Medical Malpractice Liability Reform: Legal Issues and Fifty-State Survey of Caps on Punitive Damages and Noneconomic Damages

CRS Report for Congress
Medical Malpractice Liability Reform:
Legal Issues and Fifty-State Survey of
Caps on Punitive Damages and
Noneconomic Damages
Updated January 18, 2006
Henry Cohen
Legislative Attorney
American Law Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Medical Malpractice Liability Reform: Legal Issues and
Fifty-State Survey of Caps on Punitive Damages and
Noneconomic Damages
Medical malpractice liability is governed by state law, but Congress has the
power, under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Art. I, § 8, cl. 3), toth
regulate it. In the 108 Congress, the House passed virtually identical bills (H.R. 5
and H.R. 4280) that would have preempted state law with respect to certain aspects
of medical malpractice lawsuits, and it seems likely that the 109th Congress will also
consider medical malpractice reform proposals.
This report does not examine the effects of medical malpractice litigation or
medical malpractice liability reform on the health care system or on the cost of
liability insurance premiums. In other words, it does not consider whether tort
reform would be a good idea. Rather, it explains specific tort reform proposals that
have been included in past legislation, and discusses their individual pros and cons
from a legal perspective. These proposals include imposing caps on noneconomic
damages and punitive damages, permitting defendants to be held liable for no more
than their share of responsibility for a plaintiff’s injuries, requiring that damage
awards be reduced by amounts plaintiffs receive from collateral sources such as
health insurance, limiting lawyers’ contingent fees, creating a federal statute of
limitations, and requiring that awards of future damages in some cases be paid
periodically rather than in a lump sum.
An appendix to this report presents a chart of current state caps on punitive
damages and noneconomic damages.

In troduction ......................................................1
The Tort of Medical Malpractice......................................2
Caps on Noneconomic Damages......................................3
Pro .....................................................3
Con .....................................................3
Caps on Punitive Damages..........................................4
Pro .....................................................5
Con .....................................................5
Limiting Joint and Several Liability...................................6
Pro .....................................................6
Con .....................................................6
Abolishing the Collateral Source Rule.................................6
Pro .....................................................7
Con .....................................................8
Limiting Lawyers’ Contingent Fees....................................8
Pro .....................................................8
Con .....................................................9
Creating a Federal Statute of Limitations...............................9
Periodic Payment of Damages........................................9
Pro ....................................................10
Con ....................................................11
Appendix: Fifty State Survey of Caps on Punitive Damages and
Noneconomic Damages........................................12

Medical Malpractice Liability Reform:
Legal Issues and Fifty-State Survey of
Caps on Punitive Damages and
Noneconomic Damages
Advocates of medical malpractice liability reform argue that current state tort
law provides a costly and inefficient mechanism for resolving claims of health care
liability and compensating injured patients. Increasing liability insurance premiums,
they argue, are forcing doctors to curtail their medical practices and to engage in
excessive “defensive medicine.” As consequence, high liability insurance premiums
diminish consumers’ access to health care and raise health care costs. Physicians and
their insurers claim that frivolous malpractice lawsuits and unreasonably large jury
awards are responsible for the problem. They typically support tort reform legislation
that would limit the amount juries may award to plaintiffs in malpractice cases.
Opponents of medical malpractice reform have argued that “there is a very
minimal relationship between health care costs and malpractice litigation,” and that,
“[a]s the Harvard Medical Practice Study reported in 1990, . . . about one in eight
negligently injured patients file a malpractice claim. The study’s authors concluded
that the problem is not too many claims, but, if anything, too few claims.1 Lawyers
and consumer groups argue that the insurance industry is to blame for the rapid rise
in malpractice insurance premiums. These groups contend that bad investment
choices, in addition to the underwriting cycle, have led to dwindling profits for
insurers, who then try to recoup their losses through over-priced insurance products.
Lawyers and consumer groups generally support efforts to reform the insurance
industry in order to rein in premiums.
This report does not consider the debate outlined in the prior two paragraphs,
and does not examine the effects of medical malpractice litigation or medical
malpractice liability reform on the health care system or on the cost of liability
insurance premiums. In other words, it does not consider whether tort reform would
be a good idea. Rather, it explains specific tort reform proposals that have been
included in past legislation, and discusses their individual pros and cons from a legal
perspective. These include imposing caps on noneconomic damages and punitive
damages, permitting defendants to be held liable for no more than their share of
responsibility for a plaintiff’s injuries, requiring that damage awards be reduced by

1 Barry J. Nace, Changing medical malpractice liability will not reduce health care costs,
National Law Journal (Oct. 11, 1993).

amounts plaintiffs receive from collateral sources such as health insurance, limiting
lawyers’ contingent fees, creating a federal statute of limitations, and requiring that
awards of future damages in some cases be paid periodically rather than in a lump
An appendix to this report presents a chart of current state caps on punitive
damages and noneconomic damages.
The Tort of Medical Malpractice
Medical malpractice is a tort, which is a civil (as distinct from a criminal)
wrong, other than a breach of contract, that causes injury for which the victim may
sue to recover damages. Actions in tort derive from the common law, which means
that the rules that govern them were developed by the courts of the fifty states, and
no statute is necessary in order to bring a tort action. Statutes, however, can change
the court-made rules that govern tort actions, and many states have enacted tort
reform statutes, including medical malpractice reform statutes. Congress also has the
power, under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Art. I, § 8, cl. 3), to
regulate medical malpractice litigation.
Medical malpractice liability arises when a health care professional engages in
negligence or commits an intentional tort. Negligence has been defined as conduct
“which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against
unreasonable risk of harm.”2 In most instances it arises from a failure to exercise due
care, but a defendant may have carefully considered the possible consequences of his
conduct and still be found to have imposed an unreasonable risk on others.3
“Negligence is conduct, and not a state of mind.” The following is a “traditional
description” of the standard of care to which doctors are held to avoid liability for
medical malpractice:
This legal duty requires that the physician undertaking the care of a patient
possess and exercise that reasonable and ordinary degree of learning, skill, and
care commonly possessed and exercised by reputable physicians practicing in the4
same locality.
Today, however, “[t]he growing majority of jurisdictions employ some variation5
of the national standard of care.”
The skill, diligence, knowledge, means and methods [required] are not those
“ordinarily” or “generally” or “customarily” exercised or applied, but those that
are “reasonably” exercised or applied. Negligence cannot be excused on the

3 W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 31 (5th ed. 1984).
4 Quoted in David M. Harney, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, § 21.2 (3d ed. 1993).
5 Nalder v. West Park Hospital, 254 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2001).

ground that others practice the same kind of negligence. Medicine is not an6
exact science and the proper practice cannot be gauged by a fixed rule.
Medical malpractice liability, as noted, may arise from an intentional tort as well
as from negligence. One commentator explained:
[A]n important part of medical malpractice law in some jurisdictions — failure
[of the patient] to give consent — falls into the category of intentional torts . . . .
The reasoning is that because the doctor did not fully explain the risks that might
arise from the contact, the doctor’s contact with the patient was done without
permission. In traditional liability law, such contact is a battery, which is an
intentional tort.7
Caps on Noneconomic Damages
Economic damages refer to monetary losses that result from an injury, such as
medical expenses, lost wages, and rehabilitation costs. Noneconomic damages
consist primarily of damages for pain and suffering. (Though punitive damages —
discussed in the next section of this report — are not economic damages, they are
typically viewed — and capped or not capped — separately from noneconomic
damages.) Determining the amount of noneconomic damages is traditionally subject
to broad discretion on the part of juries, which must equate two variables — money
and suffering — that are essentially incommensurable. Judges, however, have the8
authority to reduce damage awards that they find excessive.
Pro. Advocates of caps on damages for pain and suffering argue that a lack of
caps guarantees inconsistency and unpredictability in the tort system, and forces
insurers to counter this uncertainty by charging higher premiums. Disagreement over
the amount of pain and suffering damages is a major obstacle to out-of-court
settlement, thus increasing litigation and coercing insurers to overpay on settlements
of smaller claims. Further complicating the problem is a tendency of juries to inflate
pain and suffering awards to cover some or all of the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.
Con. Caps on noneconomic damages punish the worst afflicted, because the
more pain and suffering that a plaintiff has endured, the more a cap deprives him of
damages to which he would otherwise have been entitled. “By forever freezing
compensation at today’s levels, caps discriminate against a single class of Americans
whose members are destined to suffer a lifetime of deprivation of dignity and

6 Id.
7 Victor E. Schwartz, Doctors’ Delight, Attorneys’ Dilemma, Legal Times, Health-Care Law
Supplement (Feb. 28, 1994) at 30.
8 See Michael Higgins, Homogenized Damages: Judge suggests using statistical norms to
determine whether pain and suffering awards are excessive, American Bar Association
Journal (Sept. 1997) at 22.

independence.”9 The $250,000 cap in the bills that the House passed in the 108th
Congress would have imposed was adopted by California in 1975 “at a time when
pain-and-suffering awards rarely exceeded that amount.”10 Twenty years later, in
1995, the median award for pain and suffering in malpractice cases reportedly was
$300,000, and inflation has also taken a toll.11 “Instead of embracing arbitrary limits
that are unfair if not inhumane — and useless as a device for controlling insurance
premiums — we must continue to rely on our time-tested jury system for determining
what’s right.”12 In any event, jury awards for noneconomic damages are not totally
arbitrary, as they are often based on multiples of the award for economic damages.
Caps on Punitive Damages
In 1851, the Supreme Court wrote:
It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in actions . . . for torts,
a jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages
upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of his offense rather than the
measure of compensation to the plaintiff. We are aware that the propriety of this13
doctrine has been questioned by some writers.
When may punitive damages be awarded? A treatise states:
Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for
punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such
as spite or “malice,” or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant,
or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the
conduct may be called wilful or wanton. There is general agreement that,
because it lacks this element, mere negligence is not enough, even though it is so
extreme as to be characterized as “gross,” a term of ill-defined content, which
occasionally, in a few jurisdictions, has been stretched to include the element of14
conscious indifference to consequences, and so to justify punitive damages.
Among the restrictions that have been proposed with regard to punitive
damages, besides that they be capped, are (1) that the circumstances in which they
may be awarded be narrowed, (2) that plaintiffs be required to prove by “clear and

9 Peter Perlman, Don’t Punish the Injured, American Bar Association Journal (May 1986)
at 34.
10 Edward Felsenthal, Why a Medical Award Cap Remains Stuck at $250,000, Wall Street
Journal (Nov. 1995).
11 Id. “Nationally, median jury awards for medical malpractice [not just for pain and
suffering] doubled from 1995 to 2000, increasing from $500,000 to $1 million. Median out-
of-court settlements also were significantly up during that time, rising 40 percent from
$350,000 to $500,000.” William R. Brody, Dispelling Malpractice Myths, Washington Post
(Nov. 14, 2004).
12 Perlman, supra note 9.
13 Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
14 W. Page Keeton, supra note 3, § 2.

convincing” evidence that they are entitled to them (instead of having to prove it by
a mere “preponderance of the evidence.”), (3) that liability for punitive damages be
determined in a separate proceeding from liability for compensatory damages,15 and
(4) that punitive damages be paid in part to the government or to a fund that serves
a public purpose instead of to the plaintiff.16
Pro. Critics charge that punitive damage awards in medical malpractice cases
“are often unfair, arbitrary and unpredictable, and result in overkill. . . . One
publication argues that reform is needed because there has been an outpouring of ‘the
most outrageous punitive damage awards’ in medical malpractice.”17 “Even though
punitive damage awards occur in a small percentage of cases, they can have a
devastating impact on individual defendants and can impose big costs on the18
economy as a whole . . . .”
Con. The American Bar Foundation found that punitive damage awards are not
routine, and “are not, typically, given in amounts that boggle the mind.”19 Punitive
damages have been called “a necessary tool in the effective control of socially
undesirable conduct. . . . Punitive damages must be allowed to fill the gaps the
criminal law leaves open.”20 Finally, plaintiffs often do not recover the amounts that
juries award. This is because trial judges often reduce punitive damages awards that
they find excessive, and a recent Supreme Court decision “makes it easier for
appellate courts to reduce punitive damages.”21 It is also because “[m]any plaintiffs
settle for less than a jury’s verdict, to eliminate delays and the uncertainty of appeal.
Sometimes, even before a jury rules, a plaintiff has signed an agreement that limits
how much money actually changes hands.”22

15 In BMW of North American, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 618 (1996), the Supreme Court
listed state statutes that provide for this.
16 In BMW of North American, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 616 (1996), the Supreme Court
listed state statutes that provide for this.
17 Micahel Rustad and Thomas Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in Medical
Malpractice: Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not “Moral Monsters,” 47 Rutgers Law
Review 975, 978, 980-981 (1995).
18 Mark Thompson, Applying the Brakes to Punitives — But is There Anything to Slow
Down?, American Bar Association Journal (Sept. 1997) at 68, 69.
19 Stephen Daniels, Punitive Damages: The Real Story, American Bar Association Journal
(Aug. 1986) at 60, 63.
20 Lisa M. Broman, Punitive Damages: An Appeal for Deterrence, 61 Nebraska Law Review

651, 680 (1982).

21 Tania Zamorsky, Impact of High Court’s Ruling In “Leatherman”: Punitive awards
reduced in four cases, National Law Journal (Aug. 1, 2001), citing Cooper Industries, Inc.
v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001), which held that appellate courts
should perform de novo review, rather than apply an abuse-of-discretion standard, when
determining whether punitive damages are excessive in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
22 Joseph T. Hallinan, In Malpractice Trials, Juries Rarely Have the Last Word, Wall Street
Journal (Nov. 30, 2004).

Limiting Joint and Several Liability
Joint and several liability is the common-law rule that, if more than one
defendant is found liable for a plaintiff’s injuries, then each defendant may be held
100 percent liable. With joint and several liability, the plaintiff may not recover
more than once, but he may recover all his damages from fewer than all liable
defendants, with any defendant who pays more than its share of the damages entitled
to seek contribution from other liable defendants.
Some states have eliminated joint and several liability, making each defendant
liable only for its share of responsibility for the plaintiff’s injury. Other states have
adopted compromise positions, eliminating joint and several liability only for
noneconomic damages (presumably with the view that it is more important for the
plaintiff to recover all his economic damages than all his noneconomic damages), or
eliminating joint and several liability only for defendants responsible for less than a
specified percentage (e.g., 50 percent) of the plaintiff’s harm (presumably with the
view that it is especially unfair for such defendants to be held liable for up to 100
percent of the damages).
Pro. Advocates of abolishing or limiting joint and several liability argue that
it “frequently operates in a highly inequitable manner — sometimes making
defendants with only a small or even de minimis percentage of fault liable for 100%
of plaintiff’s damage. Accordingly, joint and several liability in the absence of
concerted action has led to the inclusion of many ‘deep pocket’ defendants such as
governments, larger corporations, and insured entities whose involvement is only
tangential and who probably would not be joined except for the existence of joint and
several liability.”23
Con. Advocates of joint and several liability cite the reason that the common
law adopted it: it is preferable for a wrongdoer to pay more than its share of the
damages than for an injured plaintiff to recover less than the full compensation to
which he is entitled.
Abolishing the Collateral Source Rule
The collateral source rule is the common-law rule that allows an injured party
to recover damages from the defendant even if he is also entitled to receive them
from a third party (a “collateral source”), such as a health insurance company, an
employer, or the government. To abolish the collateral source rule would be to allow
or require courts to reduce damages by amounts a plaintiff receives or is entitled to
receive from collateral sources.

23 Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications
of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability (Feb. 1986) at 64.

Often a collateral source, such as a health insurer or the government, has a right
of subrogation against the tortfeasor (the person responsible for the injury).24 This
means that the collateral source takes over the injured party’s right to sue the
tortfeasor, for up to the amount the collateral source owes or has paid the injured
party. Though the collateral source rule may enable the plaintiff to recover from both
his insurer and the defendant, the plaintiff, if there is subrogation, must reimburse his
insurer the amount it paid him. If the collateral source rule were eliminated, then the
defendant would not have to pay the portion of damages covered by a collateral
source, and the collateral source would apparently not be able through subrogation
to recover the amount it paid the plaintiff. In the medical malpractice context,
therefore, eliminating the collateral source rule would benefit liability insurers at the
expense of health insurers.
Some jurisdictions, however, have abolished the collateral source rule only in
cases in which there is no right of subrogation. In such jurisdictions, where there is
no right of subrogation, the collateral source would be unaffected by elimination of
the collateral source rule (i.e., the health insurer would still not recover its money),
and the defendant would benefit by not having to pay the plaintiff.25
Some proposals to abolish the collateral source rule have taken into account that
the plaintiff may have paid insurance premiums for his collateral source benefit.
Such proposals, instead of allowing a damage award to be reduced by the full amount
of a collateral source benefit, allow it to be reduced by the full amount of a collateral
source benefit minus the amount the plaintiff paid to secure that benefit.
Some proposals would allow the defendant to introduce evidence of collateral
source payments, but do not specify whether the jury must reduce economic damages
awards by the amount of such payments. Eliminating the collateral source rule could
also indirectly reduce noneconomic damages awards, because juries often set such
awards as a multiple of economic damages. If the collateral source rule were
abolished, then could the plaintiff disclose to the jury only his out-of-pocket
expenses, or could he disclose his total economic damages before collateral source
payments are deducted? If the former, then the plaintiff might receive a lesser award
of noneconomic damages.
Pro. Advocates of abolishing the collateral source rule object to the fact that
it “permits the plaintiff to obtain double recovery for certain components of his
damages award,” unless the collateral source is subrogated to the plaintiff’s claim

24 The Medical Care Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a), provides: “In any case in which the
United States is authorized or required by law to furnish or pay for hospital, medical,
surgical, or dental care and treatment . . . to a person who is injured or suffers a disease . . .
under circumstances creating a tort liability upon some third person . . . , the United States
shall have a right to recover . . . from said third person, or that person’s insurer, the
reasonable value of the care and treatment . . . and shall as to this right be subrogated to any
right or claim that the injured or diseased person . . . has against such third person to the
extent of the reasonable value of the care and treatment . . . .”
25 Michael F. Flynn, Private Medical Insurance and the Collateral Source Rule: A Good
Bet?, 22 University of Toledo Law Review 39, 49 (1990).

against the defendants.26 Abolishing the collateral source rule will reduce damage
awards without denying plaintiffs full recovery of their damages.
Con. Advocates of the collateral source rule cite the reason that the common
law adopted it: it is preferable for the victim than for the wrongdoer to profit from the
victim’s prudence (as in buying health insurance) or good fortune (in having some
other collateral source available). One commentator has also noted that, when the
collateral source is the government, and the benefit it provides are future services,
such as physical therapy, there is no guarantee that it will provide such services for
as long as they are needed, as government programs can be cut back.27
Limiting Lawyers’ Contingent Fees
A contingent fee is one in which a lawyer, instead of charging an hourly fee for
his services, agrees, in exchange for representing a plaintiff in a tort suit, to accept
a percentage of the recovery if the plaintiff wins or settles, but to receive nothing if
the plaintiff loses. Payment is thus contingent upon there being a recovery. Plaintiffs
agree to this arrangement in order to afford representation without having to pay
anything out-of-pocket, and lawyers agree to it because the percentage they receive
— usually from 33a to 40 percent — generally amounts to more than an hourly fee
Twenty-five states reportedly regulate contingent fees in medical malpractice
cases in one or more of the following ways: “(1) establishment of a sliding scale for
the attorney fees; (2) establishment of a maximum percentage of the award that may
be paid for attorney fees; and (3) provision for court review of the reasonableness of
the attorney fees.”28
Legislation to limit contingency fees might consider specifying whether
plaintiffs’ attorneys would be allowed to “add costs, including expert-witness fees,
travel, and photocopying on top of the cap[.] Or must costs be recouped from the
lawyer’s . . . recovery? In medical malpractice cases, where costs can skyrocket, the
difference is significant.”29
Pro. Advocates of limiting contingent fees argue that such fees cause juries to
inflate verdicts, result in windfalls for lawyers, and prompt lawyers to file frivolous

26 Report of the Tort Policy Working Group, supra note 23.
27 Barry J. Nace and Virginia C. Nelson, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Have Already Seen Many of the
Proposed Tort Reforms in the States, and Find Them Disastrous for Clients, National Law
Journal (Jan. 17, 1994) at 29.
28 American Medical Association, AMA Tort Reform Compendium (1989) at 19, 132-134;
see also, Office of Technology Assessment, Impact of Legal Reforms on Medical
Malpractice Costs (1993) at 93. A more recent chart continues to list 25 states with
contingent-fee limitations in medical malpractice cases. National Conference of State
Legislatures, State Medical Liability Laws Table (2002).
29 Schwartz, supra note 7, at 30.

suits in the hope of settling. They also argue that, where there is no dispute as to
liability, but only as to damages, there is no contingency and therefore no justification
for contingent fees. One study proposed that, if a defendant makes a prompt
settlement offer, then counsel fees be “limited to hourly rate charges and capped at
10% of the first $100,000 of the offer and 5% of any greater amounts. . . . When
plaintiffs reject defendants’ early offers, contingency fees may only be charged
against net recoveries in excess of such offers.”30
Con. Opponents of limiting contingent fees argue that such fees enable injured
persons, faced with medical bills and lost wages, to finance lawsuits that they
otherwise could not afford — especially if their injury has disabled them from
working. They argue that lawyers are unlikely to file frivolous lawsuits if they stand
to recover nothing if they lose, and that studies have shown that contingent fees do
not encourage frivolous lawsuits.31 Finally, they note, “[a]n hourly fee arrangement
[such as defendants’ lawyers use] can encourage delay, inefficiency, and unnecessary
action,” whereas “[a] contingent fee is an added inducement for a lawyer to be32
efficient and expeditious.”
Creating a Federal Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations — the period within which a lawsuit must be filed
— for medical malpractice suits under state law is typically two or three years,
starting on the date of injury. Sometimes, however, the symptoms of an injury do not
appear immediately, or even for years after, malpractice occurs. Many states
therefore have adopted a “discovery” rule, under which the statute of limitations
starts to run only when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should have discovered, his injury — or, sometimes, his injury and its
cause. Plaintiffs would favor allowing a statute of limitations to run only upon
discovery of an injury and its cause because it may take additional time after
symptoms become manifest to discover that an injury was caused by medical
Periodic Payment of Damages
Traditionally, damages are paid in a lump sum, even if they are for future
medical care or future lost wages. In recent years, however, “attorneys for both
parties in damages actions have occasionally foregone lump-sum settlements in favor
of structured settlements, which give the plaintiff a steady series of payments over
a period of time through the purchase of an annuity or through self-funding by an

30 The Manhattan Institute, Rethinking Contingency Fees (1994) at 28, 29.
31 See studies cited in Association of Trial Lawyers of American, Keys to the Courthouse:
Quick Facts on the Contingent Fee System (1994) at 4, 5.
32 Id. at 6.

institutional defendant.”33 “There are many forms of periodic payment statutes
throughout the United States. Many of these involve mind boggling calculations,
creating barriers for those who use the periodic payment process.”34
Proposals concerning the periodic payment of damages have been applied to
future damages as well as to all damages.35 An issue that may arise in connection
with awards of future damages is whether such awards should be converted to present
value. Not to require such conversion “could be a very major change, significantly
reducing awards, if it is intended to allow a defendant to pay, for example, a $1
million award over a 10-year period at $100,000 a year. On the other hand, if it
requires the jury award to be converted into present value terms — an annuity with
a present value of $1 million — the reform doesn’t mean that much; as a practical
matter, the defendant would be paying the same amount as before.”36 The defendant,
that is, would have to spend $1 million for an annuity that, as it earned interest over
the years of its distribution, would yield the plaintiff more than $1 million. Had the
defendant paid the plaintiff a lump sum of $1 million, then the plaintiff could have
purchased that same annuity.
The Uniform Periodic Payment of Judgments Act addresses other issues that
Congress might consider if it addresses the matter of periodic payment of future
damages. These include accounting for inflation and for the effect of the plaintiff’s
death on unpaid amounts. Section 5(a) of the uniform act provides that, in a trial,
“evidence of future changes in the purchasing power of the dollar is admissible on
the issue of future damages.” Section 13 provides that “liability to a claimant for
periodic payments not yet due for medical expenses terminates upon the claimant’s
death.” Damages for other economic losses, however, except in actions for wrongful
death, must be paid to the plaintiff’s estate. The House-passed 108th Congress
legislation provided that “the court may be guided by the Uniform Periodic Payment
of Judgments Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.”37
Pro. “Both defendants and plaintiffs are often benefited by such arrangements:
the defendant need not immediately pay out a large sum of money, since the cost of
the annuity or other method of payment is less than a conventional lump-sum
settlement; and the plaintiff is prevented from dissipating a recovery and is provided
a secure, tax-free income for a long period of time without having to assume the costs

33 Annotation, Propriety and Effect of “Structured Settlements” Whereby Damages are Paid
in Installments Over a Period of Time, and Attorneys’ Fees Arrangements in Relation
Thereto, 31 ALR4th 95, 96.
34 Paul J. Lesti, STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS (2d ed., 1993) at § 21.5.
35 Compare H.R. 5 and H.R. 4280, 108th Congress, with H.R. 3600 and S. 1757, 103d
Congress. Regarding the latter, see CRS Report 94-219 A, Medical Malpractice Provisions
of the President’s Proposed Health Security Act: A Legal Analysis (Mar. 7, 1994). (Out of
Print. For copies, contact author at 202-707-7892.)
36 See Schwartz, supra note 7 at 30.
37 This uniform act was promulgated in 1990; it was preceded by the 1980 Model Periodic
Payment of Judgments Act. Both appear in volume 14 of the UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED.

and risks of managing an investment portfolio .”38 “Periodic payment of malpractice
awards is nothing more than what lawyers have been doing for years in structured
settlements. It is workable and often the only means of providing full compensation
for an injured claimant when resources are otherwise unavailable.”39
Con. If periodic payments will in fact benefit plaintiffs, then they will agree
to them, as they sometimes do, without legislation. Some plaintiffs, however, may
prefer to invest their awards themselves and not risk the insolvency of the defendant
or the company from which the defendant purchases an annuity.

38 Annotation, supra note 33, at 96.
39 A. Blackwell Stieglitz, Defense Counsel Will Find the President’s Medical Malpractice
Proposals So Benign as to be Meaningless, National Law Journal (Jan. 17, 1994) at 27.

Appendix: Fifty State Survey of Caps on Punitive
Damages and Noneconomic Damages
The following chart summarizes state laws that impose caps on punitive
damages and noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases. An empty box in
the chart indicates that the state apparently imposes no cap in medical malpractice
suits, either because the state constitution prohibits caps or because the state
legislature has chosen not to enact a cap. We quote (in italics) some, but not
necessarily all, state constitutional provisions that prohibit caps.
The caps listed in the chart, as well as the entry “punitive damages prohibited,”
do not necessarily apply to tort actions other than for medical malpractice, though in
many cases they do.
The term “economic damages” refers to past and future monetary expenses of
an injured party, such as medical bills, rehabilitation expenses, and lost wages.
“Noneconomic damages” refers primarily to damages for pain and suffering.
Economic and noneconomic damages are both compensatory damages; i.e., they are
intended to compensate the injured party.
Punitive damages (also called exemplary damages), by contrast, are awarded not
to compensate plaintiffs but to punish and deter particularly egregious conduct on the
part of defendants — generally meaning reckless disregard for the safety of others,
and more than negligence or even gross negligence. Punitive damages are
noneconomic by nature, but state statutes that impose caps on punitive damages
usually treat them separately from compensatory noneconomic damages.
The dollar amount in the right-hand column refers to the cap on compensatory
noneconomic damages, except that “total cap” means a cap on all damages —
economic, noneconomic, and punitive damages — combined. Caps that a state’s
highest court have declared to violate the state’s constitution are not necessarily

Alabama§ 6-11-21. The greater of three§ 6-5-544, which imposes a
times compensatory damages or$400,000 cap on “noneconomic
$500,000 ($1.5 million iflosses, including punitive
physical injury), withdamages,” held to violate state
exceptions. Held to violateconstitution. Moore v. Mobile
state constitution. HendersonInfirmary Ass’n, 592 So.2d 156
ex rel. Hartsfield v. Alabama(Ala. 1991).
Power Co., 627 So.2d 878 (Ala.
1993).§ 6-5-547. $1,000,000 total cap in
wrongful death actions against a
health care provider held to violate
state constitution. Smith v.
Schulte, 671 So.2d 1334 (Ala.
1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1220
Alaska§ 09.17.020. Greater of 3 times§ 09.17.010. “$400,000 or the
compensatory damages orinjured person’s life expectancy in
$500,000, except if defendantyears multiplied by $8,000,
was motivated by financial gainwhichever is greater,” but
and actually knew the adverse“$1,000,000 or the person’s life
consequences, then the greatestexpectancy in years multiplied by
of 4 times compensatory$25,000, whichever is greater,
damages, 4 times financial gain, when the damages are awarded for
or $7,000,000.severe permanent physical impair-
ment or severe disfigurement.”
ArizonaArizona Constitution, Art. 2,the amount of damages to be
§ 31, provides: “No law shallrecovered for causing the death or
be enacted in this State limitinginjury of any person.”
Arkansas§ 16-55-208. The greater ofArkansas Constitution, Art. 5,
$250,000 or three times§ 32, provides “[N]o law shall be
compensatory damages, not toenacted limiting the amount to be
exceed $1,000,000, to berecovered for injuries resulting in
adjusted as of 1/1/06 and atdeath or for injuries to persons or
three-year intervals thereafter,property . . . .” (No cases found
in accordance with the CPI. Noon whether this provision affects
cap if defendant intentionallythe punitive damages cap.)
caused injury or damage.
CaliforniaCivil Code § 3333.2. $250,000.
Colorado§ 13-21-102. The amount of§§ 13-21-102.5, 13-64-302.
actual damages awarded, but 3$250,000 noneconomic cap, but
times that amount if the$500,000 cap if court finds
defendant continues to act in ajustification for more than
willful and wanton manner$250,000. Both caps adjusted for
during the pendancy of the case.inflation. $1,000,000 total cap in
suits against health care providers.

District of
Florida§ 768.73(1). The greater of 3§ 766.118(2). $500,000, except
times compensatory damages or$1 million cap on all practitioners
$500,000, except, if wrongfulin the aggregate if permanent
conduct was motivated solelyvegetative state or death, or if,
by unreasonable financial gain,because of special circumstances,
and unreasonably dangerousnoneconomic harm is particularly
nature of the conduct and highsevere and injury was catastrophic.
likelihood of injury wereFor non-practitioners, above caps
known, then the greater of 4are $750,000 and $1.5 million,
times compensatory damages orrespectively. For emergency
$2 million. No cap whereservices, caps are $150,000 for
specific intent to harm plaintiff.practitioners, $750,000 for non-
practitioners, with maximum
§ 766.207(7)(d). Punitivedamages recoverable by all
damages prohibited inclaimants $300,000 and $1.5
voluntary binding arbitration.million, respectively.
Georgia§ 51-12-5.1. $250,000.
Hawaii§ 663-8.7. $375,000 (cap does not
apply to intentional torts).
Idaho§ 6-1604, as amended by 2003§ 6-1603. $250,000 for actions
Session Laws, Ch.122. Foraccruing after 7/1/03, subject to
actions accruing after 7/1/03,increase or decrease in accordance
the greater of $250,000 or threewith the average annual wage.
times compensatory damages.
Illinois735 ILCS 5/2-1115. “PunitiveNone. (Cap in 735 ILCS 5/2-
damages are not recoverable in1115.1 held unconstitutional in
healing art and legalBest v. Taylor Machine Works,
malpractice cases.”689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997)).
Indiana§ 34-51-3-4. Greater of 3 times§ 34-18-14-3. $1,250,000. For
compensatory damages or“qualified” health care provider,
$50,000.$250,000 total cap.
Kansas§ 60-3702(e), (f). The lesser of§ 60-19a02(b). $250,000 “by each
the defendant’s annual grossparty from all defendants.”

income or $5,000,000, but if
the profitability of the mis-
conduct exceeds such amount,
the cap is 1.5 times the profit.

KentuckyKentucky Constitution, § 54,recovered for injuries resulting in
provides: “The Generaldeath, or for injuries to person or
Assembly shall have no powerproperty.”
to limit the amount to be
LouisianaPunitive damages prohibited at§ 40:1299.42. $500,000 total cap,
common law.exclusive of “future medical care
and related benefits” (as defined).
“Qualified” health care provider:
$100,000 total cap per patient.
MaineT. 18-A, § 2-804(b). $75,000T. 18-A, § 2-804(b). “$400,000
in wrongful death actions.for the loss of comfort, society and
companionship of the deceased,
including any damages for
emotional distress,” in wrongful
death actions.
MarylandCourts and Judicial Proceedings
§ 11-108. $500,000 if cause of
action arises on or after Oct. 1,
1994, increased by $15,000 on
Oct. 1 of each succeeding year for
causes of action that arise on or
after the date of the increase.
MassachusettsCh. 229, § 2. In wrongful deathCh. 231, § 60H. $500,000, unless
cases, not less than $5,000death resulted or “special
where punitive damages arecircumstances” are found. Ch.
appropriate. Punitive damages231, § 85K. $20,000 total cap if
otherwise prohibited atcharitable institution.
common law.
MichiganExemplary damages “are§ 600.1483. $280,000,
awardable where the defendant“recoverable by all plaintiffs,
commits a voluntary act whichresulting from the negligence of
inspires feelings of humiliation,all defendants,” but $500,000 if a
outrage, and indignity. . . . Theserious injury enumerated in the
purpose of exemplary damagesstatute occurred.
is not to punish the defendant,
but to render the plaintiff
whole. When compensatory
damages can make the injured
party whole, exemplary
damages must not be awarded.”
Jackson Printing Co., Inc. v.
Mitan, 425 N.W.2d 791 (Mich.



Mississippi§ 11-1-65. $20 million if§ 11-1-60. $500,000 for claims
defendant’s net worth exceedsfiled before 7/1/2011; $750,000
$1 billion; $15 million if itfrom 7/1/2011 - 6/30/2017; $1
exceeds $750 million but is notmillion from 7/1/2017. Cap does
more than $1 billion; $10not apply if the judge determines
million if it exceeds $500that a jury may impose punitive
million but is not more thandamages, and does not limit
$750 million; $7½ million if itdamages for disfigurement.
exceeds $100 million but is not
more than $500 million; $5
million if it exceeds $50
million but is not more than
$100 million; 4% of defen-
dant’s net worth if defendant’s
net worth is $50 million or less.
Missouri§ 538.210. $350,000 per
defendant, subject to increase or
decrease each January 1 to reflect
inflation or deflation.
Montana§ 25-9-411. $250,000.
NebraskaPunitive damages prohibited at§ 44-2825. $1,750,000.
common law.
Nevada§ 42.005. Three times§ 41A.031. $350,000, but a higher
compensatory damages ifaward may be made if “gross mal-
compensatory damages arepractice” or if “justified because of
$100,000 or more; $300,000 ifspecial circumstances.” If
they are less.defendant has insurance of not less
than $1 million per occurrence and
$3 million in the aggregate, then
noneconomic damages may not
exceed the amount of the policy
after subtracting the economic
damages awarded.
New§ 507:16. “No punitive§ 507-C:7. $250,000 cap held
Hampshiredamages shall be awarded inunconstitutional. Carson v.
any action, unless otherwiseMaurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H.
provided by statute.” No1980).
statute provides for punitive
damages in medical malpractice
New Jersey2A:15-5.14. Greater of 5 times
compensatory damages or

New Mexico§ 41-5-6. $600,000 total cap,
“[e]xcept for punitive damages
and medical care and related
benefits,” which are not subject to
the cap. “Monetary damages shall
not be awarded for future medical
expenses in malpractice claims.”
New York
North Carolina§ 1D-25. Greater of 3 times the
amount of compensatory
damages or $250,000.
North Dakota§ 32-03.2-11(4). Greater of§ 32-42-02. $500,000.
two times compensatory
damages or $250,000.
Ohio§ 2323.43, as amended by 2001
Ohio S.B. 281 (approved by the
Governor on Jan. 10, 2003). The
greater of $250,000 or three times
plaintiff’s economic loss, to a
maximum of $350,000 for each
plaintiff or a maximum of
$500,000 for each occurrence.
But, if specified serious injuries
occur, cap is $500,000 for each
plaintiff or $1 million for each
OklahomaT. 23, § 9.1. Where recklessT. 63, § 1-1708.1F (added by Ch.
disregard, greater of $100,000390, § 6 (2003)). $300,000 per
or actual damages awarded. action regardless of the number of
Where intentional and withdefendants, but cap applies only in
malice, greatest of $500,000,cases involving “[p]regnancy or
twice actual damages awarded,labor and delivery, including the
or financial benefit derived byimmediate post-partum period,”
defendant. If court findsand “[e]mergency care in the
beyond a reasonable doubt thatemergency room of a hospital or
defendant engaged in conductfollow-up to” such care. Cap does
life-threatening to humans, thennot apply if judge finds clear and
no cap.convincing evidence of negli-
gence, or in wrongful death action.
Cap terminates July 1, 2008.

Oregon§ 31.740 (formerly § 18.550). § 31.710 (formerly § 18.560).
Prohibited against specified$500,000 cap held to violate
health practitioners.Oregon Constitution, Art. VII, § 3,
which provides that “no fact tried
by a jury shall be otherwise re-
examined.” But the cap
apparently applies in wrongful
death actions because there is no
right to a jury trial for them. Lakin
v. Senko Products, Inc., 987 P.2d

463 (Ore. 1999).

Pennsylvania40 P.S. § 1303.505(d). “ExceptPennsylvania Constitution, Art. 3,
in cases alleging intentional§ 18, provides: “[I]n no other
misconduct, punitive damagescases [than those involving
against an individual physicianemployees] shall the General
shall not exceed 200% of theAssembly limit the amount to be
compensatory damagesrecovered for injuries resulting in
awarded. Punitive damages,death, or for injuries to persons or
when awarded, shall not lessproperty . . . .” (Art. 3, § 18 is
than $100,000 unless a lowertitled “Compensation laws
verdict amount is returned byallowed to General Assembly,”
the trier of fact.”which may explain the existence
of a cap on punitive damages.)
40 P.S. § 1303.712(c)(2)(i) caps
total liability of the Medical
Professional Liability Catastrophe
Loss Fund at “$500,000 for each
occurrence and $1,500,000 per
annual aggregate.”
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota§ 21-3-11. $500,000 “total
general [noneconomic] damages”;
“no limitation on the amount of
special [economic] damages.”

TexasCivil Practice and RemediesCivil Practice and Remedies
§ 41.008, as amended by 2003§ 74.301 et seq. (2003 Tex. Gen.
Tex. Gen. Laws 204, effectiveLaws 204), effective 9/1/03.
9/1/03. Greater of (1) two$250,000 per claimant against a
times the amount of economicphysician or health care provider
damages plus the amount ofand $250,000 per claimant against
noneconomic damages up toa health care institution. If more
$750,000; or (2) $ 200,000.than one health care institution is
liable, cap against them all is
$500,000 per claimant. In
wrongful death or survival action
against a physician or health care
provider, cap on total damages
(including punitive damages) is
$500,000 per claimant, subject to
increase or decrease in accordance
with consumer price index.
Utah§ 78-14-7.1. $400,000, adjusted
for inflation.
Virginia§ 8.01-38.1. $350,000.§ 8.01-581.15. $1.5 million total
cap, to increase by $50,000 every
July 1 from 2000 through 2006,
and by $75,000 on July 1, 2007
and 2008, with no subsequent
WashingtonPunitive damages prohibited at§ 4.56.250. Cap derived from
common law.formula held unconstitutional in
Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771
P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989).
West Virginia§ 55-7B-8 (as amended in 2003).
$250,000 per occurrence,
regardless of the number of
plaintiffs or defendants, except cap
is $500,000 if death or permanent
serious injury. Annual increases
based on consumer price index.
Caps apply only if defendant has
insurance of at least $1 million per

Wisconsin§§ 655.017, 893.55(4), 895.04(4).
$350,000 cap held
unconstitutional in Ferdon ex rel.
Petrucelli v. Wisconsin Patients
Compensation Fund, 2005 WL

1639450 (Wis. July 14, 2005).

WyomingWyoming Constitution, Art. 10,amount of damages to be
§ 4, provides: “No law shall berecovered for causing the injury
enacted limiting theor death of any person.”