the Iran Nuclear Proliferation Prevention
Act of 2002 (subtitle D of title XIII of P.L. 107-228; approved September 30, 2002).

(currently North Korea, China, Cuba, Vietnam, and Tibet). Most recently, sec. 2101
of P.L. 109-13 (119 Stat. 266) removed Iraq from the list. Limitations in subsec. (c)
were originally added by sec. 431(a)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103-236; approved April 30, 1994). Language pertaining to
nuclear developments in Cuba was added by sec. 2809(a)(1) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, 1998 and 1999 (subdivision B of division G of P.L. 105-277;
approved October 21, 1998).
Section 498A(b) (Criteria for Assistance to Governments of the
Independent States; 22 U.S.C. 2295a(b)) requires that the President not provide
assistance to independent states of the former Soviet Union if he determines that the
government of that state, among other things, (1) has failed to implement arms
control obligations signed by the former Soviet Union, or (2) has knowingly
transferred to another country: missiles or missile technology inconsistent with
guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime; “any material,
equipment, or technology that would contribute significantly to the ability of such
country to manufacture any weapon of mass destruction (including nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons) if the President determines that the material, equipment, or
technology was to be used by such country in the manufacture of such weapon.” The
section further prohibits foreign assistance under chapter 11 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 to any country for which a determination has been issued
pursuant to sections 101 or 102 of the Arms Export Control Act or sections 306(a)(1)
or 307 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination
Act of 1991.
The President may waive the prohibition — other than that based on other
proliferation legislation as cited in the section — on U.S. national security grounds,
if he determines that furnishing assistance “will foster respect for internationally
recognized human rights and the rule of law or the development of institutions of
democratic governance,” or to alleviate suffering resulting from a natural or man-
made disaster. Assistance may also be provided under the U.S. Information
Agency’s (USIA) secondary school exchange program notwithstanding a country’s
ineligibility (except in instances where ineligibility is based on nonproliferation
violations). Any waiver requires an immediate report to Congress of any
determination or decision.
Section 498A was added by sec. 201 of the FREEDOM Support Act (P.L. 102-
511; approved October 24, 1992). See also discussion, above, on sec. 73(b)(2) and
sec. 73B of the AECA, as amended. Those sections refer to sec. 498A(b)(3)(A) to
limit certain transactions with independent states of the former Soviet Union if the
transactions involve missiles or missile technology and are conducted in a manner
inconsistent with guidelines and parameters of the MTCR.
Section 620(y) (Prohibitions Against Furnishing Assistance; 22 U.S.C. 2370)
restricts foreign assistance, or assistance pursuant to any other act, to any country
providing nuclear fuel, related assistance, and credits to Cuba. Assistance denied the
country in question equals the value of that country’s nuclear development assistance,
sales, or transfers to Cuba. The requirement to limit assistance is waived if Cuba (A)
ratifies the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or the Treaty of
Tlatelelco and is in compliance with terms of the treaty; (B) “has negotiated and is

in full compliance with full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy
Agency” within two years of the treaty ratification; and (C) “incorporates and is in
compliance with internationally accepted nuclear safety safeguards.” The section
also requires the Secretary of State to report to Congress annually on the matter.
Added by sec. 2810(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years

1998 and 1999 (subdivision B of Division G of P.L. 105-277; approved October 21,

1998).

Section 620E (Assistance to Pakistan; 22 U.S.C. 2375), related to U.S.
assistance to Pakistan, was enacted in response to the threat posed by Soviet
occupation of neighboring Afghanistan. Section 620E(d) authorizes the President
to waive sanctions under section 101 of the AECA to provide assistance to Pakistan,
if he determines it is in the U.S. national interest to do so.
Subsection 620E(e) states that no military assistance shall be furnished and no
military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan unless the
President certifies to the Speaker of the House and the Chairperson of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that, for the fiscal year in which the assistance, sale or
transfer would occur, Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that
proposed military assistance would significantly reduce the risk that Pakistan will
possess a nuclear explosive device. This restriction does not apply to international
narcotics control assistance, International Military Education and Training funds,
funding for humanitarian and civic assistance projects, peacekeeping or other
multilateral operations funds, or antiterrorism assistance.
Sec. 620E was added to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by sec. 736 of the
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-113;
approved December 29, 1981). Sec. 620E(d) was amended by the Nuclear
Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (title VIII of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; P.L. 103-236; approved April 30,
1994) to reflect the repeal of secs. 669 and 670 and the enactment of secs. 101 and
102 of the Arms Export Control Act. Sec. 620E(e), the “Pressler amendment,” was
added by sec. 902 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act
of 1985 (P.L. 99-83; approved August 8, 1985). Sec. 559(a)(1)(D) of the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1996
(P.L. 104-107; approved February 12, 1996), amended the section to exclude certain
assistance programs from the ban, as noted in the last sentence, above. The same
Act amended the section to authorize the President to: release Pakistan from paying
storage costs of items purchased before October 1, 1990, but not delivered
(presumably F-16s); release other items serviced in the United States; and continue
the applicability of other laws pertaining to ballistic missile sanctions. This bloc of
amendments is sometimes referred to as the “Brownback amendment.” The same
Act made several changes to restrict only “military assistance,” formerly the section
had referred to assistance generally; this amendment is popularly referred to as the
“Brown amendment.”
After India and Pakistan tested nuclear explosive devices in May 1998,
sanctions were imposed in accordance with requirements of sec. 102 of the Arms
Export Control Act (see above). Subsequently, Congress enacted six laws to ease

sanctions or to grant the President discretionary authority to waive their application.
The Agriculture Export Relief Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-194; approved July 14, 1998)
authorizes the exemption of sanctions as they pertain to certain agricultural
commodities. The India-Pakistan Relief Act (title IX of the Agriculture, Rural
Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 1999; division A, sec. 101(a) of P.L. 105-277; 112 Stat. 2681-40; approved
October 21, 1998) authorizes the President to waive the application of most
sanctions under secs. 101 and 102 of the AECA, sec. 620E(e) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, and sec. 2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, for
a period of one year. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000 (P.L.
106-79; approved October 21, 1999; see title IX), repeals the India-Pakistan Relief
Act, but also authorizes the President to waive the same sections of law, including
sec. 620E(e). President Bush exercised this authority in issuing Presidential
Determination No. 2000-4 on October 27, 1999 (64 F.R. 60649) to the extent it
applied, in the case of Pakistan, to “credit, credit guarantee, or other financial
assistance provided by the Department of Agriculture to support the purchase of food
or other agricultural commodity; and the making of any loan or the providing of any
credit to the Government of Pakistan by any U.S. bank.” On September 22, 2001,
the President lifted all remaining nuclear test-related sanctions against India and
Pakistan, including sec. 620E(e), under the authority granted him in P.L. 106-79
(Presidential Determination No. 2001-28; 66 F.R. 50095). The fourth measure, P.L.
107-57 (115 Stat. 403, approved October 27, 2001), authorizes the President to
waive remaining restrictions (relating to military dictatorship and debt arrearage,
statutorily required by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and annual foreign
operations appropriations measures) on foreign assistance to Pakistan. P.L.
108-447 (of which division D is the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2005; approved December 8, 2004), amends
P.L. 107-57 to extend foreign assistance to Pakistan to October 1, 2005. P.L.

108-458 (of which title VII is the 9/11 Commission Implementation Act of 2004;

approved December 17, 2004), sought to amend P.L. 107-57 to extend foreign aid
to Pakistan to October 1, 2006. This amendment, however, was not executable for
technical reasons. Sec. 117 of the Continuing Resolution (P.L. 109-77; 119 Stat.
2037; approved September 30, 2005), and subsequently, sec. 534 of the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L
109-102; 119 Stat 2210, approved November 14, 2005), however, authorized the
President to waive the applicability to Pakistan of restrictions imposed on a country
under military dictatorship and waived debt arrearage requirements for Fiscal Year
2006. Authorities contained in P.L. 109-102, in turn, are continued into fiscal year

2007 by division B of P.L. 109-289 (120 Stat. 1257 at 1311; approved September 29,

2006), as amended.

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2006²¹
A Foreign Operations Appropriations Act is enacted annually, generally at the
start of a fiscal year, to make appropriations for various foreign assistance, military
assistance, and international financial institutions programs. Language in the current
fiscal year act pertains only to that fiscal year unless otherwise expressly stated.
Congress has not enacted a comprehensive foreign aid authorization bill since 1985,
however; as a result, the annual appropriations act increasingly has become a means
of enacting authorizing language that carries the force of law beyond the fiscal year.
In recent years, Security Assistance Acts and authorization acts addressing single
issues have been enacted. Recent single-issue legislation has included the
Millennium Challenge Account, trafficking in persons, microenterprise, HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis and malaria treatment and prevention programs, clean water, programs
for orphans and vulnerable children, transfer of excess military equipment, North
Korea, Afghanistan, Russia, and Sudan.
Title I, Export-Import Bank of the United States, prohibits the use of Export-
Import Bank funds in the current fiscal year to make expenditures, contracts, or
commitments for the export of nuclear equipment, fuel or technology to any non-
nuclear-weapon state, if that state is otherwise eligible to receive economic or
military assistance under this Act.
Title II, Assistance for the New Independent States of the Former Soviet
Union, appropriates $514 million for assistance to the states of the former Soviet
Union. The paragraph withholds 60 percent of any funds obligated for the
Government of Russia until the President determines and certifies to the Committees
on Appropriations that the Government of Russia has terminated its efforts “to
provide Iran with technical expertise, training, technology, or equipment necessary
to develop a nuclear reactor, related nuclear research facilities or programs, or
ballistic missile capability...” The restriction does not apply to assistance for
combating infectious diseases, child survival activities, assistance for victims of
trafficking in persons, and nonproliferation and disarmament programs authorized
under title V of the FREEDOM Support Act.
Congress has incorporated this language into the foreign assistance
appropriations bill for several years. In earlier years, the President was authorized
to waive the restriction on the basis of vital U.S. national security interests, or if he
found that the Government of Russia was taking meaningful steps to limit major
supply contracts and to curtail the transfer of technology and technical expertise to
certain programs in Iran. The FY2006 Act does not include such a waiver.

²¹ P.L. 109-102; 119 Stat. 2172; approved November 14, 2005. See Legislation on Foreign
Relations Through 2005, vol. I-A, p. 923. The 2^nd Session of the 109^th Congress did not
complete work on a foreign operations appropriations bill for Fiscal Year 2007. Division
B of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-289; 120 Stat. 1257 at
1311; approved September 29, 2006), as amended, provides a continuation of lapsed
appropriations through February 15, 2007.

Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy
Cooperation Act of 2006²²
The Hyde U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 exempts
some requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 in order for the President to
negotiate a U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement. The Act reaffirms the United
States’ commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (to which India is not
a signatory) and adherence to Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. The Act
authorizes the Secretary of Energy, with consultation from the Secretaries of State
and Defense, to “establish a cooperative nuclear nonproliferation program to pursue
jointly with scientists from the United States and India a program to further common
nuclear nonproliferation goals.” The Act also implements a new U.S. Additional
Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed on June 12, 1998, to
demonstrate the United States’ commitment to the Treaty and to encourage non-
nuclear-weapon states to commit to international nuclear nonproliferation standards.
Section 104(d)(3) (Waiver Authority and Congressional Approval;
Restrictions on Nuclear Transfers; Termination of Nuclear Transfers to India;

22 U.S.C. 8003(d)(3)) terminates exports of nuclear and nuclear-related material,

equipment, or technology to India if, after the proposed U.S.-India nuclear
cooperation agreement enters into force, any Indian person transfers: “(i) nuclear or
nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology that is not consistent with NSG
guidelines or decisions, or (ii) ballistic missiles or missile-related equipment or
technology that is not consistent with MTCR guidelines.”
The President may determine “that cessation of such exports would be seriously
prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or
otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security” to allow nuclear-related
exports to India to continue. The President may also allow exports to continue if he
finds that (i) the transfer in question was made without the knowledge of the
Government of India; (ii) at the time of the transfer, either the Government of India
did not own, control, or direct the Indian person that made the transfer or the Indian
person that made the transfer is a natural person who acted without the knowledge
of a Indian commercial or government entity ; and “(iii) the President certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees that the Government of India has taken or is
taking appropriate judicial or other enforcement actions against the Indian person
with respect to such transfer.”
Sec. 106. (Inoperability of Determination and Waivers; 22 U.S.C. 8005)
cancels any waiver or determination issued under section 104 “if the President
determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of the
enactment of this title.”

²² P.L. 109-401; approved December 18, 2006; 22 U.S.C. 8001 et seq.

International Emergency Economic Powers Act²³
Section 203 (Grants of Authorities; 50 U.S.C. 1702) authorizes the President
“to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to a declared national
emergency.”²⁴ After he declares a national emergency exists, pursuant to the
authority in the National Emergencies Act, the President may use the authority in this
section to investigate, regulate, or prohibit foreign exchange transactions, credit
transfers or payments, currency or security transfers, and may take specified actions
relating to property in which a foreign country or person has interest. In terms of
nonproliferation concerns, it is pursuant to this section that the President has
continued the authority of the expired Export Administration Act, prohibited
transactions with “those who disrupt the Middle East peace process,” issued export
controls on encryption items, established export controls related to weapons of mass
destruction, prohibited transactions “with persons who commit, threaten to commit,
or support terrorism,” and blocked certain property of, and transactions with,
governments of specific countries found to be engaged in activities that constitute an
extraordinary threat, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.²⁵
Enacted as title II of P.L. 95-223; approved December 28, 1977, to update and
continue authority carried earlier in the Trading With the Enemy Act (P.L. 65-92;
approved October 6, 1917). It has been amended from time to time to update the list
of what cannot be restricted, mostly to keep up with changes in technology (for
example, the law allows the free flow of informational materials, most recently

²³ 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.
²⁴ The “situations in which authorities may be exercised” are stated in sec. 202 (50 U.S.C.

1701).

²⁵ Unless otherwise noted, all codified at 50 U.S.C. 1701 note, see Executive Order 12938,
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (November 14, 1994; 59 F.R. 59099,
amended); Executive Order 12947, Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten
To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process (January 23, 1995; 60 F.R. 5079); Executive
Order 12957, Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Development of Iran
Petroleum Resources (March 15, 1995; 60 F.R. 14615); Executive Order 12959, Prohibiting
Certain Transactions with Respect to Iran (May 6, 1995; 60 F.R. 24757); Executive Order
13026, Administration of Export Controls on Encryption Products (November 15, 1996; 61
F.R. 58767; 50 U.S.C. App. 2403 note); Executive Order 13059, Prohibiting Certain
Transactions with Respect to Iran (August 19, 1997; 62 F.R. 44531); Executive Order
13159, Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the
Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons (June 21, 2000;

65 F.R. 39279); Executive Order 13222, Administration of Export Controls (August 17,

2001; 66 F.R. 44025); Executive Order 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting
Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism
(September 23, 2001; 66 F.R. 49079); Executive Order 13338, Blocking Property of Certain
Persons and Prohibiting Export of Certain Goods To Syria (May 11, 2004; 69 F.R. 26751);
and Executive Order 13382, Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferators and Their Supporters (June 28, 2005; 70 F.R. 38567). The President also uses
the authority in IEEPA to issue executive orders to implement United Nations Security
Council Resolutions. Of the several that are current, Executive Order 12724, Blocking Iraqi
Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Iraq (August 9, 1990; 55 F.R.

33089) has relevance to issues of proliferation.

amended to include CD ROMs). Most recently, the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56;
approved October 26, 2001) made amendments to clarify the applicability of the
IEEPA to persons or property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and to
make available any classified materials in court proceedings related to IEEPA
violations.
Iran Sanctions Act²⁶
Section 4(Multilateral Regime) authorizes the President to waive, on a case-
by-case basis, sanctions imposed on any national of another country found to be
investing in Iran’s oil capabilities if he finds it vital to U.S. national security interests
to do so.
Section 5 (Imposition of Sanctions) requires the President to impose sanctions
on any person found to have invested in Iran’s ability to develop petroleum resources.
The President is required to impose two or more of the sanctions listed in section 6
on any person he finds has, after September 30, 2006 (the date of enactment of
amendments in the Iran Freedom Support Act), “exported, transferred, or otherwise
provided to Iran any goods, services, technology, or other items knowing that the
provision of such ... items would contribute materially to the ability of Iran to ...
acquire or development chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related
technologies; or acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of advanced
conventional weapons.”
Section 6 (Description of Sanctions) authorizes the President to employ a
range of punitive measures, including denial of Export-Import funding, denial of
export licenses, prohibition on U.S. government and commercial bank financing,
refusal of U.S. government procurement contracts, and additional measures as the
President sees fit.
Section 8 (Termination of Sanctions) cancels the requirement for sanctions if
the President determines that Iran has ceased all efforts to design, develop,
manufacture, or acquire weapons of mass destruction or related delivery systems, and
if Iran is removed from the list of supporters of international terrorism.

²⁶ 50 U.S.C. 1701 note; enacted originally as the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. On
April 23, 2004, the President determined that “Libya has fulfilled the requirements of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 748, adopted March 31, 1992, and United Nations
Security Council Resolution 883, adopted November 11, 1993” (Presidential Determination
No. 2004-30; 69 F.R. 24907). The determination met the requirements of the law to
authorize the President to terminate economic sanctions imposed on Libya under this Act.
The President has subsequently revoked four Executive Orders relating to Libya — E.O.
12538, 12543, 12544, and 12801 — in Executive Order 13357 of September 20, 2004 (69
F.R. 56665), removing most of the statutory barriers to full and normal trade relations with
that country. On May 12, 2006, the President certified that Libya was no longer a supporter
of acts of international terrorism, and removed that country from the sec. 6(j) list
(Presidential Determination No. 2006-14; 71 F.R. 31909; June 1, 2006).

Section 9 (Duration of Sanctions; Presidential Waiver) authorizes the
President to delay the imposition of sanctions for up to 90 days if consultations are
entered into with a government that holds jurisdiction over the offending party.
Sanctions may be further delayed another 90 days if the government of jurisdiction
takes action to terminate the offending behavior and penalize the offender.
Otherwise, sanctions are imposed for not less than two years or until such time that
the President can certify that the offending behavior has ceased, at which juncture
sanctions remain in place for at least one year. Alternatively, the President may
waive the imposition of sanctions if he finds it important to U.S. national interests
to do so.
P.L. 104-172; approved August 5, 1996. Originally enacted as the Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. The President waived its application toward Libya on
April 23, 2004 (see note), and the Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293;
approved September 30, 2006) struck out the reference to Libya and made other
substantive changes to focus the intent of the Act solely on Iran and that country’s
efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction or other military capabilities. Thus,
for example, where section 5 previously required the imposition of sanctions on any
person found to be contributing to Libya’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction,
advanced conventional weapons, or other military resources, the amended section
hones in only on Iran’s development of military resources. The Iran Freedom
Support Act also struck out references in section 8 to Libya’s complicity in the
PanAm Flight 103 explosion over Lockerbie, Scotland. Previously, the Act had been
amended to lower the threshold of investment in Libya that triggered the imposition
of sanctions, change reporting requirements, fine-tune definitions, and extend the
authorities herein another five years, to 2006 (P.L. 107-24; approved August 3,

2001). Authorities were further extended to September 29, 2006 (P.L. 109-267;

approved August 4, 2006), and again to December31, 2011 (P.L. 109-293).
Iran Freedom Support Act²⁷
Section 101 (Codification of Sanctions) locks in place the substantive elements
of three Executive orders in effect on January 1, 2006.²⁸ The orders, first issued by
President Clinton in 1995 and 1997, and renewed annually by him and then by
President Bush, impose economic sanctions on transactions and trade with Iran,
including prohibiting any U.S. person from: entering into a contract or financing
related to the development of petroleum resources in Iran; making new investments
in property owned or controlled by the Government of Iran; or exporting goods or
technology to Iran, investing there, or engaging in transactions to traffic Iran-made
goods or technology.
The Executive Orders were issued by the President under authority granted his
office in the National Emergencies Act and the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act. To terminate the sanctions, the President is now required to notify

²⁷ P.L. 109-293; approved September 30, 2006; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note.
²⁸ Executive Order 12957 (March 15, 1995; 60 F.R. 14615), as amended; Executive Order

12959 (May 6, 1995; 60 F.R. 24757), as amended ; and Executive Order 13059 (August 19,

1997; 62 F.R. 44531) — all codified as notes to 50 U.S.C. 1701.

Congress 15 days in advance, unless circumstances require the President to first
terminate sanctions and notify Congress after the fact, but then within three days after
exercising the authority. In effect, the section dampens the President’s authority to
lift the sanctions on Iran without advising Congress, though notification is the only
requirement to satisfy the law.
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992²⁹
Section 1603 (Application to Iran of Certain Iraq Sanctions) makes
sanctions in section 586G(a)(1) through (4) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1990 also
fully applicable against Iraq (see below, including notes as they pertain to Iraq).
Section 1604 (Sanctions Against Certain Persons) requires the President to
impose sanctions against any person whom he has determined to be engaged in
transferring goods or technology so as to contribute knowingly and materially to the
efforts by Iran or Iraq to acquire chemical, biological, nuclear, or destabilizing
numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons. Section 1605 (Sanctions
Against Certain Foreign Countries) similarly addresses activities of foreign
governments.
In both cases, mandatory sanctions prohibit, for a period of two years, the U.S.
government from entering into procurement agreements with, or issuing licenses for
exporting to or for the sanctioned person or country. Where a foreign country is
found to be in violation of the law, the President must suspend U.S. assistance;
instruct U.S. Executive Directors in the international financial institutions to oppose
multilateral development bank assistance; suspend codevelopment and coproduction
projects the U.S. government might have with the offending country for one year;
suspend, also for one year, most technical exchange agreements involving military
and dual-use technology; and prohibit the exportation of U.S. Munitions List items
for one year. In the case of foreign countries targeted for sanctions under this Act,
the President may, at his discretion, use authority granted him under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act to further prohibit transactions with the country.
The President may waive the mandatory sanctions against persons or foreign
country with 15 days notice to congressional committees that exercising such a
waiver is essential to U.S. national interests.
Enacted as title XVI of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1993 (P.L. 102-484; approved October 23, 1992). Sec. 1408(a) of P.L. 104-106 (110
Stat. 494) amended sections 1604 and 1605 to apply not just to conventional
weapons but also to chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Sec. 1308 of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228; approved
September 30, 2002) consolidated various reports related to missile proliferation
and essential components of nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons
in one section of law, and repealed language in other sections of law, including a
report required under sec. 1607 of this Act, to result in fewer reports overall.

²⁹ 50 U.S.C. 1701 note.

Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act of 2000³⁰
Sections 2 through 5 (Reports; Application; Procedures; Determination;
50 U.S.C. 1701 note) require the President to report to Congress twice a year to
identify “every foreign person with respect to whom there is credible information
indicating that the person, on or after January 1, 1999, transferred to or acquired from
Iran, or on or after January 1, 2005, transferred to or acquired from Syria...” goods,
services or technology the export of which (1) is controlled for nonproliferation
reasons in accordance with various international agreements, or (2) is not controlled
by the country of origin but would be subject to controls if shipped from the United
States. The President is authorized to apply a range of sanctions against any foreign
person included in his report, including denial of procurement contracts with the U.S.
government, prohibition on importation into the United States, and denial of foreign³¹
assistance — sanctions laid out in Executive Order 12938, as amended. A foreign
person named in the President’s report may also be denied U.S. government sales of
items on the U.S. Munitions List and export licenses for dual-use items.
The decision to impose sanctions is left to the President, but if he decides to take
no action, he is required to notify Congress of his reasons. The President may also
take no action if he finds that (1) the person in question did not “knowingly transfer
to or acquire from Iran or Syria” objectionable items; (2) the goods, services or
technology “did not materially contribute to the efforts of Iran or Syria, as the case
may be, to develop nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or ballistic or cruise
missile systems, or weapons listed on the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List...”;
(3) the named person falls under the jurisdiction of a government that is an adherent
to “one or more relevant nonproliferation regimes” and his actions were consistent
with such regime’s guidelines; or (4) the government of jurisdiction “has imposed
meaningful penalties” on the named person.
Section 6 (Restrictions on Extraordinary Payments in Connection with the
International Space Station) prohibits any agency of the U.S. government from
making extraordinary payments to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, or any
affiliates, or the Government of the Russian Federation, or any entities of the
government, until the President determines and reports to Congress that (1) it is the
Russian government’s policy “to oppose the proliferation to or from Iran or Syria of
weapons of mass destruction and missile systems capable of delivering such
weapons;” (2) the Russian government has demonstrated a commitment to preventing
transfers of such goods to or from Iran or Syria; and (3) the Russian Aviation and
Space Agency, or its affiliates, has not made such transfers to or from Iran or Syria
in the preceding year (other than those allowed by the President’s certification for
ex em pt i ons).

³⁰ 50 U.S.C. 1701 note. Originally enacted as the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000.
³¹ Executive Order authorizing the Secretaries of Commerce, Treasury, and State to limit or
prohibit some transactions to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Issued
November 14, 1994 (59 F.R. 59099); subsequently amended. See 50 U.S.C. 1701 notes for
current text.

The President may allow extraordinary payments when “such payments are
necessary to prevent the imminent loss of life by or grievous injury to individuals
aboard the International Space Station.” This allowance requires the President to
notify to Congress such payments will be allowed, and to report to Congress on
details within 30 days of the initial notification. The President may also allow
extraordinary payments for specific development programs of the International Space
Station provided he notify Congress ahead of payment and that the recipients of that
payment are not subject to nonproliferation sanctions.
P.L. 106-178; approved March 14, 2000. Originally enacted as the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000. Sec. 4(e) of the Iran Nonproliferation Amendments Act
of 2005 (P.L. 109-112; approved November 22, 2005) inserted the reference to Syria,
and that Act broadened the application of the original Act to encompass transfers to
and from both Iran and Syria. The North Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2006 (P.L.
109-353; approved October 13, 2006) inserted the reference to North Korea
throughout the Act.
Sec. 1306 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L.
107-228; approved September 30, 2002), added the reference to weapons listed on
the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List. See also sec. 708 of the Security
Assistance Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-280; 114 Stat. 862; 22 U.S.C. 2797b note;
approved October 6, 2000), which requires the President to certify that any Russian
person he identifies as “a party to an agreement related to commercial cooperation
on MTCR equipment or technology with a United States person” is not also one who
transfers goods, services, or technology to Iran, as identified pursuant to sec.

2(a)(1)(B) of this Act.

Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990³²
This Act reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to sanctions leveled by the
United Nations after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The findings, laid out in
section 586F (Declarations Regarding Iraq’s Long-Standing Violations of
International Law), cite Iraq’s violation of international law relating to chemical
and biological warfare, Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran and its own
Kurdish population, efforts to expand its chemical weapons capabilities, evidence of
biological weapons development, and its efforts to establish a nuclear arsenal.
Section 586C (Trade Embargo Against Iraq) continues sanctions imposed
pursuant to four executive orders issued at the outset of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
Sanctions include foreign assistance, trade, economic restrictions, and the freezing
of Iraqi assets under U.S. jurisdiction. The President may alter or terminate the
sanctions issued in his executive orders only with prior 15-day notification to
Congress.
Section 586D (Compliance with U.N. Sanctions Against Iraq) prohibits
foreign assistance, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) funding, and
assistance or sales under the AECA to countries found to be not in compliance with
United Nations Security Council sanctions against Iraq. The President may waive
these sanctions if he determines and certifies to Congress that assistance is in U.S.
national interest, that assistance will benefit the targeted country’s needy, or such
assistance will be in the form of humanitarian assistance for foreign nationals fleeing
Iraq and Kuwait.

³² 50 U.S.C. 1701 note. Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2004, vol. I-B, p. 46.
Sec. 1503 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003 (P.L. 108-11;
approved April 16, 2003), as amended by P.L. 108-106 (approved November 6, 2003),
authorized the President to “suspend the application of any provision of the Iraq Sanctions
Act of 1990: Provided, That nothing in this section shall affect the applicability of the Iran-
Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-484), except that such Act shall not
apply to humanitarian assistance and supplies: Provided further, That the President may
make inapplicable with respect to Iraq section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
or any other provision of law that applies to countries that have supported terrorism:
Provided further, That military equipment, including equipment as defined by title XVI,
section 1608(1)(A) of Public Law 102-484, shall not be exported under the authority of this
section: Provided further, That section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall not
apply with respect to programs of international organizations for Iraq: Provided further, that
provisions of law that direct the United States Government to vote against or oppose loans
or other uses of funds, including for financial or technical assistance, in international
financial institutions for Iraq shall not be construed as applying to Iraq: Provided
further,...That the authorities contained in this section shall expire on September 30, 2005,
or on the date of enactment of a subsequent Act authorizing assistance for Iraq and that
specifically amends, repeals or otherwise makes inapplicable the authorities of this section,
whichever occurs first.”
On May 7, 2003, the President issued a memorandum to suspend the application of all the
provisions, other than section 586E (which establishes penalties for violating the sanctions
imposed in the wake of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990), of this Act on Iraq. Presidential
Determination No. 2003-23 (68 F.R. 26459).

Section 586G (Sanctions Against Iraq)³³ prohibits the United States from
engaging in the following activities relating to Iraq: (1) U.S. foreign military sales
under the AECA; (2) commercial arms sales licensing of items on the U.S. Munitions
List; (3) exports of control list goods and technology, as defined by secs. 4(b) and
5(c)(1) of the Export Administration Act; (4) issuance of licenses or other
authorizations relating to nuclear equipment, materials, and technology; (5)
international financial institutions support; (6) Export-Import Bank funding; (7)
Commodity Credit Corporation funding; and (8) foreign assistance other than
emergency medical or humanitarian funding.
Pursuant to section 586H (Waiver Authority), the President may waive the
application of sec. 586G sanctions if he certifies to Congress that the Government of
Iraq has demonstrated improved respect for human rights, does not support
international terrorists, and “is not acquiring, developing, or manufacturing (I)
ballistic missiles, (ii) chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, or (iii) components
for such weapons; has forsworn the first use of such weapons; and is taking
substantial and verifiable steps to destroy or otherwise dispose of any such missiles
and weapons it possesses...” The President must further certify that Iraq is meeting
its obligations under several international agreements. Finally, the President must
certify that it is in the national interest of the United States to make such a waiver and
resume any or all of these economic supports. The section also authorizes the
President to waive the restrictions in response to a fundamental change in Iraq’s
leadership, provided the new government makes credible assurances that it meets the
above criteria.
Section 586I (Denial of Licenses for Certain Exports to Countries Assisting
Iraq’s Rocket or Chemical, Biological, or Nuclear Weapons Capability) prohibits
the export licensing of supercomputers to any government (or its officials) that the
President finds to be assisting Iraq in improving its rocket technology, or chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons capability. While the section includes no waiver
authority, it is triggered by the President making a determination and so its
implementation rests with the executive branch.
Enacted as secs. 586-586J of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991 (P.L. 101-513; approved November 5,

1990). It has not been amended.

National Emergencies Act
Title II (50 U.S.C. 1621, 1622) authorizes the President to declare, administer,
and terminate national emergencies. Such a condition is required for the President
to exercise his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
P.L. 94-412; approved September 14, 1976. There have been no substantive
amendments specifically affecting proliferation issues.

³³ Section 1603 of the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 102-484; 50 U.S.C.
1701 note; approved October 23, 1992) makes sec. 586G(a)(1) through (4) of the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1990 applicable to Iran.

North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999
The North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999 prohibits the entering into effect
for the United States of any international agreement or agreement for cooperation
with North Korea that would result in North Korea obtaining nuclear materials. The
law also prohibits U.S. issuance of export licenses for, or approval for transfer or
retransfer of, a specified nuclear item. To make such items available, the President
must determine and report to Congress that North Korea has met certain benchmarks
on the safe use of nuclear materials, including cooperation with the IAEA on
inspections, compliance with IAEA safeguard agreements, compliance with terms of
the Agreed Framework it reached with the United States, implementation of terms
of the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization, no accrual of enriched uranium or the
means to develop that material, and no efforts to acquire or develop nuclear weapon
capability. The President must also determine and certify that it is the U.S. national
interest to transfer key nuclear components to North Korea.
Enacted as subtitle B of title VIII of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg
Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (H.R.

3427, enacted by reference in sec. 1000(a)(7) of P.L. 106-113; 113 Stat. 1501A-472;

approved November 29, 1999). Sec. 1307 of the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228; 116 Stat. 1438) amended the Act to define more
clearly what nuclear-related materials require licensing for export to North Korea
by citing terms and requirements in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and Annex A and
Annex B of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978³⁴
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 states U.S. policy for actively
pursuing more effective international controls over the transfer and use of nuclear
materials, equipment, and technology for peaceful purposes in order to prevent
proliferation. The policy statement includes the establishment of common
international sanctions. The Act promotes the establishment of a framework for
international cooperation for developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy, authorizes
the U.S. government to license exports of nuclear fuel and reactors to countries that
adhere to nuclear non-proliferation policies, provides incentives for countries to
establish joint international cooperative efforts in nuclear non-proliferation, and
authorizes relevant export controls. The Act requires the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to publish regulations establishing procedures for granting, suspending,
revoking or amending nuclear export licenses. The Act also requires the Department
of Commerce to issue regulations relating to all export items that could be of
significance for nuclear explosive purposes.
Section 304(b) (Export Licensing Procedures; 42 U.S.C. 2155a) requires the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to publish regulations establishing the procedures
for granting, suspending, revoking or amending nuclear export licenses. Section 309
(42 U.S.C. 2139a) similarly requires the Department of Commerce to issue

³⁴ 22 U.S.C. 3201 and following.

regulations relating to all export items that could be of significance for nuclear
explosive purposes.
Section 402 (Additional Requirements; 42 U.S.C. 2153a) provides that,
unless otherwise stated in a cooperation agreement, no source or special nuclear
material exported from the United States may be enriched after exportation unless the
United States approves the enrichment. The section prohibits the export of nuclear
material for the purpose of enrichment or reactor fueling if the recipient country is
party to a cooperation agreement with the United States amended or concluded after
1978, unless the agreement specifically allows for such transfers. Finally, the section
prohibits export of any major critical component of any uranium enrichment, nuclear
fuel reprocessing, or heavy water production facility, unless a cooperation agreement
specifically designates these items as exportable.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 was enacted as P.L. 95-242;
approved March 10, 1978. Secs. 304(b) and 402 have not been amended. Minor
changes have been incorporated into sec. 309, relating to a requirement of prior
consultation and the reorganization of the Department of State.
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994
The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 was enacted to update current
law to reflect growing concerns about nuclear proliferation.
Section 821 (Imposition of Procurement Sanction on Persons Engaging in³⁵
Export Activities That Contribute to Proliferation; 22 U.S.C. 6301) requires
U.S. government procurement sanctions against any U.S. person or foreign person
if the President determines that person has materially, and with requisite knowledge,
contributed, through export of goods or technology, to efforts to acquire
unsafeguarded special nuclear material, or to use, develop, produce, stockpile, or
otherwise acquire a nuclear explosive device. Terms of the sanctions are that the
U.S. government may not, for 12 months, procure from or enter into procurement
contracts with the sanctioned individual. Sanctions may be terminated after 12
months if the President determines and certifies to Congress that the individual has
stopped whatever activities that brought on the sanctions, and that the individual will
not engage in such activities in the future. Otherwise, to waive the sanctions at the
end of 12 months, the President must determine and certify to Congress, 20 days in
advance, that continuing the sanctions would have a serious adverse effect on vital
U.S. interests.
The President is not required to apply or maintain sanctions if the articles or
services provided are essential to U.S. national security; if the provider is a sole
source; if the articles or services are essential to national security under defense

³⁵ Formerly at 22 U.S.C. 3201 note, all the freestanding sections of the Nuclear Proliferation
Prevention Act of 1994 have been reclassified as full sections of the United States Code:
within title 22, at Chapter 72 — Nuclear Proliferation Prevention, and therein, Subchapter
1 — Sanctions for Nuclear Proliferation, and Subchapter 2 — International Atomic Energy
Agency [in P.L. 103-236].

cooperative agreements; if the articles constitute essential spare parts, essential
component parts, routine servicing or maintenance, or information and technology
essential to U.S. production. Sanctions may also not be required if the individual
relied on an advisory opinion of the State Department stating that a particular activity
was not deemed to be sanctionable.
In the case of a foreign person, the President is required to enter into
consultation with the foreign government with primary jurisdiction over that person,
and thus may delay the imposition of sanctions for up to 90 days. Sanctions may be
further averted if the President determines and certifies that the foreign government
has taken steps to end the foreign person’s activities.
Section 823 (Role of International Financial Institutions; 22 U.S.C. 6302)
requires the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct U.S. executive directors of
international financial institutions to use voice and vote to oppose promotion of the
acquisition of unsafeguarded special nuclear material or the development,
stockpiling, or use of nuclear explosive devices by any non-nuclear-weapon state.
Section 824 (Prohibition on Assisting Nuclear Proliferation Through the
Provision of Financing; 22 U.S.C. 6303) prohibits financial institutions and persons
involved with financial institutions from assisting nuclear proliferation through the
provision of financing. The section requires that when the President determines that
a U.S. person or foreign person has engaged in a prohibited activity, he shall impose
the following sanctions: (1) ban on dealing in U.S. government debt instruments; (2)
ban on serving as a depositary for U.S. government funds; (3) ban on pursuing,
directly or indirectly, new commerce in the United States; and (4) ban on conducting
business from a new location in the United States.
The President is required to consult with any foreign government that serves as
primary jurisdiction for any foreign person sanctioned under this section. Sanctions
may be delayed for 90 days while consultation with a foreign government is
underway, and may be further averted if the foreign government takes steps to stop
the prohibited activity.
Sanctions are in place for not less than 12 months, and are terminated then only
if the President determines and certifies to Congress that the person’s engagement in
prohibited activity has ceased and will not resume. The President may waive the
continued use of sanctions when he determines and certifies to Congress that
continuing the restrictions would have a serious adverse effect on the safety and
soundness of the domestic or international financial system or the domestic or
international payments system.
The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 was enacted as title VIII of
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103-236;
approved April 30, 1994). Sec. 157(b) of P.L. 104-164 (approved July 21, 1996)
made changes to sec. 824, including striking out a requirement that any Presidential
determination pursuant to subsec. (c) be reviewed by the courts.

Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration
Act of 2003³⁶
Section 5 (Penalties and Authorization) requires the President to prohibit the
export to Syria of any dual-use item on the U.S. Munitions List or Commerce Control
List, prohibit the issuance of export licenses for such items, and to choose from a
menu of other restrictions, to impose two or more of the following: (A) prohibit the
export of most U.S. products, (B) prohibit U.S. businesses from operating in Syria,
(C) limit U.S. travel of Syrian diplomats, (D) prohibit landing or flyover rights to
Syrian air carriers, (E) curtail diplomatic relations between the United States and
Syria, or (F) block transactions in which the Government of Syria has an interest.
For sanctions to be lifted, the President must certify to Congress that four
conditions have been met, that the Government of Syria has ceased: (1) providing
support for international terrorist groups and does not allow terrorist groups to
maintain facilities in territory under Syrian control; (2) its occupation of Lebanon; (3)
“the development and deployment of medium- and long-range surface-to-surface
ballistic missiles, is not pursuing or engaged in the research, development,
acquisition, production, transfer, or deployment of biological, chemical, or nuclear
weapons, has provided credible assurances that such behavior will not be undertaken
in the future, and has agreed to allow United Nations and other international
observers to verify such actions and assurances”; and (4) support for, and facilitation
of, terrorist activities in Iraq.
The President may waive any or all sanctions, however, if he finds it in the U.S.
national security interest to do so and notifies Congress.
P.L. 108-175; approved December 12, 2003. No amendments have been
enacted.

³⁶ 22 U.S.C. 2151 note.