Congressional Intervention in the Administrative Process: Legal and Ethical Considerations

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

When congressional committees engage in oversight of the administrative bureaucracy, or when
Members of Congress intervene in agency proceedings on behalf of private constituents or other
private entities with interests affecting the Members’s constituency, such interventions involve
varying degrees of intrusion into agency decisionmaking processes. This report will briefly
examine the currently applicable legal and ethical considerations and standards that mark the
limits of such intercessions.
The report initially reviews the judicial development and application of standards for determining
whether congressional pressure or influence will be deemed to have tainted an agency
proceeding. It concludes that the courts, in balancing Congress’s performance of its constitutional
and statutory obligations to oversee the actions of agency officials against the rights of parties
before agencies, have shown a decided predilection for protecting the congressional prerogatives.
Thus where informal rulemaking or other forms of informal decisionmaking are involved, the
courts will look to the nature and impact of the political pressure on the agency decisionmaker
and will intervene only where that pressure has had the actual effect of forcing the consideration
of factors Congress did not intend to make relevant. Where agency adjudication is involved a
stricter standard is applied and the finding of an appearance of impropriety can be sufficient to
taint the proceeding. But even here the courts have required that the pressure or influence be
directed at the ultimate decisionmaker with respect to the merits of the proceeding and that it does
not involve legitimate oversight and investigative functions, before they will intervene.
The report next examines the conduct of Members of Congress and their staffs intervening in
administrative matters from the perspective of ethics and conflict of interest rules, statutes and
guidelines bearing upon a Member’s and staffer’s official duties. It notes that since congressional
intervention and expressions of interest in administrative matters from a Member’s office are
recognized as legitimate, official representational and oversight functions and duties of Members
of Congress, the primary focus of the ethical and statutory conduct restraints is limited to(1) any
improper enrichment or financial benefit accruing to the Member in return for, or because of, his
or her official actions and influences, including the receipt of gifts or payments, or existing
financial interests in, or relating to the matter under consideration; and (2) any overt coercion or
threats of reprisals, or promises of favoritism or reward to administrators from the Member’s
office which could indicate an arguable abuse of a Member’s official representational or oversight
role. Additionally, ethical guidelines in Congress incorporate an “appearance” standard for
Members which would counsel a Member to adopt office procedures and systems which would
prevent an appearance of a “linkage” between interventions and the receipt of things of value,
particularly legitimate campaign contributions, and which would assure that decisions to
intervene are based on the merits of a particular matter.

I. Introduction..................................................................................................................................1
II. Current Judicial Standards Governing Congressional Influence on Agency
Decisi onmaking ............................................................................................................................ 2
A. The Nature of the Proceeding...............................................................................................3
B. The Foundation Cases..........................................................................................................7
1. Pillsbury Co. v. FTC.......................................................................................................7
2. D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Volpe..............................................................8
3. The Critique of Pillsbury and D.C. Federation............................................................10
C. Adjudicatory Rulings Since Pillsbury.................................................................................11
1. Koniag v. Kleppe...........................................................................................................12
2. Gulf Oil Corporation v. FPC........................................................................................13
3. Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.............................................14
4. Power Authority of the State of New York v. FERC.......................................................15
5. State of California v. FERC..........................................................................................15
6. ATX, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Transportation...........................................................16
D. Informal Decisionmaking Rulings Since D.C. Federation................................................18
1. American Public Gas Association v. FPC....................................................................18
2. Town of Orangetown v. Ruckelshaus............................................................................20
3. Chemung County v. Dole..............................................................................................20
4. DCP Farms et al v. Yeutter...........................................................................................21
E. Interference With Agency Rulemaking Proceedings..........................................................23
1. Texas Medical Association v. Mathews.........................................................................23
2. United States ex rel Parco v. Morris.............................................................................24
3. Sierra Club v. Costle.....................................................................................................24
F. Influence That Could Abuse the Agency Investigatory Process..........................................27
1. SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp........................................................................27
2. United States v. Armada Petroleum Corp.....................................................................30
3. United States v. American Target Advertising, Inc........................................................31
G. Summary and Conclusions.................................................................................................31
III. Ethical Standards and Considerations.....................................................................................36
A. House and Senate Guidelines.............................................................................................39
1. Opinion of the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct............................39
2. Senate Rule on Intervention..........................................................................................40
B. Intervention and Receipt of Things of Value......................................................................41
1. Bribery..........................................................................................................................41
2. Illegal Gratuities............................................................................................................42
3. Compensation/Conflicts of Interest..............................................................................44
4. Extortion.......................................................................................................................45
5. Conspiracy to Defraud the Government.......................................................................45
6. Campaign Contributions and Interventions..................................................................48
7. Gifts..............................................................................................................................57
C. Personal Financial Interest in the Matter............................................................................61
D. Conduct During Interventions............................................................................................64
E. Issues in Particular Intervention Contexts..........................................................................68
1. Federal Employment and Personnel Matters................................................................68

2. Federal Contracts..........................................................................................................70

3. Judicial Intervention......................................................................................................71
F. Conclusions Concerning Ethical Issues..............................................................................73
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................74

The inevitable tension between Congress and the Executive created by our constitutionally
mandated system of separated but shared powers has been the source of continual interbranch
conflict. One manifestation of this struggle occurs when congressional committees engage in
oversight of the administrative bureaucracy; another when Members of Congress attempt to
intervene in administrative proceedings on behalf of private constituents or other private entities
with interests affecting the Member’s constituency. Both such interventions involve varying
degrees of intrusion into agency decisionmaking processes. On relatively rare occasions these
interventions have resulted in court actions challenging the congressional intercession as
exertions of undue political influence on agency decisionmakers which violate the due process
rights of participants in the proceedings in question and impugn the integrity of the agency
decisional processes; or in disciplinary proceedings before ethics committees of either House
alleging that such Member actions violated institutional rules or other ethical standards. Such
challenges have arisen in the context of congressional intercessions into rulemakings,
ratemakings, informal decisionmaking, adjudications, and agency investigations that arguably
would lead to an adjudicatory proceeding.
Past high profile incidents raising questions regarding the legal and ethical propriety of
congressional exertions of influence on administrative decisionmaking have surprisingly
produced only a paucity of authoritative commentary on and analysis of the guiding principles
and standards applicable to the constitutional bases of the roles Members play when they act as ¹
part of the committee oversight process or in their individual representative capacities. This
report is designed to provide a contemporary overview of applicable guidelines and
considerations in the judicial and congressional forums. Toward that end, Part II reviews the
judicial development and application of standards for determining whether congressional pressure
or influence will be deemed to have tainted an agency proceeding. It concludes that the courts, in
balancing Congress’s performance of its constitutional and statutory obligations to oversee the
actions of agency officials against the rights of parties before agencies, have shown a decided
predilection for protecting the congressional prerogatives. Thus where informal rulemaking or
other forms of informal decisionmaking are involved, the courts will look to the nature and
impact of the political pressure on the agency decisionmaker and will intervene only where that
pressure has had the actual effect of forcing the consideration of factors Congress did not intend
to make relevant. Where agency adjudication is involved a stricter standard is applied and the
finding of an appearance of impropriety can be sufficient to taint the proceeding. But even here

¹^Wⁱ^t^h^resp^ect^t^o^j^u^di^ci^al^st^an^d^a^r^d^{s co}ⁿ^cernⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e exert}ⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^coⁿ^g^ressi^oⁿ^a^lⁱⁿ^f^l^u^eⁿ^ce,^{see Ri}^ch^ard^J.^Pⁱ^erce,^Jr.^,
^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e^L^a^w^T^r^e^a^tis^e^,^Vol^.^I^I^,^s^e^c^.⁹^.^8,⁶⁷^5-^{79 (}⁴^th^Ed.²⁰⁰²⁾⁽^P^ie^r^c^e^T^r^e^a^tis^e⁾⁽^c^our^ts^s^houl^d^“^r^e^c^o^gⁿ^iz^e^[^]^the
ⁿ^eed^t^o^p^e^rmⁱ^t^p^o^lⁱ^tⁱ^cal^o^v^ersi^gh^t^wⁱ^t^h^resp^ect^t^o^po^lⁱ^c^yⁱ^ssu^{es Co}ⁿ^g^{ress h}^a^{s en}^t^r^u^s^t^e^d^t^o^agen^c^y^d^eci^si^oⁿ^m^aker^s.^”);
^Ric^h^a^r^{d J.}^Pie^r^c^e^,^Jr.,^Politic^a^l^C^o^ntrol^V^e^rsus^Im^pe^r^mⁱ^ssible^Bia^s^{In A}^g^eⁿ^c^y^D^e^cⁱ^sionm^a^k^ing^:^Le^{ssons f}^o^rm^Ch^evroⁿ
^a^nd^Mistretta^,⁵⁷^U^.^of^Chic^{. L}^.^Re^v^.^{481 (}¹⁹^90)(s^a^m^e^)(P^ol^itic^a^l^C^ontr^o^{l); N}^o^te^{, J}^u^dicⁱ^a^l^Re^s^t^ric^tioⁿ^s^{on Im}^prope^r
^Inf^l^ue^nc^e^{in A}^d^mⁱ^nistra^tiv^e^De^cⁱ^sⁱ^on-m^a^kⁱ^ng^:^A^De^f^e^nse^of^the^P^ill^sbury^Doc^t^rine^{, 6 J.}^of^L^a^w^a^nd^Politic^{s 1}³⁵
⁽¹⁹⁸⁹^)(callin^g^f^o^{r im}^p^o^s^iti^oⁿ^o^f^“ap^p^earan^{ce o}^f^im^p^r^o^p^r^iety^{” stan}^d^a^rdⁱⁿ^aⁿ^y^ag^en^c^y^p^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^v^o^lvⁱⁿ^g
^c^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l in}^te^r^v^eⁿ^tion^.⁾^;^B^l^oc^k^,^O^r^pha^ne^d^R^u^le^sⁱⁿ^the^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e^Sta^t^e^:^T^h^e^Fa^ir^ne^s^s^D^o^c^t^rⁱ^ne^aⁿ^d^O^t^he^r
^O^r^pha^ne^d^P^r^og^eⁿ^y^of^Iⁿ^te^r^a^c^tiv^e^R^e^g^u^la^tion,⁷⁶^G^e^{o. L}^.^J^.^{59 (}¹⁹⁸⁷⁾⁽^“^[^M^]^e^m^b^e^r^s^of^C^ong^r^e^s^s^s^houl^d^not^be^j^udicⁱ^a^lly
^coⁿ^s^t^r^aiⁿ^e^{d i}ⁿ^t^h^ei^{r ef}^f^o^rt^{s t}^o^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^cat^e^wⁱ^t^h^agen^ci^{es” d}^u^rⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^al^ru^l^e^m^a^kiⁿ^g^p^r^o^cess.^);^P^a^rn^el^l^,
^C^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l I}ⁿ^te^r^f^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^{in A}^g^eⁿ^cy^Enf^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^{t: T}^h^e^I^R^{S Ex}^pe^rⁱ^eⁿ^c^e^,⁸⁹^Y^a^le^L^.^J^.¹³⁶^{0 (}¹⁹⁸⁰⁾⁽^“^T^h^e^pow^e^r^of
^C^ong^r^e^s^s^{to i}ⁿ^v^e^s^tig^a^t^e^the^I^R^{S is}^wⁱ^de^-^r^a^ng^ing^a^{nd m}^a^y^ef^f^e^c^tive^l^y^be^li^m^ite^{d only}^by^dis^c^r^e^{tion a}ⁿ^{d pr}^ude^nc^e^.^”⁾^;
^N^o^te^{, J}^u^dicⁱ^a^l^Lⁱ^m^ita^{tion of}^C^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l I}ⁿ^f^l^ue^nc^e^oⁿ^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e^A^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^{, 73 N}^o^r^t^hw^e^s^te^rⁿ^L^.^R^e^v^.⁹³¹
⁽¹⁹⁷⁹^)(“W^h^en^t^h^{e so}^u^r^ce^[o^f^co^ngressi^oⁿ^a^lⁱⁿ^f^l^u^eⁿ^ce]ⁱ^s^an^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^co^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee i}ⁿ^vestⁱ^g^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^no^a^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^ratⁱ^v^e
^p^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^{g sho}^u^l^d^b^eⁱⁿ^valⁱ^d^at^ed^uⁿ^l^{ess ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^ratⁱ^v^{e b}ⁱ^{as as t}^o^adj^u^dⁱ^catⁱ^v^{e f}^act^{s can}^b^e^dⁱ^scern^e^d^.^”)

the courts have required that the pressure or influence be directed at the ultimate decisionmaker
with respect to the merits of the proceeding and that it does not involve legitimate oversight and
investigative functions before they will intervene.
Part III of the report examines the conduct of Members of Congress and their staffs intervening in
administrative matters from the perspective of ethics and conflict of interest rules, statutes and
guidelines bearing upon a Member’s and staffer’s official duties in this area. It notes that since
congressional intervention and expressions of interest in administrative matters from a Member’s
office are recognized as legitimate, official representational and oversight functions and duties of
Members of Congress, the primary focus of these ethical and statutory conduct restraints is
limited to(1) any improper enrichment or financial benefit accruing to the Member in return for or
because of his or her official actions and influences, including the receipt of gifts or payments, or
existing financial interests in, or relating to the matter under consideration; and (2) any overt
coercion or threats of reprisals, or promises of favoritism or reward to administrators from the
Member’s office which could indicate an arguable abuse of a Member’s official representational
or oversight role. Additionally, there are ethical guidelines in Congress incorporating broad
“appearance’ standards for Members which could raise ethical concerns in relation to the
acceptance of gifts, favors, donations, and benefits, including campaign contributions, by
Members from those who are directly affected by the Member’s official duties, even in the
absence of a showing of any corrupt bargain, express payment, or any direct connection to an
official act. While campaign contributions from private individuals to Members have a facial
legitimacy and necessity in our government and electoral system which other forms of monetary
transfers to legislators (such as gifts) do not, and may be treated differently, both Houses of
Congress advise members and staff to avoid any appearance of a “linkage” between campaign
contributions and interventions. Such guidance would counsel a Member to adopt office
procedures and systems for evaluating requests for assistance which would prevent any
appearance that interventions decisions are based upon the receipt of things of value, particularly
legitimate campaign contributions, and which would assure that decisions to intervene are, rather,
based on the merits of a particular matter.

Support for claims that an exercise of congressional influence in an agency proceeding may serve
as basis for a challenge to the end product of that decisional process rest on two foundation cases, ²
a 1966 decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pillsbury Co. v. FTC and a 1971 ruling
of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. ³
Volpe, and a relative handful of judicial rulings since then which have grappled with the question
of whether particular instances of exertion of congressional pressure would serve to taint such a
proceeding. While this case law makes it clear that there are limits to congressional intercession,
whether those limits have been breached in a particular instance is often far less clear. Analysis
has been made difficult by the relative dearth of decisions and the reluctance of courts in those

²³⁵⁴^F.^2d⁹⁵^{2 (}⁵^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁶⁶⁾^.
³⁴⁵^{9 F}^.²^d¹²³¹⁽^D^.C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷¹⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed⁴⁰⁵^U.^S.¹⁰³⁰⁽¹⁹⁷²⁾^.

cases to venture beyond the factual confines of the dispute. The absence of a congressional
spokesperson in most of the cases to present the legislative interest may also be a complicating
factor.
Close analysis of the apparently disparate and sometimes seemingly conflicting judicial decisions,
however, reveals a consistent underlying pattern that allows for rationalization of the holdings
and for the formulation of guidelines for application in future situations. The determinative
factors for the courts appear to be the nature of the proceeding involved, the impact the political
pressure had on the decisionmaker, and whether the object of the political intercession is to reflect
the views of members on issues of law and policy. This part of the report will examine the extant
case law to explicate the manner in which the courts are formulating the differing standards that
are applied to the various types of administrative proceedings and the underlying rationale for
their actions.
The law of undue influence is a still-evolving, difficult to define area of jurisprudence that does
not as yet yield ready answers when applied to particular complex and often politically charged
fact situations. The relatively small body of case law that has developed, however, reflects the
growing sensitivity of the courts to appearing to be engaging in unwarranted intrusions into the
political process.
Problems in this area are not subject to easy categorization or generalizations; case by case
evaluations have been the norm. However, the case law does provide broad guidelines within
which analysis may proceed: Where agency actions resembles judicial action, where it involves
formal or informal adjudication, or formal rulemaking, insulation of the decisionmaker from
political influence through public pressure or unrevealed ex parte contacts has been deemed ⁴
justified by basic notions of due process to the parties involved. But where agency action
involves informal rulemaking of generally applicable policy, thus closely resembling the
legislative process, there is deemed to be far less justification for judicial intervention to protect ⁵
the integrity of the process
In practice, however, these categorizations serve only as useful starting points for analysis. The
courts have eschewed mechanical application of these categories. That is, an agency proceeding
that has adjudicatory elements will not be pigeonholed automatically as a case requiring the ⁶
highest level of judicial scrutiny. Similarly, an informal rulemaking may not be reflexively dealt ⁷
with as a matter of pure policymaking and accorded extreme deference. Rather, the courts appear
to be making their determinations in this area by ascertaining where on the
adjudication/policymaking continuum the proceeding falls and then applying the factors most ⁸
appropriate to that particular situation. The task of analysis in such cases is thus threefold: (1)

⁴^E.g.^{, Pil}^l^s^bur^y^C^o^.^v.^FT^C^{, 35}⁴^F^.^{2d 95}²⁽⁵^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁶⁶⁾^.
⁵^Sie^r^r^a^C^l^ub^v.^C^o^stle^,⁶⁵^{7 F.}^2d²^98,⁴⁰^0-^{01 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸¹⁾^.
⁶^S^ee,^e^.^g.,^Gulf^{Oil Cor}^p^.^v.^FP^C^,⁵⁶³^F.^2d⁵^{88 (}³^d^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^.^A^l^s^o^c^o^m^p^a^r^e^Assocⁱ^ation^{of N}^a^ti^on^al^Adv^e^r^tise^r^s^v.
^FTC^{, 6}²⁷^F.^2d¹¹⁵¹⁽^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁹⁾^,^cert^d^eⁿⁱ^ed⁴⁴⁷^U.^S^.⁴²¹⁽¹⁹⁸⁰⁾⁽^h^y^b^ri^d^ru^l^e^m^a^kiⁿ^g^p^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^{g h}^e^l^d^l^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^v^e
ⁿ^a^tu^re).
⁷^T^exa^{s Med}ⁱ^ca^l^A^sso^ci^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^v.^Mat^h^ew^s^{, 4}⁰⁸^{F. S}^u^p^p^.³⁰^{3 (}^W^.D^{. T}^e^x^.¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.
⁸^S^ee^Sok^a^o^g^oⁿ^C^hⁱ^ppe^w^a^C^o^m^m^u^nity^v.^Ba^bb^itt^,⁹²^{9 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.¹¹⁶⁵^{, 11}⁷⁴^-⁷^{6 (}^W^.D^{. W}ⁱ^s^c^{. 199}⁶⁾⁽^“^[^T^]^h^e^pr^opr^ie^ty^of
^coⁿ^g^ressi^oⁿ^a^l^con^t^act^{s d}^e^p^e^nd^{s on}^t^h^eⁿ^a^t^u^re^o^f^t^h^{e ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^ratⁱ^v^{e p}^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g”);^Si^erra^C^l^ub^v.^C^o^stle^{, 65}^{7 F}^.²^d²⁹^8,
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

determination of the type of proceeding involved; (2) identification and application of the factors
relevant to that type of proceeding; and, if taint is involved, (3) determining the remedies that
may be available. The following discussion will treat each of these issues in turn. It seems useful,
however, to start with an overview and description of the distinguishing elements of the various
proceedings in the continuum as it moves from adjudication toward varieties of informal, non-
record decisionmaking.
Administrative action pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)⁹ is either adjudication
or rulemaking. The two processes differ fundamentally in purpose and focus and as a
consequence have imposed on them sharply divergent statutory and constitutional procedural ¹⁰
requirements. Thus the APA defines “adjudication” as the “agency process for the formulation ¹¹
of an order.” The term “order” is then defined as “the whole or part of a final disposition,
whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other ¹²
than a rulemaking but including licensing.” A “rulemaking” is the “agency process for ¹³
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.” Finally, a “rule” is defined to mean:
^{. . .}^th^e^w^h^o^l^{e o}^r^a^p^a^r^t^o^f^an^ag^en^c^y^state^m^eⁿ^{t o}^f^g^eⁿ^e^r^a^{l o}^r^p^a^r^ticu^l^ar^ap^p^licab^ility^an^d
^f^u^t^u^{re e}^f^f^ect^desⁱ^gn^{ed t}^oⁱ^m^pl^e^m^ent^,ⁱⁿ^t^e^rpret^,^{or pres}^cri^b^{e l}^a^w^{or pol}ⁱ^c^y^{or des}^c^ri^biⁿ^g^t^h^e
^org^aⁿⁱ^zatⁱ^oⁿ^,^procedu^r^{e, or pra}^c^tⁱ^{ce requ}ⁱ^r^e^m^eⁿ^t^s^{of an ag}^eⁿ^c^y^aⁿ^{d i}ⁿ^c^l^u^d^{es t}^h^e^approv^al^or
^p^r^e^s^c^rⁱ^p^tⁱ^oⁿ^f^o^r^t^h^e^f^u^t^u^r^e^o^f^r^a^t^e^s^,^w^a^g^e^s^,^c^o^r^p^o^r^a^t^e^or^fi^na^ncⁱ^a^l^st^r^u^c^t^ur^e^s^o^r^r^e^o^r^gaⁿⁱ^z^a^tⁱ^o^ns
^th^er^eo^f^,^p^r^{ices, f}^acilitie^{s, ap}^p^lian^{ces, ser}^v^ice^s^o^r^allo^w^aⁿ^c^e^s^th^er^ef^o^r^o^r^o^f^v^a^lu^atioⁿ^s^{, co}^sts,¹⁴
^{or accou}ⁿ^ting^,^{or practices}^bea^rⁱⁿ^g^on^aⁿ^y^o^f^t^h^{e f}^o^reg^oⁱⁿ^g^.
The definitive explanation of the interrelationship of these definitions and the dichotomous ¹⁵
scheme of the APA was provided the Attorney General in 1947.
^T^h^{e ob}^j^ect^of^th^{e ru}^le^m^a^kⁱ^ng^proceedin^g^is^th^{e i}^m^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^tatⁱ^oⁿ^o^r^p^r^e^s^c^rⁱ^p^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^l^a^w^o^r
^p^o^licy^f^o^r^th^{e f}^u^tu^r^e^{, r}^a^th^er^th^aⁿ^th^{e ev}^a^l^u^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^{a r}^e^sp^oⁿ^d^eⁿ^t^’^s^p^a^s^t^c^oⁿ^d^u^c^t^.^Ty^pⁱ^c^a^l^ly^,^th^e
^iss^u^{es r}^e^lateⁿ^o^t^to^th^e^ev^id^eⁿ^ti^ar^y^f^a^c^t^{s, a}^s^to^w^h^ic^h^t^h^e^v^e^r^acit^y^aⁿ^d^d^e^m^e^aⁿ^o^r^o^f^wⁱ^tⁿ^esse^s
^w^o^u^l^{d of}^t^eⁿ^{be i}^m^port^a^nt^{, bu}^t^rat^h^{er t}^o^t^h^{e pol}ⁱ^c^y^-^m^a^kⁱⁿ^g^co^ncl^u^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^t^o^{be dra}^wⁿ^f^r^o^m^t^h^e
^f^acts^{. . . C}^onv^ers^e^l^y^{, adj}^u^dication^is^con^cerⁿ^e^d^w^ith^th^{e dete}^r^mⁱⁿ^a^tion^of^pas^t^an^{d pres}^en^t
^rⁱ^g^h^t^{s an}^d^liab^{ilities. No}^r^m^al^l^y^{, th}^er^{e is in}^v^o^l^v^ed^{a d}^ecisioⁿ^{as to}^w^h^et^h^e^r^p^a^{st co}ⁿ^d^u^c^t^w^a^s

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
⁴⁰⁰^(D^{.C. Cir}^.¹⁹⁸¹^).
⁹^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.⁵⁵¹^et^seq^.⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
¹⁰^A^sso^c.^o^f^Na^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^A^d^vertⁱ^s^ers,^In^c.^v.^FTC⁶²^{7 F}^.²^d¹¹⁵¹^,¹¹^60-^{61 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁹⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed⁴⁴⁷^U^.^S.⁹²¹
⁽¹⁹⁸⁰⁾^.
¹¹^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.⁵⁵^{1 (}⁷⁾⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
¹²^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.⁵⁵^{1 (}⁶⁾⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^{. “}^L^ic^eⁿ^sⁱ^ng^”^is^de^fⁱ^ne^{d to}^inc^l^ude^“^t^he^a^g^eⁿ^cy^pr^oc^e^s^s^r^e^s^p^e^c^ting^the^g^r^aⁿ^t,^r^e^ne^w^a^{l, de}^nia^l
^revo^catⁱ^oⁿ^,^su^s^p^en^si^on^,^ann^u^l^m^en^t^,^wⁱ^t^h^d^r^aw^al^,^lⁱ^mⁱ^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^am^en^d^m^en^t^,^m^o^dⁱ^fⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^,^o^r^con^dⁱ^tⁱ^onⁱⁿ^g^o^f^{a l}ⁱ^cen^se.^”⁵
^U^.^S.C^.⁵⁵¹⁽⁹⁾⁽¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^.
¹³^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.⁵⁵^{1 (}⁵⁾⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
¹⁴^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.⁵⁵^{1 (}⁴⁾⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
¹⁵^A^ttorⁿ^e^y^G^e^ne^r^a^l’^s^Ma^nua^{l o}ⁿ^t^h^e^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e^P^r^oc^e^dur^e^A^c^{t 1}⁴⁽¹⁹⁴⁷⁾^{. T}^h^e^m^a^nua^{l is}^a^c^onte^m^por^aⁿ^e^o^us
ⁱⁿ^t^e^rp^ret^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e A}^P^A^.^Becau^s^e^o^f^“t^h^e^ro^l^e^p^l^ay^ed^b^y^t^h^{e Dep}^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^Ju^stⁱ^{ce i}ⁿ^d^r^af^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e l}^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^{” i}^t^s
ⁱⁿ^t^e^rp^ret^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^and^exp^l^an^atⁱ^oⁿ^s^h^a^{ve b}^een^acco^rd^ed^si^gnⁱ^fⁱ^can^t^d^e^f^e^ren^{ce b}^y^t^h^{e co}^u^r^t^s^.^S^ee^V^e^rmoⁿ^t^Y^aⁿ^kee^Nu^cl^ea^r
^Po^{wer Co}^rp^.^v.^NRDC^,⁴³^{5 U}^.^S^.⁵¹⁹^{, 5}⁴⁶⁽¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^;^As^s^o^c^.^of^N^a^ti^on^{al M}^aⁿ^u^f^a^c^t^ur^e^r^s^,^Iⁿ^c^.^v.^FT^C^,^sup^r^a^f^oot^note^6,
⁶²⁷^F^.²^d^at¹¹⁶⁰^n.¹⁵^.

^uⁿ^l^a^w^fu^l,^s^o^th^at^th^{e proceedin}^g^is^c^h^{aracterized b}^y^an^acc^us^ator^y^f^l^av^{or a}ⁿ^d^m^a^y^res^u^{lt i}ⁿ¹⁶
^dⁱ^scip^lin^ar^y^act^ioⁿ^.
In sum, then, rulemaking involves the formulation of a policy or interpretation which the agency
will apply in the future to all persons engaged in the regulated activity. Adjudication is the
administrative equivalent of a judicial trial. It applies policy to a set of past actions and results in
an order against (or in favor of) the named party. The focus of rulemaking is prospective. The
primary focus of adjudication is retrospective.
Administrative rulemaking and adjudication may be conducted pursuant to either informal or
formal procedures. Informal rulemaking requires the administrative agency, following publication
of a proposed rule in the Federal Register, to provide “interested persons an opportunity to ¹⁷
participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views or arguments.” Courts
reviewing such proceedings are required to uphold informal rulemaking decisions unless those
decisions are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with ¹⁸
law.
Formal rulemaking is invoked when “rules are required by statute to be made on the record after ¹⁹
opportunity for agency hearing.” Under the APA, formal rulemaking must include a trial-type
hearing at which a “party is entitled to present his case or defense or oral or documentary
evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required ²⁰
for a full and true disclosure of the facts.” Judicial review of formal rulemaking requires a court ²¹
to set aside a rule that is “unsupported by substantial evidence” on the record.
Formal adjudication is governed by section 554 of the APA and arises in “every case of
adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency ²²
hearing.” Section 554 incorporates the procedural requirements of section 556 and 557 and
affords parties to a formal adjudication the right to present evidence and to conduct cross ²³
examination. Judicial review of formal adjudication, like that of formal rulemaking, is governed
by the substantial evidence standard.
Informal adjudication occurs when an agency determines the rights or liabilities of a party in a ²⁴
proceeding to which section 554 does not apply. The APA makes no provision for informal
adjudications—adjudications unaccompanied by the protections of an on the record, formal,
judicial-like trial. But since these informal adjudications involve individual rights rather than
issues of general policy, the courts have recognized they implicate constitutional due process

¹⁶^S^{ee al}^so^U.^S^.^v.^Fl^or^id^{a Eas}^t^C^o^as^{t Ry}^.,⁴¹^{0 U}^.^S^.²²⁴^,²^44-⁴⁶⁽¹⁹⁷³⁾^.
¹⁷^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.⁵⁵^{3 (}^c⁾⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
¹⁸^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.⁵⁵^{3 (}²⁾⁽^A⁾^.
¹⁹^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.⁵⁵^{3 (}^c⁾^.
²⁰^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.⁵⁵^{3 (}^d⁾^.
²¹^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.⁷⁰^{6 (}²⁾⁽^E)^.
²²^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.⁵⁵^{4 (}^a⁾^.
²³^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.⁵⁵^{4 (}^b⁾^-⁽^d)^.^Se^c^tion⁵⁵⁷⁽^d)^a^l^s^o^pr^o^h^ib^its^{ex p}^a^r^t^e^c^ontr^a^c^t^s^w^{ith or}^by^aⁿ^y^one^“w^{ho is}^or^m^a^y^be
^reasoⁿ^a^b^l^y^exp^e^ct^ed^t^o^b^eⁱⁿ^vo^l^v^edⁱⁿ^t^h^e^d^eci^si^oⁿ^a^l^p^r^o^{cess” o}^f^an^ad^j^u^di^cat^o^r^y^p^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g.
²⁴^S^ee,^e.^g^.^C^a^mp^v.^Pitts^,⁴¹^{1 U}^.^S.¹³⁸^{, 1}⁴⁰^-⁴²⁽¹⁹⁷³⁾⁽^p^e^{r cu}^ri^a^m^);^Aircra^{ft Own}^e^{rs an}^d^{Pilots Asso}^c^.^v.^FAA^,⁶⁰⁰
^F^.^2d⁹⁶^5,⁹⁶⁹^-⁷⁰⁽^D^.^C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁹⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^Li^ne^s^,^Iⁿ^c^.^v.^FM^C^,⁵⁸⁴^F.^2d⁵¹^{9 (}^D^.^C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^.

values.²⁵ Thus, although due process does not generally require a full scale judicial trial, informal
adjudications must nevertheless conform “with the notion of a fair hearing and with the principles ²⁶
of fairness implicit in due process.” In such proceedings, the agency’s final decision is reviewed
under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard which requires a court to conduct a “searching
and careful” inquiry based upon “the full administrative record that was before the [agency ²⁷
decisionmaker] at the time he made his decision.”
It is important to note that informal decisionmaking, that is, governmental actions that are taken
without an evidentiary hearing and formal record, constitute by far the vast bulk of government
decisionmaking. As one commentator has noted:
^{... Ho}^w^e^v^e^{r de}^fⁱⁿ^e^{d, inf}^o^r^m^al^action^is^t^h^e^m^{ode i}ⁿ^w^h^ic^h^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^operates^.^A^co^mm^oⁿ
^an^{d loos}^{e f}ⁱ^gu^{re is}^t^h^atⁿⁱⁿ^e^t^y^percen^{t of}^th^{e g}^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^’^s^bu^sⁱⁿ^e^s^sⁱ^s^acco^m^p^li^s^h^{ed b}^y
ⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^{al actio}ⁿ^.^T^h^{e f}ⁱ^g^u^r^e^is^m^u^c^h^to^o^lo^w^.^Iⁿ^ter^m^{s o}^f^q^u^aⁿ^tit^y^,^s^u^r^e^l^y^m^u^ch^less^th^aⁿ^oⁿ^e
^percen^{t of}^th^{e action}^s^of^t^h^{e f}^e^{deral g}^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^{are bas}^e^{d u}^pon^ev^iden^ti^a^r^y^h^e^a^rⁱⁿ^g^s^.^Aⁿ^d^,ⁱ^f
^on^e^w^e^{re pos}^s^e^s^s^{ed of}^{a div}ⁱⁿ^e^{calibrator th}^{at cou}^l^{d m}^e^a^s^u^r^e^“i^m^p^o^r^t^aⁿ^c^e^,^”ⁱ^tⁱ^s^d^o^u^b^t^f^u^l^t^h^a^t
^w^eⁱ^g^hⁱ^ng^t^h^{e trans}^actions^b^y^t^h^{eir i}^m^portan^ce^w^o^u^l^{d redu}^{ce th}^{e predom}ⁱⁿ^aⁿ^{ce of}ⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^al²⁸
^actioⁿⁱⁿ^t^h^{e o}^p^e^r^a^tioⁿ^s^o^f^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^.
As a consequence, this category of decisionmaking has been accorded special attention by the
courts.
A final important category of agency action that has been the subject of undue influence litigation
is investigation. Most administrative action, including much of that which occurs in an informal
as well as in a formal proceeding, is conditioned by information obtained through an agency’s
prior investigation. Administrative agencies do not have unrestricted power to demand
information merely for satisfying their curiosity. The agency’s command can be enforced only if
it is authorized by law and issued in a lawful manner. Additionally, constitutional limitations
hedge administrative power to investigate. Within these constraints, the courts have
acknowledged the importance of judicial deference to administrative agencies in conducting ²⁹
investigations. Agency decisions to conduct investigations are deemed “committed entirely to ³⁰
agency discretion” and are unreviewable except where they are made in “bad faith” and the ³¹
enforcement of the administrative process would be an abuse of the judicial process.

²⁵^V^e^rmoⁿ^t^Y^aⁿ^{kee Nu}^cl^ea^r^P^o^wer^Co^rp^.^v.^NRDC^,⁴^{35 U}^.^S.⁵¹^9,⁵⁴^{2 (}¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^;^Sie^r^r^a^C^l^ub^v.^C^o^stle^{, 6}^{57 F.2}^d²⁹^{8, 400}
^(D^{.C. Cir.}¹⁹^81).
²⁶^U^.^{S. Line}^s^v.^FM^C^,⁵⁸⁴^F^.^2d⁵¹⁹^,⁵³^{9 (}¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^.
²⁷^Citizeⁿ^{s to}^Pre^s^e^r^v^e^Ov^e^r^{ton P}^a^rk^{, Inc}^.^v.^Vo^l^p^e^{, 40}¹^U^.^{S. 40}^{2, 41}^6,⁴²⁰⁽¹⁹⁷¹⁾^;^U^.^{S. Line}^s^v.^FM^C^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^note
^{26, 58}^{4 F.2}^d^a^t⁵⁴^1-⁴²^.
²⁸^G^a^r^dne^r^,^T^h^e^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^l^A^c^tions^o^f^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt, 26 A}^m^e^r^{. U}^.^L^.^R^.⁷⁹⁹^{, 7}⁹⁹^-⁸⁰^{0 (}¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^{. T}^h^e^ty^pe^s^of^a^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e
^de^cⁱ^{sions t}^h^a^t^m^a^y^c^o^m^p^rise^the^le^g^a^{l c}^a^t^e^g^or^y^of^“ⁱ^nf^or^m^a^{l a}^c^tion^s^”^w^{ould inc}^l^ude^se^ttle^m^e^{nt, ne}^g^o^tia^tion^aⁿ^d
^a^lte^rⁿ^a^tiv^e^dis^pute^r^e^s^o^luti^on;^r^e^vⁱ^e^w^a^{nd dis}^pos^a^l^of^a^pplic^a^tio^ns^a^{nd c}^l^aⁱ^m^s^f^o^r^s^o^cⁱ^a^l^w^e^lf^a^r^e^be^ne^f^its^{, im}^mⁱ^g^r^a^tion
^m^a^tte^r^s^{, e}^t^c^.^{; te}^s^t^a^{nd i}ⁿ^s^p^e^c^tio^{n p}^r^og^r^a^m^s^{; s}^u^s^p^eⁿ^sⁱ^ons^,^s^e^iz^ur^e^s^aⁿ^{d r}^e^c^a^lls^{; inf}^o^r^m^a^l^s^upe^r^v^is^{ion (}^s^uc^{h a}^sⁱⁿ^ba^nk
^regu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ⁾^;^t^h^{e u}^s^e^b^y^ag^en^ci^{es o}^f^p^u^b^lⁱ^cⁱ^t^y^;^an^d^respoⁿ^s^{es t}^o^req^u^est^s^f^o^{r ag}^en^c^y^ad^vi^{ce an}^d^d^ecl^arat^o^r^y^o^r^d^e^rs,^am^oⁿ^g
^othe^r^s^{. Se}^e^,^Er^ne^s^t^G^e^llhorⁿ^aⁿ^d^R^ona^ld^{M. L}^e^vⁱ^{n, A}^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e^L^a^w^a^{nd P}^r^oc^e^s^s^,¹⁵^6-⁹⁰⁽¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^.
²⁹^S^ee,^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v.^La^S^a^lle^Na^tion^a^{l B}^ank^,⁴^{37 U}^.^S.²⁹^8,³¹^6-¹⁷⁽¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^.
³⁰^City^{of C}^h^ic^a^g^o^v.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^{, 3}⁹⁶^U.^S.¹⁶^2,¹⁶^{5 (}¹⁹⁶⁹⁾^;^C^h^um^M^e^c^h^ling^C^o^r^p^.^v.^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^,⁵⁶⁶^F.^2d⁷^22,
⁷²⁴^-2⁵^{(D.C. Cir}^.¹⁹⁷⁷^);^{Dresser In}^du^stries,^In^c.^v.^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^,⁵⁹⁶^F.2^d¹²^31,¹²³⁵^N^.¹⁽⁵^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁹⁾^,^cert^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,^st
⁴⁴⁴^U^.^S.¹⁰⁴⁴⁽¹⁹⁸⁰⁾^;^SEC^v.^Ho^w^a^t^t^,⁵²⁵^F.^2d²²^6,²²^{9 (}¹^Cir.¹⁹⁷⁵^);^Kix^m^ille^r^v.^SE^C^,⁴⁹^{2 F}^.²^d⁶⁴¹^,⁶⁴^{5 (}^D^.^C^.
^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁴⁾⁽^p^e^{r cu}^ri^a^m^).
³¹^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^A^m^eri^c^aⁿ^T^a^rg^et^A^d^vertⁱ^sⁱⁿ^g,^In^c.^{, 2}⁵⁷^F.^3d³⁴^{8 (}⁴^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾^.^SEC^v.^W^h^e^e^lin^g-P^ittsbur^{gh Ste}^e^l
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

The cases indicate, at least in their rhetoric, that identification and categorization of the subject
proceedings are significant. We turn now to a review of the pertinent case law which serves to
illustrate the types of factors the courts have identified as relevant in different kinds of
proceedings.
The seminal case with respect to the nature and extent of permissible congressional intercession
into agency adjudicatory or quasi-adjudicatory proceedings is the 1966 decision of the Court of ³²
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Pillsbury Company v. Federal Trade Commission, which held a
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) divestiture order invalid because the Commission’s decisional
process had been tainted by impermissible congressional influence. At issue was an intense
interrogation at a Senate subcommittee hearing of the FTC Chairman and several members of his
staff on a key issue in an antitrust adjudication involving the Pillsbury Company which was then
pending before the Commission. The Senators expressed opinions on the issue and criticized the
FTC for its interpretation of section 7 of the Clayton Act in a previous interlocutory order in ³³
Pillsbury’s favor. The clear message of the Senate committee criticism was that the FTC should ³⁴
have ruled against Pillsbury. In its subsequent final decision the Commission ruled as the
Committee had suggested. The appeals court found the Senate inquiry to be an “improper
intrusion into the adjudicatory process of the Commission.” The court based its holding on the
fact that the agency was acting in a judicial capacity. As a consequence, the private litigants had a
“right to a fair trial” and the “appearance of impartiality” as part of the general guarantees of
procedural due process when the agency is acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. The
court emphasized the judicial nature of the function the agency was performing and explained
that in order to protect the integrity of that type of process, it was proscribing the subcommittee’s
action because it cast doubt upon the “appearance of impartiality” of the decisionmakers, and not
because of any finding that the Commission had actually been influenced.
^{... How}^e^v^e^r,^w^h^eⁿ^{[a con}^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al] in}^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^ation^f^o^cus^e^s^dⁱ^r^e^c^t^ly^aⁿ^d^s^u^b^s^t^aⁿ^tⁱ^a^l^l^y^u^p^oⁿ^th^e
^m^e^{ntal decis}ⁱ^oⁿ^{al proces}^s^e^s^o^f^{a C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^{on in}^a^cas^e^w^h^ic^h^is^pen^d^ing^be^f^o^{re it, C}^ong^res^s
^{is n}^o^loⁿ^g^e^rⁱⁿ^ter^v^eⁿⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^th^{e ag}^eⁿ^c^y^’^s^le^gⁱ^s^l^ati^v^{e f}^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^b^u^{t r}^a^th^er^{, in}^{its j}^u^dⁱ^cial
^f^uⁿ^c^tioⁿ^.^{At th}ⁱ^s^latter^p^oⁱⁿ^t^,^w^e^b^eco^m^e^coⁿ^cerⁿ^e^d^wⁱ^t^h^th^{e r}ⁱ^g^h^t^o^f^p^r^iv^{ate litig}^aⁿ^t^s^t^o^a^f^aⁱ^r
^tr^{ial an}^d^,^eq^u^a^ll^yⁱ^m^p^o^r^taⁿ^t^,^wⁱ^th^th^eir^rⁱ^g^h^t^to^th^{e ap}^p^ear^an^ce^o^fⁱ^m^p^a^r^tialit^y^,^w^h^ic^h^caⁿⁿ^o^t
^{be m}^aⁱⁿ^taiⁿ^{ed un}^les^s^th^os^e^w^h^{o ex}^ercis^e^th^{e j}^u^dicⁱ^a^l^f^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^r^e^f^r^e^e^f^r^o^m^p^o^w^e^r^f^u^l^e^x^t^e^rn^al
^inf^l^u^eⁿ^ces^...

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^Co^rp^.^,⁶⁴⁸^F.2^d¹¹^{8 (}³^{d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸¹⁾⁽^eⁿ^ba^nc^);^Unⁱ^t^ed^St^a^t^es^v.^RF^{B Pe}^trole^u^m,^Inc^.^,⁷⁹^{3 F}^.²^d⁵²⁸^,⁵³²^-³^{3 (}^E^m^.^A^ppl.
¹⁹⁸³⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v.^Ph^oe^nix^P^e^tr^ole^u^m^C^o^r^p^.^,⁵⁷^{1 F.}^Su^pp^{. 1}⁶⁽^S^.D^{. T}^e^x¹⁹⁸²⁾^;^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^State^s^v.^Ar^m^ada
^Pe^trole^u^{m Cor}^p^.^,⁵⁶^{2 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.⁴³^(S.D^{. T}^e^x^.¹⁹^82).
³²³⁵⁴^F.^2d⁹⁵^{2 (}⁵^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁶⁶⁾^.
³³^E^a^rl^yⁱⁿ^t^h^{e p}^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g,^t^h^{e F}^T^{C h}^a^dⁱ^ssu^e^d^anⁱⁿ^t^e^rl^o^c^u^t^o^r^y^o^r^d^e^r^anⁿ^o^uⁿ^cⁱⁿ^{g i}^t^w^o^u^l^d^u^s^{e t}^h^{e ru}^l^e^o^f^reasoⁿ^rat^h^er
^t^h^an^a^p^e^{r se ru}^l^e^t^o^eval^u^a^t^e^acq^ui^si^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^un^d^e^{r t}^h^{e Cl}^ay^t^oⁿ^A^c^t^.
³⁴^T^h^e^c^o^m^m^itte^e^c^h^aⁱ^r^m^aⁿ^{’s que}^stioni^ng^of^the^FT^{C c}^h^aⁱ^rm^aⁿ^{, a}^s^we^{ll a}^s^tha^t^of^the^c^o^m^m^itte^e^m^e^m^b^e^r^{s w}^a^{s hostile}
^a^{nd p}^oⁱⁿ^te^{d a}ⁿ^{d e}^x^pr^e^s^s^e^{d the}^s^t^r^ong^ly^he^{ld v}ⁱ^e^w^tha^t^the^FT^C^s^h^o^u^ld^us^e^the^pe^r^s^e^r^u^le^{, a}^nd^bo^{th t}^h^e^s^e^na^tor^s^aⁿ^{d t}^h^e
^F^T^{C ch}^ai^r^m^an^f^r^eq^u^eⁿ^t^l^y^re^ferred^t^o^t^h^{e f}^act^{s o}^f^t^h^{e P}ⁱ^l^l^sb^u^r^y^{case t}^oⁱ^l^l^u^s^t^r^at^{e t}^h^ei^{r vi}^ew^s.^S^{ee 3}⁵⁴^F^.²^d^at⁹⁵⁵^-⁶²^.

^T^o^s^u^bj^{ect an}^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^{rator to}^{a s}^earchⁱⁿ^g^e^x^a^mⁱⁿ^a^{tion as}^to^h^o^w^aⁿ^d^w^h^y^h^e^reach^ed
^hⁱ^{s d}^ecisioⁿⁱⁿ^{a case sti}^{ll p}^eⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^b^e^f^o^{re h}ⁱ^m^,^aⁿ^d^to^{criticize h}ⁱ^m^f^o^{r reach}ⁱⁿ^g^th^e^“w^roⁿ^g^”
^decisⁱ^on^{, as}^th^{e Se}ⁿ^a^{te s}^u^bcom^mⁱ^{ttee did in}^thⁱ^s^cas^{e, s}^acrif^ices^t^h^{e appearan}^{ce of}
ⁱ^m^p^a^r^tialit^y^—^t^h^e^sⁱ^{ne qua non}^of^Am^{erican j}^u^{dicial j}^u^s^tice^—^{in f}^a^v^o^{r of s}^o^m^e^s^h^ort-^r^uⁿ
^no^tⁱ^o^{ns r}^e^ga^r^dⁱ^{ng t}^h^e^Coⁿ^g^r^e^s^sⁱ^o^na^lⁱⁿ^t^e^nt^und^e^r^l^yⁱ^{ng a}ⁿ^a^m^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^t^t^o^a^st^a^t^ut^e^,^unf^et^t^e^re^d
^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tioⁿ^o^f^w^h^ich^w^a^{s co}^m^mⁱ^tted^b^y^Coⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^to^th^e^Fed^e^r^a^{l Tr}^ad^{e Co}^m^mⁱ^s^s^ioⁿ^.
^It^m^a^y^{be ar}^g^u^e^d^th^a^t^s^u^c^h^o^f^fⁱ^cials^a^s^m^e^m^b^er^s^{of t}^h^{e Feder}^a^{l T}^r^{ade C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^are
^su^f^f^icieⁿ^t^l^y^a^w^ar^{e o}^f^t^h^{e r}^ealiti^{es o}^f^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^a^l^{, n}^o^t^to^sa^y^“^p^o^{litical,” li}^f^e^{as to}^b^e^ab^{le to}
^wⁱ^t^h^stan^d^s^u^c^h^q^u^es^tioⁿⁱⁿ^g^a^s^w^e^h^a^v^e^o^u^tlⁱⁿ^ed^h^e^r^e^{. H}^o^w^e^v^e^r^,^th^{is co}^u^r^{t is}ⁿ^o^{t so}
^“^s^ophi^s^tⁱ^cat^{ed” t}^h^atⁱ^t^caⁿ^sh^rug^off^su^c^h^{a procedu}^r^al^du^{e pro}^ces^s^cl^ai^m^m^e^rel^y^beca^u^s^{e t}^h^e
^o^f^fⁱ^cia^l^sⁱⁿ^v^o^lv^ed^sh^o^u^ld^b^e^a^b^{le to}^dⁱ^sco^uⁿ^t^w^h^at^is^said^aⁿ^d^to^dⁱ^sr^eg^ar^d^th^e^f^o^r^{ce o}^f^t^h^e
ⁱⁿ^trus^{ion i}ⁿ^{to t}^h^{e adj}^u^dicator^y^proces^s^.^W^e^con^c^l^u^{de t}^h^at^w^e^can^pres^er^v^e^t^h^{e ri}^gh^ts^of^th^e
^litig^aⁿ^t^sⁱⁿ^{a case su}^c^h^{as t}^h^is^wⁱ^t^h^o^u^{t h}^a^vⁱⁿ^g^an^y^ad^v^e^r^s^{e e}^f^f^{ect u}^p^oⁿ^th^{e leg}ⁱ^ti^m^a^t^e^e^x^e^r^cⁱ^se
^o^f^th^{e in}^v^e^s^tig^a^tiv^{e p}^o^w^e^r^o^f^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^{s. W}^h^at^w^e^d^o^{is to}^p^r^es^er^v^e^th^{e i}ⁿ^t^e^g^rⁱ^t^y^o^f^t^h^e^ju^dⁱ^cⁱ^al³⁵
^as^{pect of}^th^{e ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rati^v^e^proces^s^.
D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Volpe,³⁶ decided by the D.C. Circuit five years later,
provides an apt counterpoint to Pillsbury. D.C. Federation also involved a claim of undue
congressional influence but not within the context of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. The
principles enunciated by the court as necessary to establish a claim of taint in such a situation
mark out the boundaries of permissible congressional action which have influenced courts since
then. D.C. Federation involved the approval by the Secretary of Transportation of construction of
the Three Sisters Bridge across the Potomac River. Two issues were presented: first, whether the
Secretary failed to comply within statutory requirements prior to approval of construction; and
second, whether the Secretary’s determinations were tainted by extraneous pressures. With regard
to the first issue, a majority of the court found that in a number of critical respects the Secretary
had failed to comply with applicable statutory standards which therefore required a remand for
further agency determinations.
Although this finding would have been sufficient to dispose of the case, Judge Bazelon chose to
deal with the “taint” issue. That involved the allegation that threats by the Chairman of the House
appropriation subcommittee, which had jurisdiction over the funding of District of Columbia’s
transportation construction projects to deny funds for the District’s proposed subway system
unless the bridge project was approved and whether those threats had a legal impact on the
Secretary’s subsequent approval decision. Judge Bazelon stated that he was “convinced that the
impact of this is sufficient, standing alone, to invalidate the Secretary’s action. Even if the
Secretary had taken every formal step required by every applicable statutory provision, reversal
would be required, in my opinion, because extraneous pressure intruded into the calculus of ³⁷
considerations on which the Secretary’s decision was based.”
Judge Bazelon pointed out that he was alone in this opinion: “Judge Fahy, on the other hand, has
concluded that since critical determinations cannot stand irrespective of the allegations of

³⁵^Id^.^a^t⁹⁶^4.
³⁶⁴⁵^{9 F}^.²^d¹²³¹⁽^D^.C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷¹⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed⁴⁰⁵^U.^S.¹⁰³⁰⁽¹⁹⁷²⁾^.
³⁷⁴⁵⁹^F.^2d^at¹²⁴⁵^-⁴⁶^.

pressure, he finds it unnecessary to decide the case on this independent ground.”³⁸ But it is to be
noted that the disagreement between Judges Bazelon and Fahy was not as to the applicable
principle of law but rather as to whether the district court below had found there had been any
consideration by the Secretary of extraneous influence:
^W^h^{ile J}^u^dg^e^Fa^hyⁱ^sⁿ^o^{t e}ⁿ^tirel^y^convⁱⁿ^{ced t}^h^{at t}^h^e^Dis^t^ric^t^C^o^u^r^{t u}^l^ti^m^a^tel^y^f^oun^{d as}^a^f^act
^th^{at th}^{e e}^x^tran^eo^u^s^pres^s^u^{re h}^a^{d in}^f^l^u^eⁿ^{ced th}^{e Secretar}^y^—^a^p^oⁱⁿ^t^w^hⁱ^c^hⁱ^s^f^o^r^m^e^c^l^e^a^r^—h^e
^h^a^{s au}^t^h^o^r^ized^m^e^toⁿ^o^{te h}ⁱ^s^coⁿ^c^u^r^r^eⁿ^{ce i}ⁿ^m^y^dⁱ^sc^u^s^sioⁿ^o^f^th^{e co}ⁿ^t^r^o^llin^g^p^rⁱⁿ^cip^l^{e o}^f
^l^a^w^:ⁿ^a^m^e^l^y^{, t}^h^at^t^h^{e deci}^sⁱ^oⁿ^w^o^u^l^{d be i}ⁿ^v^a^lⁱ^dⁱ^f^bas^e^{d i}ⁿ^w^h^ol^{e or i}ⁿ^part^on^t^h^{e pres}^s^u^res
^e^m^an^a^{ting f}^r^o^m^R^e^pres^en^tati^{ve Natch}^e^{r. J}^u^dg^e^Fahy^a^g^rees^,^an^d^w^e^t^h^ere^f^{ore h}^o^{ld, t}^h^{at o}ⁿ
^re^m^aⁿ^d^t^h^{e Secretar}^y^m^u^s^t^m^a^k^eⁿ^e^w^deter^mⁱⁿ^atioⁿ^s^ba^s^e^{d s}^t^rictl^y^on^th^e^m^e^rit^s^aⁿ^d³⁹
^co^m^p^lete^l^y^wⁱ^t^h^o^u^t^r^e^g^a^r^d^to^aⁿ^y^coⁿ^s^id^er^atioⁿ^sⁿ^o^t^m^a^d^e^r^e^l^e^v^aⁿ^tⁱⁿ^t^h^e^a^p^p^lⁱ^c^a^b^l^e^s^t^a^t^u^t^e^.
Judge Bazelon’s opinion makes it clear that the court’s standard—that extraneous congressional
influences actually shown to have had an impact on an agency decision will taint such ⁴⁰
administrative action–is crafted for the special administrative circumstances of the situation
before it: where the decisional process was neither judicial or legislative in nature.
^T^h^{e Dis}^t^rict^C^o^u^r^t^w^a^s^s^u^rel^y^{correct in}^coⁿ^c^l^u^diⁿ^g^t^h^{at t}^h^e^Secretar^y^’^s^act^ion^w^a^sⁿ^o^t
^j^u^{dicial or}^qu^as^i-^j^u^{dicial, an}^d^f^o^{r th}^{at reas}^on^w^e^ag^{ree th}^at^m^u^c^h^of^t^h^{e doctrin}^{e cited by}
^pl^aiⁿ^tⁱ^f^fsⁱ^sⁱⁿ^apposⁱ^t^e^{. I}^f^h^e^h^a^{d been act}ⁱⁿ^{g i}ⁿ^su^c^h^a^ca^paci^t^y^{, pl}^aiⁿ^tⁱ^f^fs^co^u^l^d^h^a^v^e
^f^o^rcefu^l^l^y^ar^gu^{ed th}^{at t}^h^{e decis}ⁱ^on^w^a^s^inv^a^{lid becaus}^e^of^th^{e deci}^sⁱ^onm^a^k^er’^s^bia^s^or
^becau^s^e^h^e^h^a^d^receiv^e^d^{ex pa}^r^t^e^co^m^m^uni^catⁱ^ons^{. Wel}^l^-^e^s^t^ablⁱ^s^h^e^{d pri}ⁿ^ci^pl^e^s^cou^l^d^h^a^v^e
^beenⁱⁿ^v^o^k^e^{d t}^o^s^u^pport^t^h^es^e^arg^u^m^eⁿ^t^s^,^an^{d pl}^aiⁿ^tⁱ^f^fs^mⁱ^ght^h^a^v^e^prev^ai^l^e^{d e}^v^en^wⁱ^t^h^out
^sho^wⁱ^{ng t}^h^a^t^t^h^e^p^r^e^s^s^u^r^e^ha^d^a^c^t^ua^l^l^yⁱⁿ^fl^ueⁿ^ced^th^e^Secret^ary^’^s^decisⁱ^oⁿ^{. W}ⁱ^t^h^re^g^a^{rd to}
^j^u^{dicial decis}ⁱ^onm^a^kⁱⁿ^g^,^w^h^et^h^e^{r by}^cou^r^{t or ag}^en^c^y^{, th}^{e appearan}^{ce of}^bⁱ^a^s^o^r^p^r^e^s^s^u^r^e^m^a^y
^{be n}^o^les^s^obj^ection^a^{ble th}^an^t^h^{e realit}^y^.^B^u^{t s}ⁱⁿ^{ce th}^e^Secretar^y^’^s^action^w^a^sⁿ^o^{t j}^u^dicial,
^th^{at r}^a^tioⁿ^a^le^h^a^sⁿ^o^ap^p^licatioⁿ^h^e^r^e^.
^If^{, on}^th^{e ot}^h^e^{r h}^aⁿ^d^{, th}^e^Secretar^y^’^s^action^h^a^{d been}^pu^rel^y^l^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e,^w^e^mⁱ^gh^{t h}^a^v^e
^ag^reed^wⁱ^t^h^th^{e Di}^s^t^{rict C}^o^u^r^{t th}^{at h}ⁱ^s^decisⁱ^on^cou^l^{d s}^t^aⁿ^{d in}^s^p^{ite of}^{a f}ⁱⁿ^d^ing^th^at^h^e^h^a^d
^con^s^{idered ex}^traⁿ^eou^s^pres^s^u^r^e^s^.^B^e^gⁱⁿⁿ^ing^wⁱ^t^h^Fletcher^v.^Peck^,^th^e^Su^p^r^em^{e C}^o^u^r^t^h^a^s
^m^aⁱⁿ^taiⁿ^{ed th}^at^{a s}^t^at^u^t^{e ca}^{nnot be in}^v^a^lⁱ^dated^m^e^rel^y^becaus^e^th^e^legis^l^at^u^r^e’s^actioⁿ^w^a^s
^m^o^tiv^a^t^ed^b^yⁱ^m^p^e^r^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^b^l^{e c}^oⁿ^s^id^er^atioⁿ^s⁽^e^x^{cept, perh}^aps^,ⁱⁿ^s^p^{ecial circum}^s^t^an^ce^sⁿ^o^t
^{applicable h}^e^re).^In^{deed, th}^{at v}^e^ry^prin^{ciple requ}^ires^u^s^{to rej}^e^{ct plain}^tiffs^’^ar^g^u^m^en^t^t^h^a^t^th^e
^approv^al^of^t^h^{e bri}^d^g^e^by^t^h^e^Dⁱ^s^t^ri^ct^of^C^o^l^u^m^bⁱ^a^Cⁱ^t^y^C^oun^ci^l^w^a^sⁱⁿ^s^o^m^e^s^e^ns^{e i}ⁿ^v^a^lⁱ^d^.
^W^e^d^oⁿ^o^{t sit in}^j^u^d^g^m^eⁿ^{t o}^f^t^h^e^m^o^tⁱ^v^e^{s o}^f^t^h^{e Di}^strⁱ^ct^’^s^le^gⁱ^sla^tiv^{e b}^o^d^y^,ⁿ^o^r^d^o^w^e^h^a^v^e
^au^th^o^r^it^y^to^r^e^vⁱ^e^wⁱ^t^{s d}^ecisioⁿ^{s. T}^h^{e Cit}^y^Co^uⁿ^c^il^’^s^actioⁿ^coⁿ^s^tit^u^t^ed^{, in}^o^u^r^vⁱ^e^w^{, t}^h^e
^approv^{al of}^th^{e proj}^ect^requ^{ired by}^t^h^{e s}^t^at^u^t^e.
^T^h^u^s^{, th}^e^un^derl^yⁱ^ng^problem^canⁿ^o^{t be ill}^umⁱⁿ^{ated b}^y^a^sⁱ^m^p^lis^tⁱ^{c eff}^o^{rt to}^f^o^{rce th}^e
^Secretar^y^’^s^action^{into a pu}^rely^j^u^{dicial or}^p^u^r^e^l^y^le^gi^sla^tⁱ^v^e^m^o^ld^.^{His d}^e^cⁱ^sioⁿ^w^a^{s no}^t
^“^j^u^d^{icial” i}ⁿ^t^h^at^h^e^w^a^sⁿ^o^{t r}^e^q^u^ir^ed^to^b^a^{se it}^so^lel^y^oⁿ^a^f^o^r^m^{al r}^eco^r^d^estab^lⁱ^s^h^e^d^at^a
^p^u^b^{lic h}^earⁱⁿ^g^.^A^t^t^h^{e sa}^m^e^ti^m^e^{, it}^w^a^sⁿ^o^{t p}^u^r^e^l^y^“^l^eg^islati^v^{e” si}ⁿ^{ce Co}ⁿ^g^r^e^ss^h^a^d^alr^ead^y
^es^t^a^blⁱ^s^h^e^{d t}^h^{e boun}^dari^es^wⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^h^hⁱ^s^di^s^c^retⁱ^oⁿ^cou^l^d^operat^e^.^Bu^t^ev^en^t^h^ough^hⁱ^s
^actioⁿ^f^e^ll^b^e^t^w^een^th^e^s^{e t}^w^o^c^oⁿ^cep^tu^{al e}^x^tr^e^m^es,^{it i}^s^still^g^o^v^erⁿ^e^d^b^y^p^rⁱⁿ^cip^l^es^th^a^t^w^e

³⁸^Id^{. a}^t¹²⁴⁶^.
³⁹^Id^.
⁴⁰^Ju^d^g^{e Bazel}^oⁿ^em^p^h^a^si^zed^t^h^at^{he b}^e^lⁱ^e^ved^t^h^at^un^d^e^r^t^h^{e ci}^rcu^m^st^an^{ces o}^f^t^h^{e case,}^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^g^ressi^oⁿ^al^t^h^reat^s
^inv^o^lv^e^d^w^e^r^e^ta^ke^{n into}^a^c^c^ount^by^the^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^:^“^Iⁿ^m^y^vⁱ^ew^{, the}^Dⁱ^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^C^our^t^c^l^e^a^r^ly^a^{nd una}^m^b^ig^uo^us^ly^f^ound^a^s
^{a f}^a^ct^t^h^at^t^h^e^p^r^essu^{re exert}^e^d^b^y^Rep^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^v^{e Nat}^c^h^e^{r an}^d^o^t^h^e^r^s^dⁱ^d^h^a^{ve an}ⁱ^m^p^act^oⁿ^S^ecret^{ary Vo}^l^p^e’s^d^eci^si^oⁿ
^{to a}^p^pr^ov^e^the^br^idg^e^.”⁴⁵⁹^F.^2d^a^t¹²^46.

^h^a^{d t}^h^ough^t^el^e^m^ent^a^r^y^aⁿ^{d bey}^oⁿ^d^di^s^p^u^t^{e. If}^{, i}ⁿ^t^h^{e cou}^r^s^e^of^reac^hⁱ^ng^hⁱ^s^deci^si^on^,
^Secretar^y^{Volpe took}ⁱⁿ^{to accou}ⁿ^t^“^c^oⁿ^sⁱ^derations^th^a^t^C^ong^r^e^s^s^cou^l^{d n}^o^t^h^a^v^eⁱⁿ^teⁿ^d^{ed to}
^m^a^k^e^rele^v^aⁿ^t^{,” h}ⁱ^s^action^pro^{ceeded f}^r^om^aⁿ^erron^e^ou^s^pre^m^is^{e a}ⁿ^{d his}^decisⁱ^oⁿ^cann^o^t
^s^t^an^{d. T}^h^{e error w}^oul^{d be}^m^o^{re f}^l^ag^raⁿ^t^{, of}^cou^r^s^e^{, i}^f^t^h^{e S}^e^c^r^et^ary^h^a^{d bas}^e^{d h}ⁱ^s^deci^sⁱ^on
^so^lel^y^oⁿ^th^{e p}^r^es^su^r^e^{s g}^eⁿ^e^r^a^t^e^d^b^y^Rep^r^esen^ta^tiv^e^Natch^e^r^.^B^u^{t it s}^h^o^u^ld^b^e^clear^t^h^at^hⁱ^s⁴¹
^action^w^o^u^l^{d n}^o^{t be i}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^ze^{d m}^e^rel^y^becau^s^e^h^e^als^o^con^sⁱ^d^{ered s}^o^m^e^relev^aⁿ^t^f^a^c^t^ors^.
Thus, the court appeared to view undue influence cases as classifiable on a continuum, with the
applicable standard dependant on where on the continuum the nature of the case places it. If a
proceeding is one in which judicial or quasi-judicial functions are being exercised, then the
highest standard of conduct is required, and only a showing of interference with merely the
“appearance of impartiality,” without proof of actual partiality or other effect of the extraneous ⁴²
influences, is necessary. If the decisionmaking is “purely legislative” (policymaking) in nature,
such as takes place in informal rulemaking, then the courts will be most deferential, even in the
face of heavy extraneous pressures, to the political nature of the process. Finally, where a
decisional process involves application of ascertainable legislative standards by an agency official
in a situation that cannot be categorized as either judicial or legislative, i.e., informal
decisionmaking, then a claim of impermissible interference will be sustained only on a showing
of actual effect. The courts appear to have been guided by this suggested mode of analysis.
The rulings in Pillsbury and D.C. Federation have received surprisingly limited attention over the
years, but what commentary there is has been generally critical, emphasizing both courts’ failure ⁴³
to give proper weight to the values of the political process in such cases. An influential 1990
article by Professor Richard J. Pierce, Jr., a leading administrative law scholar, reflects practical ⁴⁴
concerns raised by the decisions. Pierce agrees that the Pillsbury court reached a defensible
result in light of the circumstances presented: the contested issues of fact were at least arguably
adjudicatory in nature rather than legislative and the intense interrogation could be viewed as
pressure to resolve the facts against Pillsbury, thereby creating the appearance of impropriety.
Thus, even though it is impossible to determine whether the FTC’s resolution of those facts was
in fact influenced by the hostile questions, Pierce argues that one could infer that the FTC
purposely resolved adjudicative facts against Pillsbury in response to the committee’s attacks. ^th
Pierce’s concern, however, is that the 5 Circuit did not decide the case on this narrow ground,
but announced the far broader principle that “[w]hen [a congressional] investigation focuses
directly and substantially upon the mental decisional processes of a Commission in a case before ⁴⁵
it, Congress is . . . intervening [impermissibly] in the agency’s adjudicatory function.”
Application of such a broadly stated prohibition in future cases, Pierce asserts, could result in
findings attributable to congressional pressure without regard to the actual context of the
congressional proceeding and
^w^o^u^l^d^coⁿ^s^titu^{te a}ⁿ^uⁿ^j^u^s^tⁱ^f^ied^j^u^dⁱ^{cial i}ⁿ^ter^f^er^eⁿ^ce^wⁱ^th^t^h^{e p}^o^{litical p}^r^o^cess^o^f
^p^o^licy^m^a^kⁱⁿ^g^.^W^h^et^h^e^r^to^ap^p^l^y^th^{e r}^u^{le o}^f^r^easoⁿ^o^r^{a p}^e^r^se^r^u^{le to}^acq^uⁱ^sitioⁿ^s^uⁿ^d^e^r^th^e

⁴¹⁴⁵^{9 F}^.²^d^a^t¹²⁴⁶^-4^{8 (f}^oot^note^s^o^m^itte^d).
⁴²^T^h^{e co}^u^r^t^q^uⁱ^t^e^cl^earl^y^acc^ep^t^e^d^t^h^e^Pillsb^u^ry^d^o^c^t^rⁱ^ne^.^Se^e⁴⁵^{9 F}^.²^d^a^t¹²⁴⁶^note^s^75-^78.
⁴³^Se^e^c^o^m^m^e^nta^r^ie^{s liste}^{d in f}^o^o^tⁿ^o^te^1.
⁴⁴^P^o^li^tic^a^l^Con^t^rol^,^sup^r^a^f^oot^no^te^1.
⁴⁵^P^o^li^tic^a^l^C^oⁿ^t^r^o^l^a^t⁵^00,^q^uotiⁿ^g^Pillsbury^.

^C^l^a^y^t^oⁿ^A^c^tⁱ^s^pu^rel^y^{a pol}ⁱ^c^y^deci^sⁱ^on^{. . . L}^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^ors^sh^ou^l^d^{be f}^r^{ee t}^o^ex^pres^s^t^h^ei^{r v}ⁱ^e^w^s
^on^t^hⁱ^s^polⁱ^c^yⁱ^s^su^{e, an}^{d F}^T^C^c^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^ers^sh^ou^l^d^{be f}^r^{ee t}^o^ch^ang^e^t^h^ei^r^mⁱⁿ^d^s^aⁿ^{d adopt}
^th^o^s^e^vⁱ^e^w^{s. T}^hⁱ^s^{is t}^h^{e p}^o^litic^{al p}^r^o^{cess f}^uⁿ^c^tioⁿⁱⁿ^g^p^r^o^p^e^r^l^y^.^I^t^{is o}^fⁿ^o^coⁿ^s^eq^u^eⁿ^{ce to}^t^h^e
^j^u^diciary^w^h^et^h^e^{r th}^{e FT}^C^chan^g^e^s^its^polic^y^beca^u^s^{e it i}^s^pers^u^a^{ded by}^t^h^e^m^e^rit^s^of^t^h^e
^legⁱ^s^l^ators^’^ar^g^u^m^eⁿ^t^s^,^{or becau}^s^e^it^f^ears^t^h^{at t}^h^{e legis}^l^at^u^r^e^wⁱ^l^l^{retaliate . . . Si}^mⁱ^larl^y^,^t^h^e
^c^o^ur^t^s^sho^u^l^d^no^t^dⁱ^stⁱⁿ^g^uⁱ^s^{h b}^e^t^w^e^e^{n p}^o^lⁱ^c^y^d^e^cⁱ^si^oⁿ^s^m^a^d^e^t^h^r^o^ug^{h r}^u^l^e^ma^kiⁿ^g^aⁿ^d^polⁱ^c^y
^decisⁱ^on^s^dev^e^{loped in}^adj^u^dicatory^proceedin^gs^{. T}^o^parap^h^r^as^{e J}^u^s^t^{ice Hol}^m^e^s^{, j}^u^dicial
^p^r^o^{cess v}^a^lu^es^sh^o^u^ld^tr^u^m^p^p^o^{litical p}^r^o^{cess v}^a^lu^e^s^oⁿ^l^y^w^h^en^an^ag^eⁿ^c^y^h^a^s^sⁱⁿ^g^l^e^d^o^u^t^aⁿ⁴⁶
ⁱⁿ^divⁱ^d^u^al^f^o^{r adv}^e^rs^{e treat}^m^eⁿ^t^.
While finding Pillsbury’s holding defensible, Professor Pierce deems D.C. Federation
indefensible, “stand[ing] for the principle that two politically accountable branches cannot ⁴⁷
compromise their frequently differing policy preferences.” In Pierce’s view, the case was about
a political dispute over the allocation of transportation funds between the administering agency
and the key congressional appropriating subcommittee. The secretary preferred seeing a subway
built; the subcommittee (and Congress) wanted a bridge built. After a heated public dispute, a
political compromise was effected whereby both projects would go forward. But the appeals court
intervened finding that the secretary’s decisions, which were part of the political deal, were
infected with impermissible bias as a result of legislative branch pressure. In the words of the
court, “the impact of this pressure is sufficient, standing alone, to invalidate the Secretary’s ⁴⁸
action.” In Professor Pierce’s view:
^{D.C. Fed}^e^ra^tioⁿ^{is h}^a^rd^to^ex^p^l^ainⁱⁿ^{a d}^e^m^o^crac^yⁱⁿ^w^h^ic^h^t^w^o^p^o^liticall^y^acco^uⁿ^tab^l^e
^bran^ch^es^o^f^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^s^h^are^th^{e po}^w^e^{r to}^m^a^k^e^polic^y^.^T^h^e^ag^en^c^y^w^a^sⁿ^o^{t adj}^u^dicatiⁿ^g^a
^dⁱ^sp^ut^eⁱⁿ^vo^l^vⁱⁿ^{g i}ⁿ^dⁱ^vi^d^u^a^l^rⁱ^ght^s;^no^r^w^a^{s i}^t^r^e^so^l^vⁱⁿ^{g c}^o^nt^e^s^t^e^dⁱ^s^su^es^of^adj^u^di^catⁱ^v^e^f^act^.
^P^e^rh^ap^{s th}^{e case stan}^d^s^f^o^{r th}^{e p}^rⁱⁿ^cip^l^{e th}^{at th}^{e t}^w^o^p^o^liticall^y^acco^uⁿ^t^a^b^l^e^b^r^aⁿ^ch^e^s^c^aⁿⁿ^o^t
^com^p^ro^mⁱ^s^e^t^h^eⁱ^{r f}^r^equ^e^nt^l^y^di^ff^eriⁿ^g^polⁱ^c^y^pref^eren^ces^.^B^u^t^if^s^o^,ⁱ^tⁱ^s^a^sⁱⁿ^g^u^l^a^r^ly^a^r^r^o^g^aⁿ^t
^decisⁱ^on^{. T}^h^{e C}^oⁿ^s^tit^u^tioⁿ^cre^a^{ted a s}^y^s^t^e^m^{of s}^h^{ared an}^{d co}^ordin^a^{ted policy}^m^a^kⁱⁿ^g^b^y^t^h^e
^t^w^o^p^o^liticall^y^acco^uⁿ^tab^l^{e b}^r^an^ch^{es. T}^h^{e Fra}^m^{ers i}ⁿ^cl^u^d^e^d^m^aⁿ^y^f^eat^u^r^{es to}^f^o^rce
^com^p^ro^mⁱ^s^e^bet^w^eeⁿ^t^h^{e t}^w^o^bran^ch^es^{: T}^h^{e P}^r^es^iden^t^’^s^{role in}^t^h^{e le}^gⁱ^s^l^ativ^e^proces^s^,^th^e
^Sen^a^te^’^s^{role in}^approv^ing^polic^y^m^a^kⁱⁿ^g^of^ficials^f^o^{r th}^{e ex}^ec^u^tⁱ^v^{e bran}^ch^{, th}^{e S}^eⁿ^a^t^e^’^s^r^o^l^e
ⁱⁿ^r^a^ti^f^yⁱⁿ^g^tr^{eaties a}ⁿ^d^th^{e e}^x^clu^sⁱ^v^{e p}^o^w^e^r^o^f^th^{e Ho}^u^s^{e to}ⁱⁿ^{itiate ta}^x^aⁿ^d^ap^p^r^o^p^rⁱ^atioⁿ^s
^b^{ills. O}^u^rⁿ^a^tioⁿ^w^o^u^l^d^b^e^uⁿ^g^o^v^erⁿ^a^b^l^eⁱⁿ^th^e^ab^sen^c^e^o^f^coⁿ^s^taⁿ^t^p^o^lic^y^co^m^p^r^o^mⁱ^ses⁴⁹
^bet^w^eeⁿ^th^{e e}^x^ecutiv^{e a}ⁿ^{d legis}^l^ati^v^{e bran}^ch^e^s^.
As will be seen in the following review of the undue influence case law since the decisions in
Pillsbury and D.C. Federation, Professor Pierces’s pragmatic views appear to have been
influential.
Since the decision in Pillsbury, while courts have continued to recognize verbally the vitality of
that precedent, only one court has actually overturned a quasi-judicial agency proceeding on
grounds of undue political influence, and the most recent judicial rulings have evinced a clear

⁴⁶^Id^.^a^t⁵⁰^0-⁰¹^.
⁴⁷^Id^.^a^t⁴⁹^6.
⁴⁸^D.^C.^Fed^e^ra^tⁱ^on^,^sup^r^a⁴⁵^{9 F}^.²^d^a^t¹²⁴⁴^.
⁴⁹^P^o^lⁱ^tⁱ^cal^Co^nt^ro^l^at⁴⁹⁶^-⁹⁷^.^S^{ee al}^so^Pⁱ^{erce T}^r^eatⁱ^s^e,^s^upr^a^f^oot^not^e^{1, a}^t⁶⁷^6-⁷⁸^{, r}^e^ite^r^a^ting^aⁿ^d^up^d^a^ting^his¹⁹⁹⁰
^c^r^itique^of^Pillsbury^and^D^.^C^.^Fe^de^r^a^tio^n.

predilection to defer to congressional actions where they involve the legitimate exercise of
legislative oversight and investigative functions.
The solitary ruling referred to occurred in Koniag v. Kleppe,⁵⁰ in which a district court set aside
adjudicatory decisions of the Secretary of the Interior with respect to the eligibility of several
communities to receive land and money under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANSCA), at least in part because it found improper congressional pressure exerted on the
Department and the Secretary. There, a congressional subcommittee held oversight hearings on
the administration of the Act while the proceedings in question were pending. The district court,
however, found that the hearings went substantially beyond the oversight function.
^T^h^{e h}^earin^gs^took^{place du}^riⁿ^g^t^h^{e ti}^m^e^t^h^{at t}^h^{e v}^a^lidit^{y of}^certain^clai^m^s^beiⁿ^g
^ad^v^aⁿ^ced^b^y^th^{e p}^l^ain^t^if^f^s^w^a^{s b}^eⁱⁿ^g^liti^g^a^ted^b^e^f^o^r^e^t^h^e^S^e^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^aⁿ^d^f^o^l^l^o^wⁱⁿ^g^u^p^oⁿ^e^a^r^lⁱ^e^r
^corres^pon^den^ce^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^{e Con}^g^r^essm^aⁿ^h^a^{d addres}^s^e^{d t}^o^v^a^ri^ou^s^su^bordiⁿ^a^t^e^s^of^t^h^e
^Secretar^y^.^T^h^{e s}^t^{ated pu}^rpos^e^of^th^{e h}^earings^w^a^s^{to pres}^en^{t a f}^o^rum^f^o^{r dis}^c^us^sⁱ^ng^th^e
ⁱ^m^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t^a^tⁱ^o^{n o}^f^t^h^e^A^c^t^b^u^tⁱⁿ^fa^c^t^t^h^e^Co^mmi^t^t^e^e^,^t^h^r^o^ughⁱ^t^s^c^h^aⁱ^r^m^aⁿ^aⁿ^d^st^a^f^f
^m^e^m^b^ers^,^{probed deepl}^yⁱⁿ^t^o^d^e^t^aⁱ^l^s^of^coⁿ^t^es^{ted cas}^es^t^h^eⁿ^un^{der con}^s^ideration^,ⁱⁿ^dicatiⁿ^g
^th^at^th^ere^w^a^s^“m^{ore t}^h^aⁿ^m^eet^s^t^h^{e e}^y^{e.” T}^h^{e e}ⁿ^{tire r}^u^le^-m^akin^{g proces}^s^w^a^s^re^-^e^x^a^mⁱⁿ^e^d,
^trav^{el v}^o^u^c^h^e^rs^aⁿ^{d oth}^e^{r i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^ation^w^e^{re s}^o^u^g^h^t^to^{probe th}^{e adequ}^acy^of^t^h^e
ⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^atioⁿ^s^m^a^{de, all papers}ⁱⁿ^t^h^{e pen}^dⁱⁿ^g^proceeding^s^w^e^{re dem}^aⁿ^d^{ed, th}^{e acc}^u^r^ac^y^o^f
^dat^a^an^{d pr}^ocedu^r^es^w^a^s^qu^estⁱ^oⁿ^e^{d, an}^{d con}^s^tan^t^l^y^th^e^Co^m^m^{ittee in}^ter^j^ected^itselfⁱⁿ^to⁵¹
^as^pects^of^t^h^{e decis}ⁱ^onm^a^k^ing^proces^s^.
When the departmental officials expressed concern about the integrity of the quasi-judicial
administrative process, the Chairman several times stated that it was not his purpose to pressure
the Department, but he many times stated his doubts that the law was being properly carried out.
The court noted: “On key issues now in dispute before the Court, representatives of the
Government were obligated to take positions as to the interpretation of the Act. A strenuous effort
was made by the Chairman to encourage protest and appeals, coupled with comments indicating
his clear impression that all that could be done was being done and that some of the results being ⁵²
reached were contrary to congressional intent.”
Two days before the Secretary made his determination on the eligibility of the villages, the
Chairman sent a letter to him requesting that he postpone his decision on the matter pending a
review and opinion by the Comptroller General because it “appears from the testimony [at the
hearings] that village eligibility and Native enrollment requirements of ANSCA have been
misinterpreted in the regulations and that certain villages should not have been certified as ⁵³
eligible for land selections under ANSCA.” On these facts the district court vacated the
Secretary’s eligibility decisions and reinstated the decisions initially rendered by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA).

⁵⁰⁴⁰^{5 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.¹³^{60 (D}^.D^.C^{. 1}⁹⁷⁵⁾^,^m^odi^fie^{d s}^ub^nom^.^K^o^nia^g^v^.^Aⁿ^dr^us^,⁵⁸^{0 F.}^2d⁶^{01 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^,^cert^.^de^nie^d^,
⁴³⁹^U^.^S.¹⁰⁵²⁽¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^.
⁵¹⁴⁰^{5 F}^.^S^u^p^p^{. a}^t¹³^71.
⁵²^Id^{. a}^t¹³^71-⁷²^.
⁵³^Id^.

On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of appeals disagreed in part with the lower
court’s application of the relevant law but not with its validity. Thus, with regard to the
Chairman’s conduct of the hearings, the appeals court found fault with the district court’s ruling
because none of the agency officials subjected to the Chairman’s interrogations was an agency
decisionmaker.
^T^h^{e h}^eariⁿ^g^sⁱⁿ^qu^e^s^tⁱ^on^w^e^re^cal^l^e^{d b}^y^C^ong^ressm^{an D}ⁱⁿ^g^el^lⁱⁿ^Jun^e^{of 1974 at}^t^h^e
^tⁱ^m^e^t^h^e^B^o^a^r^{d a}ⁿ^d^t^h^e^S^e^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^we^r^e^c^o^nsⁱ^d^e^rⁱ^ng^mos^t^of^t^h^es^e^cas^es^....^Du^ring^th^{e h}^earings
^Coⁿ^g^r^e^ss^m^aⁿ^Din^g^ell^m^a^d^eⁿ^o^secr^{et o}^f^hⁱ^{s d}ⁱ^sp^leas^u^r^e^wⁱ^t^h^so^m^e^o^f^th^{e i}ⁿ^{itial B}^I^A
^elig^ib^ilit^y^d^e^ter^mⁱⁿ^atioⁿ^s^{. Ne}^v^e^r^t^h^e^le^ss,^w^e^t^hⁱⁿ^k^t^h^e^Pillsb^u^ry^d^ecisioⁿ^{is n}^o^{t co}ⁿ^t^r^o^lliⁿ^g
^h^e^{re b}^ecau^{se n}^oⁿ^e^o^f^t^h^{e p}^e^rsoⁿ^{s called}^b^e^f^o^{re th}^{e su}^b^c^o^m^m^ittee^w^a^{s a d}^ecisioⁿ^m^a^k^{er in}
^th^es^{e ca}^s^e^s^.^Oⁿ^{e pos}^sⁱ^{ble e}^x^c^e^ption^w^a^s^{Mr. Ke}ⁿ^B^r^o^wⁿ^,^{a clos}^{e adv}ⁱ^s^o^{r to th}^e^Secretar^y
^w^{ho brief}^e^{d h}ⁱ^m^oⁿ^th^{e cas}^e^s^{at th}^{e ti}^m^e^h^e^{decided to app}^r^ov^{e th}^{e B}^o^ard’^s^recom^m^eⁿ^d^ed
^decisⁱ^on^s^.^Ho^w^e^v^e^{r, ev}^eⁿ^if^{we as}^s^u^m^e^th^a^t^th^e^Pill^sb^u^r^y^do^ctrin^e^w^o^u^l^{d reach}^advⁱ^s^o^rs^to
^th^{e decis}ⁱ^onm^a^k^{er, Mr. B}^r^owⁿ^w^a^sⁿ^o^{t as}^k^e^{d to prej}^u^d^g^e^any^of^th^{e c}^l^aⁱ^m^s^by^c^h^a^r^a^c^t^e^rⁱ^zⁱⁿ^g
^th^eir^v^a^lid^it^y^.^See^Pillsb^u^r^{y Co}^{. v. FTC, su}^p^r^a^at⁹⁶^4.^T^h^{e w}^o^r^s^{t cas}^{t th}^{at c}^aⁿ^b^e^p^u^t^u^p^oⁿ^t^h^e
^h^earⁱⁿ^gⁱ^s^th^a^t^B^r^o^wⁿ^w^a^{s p}^r^e^s^en^t^w^h^eⁿ^t^h^{e s}^u^b^c^o^m^m^{ittee e}^x^p^r^essed^its^b^e^lief^t^h^{at cer}^taiⁿ
^v^illa^g^e^s^h^a^d^m^a^d^e^f^r^au^d^u^l^en^t^clai^m^s^an^d^t^h^{at t}^h^{e B}^I^A^d^ecisi^oⁿ^s^w^e^r^eⁱⁿ^er^r^o^r^.^T^h^{is is}ⁿ^o^t⁵⁴
^eⁿ^o^u^gh.
With regard to the Chairman’s letter, however, the court of appeals found “it compromised the
appearance of the Secretary’s impartiality,” and thereby tainted the decision, citing Pillsbury
approvingly. But rather than reinstate the BIA decisions, the matter was remanded to the
Secretary since three and a half years had passed and a new Secretary of a new Administration ⁵⁵
had taken office, thus making possible a fair and dispassionate treatment of the matter.
Other than Koniag, reviewing courts have consistently upheld congressional intercessions into
adjudicatory proceedings against undue political influence challenges. In Gulf Oil Corporation v. ⁵⁶
FPC, for example, petitioners sought to overturn a Federal Power Commission (FPC) order
requiring delivery of larger quantities of natural gas. In upholding the order, the appeals court
rejected a claim that members and staff of the FPC had been subjected to improper interrogation
and interference in the decision of the matter by the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee at hearings and in
correspondence. The court recognized the relevance of Pillsbury to such an adjudicatory
proceeding but acknowledged that it had to be sensitive to the legislative importance of
congressional committees in oversight and investigation and recognized that “their interest in the
objective and efficient operation of regulatory agencies serves a legitimate and wholesome ⁵⁷
function with which we should not lightly interfere.” Balancing the interests of integrity of an
adjudicatory proceeding and congressional oversight, the court found determinative distinctions
between Pillsbury and the case before it. First, the court found that the subcommittee was not
concerned with the merits of the agency’s decision, as was the situation in Pillsbury, but “was ⁵⁸
directed at accelerating the disposition and enforcement of the FPC’s compliance procedures.”

⁵⁴⁵⁸⁰^F.^2d^at⁶¹^0.
⁵⁵^Id^.
⁵⁶⁵⁶^{3 F}^.²^d⁵⁸⁸⁽³^{d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^.
⁵⁷⁵⁶³^F.^2d^at⁶¹^0.
⁵⁸^Id^.^a^t⁶¹^1.

Nor did the court find any effort to influence the Commission in reaching any decision on the
specific facts of the case or any factual prejudice. Any intrusions into the merits of the FPC’s
decision were found to be “incidental to the purpose of accelerating” the agency’s disposition of
the case. Those “incidental intrusions” were found not to have had serious influence on the
agency because (1) the interrogation did not reflect the majority view of the subcommittee; (2)
the agency did not accede to Members’ requests and continued with the show cause proceeding;
and (3) the ultimate resolution of the issue was the same as it had been in proceedings concluded ⁵⁹
a year prior to the hearings in question. Concluding that the claim of prejudice could not be
sustained under the facts and circumstances of the case, the court recapitulated the factors it had
taken into consideration:
^W^e^ig^hⁱ^ng^th^es^e^f^actors^–^th^{e i}^m^portaⁿ^{ce an}^{d n}^{eed f}^o^{r C}^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^sⁱ^on^a^l^ov^ersⁱ^gh^{t of}
^reg^u^l^ator^y^a^g^eⁿ^cies^{, t}^h^{e C}^o^mm^is^sⁱ^on’s^ev^ideⁿ^{t s}^t^rong^backbon^{e in}^resⁱ^s^t^ing^s^u^bco^m^m^itte^e
^pres^s^u^{re, th}^{e C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^s^ion’^sⁱ^d^en^{tical res}^o^lu^tioⁿ^of^each^is^s^u^{e i}ⁿ^its^{prior decis}ⁱ^on^{, th}^e
^en^tir^el^y^leg^a^{l n}^a^t^u^r^e^o^f^th^e^Co^m^m^is^sioⁿ^’^{s d}^eci^sioⁿ^{, a}ⁿ^d^o^u^r^ag^r^e^e^m^eⁿ^t^wⁱ^th^th^{at d}^eci^sioⁿ^–
^ag^ains^{t ou}^{r co}^m^mⁱ^t^m^eⁿ^{t to t}^h^{e prin}^{ciple th}^{at ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rati^v^e^ag^en^cie^s^m^u^s^t^{be allo}^w^e^{d to}
^ex^ercis^e^th^eir^adj^u^dicativ^e^fu^nction^s^f^r^{ee o}^f^C^ong^ressⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^pres^s^u^re,^w^e^con^c^l^u^{de t}^h^at^t^h^e
^legⁱ^s^l^ati^v^{e con}^d^u^c^tⁱⁿ^thⁱ^s^cas^e^{did n}^o^{t aff}^{ect t}^h^e^f^a^irn^e^s^s^{of t}^h^{e C}^o^mm^is^sⁱ^ons^proceedin^g^s⁶⁰
^an^{d does}ⁿ^o^t^w^a^rrant^ou^{r s}^e^t^tⁱⁿ^g^a^sⁱ^d^{e t}^h^{e C}^o^mmⁱ^s^sⁱ^on’s^order.
In Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,⁶¹ the appeals court dealt with the
effects of the conduct of a Senator at prior congressional investigations on the subject of
debarment of government contractors convicted of bid-rigging and similar offenses, and his
recommendations and status inquiries contemporaneous with an ongoing debarment proceeding.
The plaintiff, the subject of the debarment proceeding, claimed that the Senator’s persistence in
the subject area, and his particular interest in its case, compromised the integrity of the
administrative proceeding. The district court agreed. On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court reversed.
The appeals court acknowledged that a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding could be invalidated
by the appearance of bias or pressure and that under that standard “pressure on the decisionmaker ⁶²
alone, without proof or effect on the outcome, is sufficient to vacate a decision.” Thus, “[t]he
test is whether ‘extraneous factors intruded into the calculus of consideration’ of the individual ⁶³
decisionmaker.” In the case before it, the court found neither actual nor apparent congressional
interference since the Senator had never communicated directly with the ultimate decisionmaker
in the debarment, the Assistant Judge Advocate General for Civil Law, nor was it shown that that
official was even aware of the Senator’s communications.

⁵⁹^Id^.
⁶⁰^Id^.^a^t⁶¹^2.
⁶¹⁷¹⁴^F.^2d¹⁶^{3 (}^D^.^C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸³⁾^.
⁶²⁷¹⁴^F.^2d^at¹⁶^9.
⁶³^Id^.^a^t¹⁷^{0 (}^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^by^c^our^t)^.

Challenged congressional communications in an adjudicatory setting were next rejected in Power ⁶⁴
Authority of the State of New York v. FERC. This was an action for review of a series of
decisions by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) which involved, inter alia, the
claim that four Members of Congress allegedly engaged in ex parte communications with FERC
in connection with a proceeding for a declaratory order regarding the allocation of power
generated by waters of the Niagara River. The communications in question consisted of a letter
from two House Members to President Reagan which the President forwarded to the Chairman of
FERC, and a press conference attended by the four defendants, FERC officials and the public, at
which the petitioners urged reversal of an administrative law judges’s decision against them. At
the time FERC was considering petitions for rehearing, one of the petitioners filed a motion with
FERC to deny rehearing because the proceeding had been tainted. The Commission denied the
motion on the ground that the ex parte communications had not undermined “the integrity of ...
[the Commission’s] processes.” That same decision also resolved the merits of the proceeding and
the Municipal Electric Utilities Association of New York (MEUA) and other parties sought
appellate review.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals summarily rejected MEUA’s contentions with the following
analysis:
^{Ex par}^t^e^com^m^uni^catⁱ^ons^b^y^C^ong^res^s^m^eⁿ^{or any}^oⁿ^{e els}^e^wⁱ^t^h^{a j}^u^{dicial or qu}^asⁱ^-
^j^u^di^ci^al^body^re^g^a^rdiⁿ^g^{a pe}^ndiⁿ^g^m^a^t^t^{er are i}^m^{proper an}^d^s^h^oul^{d be di}^s^c^ou^ra^g^e^{d. O}ⁿ^t^h^e
^oth^e^{r h}^aⁿ^d^{, th}^e^m^e^{re ex}^is^teⁿ^{ce of}^s^u^c^h^co^m^m^unications^h^a^rdl^y^requ^ires^{a cou}^r^{t or}
^admⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ratⁱ^v^e^bod^y^t^o^di^s^q^u^a^lⁱ^fyⁱ^t^s^e^l^f^.^R^e^c^u^s^a^l^w^o^u^l^{d be requ}ⁱ^r^{ed on}^l^yⁱ^f^t^h^e
^com^m^unications^pos^{ed a s}^e^riou^s^li^k^e^li^h^{ood of}^af^f^ectiⁿ^g^th^{e a}^g^en^c^y^’s^abilit^y^{to act f}^a^irl^y^aⁿ^d
ⁱ^m^p^a^r^tiall^yⁱⁿ^t^h^e^m^a^tter^b^e^f^o^r^e^it.^Gu^{lf O}^il^Co^rp^{. v. FPC,}⁵^{63 F}^.^{2d 588, 6}^11-^{12 (3}^{d C}ⁱ^r.
¹⁹⁷⁷^{). In}^res^o^l^vⁱⁿ^g^t^h^atⁱ^s^su^e^,^on^e^m^u^s^t^l^ook^t^o^t^h^{e n}^a^t^u^re^of^t^h^{e co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^ca^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^aⁿ^d
^p^a^r^tⁱ^c^ul^a^r^l^y^t^o^w^h^e^t^he^r^t^h^e^y^c^o^nt^aⁱ^{n fa}^c^t^ua^l^m^a^t^t^e^r^o^r^o^t^he^rⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^ou^t^sⁱ^d^e^of^t^h^e^record,
^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^{e part}ⁱ^e^s^di^{d n}^o^t^h^a^v^e^an^opport^uⁿⁱ^t^y^t^o^rebu^t^.^S^ee^Pr^of^es^sⁱ^onal^Ai^r^Tra^ffic
^C^ont^r^o^l^l^e^r^s^O^r^gani^z^a^tⁱ^{on v.}^F^L^PA,⁶⁷²^F^.²^d^109,¹^12-^{13 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^{r. 1982}^);^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^St^at^es
^Lin^e^{s v. Fed}^e^ra^{l Ma}^{ritime Co}^mmiss^ioⁿ^,⁵⁸⁴^F^.^2d^519,⁵³^3-^{34 (D}^.C^{. C}ⁱ^{r. 19}^78).
^T^h^{e co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^s^h^e^r^e^f^a^{ll f}^a^r^sh^o^r^{t o}^f^m^eetⁱⁿ^g^th^e^s^e^r^e^q^u^ir^em^eⁿ^ts^.^N^oⁿ^e^w^evⁱ^d^eⁿ^c^e
^w^a^sⁱⁿ^t^r^odu^{ced. T}^h^{ere w}^a^s^not^hⁱ^ng^s^ecret^abou^t^t^h^{e l}^e^t^t^e^{rs. MEU}^A^w^a^s^pro^m^pt^l^y^m^a^de
^a^w^{are of}^t^h^{e corres}^pon^den^{ce by}^t^h^e^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^an^d^h^a^{d a ful}^l^opport^uⁿⁱ^t^y^t^o^co^m^m^eⁿ^t^aⁿ^d
^res^pon^{d. Sin}^{ce MEU}^A^h^a^{d n}^o^rebu^{ttal ev}^iden^ce^t^o^o^ffe^r^–ⁱⁿ^d^e^e^d^,^no^ne^w^a^{s c}^a^l^l^e^d^fo^r^{- a}ⁿ⁶⁵
^evⁱ^d^en^tⁱ^a^r^y^h^eariⁿ^g^w^a^s^uⁿⁿ^e^c^e^s^s^a^r^y^.^T^h^{e C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^prope^rl^y^denⁱ^ed^MEU^A^’s^m^o^tⁱ^on^.
The two most recent appellate court rulings continue the trend of the courts not to interfere with
congressional attempts to influence quasi-adjudicatory proceedings, emphasizing judicial
recognition of the important constitutional role of oversight and investigation and the
demonstrated ability of agencies to shield their sensitive adjudicatory processes from due process ⁶⁶
intrusions. In State of California v. FERC, an applicant for a license to build a hydroelectric

⁶⁴⁷⁴³^F.^2d⁹³⁽²^d^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁴⁾^.
⁶⁵⁷⁴³^F.^2d^at¹¹^0.
⁶⁶⁹⁶⁶^F.^2d¹⁵⁴¹⁽⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹²⁾^.

facility challenged the award of a conditioned license on the grounds, among others, that letters
from the Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee unduly influenced, and
thereby tainted, the entire sequence of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission orders which
resulted in the conditioned license, relying on the Pillsbury case. In three letters to FERC, the
Chairman complained that the agency had not followed the recently enacted dispute resolution ⁶⁷
procedures under the Federal Power Act. In response to those complaints, FERC reopened
dispute resolution negotiations with State and federal fish and wildlife agencies prior to the
conclusion of the licensing process. The Chairman also sent two letters to the agency urging it to
review its two decades old interpretation of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA) that a hydroelectric project sponsor was not required to obtain a right-of-way permit
over public lands from the Bureau of Lands Management of the Department of Interior because
FERC had exclusive jurisdiction over federal hydroelectric development. The Chairman put forth
a contrary view and requested and received support for that view in a report by the General
Accounting Office (GAO). FERC, after initially rejecting the Chairman’s contention and
reaffirming its long held interpretation during the course of the licensing proceeding, reversed its
course after receiving the GAO report.
The appeals court rejected both objections, holding that neither rose “to the level of undue
congressional influence described in Pillsbury nor do they adversely affect the appearance of ⁶⁸
impartiality in this case.” FERC’s decision to open the dispute resolution process after receipt of
the Chairman’s letters was designed, the court found, to “correct a procedural problem” and “was
based on its own independent analysis of the record in this proceeding, and was an effort to ⁶⁹
establish fair procedures to allow the parties and the Commission to investigate.” Since the
negotiation requirements were so recent both the Chairman “and the Commission were ⁷⁰
understandably concerned about getting off to a good start.” With respect to the successful
urging that FERC change its long held interpretation of FLPMA, the court explained that
Pillsbury was not implicated because “FERC gave a reasoned explanation for its reversal of its
original interpretation of FLPMA, and this provides substance for its claim that it addressed and ⁷¹
resolved the right-of-way issue under its own independent and detailed analysis of the issue.”
The court further noted that the fact that it found (later in its ruling) that the reversal of its past
interpretation was legally incorrect was irrelevant since the record of the proceeding supported
that it had gone through a process of reasoned analysis. “In short, [the Chairman’s] letters,
expressing his views on the 10(j) and FLPMA issues, do not constitute the type of intense and ⁷²
undue congressional influence that was present in Pillsbury.”
Finally, in ATX, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Transportation,⁷³ the appeals court found that vocal,
hostile, and intense opposition of Members of Congress to the application of ATX, Inc. to operate
a new airline in Boston, Atlanta and Baltimore/Washington, did not fatally flaw the proceeding

⁶⁷^{16 U}^.^S.C^.⁸^{03 (}^j⁾⁽¹⁹⁹⁶⁾⁽¹⁰⁽^j)^p^r^oc^e^dur^e^s⁾^.
⁶⁸⁹⁶⁶^F.^2d¹⁵⁵²^.
⁶⁹^Id^.
⁷⁰^Id^.
⁷¹^Id^.
⁷²^Id^.
⁷³⁴¹^F.^3d¹⁵²²⁽^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁴⁾^.

held by the Department of Transportation (DOT), and that DOT’s denial of the application on the
ground that ATX was unfit was reasonable.
The pertinent facts of the controversy are essentially as follows. Congressional opposition to ATX
arose even prior to the filing of its application, based largely on the perceived reputation of Frank
Lorenzo, its founder and majority owner, from his previous record of management of a major
airline. Twenty one Members of Congress wrote the Secretary of DOT urging him to deny ATX’s
application even before it had been filed, because of Lorenzo’s alleged unfitness to own and ⁷⁴
operate an airline. Most of the signatures on the letter were members of the House committee
with jurisdiction over DOT, including the chair of the full committee, the chair of the Aviation
Subcommittee, and the chair of the Oversight Subcommittee. After ATX filed its application, 125
House and Senate members wrote the Secretary to declare their opposition to Lorenzo. Two ⁷⁵
congressmen introduced legislation to prohibit Lorenzo from re-entering the airline industry.
The Secretary responded by acknowledging receipt of the letters, refusing to comment on the ⁷⁶
merits, and putting the correspondence in a file for “contacts outside the record of the case.”
During the hearing on the application one of the congressional letter writers was allowed to
testify as to his opposition. Ultimately the Department rejected the application on the ground that
ATX “lacked both managerial competence to operate an airline and a disposition to comply with ⁷⁷
regulatory requirements.”
In rejecting the undue influence challenge, the court acknowledged that the size, vocality, and
source of the congressional opposition toward the applicant in this quasi-judicial proceeding
required close judicial scrutiny to allay due process concerns with the alleged appearance of bias.
The court explained
^{... In}^th^{e n}^oⁿ^j^u^d^{icial con}^t^e^x^t,^w^e^h^a^v^e^s^u^gg^es^{ted th}^{at t}^h^e^w^a^y^{to cu}^{re t}^h^{e appearan}^{ce of}^bia^s
^m^a^y^b^e^to^estab^lⁱ^s^h^“^a^f^u^ll^s^cal^{e adm}ⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rati^v^e^record^w^h^ic^h^mⁱ^g^h^t^di^s^p^{el any}^dou^bts^abou^t
^t^h^e^t^r^ue^na^t^u^r^e^o^f^[^t^he^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^’s^]^a^c^tⁱ^o^n.^”^Volpe,^{459 F}^.^{2d at}¹^{249. Wi}^t^h^res^p^ect^t^o^t^h^{e n}^e^xu^s
^r^e^q^uⁱ^r^e^m^eⁿ^t^s^,^w^e^ha^ve^ne^ve^r^q^u^e^s^tⁱ^o^ne^d^t^h^e^a^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^t^y^o^f^c^o^ngr^e^ssi^oⁿ^a^l^r^e^p^r^e^s^eⁿ^t^a^tⁱ^ve^{s t}^o
^ex^{ert pres}^s^u^re,^s^{ee id.,}^an^d^w^e^h^a^v^e^h^e^{ld t}^h^{at cong}^res^s^ion^a^{l a}^c^tion^sⁿ^o^{t targ}^{eted directl}^y^at
^t^h^{e deci}^sⁱ^on^m^a^k^e^rs-^s^u^c^h^a^s^con^t^e^m^poran^eous^h^eariⁿ^gs^{–do n}^o^tⁱⁿ^v^a^lⁱ^d^at^{e an}^a^g^eⁿ^c^y
^decisⁱ^on^.^{See K}^oni^ag,^{580 F}^.^{2d at}^{610. U}ⁿ^{der t}^hⁱ^s^f^r^a^m^e^w^{ork, i}^tⁱ^s^apparen^t^t^h^a^tⁿ^oⁿ^e^{of t}^h^e⁷⁸
^con^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al pres}^s^u^{re ch}^al^leng^{ed b}^y^A^T^{X is}^su^f^f^icien^t^toⁱⁿ^v^a^lid^{ate th}^{e ad}^j^u^dⁱ^catioⁿ^.
The court commented that the influence with which it was concerned is “when congressional
influence shapes the determination of the merits.” The court commented that the lengthy opinion
supporting the decision based on the administrative record “was clear and open to scrutiny and
[the] decision was fully supported by the record. There is no reason for us to infer that the letters
influenced his decision inasmuch as he did not reverse the ALJ’s recommendation nor was the ⁷⁹
merits decision a close one on the record.” The testimony of the congressman at the hearing did
not create “a fatal appearance of bias as it was based almost entirely on information already

⁷⁴⁴¹^F.^{3d a}^t¹⁵²⁴^.
⁷⁵^Id^.^a^t¹⁵²⁵^.
⁷⁶^Id^.
⁷⁷^Id^.^a^t¹⁵²⁶^.
⁷⁸^Id^.^a^t¹⁵²⁸^.
⁷⁹^Id^.^a^t¹⁵^28-²⁹⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^{in or}^igⁱⁿ^a^l⁾^.

available to the ALJ, was void of threats and was not relied on in any of the decisions, which ⁸⁰
were accompanied by extensive findings and reasons.” The court concluded:
^Iⁿ^ad^d^itioⁿ^w^e^fⁱⁿ^dⁿ^o^ev^id^eⁿ^{ce th}^{at t}^h^{e leg}ⁱ^slati^v^{e activ}ⁱ^t^y^act^ual^l^y^af^f^{ected th}^e
^o^u^tco^m^{e o}ⁿ^th^e^m^e^r^its.^See^Ki^ewit,^{714 F}^.^{2d at}¹⁶^9;^Volpe^,^{459 F}^.^2d^at¹^246.^N^eⁱ^t^h^{er t}^h^e
^D^e^part^m^eⁿ^t^’s^fⁱⁿ^a^l^deci^sⁱ^oⁿ^{nor t}^h^{e A}^L^J’s^t^w^{o deci}^sⁱ^ons^m^eⁿ^tⁱ^oⁿ^e^{d t}^h^{e t}^e^s^tⁱ^m^oⁿ^y^o^f^t^h^e
^con^g^r^essm^aⁿ^{, t}^h^{e cong}^ressⁱ^onal^l^e^t^t^e^rs^{or t}^h^{e propos}^{ed l}^e^gⁱ^s^l^atⁱ^oⁿ^.^A^l^l^o^f^t^h^{e cong}^res^sⁱ^oⁿ^a^l
^con^t^acts^w^e^{re placed in}^th^{e ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rati^v^e^{record an}^d^A^T^{X r}^e^s^pon^{ded to th}^e^m^{. . . . Fi}ⁿ^a^ll^y^,
^th^{e record m}^a^nif^e^s^t^s^t^h^{at both th}^{e Secretar}^y^an^{d h}ⁱ^s^acting^As^sⁱ^s^t^{ant Secretar}^y^w^e^{re n}^on-
^co^m^mⁱ^{ttal i}ⁿ^t^h^eir^r^eactioⁿ^s^to^th^{e co}ⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^ioⁿ^a^{l co}ⁿ^t^acts^.^Se^cretary^P^e^ñ^a^’s^res^pon^s^e^{to th}^e
^corres^pon^den^{ce s}^t^res^s^e^{d t}^h^atⁱ^t^w^a^sⁱⁿ^appropri^a^t^e^f^o^{r h}ⁱ^m^t^o^di^s^c^u^s^s^t^h^e^m^e^ri^t^s^of^t^h^{e ca}^s^e
^wⁱ^th^th^e^c^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^m^eⁿ^.
^{* *}^*
^{. . . Here, t}^h^eⁿ^e^x^u^s^bet^w^ee^{n th}^e^pres^s^u^{re e}^x^{erted an}^{d t}^h^e^actu^a^l^decisⁱ^oⁿ^m^a^k^e^rsⁱ^s^s^o
^ten^u^o^u^s^aⁿ^d^th^{e e}^v^id^en^ce^so^ad^eq^u^a^tel^y^estab^lⁱ^s^h^e^s^A^T^X’^{s i}ⁿ^eli^g^ib^ilit^y^f^o^r^an^air^lⁱⁿ^e
^cer^tif^{icate t}^h^at^w^e^coⁿ^c^lu^d^e^p^o^{litical in}^f^l^u^eⁿ^ce^dⁱ^dⁿ^o^t^eⁿ^t^e^r^t^h^e^d^e^cⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^m^a^k^e^r^’^s^“^c^a^l^cu^lu^s^o^f⁸¹
^con^s^ideration^.^”
American Public Gas Association v. FPC⁸² was a case that arose from a FPC ratemaking
conducted pursuant to section 553 of the APA. The Commission first issued Opinion 770, in July

1976, and on rehearing, issued Opinion 770-A in November of the same year. In August 1976,

while the rehearing was pending, Representative John Moss, chairman of the Oversight
Subcommittee of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, summoned the
Commissioners to appear at a hearing. Representative Moss, who with three other members of the
subcommittee had been parties to the proceeding before the FPC, subjected the Commissioners to
what the reviewing court described as an “intensive examination.” Decisions underlying Opinion
770 came under attack, notwithstanding the fact that the Commission had warned the
congressmen that those decisions were subject to reconsideration on rehearing. In the D.C.
Circuit’s words:
^T^h^{e q}^u^estioⁿⁱⁿ^g^w^a^{s n}^o^{t co}ⁿ^fⁱⁿ^ed^to^ex^p^licatioⁿ^o^f^“w^h^a^{t th}^e^Opⁱⁿ^ioⁿ^m^e^aⁿ^{s an}^d^w^h^at
^itsⁱ^m^plications^{are.” C}^h^air^m^aⁿ^Mos^s^w^e^{nt fu}^rt^h^e^{r, s}^t^atiⁿ^g^:^“^I^a^m^m^o^s^t^co^m^mⁱ^{tted as}^aⁿ
^adv^e^rs^ar^y^.^{I f}ⁱⁿ^d^t^h^at^{I a}^m^ou^t^r^ag^{ed by}^O^r^{der 770. I}^fⁱⁿ^dⁱ^t^v^e^r^y^di^ffⁱ^c^u^l^t^t^o^co^m^p^reh^eⁿ^d^aⁿ^y
^s^t^an^{dard of}^j^u^s^t^an^{d reas}^on^abl^eⁿ^e^s^sⁱⁿ^t^h^{e decis}ⁱ^on^aⁿ^{d I}^w^o^u^l^{d n}^o^t^w^a^{nt th}^{e record to b}^e
^a^m^bi^gu^ous^on^t^h^at^poiⁿ^t^f^o^{r on}^e^m^o^m^e^nt^.”

⁸⁰^Id^{. a}^t¹⁵²⁹^.
⁸¹^Id^.^at¹⁵²⁹^,¹⁵³⁰^.^S^ee^al^so^,^Pⁱ^erc^e^T^r^eatⁱ^s^e,^s^upr^a^f^oot^no^te^1,^a^t⁶⁷⁸^-⁷^9,^dis^c^us^sⁱ^ng^{, w}^{ith a}^p^pr^ov^a^l^{, t}^h^e^a^ppe^a^l^s^c^o^u^r^t
^rulingⁱⁿ^A^T^X^.
⁸²⁵⁶^{7 F}^.²^d¹⁰¹⁶⁽^D^.C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^{, 43}⁵^U^.^{S. 90}⁷⁽¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^.

These expressions, coupled with what the court characterized as the Subcommittee Counsel’s
adversarial interrogation about particular factors in the cost analysis of Opinion No. 770, formed ⁸³
the basis of the claim of prejudice.
In reaching the question whether the Commission should be disqualified, the Court related the
facts of Pillsbury and described its holding at length. It then observed:
^W^e^d^o^u^b^t^th^{e u}^tilit^y^o^f^clas^si^fyⁱⁿ^g^th^e^rate^m^a^kⁱⁿ^g^uⁿ^d^e^rtak^eⁿⁱⁿ^t^h^{e p}^r^esen^{t p}^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^s^b^y
^th^{e P}^o^w^e^{r C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^s^ion^as^eⁿ^ti^rel^y^{a j}^u^{dicial, or a leg}ⁱ^s^l^ati^v^e^f^uⁿ^c^tioⁿ^,^{or a com}^bⁱⁿ^ation^o^f
^th^{e t}^w^{o, f}^o^{r in}^aⁿ^y^e^v^{ent th}^eⁿ^{eed f}^o^{r an}ⁱ^m^{partial deci}^sⁱ^{on is}^obv^iou^s^{... C}^ong^res^s^ion^a^l
ⁱⁿ^ter^v^eⁿ^tioⁿ^w^h^ic^h^o^ccu^r^s^d^u^rⁱⁿ^g^t^h^e^stil^l-^p^eⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^d^ecisⁱ^oⁿ^{al p}^r^o^{cess o}^f^aⁿ^a^g^en^c^y
^en^dang^ers^,^an^d^m^a^y^uⁿ^d^er^mⁱ^{ne, th}^{e in}^te^g^r^it^y^of^t^h^{e ens}^uⁱⁿ^g^decisⁱ^on^,^w^h^ic^h^C^ong^res^s^h^a^s
^r^e^q^u^ir^ed^b^e^m^a^d^e^b^y^aⁿⁱ^m^p^a^r^{tial ag}^en^c^y^c^h^ar^g^e^d^wⁱ^t^h^r^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ilit^y^f^o^r^r^e^so^lvⁱⁿ^g
^coⁿ^t^r^o^v^e^r^s^ies^w^ithⁱⁿⁱ^t^{s j}^u^rⁱ^sd^ictioⁿ^.^Coⁿ^g^r^es^{s as}^w^e^{ll as t}^h^{e co}^u^r^{ts h}^a^{s r}^e^sp^oⁿ^sⁱ^b^ilit^y^to⁸⁴
^{protect th}^{e decis}ⁱ^on^{al integ}^r^it^{y of}^s^u^c^h^an^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^.
However, despite this rhetorical obeisance to the spirit of Pillsbury, the court did not disqualify
the agency, because the producers, though fully aware of all these facts, failed to ask the
Commission to disqualify itself. The court said that a party cannot, with knowledge of the alleged
taint, stay silent in hopes of a favorable decision, and then, when the decision is unfavorable, seek
its reversal on the ground of partiality: “A party, knowing of a ground for requesting
disqualification, cannot be permitted to wait and decide whether he likes subsequent treatment ⁸⁵
that he receives.” But the court did not end its analysis there. It went on to ask whether the
interference was so serious as to require it sua sponte to void the result and set forth the factors it
took into account in concluding that it would not:
^...th^e^ch^{aracter an}^{d s}^c^{ope of}^th^{e in}^terf^eren^{ce alle}^g^e^{d; th}^e^f^act^th^{at th}^{e parties}^w^h^{o rais}^{e th}^e
^dⁱ^sq^u^a^li^fⁱ^catioⁿ^q^u^estioⁿ^see^mⁿ^o^{t to}^h^a^v^e^d^e^e^m^ed^w^h^{at o}^ccu^r^r^ed^to^im^p^a^ir^th^{e i}^m^p^a^r^tialⁱ^t^y
^of^th^e^C^o^mm^is^sⁱ^onⁱ^t^s^e^l^fⁱⁿ^depen^d^en^{t o}^f^t^h^{e res}^u^{lt i}^t^reach^ed;^th^e^f^{act t}^h^{at i}ⁿ^oⁿ^{e i}^m^portaⁿ^t
^res^p^{ect, an}^{d in}^{deed th}^{e is}^s^u^e^th^at^w^a^s^m^o^s^t^v^e^h^e^m^eⁿ^t^l^y^e^x^a^mⁱⁿ^{ed by}^t^h^{e C}^ong^res^s^m^eⁿ^,
ⁿ^a^m^e^l^y^t^h^{e correctn}^e^s^s^of^t^h^{e C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^s^ion’s^decisⁱ^on^res^p^ecting^th^{e i}ⁿ^co^m^e^tax^co^m^pon^eⁿ^t,
^th^{e Co}^m^mⁱ^ss^ioⁿ^lef^t^stan^dⁱⁿ^g^th^{e d}ⁱ^sp^o^s^itioⁿ^cr^iticized^{at th}^e^Su^b^c^o^m^m^ittee^h^earing^;^t^h^{e f}^a^c^t
^t^h^at^t^h^{ere i}^sⁿ^o^t^hⁱⁿ^g^t^o^l^{ead t}^h^e^cou^r^t^t^o^fⁱⁿ^d^t^h^at^act^u^a^lⁱⁿ^f^l^u^eⁿ^{ce aff}^ect^{ed O}^pⁱⁿⁱ^oⁿ^N^o^{. 770-}
^A^;^aⁿ^{d th}^{e f}^{act t}^h^{at ins}^o^f^a^{r as}^aⁿ^y^actioⁿ^s^of^t^h^{e C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^e^r^s^t^h^em^s^e^lv^e^s^a^r^e^c^oⁿ^c^e^rⁿ^e^dⁿ^o⁸⁶
^appearan^{ce of}^partialit^y^is^e^vⁱ^d^en^t.
In essence, then, the court’s decision turned on its finding of no actual impact of the congressional
intervention on the agency decision. Since the court earlier made clear it understood the differing ⁸⁷
standards applied by the Pillsbury and D.C. Federation rulings, it would appear to have
considered the proceeding closer in type or form to D.C. Federation.

⁸³⁵⁶⁷^F.^2d^at¹⁰⁶⁸^.
⁸⁴^Id^.^a^t¹⁰⁶⁹^.
⁸⁵^Id^.
⁸⁶^Id^.^a^t¹⁰⁷⁰^.
⁸⁷^Co^m^p^{are t}^h^{e d}ⁱ^scu^ssi^on^o^f^Pills^b^u^ry^a^t⁵⁶^{7 F}^.²^d^a^t¹⁰^68,^w^{ith tha}^t^of^D^.^C^.^Fe^de^r^a^ti^on^a^t⁵⁶^{7 F}^.²^d^a^t¹⁰^69,^f^ootn^o^te
¹⁰¹^.

In Town of Orangetown v. Ruckelshaus,⁸⁸ the Town sought to prevent the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
(NYSDEC) from approving grants that would modernize an outmoded and overloaded sewage
treatment plant. It was argued that improper political pressure by state and local officials on EPA
caused EPA to reconsider and relax certain conditions on the grants that it had originally imposed
that were important to the Town. The Second Circuit held that in a non-adjudicatory proceeding
involving the disbursement of funds it had to be shown that “political pressure was intended and
did cause the agency’s action to be influenced by factors not relevant under the controlling ⁸⁹
statute.” Here, the court stated, “The potential effect of proposed grant on area development is
one of the relevant factors for the EPA to consider . . . and elected officials should not be
precluded from bringing those factors to administrators’ attention. [citing Sierra Club v. Costle]
Orangetown ‘may not rest upon mere conclusory allegations’ of improper political influence as a ⁹⁰
means of obtaining a trial.” Since the EPA decision whether to impose conditions on the grants
was not adjudicatory in nature but “an administrative one dealing with the disbursement of grant
funds, and required no adversary proceeding,” the appeals court concluded that he Town did not
have the status of a party and was not entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard.
“Consequently, such communications as the EPA had with the two public officials did not deprive ⁹¹
[the Town] of due process.”
Chemung County v. Dole⁹² involved a protest over the award of a contract by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to locate and build a flight service station. The contract was originally
awarded to Elmira, New York (in Chemung County) but was rescinded and then awarded to
Buffalo, New York. It was claimed that the change was improperly effected by the political
pressure brought on the FAA by two New York congressmen. Adopting the rule announced in its
Town of Orangetown ruling, the appeals court found no undue political influence:
^T^h^{e f}^u^l^l^ex^t^eⁿ^t^of^R^e^pres^en^t^a^tⁱ^v^e^s^K^e^m^p^aⁿ^{d N}^o^w^a^k^’^s^eff^o^rt^s^on^beh^a^l^f^of^t^h^{e N}^F^T^A
^w^a^{s th}^eir^h^a^vⁱⁿ^g^w^r^itteⁿ^letter^s^to^th^{e FAA}^aⁿ^d^th^eir^sta^f^f^s^aⁿ^d^h^a^vⁱⁿ^g^m^e^t^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e G}^A^O
ⁱⁿ^v^e^sti^g^ato^r^{. A}^p^p^e^{llees o}^b^j^{ect to}^th^{e Rep}^r^eseⁿ^tati^v^e^s^’^letter^t^o^th^{e F}^A^A^as^kⁱⁿ^g^{it to}^r^e^f^r^ain
^f^r^o^m^f^o^r^m^all^y^en^terⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^to^a^coⁿ^t^r^act^wⁱ^th^Ch^e^m^uⁿ^g^Co^uⁿ^t^y^w^h^{ile t}^h^{e G}^{AO au}^d^it^w^a^s
^uⁿ^d^er^w^a^y^.^T^h^{e F}^A^A^h^a^{d a rig}^h^{t to s}^u^s^p^en^{d perf}^or^m^aⁿ^{ce of}^{a c}^oⁿ^t^{ract pen}^d^ing^{a G}^A^{O au}^dit.
^I^f^th^{e au}^d^{it p}^r^o^v^ed^th^{at NFT}^A^h^a^d^su^b^m^itted^th^{e lo}^w^e^{st b}ⁱ^d⁽^a^{s it d}ⁱ^d^so^p^r^o^v^e)^{, th}^{e FAA}^h^a^d
^th^{e o}^b^lig^atioⁿ^to^a^w^ar^d^th^{e co}ⁿ^t^r^{act to}^NFT^A^{. See 4}¹^{U.S.C. §}²⁵³^b⁽¹⁹⁸²⁾^.^T^h^u^s^t^h^{is letter}
^ur^ge^d^t^h^e^F^A^A^t^o^t^a^ke^a^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^dⁱ^r^e^c^t^l^y^a^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^z^e^d^b^y^t^h^e^st^a^t^ut^o^r^y^sc^he^me^go^ve^rⁿⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^e
^a^w^{ard of}^con^t^racts^.
^Si^mⁱ^larl^y^,^t^h^e^R^e^pres^en^tati^v^e^s^’^{letter to t}^h^{e F}^A^A^u^r^gⁱ^ng^t^h^e^ag^en^c^y^{to re-}^e^v^a^l^u^{ate it}^s
^teleco^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^s^co^{st esti}^m^a^{tes in}^li^g^h^t^o^f^t^h^{e G}^A^O’^s^fⁱⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^s^w^a^s^a^l^s^o^p^r^o^p^e^r^.^Thⁱ^s^l^e^t^t^e^r
^w^a^{s also}^an^atte^m^p^{t to}^p^e^r^s^u^a^d^e^th^{e FAA}^to^ab^id^{e b}^y^{its sta}^t^u^t^o^r^y^o^b^lig^atioⁿ^s^{, n}^o^{t ig}ⁿ^o^r^e
^th^e^m^.^A^sⁿ^o^{ted abov}^{e, a}ⁿ^a^w^ar^{d of}^a^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^coⁿ^t^{ract to}^any^oⁿ^e^e^x^{cept t}^h^{e bidder}^wⁱ^t^h

⁸⁸⁴⁰^F.^2d¹⁸^{5 (}^{2d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁴⁾^.
⁸⁹⁷⁴⁰^F.^2d^at¹⁸^8.
⁹⁰^Id^.
⁹¹^Id^.^a^t¹⁸^8-⁸⁹^.
⁹²⁸⁰^{4 F}^.²^d²¹⁶⁽²^{d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^.

^t^h^e^m^o^st^adv^aⁿ^t^a^g^eous^propo^s^a^l^w^o^u^l^{d v}ⁱ^ol^at^{e t}^h^{e FA}^A^’^s^s^t^at^ut^or^y^oblⁱ^g^atⁱ^ons^{, an}^{d t}^h^e
^R^e^pres^en^t^a^tⁱ^v^e^act^{ed properl}^yⁱⁿ^briⁿ^gⁱ^ng^a^pos^sⁱ^bl^e^vⁱ^ol^atⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^hⁱ^s^du^t^y^t^o^t^h^{e a}^g^eⁿ^c^y^’^s⁹³
^atten^tioⁿ^–^ev^eⁿ^if^it^h^e^lp^ed^th^ei^r^h^o^m^e^dⁱ^strⁱ^cts.
Finally, in DCP Farms et al v. Yeutter⁹⁴ the 5^th Circuit addressed the issue whether the denial of
farm subsidy payments had been tainted by the intercession of a powerful congressman prior to
commencement of a Department of Agriculture adjudication and thereby required the application
of Pillsbury’s “mere appearance of bias” standard. The adjudication was to be held to determine
whether an aggregation of 51 irrevocable agricultural trusts was entitled to large subsidies in the
face of a statute that limited farm subsidies to $50,000 per “person.” The effect of the trust
scheme would have been to allow DCP Farms $1.4 million in subsidies for the 1989 crop year.
Prior to the award decision, the Department’s Inspector General (IG) issued a report on abuses of
the farm subsidy program which highlighted DCP Farms as an example of “egregious violations ⁹⁵
of the $50,000 per person limit.” The report received considerable publicity and reached the
attention of the jurisdictional subcommittee of the House Agriculture Committee. Staff of the
subcommittee chairman met with Department officials to discuss the issues raised by the IG
report in late 1989. DCP Farms was specifically discussed. In December 1989 the Chairman
wrote to the Secretary of Agriculture about the reports of abuses in the subsidy program and cited
DCP Farms as an example of the continued abuse of the statutory limit. He urged careful review
of schemes involving irrevocable trusts, particularly in light of the fact that he had had assurances
in the past from USDA officials that no legislative action was needed with respect to the
treatment of such trusts. The chairman received assurance from the Secretary that the DCP Farms
case was under administrative review and that the Department would “take a very aggressive ⁹⁶
position in dealing with this case.” In June 1990 an administrative decision was issued finding
that DCP Farms had adopted schemes to evade the payment limitation provisions of the law and
was ineligible to receive any subsidy payments for the 1989, 1990 and 1991 crop years. DCP
Farms appealed and requested a hearing, which was set for December 12, 1990. Before the
hearing date DCP Farms learned of the meeting with the chairman’s staff and of the chairman’s
letter and successfully sued to enjoin the hearing on the ground, among others, that improper ⁹⁷
congressional interference denied then due process.
The Fifth Circuit rejected the argument in an opinion that recognizes the need to permit political
oversight with respect to policy issues Congress has entrusted to agency decisionmakers. The
appeals court first rejected the applicability of Pillsbury because “the contact here occurred well
before any proceeding which could be considered judicial or quasi-judicial . . . There was no
hearing on the merits of DCP Farms’ application for farm subsidy payments because DCP Farms ⁹⁸
abandoned the administrative process for this litigation.” The court saw the dispute between
DCP Farms and the Department as part of a larger policy debate and rejected any connection

⁹³⁸⁰⁴^F.^2d^at²²^2.
⁹⁴⁹⁵⁷^F.^2d¹¹⁸³⁽⁵^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹²⁾^,^c^e^r^{t. de}^nie^d^,⁵⁰^6U^{.S. 95}³⁽¹⁹⁹²⁾^.
⁹⁵⁹⁵⁷^F.^2d^at¹¹⁸⁶^.
⁹⁶⁹⁵⁷^F.^2d^at¹¹⁸⁶^.
⁹⁷^Id^.^a^t¹¹^86-⁸⁷^.
⁹⁸^Id^.^a^t¹¹⁸⁷^.

between the preliminary processing of DCP Farms’ application and the appeals hearing that
would raise Pillsbury issues:
^Iⁿ^s^h^o^r^{t, th}^{e co}ⁿ^g^r^e^ss^ioⁿ^a^{l co}^m^m^uⁿ^icatioⁿ^h^e^r^e^w^a^{s n}^o^{t ai}^m^e^d^{at th}^{e d}^eci^sioⁿ^m^a^kⁱⁿ^g
^proces^s^of^any^qu^asⁱ^-^j^u^di^ci^al^body^{. C}^oⁿ^g^r^essm^an^H^u^ck^ab^y^w^a^s^con^cern^e^{d abou}^t^t^h^e
^admⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ration^of^{a cong}^res^sⁱ^oⁿ^all^y^{created prog}^ra^m^.^T^h^{e di}^s^p^u^t^{e bet}^w^een^t^h^{e USD}^A^an^d
^D^C^{P F}^a^r^m^s^w^a^s^part^{of a l}^a^rg^{er pol}ⁱ^c^y^debat^e^.^A^ppl^yⁱⁿ^g^Pillsb^u^r^y’^s^s^t^ring^eⁿ^{t “m}^ere
^appearan^{ce of}^bias^{” s}^t^an^{dard at th}^is^j^uⁿ^c^t^u^{re of}^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rati^{ve proces}^s^w^o^u^l^{d erect n}^o^s^m^all
^{barrier t}^o^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^oⁿ^{al ov}^e^r^sⁱ^gh^{t. It ref}^l^ects^anⁱⁿ^s^u^{lar v}ⁱ^e^w^of^th^e^s^{e ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ratⁱ^v^e
^p^r^o^c^e^sse^{s fo}^r^w^hⁱ^c^h^w^e^fi^nd^no^w^a^r^r^aⁿ^t^.^W^e^a^r^e^un^wⁱ^l^lⁱ^{ng t}^o^so^d^r^a^m^a^tⁱ^c^a^l^l^y^r^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^t
^com^m^unications^bet^w^een^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^s^an^{d th}^{e e}^x^ecutiv^e^ag^en^cie^s^ov^{er polic}^y^is^s^u^e^s^.⁹⁹
^A^ppearan^{ce of}^biasⁱ^sⁿ^o^{t t}^h^{e s}^t^an^dard.
The proper standard for this type of case, the court advised, is whether the communication
actually influenced the agency’s decision. This is appropriate, the court explained, because it
protects the proper and effective workings of the political process:
^T^h^is^f^o^c^u^s^oⁿ^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^tr^u^s^ioⁿ^ofⁱ^m^{proper ex}^tran^eous^f^actorsⁱⁿ^{to th}^{e a}^g^eⁿ^c^y^’s^decisⁱ^oⁿ^-
^m^a^kⁱⁿ^g^p^r^o^{cess r}^eco^gⁿ^{izes t}^h^e^p^o^{litical r}^ealit^y^th^a^t^“m^e^m^b^e^r^s^o^f^Coⁿ^g^r^e^{ss ar}^{e r}^e^q^u^es^ted^to^,
^an^{d do in}^f^{act, i}ⁿ^tr^u^d^{e in}^vary^ing^deg^r^ees^{, i}ⁿ^ad^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^{e proceedin}^gs^.”^S.E.C^.^v.
^W^h^eelin^g^-^Pittsb^u^r^g^h^S^t^{eel Co}^rp^{., 648 F}^.^2d^118,¹²⁶^{(3d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸¹^{) (en}^ban^c^{). It}^w^oul^{d be}
^uⁿ^r^eali^s^{tic to requ}^{ire th}^{at a}^g^encies^tu^rⁿ^{a d}^eaf^{ear to com}^m^e^nts^f^r^o^m^m^e^m^b^er^s^of^C^ong^res^s^.
^T^h^{e ag}^en^c^y^’s^d^u^t^y^,^s^o^lo^ng^asⁱ^t^isⁿ^o^{t act}^ing^{in its}^qu^as^i-^j^u^dicⁱ^{al capacit}^y^,^is^sⁱ^m^p^l^y^to^“g^iv^e
^con^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al co}^m^m^eⁿ^t^s^on^l^y^as^m^u^ch^de^f^e^ren^{ce as}^t^h^e^y^de^s^e^rv^{e on}^th^e^m^e^rits^.”^Id.
^W^e^{are cau}^tiou^sⁱⁿ^readiⁿ^g^e^x^tran^eo^u^s^f^actors^{too broa}^dly^,^les^t^th^e^yⁱ^m^pa^{ir ag}^en^c^y
^f^l^e^x^ib^ilit^yⁱⁿ^d^ealin^g^wⁱ^t^h^Coⁿ^g^r^e^{ss. I}ⁿ^p^a^r^ticu^l^ar^{, an}^ag^eⁿ^c^y^’^s^p^a^tien^t^au^dⁱ^eⁿ^{ce to}^{a m}^e^m^b^e^r
^of^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^s^wⁱ^llⁿ^o^{t b}^y^it^s^e^l^f^con^s^tit^u^t^{e t}^h^{e i}ⁿ^j^ection^{of an}^e^x^tran^eo^u^s^f^{actor. Nor}^w^o^u^l^{d a}
^sⁱ^m^p^{le plea f}^o^r^m^o^{re ef}^f^e^c^tiv^e^en^f^o^rce^m^en^{t o}^f^{a la}^w^{be th}^{e in}^j^ection^of^anⁱ^m^pr^o^p^e^r^f^a^c^t^o^r^.^A
^t^r^u^l^y^ex^t^r^aⁿ^eous^f^act^or^m^u^st^t^a^k^eⁱⁿ^t^o^accoun^t^“^c^oⁿ^sⁱ^deratⁱ^ons^t^h^at^C^ong^res^s^co^u^l^dⁿ^o^t^h^a^v^e
ⁱⁿ^teⁿ^d^ed^to^m^a^k^e^r^e^lev^aⁿ^t^,”^D.^{C. Fed}^e^ra^tioⁿ^{, 45}^{9 F}^.²^d^at¹²^47.
^Coⁿ^g^ressioⁿ^al^“ⁱⁿ^t^erf^e^ren^ce”^an^d^“^p^o^{litical p}^r^ess^u^{re” are lo}^ad^ed^term^{s. W}^eⁿ^eedⁿ^o^t
^atte^m^p^{t a p}^o^r^tr^{ait o}^f^{all th}^eir^sⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^er^p^o^ssib^{ilities, e}^v^enⁱ^f^we^w^e^r^e^ab^{le to}^d^o^so^.^W^e^can
^m^a^k^e^plain^th^at^th^e^f^o^{rce of log}ⁱ^{c a}ⁿ^{d ideas}^isⁿ^o^{t o}^u^{r con}^cerⁿ^.^T^h^e^y^carr^y^th^{eir o}^wⁿ^f^o^rce
^an^{d ex}^ert^t^h^{eir o}^w^{n pres}^s^u^re^{. In}^t^hⁱ^s^practical^s^e^ns^{e t}^h^e^y^{are n}^o^t^ex^traⁿ^eous^{. T}^h^{at a}
^con^g^r^es^s^m^aⁿ^ex^pres^s^e^s^th^e^vie^w^t^h^{at t}^h^e^la^w^o^u^gh^tⁿ^o^t^s^aⁿ^c^{tion t}^h^e^u^s^e^of^fⁱ^f^t^y^-^oⁿ^e
^ir^r^e^v^o^cab^{le tr}^u^s^{ts to}^g^aⁱⁿ^$¹^.⁴^m^illioⁿⁱⁿ^s^u^b^s^id^{ies i}^sⁿ^o^{t i}^m^p^e^r^m^is^sib^l^{e p}^o^{litical “}^p^r^e^ss^u^r^e.”
^{It certain}^l^yⁱⁿ^j^ectsⁿ^o^ex^traⁿ^eo^u^s^f^{actor. W}^e^fⁱⁿ^dⁿ^o^du^{e proces}^s^ri^g^h^tⁱⁿ^t^h^e^s^{e preli}^mⁱⁿ^ar^y
^ef^f^o^r^t^{s to}^p^e^r^s^u^a^d^e^t^h^{e g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^to^g^r^aⁿ^t^f^a^r^m^s^u^b^s^id^ies^su^f^f^icien^t^to^ex^cl^u^d^{e t}^h^{e p}^o^litical
^tu^gs^{of th}^e^diff^eren^t^bran^ch^e^s^of^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt, an}^d^w^e^s^eeⁿ^o^th^ing^m^o^{re h}^e^{re. W}^e^rej^{ect th}^e
^h^o^ldⁱⁿ^g^o^f^t^h^{e d}ⁱ^strⁱ^ct^co^u^r^t^th^{at DCP}^Far^m^s^c^o^ul^dⁱ^g^no^r^e^t^h^e^a^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^r^a^tⁱ^ve^p^r^o^c^e^d^ur^e^ye^t¹⁰⁰
^av^ailab^l^{e to}^{it an}^d^tu^rⁿ^to^th^{e c}^oⁿ^s^eq^u^eⁿ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{is b}^y^p^a^{ss o}^f^r^e^m^e^dⁱ^es.

⁹⁹^Id^{. a}^t¹¹^87-⁸⁸^.
¹⁰⁰^Id^.^a^t¹¹⁸⁸^.

In one of the first cases to be decided after D.C. Federation, a district court applied its principles
to find an impermissible congressional intervention in an agency rulemaking proceeding. In Texas ¹⁰¹
Medical Association v. Mathews, the court considered plaintiff’s contention that congressional
pressure should invalidate a decision of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
dividing Texas into nine Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSRO). HEW, after
consulting with the plaintiff and several other interested groups, first announced it would form
one statewide PSRO. But after a lengthy meeting with Senator Wallace Bennett, sponsor of the
PSRO legislation, and a senior staff member of the Senate Finance Committee, an HEW official
abruptly changed his mind and called for the division of Texas into nine PSRO’s.
The court noted that while it had no evidence as to what Senator Bennett or the staffer may have
said during the meeting, HEW was unable to adequately explain its sudden reversal of decision ¹⁰²
with regard to the number of PSRO’s so soon after the meeting. Moreover, the court found
“proof of a pattern of undue influence by the same Congressional sources permeating HEW’s ¹⁰³
entire administrative process relative to PSRO designation for Texas.” Applying D.C.
Federation’s principle that “agency action is invalid if based, even in part, on pressures emanating ¹⁰⁴
from Congressional sources,” the court concluded that “the fact that an agency decision is a
‘little pregnant’ with pressures emanating from Congressional sources is enough to require
invalidation of the agency action. Especially should this be the law where, as here, the invasive ¹⁰⁵
Congressional source has financial leverage on the involved agency.”
The fact that the agency action involved in Mathews was in the nature of a rulemaking would not
appear to be an inapt or inconsistent application of D.C. Federation. When Judge Bazelon noted
there that the courts would give absolute deference to legislative actions, it is clear from the
context that he was referring to such action by a legislative body, there the D.C. Council, a
political body directly accountable to its constituency in the electoral process. Where similar
legislative action (informal rulemaking) is taken by an administrative agency, the courts accord
great but not absolute deference to that process since it is not directly accountable to the
electorate. A finding of taint in an informal rulemaking is therefore not foreclosed by the D.C.
Federation rationale. Thus the court in Mathews held that the normal presumption in favor of the
agency’s decision was overcome by the evidence of the pervasive and invasive nature of the
congressional intrusions. However, while the ruling is not inconsistent with D.C. Federation, the
holdings in U.S. ex rel Parco v. Morris, and Sierra Club v. Costle, to be discussed next, appear to
reflect more accurately the nature and extent of the currently prevailing judicial deference to
congressional attempts to influence policymaking in the rulemaking process.

¹⁰¹⁴⁰^{8 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.³⁰^{3 (}^W^.D^{. T}^e^x¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.
¹⁰²^Id^{. a}^t³¹^2-¹³^.
¹⁰³^Id^{. a}^t³¹^0.
¹⁰⁴^Id^{. a}^t³⁰^6.
¹⁰⁵^Id^.^a^t³¹^3.

United States ex rel Parco v. Morris¹⁰⁶ involved a challenge by deportable aliens to the rescission
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of a longstanding operating instruction which
would have allowed them to extend the date of their voluntary departure. Plaintiff’s contended,
inter alia, that the change in policy was precipitated by the direct pressure applied by
Representative Peter Rodino who was then chairman of the subcommittee responsible for the
oversight of the administration of the immigration laws. It was conceded that Representative
Rodino’s request was the direct impetus for the change in policy. The court rejected the
contention based on its reading of the D.C. Federation. That holding, it said, was based upon a
“public and enforceable threat” by a congressman to withhold public funds for a particular
purpose unless an agency official acceded to the congressman’s wishes, and evidence that the ¹⁰⁷
official’s decision was based in part on that pressure. The court went on to note the importance
of the nature of the proceeding in analysis of such cases.
^Ho^w^e^v^e^r,^J^u^dg^e^B^azelon^’^s^an^al^y^sⁱ^s^{of t}^h^is^prin^ciple^dis^tⁱⁿ^guⁱ^s^h^e^s^s^h^arpl^y^bet^w^eeⁿ
^ag^en^c^y^actioⁿ^w^h^ich^is^“^j^u^dⁱ^{cial” o}^r^“^q^u^a^si^-^j^u^d^{icial” a}ⁿ^d^ag^eⁿ^c^y^act^ioⁿ^w^h^ic^h^is
^“^l^e^g^is^lati^v^e^{.” T}^h^{e f}^o^r^m^er^coⁿ^c^ep^{t r}^e^lated^to^ag^eⁿ^c^y^ad^j^u^dⁱ^catioⁿ^o^f^{a p}^a^r^ticu^l^ar^{, i}ⁿ^dⁱ^vⁱ^d^u^al
^cas^{e, or w}^h^eⁿ^{it ren}^d^ers^{a decis}ⁱ^on^on^t^h^{e r}^{ecord com}^p^ile^{d in}^f^o^r^m^al^h^earing^s^{; i}ⁿ^s^u^c^h
ⁱⁿ^s^t^aⁿ^{ce t}^h^{e con}^s^ideration^of^e^x^tran^eo^u^s^pres^s^u^rⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^f^l^ue^nc^e^s^und^e^r^mi^ne^{s t}^h^e^faⁱ^r^ne^{ss o}^f^t^h^e
^h^earing^{accorded th}^e^adv^e^rs^{e parties}^.^Id^{. at 124}^{6; accord,}^Pi^llsb^u^r^{y Co}^{. v}^.^FT^C^{, 354 F}^.^2d^th
^{952, 964 (5}^Cⁱ^{r. 19}^66);^Texa^s^{Medical As}^s^o^c^v.^Ma^th^e^w^s^,^{408 F}^.^S^u^{pp. 3}^{03 (}^W^.D^.^T^e^x^.
¹⁹⁷⁶^);^K^oni^{ag, I}ⁿ^c.^v.^K^l^eppe^{, 405 F}^.^S^u^{pp. 13}^{60, 1}^371-^{73 (}^D^.D^.C^{. 1975) (G}^es^el^l^,^J.^{). O}ⁿ
^th^{e o}^t^h^e^r^h^aⁿ^d^,^w^h^en^t^h^{e ag}^eⁿ^c^y^act^ioⁿ^{is p}^u^r^e^l^y^“^l^e^gⁱ^s^lati^v^e^,”^{as in}^th^{e in}^f^o^r^m^a^l^r^u^le^m^a^kⁱⁿ^g
ⁱⁿ^v^o^l^v^{ed h}^e^{re, th}^{e decis}ⁱ^on^“^c^aⁿⁿ^o^{t be in}^v^a^lidated^m^e^rel^y^beca^u^s^{e t}^h^{e ... action}^w^a^s
^m^o^tiv^a^t^{ed by}ⁱ^m^per^m^is^sⁱ^{ble con}^s^ideration^s^{” a}ⁿ^y^m^o^{re th}^aⁿ^can^th^{at o}^f^{a leg}ⁱ^s^l^at^u^r^e.^D.C^.
^Feder^a^tⁱ^{on, s}^upr^a^{, 4}^{59 F}^.^{2d at}¹²⁴^7;^{cf. Fletcher}^v.^Peck^,¹⁰^U^.^S.⁽⁶^Cr^aⁿ^c^h⁾^87,^129-³¹^3,³¹⁰⁸
^L^.^{Ed. 162 (}¹⁸¹^0).
The court concluded that since plaintiffs did not claim that Representative Rodino had interfered ¹⁰⁹
with the “quasi-judicial decision to deny them extended voluntary departure,” but rather were
attacking the motivation of the official in changing the agency’s policy, a “purely’ legislative ¹¹⁰
action, they had to meet a more stringent standard of proof. The court ruled they had failed to ¹¹¹
do so.
The seminal case in this line is Sierra Club v. Costle,¹¹² in which the appeals court found no taint
of the rulemaking proceeding there for failure to docket post-comment period meetings with the
Senate majority leader. The court concluded that it would not set aside a rulemaking simply on
the grounds that political pressure had been exerted in the process. It ruled that there has to be a

¹⁰⁶⁴²^{6 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.⁹⁷^{6 (}^E^.D^.^P^a¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^.
¹⁰⁷^Id^{. a}^t⁹⁸^2.
¹⁰⁸^Id^.
¹⁰⁹^Id^.
¹¹⁰^Id^.
¹¹¹^Id^{. T}^h^e^c^o^urt^ultim^a^t^e^l^y^de^c^l^a^r^e^d^the^re^sc^{ission i}ⁿ^v^a^{lid f}^o^{r f}^a^ilure^{to c}^o^m^p^ly^w^{ith the}^A^P^A^’^{s rule}^m^a^kⁱ^ng^a^nd
^pub^lic^a^tio^{n r}^e^q^u^ir^e^m^eⁿ^ts^{, 5 U}^.^S.^C^.⁵⁵^{2 (}^a⁾⁽¹⁾^,⁵⁵³⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
¹¹²⁶⁵⁷^F.^2d²⁹^{8 (}^D^.^C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸¹⁾^.

showing that “the content of the pressure on this [decisionmaker] is designed to force him to
decide upon factors not made relevant by Congress in the applicable statute” and also that the ¹¹³
determination made “must be affected by those extraneous considerations.” More particularly,
it was alleged that an “ex parte blitz” conducted after the comment period for an informal
rulemaking had caused the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to back away from its ¹¹⁴
support of a more stringent emission standard and was therefore unlawful and prejudicial. Post-
comment period communications included a number of oral conversations and briefings between
agency officials and private parties and other government officials, including the majority leader
of the United States Senate and the President of the United States.
The appeals court initially noted that the statute in question there did not require the docketing of
all post-comment period conversations and meetings and refused to apply a blanket rule requiring
such docketing. To the contrary, where the nature of the rulemaking is general policymaking, the
court expressed the view that “the concept of ex parte contacts is of more questionable utility.”
Indeed, the court deemed informal contacts vital to the effectiveness and legitimacy of our
governmental processes.
^Uⁿ^d^e^r^o^u^r^s^y^st^e^m^o^f^go^ve^rⁿ^m^e^nt^,^t^h^e^ve^r^y^l^e^gi^tⁱ^ma^c^y^o^f^ge^ne^r^a^l^p^o^lⁱ^c^yma^kⁱⁿ^g
^perf^orm^e^{d b}^y^un^el^ect^{ed ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^rat^o^rs^depen^d^sⁱⁿⁿ^o^smal^l^part^u^pon^t^h^{e open}ⁿ^e^ss^,
^accessib^ilit^y^,^an^d^a^m^eⁿ^ab^ilit^y^o^f^th^e^s^{e o}^f^fⁱ^cial^{s to}^t^h^{e n}^eed^s^an^d^id^{eas o}^f^t^h^{e p}^u^b^lic^f^r^o^m
^w^h^o^m^th^eⁱ^r^u^l^ti^m^a^{te a}^u^th^o^r^it^y^d^e^rⁱ^v^e^{s a}ⁿ^d^u^p^oⁿ^w^h^o^m^t^h^eir^c^o^m^m^aⁿ^d^s^m^u^st^f^a^ll.^A^s^j^u^d^g^es
^w^e^are^ins^u^{lated f}^r^o^m^t^h^es^{e pr}^es^s^u^res^becaus^e^of^t^h^{e n}^a^tu^{re o}^f^t^h^{e j}^u^{dicial proces}^sⁱⁿ^w^h^ich
^w^e^{participate; bu}^t^w^e^m^u^s^t^ref^r^ain^f^r^o^m^th^{e eas}^y^te^m^p^tatioⁿ^{to look}^as^k^aⁿ^{ce at all f}^ace-^to^-
^f^{ace lobb}^yⁱⁿ^g^eff^o^rts^,^re^g^a^rdles^s^o^f^t^h^e^f^o^rumⁱⁿ^w^h^ic^h^t^h^e^y^occu^r,^m^e^rel^y^becaus^e^w^e^s^ee
^th^e^m^asⁱⁿ^ap^p^r^o^p^r^{iate in}^th^e^j^u^dⁱ^{cial co}ⁿ^t^ex^{t. F}^u^r^t^h^e^r^m^o^r^{e, th}^eⁱ^m^p^o^r^tan^c^e^to^e^f^f^e^c^tiv^e
^r^e^gul^a^tⁱ^o^{n o}^f^c^o^ntⁱⁿ^ui^{ng c}^oⁿ^t^a^c^t^wⁱ^t^h^a^r^e^g^u^l^a^t^e^dⁱⁿ^d^u^st^r^y^,^o^t^he^r^a^f^fe^c^t^e^d^gr^o^u^p^s^,^aⁿ^d^t^h^e
^ag^en^c^y^t^o^wⁱⁿⁿ^{eeded s}^u^pport^f^o^{r i}^t^s^prog^ra^m^,^red^u^{ce fu}^t^u^re^en^f^o^rce^m^en^t^requⁱ^r^e^m^eⁿ^t^s^b^y
^h^e^lpⁱⁿ^g^t^h^o^s^e^r^e^g^u^lated^to^aⁿ^ticip^{ate an}^d^sh^ap^{e t}^h^eir^p^l^aⁿ^s^f^o^r^t^h^e^f^u^t^u^r^e^{, a}ⁿ^d^sp^u^r^th^e¹¹⁵
^p^r^o^v^isioⁿ^o^fⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^w^h^ic^h^th^{e a}^g^en^c^yⁿ^eed^s.
However, the court inferred from the statutory scheme that oral comments “of central relevance to
the rulemaking” should be placed in the record. Although the court conceded that this allows the
agency to decide in its own discretion which comments are relevant, the court did not find this to
be a persuasive enough consideration to require a more stringent rule.
^{EDF is u}ⁿ^d^e^r^s^tan^d^ab^l^y^w^a^r^y^o^f^{a r}^u^le^w^h^ic^h^p^e^r^m^it^{s th}^{e ag}^eⁿ^c^y^to^d^ecid^e^f^o^rⁱ^t^s^e^l^f^w^h^eⁿ^o^r^a^l
^com^m^uni^catⁱ^ons^{are o}^f^s^u^c^h^c^eⁿ^t^ral^rel^e^v^aⁿ^c^e^t^h^at^a^dock^e^t^en^t^r^y^f^o^{r t}^h^e^mⁱ^s^requi^{red. Y}^e^t
^th^e^s^t^at^u^t^{e it}^s^e^l^f^v^e^s^t^s^EP^A^wⁱ^th^dis^c^retioⁿ^{to decide}^w^h^et^h^e^{r “}^docum^eⁿ^ts^”^{are of}^ceⁿ^t^ral
^relev^aⁿ^c^e^an^{d t}^h^ere^f^ore^m^u^s^t^{be placed in}^t^h^{e dock}^e^t^;^s^u^rel^y^EP^A^caⁿ^be^gⁱ^v^e^{n n}^o^le^s^s
^dis^c^retionⁱⁿ^dock^e^tiⁿ^g^{oral com}^m^unications^con^cernⁱ^ng^wh^ich^t^h^{e s}^t^at^u^t^{e h}^a^sⁿ^o^ex^plici^t
^requ^ire^m^ents^w^h^ats^o^e^v^{er. Fu}^rt^h^e^r^m^{ore, th}ⁱ^s^co^u^r^{t h}^a^s^alread^y^recogn^{ized th}^a^t^th^{e relati}^v^e
^sigⁿⁱ^f^icaⁿ^{ce o}^f^v^a^rⁱ^o^u^{s co}^m^m^uⁿ^icatioⁿ^s^to^th^{e o}^u^tco^m^{e o}^f^th^e^r^u^{le is a}^f^acto^rⁱⁿ^d^e^ter^mⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g
^w^h^et^h^e^{r t}^h^eⁱ^{r di}^s^c^l^o^su^{re i}^s^requⁱ^r^{ed. A}^j^u^di^ci^al^l^yⁱ^m^pos^{ed bl}^aⁿ^k^e^t^requⁱ^r^e^m^en^t^t^h^a^t^al^l^pos^t^-
^com^m^eⁿ^t^peri^{od oral}^com^m^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^{be dock}^e^t^e^d^w^o^u^l^{d, on}^t^h^{e ot}^h^e^{r h}^aⁿ^d^{, c}^oⁿ^t^r^a^v^eⁿ^e^o^u^r
^lⁱ^mⁱ^t^e^{d po}^w^e^rs^of^re^vⁱ^e^w^,^w^o^u^l^{d s}^tⁱ^f^l^e^desⁱ^rabl^{e ex}^peri^m^eⁿ^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^t^h^e^a^r^e^a^by^C^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^an^d
^th^{e ag}^eⁿ^cie^s^{, an}^{d is}^uⁿⁿ^ece^s^s^a^r^y^f^o^{r ach}^ie^vⁱ^ng^th^e^g^o^{al of}^aⁿ^e^s^tablis^h^e^{d, procedu}^r^e-^defⁱⁿ^e^d

¹¹³⁶⁵⁷^F.^2d^at⁴⁰^9.
¹¹⁴^Id^{. a}^t³⁸^6.
¹¹⁵^Id^{. a}^t⁴⁰^0-0¹^(f^oot^note^s^om^itte^d).

^dock^e^t^,^viz^{., to}^en^ab^{le r}^e^vⁱ^e^wⁱⁿ^g^co^u^r^ts^to^f^u^ll^y^e^v^alu^a^{te th}^e^st^ated^j^u^stif^ica^tioⁿ^gⁱ^v^eⁿ^b^y^t^h^e¹¹⁶
^ag^en^c^y^f^o^r^{its f}ⁱⁿ^a^{l r}^u^le.
The appeals court concluded that none of the non-docketed post-comment meetings, including
those with the Senate majority leader and the President, required docketing. It underlined its view
that informal rulemaking involving general policymaking is akin to the legislative process and
therefore the courts should be wary of attempting to probe too deeply. It stated that before an
administrative rulemaking could be overturned simply on the grounds of political pressure, it had
to be shown that “the content of the pressure on the [decisionmaker] is designed to force him to
decide upon factors not made relevant by Congress in the applicable statute” and also that the ¹¹⁷
determination made “must be affected by those extraneous considerations.” Although the
meetings were called at the behest of the majority leader “in order to express ‘strongly’ his ¹¹⁸
views” on the subject of the rulemaking, it found that the agency made no commitments to him
nor was there evidence that he used “extraneous” pressures to further his position. The court
characterized the Senator’s efforts, since they were exerted in a rulemaking proceeding, as within
the accepted boundaries of the political process.
^{... Am}^erican^s^ri^gh^tl^y^ex^{pect t}^h^{eir elected repres}^en^tati^v^e^s^t^o^v^o^{ice th}^eir^g^r^iev^aⁿ^ces^aⁿ^d
^pref^eren^ces^con^cerⁿⁱⁿ^g^th^{e ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ratioⁿ^of^o^u^{r la}^w^s^{. W}^e^believ^e^{it e}ⁿ^tirel^y^{proper f}^o^r
^C^ong^res^sⁱ^oⁿ^{al repres}^en^tatⁱ^v^e^s^vⁱ^g^o^rous^l^y^{to repres}^en^{t t}^h^{e i}ⁿ^teres^t^s^of^t^h^{eir con}^s^tit^u^eⁿ^t^s
^b^e^f^o^r^e^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^r^a^tiv^{e a}^g^en^cie^s^en^g^a^g^e^dⁱⁿⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^l^{, g}^eⁿ^e^r^a^l^p^o^licy^r^u^le^m^a^kⁱⁿ^g^{, so}^loⁿ^g^as
ⁱⁿ^divⁱ^d^u^al^C^ong^res^s^m^eⁿ^{do n}^o^{t f}^r^u^s^{trate t}^h^{e i}ⁿ^teⁿ^t^o^f^C^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^as^a^w^h^o^l^{e as}^e^x^pres^s^e^{d i}ⁿ
^s^t^{atute, n}^o^{r un}^der^mⁱⁿ^{e appli}^{cable ru}^les^of^procedu^r^{e. W}^h^{ere C}^ong^res^s^m^eⁿ^k^{eep th}^eⁱ^r
^com^m^eⁿ^t^s^f^o^c^u^s^e^{d on}^t^h^e^s^ubs^t^aⁿ^{ce of}^t^h^{e propos}^{ed ru}^l^e^—^aⁿ^d^w^e^h^a^v^eⁿ^o^su^bs^t^aⁿ^tⁱ^a^l
^ev^id^en^{ce to}^cau^se^u^s^to^b^e^liev^e^Sen^a^to^r^B^y^r^d^dⁱ^dⁿ^o^{t d}^o^so^h^e^r^e^—^a^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^r^a^t^iv^e^a^g^en^cⁱ^es^a^r^e
^ex^{pected to balan}^{ce C}^ong^res^s^ion^a^{l pres}^s^u^re^wⁱ^th^t^h^{e p}^r^ess^u^r^e^{s e}^m^aⁿ^atin^g^f^r^o^m^{all o}^t^h^e^r
^so^u^r^{ces. T}^o^h^o^ld^o^t^h^e^r^w^ise^w^o^u^l^d^d^e^p^r^iv^{e th}^{e ag}^eⁿ^cie^s^o^f^le^g^iti^m^a^te^so^u^r^{ces o}^fⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ¹¹⁹
^an^d^{call in}^to^q^u^e^s^tioⁿ^t^h^{e v}^a^lⁱ^d^it^y^o^fⁿ^ear^l^y^ev^er^y^coⁿ^t^r^o^v^e^r^s^{ial r}^u^le^m^a^kⁱⁿ^g^.
Similarly, with regard to a meeting involving the President, the court held that as long as there is
factual support in the record for the agency’s outcome, it does not matter that “but for” the
Presidential input it would have gone the other way.
^O^f^co^u^r^s^e^{, i}^tⁱ^s^al^w^a^y^s^pos^sⁱ^bl^{e t}^h^at^un^di^s^c^l^o^s^e^{d Pres}ⁱ^d^en^tⁱ^a^l^proddiⁿ^g^m^a^y^di^rect^an
^ou^t^c^o^m^{e t}^h^a^tⁱ^s^f^act^u^a^l^l^y^bas^e^{d on}^t^h^{e record,}^bu^t^di^f^f^e^reⁿ^t^f^r^o^m^t^h^e^o^u^t^c^om^e^t^h^a^t^w^o^u^l^d^h^a^v^e
^obtain^e^{d in}^th^{e abs}^eⁿ^{ce of}^P^r^es^iden^{tial i}ⁿ^v^o^l^v^e^m^en^{t. In}^s^u^c^h^a^cas^{e, it}^w^o^u^l^{d be tru}^e^th^{at t}^h^e
^p^o^{litical p}^r^o^{cess d}ⁱ^d^af^f^{ect t}^h^e^o^u^tco^m^{e i}ⁿ^a^w^a^y^th^{e co}^u^r^{ts c}^o^u^l^dⁿ^o^{t p}^o^{lice. B}^u^t^w^e^d^oⁿ^o^t
^believ^e^t^h^at^C^ong^res^sⁱⁿ^teⁿ^d^e^d^th^{at t}^h^{e cou}^r^t^s^conv^{ert i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^{al r}^u^le^m^a^kⁱ^ngⁱⁿ^{to a rarified}
^techⁿ^o^cr^{atic p}^r^o^{cess, u}ⁿ^af^f^ect^ed^b^y^p^o^{litical co}ⁿ^s^id^er^atioⁿ^s^o^r^th^{e p}^r^esen^{ce o}^f^P^r^esid^en^tial¹²⁰
^po^w^e^r.

¹¹⁶^Id^.^a^t⁴⁰^2-0⁴^(f^oot^note^s^om^itte^d).
¹¹⁷^Id^{. a}^t⁴⁰^9.
¹¹⁸^Id^{. a}^t⁴⁰^9.
¹¹⁹^Id^{. a}^t⁴⁰^9-1⁰^(f^oot^note^om^itte^d).
¹²⁰^Id^.

On rare occasions the claim is made that an agency investigation has been instigated by
congressional pressure or influence and the claim is made by the subject of such investigation that
it is tainted by the political intervention. On even rarer occasions agencies have sought to fend off
congressional oversight of closed or ongoing investigations because of concern that present and
future open cases could be compromised by turning over requested internal deliberative
documents. Agencies argue that such disclosures, even from closed investigations, might be
utilized by attorneys representing potential targets of investigations, or defendants in civil and
criminal actions, as evidence that the investigations or prosecutions are politically motivated and
not driven by legitimate investigatory concerns and are thereby tainted. This notion is said to be ¹²¹
supported by the appellate court ruling in SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. It is argued
that Wheeling-Pittsburgh precludes any agency contact with Members of Congress which would
give the appearance that an agency is acting at the behest of a Member or committee and that its
proper course is to avoid any appearance that its enforcement efforts are being pursued at
Congress’ bidding. The claim, however, does not appear to be an accurate portrayal of either the
Wheeling-Pittsburgh ruling or the case law that preceded or followed it. The Wheeling-Pittsburgh
court made it clear that a court will deem a request for the enforcement of an administrative
subpoena an abuse of the judicial process only if it was in fact shown that the subpoena was
issued because of congressional influence, the agency knew its process was being abused, that it
knowingly did nothing to prevent the abuse, and that it vigorously pursued the frivolous charges.
Under the standard articulated by the appeals court the motivation of the Members of Congress is
irrelevant; the focus is on the actual impact of the congressional intercession on the motivation of
the agency itself. Simply the appearance of impropriety is not enough to taint the proceeding.
SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. involved the initiation of an informal investigation of
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation after the receipt by the Securities and Exchange
Commission of a letter from a United States Senator suggesting that Wheeling had violated
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and rule 10b-5a promulgated thereunder.
During the period of the initial informal investigation, there was considerable contact between the
SEC staff attorney conducting the investigation and the Senator’s office and with competitors of
Wheeling who were in alleged complicity with the Senator. The Senator was also actively
pursuing the passage of legislation that would prevent Wheeling from obtaining Federal loan
guarantees if it was under investigation by a Federal agency. Thereafter, the SEC ordered a formal
investigation of the matter. Pursuant to the formal investigation order, the SEC issued a subpoena
duces tecum to Wheeling and its chief executive officer. He refused to answer certain questions
and the agency sought enforcement. Wheeling defended on the grounds, inter alia, that the
subpoena was issued in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment; and that the investigation
constituted an abuse of the SEC’s investigatory power by competitors of Wheeling who were
opposed to the grant of certain Federal loan guarantees to Wheeling.
The district court refused to enforce the subpoena. Although it specifically rejected the claim of
bad faith on the part of the agency, it concluded that, “under the totality of circumstances,”

¹²¹⁴⁸²^F^.^S^u^pp⁵⁵^{5 (W}^.^D^.^P^a^.¹⁹^79),^vacat^ed^an^d^rem^aⁿ^d^e^d^,⁶⁴⁸^F^.^2d¹¹⁸^(3d^Ci^r.¹⁹⁸¹⁾⁽^eⁿ^b^anc⁾⁽^W^h^e^e^ling-
^Pittsbur^gh^).

enforcement would be an abuse of the court’s process.¹²² The court reached this conclusion
because it believed that the SEC had allowed biased third parties to improperly influence the
investigation process, although it conceded that the agency did not adopt the biased motives of ¹²³
the third parties.
A panel of the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that a court could not refuse to enforce
administrative subpoenas issued in good faith pursuit of a statutorily authorized purpose. The
court concluded that bias of third parties was irrelevant where the agency had proceeded in good
faith and that to invalidate agency action on the basis of an abuse of process theory independent
of the bad faith defense was improper.
The case was reargued before the Third Circuit en banc, which by a 6-4 vote remanded the case
to the district court in light of its ruling that even in the absence of bad faith on the part of an
agency, it would not enforce an administrative subpoena if it was issued because of congressional
influence and it was shown that the agency knew its process was being abused, that it knowingly ¹²⁴
did nothing to prevent the abuse, and that it vigorously pursued the frivolous charges.
^W^e^d^oⁿ^o^{t d}^o^u^b^t^th^e^u^s^e^f^u^lⁿ^e^s^s^to^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tiv^e^ag^eⁿ^cie^s^o^fⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^g^aⁱⁿ^ed^f^r^o^m
^th^ir^d^p^a^r^{ties. No}^r^d^o^w^e^d^o^u^b^t^th^at^f^r^eq^u^eⁿ^t^l^y^th^e^m^o^ti^v^a^tioⁿ^s^o^fⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^aⁿ^t^s^ar^{e less}^th^aⁿ
^altr^uⁱ^st^{ic. See}^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^{d St}^at^es^{v. C}^o^r^t^es^e^{, 614 F}^.^{2d 91}^{4 (}^{3d C}ⁱ^r.¹⁹⁸⁰^{). Bu}^t^w^e^caⁿⁿ^ot^sⁱ^m^p^l^y
^av^er^{t o}^u^r^e^y^e^s^f^r^o^m^th^{e r}^ealitie^{s o}^f^t^h^{e p}^o^litical^w^o^r^l^d^:^m^e^m^b^er^{s o}^f^Coⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^ar^{e r}^e^q^u^ested
^{to, an}^{d do in}^f^{act, i}ⁿ^tru^d^e,^{in v}^a^r^yⁱⁿ^{g de}^g^r^ees^{, i}ⁿ^admⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rati^v^e^proceedin^g^s^.^One
^com^m^eⁿ^t^{ator h}^a^s^s^a^{id recen}^tl^{y of}^th^{e In}^terⁿ^{al R}^e^v^eⁿ^u^e^Ser^vⁱ^ce:
^[^A^]^t^ho^u^{gh t}^h^e^I^R^S^ul^tⁱ^ma^t^e^l^y^mu^s^t^b^e^accouⁿ^t^able^to^C^ong^res^s^,^w^h^os^{e m}^e^m^b^ers^are
ⁱⁿ^t^u^rⁿ^acco^uⁿ^tab^l^e^to^t^h^{e p}^e^o^p^l^{e, th}^e^I^R^S^also^h^a^{s a}^coⁿ^s^tit^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^{l d}^u^t^y^to^e^x^ecu^te
^th^{e ta}^x^la^w^f^a^ith^f^u^ll^y^b^y^d^e^ter^mⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^aⁿ^d^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^sterⁱⁿ^g^{it p}^r^o^p^e^r^l^y^.^T^h^{e I}^R^S^m^u^st
^gi^ve^c^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^sⁱ^o^na^l^c^o^mme^nt^{s o}ⁿ^l^y^a^s^muc^h^d^e^f^e^ren^ce^as^t^h^e^y^des^e^rv^e^on^t^h^{e m}^e^ri^t^s^,
^f^o^{r th}^{e ag}^eⁿ^c^y^h^a^sⁿ^o^d^u^t^y^to^p^l^{acate p}^a^rticu^l^{ar co}ⁿ^g^r^es^s^m^eⁿ^o^r^co^m^m^ittee^s^{. Giv}^eⁿ
^th^e^fⁱⁿ^e^lin^e^b^e^t^w^een^la^wm^a^kⁱⁿ^g^an^d^la^w^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^e^m^eⁿ^{t, i}^tⁱ^s^a^l^w^a^y^s^dⁱ^f^f^ic^u^l^t^to^sa^y
^w^h^eⁿ^on^{e s}^h^adesⁱⁿ^{to th}^{e ot}^h^e^{r, bu}^{t clearl}^y^t^h^{ere is}^anⁱⁿ^e^v^it^{able ten}^s^ioⁿ^bet^w^eeⁿ
^con^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al o}^v^ersⁱ^gh^{t po}^w^e^r^s^an^{d t}^h^{e e}^x^ec^u^tⁱ^v^{e e}^x^ercis^e^{of deleg}^a^{ted po}^w^e^rs^to
ⁱⁿ^{terpret, articu}^l^{ate, an}^{d ex}^ec^{ute th}^{e tax}^la^w^s^.
^P^a^rn^{ell, C}^ong^res^sⁱ^oⁿ^{al Interf}^er^en^{ce i}ⁿ^Ag^en^c^y^Eⁿ^f^o^rce^m^eⁿ^t:^T^h^{e IR}^{S Ex}^perien^{ce, 89 Yale}
^L^.^J^.¹³⁶⁰^,¹³⁶⁸⁽¹⁹⁸⁰⁾⁽^f^o^o^tⁿ^o^{tes o}^m^itted⁾^{. T}^h^{e d}^u^ty^o^f^t^h^{e SEC, th}^er^e^f^o^r^{e is n}^o^{t to}^igⁿ^o^r^e
ⁱⁿ^fo^r^m^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^gi^ve^{n t}^oⁱ^t^b^y^c^o^ng^r^e^ss^m^e^n,^b^u^t^t^o^“^gⁱ^v^e^c^o^ngr^e^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^c^o^mme^nt^{s o}ⁿ^l^y^a^s^muc^h
^def^e^ren^{ce as}^th^e^y^des^e^r^v^{e on}^t^h^e^m^e^rits^.”^Id.^Aⁿ^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ratⁱ^v^e^a^g^en^c^y^t^h^at^un^dertak^es^aⁿ
^ex^tensⁱ^v^{e i}ⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^ation^at^th^eⁱⁿ^sⁱ^s^t^eⁿ^{ce of}^{a po}^w^e^rfu^l^Uⁿ^{ited States}^Seⁿ^a^tor^“w^it^hⁿ^o
^reas^on^{able ex}^pectation^”^o^f^prov^ing^a^vⁱ^olatioⁿ^aⁿ^{d t}^h^en^s^eeks^f^e^{deral cou}^r^{t enf}^o^rce^m^eⁿ^{t of}
^its^s^u^bpoen^a^cou^l^{d be f}^o^uⁿ^d^{to be u}^sⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e j}^u^diciar^y^f^o^{r illic}^{it pu}^rpos^es^{. W}^eⁿ^{eed n}^o^{t len}^d¹²⁵
^t^h^{e proces}^s^of^t^h^{e f}^e^deral^cou^r^t^s^t^o^ai^{d s}^u^ch^be^h^a^vⁱ^or.
The appeals court made it clear that the bad faith defense need not be the sole basis for denial of
enforcement, and that agency acquiescence in an abuse of its own process may lead to a finding
of abuse of the court’s process. The court distinguished between the two, noting that “bad faith

¹²²⁴⁸^{2 F}^.^Su^pp^{. 5}⁵⁵^,⁵⁶⁷^(W^.D^.^P^a^.¹⁹⁷^9).
¹²³⁴⁸^{2 F}^.^Su^pp^{. a}^t⁵^65-⁶⁶^.
¹²⁴⁶⁴⁸^F.^2d^at¹²^5.
¹²⁵^Id^.^a^t¹²^{6 (f}^oot^note^s^om^itte^d).

connotes a conscious decision by an agency to pursue a groundless allegation,” while “an agency
may be found to be abusing the court’s process if it vigorously pursued a charge because of the ¹²⁶
influence of a powerful third party without consciously and objectively evaluating the charge.”
The court also emphasized the point that it was improper for the district court to have taken into
account the motivation of third parties in determining either bad faith or abuse of process. “This
court has previously made clear that the proper focus in a challenge to an administrative subpoena
is motivation of the agency itself, not that of third parties,” citing United States v. Cortese, 614 ¹²⁷
F.2d 914, 921 (3d Cir. 1980). The requirement of a finding of “institutional” bad faith rather
than that of an individual agent, or the refusal to allow attributing the motives of third parties to ¹²⁸
an agency, is well established.
^T^h^{e cou}^r^{t con}^c^lu^ded:
^A^t^botto^m^,^this^cas^{e rais}^es^t^h^{e qu}^es^tion^w^h^et^h^e^{r, bas}^e^{d on}^ob^j^ectiv^{e f}^actors^,^th^{e SEC}^’^s
^decisⁱ^on^{to in}^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^{ate ref}^l^ecte^d^itsⁱⁿ^depen^d^en^{t deter}^mⁱⁿ^atioⁿ^,^{or w}^h^et^h^e^{r th}^{at decis}ⁱ^on^w^a^s
^th^{e produ}^{ct of}^ex^terⁿ^{al inf}^l^uen^ces^{. T}^h^{e realit}^y^of^pros^ec^u^t^{orial ex}^perien^{ce, t}^h^at^m^o^s^t
ⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^atⁱ^oⁿ^s^ori^gⁱⁿ^at^{e on}^t^h^e^basⁱ^s^of^tⁱ^p^s^,^s^ugg^es^tⁱ^on^s^,^{or i}^m^port^uⁿⁱ^ng^s^o^f^t^hⁱ^r^{d part}ⁱ^e^s^,
ⁱⁿ^cl^u^d^ing^co^m^m^e^{rcial co}^m^p^etⁱ^t^ors^,ⁿ^{eed h}^a^rdl^y^{be n}^o^{ted. T}^h^{at th}^{e SE}^C^co^m^m^eⁿ^{ced th}^e^s^e
^proceedin^g^s^as^{a res}^u^lt^{of t}^h^{e i}^m^port^u^ning^s^{of Se}ⁿ^a^{tor W}^e^{icker or C}^F^&^I^{, ev}^eⁿ^wⁱ^t^h^m^a^lice
^oⁿ^t^h^eⁱ^r^p^a^r^t^,ⁱ^s^no^t^a^suf^fⁱ^cⁱ^e^nt^b^a^si^{s t}^o^d^eⁿ^y^eⁿ^fo^r^c^e^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^t^h^e^subpoen^a^s^.^S^e^e^Co^rte^s^e^{, 614}
^F^.^{2d at}^921.^Bu^t^begⁱⁿⁿⁱⁿ^g^aⁿⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^alⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^atⁱ^oⁿ^b^y^col^l^ectⁱⁿ^g^f^a^c^t^s^at^t^h^{e requ}^e^s^t^of^a
^th^ir^d^p^a^r^t^y^,^e^v^en^oⁿ^{e h}^a^r^b^o^rⁱⁿ^g^u^lterⁱ^o^r^m^o^ti^v^e^{s is}^m^u^c^h^dⁱ^f^f^er^en^t^f^r^o^m^eⁿ^terⁱⁿ^g^an^o^r^d^e^r
^di^rectⁱⁿ^g^{a pri}^v^at^e^f^o^r^m^alⁱⁿ^ves^tⁱ^g^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^pu^rsu^aⁿ^t^t^o^{17 C}^.^F^.^R^.^{§ 202.}^{5 (}¹⁹⁸^{0), w}ⁱ^t^h^ou^t^aⁿ
^o^b^j^ectiv^{e d}^e^ter^mⁱⁿ^atioⁿ^b^y^th^{e Co}^m^mⁱ^ssioⁿ^aⁿ^d^oⁿ^l^y^b^eca^u^s^{e o}^f^p^o^litical^p^r^ess^u^r^e^{. T}^h^e
^res^pon^den^t^s^areⁿ^o^{t f}^r^{ee f}^r^o^m^anⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^{al inv}^e^s^t^ig^at^ionⁱⁿ^s^tⁱ^g^{ated b}^y^any^oⁿ^e^,^{in or ou}^{t o}^f
^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^{. B}^u^{t t}^h^e^y^ar^{e e}ⁿ^t^itled^to^{a d}^eci^sioⁿ^b^y^th^e^SE^{C it}^sel^f^,^f^r^ee^f^r^o^m^th^ir^d^-^p^a^r^t^y
^{political pres}^s^u^{re, th}^a^t^a^“lik^e^l^ih^{ood” of}^a^vⁱ^olat^ion^e^xⁱ^s^ts^{and th}^at^{a priv}^ateⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^ation
^s^h^oul^{d be ordered. S}^{ee 17 C}^.^F^.^R^.^{§ 205.2(a).}^T^h^{e S}^E^C^{order m}^u^s^t^{be su}^pport^e^{d by}^aⁿ
ⁱⁿ^depen^d^en^{t a}^g^en^c^y^deter^mⁱⁿ^ation^,ⁿ^o^{t on}^{e dictated or}^pres^s^u^{red by}^e^x^tern^al^f^o^rces^{. If}^an
^alleg^a^tioⁿ^o^fⁱ^m^p^r^o^p^e^rⁱⁿ^f^l^u^eⁿ^{ce an}^d^ab^dⁱ^catioⁿ^o^f^th^{e a}^g^eⁿ^c^y^’^s^o^b^j^ectiv^{e r}^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ilitie^{s is}
^m^a^{de, an}^{d su}^pport^e^{d by}^suffⁱ^cⁱ^eⁿ^t^e^vⁱ^d^en^{ce t}^o^m^a^k^eⁱ^t^f^aci^al^l^y^credi^b^l^e^{, res}^pon^den^t^{s are}
^en^titled^to^ex^a^mⁱⁿ^{e t}^h^{e cir}^c^u^m^stan^ce^{s su}^r^r^o^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^th^e^S^E^C’^s^p^rⁱ^v^a^t^eⁱⁿ^v^e^s^t^ig^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^r^d^e^r^.^Th^e
^cou^r^{t s}^h^{ould be g}^uⁱ^{ded b}^y^t^wⁱⁿ^beacon^s^{: t}^h^{e cou}^r^t’s^proces^s^is^f^o^cus^of^t^h^{e j}^u^{dicial in}^quir^y¹²⁹
^an^{d t}^h^{e res}^pon^den^t^m^a^y^ch^al^l^eⁿ^g^e^t^h^{e summ}^oⁿ^s^oⁿ^any^appropri^a^t^e^g^r^ouⁿ^d^.
In sum, then, it would appear that the Third Circuit, while accepting the possibility of finding that
political pressure can taint an investigative proceeding under a variety of theories, has imposed on
a litigant the burden of establishing the factual predicate to support such a determination which
may prove quite formidable. It certainly appears no less an obstacle than the showing of actual ¹³⁰
effect required in other non-adjudicatory situations.

¹²⁶⁶⁴^{8 F}^.²^d^a^t¹²⁵^n.^9.
¹²⁷⁶⁴⁸^F.^2d^at¹²^7.
¹²⁸^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^La^Sa^lle^N^a^ti^on^al^Bank^,⁴^{37 U}^.^S.²⁹^8,³¹^{6 (}¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^T^a^rg^et^A^d^vertⁱ^sⁱⁿ^g^,^Iⁿ^c.^,²⁵⁷
^F^.^3d³⁴^8,³⁵^{5 (}⁴^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾^;^Pic^k^e^l^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^,⁷⁴⁶^F.2^d¹⁷^6,¹⁸⁴⁽³^{d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁴⁾^;^EEO^C^v^.^Mⁱ^c^hae^{l C}^ons^tr^uc^ti^on^th
^Co^.^,⁷⁰^{6 F.}^2d²^44,²⁵¹^n.^{7 (}⁸^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸³⁾^;^NL^{RB v.}^Iⁿ^tersta^t^{e Dress Ca}^rriers,^In^c.^,⁶¹^{0 F.}^2d⁹⁹^,¹¹²⁽³^d^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁹⁾^.
¹²⁹⁶⁴⁸^F.^2d^at¹³^0.
¹³⁰^S^ee^e^.^g.,^Am^e^r^ic^{an P}^ubl^ic^G^a^s^A^s^s^o^cⁱ^atio^{n v}^.^F^P^C^,⁵⁶^{7 F.}^2d¹⁰¹⁶^,¹⁰⁷⁰^{, (}^D^.C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed⁴^{35 U}^.^S.
⁹⁰⁷⁽¹⁹⁷⁸⁾⁽^r^a^te^m^a^kⁱ^ng⁾^;^State^of^Califorⁿ^ia^v^.^FERC^,⁹⁶⁶^F.^2d¹⁵^{41 (}⁹^th^{Cir. 1}⁹⁹²^{) (len}^g^t^h^y^series^o^f^co^rresp^oⁿ^d^eⁿ^ce
^be^tw^e^eⁿ^{FERC a}^{nd Cha}ⁱ^rm^aⁿ^of^Ene^r^gy^a^{nd Com}^m^e^r^c^e^Co^m^m^itte^e^w^h^ic^{h re}^sulte^{d in}^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^{(1) re}^o^p^eⁿ^ing^a^f^a^c^t^-
^fⁱⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^p^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^{g an}^{d (2}^{) reversi}ⁿ^{g a l}^oⁿ^g^st^an^dⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^t^e^rp^ret^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^fⁱ^t^s^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^t^y^,^h^e^l^d^no^t^uⁿ^d^u^e^c^oⁿ^g^ressi^oⁿ^a^l
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

On the other hand, Wheeling-Pittsburgh represents something of a liberalization in an area where
court review of agency requests for enforcement of administrative subpoenas has traditionally ¹³¹
been severely circumscribed and narrow. Indeed, the development has been severely ¹³²
criticized, and some courts appear to have rejected Wheeling-Pittsburgh and are adhering to the ¹³³
traditional standard of high deference to agency subpoena issuance decisions. In fact, it may be
that the somewhat more expansive review of such situations afforded by Wheeling-Pittsburgh ¹³⁴
may be limited to cases arising in the Third Circuit. In any event, we are aware of no court that
has utilized the Wheeling-Pittsburgh standard to refuse to enforce an administrative subpoena
because of alleged undue congressional influence. Indeed, the Wheeling-Pittsburgh court itself
did not find that the SEC had been guilty of an abuse judicial process; it remanded the case to the
district court to make findings consonant with its opinion.
Several courts have subsequently applied the Wheeling-Pittsburgh rationale in cases involving the
issuance of subpoenas by the Department of Energy to resellers of petroleum products who had
refused to voluntarily supply documents in the course of a valid agency audit. In each case the
defendant company claimed, inter alia, that the Chairman of the Oversight and Investigations
Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee had exerted improper influence
on the agency official making the decision to issue the subpoena. In each instance the courts ¹³⁵
rejected the claims. In United States v. Armada Petroleum Corp., for example, the court
acknowledged Wheeling-Pittsburgh’s holding that an agency may not order an investigation
“because of political pressure to do so,” but found that where, as in the case before it, “the
Congressional involvement is directed not at the agency’s decision on the merits but at
accelerating the disposition and enforcement of the pertinent regulations, it has been held that
such legislative conduct does not affect the fairness of the agency’s proceedings and does not ¹³⁶
warrant setting aside its order.”

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
ⁱⁿ^f^l^u^eⁿ^{ce b}^ecau^{se t}^h^{e agen}^c^y^m^a^d^eⁱ^t^s^d^eci^si^on^{s b}^a^sed^u^p^oⁿ^“i^t^s^owⁿⁱⁿ^d^e^p^e^nd^en^t^and^d^e^t^aⁱ^l^e^d^an^al^ysi^s^o^f^t^h^e
^issu^e[^s^]^.^”^).
¹³¹^S^ee^e^.^{g., U}ⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^L^a^S^a^lle^N^a^ti^on^{al B}^ank^,⁴³^{7 U}^.^S^.²⁹⁸^,³¹⁶^-¹^{7 (}¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^M^o^r^t^on^Sa^{lt C}^o^.^,
³³⁸^U^.^S.⁶^32,⁶^{52 (}¹⁹⁵⁰⁾^;^C^ity^of^C^h^ic^a^{go v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^,³⁹^{6 U.S}^.¹⁶^2,¹⁶^{5 (}¹⁹⁶⁹⁾⁽^a^gen^c^y^d^eci^si^oⁿ^s^to^con^d^u^c^t
^inv^e^stig^a^{tions a}^r^e^“^c^o^m^m^itte^{d e}ⁿ^tire^l^y^{to a}^g^eⁿ^c^y^disc^r^e^tion);^Uⁿ^ioⁿ^M^e^c^h^{ling C}^o^r^p^.^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^,⁵⁶⁶^F.^2d⁷^22,^th
⁷²⁴^-2⁵^{(D.C. Cir}^.¹⁹⁷⁷^),^{Dresser In}^du^{stries In}^c.^v.^United^S^t^ates^,⁵^{96 F.2}^d¹²^{31 12}^{35 n. 1(}⁵^{Cir. 1}⁹⁷⁹^),^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,
⁴⁴⁴^U^.^S.¹⁰⁴⁴⁽¹⁹⁸⁰⁾^.
¹³²^S^{ee Co}^mm^en^t^,^{SEC v}^.^W^h^e^e^lin^g-^Pittsbur^gh^Ste^e^l^Cor^p^.:^B^a^d^Fa^it^h^a^{nd A}^bus^e^-^O^f^-^P^r^o^c^e^s^s^D^e^f^e^ns^e^t^o
^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e^Subp^oe^na^s^,⁸²^C^o^lum^.^L^.^R^e^v^.^{811 (}¹⁹⁸²⁾^.
¹³³^S^ee^e^.^{g., U}ⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Ae^{ro M}^a^y^flowe^{r Tra}ⁿ^{sit C}^o^.^,⁸³^{1 F}^.²^d¹¹^42,¹¹⁴⁶^-⁴⁷⁽^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁷⁾⁽^a^c^our^t^on^ly^ha^s
^dⁱ^scretⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^c^o^nd^u^c^t^{an evi}^d^en^tⁱ^a^ry^h^eariⁿ^{g i}ⁿ^{a su}^b^p^o^eⁿ^a^en^f^o^rcemen^t^{case i}ⁿ^t^h^{e un}^lⁱ^k^el^y^si^t^u^atⁱ^oⁿ^w^h^{ere t}^h^{e p}^a^rt^y
^opp^os^ing^t^h^e^s^u^bp^oe^na^ha^s^pr^e^s^eⁿ^te^{d a}^f^fⁱ^da^v^{it e}^v^ideⁿ^c^e^tha^t^the^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^“ⁱ^s^ac^ting^w^{ithout a}^u^t^horⁱ^t^y^or^w^h^e^r^e^its
^pur^pos^eⁱⁿ^ha^r^a^s^s^m^eⁿ^{t of}^c^itiz^eⁿ^s^.^”⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es v.}^T^eeven^{, 7}⁴⁵^F^.^Su^pp.²^20,²^24-²²^{7 (}^D^{. D}^e^l.¹⁹⁹⁰⁾⁽^d^is^c^u^s^sⁱ^ng
^Ae^ro^a^{nd c}^onc^lu^di^ng^tha^t^W^h^e^e^lin^g-Pittsb^u^rg^h^{is sti}^{ll c}^o^ntro^llingⁱⁿ^T^h^{ird Circ}^uit)^.
¹³⁴^S^ee,^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^a^t^{es v.}^Westⁱⁿ^gh^{ouse E}^l^ect^ri^{c Co}^rp^.,⁷⁸^{8 F.}^2d¹^64,¹^66-^{67 (}³^d^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁶⁾⁽^c^iti^ng^W^h^e^e^ling-P^ittsb^u^rgh
^a^ppr^ov^ing^l^y⁾^;^{EEOC v}^.^Univ^e^rsity^{of Pe}ⁿⁿ^sy^lv^ani^a^,⁸⁵⁰^F.^2d⁹⁶^9,⁹⁸⁰⁽³^d^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁸⁾⁽^e^xp^r^e^ssl^y^r^e^c^o^gnⁱ^zed^con^tⁱⁿ^u^e^d
^v^ita^lity^o^f^W^h^e^e^ling-Pittsb^u^rg^h^oⁿ^a^bus^e^of^pr^oc^e^s^s^is^s^u^e⁾^,^af^f’^d⁴⁹^{3 U}^.^S.¹^{82 (}¹⁹⁹⁰⁾^.
¹³⁵^Unite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^{FRB Pe}^trole^u^m,^Inc^.^{, 7}⁰³^F.^2d⁵²^8,⁵³^{2 (}^E^m^.^A^ppe^a^l^s¹⁹⁸³⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^v^.^Ph^oe^nix
^Pe^trole^u^m,⁵⁷¹^F.^Su^pp.¹⁶²⁰⁽^S^.^D^{. T}^e^x¹⁹⁸²⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Ar^m^ada^Pe^tr^ole^u^m^C^o^r^p^.^{, 5}⁶²^F.S^u^pp.⁴³^{, 5}⁰^-5^{1 (}^S^.D^.
^T^e^x^.¹⁹⁸²⁾^.^Se^e^a^l^s^o^,^Un^ite^d^Stat^e^s^v^.^M^e^{rit Pe}^trole^u^{m, Inc}^.^,⁷³¹^F^.^2d⁹⁰^1,⁹⁰^{4 (}^E^m^.^A^ppe^a^l^s¹⁹⁸⁴⁾^.
¹³⁶^S^{ee al}^so^,^Unⁱ^t^ed^St^a^t^{es v.}^H^a^yes^{, 408}^F.^2d⁹^{32 (}⁷^th^Cir.),^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^{, 3}^{96 U}^.^S.⁸³^{5 (}¹⁹⁶⁹⁾⁽^t^he^f^a^c^t^tha^t^a^H^o^us^e
^Subc^om^m^itte^e^ha^{d e}^x^pr^e^s^s^e^{d a}ⁿ^inte^r^e^s^t^{in a}ⁿ^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^l^R^e^v^e^nue^Se^r^v^ic^e^inv^e^s^tig^a^{tion did}^no^{t s}^h^ow^tha^t^the
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

In the most recent decision in which the target of an administrative investigation invoked ^th
Wheeling-Pittsburgh principles, the 4 Circuit, in United States v. American Target Advertising, ¹³⁷
Inc., rejected the claim of the defendant that the issuance of an investigative subpoena was a
tool of harassment and intimidation exercised by the agency (the Postal Service) at the behest of a
Senator who, the court conceded, “has demonstrated a fair degree of hostility toward” the
defendant. But the appeals court reiterated that that was not enough. The appellant “must show
that the party actually responsible for initiating the investigation, i.e., the Postal Service, has done ¹³⁸
so in bad faith.” The court found no evidence of bad faith and rejected American Target’s
request for discovery before the district court, noting “that such discovery is prohibited in these
types of summary enforcement proceedings absent ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” The appeals
court advised that in order to obtain discovery, the target must distinguish himself “from the class ¹³⁹^th
of the ordinary respondent, by citing special circumstances.” The 4 Circuit concluded that it
had not done so there, stating: “when presented with evidence of unlawful conduct, the
Government is not bound to investigate only those potential wrongdoers who support its policies.
Because American Target failed to distinguish itself from the ordinary disgruntled respondent, it ¹⁴⁰
is not entitled to discovery regarding the genesis of the Postal Service’s inquiry.”
In sum, it would appear that the assertions with respect to the Wheeling-Pittsburgh precedent is
unduly restrictive. That case does not establish an “appearance of partiality” standard with respect
to congressional contacts. A high degree of proof is needed to demonstrate that the agency’s
motivation in continuing an investigation is solely in acquiescence to congressional influence and
without any regard to the adequacy of the grounds of the allegations.
A review of the undue influence case law since 1966 indicates that the courts, in balancing
Congress’s performance of its constitutional and statutory obligations to oversee the actions of
agency officials against the rights of parties before agencies, have increasingly looked to the role
of the political process in all types of agency decisionmakings and have attempted to give weight
to that process on a case-by case basis. The result has been a strong predilection of the courts to
accept congressional prerogatives. Thus where informal rulemaking or other forms of informal
decisionmaking are involved, the courts will look to the nature and impact of the political
pressure on the agency decisionmaker and will intervene only where that pressure has had the

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^inv^e^s^tig^a^{tion w}^a^s^c^onduc^te^{d f}^o^r^aⁿ^im^pr^ope^r^pur^pos^e⁾^.
¹³⁷²⁵⁷^F.^3d³⁴^{8 (}⁴^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾^.
¹³⁸²⁵⁷^F.^3d^at³⁵^5.
¹³⁹^Id^.
¹⁴⁰^Id^.^a^t³⁵^6.^{For a}ⁿⁱⁿ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^{in w}^hⁱ^c^{h a}^c^ourt^f^oun^{d tha}^t^a^pa^rty^a^lle^ging^a^g^eⁿ^cy^undue^pol^itic^a^l^inf^l^ue^nc^e^{on a}ⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^cy
^ha^{d m}^a^de^a^s^u^f^f^ic^ie^ntl^y^“^s^tr^ong^s^how^ing^”^of^im^pr^ope^r^inf^l^ue^nc^e^to^be^eⁿ^tit^le^{d t}^o^e^x^tr^a^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^r^y^dis^c^ov^e^r^y^a^nd
^e^x^am^ina^{tion of}^a^g^eⁿ^cy^pe^r^s^onne^l,^s^e^e^Sok^ao^ga^{n C}^h^ip^pe^w^a^C^o^m^m^u^nity^v^.^B^a^b^b^itt^,⁹⁶¹^F.S^u^p^p^.¹²^76,¹²^80-⁸⁶⁽^W^.D^.
^Wⁱ^s^c^{. 1997)}^{. T}^h^e^c^ourt^w^a^rne^d^th^a^t^plaⁱ^ntif^f^s^s^{till ne}^e^d^“^t^o^s^how^th^a^t^the^pre^s^s^u^re^w^a^s^inte^nde^d^to^aⁿ^{d di}^{d c}^a^u^s^e^the
^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Iⁿ^te^rⁱ^or^’^s^a^c^tio^ns^t^o^beⁱⁿ^f^l^ue^nc^e^d^by^f^a^c^t^or^s^{not r}^e^l^e^v^a^{nt unde}^r^t^h^e^c^o^ntr^o^l^ling^s^t^a^t^u^t^e^.^”⁹⁶¹^F.S^u^p^p^{. a}^t
¹²⁸⁶^.^A^f^t^e^{r t}^h^{e co}^u^r^t^’^{s r}^u^lⁱⁿ^{g al}^l^p^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^{gs i}ⁿ^t^h^{e m}^a^t^t^e^{r w}^e^r^e^su^sp^en^d^e^d^d^u^rⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e p}^e^nd^en^cy^o^f^aⁿⁱⁿ^d^e^p^e^nd^en^t
^c^ouns^e^lⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tig^a^{tion. A}^t^the^c^o^nc^lusⁱ^oⁿ^of^tha^t^inv^e^s^tig^a^{tion t}^h^e^govern^m^eⁿ^t^an^d^t^h^{e trib}^{es settled and}^th^e^uⁿ^d^u^e^th
ⁱⁿ^f^l^u^eⁿ^{ce i}^ssu^{e w}^a^{s n}^o^t^p^u^r^s^u^ed^.^S^ee^Sok^a^o^g^{on C}^hⁱ^ppe^w^a^C^o^m^m^u^nity^v.^Ba^bb^itt^,²¹⁴^F.^3d⁹⁴^1,⁹⁴^4-⁴⁵⁽⁷^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.

actual effect of forcing the consideration of factors Congress did not intend to make relevant.
Where agency adjudication is involved a stricter standard is applied and the finding of an
appearance of impropriety can be sufficient to taint the proceeding. But even here the courts have
required that the pressure or influence be directed at the ultimate decisionmaker with respect to
the merits of the proceeding and that it does not involve legitimate oversight and investigative
functions before they will intervene. And where congressional intrusion in an agency’s
investigative process is involved the courts will intervene only if it is in fact shown that an
inquiry was instituted and subpoenas issued because of congressional influence, the agency knew
its process was being abused, that it knowingly did nothing to prevent abuse, and that it
rigorously pursued frivolous charges.
A 1989 legal commentary has severely criticized this decisional trend, arguing that the case law in
this area means that:
^{... Me}^m^b^ers^{of C}^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^{can i}ⁿ^terv^eⁿ^{e i}ⁿ^ong^oing^a^g^en^c^y^pr^oceedin^g^s^b^y^coⁿ^t^actiⁿ^{g eit}^h^er
^t^h^{e cl}^os^{e pers}^on^a^l^ai^des^{or t}^h^eⁱ^m^m^e^di^at^{e su}^periors^of^t^h^e^u^l^tⁱ^m^{ate decis}ⁱ^onm^ak^{er, conv}^e^y
^t^h^ei^{r j}^u^dgm^eⁿ^t^s^on^h^o^w^t^h^os^{e q}^u^es^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^sh^ou^l^d^{be deci}^{ded an}^d^av^oi^{d j}^u^di^ci^al^revⁱ^e^w^of^t^h^ei^r
^actioⁿ^s^w^h^{ile k}ⁿ^o^wⁱⁿ^g^f^u^{ll w}^e^ll^th^{at th}^eir^m^e^s^s^ag^e^w^{ill f}ⁱⁿ^dⁱ^t^{s w}^a^y^to^th^e^r^e^le^v^aⁿ^t^ag^eⁿ^c^y
^of^fⁱ^cia^l^{. In}^s^h^{ort, th}^{e actu}^a^{l inf}^l^u^eⁿ^ce^s^t^an^{dard of}^{D.C. Fed}^e^ra^tioⁿ^is^m^aⁿⁱ^p^u^lab^l^{e at t}^h^e
^w^hⁱ^m^o^f^C^ong^res^s^aⁿ^{d, i}ⁿ^t^h^e^w^o^rds^o^f^Ju^d^g^{e G}^e^s^e^l^l^,^t^h^os^e^seekⁱ^{ng t}^oⁱⁿ^v^o^k^e^t^h^e^Pillsb^u^r^y
^doct^rⁱⁿ^e^m^u^s^tⁿ^o^w^“^s^h^o^u^l^{der t}^h^{e v}ⁱ^rt^u^a^l^l^yⁱ^m^pos^si^bl^{e bu}^rden^of^pr^o^vⁱⁿ^g^w^h^e^t^h^e^r^aⁿ^dⁱⁿ^w^h^a^t¹⁴¹
^w^a^y^{... th}^{e ag}^eⁿ^c^y^w^a^s^act^u^a^ll^y^inf^l^u^eⁿ^{ced” by}^coⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^a^lⁱⁿ^terv^eⁿ^tioⁿ^.
As a remedy, the author calls for the judicial application of Pillsbury’s “appearance of
impartiality” standard to any instance of informal congressional intercession, regardless of the
nature of the proceeding in question, “as a legitimate and useful tool for controlling congressional
abuse of the informal oversight mechanisms which are likely to see wider use in the post-Chadha ¹⁴²
era.” The comment suggests that the use of such informal oversight mechanisms is an unlawful ¹⁴³
circumvention of the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha, which invalidated the use of
legislative veto devices, because it allowed Congress to evade the presentment and bicameralism ¹⁴⁴
requirements of the legislative process mandated by the Constitution. “If Congress determines
through the use of oversight mechanisms that an agency has misinterpreted a statute, the
appropriate response is to take the formal step of amending the law, not to use informal means to ¹⁴⁵
alter the agency’s interpretation.”
The comment would appear to misconceive the nature and scope of Congress’ constitutional
oversight and investigatory authority and the judicial recognition and approbation of informal
congressional techniques to influence agency actions as both directly flowing from that authority
and as being an integral part of the checks and balances mechanism underlying our scheme of
separated but shared powers. Thus it is well settled that Congress in legislating pursuant to the
powers granted it under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, has the authority, under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18, to create the bureaucratic infrastructure of the

¹⁴¹^C^o^m^m^eⁿ^{t, J}^udicⁱ^a^l^R^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^tio^{n o}ⁿ^I^m^pr^ope^r^C^o^ng^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l I}ⁿ^f^l^ue^nc^e^{in A}^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e^Iⁿ^f^l^ue^nc^eⁱⁿ^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e
^D^e^cⁱ^sⁱ^on-^m^a^kⁱ^ng^{: A}^Def^e^ns^e^of^t^h^e^Pillsb^u^ry^Doc^tⁱⁿ^e^,⁶^{J. of}^L^a^w^&^Politic^s¹³^5,¹⁵^{4 (1}⁹⁸^9).
¹⁴²^Id^.^,^{6 J}^.^of^L^a^w^a^nd^P^o^li^tic^s^a^t¹³^60-^37.
¹⁴³⁴⁶^{2 U}^.^S^.⁹¹⁹⁽¹⁹⁸³⁾^.
¹⁴⁴^Id^{. a}^t¹⁴^7.
¹⁴⁵^Id^.^a^t¹⁵^9.

Executive branch and to determine the nature, scope, and power of the duties so created.¹⁴⁶
Moreover, as a general matter, the Supreme Court has spoken very broadly of the legislative
power over offices. Where Congress deals with the structure of an office – its creation, location,
abolition, powers, duties, tenure, compensation and other such incidents – its power is virtually ¹⁴⁷
plenary. Only where the object of the exercise of the power is clearly seen in the particular
situation as an attempt to effect an unconstitutional purpose, e.g., congressional appointment or ¹⁴⁸
removal of an officer, have the courts felt constrained to intervene.
Equally well settled is the breadth of Congress’ authority to effectively monitor the work of its
creations. Supreme Court rulings have firmly established that the oversight and investigatory
power of Congress is so essential to the legislative function as to be implied from the general ¹⁴⁹
vesting of legislative power in Congress. In the absence of a countervailing constitutional
privilege or a self-imposed statutory restriction upon its authority, the Congress (and its
committees) has plenary power to compel information needed to discharge its legislative function
from executive agencies, private persons, and organizations, and within certain constraints, the ¹⁵⁰
information so obtained may be made public.
Moreover, Congress’ power to influence executive and other governmental conduct is not
confined to its utilization of its lawmaking authority. The courts have long recognized
congressional authority to investigate, and to express its opinion, in an attempt to influence the ¹⁵¹
manner in which the laws are executed. In upholding the exercises of similar kinds of authority, ¹⁵²
courts have acknowledged that the issuance of a subpoena to the executive, the mandate of a ¹⁵³
report and wait provision, and the expression of disapprobation or the focusing of public ¹⁵⁴
attention on executive action, do not themselves constitute improper control of executive ¹⁵⁵
decisionmaking.
The Supreme Court has also recognized Congress’ right to investigate the Government’s conduct ¹⁵⁶
of civil and criminal litigation. In the leading case of McGrain v. Daugherty, the Senate had
appointed a select committee to investigate the alleged failure of the Justice Department to
prosecute and defend certain civil and criminal actions to which the government was a party. The
Supreme Court upheld the action of the Senate in citing the brother of the Attorney General for
contempt of Congress for failure to comply with a subpoena issued by the select committee. The
Court determined that the subject of the investigation–”whether the Attorney General and his

¹⁴⁶^B^u^ckl^ey^v.^Vale^o^,⁴^{24 U}^.^S.^{1 (}¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.
¹⁴⁷^S^ee,^e.^g.^,^C^r^eⁿ^s^haw^v.^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^{, 1}^{34 U}^.^S.⁹⁹^{, 1}^05-⁰⁶⁽¹⁸⁹⁰⁾^;^Mo^rrisoⁿ^v.^Olson^,⁴⁸^{7 U}^.^S^.⁶⁵⁴⁽¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^;
^Mistretta^v.^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^{, 4}^{88 U}^.^{S. 3}⁶¹⁽¹⁹⁸⁹⁾^.
¹⁴⁸^S^ee^B^u^ckl^ey^v.^Vale^o,^s^upr^a;^B^o^w^s^he^r^v.^Sy^nar^,⁴^{78 U}^.^S.⁷¹^{4 (}¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^.
¹⁴⁹^M^c^G^r^ain^v.^D^a^ug^he^r^t^y^{, 27}^{3 U}^.^S^.¹³^5,¹⁷^4-⁷⁵⁽¹⁹²⁷⁾^;^W^a^tk^ins^v.^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^{, 35}⁴^U^.^{S. 17}^{8, 18}^{7 (}¹⁹⁵⁸⁾^;^Eastl^aⁿ^d
^v.^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^Se^r^v^ic^e^m^eⁿ^’^s^Fund^{, 42}¹^U^.^{S. 49}^{1, 50}^4-⁰⁵⁽¹⁹⁷⁵⁾^.
¹⁵⁰^Id^.^S^ee^al^so^Gra^vel^v.^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^es^,⁴⁰⁸^U.^S.⁶⁰^6,⁶²^{5 (}¹⁹⁷³⁾^;^Doe^v.^M^c^M^illan^{, 4}^{12 U}^.^S.³⁰^{6 (}¹⁹⁷³⁾^.
¹⁵¹^McGraⁱⁿ^v.^D^a^u^ghe^r^t^y^,^s^upr^a^;^W^a^tk^ins^v.^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^,^s^upr^a^.
¹⁵²^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v.^Nixoⁿ^{, 4}¹⁸^U^.^S.⁶⁸³⁽¹⁹⁷⁴⁾^.
¹⁵³^INS^v.^C^h^ad^ha^,⁴⁶^{2 U.}^S^.⁹¹⁹^,⁹³⁵ⁿ^.⁹^,^c^itin^{g Sib}^bac^h^v.^W^ilson^&^Co.^{, 31}²^U^.^{S. 1}⁽¹⁹⁴¹⁾^.
¹⁵⁴^Bowshe^r^v.^{Merck &}^Co^.^,⁴⁶⁰^U.S^.⁸²^4,⁸³^{3 (}¹⁹⁸³⁾^;^C^ity^of^Ale^x^a^ndr^ia^v.^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^,⁷³^{7 F.}^2d¹⁰²²⁽^F^e^d^{. C}ⁱ^r^.
¹⁹⁸⁴⁾^.
¹⁵⁵^S^{ee al}^so^,^Ame^r^on^v.^U^.^S.^C^o^r^p^s^o^f^En^gine^e^r^s^{, 8}⁰⁹^F.^2d⁹⁷^9,⁹⁹^2-⁹^93,⁹⁹^{5 (}^{3d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^,^{cert d}ⁱ^smi^ssed¹⁰^{9 S.}^C^t^.
²⁵⁷⁽¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^.
¹⁵⁶²⁷^{3 U}^.^S^.¹³⁵⁽¹⁹²⁷⁾^.

assistants were performing or neglecting their duties in respect of the institution and prosecution
of proceedings to punish crimes and enforce appropriate remedies against the wrongdoers”–was
clearly one on which legislation could be enacted and was within the jurisdiction of the Senate to ¹⁵⁷
investigate.
Additionally, the courts have explicitly held that agencies may not deny Congress access to
agency documents, even in situations where the inquiry may result in the exposure of criminal
corruption or maladministration by agency officials. As the Supreme Court has noted, “But surely
a congressional committee which is engaged in a legitimate legislative investigation need not
grind to a halt whenever responses to its inquiries might potentially be harmful to a witness in ¹⁵⁸
some distinct proceeding . . . or when crime or wrongdoing is exposed.”
Thus, the courts have recognized the potentially prejudicial effect congressional hearings can
have on pending cases. While not questioning the prerogatives of Congress with respect to
oversight and investigation, the cases pose a choice for the Congress: congressionally generated
publicity may result in harming the prosecutorial effort of the Executive; but access to
information under secure conditions can fulfill the congressional power of investigation and at the
same time need not be inconsistent with the authority of the Executive to pursue its case.
Nonetheless, it remains a choice that is solely within Congress’ discretion to make, irrespective of
the consequences.
The foregoing review of the case law concerning Congress’ oversight and investigatory authority
appears to abundantly demonstrate that the decisional law development in the area of undue
influence is hardly aberrational but is, rather, a subset, and therefore a mirror, of the broad
oversight power the courts have accorded Congress over Executive agencies generally. In all such
cases the courts balance Congress’ constitutional oversight and investigatory prerogatives against
the interests of the agencies or private parties involved. In a non-adjudicatory setting involving
general policymaking, it is hardly surprising that the congressional prerogatives are likely to be
weighed and found persuasive unless the subject matter implicates countervailing constitutional
privileges of the President or the pressure brought to bear results in a decision that ignores
applicable statutory considerations or procedures. Thus the Sierra Club court noted that a
rulemaking would be overturned because of congressional pressure only if two conditions were
met: first, if the content of the pressure was designed to force the decisionmaker to decide on the
basis of factors not made relevant by Congress in the applicable statute and, second, if the ¹⁵⁹
decision was in fact affected by those extraneous considerations. The court explained its
rationale as follows: “We believe it entirely proper for Congressional representatives vigorously
to represent the interests of their constituents before administrative agencies engaged in informal,
general policy rulemaking, so long as individual Congressmen do not frustrate the intent of ¹⁶⁰
Congress as a whole as expressed in statue, nor undermine applicable rules of procedure.”
On the other hand, underlying the greater judicial sensitivity to public or secret (ex parte)
exertions of political pressure on an agency adjudication is the premise that such adjudications,
whether formal or informal, involve individual rights rather than issues of general policy, and thus
implicate constitutional due process values. Although due process does not generally require a

¹⁵⁷²⁷^{3 U}^.^S^.^a^t¹⁷⁰^,¹^77-⁷⁸^.
¹⁵⁸^Hu^tch^e^soⁿ^v.^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^,³⁶⁹^U.^S^.⁵⁹^9,⁶¹^{7 (}¹⁹⁶²⁾^.
¹⁵⁹^Sie^r^r^a^C^l^ub^v.^C^o^stle^{, su}^pra^,⁶⁵^{7 F}^.^2d^at⁴⁰⁹^.
¹⁶⁰^Id.

full-scale judicial trial, informal adjudications must nonetheless conform to the “fundamental ¹⁶¹
notions of fairness implicit in due process.” Both public and secret congressional attempts to
influence agency decisionmaking may undermine the due process rights of parties to informal
adjudications in several respects. Where the contacts are unrevealed, parties to the adjudication
are deprived of notice and an opportunity to respond with relevant information, a violation of ¹⁶²
fundamental canons of fairness. Moreover, whether overt or concealed, political pressure
compromises the appearance of impartiality and objectivity of the decisionmaker, qualities ¹⁶³
traditionally regarded as essential to due process. Thus the decisions in this area reflect a
common purpose of the courts “to preserve the integrity of the judicial aspect of the ¹⁶⁴
administrative process.”
But even in the adjudicatory setting the judicial deference to congressional prerogatives is
apparent. Taint will not be found unless the pressure is directly on the decisionmaker, concerns ¹⁶⁵¹⁶⁶¹⁶⁷
the merits of the case, and is not minimal. The Gulf Oil MEUA, California v. FERC and ¹⁶⁸
ATX litigations serve to illustrate the current judicial practice. All four cases involved
proceedings adjudicatory in nature but in none was taint found. In Gulf Oil the court found the
following factors determinative: the subcommittee interrogations were not concerned with the
merits of the agency’s decision but with its compliance procedures; there was no attempt to
influence a factual determination of the agency; the Commission in fact resisted the political
pressure as evidenced by its resolution of key issues in a manner identical to the way it had
decided them before the committee hearings; and the fact that the nature of the agency’s decision
was entirely legal. In the MEUA case, the Second Circuit found the ex parte communications
involved there to be de minimis. The challenged communications were not secret and were in fact
promptly placed in the public record; they contained no new factual information; and no
opportunity for rebuttal was either required or necessary. In California v. FERC the court
emphasized that the congressional intercessions were meant to correct procedural problems and to
question whether the agency was applying the proper legal standard and that the agency
determination made in each instance was based on its own independent, on-the-record analysis of
the congressional objections and was accompanied by a reasoned explanation. The court viewed
the matter as properly involving the congressional interest in policymaking and policy
application. Finally, the intense congressional pressure in ATX to deny an application to operate a
new airline was found not to taint the proceeding because close examination showed that it did
not affect the outcome of proceeding. The court pointed to the absence of threats, the insulation of
the immediate decisionmaker, and that the findings of material facts were very well supported by
the evidentiary record, including the extensive evidence of previous wrongdoing and

¹⁶¹^Ho^{me B}^o^{x Of}^fⁱ^ce,^Iⁿ^c.^v.^FCC^,⁵^{67 F.2}^d^{9, 56}⁽^D^.C^.^Cⁱ^r¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^,^cert^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^{, 4}³⁴^U^.^S.⁸²^{9 (}¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^.⁽^Ex^par^te^con^t^act^s
^by^pr^iv^a^t^e^inte^r^e^s^t^s^a^{nd Me}^m^b^e^r^s^of^C^ong^r^e^s^s^ta^inte^{d a}^r^u^le^m^a^kⁱ^ng^inv^o^lv^ing^c^onf^lic^ting^c^l^aⁱ^m^s^{to pr}^iv^a^t^e^rig^h^ts).
¹⁶²^Mo^rg^an^v.^U.^S.^,³⁰¹^U.^S^.¹¹^,¹⁸⁽¹⁹³⁸⁾^(“T^h^{e ri}^gh^t^t^o^a^h^eariⁿ^{g em}^b^r^ac^{es n}^o^t^on^l^y^t^h^{e ri}^gh^t^t^o^p^r^es^en^t^evi^d^en^{ce b}^u^t
^al^so^{a reaso}ⁿ^a^b^l^{e op}^po^rt^uⁿⁱ^t^y^t^o^kⁿ^o^w^t^h^{e cl}^ai^m^s^o^f^t^h^{e o}^p^p^o^sⁱⁿ^{g part}^y^an^d^t^o^m^eet^t^h^em^.^T^h^{e ri}^gh^t^t^o^sub^mⁱ^t
^a^r^g^u^m^e^nts^im^plie^s^tha^t^opp^or^t^unit^y^{; othe}^r^w^ise^the^rⁱ^g^h^{t m}^a^y^be^a^bar^r^e^{n one}^.”⁾^;^Sa^ng^a^m^on^V^a^l^l^{ey T}^e^l^evi^si^oⁿ^Co^r^p^{. v}^.
^U.^S^.^,²⁶^{9 F}^.²^d²²^1,²²^{4 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁵⁹⁾^;^U^.^{S. Li}^ne^s^v.^FM^C^,⁵⁸⁴^F^.^2d¹⁶^3,¹⁶⁹^-⁷⁰⁽^D^.^C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸³⁾^.
¹⁶³^Pillsb^u^ry^{, Co.}^v.^FTC^{, 35}⁴^F^.^2d⁹⁵²^,⁹⁶^{4 (}⁵^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁶⁶⁾^;^Pe^te^r^Kⁱ^e^w^e^t^Sons^’^C^o^.^v.^U^.^S.^Ar^m^y^C^o^r^p^s^of^En^gine^e^r^s^,
⁷¹⁴^F.^2d¹^63,¹⁶^9-^{70 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸³⁾^.
¹⁶⁴^Pillsb^u^ry^Co.^v.^FTC^,^s^upr^a^,³⁵^{4 F}^.^2d^at⁹⁶⁴^.
¹⁶⁵^Su^pr^aⁿ^o^t^es⁵⁶^-⁶⁰^aⁿ^d^acco^m^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g^t^e^xt^.
¹⁶⁶^Su^pr^aⁿ^o^t^es⁶⁴^-⁶⁵^aⁿ^d^acco^m^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g^t^e^xt^.
¹⁶⁷^Su^pr^aⁿ^o^t^es⁶⁶^-⁷²^aⁿ^d^acco^m^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g^t^e^xt^.
¹⁶⁸^Su^pr^aⁿ^o^t^es⁷³^-⁸¹^aⁿ^d^acco^m^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g^t^e^xt^.

maladministration by the applicant. In short, the courts are looking to see if the agency itself
protected the integrity of its own decisional process.
Gulf Oil, MEUA, FERC and ATX then may be said to be reflective of the marked preference of
the courts for upholding agency action wherever it is on the decisionmaking continuum. It would
appear that unless a decisionmaker in an adjudication is directly contacted with respect to the
merits of the case before him, or the situation involves particularly outrageous and/or pervasive
congressional interference in a rulemaking, informal decisionmaking or investigative context
which actually influences the decisionmaker, it is unlikely that a court will void a challenged
agency action. Indeed, since the Pillsbury decision in 1966, only one challenge based on
adjudicatory interference has been successful (Koniag v. Andrus) and that turned on the fact of a
direct communication by letter to the agency decisionmaker by the chairman of a congressional
committee which pointedly addressed the merits of the pending proceeding. Similarly, only one
rulemaking has been found tainted during that same period (Texas Medical Association v.
Mathews). And in all instances in which a proceeding has been found tainted, the judicial remedy
has been a remand to the agency for reconsideration of the decision in question.
In the final analysis, judicial deference in this area appears to reflect the pragmatic conclusion
that maintenance of Congress’ ability to communicate as freely as possible with the
administrative bureaucracy is essential to sustaining the public acceptability of the modern
administrative state. As one commentator has explained:
^T^h^e^leg^iti^m^a^c^y^an^d^accep^tab^ilit^y^o^f^t^h^e^a^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^r^a^tⁱ^v^e^p^r^o^c^e^s^s^d^e^p^eⁿ^d^s^oⁿ^t^h^e^p^e^r^c^e^p^tⁱ^oⁿ
^of^th^{e pu}^{blic th}^{at th}^{e le}^gⁱ^s^l^a^t^{ure h}^a^s^s^o^m^e^s^o^{rt of}^u^lti^m^a^{te con}^t^{rol ov}^{er th}^{e ag}^en^cies^{. It is}
^t^h^roug^h^t^h^{e C}^ong^ress^t^h^at^t^h^{e adm}ⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ratⁱ^v^e^sy^s^t^e^mⁱ^s^account^abl^e^t^o^t^h^e^p^u^b^lⁱ^c^.^I^f^m^e^m^b^e^r^s
^of^C^ong^res^s^“^b^{e corru}^p^t^,^ot^h^e^rs^m^a^y^be^ch^o^s^en^.”^T^h^{e pu}^blⁱ^c^m^a^yⁿ^o^t^,^h^o^w^e^v^e^r,^di^rect^l^y
^re^m^o^v^e^a^g^en^c^y^offⁱ^cia^l^s^.^T^h^e^pu^{blic look}^s^{to it}^s^po^w^e^{r to el}^{ect repres}^en^tati^v^e^s^as^itsⁱⁿ^put
ⁱⁿ^to^th^{e ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tiv^{e p}^r^o^cess^.^T^h^{e p}^u^b^lic^w^{ill p}^e^r^ceiv^e^r^e^strⁱ^ctioⁿ^s^oⁿ^Coⁿ^g^r^ess’^s^p^o^w^e^r^t^o
ⁱⁿ^f^l^u^eⁿ^{ce a}^g^en^c^y^actioⁿ^a^s^red^u^cin^g^t^h^{e acco}^uⁿ^tab^ilit^y^o^f^ag^eⁿ^c^y^o^f^fⁱ^cial^{s. T}^h^is^w^ill
ⁿ^e^g^a^tⁱ^v^e^l^y^aff^{ect t}^h^{e leg}^iti^m^a^c^y^of^ag^en^c^y^actions^{, as}^w^e^l^l^as^s^e^riou^s^l^y^{erode n}^o^tion^of
^popu^l^a^{r s}^o^v^e^rei^gⁿ^t^y^.^E^v^eⁿ^admⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rat^o^rs^,^w^ho^m^a^yⁿ^o^t^percei^v^e^l^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^tⁱ^v^eⁱⁿ^t^r^u^sⁱ^oⁿ^sⁱⁿ^t^o
^th^{e ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rativ^{e proces}^s^as^bein^g^particu^l^arl^y^desⁱ^ra^{ble, recog}ⁿⁱ^{ze con}^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^al
^s^u^pervⁱ^s^ion^a^s^{a n}^ece^s^s^a^r^y^fu^nctionⁱⁿ^{a de}^m^o^cratic^s^o^ciet^y^.^T^h^{e n}^a^tu^{re of}^t^h^{e g}^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t¹⁶⁹
^requ^ires^th^{at t}^h^{e le}^gⁱ^s^l^at^u^r^e^m^aⁱⁿ^taiⁿ^{a carefu}^l^s^u^perv^is^ion^ov^{er ag}^eⁿ^c^y^actioⁿ^.

This part of the report discusses the ethical considerations and issues which may arise when a
congressional office or a Member of Congress contacts an administrative or regulatory agency or
otherwise intervenes in an administrative matter on behalf of a private constituent or other private
entity with interests affecting the Member’s constituency.
Any discussion of the “ethics” of a Member of Congress intervening in an administrative matter
on behalf of a constituent or other individual must be set within the context of the traditional role
of a Member of Congress, in which the Member is often seen as his or her constituents’ most
immediate elected “representative” to the entire United States Government. Contacting an agency,

¹⁶⁹^Co^mm^en^t,^J^udicⁱ^al^Limⁱ^t^a^tioⁿ^of^C^ongr^e^s^sⁱ^o^nal^Iⁿ^f^l^ue^nc^e^oⁿ^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e^A^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^{, 7}³^N^o^rt^hw^e^s^t^e^{rn L}^.^Re^v^.
⁹³¹^{, 9}⁴¹⁽¹⁹⁷^9)(f^ootn^o^te^{s om}^itte^d).

department or Government bureau, and representing or intervening in administrative matters on
behalf of constituents have often been characterized as among the official responsibilities of
Members of Congress on behalf of those whom they represent, and such “representational”
duties, above and beyond purely “legislative” acts, have evolved as a traditional and longstanding
discretionary practice of Members of Congress.
In discussing the theoretical, as well as the ethical context for these representational activities, the
late Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, in his valued work Ethics in Government, noted that
congressional intervention in the administrative and executive process is grounded firmly in our
concepts of checks and balances in a representative democracy, as well as our natural and
historical distrust, as a nation, of unelected governments:
^Mu^ch^o^f^th^e^m^a^{il a}ⁿ^d^ti^m^e^o^f^m^e^m^b^er^{s o}^f^Coⁿ^g^r^es^{s i}^s^d^e^v^o^ted^to^th^e^r^e^q^u^est^s^o^f
^coⁿ^s^tit^u^eⁿ^t^{s ab}^o^u^t^m^a^tter^s^coⁿ^cerⁿⁱⁿ^g^w^h^ic^h^th^e^y^{, th}^{e co}ⁿ^s^tit^u^eⁿ^t^{s, ar}^{e d}^ealin^g^wⁱ^t^h^th^e
^admⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rati^v^e^ag^eⁿ^cies^of^t^h^{e g}^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^{. In}^coun^tries^do^mⁱⁿ^a^{ted by}^ci^v^{il s}^e^rv^aⁿ^ts^,^s^u^ch^a^s
ⁱ^m^{perial Ger}^m^aⁿ^y^aⁿ^{d to a les}^s^e^{r deg}^r^{ee Great}^B^r^it^aⁱⁿ^,^aⁿ^yⁱⁿ^te^r^v^eⁿ^tⁱ^oⁿ^by^l^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^t^o^r^sⁱⁿ^s^u^ch
^admⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rati^v^e^m^a^t^t^ers^is^s^e^v^e^rel^y^dis^c^ou^rag^e^{d. T}^h^{e bu}^reau^crac^yⁱⁿ^t^h^es^{e coun}^tries^c^oⁿ^t^en^d^s
^th^{at t}^h^{e f}^uⁿ^c^tioⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e le}^gⁱ^sla^t^o^r^{s is to}^m^a^k^e^t^h^{e la}^w^s^aⁿ^d^th^at^o^f^th^{e p}^u^b^{lic ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^to^r^s^is
^to^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^er^th^e^m^{, a}ⁿ^d^th^{at co}ⁿ^s^eq^u^eⁿ^t^l^yⁿ^e^ith^er^s^h^o^u^ldⁱⁿ^ter^f^er^{e w}ⁱ^t^h^th^e^w^o^r^k^o^f^t^h^e^o^t^h^e^r^.
^...^T^h^es^e^m^eⁿ^,^cons^cious^l^y^{or u}ⁿ^c^oⁿ^s^c^io^u^s^l^y^{, reg}^a^{rd th}^{e civ}ⁱ^{l s}^e^rv^{ice off}ⁱ^cial^s^as^dev^o^ted
^pu^{blic serv}^aⁿ^{ts ... [i}ⁿ^con^t^rast^{to] th}^{e “i}^m^p^u^r^e”^{legislator .... [Su}^c^h^a^ttit^u^d^{e] is}^f^o^{stered b}^y
^th^os^e^w^h^o^w^o^u^l^{d create an}^“^a^d^mⁱⁿ^is^trati^v^{e s}^t^{ate” i}ⁿ^w^h^ich^t^h^e^{real directin}^g^p^o^w^e^r^w^o^u^l^d^b^e
^ex^ercis^e^{d b}^y^s^e^l^f^-^s^elec^ting^a^{nd s}^e^lf-^p^erpetu^atiⁿ^g^g^r^ou^{p of off}ⁱ^cials^rath^er^th^aⁿ^b^y^elected
^repres^en^tativ^e^s^of^th^{e people. A}^t^it^s^roots^th^ere^is^{a con}^{cealed bu}^{t deep}^dis^t^r^u^s^t^o^f^d^e^m^o^c^r^a^t^ic
^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^aⁿ^{d de}^m^o^cratⁱ^c^proces^s^e^s^.
* * *
^T^h^{e tr}^u^t^hⁱ^s^th^a^t^legⁱ^slatioⁿ^aⁿ^d^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tioⁿ^s^h^o^u^ldⁿ^o^t^b^e^k^e^p^tⁱⁿ^air^-^ti^g^h^t^an^d
^s^e^{parate com}^p^art^m^en^t^s^{. In}^{order th}^{at each}^g^r^ou^p^m^a^y^perform^it^s^o^wⁿ^j^{ob ade}^q^u^a^tel^y^{, i}^t
^sh^o^u^l^d^wⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^li^mⁱ^t^sⁱⁿ^ter^e^st^it^selfⁱⁿ^t^h^e^w^o^r^k^o^f^th^e^o^t^h^e^r^.^T^h^er^{e is th}^eⁿ^{, a}^so^uⁿ^d^et^hⁱ^cal
^b^a^{sis f}^o^r^legⁱ^slato^r^{s to}^r^e^p^r^esen^{t th}^{e i}ⁿ^ter^e^st^{s o}^f^coⁿ^s^tit^u^eⁿ^t^{s an}^d^o^t^h^e^r^citizeⁿ^{s i}ⁿ^th^eir
^dealⁱⁿ^gs^wⁱ^t^h^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^ratⁱ^v^{e o}^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s^aⁿ^{d bodi}^es^.
^B^e^sⁱ^des^this^e^t^hⁱ^cal^j^u^s^tⁱ^f^icatⁱ^oⁿ^,^th^ere^is^a^practicalⁿ^eces^sⁱ^t^y^f^o^{r it.}^Ou^t^{of a deep}
ⁱⁿ^s^tⁱⁿ^ct^iv^e^wⁱ^s^d^o^m^{, th}^e^Am^eri^can^{people h}^a^v^eⁿ^e^v^e^{r been}^wⁱ^l^ling^{to con}^f^{ide th}^ei^rⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vⁱ^d^u^al
^o^r^co^llectiv^{e d}^e^stiⁿ^{ies to}^ci^v^il^s^e^r^v^an^t^s^o^v^er^w^h^o^m^th^e^y^h^a^v^e^l^{ittle co}ⁿ^t^r^o^{l. T}^h^e^y^dⁱ^str^u^st^an^d
^dis^lik^{e a s}^e^l^f^-^p^erpetu^ating^bu^re^au^crac^y^,^becau^s^e^t^h^e^y^b^e^lⁱ^e^v^e^t^h^a^t^u^l^tim^at^e^l^yⁱ^t^wⁱ^llⁿ^o^t^r^e^f^l^e^c^t
^th^{e bes}^tⁱⁿ^teres^t^s^of^t^h^{e people.}^T^h^ey^t^h^eref^ore^tu^rn^{to th}^eⁱ^{r elected repres}^en^tativ^es^{to prote}^c^t¹⁷⁰
^th^eir^leg^iti^m^a^{te in}^ter^e^{sts i}ⁿ^t^h^eⁱ^r^r^e^latioⁿ^s^hⁱ^p^wⁱ^th^t^h^{e p}^u^b^lic^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^to^r^s^.
The importance of the case-work or service function of representing constituents’ individual
interests before the agencies and officials of the federal executive bureaucracy was recognized
and discussed in an important treatise on congressional ethics authored by the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, Congress and the Public Trust:
^T^h^{e case}^w^o^r^k^o^r^ser^v^ice^f^uⁿ^c^tioⁿ^h^a^{s b}^eco^m^e^a^m^a^j^o^r^r^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ilit^y^o^f^Me^m^b^er^s^o^f
^C^ong^res^s^t^oda^y^.^{In t}^h^{e perf}^or^m^aⁿ^c^e^{of t}^hⁱ^s^fun^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^{a S}^eⁿ^a^t^o^{r or R}^e^pres^en^t^a^tⁱ^v^eⁿ^e^g^o^tⁱ^a^t^e^s

¹⁷⁰^D^oug^la^s^,^P^a^ul^H^.,^E^t^hⁱ^{cs i}ⁿ^Go^ve^rn^men^t^,^a^t^85-^{88 (}^C^a^m^br^idg^e¹⁹⁵²⁾^;^see^a^l^{so disc}^ussionⁱⁿ^Se^na^te^Com^m^itte^e^P^r^int,
^“^E^thic^a^l^Staⁿ^da^r^d^sⁱⁿ^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt,”^R^e^por^t^of^a^Subc^om^m^itte^e^of^t^h^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on L}^a^bor^aⁿ^d^Publi^c^W^e^l^f^a^r^e^,^82d^st
^C^ong^{., 1}^Se^s^s^.²⁸^-³^{0 (}¹⁹⁵¹⁾^.

ⁱⁿ^hⁱ^{s co}ⁿ^s^tit^u^eⁿ^t^’^s^b^e^h^a^lf^a^wh^o^l^{e r}^aⁿ^g^{e o}^f^p^r^o^b^l^e^m^s^aⁿ^d^dⁱ^f^f^ic^u^lties^t^h^{at ar}ⁱ^s^{e o}^u^t^o^f^t^h^eir
^r^e^l^a^tⁱ^o^ns^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^e^Fe^d^e^r^a^l^go^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt^.^T^hⁱ^s^c^a^{n i}^nvo^l^v^e^t^h^e^M^e^m^b^e^rⁱⁿ^he^l^pⁱⁿ^{g t}^o^o^b^t^aⁱ^{n a}
^f^e^{deral con}^t^{ract f}^o^{r h}ⁱ^s^dis^t^ri^{ct, in}^terceding^on^beh^a^l^f^of^{a s}^e^lectiv^e^s^e^rv^{ice regis}^t^raⁿ^t^,
ⁱⁿ^qu^iriⁿ^g^w^h^y^{a cons}^tit^u^eⁿ^t^’^s^{Social Secu}^rit^y^c^h^ec^k^h^a^sⁿ^o^t^been^deliv^{ered, s}^e^ttin^g^u^p^a
^m^eetiⁿ^g^wⁱ^th^{a Federal of}^fⁱ^cia^l^{, an}^{d arran}^gⁱ^ng^f^o^{r a tou}^r^of^th^e^W^h^{ite Hou}^s^{e f}^o^{r an}^im^p^o^r^t^aⁿ^t¹⁷¹
^c^o^nstⁱ^t^ue^nt^.
The practice of intervening in administrative and executive matters on behalf of constituents and
other individuals has, therefore, not been perceived historically in the United States as an
inherently wrongful act, necessarily involving undue or improper “political” influence over
executive or administrative matters, but rather has customarily been seen as a discretionary, and
arguably, an expected function of one’s representative in Congress. The House Committee on
Standards of Official Conduct, for example, advises Members and employees of the House that:
“An important aspect of a House Member’s representative function is to act as a ‘go-between’ or ¹⁷²
conduit between his constituents and administrative agencies of the Federal Government.”
Similarly, the Senate Select Committee on Ethics has stated that: “It is a necessary function of a
Senator’s office to intervene with officials of the executive branch and independent regulatory ¹⁷³
agencies on behalf of individuals when the facts warrant ....”
There are, of course, opportunities and potential for abuse in this area, and there are, therefore,
statutory as well as ethical restraints and considerations in relation to such activities, as there are
for most official activities and duties of Members of Congress and their staff. The most prominent
and clear restriction is upon the receipt of compensation or anything of value in return for, or
because of, such representational activity.
The Supreme Court of the United States in 1905 had occasion to rule on the propriety of a United
States Senator intervening in an executive matter, and noted that such activity, although not
required of a Member, is within the Member’s discretion, may be done “without impropriety,”
and is not violative of statutory restraints as long as no compensation is accepted for the activity.
The Court in Burton v. United States, in ruling that a statute barring a Senator from receiving
compensation for representing an individual before the agencies of the Government did not
unduly interfere with a Member’s constitutional duties to represent and present his views before
those agencies, explained:
^A^s^t^at^u^t^e^lik^e^th^e^on^{e be}^f^o^{re us}^{... can}^{be e}^x^ecuted^wⁱ^t^h^ou^tⁱⁿ^any^deg^r^{ee ... i}ⁿ^terf^eriⁿ^g^wⁱ^t^h
^th^{e d}ⁱ^sch^a^r^g^{e o}^f^th^{e le}^g^iti^m^a^te^d^u^{ties o}^f^{a Sen}^a^to^r^.^T^h^{e p}^r^o^p^er^dⁱ^sch^a^r^g^{e o}^f^t^h^o^s^{e d}^u^tie^s^d^o^e^s
ⁿ^o^{t requ}^{ire a Se}ⁿ^a^{tor to appear bef}^o^{re an}^ex^ec^u^tⁱ^v^{e Depart}^m^e^{nt i}ⁿ^{order to en}^f^o^rce^hⁱ^s
^partⁱ^c^u^l^{ar v}ⁱ^e^w^s^,^{or t}^h^{e v}ⁱ^e^w^s^of^ot^h^e^rs^{, i}ⁿ^res^p^ect^of^m^a^t^t^e^rs^com^mⁱ^t^t^e^{d t}^o^t^h^at^D^e^part^m^eⁿ^t
^f^o^{r det}^e^rmⁱⁿ^atⁱ^oⁿ^.^H^e^m^a^y^of^t^eⁿ^{do s}^o^wⁱ^t^h^outⁱ^m^propri^e^t^y^{, an}^{d, as}^f^a^{r as}^exⁱ^s^tⁱⁿ^g^l^a^wⁱ^s
^con^cern^e^d,^m^a^y^{do s}^o^w^h^eⁿ^e^v^{er h}^e^ch^oos^e^s^{, prov}^{ided h}^eⁿ^e^it^h^e^{r ag}^rees^{to receiv}^eⁿ^o^r¹⁷⁴
^receiv^e^s^co^m^p^eⁿ^s^a^tioⁿ^f^o^{r s}^u^c^h^s^e^rvices^.

¹⁷¹^A^s^s^o^cⁱ^a^{tion of}^the^B^a^r^of^the^Cⁱ^t^y^o^f^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{, Spe}^cⁱ^a^l^C^o^m^m^itt^e^e^{on C}^o^ng^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l Et}^hic^s^,^C^o^ng^r^e^s^s^{and t}^h^e
^Public^Trust,^a^t¹⁰^(N^e^w^Y^o^rk¹⁹^70).
¹⁷²^Ethic^s^M^a^nu^{al f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^e^r^s^,^O^ffic^e^r^s^,^{and Em}^plo^{yees o}^f^t^h^{e U.}^S^.^Ho^u^s^{e o}^f^R^e^p^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^ves^{, C}^o^m^m^itte^e^on
^Sta^nda^r^d^s^of^O^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^C^onduc^t,¹⁰²^nd^C^ong^{., 2}^d^Se^s^s^.²⁴^{1 (}¹⁹⁹³⁾^.
¹⁷³^{S. R}^p^{t. N}^o^{. 1}^02-²²^3,¹⁰^2d^C^o^ng^{., 1}^st^Se^s^s^.,^Iⁿ^v^e^s^tigat^io^{n o}^f^Seⁿ^a^t^o^r^Alan^C^r^ans^t^oⁿ^{, a}^t^{14 (}¹⁹⁹¹⁾^.
¹⁷⁴²⁰²^U.^S.³⁴^4,³⁶^{7 (}¹⁹⁰⁵⁾^.

The initial ethical considerations thus concern the receipt of things of value by a Member or staff
from persons or organizations on whose behalf interventions before or inquiries to federal
agencies were made. Prudence and caution must, of course, be exercised by Members of
Congress and staff in accepting gifts at any time from private individuals or groups, and even
more so in accepting any gifts, offers of entertainment, or other things of value which could be
interpreted as a reward, payment or additional compensation for doing one’s official duties in
assisting constituents or others in matters before federal agencies. Since campaign contributions
are a more common, and arguably a more acceptable and necessary monetary transfer from
private individuals to Members of Congress than are outright gifts, some of the more common,
but difficult questions in this area concern the receipt, acceptance, or solicitation of campaign
contributions from those whom the Member or his or her staff has assisted in matters before
federal agencies.
In addition to statutory and rule restrictions relating to such things as the receipt of payments or
gifts in return for representational activity, or concerning a Member’s or staff’s own personal
interest in a matter, there are also general ethical considerations and guidelines which are
concerned with the prevention of undue or improper influence by those in the legislative branch
over the duties and functions of executive officers and employees, separate from the issue of
compensation or reward. These considerations and guidelines are based in some respects on the
separation of powers doctrine, as well as on the notions of due process and fairness in
administrative proceedings, and the issues of the use or abuse of political influence over matters
which are expected to be based substantially on competitive, merit principles, or which are to be ¹⁷⁵
decided strictly on particular statutory or regulatory criteria. Executive or administrative
decisions on some matters, such as certain federal contracts or hiring in the civil service, are often
expressly required to be made on a competitive, merit basis, and may be expressly required not to
be made on the basis of political affiliation or influence.
The House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct in 1973 incorporated several generally
accepted ethical standards and principles into an advisory opinion on Members’ offices dealing
with the administrative agencies of the Federal Government. Advisory Opinion No. 1, “On the
Role of a Member of the House of Representatives in Communicating With Executive and
Independent Agencies,” provides, in part, as follows:
^R^E^P^R^ES^ENT^A^T^I^ONS
^T^h^is^C^o^m^m^{ittee is}^of^t^h^{e opin}ⁱ^on^th^{at a Me}^m^b^{er of}^th^{e Hous}^{e of}^R^e^pres^en^tatⁱ^v^e^s^,^eit^h^e^r
^oⁿ^hⁱ^{s o}^wⁿⁱⁿ^itiatⁱ^v^e^o^r^{at t}^h^e^r^e^q^u^{est o}^f^{a p}^e^titioⁿ^e^r^,^m^a^y^p^r^o^p^e^r^l^y^co^m^m^uⁿⁱ^cate^wⁱ^t^h^aⁿ
^Ex^ecu^tⁱ^v^e^{or In}^depen^d^en^{t a}^g^eⁿ^c^y^oⁿ^any^m^a^t^t^{er to:}
^R^e^qu^es^tⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^{or a s}^t^at^us^report^;
^U^r^g^e^prom^pt^consⁱ^d^eratⁱ^oⁿ^;

¹⁷⁵^Fe^de^ra^{l c}^a^s^e^la^w^c^onc^e^r^ningⁿ^o^ti^ons^of^due^pr^oc^e^{ss a}^nd^unf^aⁱ^{r c}^oⁿ^g^r^e^ssiona^{l or “}^p^olitic^a^l^”ⁱⁿ^te^rf^e^r^eⁿ^c^eⁱⁿ
^a^d^mⁱ^nistra^tiv^e^m^a^tte^r^s^a^r^e^disc^usse^{d in}^P^a^r^t^II^of^{this re}^por^t.

^A^r^r^aⁿ^g^e^f^o^rⁱⁿ^ter^v^ie^w^s^o^r^ap^p^oⁱⁿ^t^m^eⁿ^t^s^;
^Ex^pres^s^j^u^dgm^en^t^;
^{Call f}^o^r^r^ecoⁿ^s^id^er^atioⁿ^o^f^an^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^ti^v^e^r^e^sp^oⁿ^se^w^h^ic^h^h^e^b^e^lie^v^e^{s is}ⁿ^o^t
^s^u^pport^e^{d by}^es^t^a^blⁱ^s^h^e^{d l}^a^w^,^F^e^deral^R^e^gu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^{or l}^e^gⁱ^s^l^atⁱ^v^{e i}ⁿ^t^eⁿ^t^;
^P^e^r^f^o^r^m^an^y^o^t^h^e^r^ser^v^ice^o^f^{a s}ⁱ^m^ilarⁿ^a^tu^r^eⁱⁿ^t^h^is^ar^ea^co^m^p^atib^le^wⁱ^t^h^th^e
^cr^iterⁱ^{a h}^e^r^eⁱⁿ^a^f^ter^ex^p^r^essedⁱⁿ^thⁱ^s^A^d^vⁱ^so^r^y^Opⁱⁿ^ioⁿ^.
^PR^I^N^C^I^PL^E^S^T^O^BE^O^B^S^E^R^V^E^D
^T^h^{e ov}^eral^l^pu^blⁱ^cⁱⁿ^t^e^rest^{, n}^a^t^u^ral^l^y^,ⁱ^s^pri^m^ar^y^t^o^anyⁱⁿ^di^vⁱ^du^al^m^a^t^t^{er an}^{d sh}^ou^l^d^be
^s^o^con^s^idered.^T^h^{ere are}^als^o^o^t^h^e^{r s}^e^l^f^-^e^vⁱ^dent^s^t^aⁿ^d^a^r^d^s^o^f^o^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^c^oⁿ^d^u^c^t^w^hⁱ^c^h^M^e^m^b^e^r^s
^sh^o^u^l^d^u^p^h^o^ld^w^ith^r^e^g^a^r^d^to^t^h^{ese co}^m^m^uⁿ^icatioⁿ^s^{. T}^h^e^Co^m^m^{ittee b}^e^lie^v^e^s^th^e^f^o^llo^wⁱⁿ^g
^t^o^{be bas}ⁱ^c:
¹^.^A^Me^m^b^er^’^s^r^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ili^t^yⁱⁿ^t^h^{is ar}^{ea i}^s^to^all^hⁱ^s^coⁿ^s^t^itu^eⁿ^{ts eq}^u^a^ll^y^an^d^sh^o^u^ld^b^e
^p^u^r^s^u^e^d^wⁱ^t^h^d^ilig^eⁿ^{ce ir}^r^e^sp^e^c^tiv^{e o}^f^p^o^{litical o}^r^o^t^h^e^r^coⁿ^s^id^er^atioⁿ^s^.
²^.^Dir^{ect o}^r^im^p^lied^s^u^g^g^es^ti^oⁿ^o^f^eit^h^er^f^a^v^o^r^itis^m^o^r^r^e^p^r^{isal in}^ad^v^aⁿ^{ce o}^f^{, o}^r
^s^u^bs^eq^u^eⁿ^t^{to, action}^ta^k^e^{n by}^t^h^{e ag}^eⁿ^c^y^con^t^{acted i}^s^unw^arran^t^{ed abu}^s^{e o}^f^th^e
^r^e^p^r^esen^tativ^{e r}^o^le.
³^.^A^Me^m^b^er^sh^o^u^ld^m^a^k^e^e^v^e^r^y^e^f^f^o^r^t^to^assu^r^e^th^{at r}^e^p^r^esen^tatioⁿ^s^m^a^d^eⁱⁿ^hⁱ^{s n}^a^m^e
^by^aⁿ^y^s^t^a^f^f^e^m^pl^o^y^{ee conf}^or^m^t^o^hⁱ^sⁱⁿ^s^t^ru^ctⁱ^oⁿ^.
The Senate adopted in 1992 a specific Senate Rule dealing with constituent service and
intervention into administrative matters. This Rule was adopted after the Senate Select
Committee on Ethics conducted disciplinary proceedings concerning five Senators and their
personal interventions into executive branch investigations of failed savings and loan institutions.
The Senate Rule, at Rule 43, provides:
^C^O^N^S^TI^TU^E^N^{T S}^E^R^V^I^C^E
¹^.^Iⁿ^r^e^sp^oⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^to^p^e^titioⁿ^s^f^o^r^assistaⁿ^{ce, a Me}^m^b^er^o^f^th^e^Sen^a^te,^actin^g^dⁱ^r^ectl^y^o^r
^th^r^o^u^g^h^e^m^p^l^o^y^{ees, h}^a^{s th}^{e r}ⁱ^g^h^t^to^assⁱ^{st p}^e^titioⁿ^e^r^s^b^e^f^o^r^e^ex^ecu^ti^v^e^an^dⁱⁿ^d^e^p^eⁿ^d^eⁿ^t
^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^offⁱ^cia^l^s^an^{d a}^g^encies^.
²^.^A^t^th^{e r}^e^q^u^e^s^{t o}^f^{a p}^e^titioⁿ^e^r^,^{a Mem}^b^er^o^f^th^e^Sen^a^{te, o}^r^{a Sen}^a^{te e}^m^p^l^o^y^ee,^m^a^y
^com^m^unicate^wⁱ^t^h^an^ex^ec^u^tⁱ^v^{e or in}^depen^d^en^{t g}^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt off}ⁱ^{cial or ag}^eⁿ^cy^on^aⁿ^y^m^a^t^t^e^r
^to^:
⁽^a⁾^r^e^q^u^{est in}^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^o^r^{a st}^atu^s^r^e^p^o^r^t;
^{(b) u}^r^g^e^prom^pt^con^sⁱ^d^eratⁱ^on;
^{(c) arran}^g^e^f^o^{r i}ⁿ^t^e^rvi^e^w^s^{or appoi}ⁿ^t^m^e^nt^s^;
^{(d) ex}^pres^s^j^u^dgm^ent^s^;

^{(e) call f}^o^{r recon}^s^{ideration of}^aⁿ^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rati^v^e^res^pon^s^e^w^h^ic^h^t^h^{e Me}^m^b^er
^belⁱ^e^v^e^sⁱ^sⁿ^o^t^reas^on^abl^e^su^pport^e^d^by^s^t^at^u^t^es^{, regu}^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^or^con^sⁱ^d^eratⁱ^oⁿ^s^of
^equⁱ^t^y^{or pu}^blⁱ^c^polⁱ^c^y^;^or
^(f^{) perf}^or^m^aⁿ^y^ot^h^e^{r s}^e^r^vⁱ^ce^of^{a s}ⁱ^mⁱ^l^a^rⁿ^a^t^u^{re con}^sⁱ^s^t^eⁿ^t^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e prov}ⁱ^sⁱ^ons^of
^th^{is r}^u^le.
³^.^T^h^{e d}^ecisioⁿ^to^p^r^o^v^id^{e a}^s^sⁱ^stan^ce^to^p^e^titioⁿ^e^r^s^m^a^yⁿ^o^t^b^e^m^a^d^e^oⁿ^t^h^{e b}^a^si^{s o}^f
^con^t^ri^bu^tⁱ^ons^{or s}^e^rvⁱ^ces^{, or pr}^omⁱ^s^e^s^of^con^t^ri^bu^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^{or s}^e^rvi^ces^{, t}^o^t^h^{e Me}^m^b^er’^s^polⁱ^tⁱ^c^a^l
^ca^m^p^aigⁿ^s^o^r^to^o^t^h^e^r^o^r^g^aⁿⁱ^zatioⁿ^sⁱⁿ^w^h^ic^h^t^h^{e Me}^m^b^er^h^a^{s a}^p^o^{litical, p}^e^r^s^oⁿ^al,^o^r
^fⁱⁿ^aⁿ^c^ia^{l in}^ter^e^st.
^{4. A}^Me^m^b^{er s}^h^all^m^a^k^e^{a reas}^on^{able eff}^o^{rt to as}^s^u^{re th}^a^t^repres^en^tations^m^a^{de i}ⁿ^t^h^e
^Me^m^b^er’sⁿ^a^m^e^b^y^aⁿ^y^Se^{nate e}^m^plo^y^ee^{are acc}^u^r^{ate a}ⁿ^{d conf}^or^m^{to th}^e^Me^m^b^er^’^s
ⁱⁿ^str^u^ctioⁿ^s^an^d^to^th^{is r}^u^le.
⁵^.^No^thⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^t^h^{is r}^u^{le s}^h^{all b}^e^coⁿ^s^tr^u^e^d^to^li^m^{it t}^h^{e au}^t^h^o^r^it^y^o^f^Me^m^b^er^{s, an}^d^Seⁿ^a^te
^e^m^p^l^o^y^{ees, to}^p^e^r^f^o^r^m^le^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e, in}^cl^u^dⁱⁿ^g^co^m^mⁱ^{ttee, r}^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ilitie^s.
One of the more fundamental ethical concerns and direct prohibitions concerning administrative
intervention, or any other “casework” function by a congressional office, relates to the receipt of
things of value in connection with such services. Depending on the circumstances of the receipt
of money, gifts or contributions, and the “nexus” of such items of value to the services performed
or agreed to be performed by a Member or staff, such conduct may implicate various criminal
laws as well as ethical rules and guidelines.
The federal bribery law at 18 U.S.C. §201 provides criminal penalties for any public official who
“corruptly” seeks, accepts, or agrees to receive anything of value “personally or for any other ¹⁷⁶
person or entity, in return for being influenced in the performance of any official act ....” Within
the bribery statute is also the so-called “illegal gratuities” clause, discussed below, which
penalizes a public official who, other than as provided by law, agrees to accept anything of value ¹⁷⁷
personally “for or because of” any official act performed or to be performed.
The bribery provision of federal law requires in the first place that “anything of value” be
corruptly sought or received in return for being influenced in an official act. The term “anything
of value” is interpreted broadly, and could include cash, gifts, discounts, or even campaign
contributions, “because the words ‘anything of value’ comprehend anything that conceivably can ¹⁷⁸
be offered or given as a bribe.”

¹⁷⁶^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§²⁰¹⁽^b)⁽²⁾⁽^A⁾^.
¹⁷⁷^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§²⁰¹⁽^c⁾⁽¹⁾⁽^B⁾^.
¹⁷⁸^H^.^{R. Rpt}^.^N^o^{. 7}^48,⁸⁷^th^Cong^.,¹^st^S^e^ss.¹⁸⁽¹⁹⁶¹⁾^,^t^o^acco^m^p^an^y^H.^R.⁸¹⁴⁰^,^t^h^{e m}^a^j^o^{r revi}^si^oⁿ^an^{d reco}^dⁱ^fⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^o^f
^the^f^e^de^r^a^{l br}^ibe^r^y^a^{nd c}^onf^lic^{t of}^inte^r^e^s^t^la^w^s^{in 19}⁶²^,^P^.^L^.^87-⁸⁴^{9; s}^e^e^a^l^s^o^Unite^{d S}^t^ate^s^v^.^W^illi^a^m^s,⁷⁰^{5 F.}^2d⁶^03,
⁶²²^-⁶^{23 (}²^d^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸³⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁴^{64 U}^.^S.¹⁰^07;^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^Gⁱ^r^a^r^d^,⁶⁰^{1 F}^.²^d⁶⁹^,⁷¹⁽²^{d C}ⁱ^r^.⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,
⁴⁴⁴^U^.^S.⁸^{71 (}¹⁹⁷⁹⁾^.

The bribery provisions, furthermore, cover things of value such as gifts, bequests or contributions
which are sought not only for oneself (as is an “illegal gratuity”), but also things of value which
are sought for third parties, that is, “for any other person or entity.” As noted in the legislative
history of this provision: “This subsection also forbids an attempt to influence a public official by
an offer or promise of something of value which will be to the advantage of somebody else in ¹⁷⁹
whose well-being he may be interested.” Contributions of funds or things of value to third
parties and other entities such as to campaign committees or to charitable foundations, may thus ¹⁸⁰
be covered by the statute when the other elements of the law are satisfied.
The operative crux of the bribery statute specifically requires that the thing of value be
“corruptly” received or sought by the public official “in return for being influenced” in the
performance of an official act. The central element of intent which is characteristic of a bribe is ¹⁸¹
thus a “corrupt” or wrongful bargain or agreement, often described as some express or implied
quid pro quo, that is, a corrupt or wrongful understanding or agreement to do something in return ¹⁸²
for something else. For a bribe to occur, the bribe must be shown to be the “prime mover or ¹⁸³
producer of the official act” performed or promised to be performed. General contributions,
donations or payments to causes, entities or to other persons, or so-called “goodwill” payments,
which are given to create a favorable atmosphere or feeling of gratitude in the recipient, or with
“some generalized hope or expectation of ultimate benefit on the part of the donor,” but which are
not given nor received in the context of any express or implied agreement to perform some
official act, that is, without a specific quid pro quo, are not considered “bribes” under the ¹⁸⁴
statute.
Within the federal bribery statute is the so-called “illegal gratuities” clause at 18 U.S.C. §201(c). ¹⁸⁵
This provision has been found to be a “lesser included offense” of a “bribe,” and does not
require a “corrupt” intent for a violation. The different intent elements for an illegal gratuity, that
is, the absence of a required “corrupt” intent, and the absence of a need to show an intent to
influence or be influenced, are among the principal distinctions between a bribe and an illegal
gratuity.

¹⁷⁹^H^.^{R. Rpt}^.^N^o^{. 7}^48,^sup^r^a^a^t^18.
¹⁸⁰^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^K^e^lly^,⁷⁴^{8 F}^.²^d⁶⁹¹^,⁶⁹^{9 (}^D^.^C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁴⁾^;^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^{es v.}^Go^mez,⁸^{07 F.2}^d¹⁵^23,¹⁵²⁷⁽¹⁰^th^Cir.
¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^.
¹⁸¹^T^h^{e cri}^mⁱⁿ^alⁱⁿ^t^eⁿ^t^o^f^“co^rru^pt^l^y^{” seeki}ⁿ^{g o}^r^agreeiⁿ^g^t^o^accep^t^so^met^hⁱⁿ^{g o}^f^val^u^{e i}ⁿ^ret^u^rⁿ^f^o^{r b}^eⁱⁿ^{g i}ⁿ^f^l^u^eⁿ^cedⁱⁿ
^aⁿ^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^a^c^t^“^b^e^s^pe^a^k^{s a}^hig^h^e^r^de^g^r^e^e^of^c^rⁱ^m^ina^l^k^now^le^dge^a^{nd p}^u^rp^ose^”^thaⁿ^doe^{s t}^h^e^so-c^a^lle^{d “}^ille^g^a^l
^g^r^a^t^uitie^s”^c^l^a^u^se^of^the^bribe^r^y^la^w^.^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^B^r^ewst^er,⁵⁰⁶^F.2^d⁶²^,⁷¹^(D^.C.Cir.¹⁹⁷⁴⁾^.^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^H^s^ie^h^th
^{Hui M}^e^{i Che}ⁿ^,⁷^{54 F.2}^d⁸¹^{7, 82}²⁽⁹^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁵⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁴⁷¹^U^.^{S. 1}¹³⁹⁽¹⁹⁸⁵⁾^.^T^h^e^H^ous^e^R^e^por^t^on^the^br^ibe^r^y
^pr^ov^is^io^{n r}^e^c^odifⁱ^e^dⁱⁿ¹⁹⁶²^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^{d t}^h^e^w^o^r^d^“^c^o^r^r^u^ptly^”^{to m}^e^{an “}^w^{ith w}^r^ong^f^u^{l or}^dis^h^one^s^tⁱⁿ^t^e^nt.”^H^.^R^.^R^p^{t. N}^o^.
^87-⁷⁴^8,^sup^r^a^a^t¹⁸^.
¹⁸²^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^S^un-^Dⁱ^am^on^{d G}^r^ow^e^r^s^{of C}^a^l^iforⁿ^ia^,⁵^{26 U}^.^S.³⁹^{8, 4}⁰⁴⁽¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^;^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es v.}^B^r^ewst^er,^su^p^r^a^at
^{62, 72}^;^Unⁱ^t^ed^St^a^t^{es v.}^T^o^mblⁱⁿ^,^{46 F.3}^d¹³^69,¹³⁷⁹⁽⁵^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Ar^th^ur^,⁵⁴^{4 F}^.²^d⁷^30,⁷^34,⁷³⁵^th
⁽⁴^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.
¹⁸³^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Br^e^w^s^t^e^r^{, s}^upr^a^a^t^72,⁸²^.
¹⁸⁴^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^J^o^hⁿ^s^oⁿ^,⁶²^{1 F.}^2d¹⁰^73,¹⁰⁷⁶⁽¹⁰^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁰⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Ar^th^ur^{, s}^u^pr^a^a^t⁷³^{4, 7}³⁵^;^Unⁱ^t^ed
^State^s^v^.^A^lleⁿ^,¹⁰^F.^3d⁴^05,⁴^{11 (}⁷^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹³⁾^;^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^State^s^v^.^To^m^b^lin,^s^upr^a^a^t¹³^79.
¹⁸⁵^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Br^e^w^s^t^e^r^{, s}^upr^a^a^t^68-^76.

What is required for a violation of the illegal gratuities clause is that a public official receive or ¹⁸⁶
seek something of value, other than as provided by law, “personally” (or “for himself”), “for or
because of” an “official act” done or to be done by him. There does not have to be an express ¹⁸⁷
quid pro quo or a corrupt bargain for an illegal gratuity, but the thing of value must be received
for the official, and must be “for or because of” an official act done or to be done, that is,
connected in some way to some official duty or function. An illegal gratuity may be received
even after an official act is performed, as a “thank you” or in appreciation for doing an act that
would have been done in any event, uninfluenced by the gratuity; while a bribe, on the other
hand, must be shown to be the “prime mover” influencing the act.
Although no specific wrongful bargain, or “corrupt” intent, in receiving an illegal gratuity need
be shown, there is a criminal intent required of an illegal gratuity which would distinguish this
wrongful receipt of a payment from a mere gift unrelated to any official act, or from such things
as lawful campaign contributions given to an elected public official “because of” his stand, vote,
or position on an issue. The intent has been described by one court as the knowledge that one is
being compensated or rewarded for a particular official act or acts:
^...[U]n^d^{er th}^{e g}^r^atuⁱ^t^y^s^ection^,^“^o^th^er^wⁱ^s^e^t^h^an^a^s^prov^{ided by}^la^w^{... f}^o^{r or becau}^s^e^of^aⁿ^y
^of^fⁱ^cia^l^{act” carries}^th^{e con}^{cept of}^th^{e of}^fⁱ^ci^a^l^act^beiⁿ^g^don^{e anyw}^a^y^{, bu}^t^t^h^{e pa}^y^m^eⁿ^t^on^l^y
^bein^g^m^a^{de becau}^s^e^of^{a s}^p^ecificall^y^iden^tⁱ^fⁱ^{ed act, an}^d^w^ith^a^certain^gu^ilt^y^kn^o^w^ledg^{e bes}^t
^defⁱⁿ^e^{d b}^y^t^h^e^Su^pre^m^e^C^o^u^r^tⁱ^t^s^el^f^,^i.e.^,^“^wⁱ^t^h^kno^w^l^e^d^ge^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^d^oⁿ^o^r^w^a^{s p}^a^yi^ng^hi^m
^com^p^eⁿ^s^a^tⁱ^on^f^o^{r an}^offⁱ^cia^l^{act ... ev}^iden^{ce of}^th^{e Me}^m^b^er’^s^kn^o^w^ledg^{e o}^f^th^{e alle}^g^e^d¹⁸⁸
^b^r^ib^er^’^s^{illicit r}^easoⁿ^s^f^o^r^p^a^yⁱⁿ^g^t^h^e^m^oⁿ^e^y^{is s}^u^f^f^icien^t^.”
While some cases in the circuits had gone so far as to find that a specific official act need not be
contemplated or identified for a payment or compensation to constitute an “illegal gratuity” as
long as payments were given to a recipient who is in a “position to use his authority in a manner ¹⁸⁹
which could affect the gift giver,” the Supreme Court in Sun-Diamond in 1999 clarified that
such so-called “status gifts,” unconnected to any identified official act, were not a violation of the ¹⁹⁰
illegal gratuities provision.
In addition to the intent requirement, under the illegal gratuities clause it must be shown that the
compensation received by the public official was received “personally,” or as stated in the earlier
version of the law, “for himself.” If things of value are directed to independent third parties or
entities, such payments might not be considered to have been received or sought with the
requisite intent to “compensate” the public official “personally” for his acts, because they were ¹⁹¹
not received by the official “for himself” or “personally,” but rather by another entity or person.

¹⁸⁶^T^h^e^s^t^a^t^ute^w^a^s^am^e^nde^{d in}¹⁹⁸⁶^,^P^.^L^.⁹⁹^-⁶^46,^§⁴⁶⁽^f⁾^,(^g⁾^{, 1}⁰⁰^Sta^t^{. 36}⁰¹^-³⁶⁰⁴^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^10,¹⁹^86,^to^pr^ov^ide
^t^echⁿⁱ^cal^am^en^d^m^en^t^s^t^o^t^h^{e cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^co^d^e^,ⁱⁿ^cl^u^dⁱⁿ^g^ch^an^giⁿ^g^t^h^e^t^e^{rms “}^f^o^r^hⁱ^m^s^el^f^”^t^o^“p^ersoⁿ^a^l^l^y^.^{” T}^h^{ere i}^sⁿ^o
ⁱⁿ^dⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^anⁱⁿ^t^eⁿ^t^t^o^ch^an^{ge t}^h^{e su}^b^s^t^aⁿ^ce^o^f^t^h^{e el}^emen^t^s^o^f^t^h^{e o}^f^f^eⁿ^s^e,^an^d^t^h^eref^o^r^{e i}ⁿ^t^hⁱ^s^re^p^o^r^t^t^h^{e t}^e^rm^s
^“p^ersoⁿ^a^l^l^y^{” an}^d^“f^o^r^hⁱ^m^s^el^{f” ar}^{e u}^s^edⁱⁿ^t^e^rch^aⁿ^g^eab^l^y^.
¹⁸⁷^B^r^ewst^er,^su^p^r^a^at⁷²^;^S^un-^Dⁱ^am^ond^{, s}^u^pr^a^a^t⁴⁰^{4 -}⁴⁰^5.
¹⁸⁸^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Br^e^w^s^t^e^r^{, s}^upr^a^a^t^81,⁸²^,^qu^oting^f^r^om^e^a^r^lie^r^Supr^e^m^e^C^our^{t de}^cⁱ^sⁱ^onⁱⁿ^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.
^B^r^ewst^er,^{408 U}^.^S.⁵⁰^1,⁵²^{7 (}¹⁹⁷²⁾^.
¹⁸⁹^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^Ni^ed^erb^e^rg^er^{, 5}^{80 F.2}^d^63,⁶⁹⁽³^rd^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁴³^{9 U}^.^S^.⁹⁸⁰⁽¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^v^.
^Alle^ssio^,⁵²^{8 F}^.²^d¹⁰⁷⁹^,¹⁰⁸²⁽⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed,⁴²⁶^U^.^S.⁹⁴⁽¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.
¹⁹⁰^Su^n-^Dⁱ^am^on^{d, s}^u^pr^a^{at 40}⁶^-⁴¹^0.
¹⁹¹^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Br^e^w^s^t^e^r^{, s}^upr^a^a^t^77.

Members of Congress, as well as all other officers and employees of the government, are
prohibited under the provisions of a conflict of interest statute at 18 U.S.C. §203(a) from
receiving or sharing in any private “compensation” for “representational services” rendered by
themselves or another for a private party before any agency of the United States Government. The
required proof of “compensation” for services rendered, the necessary intent, and the evils at ¹⁹²
which the statute are directed, are similar to the “illegal gratuities” clause of the bribery statute.
That is, “corrupt” intent is not required to be proven, but it is required to show that ¹⁹³
“compensation” was knowingly received for the services rendered.
In May v. United States, supra, a Member of Congress who was the Chairman of the Military
Affairs Committee contacted the War Department about military contracts to a private firm, after
having received complaints from the owners and officers of that firm that the War Department
was being unfair and discriminatory towards them. The court found that regardless of “whether
the complaints were or were not well-founded,” and regardless of whether or not the contacts and
intercession by the Member “were patriotic, legitimate and within the scope of his legitimate
duties as a Congressman,” the statute in question would be violated by receiving private ¹⁹⁴
compensation for such activities. The court thus found that the services may have been
“proper,” but the compensation for them was not:
^It^w^a^s^alle^g^e^{d th}^{at on}^num^erous^occas^ion^s^Ma^y^telep^h^on^{ed, called pers}^on^all^y^or^w^r^ote
^of^fⁱ^cia^l^s^of^t^h^{e W}^a^{r Depart}^m^eⁿ^tⁱⁿ^res^p^{ect to t}^h^es^e^m^a^tterⁱⁿ^w^h^ic^h^t^h^{e Gars}^s^oⁿ^s^w^e^re
ⁱⁿ^teres^t^{ed, an}^{d brou}^g^h^{t h}ⁱ^s^of^fⁱ^{cial pres}^tig^{e an}^dⁱⁿ^fl^ue^nc^e^t^o^b^e^a^r^up^oⁿ^t^hos^e^of^fi^cersⁱⁿ^order
^t^o^prom^ot^{e t}^h^{e i}ⁿ^t^e^res^t^s^of^t^h^{e G}^a^rs^s^ons^.
* * *
^If^t^h^e^m^oⁿ^e^y^w^a^s^recei^v^e^{d by}^Ma^y^a^s^co^m^p^eⁿ^s^a^tioⁿ^f^o^{r a}^c^ts^don^{e b}^y^hⁱ^m^f^o^{r th}^e
^Gar^ssoⁿ^s^{, it is i}^m^m^a^terⁱ^{al t}^h^at^th^o^s^{e acts}^w^e^r^e^p^a^tr^io^{tic, leg}ⁱ^ti^m^a^{te a}ⁿ^d^wⁱ^thⁱⁿ^t^h^{e sco}^p^e^o^f
^hⁱ^s^offⁱ^cia^l^du^ties^as^{a C}^ong^r^e^s^s^m^aⁿ^.^{... [I]f}^a^j^u^dg^{e receives}^pay^m^eⁿ^{t f}^r^o^m^{a part}^y^f^o^r
^ren^d^erin^{g a correct decis}ⁱ^oⁿ^,^{he is}^,ⁿ^e^v^e^rth^e^le^s^s^,^gu^ilt^y^o^f^a^cri^mⁱⁿ^{al ac}^{t i}ⁿ^recei^vⁱⁿ^g^{a bribe.}
^{So, if}^a^C^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^m^aⁿ^receiv^e^s^co^m^p^eⁿ^s^a^tioⁿ^f^o^{r s}^e^rvices^r^eⁿ^d^{ered by}^hi^m^{to a pers}^oⁿⁱⁿ
^r^e^latioⁿ^to^an^y^m^a^tterⁱⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^h^th^{e U}ⁿ^ited^Sta^t^{es is i}ⁿ^ter^e^sted^{, b}^e^f^o^r^e^an^y^Go^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t
^departm^eⁿ^t^{, h}^e^is^gu^ilt^y^o^f^vⁱ^olatin^g^t^h^{e s}^t^at^u^t^{e, ev}^eⁿ^th^oug^h^t^h^{e s}^e^rv^{ice ren}^d^ered^w^a^s^a
^proper^{act on}^hⁱ^s^{part. A}^C^oⁿ^g^res^s^m^aⁿ^caⁿⁿ^o^{t le}^g^a^ll^y^receiv^e^com^p^eⁿ^s^a^tioⁿ^f^r^o^m^{a pri}^v^ate
^pers^on^f^o^{r doi}ⁿ^g^hⁱ^s^du^t^yⁱⁿ^respect^t^o^s^o^m^e^t^hⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^a^t^pers^on^an^{d t}^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^es
^h^a^v^eⁱⁿ^teres^t^s^.^T^h^{e g}ⁱ^s^t^of^th^{e o}^f^f^e^ns^{e is}^th^{e receipt of}^co^m^p^ens^a^tion^,ⁿ^o^{t th}^eⁿ^a^t^u^{re o}^f^t^h^e^a^c^t¹⁹⁵
^don^{e by}^t^h^{e recipien}^{t i}ⁿ^con^s^e^q^u^eⁿ^{ce t}^h^ereof^.
Although similar in nature and necessary proof to the illegal gratuities clause, the statute is not
necessarily duplicative of the illegal gratuities provision because the “services” rendered, for
which compensation may not be accepted under §203, need not be within the “official duties” of
the officer or employee accepting such compensation, as it must be for the illegal gratuities clause

¹⁹²^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Ev^aⁿ^s^,⁵⁷^{2 F}^.²^d⁴⁵⁵^,⁴⁸^{0 (}⁵^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁴³⁹^U^.^S.⁸⁷^{0 (}¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^.
¹⁹³^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^J^o^hⁿ^s^o^n,⁴¹^{9 F.}^2d^56,⁶⁰⁽⁴^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁶⁹⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,³⁹^{7 U}^.^S^.¹⁰¹⁰⁽¹⁹⁷⁰⁾^;^Ma^{y v.}^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es,
¹⁷⁵^F.^2d⁹^{94 (}^D^.C^.C^ir^.¹⁹⁴⁹⁾^,^c^e^r^{t. de}^nie^d^,³³^{8 U}^.^S.⁸^{30 (}¹⁹⁴⁹⁾^{. S}^t^a^f^f^em^plo^y^e^e^s^a^r^e^f^u^r^t^he^r^pr^ohi^bi^te^{d f}^r^om^pr^iv^ate^,
^uⁿ^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^rep^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^actⁱ^vⁱ^t^y^f^o^{r o}^t^h^e^{rs b}^e^f^o^{re f}^e^d^e^ral^a^g^en^ci^es,^evenⁱ^f^not^c^o^m^p^eⁿ^s^a^te^{d. 18}^U^.^S.C^.^§2^05.
¹⁹⁴¹⁷^{5 F}^.²^d^a^t¹⁰⁰⁶^,¹⁰^08-¹⁰⁰⁹^.
¹⁹⁵¹⁷⁵^F.^2d^at⁹⁹^9,¹⁰⁰⁶^.

of the bribery law. Section 203 may therefore cover a broader and wider range of representational
activities for private parties than would the illegal gratuities clause. Furthermore, the statute bars
an officer or employee from sharing in or receiving compensation even for someone else’s ¹⁹⁶
representational services before a federal agency.
Somewhat related to the bribery offense is the “extortion” provision of federal law, commonly
known as the “Hobbs Act,” which prohibits the interference with commerce by way of
“extortion,” defined as the “obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by ¹⁹⁷
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence or fear, or under color of official right.”
Demands by elected public officials on private citizens for payments, such as for campaign
contributions, even when the payments are to be made to third parties such as campaign
committees, may fall within the extortion provisions when there is some wrongful use of one’s
official position to induce or coerce the contribution. As stated by one court, the Hobbs Act would
“penalize those who, under the guise of requesting ‘donations,’ demand money in return for some ¹⁹⁸
act of official grace.” Federal courts have noted that the crime of “extortion” and the crime of
bribery under federal law, “are really different sides of the same coin,” and that the intent ¹⁹⁹
requirements of the two federal offenses are parallel. That is, under the extortion provisions of
the “Hobbs Act,” there is generally, with respect to such things as campaign contributions which
have a facial legitimacy, a need to demonstrate a quid pro quo, a wrongful bargain or
understanding, that the campaign contribution solicited is exchanged for an official act requested ²⁰⁰
or desired.
It is possible that a scheme or agreement between two or more people to wrongfully exert
influence upon an agency of the government might arguably sustain a theory of a violation of 18
U.S.C. §371, conspiracy to defraud the United States. The conspiracy statute is quite broad in its
application, and could cover schemes to defraud the United States even when the object is not to
defraud the United States out of money or property, but rather to defraud the United States out of
the proper and impartial duties it should expect from its officers and employees, or which
interferes with the proper functioning of an agency. As noted by the Supreme Court, a conspiracy
to “defraud the United States” does not necessarily require a showing that the government was
cheated out of money or property, nor does it necessarily require that an illegal act be done:
^T^o^con^s^{pire to def}^r^au^{d th}^{e Un}^it^{ed States}^{... als}^o^m^e^aⁿ^s^{to in}^ter^f^ere^w^ith^{or obs}^tru^c^{t on}^{e of}^its
^la^w^f^u^l^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^al^f^uⁿ^c^tioⁿ^s^b^y^d^{eceit, cr}^a^f^{t o}^r^tr^ick^e^r^y^,^o^r^{at least b}^y^m^e^aⁿ^s^th^at^ar^e
^dis^h^on^e^s^{t. It is}ⁿ^o^{t n}^eces^s^a^r^y^t^h^{at th}^{e Gov}^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^s^h^{all be s}^u^bje^c^t^e^d^t^o^p^r^o^p^e^r^t^y^o^r^p^e^c^uⁿⁱ^a^r^y
^l^o^s^s^b^y^t^h^e^f^r^au^{d, bu}^t^on^l^y^t^h^atⁱ^t^s^l^e^gⁱ^tⁱ^m^a^t^e^offⁱ^ci^al^actⁱ^oⁿ^a^{nd pu}^rpos^{e s}^h^al^l^{be def}^eat^{ed by}

¹⁹⁶^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Eil^b^e^r^g^,⁵⁰⁷^F^.^Su^p^p^.²⁶^{7 (}^E^.^D^.P^a^.¹⁹⁸⁰⁾^.
¹⁹⁷^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁹⁵¹⁽^b)⁽²⁾^.^Em^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d.
¹⁹⁸^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^D^o^zⁱ^e^r^,⁶⁷²^F.^2d⁵³^1,⁵³^{7 (}⁵^th^Cir.)^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁴⁵⁹^U^.^S.⁹^{43 (}¹⁹⁸²⁾^.
¹⁹⁹^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Alleⁿ^{, 1}⁰^F^.³^d⁴^05,⁴¹^{1 (}⁷^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹³⁾^,^ci^tⁱⁿ^g^E^v^an^{s v.}^Unⁱ^t^e^d^St^a^t^es,⁵⁰^{4 U}^.^S^.²⁵⁵^,²⁶^5-²⁶⁸⁽¹⁹⁹²⁾^.
²⁰⁰^McCo^rmi^{ck v.}^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^a^t^es^{, 50}⁰^U^.^{S. 25}⁷⁽¹⁹⁹¹⁾^.

^mⁱ^s^r^epres^eⁿ^t^ation^,^c^h^icaⁿ^{e or th}^{e ov}^erreachⁱⁿ^g^o^f^th^os^{e c}^h^arg^e^d^wⁱ^t^h^carr^yⁱⁿ^g^{out th}^e²⁰¹
^go^ve^rⁿ^me^nt^a^lⁱⁿ^t^e^ntⁱ^o^n.
Some cases have even found that a charge of conspiracy to “defraud the United States,” that is, to
interfere with or obstruct a lawful government function, need not even allege any specific “deceit, ²⁰²
craft, trickery or dishonesty” in carrying out that scheme. To establish a conspiracy it must be
shown that there existed an agreement, either tacit or express, to “defraud the United States” or to
do an illegal act, that the person charged knew of the conspiracy and joined it or “intended to
associate himself with its objectives,” and that at least one overt act was committed in furtherance ²⁰³
of the conspiracy.
Conspiracies to defraud the United States have been found in improper, wrongful or corrupt ²⁰⁴
legislative attempts to influence federal agencies. In United States v. Sweig, count one of a
grand jury indictment was sustained which charged defendants Martin Sweig and Nathan
Voloshen with conspiracy to defraud the United States in connection with the exertion of
improper influence upon government agencies and their officials from the office of the Speaker of
the United States House of Representatives. Specifically, Count One of the indictment charged
that Sweig, a congressional employee, and Voloshen, who was not an employee of the
government, conspired:
^wⁱ^t^h^eac^h^ot^h^e^{r an}^{d ot}^h^e^{r per}^s^on^s^t^o^t^h^e^g^r^an^{d j}^u^r^y^kn^o^wⁿ^an^{d un}^kn^o^w^{n, t}^o^def^r^au^{d t}^h^e
^Un^{ited Sta}^t^es^aⁿ^{d ag}^eⁿ^cie^s^t^h^ereof^,ⁱⁿ^conn^ectioⁿ^wⁱ^t^hⁱ^t^s^l^a^w^f^u^l^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^fuⁿ^c^tⁱ^on^s
^h^e^r^eⁱⁿ^a^f^ter^d^e^scrⁱ^b^e^d^,^to^w^{it: (}^a⁾^{its la}^w^f^u^l^f^uⁿ^c^tioⁿ^to^h^a^v^eⁱ^t^s^b^u^sⁱⁿ^e^s^s^an^d^a^f^f^aⁱ^r^s^c^oⁿ^d^u^c^t^e^d
^h^oⁿ^e^st^l^y^aⁿ^{d i}^m^partⁱ^a^l^l^y^a^s^t^h^{e s}^a^m^e^s^h^o^u^l^d^{be con}^d^u^c^t^e^{d, free f}^r^o^m^f^r^a^u^{d, i}^m^{proper an}^d
^und^ueⁱⁿ^fl^ue^nc^e^,^dⁱ^s^h^oⁿ^e^s^t^y^,^unl^a^w^f^u^lⁱ^m^p^aⁱ^r^me^nt^aⁿ^d^o^b^s^t^r^uc^tⁱ^o^n;⁽^b⁾ⁱ^t^s^l^a^w^f^u^l^rⁱ^g^h^t^t^o
^h^a^v^e^its^o^f^fⁱ^cer^s^an^{d e}^m^plo^y^e^e^s^,^f^r^{ee to trans}^{act t}^h^{e off}ⁱ^cial^bu^sⁱⁿ^e^s^s^of^t^h^{e U}ⁿ^{ited State}^s
^un^hi^nd^e^r^e^d^,^unha^mp^e^r^e^d^,^uno^b^s^t^r^uc^t^e^d^,^uni^mp^aⁱ^r^e^d^aⁿ^d^un^d^e^fe^a^t^e^d^b^y^t^h^e^e^x^e^r^tⁱ^o^{n u}^pon
^t^h^e^m^o^f^di^sh^on^est^,^un^l^a^w^f^u^l^{, i}^m^paⁱ^r^{ed an}^{d u}ⁿ^d^u^e^pres^su^{re an}^{d i}ⁿ^f^l^u^eⁿ^ce.
The indictment charged that the defendants had misused the office and influence of the Speaker
of the House and had pressured various federal agencies and their employees concerning certain
matters pending before the agency. The court discussed the activities in which the defendants
were alleged to have been involved:
^Parag^r^aph^{4 of}^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^di^ct^m^eⁿ^t^s^a^y^sⁱ^t^w^a^s^part^of^t^h^{e cons}^pi^rac^y^{(a) t}^h^at^V^o^l^o^sh^en^“^w^o^u^l^d
^an^{d did accept f}^e^e^s^f^r^o^m^v^a^rio^u^s^pers^oⁿ^s^w^ith^m^a^tters^peⁿ^d^ing^bef^o^{re [}^f^{ederal] departm}^eⁿ^t^s
^an^{d ag}^eⁿ^cie^s^{... to e}^x^{ert t}^h^{e i}ⁿ^flu^eⁿ^{ce o}^f^t^h^e^o^f^fⁱ^ce^{of th}^e^Speak^{er of th}^e^Hous^{e to}^s^a^id
^ag^en^ci^e^s^{, on beh}^a^l^f^o^f^s^aⁱ^d^pers^on^s^,^{” (b) t}^h^a^t^V^o^l^o^sh^en^“w^o^u^l^d^an^{d di}^d^u^s^e^t^h^e^offⁱ^ces,
^t^e^l^e^ph^on^{e, s}^ecret^ari^a^l^s^t^a^f^f^,^{and g}^oodwⁱ^l^l^of^t^h^{e S}^p^eak^{er,” (c) t}^h^at^bot^h^def^eⁿ^d^an^t^s^w^o^u^l^d
^ag^{ree to h}^a^v^e^S^w^eig^,^“^b^y^v^a^rio^u^s^m^eans^,^ex^pres^s^th^{e i}ⁿ^teres^t^of^th^{e O}^f^fⁱ^{ce of}^t^h^{e Speak}^{er ...}

²⁰¹^Ha^mmersch^m^id^{t v.}^Unⁱ^t^ed^Sta^t^es^,²⁶^{5 U}^.^S.¹⁸^2,¹⁸^{8 (}¹⁹²⁴⁾^;^Denni^{s v.}^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^a^t^es,³⁸⁴^U^.^S.⁸⁵^5,⁸⁶¹^-⁸^{62 (}¹⁹⁶⁶⁾^.
²⁰²^Se^e^,^f^o^{r exa}^m^p^l^e,^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^v^.^Sh^ou^p^,⁶⁰⁸^F.2^d⁹⁵⁰^,⁹^63-⁹⁶^{4 (}³^rd^Cir.¹⁹⁷⁹^{), (t}^he^re^q^u^ire^m^eⁿ^{t of show}^ing^de^c^e^it,
^c^r^a^f^{t, tric}^k^e^r^y^{or disho}ⁿ^e^s^ty^“^h^a^s^l^ong^a^g^{o b}^e^eⁿ^disc^a^r^de^{d by}^the^c^our^ts”⁾^{, c}^iting^a^s^a^u^t^hori^t^y^D^e^nnis^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^,
³⁸⁴^U^.^S.⁸^55,⁸^{61 (}¹⁹⁶⁶⁾^{; a}ⁿ^d^a^l^s^o^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^v^.^J^o^hns^on,³^{83 U}^.^S.¹⁶^9,¹⁷^{2 (}¹⁹⁶⁵⁾⁽^s^c^h^e^m^e^w^h^e^r^e^b^y^“^t^w^o
^C^ong^r^e^s^s^m^e^{n w}^{ould e}^x^e^r^{t inf}^l^ueⁿ^c^e^{on t}^h^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^J^u^s^tic^e^{to o}^b^taⁱⁿ^the^dis^m^is^s^a^{l of}^pe^nding^indic^t^m^e^nts^”^f^o^r
^“^l^e^g^a^l^f^e^e^s^”^a^{nd “}^c^a^m^p^aⁱ^gⁿ^c^ontri^buti^ons”^f^o^u^nd^by^jury^{to c}^onstitu^te^c^onspira^c^y^to^de^f^r^a^{ud the}^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt, but}
^revers^ed^b^ecau^{se o}^f^S^p^eech^o^r^De^b^a^t^e^Cl^au^{se i}^m^p^lⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^);^see^Haa^s^v.^Hen^kel^,²¹⁶^U^.^S.⁴⁶^2,⁴⁷^{9 (}¹⁹¹⁰⁾^;^no^te²⁴
^A^m^eri^c^aⁿ^Cri^mⁱⁿ^a^l^L^a^{w R}^evi^ew⁴^59,⁴⁶^{1 (}¹⁹⁸⁷⁾^.
²⁰³^Ianⁿ^e^{lli v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^,⁴²^{0 U.S}^.⁷⁷^{0 (}¹⁹⁷⁵⁾^;^Bl^um^eⁿ^t^{hal v}^.^Uⁿ^it^e^d^St^ate^s^,³³²^U^.^S.⁵³^{9 (}¹⁹⁴⁷⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^v^.
^Tr^e^adw^e^ll,⁷⁶^{0 F}^.²^d³²⁷⁽^D^.C^.C^ir^{. 19}⁸⁵⁾^.
²⁰⁴³¹^{6 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.¹¹^{48 (}^S^.D^.N^.Y^.¹⁹⁷⁰⁾^.

ⁱⁿ^s^a^id^m^a^tters^{... on}^beh^a^lf^o^f^s^a^{id pers}^ons^{,” (d) th}^{at Volos}^h^eⁿ^“w^ou^{ld a}ⁿ^{d did f}^a^ls^el^y
^as^s^u^m^e^aⁿ^{d preten}^{d” to be a m}^e^m^b^{er of}^th^e^Speak^er’s^s^t^a^f^f^aⁿ^{d (e) th}^{at S}^w^ei^g^“w^ou^{ld a}ⁿ^d
^di^{d act}^as^ag^en^t^{or at}^t^o^rn^e^y^f^o^r^pers^on^s^bef^o^{re depart}^m^eⁿ^t^s^{and ag}^en^ci^e^s^of^t^h^{e G}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t
ⁱⁿ^conⁿ^ect^ion^wⁱ^t^h^{... m}^a^ttersⁱⁿ^w^h^ic^h^th^{e U}ⁿ^{ited States}^w^a^s^{a pa}^rty^an^{d in}^w^h^ic^h^{it h}^a^{d a}
^dⁱ^r^{ect an}^d^su^b^s^taⁿ^{tial i}ⁿ^ter^e^s^t^{.” P}^a^r^a^g^r^ap^h⁵^alleg^e^{s th}^e^u^s^e^o^f^telep^h^oⁿ^{e call}^s^{, f}^r^o^m^th^e
^S^p^eak^er’s^offⁱ^ce^s^aⁿ^{d el}^s^e^w^h^e^r^{e, an}^{d of}^pers^on^al^vi^sⁱ^t^s^b^y^bot^h^def^eⁿ^d^an^t^s^t^o^“^e^x^p^res^s^t^h^e
ⁱⁿ^teres^t^of^t^h^{e off}ⁱ^{ce of}^t^h^{e Speak}^{er of}^th^{e Hous}^{e in}^s^a^id^m^a^tters^pen^dⁱⁿ^g^bef^o^{re s}^a^id²⁰⁵
^ag^en^cie^s^.”
Although Voloshen was said to have received fees for his representations, Sweig, the
congressional employee, was not alleged to have done so. Nevertheless the court sustained the
indictment against Sweig:
^T^h^e^fa^c^t^t^h^a^t^S^w^eⁱ^gⁱ^s^no^t^a^l^l^e^g^e^d^t^o^ha^ve^t^a^keⁿ^m^o^ne^{y o}^r^o^t^he^r^t^hⁱⁿ^g^s^fo^r^hi^s^p^a^r^tⁱⁿ^t^h^e
^al^l^e^g^e^{d con}^s^pi^rac^y^doesⁿ^o^t^j^u^stⁱ^f^y^di^smⁱ^s^s^a^l^of^C^oun^t^Oⁿ^{e f}^o^{r f}^aci^alⁱⁿ^s^u^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^eⁿ^c^y^.^I^t^m^a^y^b^e
^dou^{bted w}^h^et^h^e^{r a j}^u^ry^w^o^u^l^{d - or c}^o^u^l^{d be}^perm^{itted to -}^{convict u}ⁿ^l^e^s^s^it^f^oun^{d ev}ⁱ^d^eⁿ^c^e^t^o
^s^h^o^w^f^o^{r each}^alle^g^e^{d con}^s^{pirator s}^o^m^e^m^eanⁱⁿ^g^f^u^l^“^s^ta^k^{e” i}ⁿ^th^{e e}ⁿ^t^e^r^p^rⁱ^s^e^.^B^u^t^t^h^eⁱⁿ^t^e^r^e^s^t²⁰⁶
ⁿ^eedⁿ^o^{t h}^a^v^e^b^een^m^oⁿ^e^tar^y^,^o^r^m^a^terⁱ^{al at all. [}^C^itatioⁿ^s^o^m^itted^]^.
Nathan Voloshen pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy and three counts of perjury. Martin
Sweig, who unlike Voloshen, was actually in the employ of the office of the Speaker and was not
alleged to have accepted fees, was acquitted by the jury on the “influence peddling” conspiracy ²⁰⁷
charges, but was found guilty on one charge of perjury. As reported by the press in 1970:
^T^h^{e v}^e^rdi^c^t^w^a^s^{a pers}^on^al^t^rⁱ^u^m^p^h^f^o^{r def}^eⁿ^s^{e couns}^el^Smi^t^h^,^w^h^{o ar}^g^u^e^{d t}^h^at^Sw^ei^g’^s
^ef^f^o^r^t^{s in}^coⁿ^t^actiⁿ^g^f^e^d^e^r^a^{l ag}^en^cie^s^w^e^r^e^{a cu}^sto^m^ar^y^p^r^{actice o}ⁿ^Cap^ito^{l Hill an}^dⁿ^o^t²⁰⁸
^uⁿ^l^a^w^fu^{l e}^v^enⁱ^f^t^h^{e j}^u^rors^mⁱ^g^h^t^fⁱⁿ^d^th^{e practice unf}^air.
Earlier, the press had quoted Sweig’s defense attorney concerning this argument relevant to the
practice and ethics of congressional intervention on behalf of individuals before federal agencies:
^“C^ong^res^s^h^a^sⁿ^e^v^e^r^m^a^{de cri}^mⁱⁿ^{al th}^{e act}^s^alleg^e^{d ag}^aiⁿ^s^{t S}^w^ei^g^”^s^a^y^s^S^m^it^h^.^“^I^t
^w^o^u^l^d^b^e^p^r^esu^m^p^t^u^o^u^sⁱⁿ^t^h^e^ex^tr^e^m^{e a}ⁿ^dⁱⁿ^clear^vⁱ^o^l^atioⁿ^o^f^coⁿ^s^ti^tu^tioⁿ^a^{l sep}^a^r^a^tioⁿ^o^f
^po^w^e^rs^f^o^{r t}^h^{e j}^u^diciar^y^{to i}^m^pos^{e s}^t^an^dards^of^con^d^u^c^{t on}^l^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^{e e}^m^plo^y^ee^s^w^h^eⁿ^t^h^e²⁰⁹
^C^ong^res^s^h^a^s^declⁱⁿ^{ed t}^o^{do s}^o^.”
In United States v. Burgin,²¹⁰ the court found that the count of conspiracy to defraud the
government could be sustained where a former State senator and a current member of the State
Legislature were involved in a “silent scheme” to exert influence over a State agency
administering federally financed contracts, finding that §371 “not only reaches financial or
property loss through employment of a deceptive scheme, but also is designed and intended to ²¹¹
protect the integrity of the United States and its agencies, programs and policies.” In this case,
the court found that the fact that the public official involved in the conspiracy had a covert

²⁰⁵³¹^{6 F}^.^S^u^p^p^{. a}^t¹¹^52.
²⁰⁶^Id^{. a}^t¹¹⁵⁶^.
²⁰⁷^No^te^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^Sw^eⁱ^g^,⁴⁴¹^F.2^d¹¹⁴⁽²^{d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷¹⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁴⁰³^U^.^S.⁹³^{2 (}¹⁹⁷¹⁾^.
²⁰⁸^Wa^sh^ing^t^on^P^o^st^{, J}^u^ly^{10, 1}⁹⁷⁰^,^a^t^{p. A}¹^.
²⁰⁹^Wa^sh^ing^t^on^P^o^st^{, Fe}^br^ua^r^y^{25, 1}⁹⁷⁰^,^a^t^p.^A^10.
²¹⁰⁶²¹^F.^2d¹³⁵²⁽⁵^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁰⁾^.
²¹¹^Id^.^a^t¹³⁵⁶^.

financial interest in the contracts, provided the “overreaching of an agent of the United States by
a public official having a financial quid pro quo interest in a federally financed contract,” which ²¹²
amounted to an “obstruction of a lawful governmental function.” The court’s finding agreed
with the government’s charge that “the meaning of ‘defraud’ includes any scheme of ‘influence
peddling’ whereby a public official receives remuneration for the exertion of influence upon other ²¹³
official s....”
The underlying motive or indirect financial interest in performing or influencing an official act
affecting an agency decision might thus be relevant to a “conspiracy” to defraud charge, and
could arguably provide the “wrongful” nature of the actions to influence federal agency decisions
if such actions are motivated by factors other than the general public interest which one is elected ²¹⁴
to serve. In a conflict of interest case, United States v. Podell, the court noted the principle of a
“breach of trust” by a Member of Congress when the Member “shed[s] the duty of disinterested
advocacy owed the government and his constituents in favor of championing private interests ²¹⁵
potentially inconsistent with this charge.” This wrongful “breach of trust” may arguably exist
even when the means in conducting such intervention and exercising such influence are not in
themselves improper or wrongful, if the motivation is improper.
One of the more persistent and difficult issues in relation to interventions is the one concerning
any connection, “nexus” or “linkage” between official interventions and the making, promising,
or solicitation of campaign contributions from those persons for whom such interventions were
made. Campaign contributions, unlike personal gifts and favors to officials, are necessary and
encouraged in our system of government where campaigns to congressional office are privately
financed, and thus have a facial legitimacy that other transfers of things of value to Members may
not have. The ethical inferences that might be raised concerning unrestricted personal gifts or
entertainment provided to a legislator, might not be relevant in the case of congressional
campaign contributions which are legitimate, acceptable, and necessary economic and monetary ²¹⁶
transfers to Members of Congress.
Both the House and Senate ethics committees thus note that it is perfectly acceptable, and often
necessary, for Members of Congress to represent the interests of a constituent before a federal

²¹²^Id^.^a^t¹³⁵⁷^.
²¹³^Id^.^a^t¹³⁵⁶^.^C^o^m^par^e^to^P^o^r^t^e^r^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^,⁵^{91 F.2}^d¹⁰^48,¹⁰^{55, (}⁵^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁹⁾^,^c^onc^e^rⁿⁱ^ng^la^c^k^of
^pa^rtic^ipa^tioⁿ^by^public^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s in a}ⁿ^a^lle^g^e^{d “}^s^c^h^e^m^e^.^”
²¹⁴⁴³^{6 F}^.^Su^pp^{. 1}⁰³⁹^,¹⁰⁴²⁽^S^.D^.N^.^Y^{. 19}⁷⁷⁾^,^af^f’^d⁵⁷²^F.^2d³¹⁽²^d^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^.
²¹⁵^T^h^e^Sta^ndi^ng^O^r^de^r^s^of^the^Se^na^t^e^e^x^pr^e^s^s^l^y^note^tha^t^it^is^the^pol^ic^y^o^f^the^Se^na^te^tha^t^a^“^p^ub^lic^of^fⁱ^c^e^is^a^publ^ic
^t^r^u^s^t^,^{” and}^t^h^at^t^h^e^p^u^b^lⁱ^c^o^f^fⁱ^cer^“h^{as b}^een^en^t^r^u^s^t^e^d^wⁱ^t^h^p^ubl^ic^p^o^w^e^{r b}^y^the^pe^op^le^{; tha}^t^the^of^fⁱ^c^e^{r hol}^{ds th}^{is p}^o^w^e^r
^{in tr}^us^{t to}^be^us^e^d^oⁿ^ly^f^o^r^theⁱ^r^b^e^ne^f^{it a}^{nd ne}^v^e^r^f^o^r^the^be^ne^f^{it of}^him^s^e^l^f^or^a^f^e^w^;^a^{nd tha}^t^t^h^e^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^m^a^y^ne^ve^r
^c^ond^uc^{t his}^ow^{n a}^f^f^a^ir^s^s^o^a^s^{to in}^f^r^ing^e^{on the}^pu^blicⁱⁿ^te^r^e^s^t^.”^Sta^ndi^ng^O^r^de^r^s^of^the^Se^na^te^,^Seⁿ^a^t^e^M^anua^l,^§7^9.6^,^th
^S.^Re^s^.²⁶⁶^{, 9}⁰^C^ong^.,^2d^Se^s^s^.⁽¹⁹⁶⁸⁾^.^A^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y^O^p^inio^{n N}^o^{. 1}^of^the^H^o^us^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on Sta}ⁿ^da^r^d^s^of^O^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l
^Cond^uc^{t w}^a^rns^tha^t^a^“^M^e^m^be^r’s^re^s^ponsⁱ^b^ility^{in th}^is^a^r^{ea” o}^fⁱⁿ^terv^en^tioⁿ^b^e^f^o^{re ag}^en^{cies “is to}^{all h}ⁱ^{s co}ⁿ^s^titu^eⁿ^ts
^e^qua^lly^....”
²¹⁶^C^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^an^{d the}^Pu^blic^Tr^us^{t, s}^upr^a^a^t¹^80:^“^O^{ur pre}^s^eⁿ^t^sy^ste^m^of^fⁱ^na^nc^ing^politic^a^l^c^a^m^pa^ig^{ns m}^a^k^e^s
^M^oⁿ^t^esquⁱ^e^u^’^{s vi}^ew^{s i}ⁿ^cap^ab^l^e^of^p^e^rfectⁱ^m^p^l^e^m^en^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^.^Sⁱⁿ^ce^M^e^m^b^{ers o}^f^Coⁿ^g^ress^m^u^stⁿ^ecessari^l^y^acc^ep^t^m^aⁿ^y
^dona^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^of^m^oney^a^s^c^a^m^p^aⁱ^gⁿ^c^ontrⁱ^buti^ons^,^{it is}^una^v^oⁱ^d^a^b^le^t^h^a^t^the^y^a^r^e^s^ubje^c^t^{to s}^o^m^e^rⁱ^s^k^s^of^inf^l^ue^nc^e^c^a^u^s^e^d
^b^y^t^h^ei^{r grat}ⁱ^t^u^d^e^f^o^{r d}^oⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^f^r^o^m^f^rⁱ^eⁿ^d^s^.^Ho^w^e^ver,^ca^m^p^ai^gn^coⁿ^t^ri^b^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^{are t}^o^l^e^rat^e^d^b^ecau^{se t}^h^ey^{are a}
^ne^c^e^s^s^a^r^y^incⁱ^de^{nt of}^our^pr^e^s^eⁿ^t^e^l^e^c^t^or^a^l^sy^s^t^em^.^A^c^c^e^p^ta^nc^e^of^gif^t^s^bey^{ond t}^h^e^r^e^quir^e^m^e^nts^of^c^a^m^p^aⁱ^gⁿ
^ne^c^e^s^s^itie^s^c^a^{nnot be}^sⁱ^m^ila^rly^jus^tif^ie^d.”

agency even when that constituent has made substantial campaign contributions to the Member’s ²¹⁷
campaign. It would be an unusual rule, at best, which would work to prohibit a Member of
Congress from representing those who have supported his candidacy, and limit a Member’s
representations to only those who have not supported him. Any interventions and representations,
however, should not be based on, nor consider, the campaign support that a Member has received
from a particular petitioner, but should, rather, be based on the merits of the particular matter and
the general public interest – the matter’s impact, importance or significance to the Member’s
constituents, district or State.
Certainly, campaign contributions, whether of soft money or regulated hard money, could be the
“thing of value” in a “bribe,” and can be implicated in a bribery scheme if the other elements of ²¹⁸
the crime of bribery are present. However, for a “bribe” to be present in the case of campaign
contributions, there must be shown a specific quid pro quo, that is, a corrupt agreement or
understanding between the parties that the public official will do some specific official act in
return for the receipt of certain valuable consideration. When such a corrupt agreement exists
(e.g., “I will intervene in this matter in return for your providing a campaign contribution to my
political committee”), there exists the requisite element of being “influenced” to do the act “in ²¹⁹
return for” the campaign contribution. When there is only a campaign contribution and a
subsequent official act favorable to the donor, or an official intervention with an agency and a
later campaign contribution, but no evidence of such an agreement directly linking the motivation
for the official act to the contribution, then there is no bribe. This is why the Supreme Court has ²²⁰
noted that bribery is among the least subtle, and most blatant forms of public corruption.
As to campaign contributions generally, the courts have noted that: “No politician who knows the
identity and business interests of his campaign contributors is ever completely devoid of ²²¹
knowledge as to the inspiration behind the donation.” While campaign contributions can be
bribes where there exists a corrupt bargain (a quid pro quo arrangement), campaign contributions
given to a candidate or official merely as support, or in appreciation or thank you for certain
official acts, positions or votes taken, as is the case for many or most campaign contributions, are
not considered to be bribes. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in United
States v. Anderson, supra, for example, where a conviction of a lobbyist was upheld for bribing a
Senator with “campaign contributions” to influence the Senator on particular postal rate
legislation, approved the jury instructions given by the trial judge which “exonerated campaign ²²²
contributions inspired by the recipient’s general position of support on particular legislation.”

²¹⁷^{S. R}^p^{t. N}^o^{. 1}^02-²²^3,^s^upr^a^at¹²^,^an^d^Se^na^te^Ethⁱ^c^s^M^anu^{al, s}^upr^a^a^t¹⁷^{8; H}^ous^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on Sta}^nda^r^d^s^of
^O^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^C^onduc^t,^St^ate^m^eⁿ^{t Re}^g^a^r^ding^C^o^m^p^laiⁿ^ts^A^gai^ns^{t Re}^pr^e^s^eⁿ^tativ^e^N^e^w^t^Gⁱⁿ^g^rⁱ^c^h^,¹⁰¹^st^Co^ng^{., 2}^d^Se^s^s^.⁶⁶
⁽¹⁹⁹⁰⁾^,^a^nd^H^ous^e^Et^hic^s^M^aⁿ^u^a^l^{, s}^upr^a^a^t²^50-²⁵^1.
²¹⁸^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^An^de^r^s^on,⁵^{09 F}^.^{2d 31}²⁽^D^.C^.C^ir^{. 19}⁷⁴⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁴²⁰^U^.^S.⁹⁹^{1 (}¹⁹⁷⁵⁾^.^Uⁿ^de^r^t^h^e^brⁱ^b^e^r^y
^c^l^a^u^se^{, a}^bribe^ne^e^dⁿ^o^t^be^oⁿ^ly^{for the}^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^“^p^e^r^sona^ll^y^,^”^{but m}^a^y^be^soug^{ht “}^f^{or a}ⁿ^y^othe^{r pe}^rsoⁿ^or^eⁿ^tity^”⁽¹⁸
^U.^S^.^C.^§²⁰¹⁽^b⁾⁽²⁾⁾^,^su^{ch as,}^p^r^es^u^m^ab^l^y^,^{a ca}^m^p^ai^gn^co^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee o}^r^p^o^lⁱ^tⁱ^cal^p^a^rt^y^.^S^ee,^e.^g^.,^Unite^{d S}^t^ate^s^v^.^Ke^lly^,⁷⁴⁸
^F^.^2d⁶⁹^1,⁶⁹^9,ⁿ^.¹⁹⁽^D^.^C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁴⁾^.
²¹⁹^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Br^e^w^s^t^e^r^{, s}^upr^a^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^An^de^r^s^on,^s^upr^a^a^t³³^0.
²²⁰^B^u^ckl^{ey v.}^V^a^l^e^o,⁴²⁴^U^.^S.^1,^27-^{28 (}¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.
²²¹^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Br^e^w^s^t^e^r^{, s}^upr^a^a^t^81.
²²²⁵⁰^{9 F}^.²^d^sup^r^a^a^t³³^0.

Campaign contributions may also be in the nature of general contributions, donations or payments
to causes, entities or to other persons, sometimes called “goodwill” payments, which are given
merely to create a favorable atmosphere or feeling of gratitude in the recipient, or with “some
generalized hope or expectation of ultimate benefit on the part of the donor,” but which are not
given nor received in the context of any express or implied agreement, and are therefore not ²²³
considered “bribes” under the statute. Political contributions to entities such as a candidate’s
political campaign committee do not in themselves constitute bribes “even though many ²²⁴
contributors hope that the official will act favorably because of their contributions.” A Court of
Appeals in United States v. Allen, interpreting a bribery statute being used as a predicate offense
for a RICO charge, explained as follows:
^[A^]ccepting^{a ca}^m^p^aⁱ^gn^con^t^rⁱ^bu^tion^doesⁿ^o^{t eq}^u^a^{l ta}^kⁱ^ng^{a bribe u}ⁿ^l^es^s^th^{e pa}^ym^en^{t i}^s
^m^a^{de i}ⁿ^e^x^ch^aⁿ^g^e^f^o^{r an}^e^x^plⁱ^cⁱ^t^promⁱ^s^{e t}^o^perf^or^m^{or n}^o^t^perf^orm^aⁿ^offⁱ^ci^a^l^act^{. V}^a^gu^e²²⁵
^ex^p^ectatioⁿ^s^o^f^so^m^e^f^u^t^u^r^e^b^eⁿ^e^f^{it s}^h^o^u^ldⁿ^o^{t b}^e^s^u^f^f^icieⁿ^t^t^o^m^a^k^e^{a p}^a^y^m^en^{t a b}^r^ib^e.
The concept of the lack of a corrupt agreement generally in campaign contributions, as
distinguished from bribes, was discussed in terms of reciprocity and “obligation” by Judge John
T. Noonan, Jr., in his work entitled Bribes. Discussing what he calls “donations of democracy,”
Judge Noonan raises the issue of the differences between such contributions and bribes, and later
in his work attempts to answer the question raised:
^Norm^a^l^l^y^{, at any}^rate,^m^oⁿ^e^y^is^gⁱ^v^eⁿ^{to an}^offⁱ^ces^ee^k^e^r^w^hos^{e v}ⁱ^e^w^s^onⁱ^m^{portant is}^s^u^es
^coin^{cide w}ⁱ^t^h^t^h^e^giv^e^r^’^s^.^T^h^{e m}^oⁿ^e^yⁱ^s^gⁱ^v^eⁿ^wⁱ^th^th^{e h}^o^pe,^ex^pectation^,^pu^rpos^e^t^h^at
^p^a^r^ticu^l^ar^vⁱ^e^w^s^wⁱ^{ll b}^e^tr^aⁿ^sl^atedⁱⁿ^to^p^a^r^ticu^l^ar^v^o^te^s.^A^t^{acit r}^ecip^r^o^c^it^y^ex^ist^s^{. Ho}^wⁱ^s
^m^oⁿ^e^y^gⁱ^v^eⁿ^{a can}^{didate diff}^e^r^en^{t f}^r^o^m^{a bribe?}
* * *
^C^a^m^p^ai^gn^con^t^rib^u^tions^{are i}^m^per^f^ect^gⁱ^f^t^s^becaus^e^t^h^e^y^ar^{e u}^s^u^a^ll^yⁿ^o^{t s}^e^{t i}ⁿ^{a contex}^t^of
^pers^on^{al relation}^s^{; t}^h^e^y^{are in}^t^eⁿ^d^{ed to ex}^pre^s^s^...^an^iden^tif^ic^ati^oⁿ^wⁱ^t^h^a^c^a^u^s^e^.^Th^e^y^a^r^eⁿ^o^t
^w^hol^l^y^t^h^{e reci}^pi^en^t^’^{s – t}^h^ei^{r p}^u^rpos^{e i}^s^res^t^ri^c^t^{ed. T}^h^ey^{are gi}^v^e^{n i}ⁿ^res^pon^s^e^t^o^w^o^r^k^don^e
^{or ex}^{pected to be don}^{e. ... T}^h^ey^{do n}^o^{t ex}^pres^s^{or create ov}^erri^din^g^obli^g^ations^{, t}^h^{at i}^s^{, t}^h^ere
^isⁿ^o^abs^o^l^u^{te oblig}^atioⁿ^on^th^{e part of}^t^h^{e con}^t^ribu^{tor to}^recogⁿⁱ^{ze pas}^t^w^o^rk^b^y^t^h^e
^can^dⁱ^d^a^{te, an}^d^th^er^{e i}^sⁿ^o^ab^so^lu^{te o}^b^lig^a^tioⁿ^oⁿ^th^{e p}^a^r^t^o^f^th^{e can}^dⁱ^d^a^{te to}^d^o^th^e^w^o^r^k^t^h^e
^con^t^ribu^{tor ex}^pects^.^A^b^s^eⁿ^c^e^of^abs^o^lu^te^oblig^ation^crea^tes^on^{e diff}^eren^{ce bet}^w^een²²⁶
^con^t^ri^bu^tⁱ^ons^an^{d bri}^b^es^.
It has been theorized that there may be some incidental “reciprocity” expected between donor and
recipient in our political process. Legislators in Congress, unlike judges, have a specific
constituency which they represent and on whom, in return, they rely for the donation of funds to
their campaigns. Judge Noonan argued that to some extent, campaign contributions, or at least
large ones, may be a kind of “access” payment to our representative which is expressly permitted
in practice in our system of private funding of campaigns for elective office:

²²³^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^J^o^hⁿ^s^oⁿ^,⁶²^{1 F.}^2d¹⁰^73,¹⁰⁷⁶⁽¹⁰^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁰⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Ar^th^ur^{, s}^u^pr^a^a^t⁷³^{4, 7}³⁵^;^Unⁱ^t^ed
^State^s^v^.^A^lle^n,¹⁰^F.^3d⁴^05,⁴^{11 (}⁷^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹³⁾^.
²²⁴^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Tom^b^li^n,^{46 F.3}^d¹³⁶⁹^{, 13}⁷⁹⁽⁵^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^.
²²⁵^{10 F.}^{3d 40}^{5, 41}¹⁽⁷^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹³⁾^.
²²⁶^N^o^oⁿ^aⁿ^,^Bri^b^e^s^,^sup^r^a^a^t⁶²^{1, 69}^6-⁶^97.

^C^a^m^p^ai^gn^con^t^ributions^m^a^y^{be con}^s^{idered a s}^u^bs^pecie^s^of^{a lar}^g^{er clas}^s^{– acces}^s
^p^a^y^m^eⁿ^ts.^“^I^’^mⁿ^o^t^p^a^yⁱⁿ^g^f^o^r^m^y^coⁿ^g^r^es^s^m^an^’^s^v^o^te,”^th^e^lar^g^e^coⁿ^t^rⁱ^b^u^to^r^w^ill^sa^y^.^“^I
^sⁱ^m^p^l^y^w^aⁿ^t^{to be s}^u^{re h}^e^wⁱ^ll^lis^teⁿ^to^m^y^sⁱ^{de of}^t^h^{e cas}^{e.” .}^{.. T}^h^{e acces}^s^pay^m^eⁿ^{t i}ⁿ^f^act
^an^d^f^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^{, if}ⁿ^o^{t in}^h^a^ir^sp^lit^tin^g^th^eo^r^y^{, i}^s^{a p}^a^y^m^eⁿ^{t to}^es^tab^lish^r^ecip^r^o^c^it^y^.
^{* *}^*
^...[^T^]^h^e^acces^s^buy^{er is}^pa^yⁱ^ngⁿ^o^{t on}^l^y^f^o^{r atten}^tioⁿ^b^u^t^f^o^r^f^a^v^o^r^a^b^l^e^a^t^t^eⁿ^tⁱ^oⁿ^.^Th^e^p^a^y^m^en^t
^is^clos^e^to^w^h^a^t^w^{ould be cal}^{led a bribe if}^m^a^{de to a j}^u^d^g^e^;^bu^{t acce}^s^s^{to an}^d^f^a^v^o^rable
^a^t^t^e^ntⁱ^o^{n b}^y^,^a^l^e^gi^sl^a^t^o^r^ha^s^no^t^ge^ne^r^a^l^l^y^b^e^eⁿ^r^e^ga^r^d^e^dⁱⁿ^t^h^e^sa^m^e^w^a^y^a^s^aⁿ^approach^t^o^a
^j^u^dg^{e. ...}
^T^h^{e hy}^poth^e^tical^s^s^h^o^w^th^a^t^{a leg}ⁱ^s^l^a^t^{or is}ⁿ^o^{t i}ⁿ^th^{e pos}^it^ion^of^{a j}^u^dg^{e. T}^h^{e j}^u^dg^e’s
^of^fⁱ^{ce i}^s^m^odel^e^{d on}^t^h^{e parad}ⁱ^gm^o^f^t^h^{e t}^r^ans^cen^deⁿ^t^Ju^dg^e^of^t^h^{e Bi}^bl^{e an}^{d a s}^h^{arp l}ⁱⁿ^e
^dⁱ^stin^g^u^is^h^e^s^hⁱ^m^f^r^o^m^t^h^{e li}^tig^aⁿ^{ts b}^e^f^o^r^e^hⁱ^m^.^T^h^{e leg}ⁱ^s^l^ato^r^{, o}ⁿ^th^{e co}ⁿ^t^r^a^r^y^,^is^hⁱ^s
^c^o^nstⁱ^t^ue^nt^’^s^rep^r^esen^ta^tive^{.... A}^certain^iden^tit^y^o^fⁱⁿ^tere^s^t^is^ex^{pected to ex}^is^{t bet}^w^een
^con^s^tit^u^eⁿ^t^an^{d le}^gⁱ^s^l^ator....^Giv^eⁿ^th^{e accepta}ⁿ^{ce of}^t^hⁱ^s^m^u^tu^al^it^y^o^f^pu^rpos^{e bet}^w^een
^con^t^ribu^{tor an}^d^legⁱ^s^l^{ator, t}^h^e^prev^ailiⁿ^g^as^s^u^m^p^{tion i}ⁿ^{America h}^a^s^been^th^at^ca^m^p^ai^gn
^c^o^nt^rⁱ^b^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^no^r^m^a^l^l^y^fa^l^lⁱⁿ^t^h^e^r^a^nge^o^f^c^a^s^e^s^whe^r^e^s^p^e^cⁱ^fi^c^votes^areⁿ^o^t^bein^g^bou^gh^t.^...
^A^t^tⁱ^me^{s “c}^a^m^p^aⁱ^g^{n c}^o^nt^rⁱ^b^u^tⁱ^o^n”^ha^{s b}^e^eⁿ^a^c^o^d^e^w^o^r^d^use^d^as^a^f^lⁱ^m^sy^co^v^e^r^f^o^r^a^pay^m^en^t
ⁱⁿ^teⁿ^d^ed^to^en^rⁱ^ch^an^o^f^fⁱ^{cial p}^e^r^s^oⁿ^all^yⁱⁿ^ex^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^f^o^r^an^o^f^fⁱ^{cial act b}^eⁿ^e^f^ittiⁿ^g^t^h^e^p^a^y^o^r^.
^T^h^es^{e cas}^es^h^a^v^eⁿ^o^{t dis}^t^u^r^{bed th}^{e n}^o^r^m^{al as}^s^u^m^p^{tion that a ca}^m^p^ai^gⁿ^coⁿ^t^ribu^tioⁿ^is²²⁷
^dⁱ^ffe^r^e^nt^fr^o^m^a^b^rⁱ^b^e^.
That there may be some tacit reciprocity, particularly concerning “access”to an elected official by
a large contributor, has not as yet been considered sufficient to satisfy the corrupt bargain or
agreement required for a bribe, in part because mere access to, that is, meeting with an individual,
is not necessarily considered an “official act” performed or agreed to be performed by the elected ²²⁸
representative.
Although for an “illegal gratuity” (unlike a “bribe”), no specific illegal bargain or “corrupt” intent
need be shown, there is a criminal intent required of an illegal gratuity which would distinguish
this wrongful receipt of a payment from a lawful campaign contribution given to a Member of
Congress, even given “because of” the Member’s acts, such as intervention in an agency matter
on behalf of a donor. As noted by the court in Brewster: “Every campaign contribution is given to
an elected public official probably because the giver supports the acts done or to be done by the ²²⁹
elected official.” The criminal intent required for an illegal gratuity as stated by the court,
however, is a knowing and willful receipt of a payment as “compensation,” other than as provided
by law such as one’s salary, for doing an official act. The court in Brewster explained:

²²⁷^N^o^oⁿ^aⁿ^,^Bri^b^e^s^{, su}^pra^a^t⁶⁸^{9, 62}^3-⁶^24.
²²⁸^T^h^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^J^u^s^tic^e^ha^s^e^xplaⁱ^ne^d^{in c}^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l te}^s^tim^on^y^tha^{t: “}^T^he^c^our^ts^tha^t^ha^v^e^a^ddr^e^s^s^e^{d the}^is^s^u^e
^h^a^{ve h}^e^l^d^t^h^at^su^ch^{access i}ⁿ^exch^an^{ge f}^o^{r p}^o^lⁱ^tⁱ^cal^coⁿ^t^ri^b^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^sⁱ^sⁿ^o^t^aⁿ^‘o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^act^{’ t}^h^at^can^p^r^ovi^d^e^t^h^{e b}^a^si^{s f}^o^{r a}
^br^ibe^r^y^or^e^x^tor^tio^{n pr}^os^e^c^u^tio^n.”^T^e^s^tⁱ^m^on^y^of^A^ttorⁿ^e^y^G^e^ne^r^a^{l Ja}^ne^{t R}^e^no,^to^the^H^o^us^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on t}^h^e^th^st
^Ju^dⁱ^ci^ary^,^Heariⁿ^gs,¹⁰⁵^Cong^.,¹^Se^s^s^{., O}^c^tobe^r¹⁵^{, 1}⁹⁹⁷^{, a}^t³²^;^see^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^C^a^r^p^eⁿ^te^r^{, 9}^{61 F.2}^d⁸²^{4, 827}^th^th
⁽⁹^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹²⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^es^v.^Sa^wyer^,⁸⁵^F.^3d⁷¹^3,⁷³¹⁽⁴^{Cir. 1}⁹⁹⁶^{); a}ⁿ^{d o}^t^he^{r c}^a^s^e^s^c^ite^{d in}^the^A^ttorne^y^G^e^ne^ra^l’s^th^th
^te^stim^on^y^,^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^R^a^b^bⁱ^t^t^,⁵⁸^{3 F}^.²^d¹⁰¹⁴^,¹⁰²⁸⁽⁴^{Cir. 1}⁹⁷⁸^);^Unⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^es^v.^L^o^f^t^u^s^{, 99}²^F.2^d⁷⁹^{3, 79}⁶⁽⁸
^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹³⁾^.
²²⁹⁵⁰⁶^F.^2d^at⁷³^,^f^o^ot^no^t^e²⁶^.

^No^p^o^litician^w^h^o^kⁿ^o^w^s^th^eⁱ^d^en^tit^y^an^d^b^u^siⁿ^e^s^sⁱⁿ^ter^e^st^s^o^f^hⁱ^{s ca}^m^p^aigⁿ^coⁿ^t^rⁱ^b^u^to^r^sⁱ^s
^ev^{er co}^m^p^letel^y^dev^o^{id of}^kⁿ^o^w^l^ed^g^e^as^{to t}^h^{e i}ⁿ^s^p^iration^be^hⁱⁿ^d^t^h^{e don}^atioⁿ^.^T^h^ere^m^u^s^t
^{be m}^o^{re s}^p^eci^fⁱ^{c kn}^o^w^ledg^{e o}^f^{a def}ⁱⁿ^{ite off}ⁱ^cia^l^{act f}^o^r^w^h^ich^t^h^{e con}^t^ribu^{tor inten}^d^s^to
^co^m^p^eⁿ^{sate b}^e^f^o^r^e^an^o^f^fⁱ^cial^’^s^actioⁿ^cr^o^{sses t}^h^{e li}ⁿ^e^b^e^t^w^e^eⁿ^g^u^{ilt a}ⁿ^dⁱⁿⁿ^o^cen^ce.
^{* *}^*
^...[U]n^d^{er th}^{e g}^r^atuⁱ^t^y^s^ection^,^“^o^th^er^wⁱ^s^e^t^h^an^a^s^prov^{ided by}^la^w^{... f}^o^{r or becau}^s^e^of^aⁿ^y
^of^fⁱ^cia^l^{act” carries}^th^{e con}^{cept of}^th^{e of}^fⁱ^ci^a^l^act^beiⁿ^g^don^{e anyw}^a^y^{, bu}^t^t^h^{e pa}^y^m^eⁿ^t^on^l^y
^bein^g^m^a^{de becau}^s^e^of^{a s}^p^ecificall^y^iden^tⁱ^fⁱ^{ed act, an}^d^w^ith^a^certain^gu^ilt^y^kn^o^w^ledg^{e bes}^t
^defⁱⁿ^e^{d b}^y^t^h^e^Su^pre^m^e^C^o^u^r^tⁱ^t^s^el^f^,^i.e.^,^“^wⁱ^t^h^kno^w^l^e^d^ge^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^d^oⁿ^o^r^w^a^{s p}^a^yi^ng^hi^m
^com^p^eⁿ^s^a^tⁱ^on^f^o^{r an}^offⁱ^cia^l^{act ... ev}^iden^{ce of}^th^{e Me}^m^b^er’^s^kn^o^w^ledg^{e o}^f^th^{e alle}^g^e^d²³⁰
^b^r^ib^er^’^s^{illicit r}^easoⁿ^s^f^o^r^p^a^yⁱⁿ^g^t^h^e^m^oⁿ^e^y^{is s}^u^f^f^icien^t^.”
In addition to providing evidence of the guilty knowledge that a public official had of being
compensated for an official act, it must be shown that the compensation received by the public
official was received “personally” or “for himself.” Even if things of value such as contributions
were arguably sought and received with the requisite guilty knowledge that they were given “for
or because of” an act to be done or which had been done by the Member, if they were directed to
a lawful campaign committee, even a Representative’s or Senator’s principal campaign
committee, or another independent entity such as a charitable organization, such payments might
not be considered to have been received or sought with the requisite intent to “compensate” the
Member “personally” for his acts, because they were not received for himself or personally, but ²³¹
rather for another entity or person.
If campaign contributions for federal elections are the “thing of value” received, therefore, it may
then be difficult to satisfy this element of the offense that the thing of value was received by the
official “for himself” or for the official “personally.” Under federal law all candidates for
Congress must have a principal campaign committee to which campaign contributions are given
and from which they are expended under authority of their treasurer, for campaign or other ²³²
designated purposes, and candidates and Members of Congress may not convert campaign ²³³
contributions to their own “personal” use under statute and congressional rule. Thus, even
contributions to a congressman/candidate’s own personal campaign committee would arguably, as
a general matter, not be considered contributions to the individual Member/candidate “for
himself” or to him or her “personally,” and thus would not come within the illegal gratuities
provision.
In the Brewster case the court there found that the “contributions” were, however, given by a
lobbyist to a sham committee which was merely the “alter ego” of the Senator, which did not file
public reports nor keep records such as other political committees under the federal law at that
time (the old Federal Corrupt Practices Act), and from which the Senator freely drew funds for ²³⁴
his own personal use. As such, these “illegal gratuity” payments were distinguishable from

²³⁰^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Br^e^w^s^t^e^r^{, s}^upr^a^a^t^81,⁸²^,^qu^oting^f^r^om^e^a^r^lie^r^Supr^e^m^e^C^our^{t de}^cⁱ^sⁱ^onⁱⁿ^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.
^B^r^ewst^er,^{408 U}^.^S.⁵⁰^1,⁵²^{7 (}¹⁹⁷²⁾^.
²³¹^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Br^e^w^s^t^e^r^{, s}^upr^a^a^t^77.
²³²^{2 U}^.^S^.^C^.^§4³²⁽^e⁾^;^{2 U}^.^S^.^C^.^§4³²⁽^a⁾^{; 2 U}^.^S^.^C^.^§⁴³⁹^a^.
²³³²^U.S^.^C.^§⁴³⁹^a^,^Sen^a^{te Ru}^le^XXXV^III,^p^a^ra.2^{; H}^o^u^s^{e Ru}^{le XX}^III⁽⁶^).
²³⁴⁵⁰^{6 F}^.²^d^a^t⁶⁹^-⁷^0,^75-⁷⁶^.

bona fide campaign contributions, which are not prohibited as illegal gratuities because they are ²³⁵
not for the candidate/official himself.
If the facts are developed that contributions or payments ostensibly made to a third party or entity
“for or because of” official acts done or to be done by a Member were in fact used or expended in
a manner to financially enrich or financially benefit the Member personally, then it might be
argued that such funds were received “for himself.” Contributions to a committee or any third
party, therefore, which are used, for example, to pay for personal living expenses of a Member,
one’s personal car or other personal expenses such as transportation, clothing, or food, might ²³⁶
arguably be considered payments for the Member “himself.”
The Supreme Court has found that elected officials who ask for bona fide campaign
contributions, only violate the “Hobbs Act” extortion law when there is evidence of a specific ²³⁷
quid pro quo, similar to the bribery statute. The Court noted in McCormick v. United States,
that the mere nearness in time of official acts by a recipient public official and campaign
contributions from the beneficiaries of those acts, that is, “shortly before or after campaign
contributions are solicited and received from those beneficiaries,” does not evidence “extortion”
under the law, and is an “unrealistic assessment” of the requirements of the crime, particularly in ²³⁸
light of how “election campaigns are financed by private contributions and expenditures.”
Rather, the Court found that the statute would be violated by a request from an elected official to
a member of the public for a voluntary campaign contribution “only if the payments are made in
return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an
official act,” where the “official asserts that his official conduct will be controlled by the terms of ²³⁹
the promise or undertaking.” The Supreme Court in McCormick explained:
^Servⁱⁿ^g^coⁿ^s^tit^u^eⁿ^t^s^aⁿ^{d s}^u^pportin^g^legis^l^at^ion^t^h^at^w^ill^ben^e^f^{it t}^h^{e dis}^t^{rict a}ⁿ^d
ⁱⁿ^divⁱ^d^u^als^aⁿ^{d g}^r^ou^ps^t^h^ereiⁿ^is^t^h^{e ev}^er^y^d^a^y^busⁱⁿ^es^s^o^f^{a leg}ⁱ^s^l^a^t^{or. It is}^als^o^tru^e^th^a^t
^c^a^m^p^aⁱ^gⁿ^s^mu^st^b^e^r^u^{n a}ⁿ^d^fⁱ^na^nc^e^d^.^M^o^ne^{y i}^s^c^o^nst^a^nt^l^y^b^eⁱ^{ng so}^lⁱ^cⁱ^t^e^d^oⁿ^b^e^ha^l^f^o^f
^can^di^dat^e^s^,^w^h^{o ru}ⁿ^on^pl^at^f^o^rm^s^aⁿ^d^w^h^{o cl}^ai^m^su^pport^on^t^h^{e b}^a^sⁱ^s^o^f^t^h^ei^r^vⁱ^ew^s^an^d^w^h^at
^t^h^e^yⁱⁿ^t^e^nd^t^o^d^o^o^r^ha^ve^d^one^.^W^h^a^t^e^v^e^r^et^hⁱ^{cal con}^s^ide^r^ation^s^an^{d appearan}^ces^m^a^y
ⁱⁿ^dⁱ^{cate, to}^h^o^ld^th^{at le}^gⁱ^sla^t^o^r^{s co}^m^m^{it t}^h^{e f}^e^d^e^r^a^{l cr}ⁱ^m^{e o}^f^e^x^to^r^tioⁿ^w^h^en^t^h^e^y^act^f^o^r^th^e
^ben^e^fⁱ^t^o^f^con^s^tⁱ^t^u^eⁿ^t^s^{or s}^upport^l^e^gⁱ^s^l^atⁱ^oⁿ^f^u^rt^h^e^ri^ng^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^t^e^res^t^s^o^f^s^o^m^e^o^f^t^h^ei^r
^con^s^tit^u^eⁿ^t^s^,^s^h^ortl^y^be^f^o^{re or af}^{ter ca}^m^p^aign^coⁿ^t^ribu^tioⁿ^s^a^r^{e s}^o^{licited a}ⁿ^{d receiv}^e^d^f^r^o^m
^t^h^os^{e ben}^e^fⁱ^ci^ari^e^s^,ⁱ^s^aⁿ^un^real^as^s^e^s^s^m^eⁿ^t^of^w^h^at^C^ong^ress^cou^l^{d h}^a^v^e^m^e^aⁿ^t^by^m^a^kⁱⁿ^gⁱ^t
^{a cri}^m^{e t}^o^obt^aiⁿ^propert^y^f^r^om^aⁿ^ot^h^e^r,^wⁱ^t^h^hⁱ^s^con^s^eⁿ^{t, “un}^d^{er color}^of^of^fⁱ^{cial righ}^{t.” T}^o
^h^o^l^d^ot^h^e^r^wⁱ^s^e^w^oul^{d open}^t^o^pros^ecu^tⁱ^oⁿⁿ^o^t^onl^y^con^d^u^c^t^t^h^at^h^a^{s l}^ong^beeⁿ^t^h^oug^ht^t^o^be
^w^e^ll^wⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^t^h^{e la}^w^but^al^s^o^con^d^u^c^t^t^h^atⁱⁿ^{a v}^e^r^y^real^s^eⁿ^s^{e is}^un^av^{oidable s}^o^long^as

²³⁵^“T^o^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^t^rary^,^h^o^w^ever,^{a p}^u^b^lⁱ^c^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^{’s a}^ccep^t^aⁿ^{ce o}^f^{a t}^hⁱⁿ^{g o}^f^val^u^{e u}ⁿ^r^el^at^ed^t^o^t^h^{e p}^e^rf^o^r^man^{ce o}^f^an^y
^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^act^and^all^bo^na^fide^c^ont^rⁱ^buti^ons^dir^e^c^t^e^d^t^o^a^law^f^ully^c^o^nduc^te^{d c}^a^m^p^ai^{gn c}^o^m^mⁱ^t^t^e^e^or^o^t^he^r^pe^r^s^on^or
^eⁿ^tity^areⁿ^o^t^pro^h^ibi^t^e^d^by²⁰¹⁽^g⁾^[^now²⁰¹⁽^c⁾^]^.^”⁵⁰⁶^F.^{2d a}^t⁷⁷^.^Em^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d.
²³⁶^B^r^ewst^er,^su^p^r^a^a^t^69-⁷⁰^{, 7}⁵^-⁷^6;^s^e^e^a^l^s^o^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^v^.^G^o^m^e^z^,⁸⁰⁷^F^.²^d¹⁵²³^,¹⁵²⁷⁽¹⁰^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^,^pa^y^m^eⁿ^t
^m^a^de^{to th}^ir^d^pa^r^t^y^{on dir}^e^c^tⁱ^on^o^f^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^o^tha^t^“^m^oney^c^{ould n}^o^t^be^li^nk^e^d^to^him^.^”
²³⁷⁵⁰^{0 U}^.^S^.²⁵⁷⁽¹⁹⁹¹⁾^.
²³⁸^Id^.^a^t²⁷^2.
²³⁹^Id^.^a^t²⁷^3.

^election^ca^m^p^aⁱ^gn^s^are^fⁱⁿ^aⁿ^c^e^d^by^priv^a^t^{e con}^t^ributions^{or ex}^pen^d^it^u^r^es^{, as}^t^h^e^y^h^a^v^e^beeⁿ²⁴⁰
^f^r^o^m^t^h^{e beg}ⁱⁿⁿⁱ^ng^of^t^h^{e N}^a^tⁱ^on^.
In a similar vein as the bribery provision, the making of campaign contributions, either on one’s
own initiative or in response to a request from an official or the official’s campaign, with the mere
hope or expectation that one might be treated favorably in the future because of one’s generosity
and support in making such campaign contributions, does not provide the necessary quid pro quo
or corrupt character for an extortion charge:
^[T]h^{e ex}^plⁱ^cⁱ^tⁿ^e^s^s^requⁱ^r^e^m^eⁿ^t^s^e^rv^e^s^t^o^di^s^tⁱⁿ^guⁱ^s^{h bet}^w^eeⁿ^con^t^ri^bu^tⁱ^ons^t^h^at^are^gⁱ^v^e^{n or}
^receiv^e^d^wⁱ^t^h^th^e^“^aⁿ^{ticipation” of}^of^fⁱ^{cial actio}ⁿ^an^{d c}^oⁿ^t^rⁱ^b^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^t^h^a^t^a^r^e^gⁱ^v^eⁿ^o^r^r^eceiv^e^d
ⁱⁿ^e^x^ch^aⁿ^g^e^f^o^{r a}^“^p^ro^mⁱ^s^e^”^{of of}^{ficial act}^ion^.^{... Wh}^eⁿ^{a co}ⁿ^t^ribu^{tor an}^{d an off}ⁱ^cial^clearl^y
^und^e^r^st^aⁿ^d^t^h^e^t^e^r^m^{s o}^f^a^b^a^r^g^aⁱ^{n t}^o^e^x^c^h^a^nge^o^f^fi^cⁱ^a^l^a^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^fo^r^m^o^ne^y,^t^h^e^y^ha^ve^mo^ve^d²⁴¹
^bey^oⁿ^d^“^aⁿ^tⁱ^cⁱ^p^atⁱ^oⁿ^”^an^{d i}ⁿ^t^o^an^arran^g^e^m^eⁿ^t^t^h^at^t^h^{e H}^obbs^A^c^t^f^o^rbi^d^s^.
It is not explicitly clear from case law whether a conspiracy to defraud the government would
exist if the “nexus” or connection between campaign contributions and the intervention activity
by a Member of Congress does not also rise to or satisfy the elements of a “bribe” (18 U.S.C.
§201(b)), an “extortion” (18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2)), an “illegal gratuity” (18 U.S.C. §201(c)), or
“compensation” for services rendered before an agency (18 U.S.C. §203(a)). However, if the
connection or linkage could be shown to be such that the campaign donations were in fact the
“inducement,” “reward,” “motivation” or “reason” for the intervention on behalf of such donor, it
might then be argued that the donations and inducements provided the “wrongful” or “improper”
character of the influence exerted upon a federal agency sufficient to sustain a “conspiracy”
theory.
In United States v. Johnson,²⁴² the Supreme Court reviewed a conviction of a Member of
Congress for conflicts of interest (18 U.S.C. §203), and for conspiracy to defraud the United
States (18 U.S.C. §371) for involvement in a scheme whereby:
^T^h^{e t}^w^{o C}^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^m^{en approac}^h^{ed th}^e^Attorn^e^y^Gen^e^{ral a}ⁿ^{d t}^h^e^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^an^t^Attorn^e^y^g^eⁿ^e^ral
ⁱⁿ^c^h^arg^e^o^f^t^h^e^C^rⁱ^mⁱⁿ^al^Di^vⁱ^sⁱ^on^aⁿ^{d u}^r^g^e^{d th}^e^m^{“to rev}ⁱ^e^w^”^th^eⁱⁿ^dict^m^eⁿ^t^[of^s^a^vⁱ^ng^s
^an^{d loan}^of^ficers^]^{. For th}^es^{e s}^e^rv^ices^J^o^hⁿ^s^oⁿ^receiv^e^{d s}^u^bs^tan^{tial s}^u^m^sⁱⁿ^th^e^f^o^r^m^of^a
^“^c^a^m^pa^ign^coⁿ^t^ribu^tioⁿ^”^aⁿ^d^“leg^al^f^ees^.”^T^h^{e Gov}^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^c^oⁿ^t^en^{ded, an}^{d pres}^um^abl^y^th^e
^j^u^ry^f^o^uⁿ^d^{, t}^h^at^t^h^es^e^pa^y^m^eⁿ^t^s^w^e^reⁿ^e^v^e^{r di}^s^c^l^o^s^e^{d t}^o^t^h^e^D^e^part^m^eⁿ^t^of^Jus^tⁱ^{ce, a}ⁿ^{d t}^h^a^t
^t^h^{e pa}^y^m^en^t^s^w^e^{re n}^o^t^bon^{a f}ⁱ^{de cam}^pai^gⁿ^con^t^ri^bu^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^{or l}^e^g^a^l^f^e^e^s^bu^t^w^e^re^m^a^{de s}ⁱ^m^p^l^y
^t^o^“^buy^{” t}^h^e^C^ong^res^s^m^aⁿ^.
^T^h^{e b}^u^lk^o^f^t^h^{e ev}^id^eⁿ^{ce s}^u^b^m^itted^{as to}^J^o^hⁿ^soⁿ^d^ealt^wⁱ^t^h^hⁱ^s^fⁱⁿ^aⁿ^c^{ial tr}^aⁿ^sact^ioⁿ^s
^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e o}^t^h^e^r^coⁿ^s^pⁱ^r^a^to^r^s^{, an}^d^w^ith^hⁱ^{s acti}^v^itie^{s in}^th^{e Dep}^a^r^t^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^J^u^{stice. As to}^th^ese
^as^pects^of^th^{e s}^u^bs^taⁿ^tⁱ^v^{e cou}ⁿ^ts^an^{d th}^{e con}^s^pirac^y^co^uⁿ^t^{, n}^o^s^u^bs^taⁿ^{tial qu}^es^tion^is^bef^o^re
^us.¹⁸^U^.^S.^C.^§³⁷¹^ha^{s l}^o^{ng b}^e^eⁿ^he^l^d^t^o^eⁿ^c^o^m^p^a^s^{s no}^t^oⁿ^l^y^c^oⁿ^s^pi^raci^es^t^h^at^mⁱ^g^h^tⁱⁿ^v^o^l^v^e
^l^o^s^s^of^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^f^uⁿ^d^s^,^bu^t^al^s^o^“^a^ny^cons^pi^rac^y^f^o^{r t}^h^{e purpos}^{e of}ⁱ^m^pai^rⁱⁿ^g^,^o^b^s^t^r^u^c^tⁱⁿ^g

²⁴⁰⁵⁰^{0 U}^.^S^.^a^t²⁷²^.
²⁴¹^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^C^a^r^p^eⁿ^te^r^,⁹⁶¹^F^.^2d⁸²^4,⁸²^{7 (}⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹²⁾^.
²⁴²³⁸^{3 U}^.^S^.¹⁶⁹⁽¹⁹⁶⁶⁾^.

^{or def}^eatⁱⁿ^g^t^h^e^l^a^w^f^u^l^f^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^on^{of any}^depart^m^eⁿ^t^of^G^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^.”^Haas^{v. Henkel,}²¹⁶²⁴³
^U^.^S^.^462,^479.³⁸^{3 U}^.^S^.^at¹⁷²^.
If there is thus found a sufficient nexus or connection between financial remuneration to one’s
campaign coffers, and an official’s actions in intervening in an administrative process and
attempting to influence an agency decision, then it might be contended, at least in theory, that the
“wrongful” nature and motivation for the influence exerted, which attempts to interfere with,
thwart or overturn the impartial, fair and due administration of the law by the agency, could
arguably raise such concerted activities by the individuals involved to the level of a “conspiracy”
to defraud the United States.
Both the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct and the Senate Select Committee on
Ethics have warned Members and staff about the “appearances” of impropriety that may occur or
be drawn from certain “linking” of campaign contributions with offers or efforts to assist
constituents with matters before federal agencies and departments, regardless of whether such ²⁴⁴
conduct rises to the level of a federal criminal offense. The Senate Rules now specifically
provide that: “The decision to provide assistance to petitioners may not be made on the basis of
contributions or services, or promises of contributions or services, to the Member’s political
campaigns or to other organizations in which the Member has a political, personal, or financial ²⁴⁵
interest.” In its report on an investigation of Members’ interventions with an agency on behalf
of a particular campaign contributor, colloquially known as the “Keating Five” investigation, the
Select Committee on Ethics explained:
^B^ecau^{se Sen}^a^to^{rs o}^ccu^p^y^{a p}^o^s^itioⁿ^o^f^tru^s^{t, ev}^er^y^Seⁿ^a^to^{r al}^w^a^y^s^m^u^{st e}ⁿ^d^eav^o^r^to
^av^{oid appearan}^{ce th}^{at t}^h^{e S}^eⁿ^a^{tor, th}^{e Se}ⁿ^a^t^e^{, or t}^h^e^gov^ernm^en^t^a^l^proces^s^m^a^y^be
ⁱⁿ^f^l^u^eⁿ^{ced b}^y^ca^m^p^aⁱ^gn^con^t^ri^bu^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^{or ot}^h^e^{r ben}^e^fⁱ^t^s^provⁱ^d^{ed by}^t^h^o^s^e^wⁱ^t^h^sⁱ^gⁿⁱ^fⁱ^can^t
^l^e^gi^s^l^a^tⁱ^v^e^o^r^go^ve^rⁿ^me^nt^a^lⁱⁿ^t^e^r^e^st^s.^N^o^ne^t^h^e^l^e^s^s,ⁱ^f^aⁿⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vi^d^u^a^l^o^r^o^r^gaⁿⁱ^z^a^tⁱ^o^{n ha}^s
^con^t^ribu^{ted to a Sen}^a^tor’^s^ca^mpaigⁿ^s^{or cau}^s^e^s^,^bu^t^h^a^s^{a cas}^e^w^h^ich^t^h^{e Se}ⁿ^a^{tor reas}^on^abl^y
^believ^e^s^h^e^{or s}^h^{e is}^oblig^{ed to}^pres^s^becau^s^e^{it is}ⁱⁿ^t^h^{e pu}^{blic in}^teres^t^{or th}^{e caus}^e^of^j^u^s^tice
^o^r^eq^u^ity^to^d^o^so^{, th}^en^th^{e Sen}^a^to^r^’^{s o}^b^lig^atioⁿⁱ^s^to^p^u^r^s^u^e^th^{at case. I}ⁿ^su^chⁱⁿ^staⁿ^{ces, t}^h^e
^Sen^a^tor^m^u^s^t^be^mⁱⁿ^d^fu^{l of}^t^h^e^appearan^{ce th}^{at m}^a^y^{be created an}^{d tak}^e^s^p^{ecial care}^t^o^t^r^y^t^o
^p^r^ev^en^t^h^a^r^m^to^t^h^{e p}^u^b^lic’^s^tr^u^s^tⁱⁿ^t^h^{e Se}ⁿ^a^to^r^aⁿ^d^th^e^Sen^a^{te. T}^hⁱ^s^d^o^e^sⁿ^o^t^m^ean^,
^h^o^w^e^v^e^{r, t}^h^at^{a Me}^m^b^{er or e}^m^ploy^ee^is^requ^ired^to^d^e^ter^mⁱⁿ^{e if}^oⁿ^e^is^{a co}ⁿ^t^rⁱ^b^u^to^r^b^e^f^o^r^e²⁴⁶
^prov^idin^g^as^sⁱ^s^t^an^ce.
The House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct has similarly explained that Members
should avoid appearances of linking contributions to actions, but that this could not mean that
Members are prohibited from assisting their supporters like any other constituent, based on the
merits of the matter:

²⁴³^T^h^e^c^ons^pira^c^y^c^ounts^w^e^re^ultim^a^t^e^l^y^dis^m^is^s^e^{d on “}^S^p^eech^o^r^Deb^a^t^e”^Cl^au^se^gr^ounds^b^ecau^{se t}^h^{e ch}^{arges were}
^{in pa}^r^t^c^oⁿⁿ^e^c^t^e^d^w^{ith the}^m^o^tiv^a^tions^of^J^ohns^{on m}^a^kⁱ^ng^a^s^p^eech^f^a^vo^rab^l^{e t}^o^t^h^{e savi}ⁿ^g^{s an}^d^l^o^{an i}ⁿ^stⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^oⁿ^t^h^e^th
^f^l^oor^of^the^H^o^us^e^.³^{83 U}^.^{S. a}^t¹⁸^5-¹^86;^no^te^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^J^o^hn^s^on,⁴¹^{9 F}^.²^d⁵⁶^,⁵⁸⁽⁴^Cir.¹⁹⁷⁰^),^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,
³⁹⁷^U^.^S.¹⁰¹⁰⁽¹⁹⁷⁰⁾^.
²⁴⁴^T^h^{e S}^eⁿ^a^t^e^S^e^l^ect^Co^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee o}ⁿ^E^t^hⁱ^{cs f}^o^uⁿ^d^“i^m^p^ro^p^e^{r con}^d^u^c^t^”^o^f^{a S}^eⁿ^a^t^o^{r w}^h^o^s^{e “o}^f^fⁱ^c^e^p^r^actⁱ^c^{es evi}^d^en^ced
^aⁿ^im^pe^r^m^is^sⁱ^ble^pa^tte^{rn of}^c^oⁿ^d^u^c^t^by^s^ubs^ta^ntia^lly^linkⁱ^ng^f^{und r}^a^is^ing^a^c^tiv^itie^s^a^{nd of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^a^c^tⁱ^v^itie^s^.^”^{S. Rpt}^.^N^o^.
¹⁰²^-²^23,^s^upr^a^a^t²⁰^.
²⁴⁵^Se^na^te^R^u^le^43,^pa^r^a^.^3.
²⁴⁶^{S. R}^p^{t. N}^o^{. 1}^02-²²^3,^s^upr^a^at¹²^.

^B^ecau^{se a Me}^m^b^er’^s^o^b^lig^a^tioⁿ^s^{are to}^{all co}ⁿ^s^titu^eⁿ^t^s^eq^u^a^ll^y^,^coⁿ^s^id^eratioⁿ^s^su^c^h^as
^{political s}^u^{pport, party}^af^filiatⁱ^on^{, or cam}^paign^con^t^ribu^tⁱ^ons^s^h^{ould n}^o^{t af}^f^e^c^t^eith^{er th}^e
^deci^sⁱ^on^o^f^{a Me}^m^b^{er t}^o^provi^{de as}^sⁱ^s^t^an^ce^{or t}^h^e^qu^alⁱ^t^y^of^h^e^l^p^t^h^atⁱ^s^gⁱ^v^eⁿ^.^Whⁱ^l^e^a
^Me^m^b^{er s}^h^ou^{ld n}^o^{t di}^s^c^ri^mⁱ^{nate in}^f^a^v^o^{r of}^{political s}^u^pporters^{, n}^e^ith^erⁿ^{eed h}^e^{or s}^h^e²⁴⁷
^dⁱ^scrⁱ^mⁱⁿ^a^{te ag}^aⁱⁿ^s^{t th}^e^m^.
Concerning the “appearances” in the receipt of campaign contributions from one for whom the
Member has interceded before a federal agency, the late Senator Paul Douglas in his work, Ethics
in Government, suggested caution specifically as to the receipt of such campaign contributions:
^{It is}^pro^b^ablyⁿ^o^t^w^r^ong^f^o^{r th}^e^cam^pai^gⁿ^m^aⁿ^a^g^e^rs^o^f^{a leg}ⁱ^s^l^{ator bef}^o^{re an}^election^to
^requ^es^{t con}^t^ribu^tioⁿ^s^f^r^o^m^th^o^s^{e f}^o^r^w^h^o^m^t^h^{e leg}ⁱ^s^l^{ator h}^a^s^don^{e app}^r^{eciable f}^a^v^o^rs^{, bu}^t
^th^is^s^h^{ould n}^e^v^e^{r be pres}^en^te^{d as}^{a pay}^m^eⁿ^{t f}^o^{r th}^{e s}^e^r^vⁱ^ces^ren^d^{ered. More}^ov^{er, th}^e
^p^o^ssib^ilit^y^o^f^s^u^c^h^{a co}ⁿ^t^rⁱ^b^u^ti^oⁿ^s^h^o^u^ldⁿ^e^v^e^r^b^e^s^u^g^g^e^sted^b^y^th^e^legⁱ^slato^r^o^r^hⁱ^s^sta^f^f^at
^th^{e ti}^m^e^th^e^f^a^v^o^{r is}^don^{e. Fu}^rt^h^e^r^m^{ore, a decen}^{t in}^ter^v^{al of}^ti^m^e^s^h^ou^{ld be allo}^w^e^{d to laps}^e
^s^o^th^{at n}^e^it^h^e^{r part}^y^wⁱ^{ll f}^{eel t}^h^{ere is}^{a clos}^{e con}ⁿ^ection^bet^w^eeⁿ^th^{e t}^w^{o acts}^.^Fiⁿ^a^ll^y^,ⁿ^o^t
^th^{e sli}^g^h^t^{est p}^r^ess^u^r^e^sh^o^u^ld^b^e^p^u^{t u}^p^oⁿ^th^{e r}^ecipⁱ^en^{ts o}^f^th^{e f}^a^v^o^r^sⁱⁿ^r^e^g^a^r^d^to^th^e
^ca^m^p^ai^gn^{. It}^s^h^oul^{d be cl}^earl^y^uⁿ^d^ers^t^{ood t}^h^at^any^gⁱ^f^t^t^h^e^y^mak^eⁱ^s^v^o^l^uⁿ^t^ar^y^an^{d t}^h^ere^w^ill
^{be n}^o^qu^es^tⁱ^on^o^f^repri^s^al^s^{or l}^ack^{of fu}^t^u^re^h^e^l^p^b^y^t^h^{e l}^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^{or i}^f^t^h^e^gⁱ^f^tⁱ^s^wⁱ^t^h^h^e^l^d^{. In}
^ot^h^e^r^w^o^rds^,^any^cont^ri^bu^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^h^oul^{d n}^o^t^{be a}^q^uⁱ^d^pr^o^qu^o^b^u^{t r}^a^th^er^a^w^h^o^l^l^y^v^o^luⁿ^t^ar^y
^o^f^f^e^rⁱⁿ^g^b^a^sed^u^p^oⁿ^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^al^f^r^ien^d^sh^ip^aⁿ^d^b^e^liefⁱⁿ^th^e^ef^f^e^c^tiv^eⁿ^e^{ss o}^f^t^h^{e le}^gⁱ^slato^r²⁴⁸
^s^h^arpen^e^{d perh}^aps^b^yⁱⁿ^divⁱ^d^u^{al ex}^perien^ce.
Providing office management and workload systems and mechanisms whereby constituent
requests for intervention assistance are routinely and consistently evaluated on the merits of the
matter, independently of campaign contributions or support from the requesting individual or
entity, could provide protection from appearances that decisions are based on campaign support
considerations. This may involve establishing certain criteria for authorizing interventions or
assistance, including prioritizing decisions on whether or not to intervene based on such factors as
the strength of the constituent’s case, the issues of justice and equity involved, the type or level of
intervention required, consistency with regular office practices, and the importance of the
underlying issues to the district, State, or the Nation.
The Senate Select Committee on Ethics set out several possible considerations and suggestions
for offices to take into account in the case of requested interventions:
^T^h^{e m}^e^rit^s^of^t^h^{e con}^s^t^itu^eⁿ^t^’^s^cas^e.
^T^h^{e co}ⁿ^tin^uⁱⁿ^g^vⁱ^ab^ilit^y^o^f^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^s^tit^u^eⁿ^t^’^s^clai^m^.^I^f^t^h^e^coⁿ^s^t^itu^eⁿ^t^’^s^clai^m
ⁱⁿ^itial^l^y^ap^p^ear^ed^to^h^a^v^e^m^e^rⁱ^t^,^h^a^{s th}^{e Se}ⁿ^a^to^r^acted^d^e^s^pⁱ^t^e^f^a^c^t^s^o^r^cⁱ^r^c^u^m^s^t^an^c^e^s^th^a^t
^{later u}ⁿ^d^er^mⁱⁿ^e^{d t}^h^e^m^e^rit^s^{of th}^{at clai}^m^?
^T^h^{e k}ⁱⁿ^d^of^ag^eⁿ^c^yⁱⁿ^v^o^lv^ed^an^{d th}^{e n}^a^t^u^{re of}^its^proceedin^gs^{. Is}^th^{e ag}^eⁿ^c^y
^perf^ormⁱ^ngⁱⁿ^{a qu}^asⁱ^-^j^u^dicial,^adj^u^dicativ^{e or en}^f^o^rce^m^{ent fu}ⁿ^c^tⁱ^on^?
^If^th^{e Se}ⁿ^a^{tor or s}^t^af^f^m^e^m^b^ers^kⁿ^o^w^s^t^h^{at an}ⁱⁿ^divⁱ^d^u^{al is}^{a con}^t^ribu^{tor, th}^{e f}^o^llo^wⁱⁿ^g
^iss^u^es^sh^o^u^ld^also^b^e^coⁿ^s^id^e^r^ed^{. (}^I^f^th^{e Sen}^a^to^r^o^r^sta^f^f^m^e^m^b^er^d^o^e^{s n}^o^t^kⁿ^o^w^if^aⁿ
ⁱⁿ^divⁱ^d^u^{al i}^s^{a con}^t^rib^u^{tor, h}^e^{or s}^h^{e is}ⁿ^o^{t re}^qu^{ired or en}^co^urag^{ed to f}ⁱⁿ^d^ou^{t. Mos}^t^Seⁿ^a^te

²⁴⁷^H^ous^e^Et^hic^s^M^aⁿ^ual^{, s}^u^pr^a^a^t²^50.
²⁴⁸^D^oug^la^s^,^E^t^hⁱ^{cs i}ⁿ^G^o^vern^m^en^t^,^s^upr^a^a^t^89-⁹⁰^.

^st^a^f^f^me^m^b^e^r^{s a}^r^e^no^t^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^e^d^wⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^fo^r^m^a^tⁱ^o^{n r}^e^ga^r^dⁱⁿ^{g c}^o^nt^rⁱ^b^u^tⁱ^o^ns^an^d^are^uⁿ^a^w^a^re^of
^w^h^et^h^e^{r an}ⁱⁿ^divⁱ^d^u^{al s}^e^e^k^ing^as^sⁱ^s^t^an^{ce i}^s^{a con}^t^ribu^tor.)
^T^h^{e am}^oun^{t of}^m^oⁿ^e^y^coⁿ^t^{ributed. Has}^th^{e con}^t^ribu^{tor g}ⁱ^v^eⁿ^o^r^r^aⁱ^s^e^d^m^o^r^e^t^h^aⁿ^aⁿ
^av^erag^{e con}^t^rib^u^tion^?
^T^h^e^hi^st^o^r^y^o^f^d^oⁿ^a^tⁱ^o^{ns b}^y^a^c^o^nt^rⁱ^b^u^t^o^r^.^H^a^{s t}^h^e^con^s^tⁱ^t^u^eⁿ^t^m^a^de^con^t^ri^bu^tⁱ^ons^t^o
^th^{e Se}ⁿ^a^to^r^p^r^ev^io^u^s^l^y^?
^T^h^e^na^t^u^r^e^aⁿ^d^d^e^gr^e^e^o^f^t^h^e^a^c^tⁱ^o^{n t}^a^ke^{n b}^y^t^h^e^Se^na^t^o^r^.^T^o^w^h^a^t^e^x^t^e^nt^d^o^e^s^t^h^e
^actioⁿ^o^r^p^a^tterⁿ^o^f^actioⁿ^d^e^vⁱ^{ate f}^r^o^m^t^h^{at Se}ⁿ^a^to^r^’^{s n}^o^r^m^a^l^coⁿ^d^u^c^t?
^T^h^{e p}^r^o^x^im^it^y^o^f^m^oⁿ^e^y^aⁿ^d^actioⁿ^.^Ho^w^clo^s^{e i}ⁿ^ti^m^eⁱ^s^t^h^e^Sen^a^to^r^’^{s actio}ⁿ^s^to²⁴⁹
^hⁱ^s^{or h}^e^{r kn}^o^w^l^e^dg^{e o}^f^{or rec}^eⁱ^p^t^of^t^h^{e con}^t^ri^butⁱ^oⁿ⁽^s⁾^?
The receipt of gifts from private individuals by Members and employees of the House or Senate,
even unconnected to any specific official act, have raised ethical issues and concerns for a
number of years because of the potential for subtle influence of, dependency upon and favoritism ²⁵⁰
towards one’s private benefactors. Gifts to Members and employees of both Houses of
Congress are now regulated by both statute and internal House and Senate rules. Federal law
provides the basic prohibition that an officer or employee of the Federal Government may not
receive any gift from certain “prohibited sources,” that is, those doing business with, seeking
some official action from, or who are regulated by the agency or department of the official, or
those whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the ²⁵¹
officer’s official governmental duties. The statute notes that each supervisory ethics office may
make rules and regulations for the receipt of gifts by the employees and officers under their ²⁵²
jurisdiction, carving out certain exceptions and circumstances. Under this provision, as well as
by virtue of Congress’ constitutional rule-making authority, each House of Congress has
promulgated detailed rules and regulations for the acceptance of gifts.
When discussing gifts, and the gifts rules, it should be noted that a “gift” may be distinguished
from more sinister rewards, remunerations, or monetary transfers. Things of value, presents,
items or tokens of appreciation received by Members and congressional staff employees may be
considered either as “gifts,” “gratuities,” “bribes” or “compensation,” depending on the intent of
the transaction and its connection to an official act. A “gift” is something of value given with the
requisite “donative” intent, that is, colloquially, without “strings attached,” and unconnected to
any reciprocal action or official act on the part of the recipient. This may include gifts of general
appreciation or “goodwill” towards an office, a Member or an employee, in gratitude for one’s
public service in general, and not connected or tied to any specific act or duty performed for the
constituent group or person. If the thing of value, however, is received personally by a
congressional staffer with the knowledge or understanding that it is given in appreciation or
gratitude, or as a reward, “for or because of” a particular official act performed or to be performed

²⁴⁹^{S. R}^p^{t. N}^o^{. 1}^02-²²^3,^s^upr^a^a^t¹³^-^14.
²⁵⁰^N^o^te^{, f}^o^r^e^x^am^ple^,^dis^c^us^sⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^D^oug^la^s^,^E^t^hi^{cs i}ⁿ^G^o^vern^m^en^t^{, a}^t⁴⁴⁽¹⁹⁵²⁾^.
²⁵¹^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.⁷³^53.
²⁵²^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 7}³⁵³⁽^b⁾^.

by the staffer, then such transaction may fall within the purview of the “illegal gratuities”
provision, or be an impermissible private “compensation” for that official act. When something of
value is given or received in exchange for being influenced in the performance of an official act,
that is, where there is a “corrupt” bargain or agreement to receive something of value in return for ²⁵³
doing an official act (often called a quid pro quo), then the bribery provision is implicated.
The Rules of the House of Representatives and of the Senate provide that “gifts” from private,
outside sources may generally not be accepted by Members and staff, except when such gifts are ²⁵⁴
expressly permitted by the respective Rule. In addition to allowing the normal receipt and ²⁵⁵
exchange of gifts among relatives and personal friends, the House and Senate Rules also permit ²⁵⁶
the receipt of gifts of “nominal value” such as baseball caps, pens, or t-shirts, and provide a
general de minimis exception allowing staff and Members to receive gifts of under $50 in value ²⁵⁷
(and cumulating no more than $100 from one source in a year). Additionally, there are
numerous other explicit exceptions to the general “no gifts” rule which are of only marginal
relevance to the performance of intervention in administrative matters on behalf of ²⁵⁸
constituents.
Although not a formal congressional rule, or an enforceable “law,” another potentially applicable
ethical “guideline” was adopted by Congress in 1958 in the “Code of Ethics for Government ²⁵⁹
Service,” as a concurrent resolution. That provision states:
^An^y^p^e^r^s^oⁿⁱⁿ^Go^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^se^r^v^{ice sh}^o^u^ld^:
^{5. ... n}^e^v^e^{r accept, f}^o^{r h}ⁱ^m^s^e^l^{f or h}ⁱ^s^f^a^mⁱ^l^y^,^f^a^v^o^rs^an^{d benef}^its^un^{der circum}^s^t^aⁿ^ce^s
^w^hⁱ^c^h^mⁱ^gh^t^{be con}^s^t^r^u^e^{d by}^reas^on^abl^e^pers^on^s^asⁱⁿ^f^l^u^eⁿ^cⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e perf}^orm^aⁿ^{ce of}^hⁱ^s
^go^ve^rⁿ^me^nt^a^l^d^u^tⁱ^e^s.
Concurrent resolutions, which are not sent to the President for his signature, are not considered a ²⁶⁰
form of legislation which have legal or binding effect on parties outside of Congress. Although

²⁵³^T^h^e^r^e^quir^e^{d c}^o^nne^c^tⁱ^on^{to s}^o^m^e^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^ac^{t, w}^h^ic^{h is}^pa^r^t^of^the^r^e^quir^e^{d c}^r^im^ina^l^inte^nt,^is^g^e^ne^r^a^lly^the^dif^f^e^r^eⁿ^c^e
^b^e^t^w^een^{a cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^“b^ri^b^{e” o}^r^“i^l^l^egal^grat^uⁱ^t^y^{” o}ⁿ^t^h^{e on}^{e h}^a^nd^,^aⁿ^d^{a m}^e^{re “}^gⁱ^f^t^”^t^o^{a p}^u^b^lⁱ^c^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^oⁿ^t^h^e^o^t^h^e^r.
^Unite^d^State^s^v^.^Su^n-Diam^on^{d Gr}^owe^{rs of Ca}^liforⁿ^ia^,⁵²^{6 U.}^S^.³^98,⁴⁰⁴⁽¹⁹⁹⁹^);^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^a^t^{es v.}^B^r^e^w^st^er,⁵⁰⁶^F.^2d^th
^62,⁷¹^-⁷^{2 (}^D^.C^.C^ir^.¹⁹⁷⁴⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^J^o^hns^on^{, 62}¹^F^.^2d¹⁰⁷³^,¹⁰⁷⁶⁽¹⁰^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁰⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^v^.^Ar^th^ur^,⁵⁴⁴^th^th
^F^.^2d⁷³^0,⁷³^4,⁷³⁵⁽⁴^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^;^Unite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Alle^n,^{10 F.3}^d⁴^{05, 41}¹⁽⁷^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹³⁾^.
²⁵⁴^Ho^u^s^{e Ru}^le^XXV^,^p^a^ra.⁵⁽^a)(¹⁾⁽^A⁾^{; S}^eⁿ^a^{te Ru}^{le XXXV}^,^p^a^ra.¹⁽^a⁾⁽¹^).
²⁵⁵^Ho^u^s^{e Ru}^le^XXV^,^p^a^ra.⁵⁽^a)(³⁾⁽^{C) an}^d^(D^{); S}^eⁿ^a^te^Ru^{le XXXV}^,^p^a^ra.¹⁽^c)(3^),⁽⁴^).
²⁵⁶^Ho^u^s^{e Ru}^le^XXV^,^p^a^ra.⁵⁽^a)(³⁾⁽^W⁾^{; S}^eⁿ^a^{te Ru}^{le XXXV}^,^p^a^ra.¹⁽^c)(2³⁾^.
²⁵⁷^House^Rule^XXV^,^pa^ra^{. 5(a}⁾⁽¹⁾⁽^{B); Se}^na^te^Rule^XXXV^,^pa^ra^{. 1(a}^{)(2). On}^ly^gⁱ^f^t^{s of}^{$10 or m}^o^reⁱⁿ^v^a^lue^w^{ill c}^ount
^tow^a^{rds the}^$1⁰⁰^y^e^a^r^l^y^li^m^it.
²⁵⁸^Se^e^dis^c^us^sⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^H^o^us^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on S}^t^a^nda^r^d^s^of^O^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^C^ond^uc^{t, “}^R^ule^s^of^the^U^.^{S. H}^ous^e^of^R^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s
^{on G}ⁱ^f^t^s^a^{nd T}^r^a^v^e^l^,”¹⁰⁶^th^C^ong^{., 2d}^Se^s^s^.^a^t⁶¹⁽^A^pr^il²⁰⁰⁰⁾^;^aⁿ^d^a^t^21-^62.
²⁵⁹^H^.^Con^.^Re^s^.¹⁷⁵^{, 8}⁵^th^C^ong^.,^2d^Se^s^s^{., J}^u^ly^11,¹⁹^58,^s^e^e⁷²^Sta^t^.^pa^r^t^I^I^,^B^12.
²⁶⁰^Rⁱ^dd^ic^k^,^Floy^{d M.}^The^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^St^ate^s^C^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^,^O^r^ga^niz^a^ti^on^a^nd^Pr^oc^e^dur^e^{, (}^W^a^s^hing^ton^D^.^C^.¹⁹⁴³⁾^,^a^t²¹^:
^“^C^onc^ur^r^e^nt^r^e^s^o^lutⁱ^oⁿ^s^a^r^e^c^o^m^m^onl^y^us^e^d^by^C^ong^r^e^s^s^{to ta}^k^e^a^joiⁿ^{t a}^c^tio^{n, s}ⁱ^m^p^ly^em^body^ing^{a m}^a^tte^r^w^{ithin the}
^lim^ite^{d s}^c^ope^of^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^{to e}^x^p^r^e^s^s^its^inte^nt,^p^u^r^p^os^e^or^s^e^ns^e^.^T^h^e^y^a^r^e^not^us^e^d^to^eⁿ^a^c^t^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^{tion a}ⁿ^{d a}^r^eⁿ^o^t
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

a concurrent resolution might bind that Congress which adopted it,²⁶¹ precedents exist which ²⁶²
suggest that a concurrent resolution technically expires at the end of that Congress. The Code
of Ethics for Government Service was expressly not intended by Congress as legislation
establishing new or different ethical standards in government, nor creating new enforceable ²⁶³
“laws,” but rather as a means of expressing existing ethical principles. However, the ethical
standards in the Code have been generally recognized as continuing guidance and principles for
both elected and appointed officials in the Government. The Rules of Procedure of the Senate
Select Committee on Ethics (revised 1999) specifically note in Part III that one of the “sources of
the subject matter jurisdiction of the Select Committee” is the “Code of Ethics for Government ²⁶⁴
Service.” The House of Representatives has expressly recognized the terms of the Code as
continuing ethical standards and has used the provisions of the Code of Ethics as the basis for ²⁶⁵
disciplinary charges and actions against Members, although the Senate has apparently never
done so.
Paragraph 5 of the Code of Ethics was intended substantially as a “gift” rule, barring the receipt
of gifts, favors and benefits from those persons and in those situations where it might be deemed ²⁶⁶
to affect or influence the performance of one’s official duties. As noted, this rule has never been
specifically applied in a Senate disciplinary ruling, nor interpreted in the Senate, but has been
applied to certain fact situations involving gifts and favors in the House of Representatives. There
is no specific indication whether the provision, if considered an actionable standard of conduct,
would go beyond current congressional rules on receipt of “compensation” for influence
improperly exerted, or the current “gifts” rules of the House or Senate, or apply to conduct at all
in connection with such things as lawful campaign contributions. It is possible to argue, however,
that the terms “benefit” or “favor” in the Code of Ethics could go beyond and be broader than ²⁶⁷
either the terms “gifts” or “compensation” in congressional rules. Under this ethical standard it
might not be required that there be any specific or provable “connection” or linkage between the

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^bin^d^ing^or^of^le^g^a^{l e}^f^f^e^c^t^.”
²⁶¹^D^e^s^c^hle^r^&^B^r^ow^n,^P^r^o^ced^u^r^{e i}ⁿ^t^h^{e U.}^S.^Hou^s^{e o}^f^R^e^p^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^ves^{, C}^h^a^p^te^r²⁴^{, Se}^c^tioⁿ^1.3⁽¹⁹⁸²⁾^.
²⁶²^Hiⁿ^d^s^’^P^r^eced^en^t^s^o^f^t^h^{e Hou}^s^{e o}^f^R^e^p^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^{ves o}^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^St^a^t^es^,^Vol^u^m^e^{5, Se}^c^tion⁷⁰⁵³^,^pp^{. 10}²²^-¹⁰²³
⁽¹⁹⁰⁷⁾^.
²⁶³^“^T^he^pur^p^o^s^e^of^this^r^e^s^o^l^u^ti^{on is}^{to s}^e^{t f}^o^r^t^h^{in a}^r^e^a^dⁱ^l^y^unde^r^s^to^o^d^b^u^{t m}^e^aⁿ^ing^f^ul^m^a^nne^r^ba^sⁱ^c^s^t^a^nda^r^d^s^of
^c^ond^uc^{t a}^s^a^g^u^ide^t^o^a^{ll w}^{ho a}^r^e^pr^iv^ile^g^e^{d to}^be^a^pa^r^t^of^the^G^ove^rⁿ^m^e^{nt Se}^r^v^ic^e^.^T^h^e^w^o^r^d^‘^g^uid^e^’^is^us^e^d
^a^d^vⁱ^se^dly^.^T^h^e^re^solutio^{n c}^r^e^a^t^e^s^no^ne^w^la^w^;ⁱ^m^pose^s^no^pe^na^ltie^s^,^ideⁿ^tif^ie^{s no ne}^w^ty^pe^of^c^rⁱ^m^e^,^a^{nd e}^s^ta^blishe^s^no
^le^g^a^{l r}^e^s^t^r^a^ints^{on a}ⁿ^y^one^{. I}^t^doe^s^,^how^e^v^e^r^{, e}^t^c^h^{out a}^c^h^a^p^te^r^of^c^ond^uc^{t a}^g^aⁱ^ns^{t w}^h^ic^{h t}^hos^eⁱⁿ^p^u^b^lic^s^e^r^v^ic^e^m^a^y^th
^m^e^a^s^ur^e^theⁱ^r^ow^{n a}^c^tions^aⁿ^{d u}^p^{on w}^h^ic^{h t}^h^e^y^m^a^y^be^judg^e^d^by^thos^e^w^hom^they^s^e^r^v^e^.^”^{S. R}^p^{t. N}^o^{. 1}⁸¹²^,⁸⁵
^C^ong^{., 2d Se}^s^s^.⁽¹⁹⁵⁸⁾^.
²⁶⁴^S^.^P^r^t.¹⁰^8-²¹^,^R^u^le^s^of^Pr^oc^e^dur^e^,^{Select Co}^mm^{ittee o}ⁿ^Ethⁱ^cs,^P^a^{rt III(h}^).
²⁶⁵^H^.^R^.^R^p^t.^N^o^.⁹⁴^-¹³⁶^4,⁹⁴^th^C^ong^{. 2d}^Se^s^s^.^a^t³^,^7-^{8 (}¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^;^H^.^R^.^R^p^{t. N}^o^{. 9}⁵^-¹⁷⁴^2,⁹⁵^th^C^o^ng^{., 2d S}^e^s^s^.⁽¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^;
^H^.^R^.^R^p^t.^N^o^.⁹⁶^-⁹^30,⁹⁶^th^C^ong^.,^2d^Se^s^s^.⁽¹⁹⁸⁰⁾^{; H}^.^R^.^R^p^t.^N^o^.⁹⁶^-⁸^56,⁹⁶^th^Cong^.,^2d^Se^s^s^.⁽¹⁹⁸⁰⁾^{; H}^.^{R. Rp}^{t. N}^o^.^th^th^st^th
^96-¹⁵^37,⁹⁶^Co^ng^.,^2d^Se^s^s^.⁽¹⁹^{80); H}^.^{R. Rp}^{t. N}^o^{. 9}⁷^-1¹⁰^{, 9}⁷^Cong^.,¹^Se^s^s^.⁽¹⁹⁸¹⁾^{; H}^.^R^.^R^p^t.^N^o^{. 1}⁰⁰^-⁵^06,¹⁰⁰
^C^ong^.,^2d^Se^s^s^.^{9 (}¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^{; n}^o^te^E^t^hⁱ^{cs Ma}ⁿ^u^a^l^f^o^{r Memb}^ers,^Of^fⁱ^cers,^aⁿ^d^E^m^pl^o^{yees o}^f^t^h^{e U.}^S.^Hou^s^{e o}^f^nd
^R^e^p^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^ves^{, 1}⁰²^C^ong^.,²^d^Se^s^s^.^18-^19.
²⁶⁶^Se^e⁹⁷^C^o^ngr^e^s^sⁱ^on^al^Re^c^o^r^d⁷¹^76-⁷¹^78,^J^une²⁶^{, 1}⁹⁵¹^{; H}^.^C^oⁿ^.^R^e^s^.¹²⁸^{, 8}²^d^C^o^ng^{., 1}^st^S^e^ss.^;^C^o^de^of^Ethic^s^f^o^r
^G^o^v^e^r^nm^eⁿ^{t Se}^r^v^ic^e^:^H^e^ar^ing^on^H^.^C^oⁿ^.^Re^s^.²^a^{nd H}^.^C^{on. Re}^s^.^{17 Be}^f^o^r^e^the^C^o^m^m^itte^e^on^Pos^t^O^ffic^e^and^Cⁱ^v^il^th^nd
^S^e^rvi^ce,^Ho^u^s^{e o}^f^R^e^p^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^ves,⁸⁴^Co^ng^.,²^Se^s^s^.⁽¹⁹⁵⁶⁾^.
²⁶⁷^T^h^e^re^le^v^a^{nt dic}^tiona^ry^de^fⁱ^nitio^{n of}^a^“^f^a^v^or”^{is “}^e^f^f^o^{rt in}^one^’s^b^e^ha^lf^{or inte}^re^st”^{or “}^a^spe^cⁱ^a^l^pri^v^ile^g^e^{or rig}^h^t
^gran^t^e^d^o^r^con^ced^ed^.^”^W^e^bste^{r’s Third Ne}^{w I}ⁿ^te^rn^atio^na^{l Dic}^tio^na^ry⁽¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.

“favor” received and any official act done, but rather the standard is apparently concerned merely ²⁶⁸
with “appearances of impropriety” in the receipt and acceptance of such items.
Some of the more common questions in the area of constituent service arise when a constituent,
grateful for assistance of a Member’s staff with such things as lost or missing social security
checks, veterans’ benefits that stop unexplainedly, or a myriad other problems with the federal
bureaucracy, send as a “thank you” for such help a small item purchased or made by the
constituent. The problem with the receipt of these small gifts is not the House or Senate gifts
rules, which as noted above, specifically exempt inexpensive items (anything under $50 in value),
but rather that such items are a thing “of value” that are accepted “because of” an official act
performed by the staffer, that is, inquiries, follow-ups or other intervention into administrative
matters in a federal agency. As such, these items may implicate and technically satisfy the ²⁶⁹
elements of the illegal gratuities clause of the bribery statute.
The illegal gratuities provision of federal law has no de minimis exception expressly provided
within the statute. Therefore, items such as boxes of candy, flowers, or home-made goods, while
often perishable and inexpensive, have some apparent value, even if only de minimis, and may
therefore still generally be considered “anything of value” as used in the federal illegal gratuities ²⁷⁰
provision. Such things of value, if accepted by congressional staff for themselves with the
knowledge that they are being rewarded or thanked for a particular “official act” performed (or to
be performed), may, under a close reading of the illegal gratuities clause, involve a technical
violation of that provision.
Since the statute itself has no express de minimis exception, the under-$50 exception for gifts in
the House and Senate Rules may not necessarily create an absolute “safe harbor” under the
federal criminal “illegal gratuities” law for all tokens of appreciation received under that amount
when such presents are connected to, that is, are “for or because of,” an official act. There are,
however, indications that the Department of Justice would recognize reasonable permitted
practices which are expressly provided in conduct rules and regulations of a Federal agency, and
which may include reasonable de minimis exceptions to prohibitions on the receipt by federal
officials of certain things of value from the public. In the executive branch of Government, for
example, the Office of Government Ethics has promulgated, in consultation with the Attorney ²⁷¹
General, standards of conduct regulations for executive branch employees which expressly
provide for a de minimis exception to the executive branch “gift” prohibitions, for gifts of $20 or ²⁷²
less. When such rules and exceptions are followed, the regulations expressly provide that the ²⁷³
receipt of things of value will not constitute an “illegal gratuity” under 18 U.S.C. § 201(c). The

²⁶⁸^Se^e^{, f}^o^r^e^x^am^ple^,^H^.^R^.^R^p^t.^N^o^.¹⁰⁰^-⁵^06,^s^upr^a^at^9.^A^s^t^o^t^h^{e rec}^eⁱ^p^t^o^f^p^e^rson^al^gi^f^t^{s an}^d^en^t^e^rt^aiⁿ^m^en^t^t^h^{e Ho}^u^s^e
^Ethic^s^Com^m^itte^e^“^c^onc^lude^d^tha^t^suc^h^im^pro^p^e^r^a^ppe^a^r^aⁿ^c^e^sup^p^o^{rts a}^de^te^rm^ina^tion^tha^t^Re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^Bia^g^gⁱ
^vi^o^l^at^ed^Cl^au^{se 5}^o^f^t^h^{e Cod}^e^o^f^E^t^hⁱ^{cs f}^o^{r G}^o^vern^m^eⁿ^t^S^e^rvi^ce.^”
²⁶⁹^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§²⁰¹⁽^c⁾⁽¹⁾⁽^B⁾^.
²⁷⁰^T^h^e^te^r^m^“^aⁿ^y^t^hing^of^v^a^lue^”^is^g^e^ne^r^a^ll^y^inte^r^p^r^e^te^{d br}^oa^dly^.^H^.^R^.^R^p^t.^N^o^.⁷⁴^8,⁸⁷^th^Co^ng^{., 1}^st^S^e^s^s^.^{18 (}¹⁹⁶¹⁾^;
^Unite^d^State^s^v^.^W^ill^iams,⁷⁰^{5 F.}^2d⁶⁰^{3 (}^{2d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸³⁾^,^c^e^r^{t. de}^nie^d^,⁴⁶^{4 U.}^S^.¹⁰⁰⁷⁽¹⁹⁸³⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^v^.^Gⁱ^r^a^r^d^,
⁶⁰¹^F.^2d⁶⁹^,^{71 (}²^d^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁹⁾^,^c^e^r^t^{. de}^nie^d^,⁴⁴^{4 U}^.^S.⁸^{71 (}¹⁹⁷⁹⁾^.
²⁷¹^Ex^e^c^u^tiv^e^O^r^de^r¹²⁶⁷⁴^{, Se}^c^tioⁿ²⁰¹⁽^A^pr^{il 1}²^,¹⁹⁸⁹⁾^,^a^s^m^odifⁱ^e^d^by^E.O^.¹²⁷³^1.
²⁷²⁵^C^.^F.^R^.^§²⁶³⁵^.2⁰⁴⁽^a⁾^.
²⁷³⁵^C.^F^.^R.^§²⁶³⁵^.²⁰²^(b^).^T^hⁱ^s^ap^plⁱ^e^{s t}^o^un^so^lⁱ^ci^t^e^d^gi^f^t^s,^w^h^enⁿ^o^t^recei^ved^“iⁿ^ret^u^rn^f^o^{r b}^eⁱⁿ^{g i}ⁿ^f^l^uen^ced^{” i}ⁿ^t^h^e
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

examples presented by the Office of Government Ethics indicate that this “safe harbor” extends
even to de minimis things of value (other than cash or securities) given in appreciation or
gratitude for an act within the scope of one’s official duties, such as for example, when an
employee of the Defense Mapping Agency is invited by a private organization “to speak about his
agency’s role in the evolution of missile technology,” and receives a token of appreciation from ²⁷⁴
such group for that presentation.
Similarly, the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct has explained that although
they are not responsible for the enforcement of the criminal illegal gratuities law, they consider
such inexpensive tokens of appreciation in the form of perishable items from constituents to be
outside of the “illegal gratuities” law when such items are physically placed in the office to be ²⁷⁵
shared with staff and office visitors. The Committee stated:
^W^h^{ile r}^e^sp^oⁿ^sibⁱ^lⁱ^t^y^f^o^r^en^f^o^r^cⁱⁿ^g^thⁱ^s^sta^t^u^t^{e r}^e^sts^wⁱ^th^th^e^J^u^{stice Dep}^a^r^t^m^eⁿ^t^{, i}ⁿ^t^h^e
^vⁱ^e^w^o^f^thⁱ^s^Co^m^m^{ittee, t}^h^ese^p^r^o^v^isioⁿ^s^d^oⁿ^o^{t e}^x^teⁿ^d^to^to^k^eⁿ^gⁱ^f^t^{s o}^f^ap^p^r^eciatioⁿ^o^r
^g^o^o^d^w^{ill, i}ⁿ^teⁿ^d^ed^{as a co}^u^r^tes^y^{, an}^d^coⁿ^s^istⁱⁿ^g^o^f^eit^h^er^:
^–^peris^h^{able ite}^m^s^(e.g^{., can}^d^y^{or f}^l^o^w^ers⁾^t^h^{at th}^e^Me^m^b^er^{or em}^plo^y^ee^s^h^are^s^wⁱ^t^h
^s^t^aff^aⁿ^{d con}^s^tit^u^eⁿ^t^s^{or don}^ates^{to ch}^arit^y^,^or
^–^decorativ^{e item}^s^t^h^{at are dis}^p^lay^e^dⁱⁿ^th^{e o}^f^{fice or don}^{ated to ch}^arit^y^.²⁷⁶
The Senate Select Committee on Ethics has given similar advice with respect to perishable items ²⁷⁷
and the gifts rule.
There is now a congressional rule, similar in both the House and the Senate, that expressly
prohibits staff employees who are required to file annual personal financial disclosure reports
from participating in an agency intervention into any nonlegislative matter affecting a non-²⁷⁸
governmental person or entity in which that employee has a significant financial interest. This
restriction can be waived in writing by the employing Member of Congress when the staff
employee’s participation is deemed necessary.
Even without this express prohibition, and even though the prohibition does not apply expressly
to Members of Congress, all Members and employees are under similar ethical rules and
guidelines which establish what might be considered a general “conflict of interest” rule or

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^p^e^rf^o^r^m^aⁿ^{ce o}^f^an^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^act^.
²⁷⁴⁵^C^.^F.^R^.^§²⁶³⁵^.2⁰⁴^,^Ex^am^ple²^.^T^h^{e e}^m^p^l^o^y^ee^m^a^{y acc}^ep^t^{a gi}^f^t^o^f^a^f^r^a^m^ed^map^wⁱ^t^h^{a market}^v^a^l^u^{e o}^f^$¹⁸^,^o^r^a
^book^w^{ith a}^m^a^r^k^e^t^va^lue^of^{$15 (}^but^no^{t b}^o^th)^,^gⁱ^v^e^{n in a}^ppr^e^cⁱ^a^tio^{n f}^o^r^his^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tio^{n de}^a^lⁱⁿ^g^w^{ith of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^a^g^eⁿ^cy
^m^a^tte^rs.
²⁷⁵^I^t^is^p^o^s^sⁱ^ble^t^h^a^t^e^m^ploy^ing^s^u^c^h^ite^m^s^f^o^r^of^fⁱ^ce^us^e^tr^aⁿ^s^f^or^m^s^“^p^e^r^s^ona^l”^gⁱ^f^t^s^into^one^s^w^{ith, a}^r^g^u^a^b^ly^{, qua}^sⁱ^-
^pub^lic^p^u^r^p^os^e^s^.
²⁷⁶^H^ous^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on Sta}^nda^r^d^s^of^O^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^C^ond^uc^{t, “}^R^ule^s^of^the^U^.^{S. H}^o^us^e^of^R^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^{on G}ⁱ^f^t^s^a^nd
^T^r^a^v^e^l^,”¹⁰⁶^th^C^ong^.,²^d^Se^s^s^.^a^t^{61 (}^A^pr^il²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
²⁷⁷^Se^na^te^Ethⁱ^c^s^M^anu^al,^s^upr^a^a^t²⁷^.
²⁷⁸^Ho^u^s^{e Ru}^le^XX^III,^p^a^ra.1²^;^Seⁿ^a^{te Ru}^le^X^XXV^II,^p^a^ra.¹⁰^.

principle. Specifically, a Member or staff employee is instructed not to allow benefits or
compensation to accrue to himself or herself, or to his or her beneficial interest, “by virtue of ²⁷⁹
influence improperly exerted from his position in Congress.”
This rule would appear to require the showing of some degree of connection or “linkage”
between “compensation” or financial rewards, on the one hand, and the exertion of influence by a
Member or employee, on the other hand. In the Senate, although the rule expressly covers only
the receipt of “compensation” for influence “improperly” exerted, the provision as adopted by the
Senate was not intended to be read in a narrow legalistic manner, but rather “should be read as a
broad prohibition against Members, officers and employees deriving financial benefit, directly or ²⁸⁰
indirectly, from the use of their official position.” As instructed by the Senate Report on this
measure, although the receipt of “compensation” for certain official duties, such as intervention
before an agency, may be “also covered by the Federal bribery statute 18 U.S.C. §§201, 203,” the ²⁸¹
Senate Rule “should be read to cover situations not covered by the bribery statute.” The Senate
Select Committee on Ethics found that a Senator’s offer “to use his official influence to obtain
government contracts for a business venture in which he had a personal financial interest” was a ²⁸²
violation of this provision of Senate Rule 37.
As noted, the provision prohibits influence “improperly” exerted in connection with the receipt of
such compensation. It does not appear, however, that the rule was intended to be limited only to
influence which would, standing alone, be considered “improper” or “undue” even without regard
to the compensation received in connection with that influence; nor does the Rule appear to
require, either in the House or the Senate, further evidence that the means of the influence
consisted of undue pressure, threats or coercion of agency officials, beyond mere intervention, if
the end result or motive was improper. As stated in the Senate Report on the measure:
^{For ex}^a^m^{ple, if}^{a Se}ⁿ^a^{tor or Sen}^a^{te e}^m^plo^y^{ee in}^ter^v^en^ed^wⁱ^t^h^an^ex^ec^u^tⁱ^v^{e a}^g^en^c^y^f^o^{r th}^e
^p^u^r^p^o^s^e^o^fⁱⁿ^fl^ue^ncⁱ^{ng a}^d^e^cⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^h^w^o^ul^d^r^e^s^u^l^tⁱⁿ^m^e^a^s^ur^a^b^l^e^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^a^l^fi^na^ncⁱ^a^l^gaⁱⁿ²⁸³
^t^o^hⁱ^m^,^t^h^{e prov}ⁱ^sⁱ^ons^of^t^hⁱ^s^p^a^rag^r^aph^w^o^u^l^{d be v}ⁱ^ol^at^ed.
The Rule in the Senate was patterned after and is substantially identical to the Rule of the House ²⁸⁴
of Representatives, House Rule 43(3). The House Rule was adopted in 1968 as part of the Code ²⁸⁵
of Official Conduct, and was at that time seen substantially as a measure to deal with the
difficult “conflict of interest” issue, that is, a rule establishing a “standard seeking to prevent ²⁸⁶
conflicts of interest [which] would be reasonably meaningful and to some degree enforceable.”
The rule is concerned with the potentially improper use of official influence or of one’s office to
benefit “personal economic interests” or financial holdings in derogation of a public official’s ²⁸⁷
duty to the general interests of one’s constituents.

²⁷⁹^Ho^u^s^{e Ru}^le^XX^III,^p^a^ra.³^;^Sen^a^t^e^Ru^{le XXXV}^II,^p^a^{ra. 1}^.
²⁸⁰^S.R^p^t^.^N^o^.⁹⁵^-⁴^9,⁹⁵^th^Co^ng^{., 1}^st^S^e^ss.^(t^o^acco^m^p^an^y^S^.^Res.¹¹⁰⁾^,^a^t^{41 (}¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^.
²⁸¹^Id^.^a^t⁴¹^.
²⁸²^Se^na^te^Ethⁱ^c^s^M^anu^al,^s^upr^a^a^t⁵⁹^{, c}^iti^ng^{S. R}^p^{t. N}^o^.^97-¹⁸^7,⁹⁷^th^C^ong^{., 1}^st^Se^s^s^.^{7 (}¹⁹⁸¹⁾^.
²⁸³^Se^na^te^Rpt.^No.⁹⁵^-4^9,^s^u^pr^a^a^t^41.
²⁸⁴^Se^na^te^Rpt.^No.⁹⁵^-4^9,^sup^r^a^a^t^40.
²⁸⁵^H^.^R^e^s^.¹⁰⁹⁹^{, 9}⁰^th^Cong^{., H}^.^R^.^R^p^{t. N}^o^{. 1}¹⁷⁶^,⁹⁰^th^C^o^ng^{., 2d Se}^s^s^.⁽¹⁹⁶⁸⁾^.
²⁸⁶^H^.^{R. Rpt}^.^N^o^{. 1}¹⁷⁶^,^s^upr^a^at¹⁸^.
²⁸⁷^Id^a^t^18-^19.

In 1987 the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct conducted an investigation into
the activities of then Representative Fernand J. St Germain concerning several allegations relating
to his interests in financial institutions, including an allegation that he:
ⁱ^m^properly^e^x^{erted i}ⁿ^f^l^u^eⁿ^ce^{for h}ⁱ^s^pers^on^{al be}ⁿ^e^{fit, as}^C^h^aⁱ^r^m^an^o^f^t^h^{e Hous}^{e C}^o^mm^ittee
^oⁿ^B^a^nki^ng,^Fi^na^nc^e^aⁿ^d^U^r^b^a^{n A}^f^faⁱ^r^s,^oⁿ^t^h^e^Fe^d^e^r^a^l^H^o^me^Lo^aⁿ^B^a^{nk B}^o^a^r^d^(B^a^nk
^B^o^ard⁾ⁱⁿ^an^eff^o^{rt to ach}^iev^e^an^{d ex}^pedite^conv^ersⁱ^on^of^F^l^ori^d^{a F}^e^deral^t^o^{a s}^t^ock
^as^s^o^{ciation an}^d^{Florida Federal’}^s^acq^uⁱ^sⁱ^tion^o^f^Firs^{t M}^u^tu^al^Savⁱ^ng^s^A^s^s^o^ciation^o^f²⁸⁸
^P^eⁿ^s^{acola, Florida (Firs}^t^Mu^t^u^al).
Such allegations arguably implicated a potential violation of House Rule 43(3). The Committee,
however, could not find evidence which showed that the Member “had an improper motive” for
the agency intervention. Even though the actual intervention and influence exerted may not in
itself have been “undue,” “excessive,” or “improper,” the implication of the Committee’s decision
was that the Committee would apparently have found “improper influence” or “improper action”
if it could have proven an “improper motive” for the intervention. The Committee reported its
conclusions:
^T^h^{e i}ⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^atⁱ^oⁿ^e^s^t^a^blⁱ^s^h^e^d^t^h^at^{, i}ⁿ^1983,^w^hⁱ^l^{e R}^e^presen^t^a^tⁱ^v^e^S^t^G^e^r^m^aiⁿ^w^a^s
^ch^ai^r^m^aⁿ^of^t^h^{e C}^o^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee on Ban}^kⁱ^ng^{, F}ⁱⁿ^aⁿ^{ce an}^{d U}^r^ban^A^f^f^aⁱ^r^s^,^w^hⁱ^c^h^h^a^{d regu}^l^a^t^o^r^y
^ov^ersⁱ^gh^t^of^f^e^deral^l^yⁱⁿ^s^u^{red s}^a^vⁱ^ng^s^an^{d l}^o^anⁱⁿ^s^tⁱ^t^u^t^e^s^an^{d t}^h^{e F}^e^deral^H^o^m^e^L^o^an^Bank
^B^o^{ard (}^B^an^k^B^o^{ard), P}^a^u^l^Nels^on^{, a B}^a^nkⁱⁿ^g^C^o^mm^ittee^s^t^af^f^m^e^m^b^er,^m^a^{de teleph}^on^e
^calls^{, apparen}^t^l^y^on^beh^a^l^f^of^t^h^{e con}^g^r^e^s^s^m^aⁿ^{, to R}ⁱ^ch^{ard P}^r^{att, th}^en^c^h^air^m^an^of^t^h^{e B}^a^nk
^B^o^{ard. Mr}^{. Nels}^on’^s^s^t^{ated p}^u^rpos^{e f}^o^{r t}^h^{e call}^s^w^a^s^{to check}^on^th^e^s^t^at^u^s^of^t^h^{e B}^aⁿ^k
^B^o^ar^d^’^{s d}^e^lib^er^atioⁿ^s^r^e^g^a^r^dⁱⁿ^g^Flo^r^id^{a Fed}^e^r^a^{l Sa}^vⁱⁿ^g^s^&^L^o^an^’^s^ap^p^licatioⁿ^to^coⁿ^v^er^t
^fr^o^m^a^mut^u^a^l^t^o^a^st^o^c^{k o}^wⁿ^e^r^s^hi^p^fi^na^ncⁱ^a^lⁱⁿ^stⁱ^t^utⁱ^o^n.
^T^h^{ere i}^sⁿ^o^evⁱ^d^en^{ce (or cl}^ai^m^b^y^t^h^{e cong}^res^s^m^aⁿ⁾^su^pportⁱⁿ^g^{a co}ⁿ^t^en^tⁱ^on^t^h^at^Mr.
^Nels^on’^s^call^s^h^a^{d a}^“^c^on^s^tit^uen^c^y^basⁱ^s^”^....
^{* *}^*
^T^h^{ere is}^circum^s^t^aⁿ^{tial e}^v^ideⁿ^{ce t}^h^{at t}^h^{e pu}^rpos^{e of}^t^h^{e c}^a^lls^mⁱ^g^h^t^h^a^v^e^been^to
^ex^pedi^t^e^t^h^{e Bank}^Board’^s^proces^sⁱ^ng^of^t^h^{e conv}^ersⁱ^oⁿ^applⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^aⁿ^e^f^f^o^rt^t^o^obt^aiⁿ
^approv^{al du}^rin^g^{a particu}^l^{ar ti}^m^e^f^r^a^m^{e. W}^h^{ile t}^h^{ere is}ⁿ^o^eviden^{ce th}^{at a}ⁿ^y^s^u^ch^e^f^f^o^rt^w^a^s
^su^cce^ss^f^u^{l o}^r^o^t^h^e^r^wⁱ^s^{e i}ⁿ^f^l^u^eⁿ^ced^th^e^u^lti^m^a^{te a}^g^en^c^y^dⁱ^sp^o^s^itioⁿ^-^th^e^B^aⁿ^k^B^o^ar^d^’^s
^approv^{al -}^th^e^calls^w^e^re^m^a^{de du}^rin^g^{a ti}^m^e^w^h^{en R}^e^pr^es^en^tatⁱ^v^e^{St Ger}^m^aiⁿ^w^a^s^a
^deposⁱ^t^o^{r at}^F^l^ori^d^{a F}^e^de^ral^.^H^e^s^t^{ood t}^o^de^ri^v^e^pers^on^al^econ^o^mⁱ^{c ben}^e^fⁱ^t^f^r^o^m^t^h^e
^o^w^ne^r^s^hⁱ^pⁱⁿ^t^e^r^e^st^s^u^c^h^d^e^p^o^sⁱ^t^ga^ve^hi^m.^Hⁱ^{s o}^w^ne^r^s^hi^pⁱⁿ^t^e^r^e^st^ga^ve^hⁱ^m^t^h^e^o^p^tⁱ^o^{n t}^o
^pu^rch^a^s^e^s^h^aresⁱ^m^m^e^diatel^y^u^pon^con^v^e^r^s^ion^.^On^{e cou}^l^{d s}^p^ecu^{late th}^{at a}^m^o^ti^v^e^f^o^{r h}ⁱ^m
^s^eekⁱⁿ^g^ex^pedi^t^e^{d conv}^ersⁱ^on^w^o^u^l^{d be t}^h^atⁱ^t^cou^l^d^gⁱ^v^e^hi^m^t^h^{e opport}^uⁿⁱ^t^y^t^o^pu^rc^h^a^s^e
^s^t^ock^{at a barg}^ain^{price relativ}^{e to th}^{e af}^ter^-^m^a^r^k^{et f}^o^{r th}^e^s^t^ock^.^C^onv^ersⁱ^ons^{to s}^t^ock
ⁱⁿ^st^itu^tioⁿ^s^h^a^d^r^e^s^u^ltedⁱⁿ^s^u^b^s^tan^{tial p}^r^{ice i}ⁿ^cr^{eases a}^f^ter^th^{e i}ⁿ^{itial o}^f^f^e^rⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^th^{e t}^h^eⁿ
^recen^{t p}^a^{st. Ho}^w^e^v^e^{r, th}^e^Co^mm^ittee^fⁱ^r^m^l^y^b^e^liev^e^{s t}^h^at^s^p^ecu^latioⁿ^ab^o^u^t^m^o^tⁱ^v^e^isⁿ^o^t
^ev^iden^ce.^An^{d, t}^h^{ere is}ⁿ^o^{direct ev}^iden^ce^t^h^{at t}^h^{e cong}^res^s^m^aⁿ^h^a^{d any}^s^u^c^hⁱ^m^proper
^m^o^tiv^{e o}^r^f^o^r^th^a^t^m^a^tter^,^ca^u^s^ed^Mr^{. Nelso}ⁿ^to^m^a^k^e^t^h^{e cal}^ls.
^In^mⁱ^d^-^{1983, t}^h^{e con}^g^r^es^sm^aⁿ^di^{d pu}^rch^a^s^e^$30,000^w^o^rt^{h of}^F^l^ori^d^{a F}^e^deral^s^t^ock
^u^pon^con^v^e^r^sⁱ^oⁿ^.^H^e^f^aⁱ^l^e^{d t}^o^r^e^port^t^hⁱ^s^as^{a “}^t^raⁿ^s^actⁱ^oⁿ^”ⁱⁿ^hⁱ^s^{1983 F}ⁱⁿ^aⁿ^cⁱ^a^l^Dⁱ^s^c^l^o^su^re
^State^m^eⁿ^{t. ...}

²⁸⁸^H^.^R^.^R^p^t.^N^o^.¹⁰^0-^46,¹⁰⁰^th^C^ong^{. 1}^st^Se^s^s^.^a^t^{2 (}¹⁹⁸⁷⁾^.

^Iⁿ^lig^h^t^o^f^th^{e ab}^o^v^{e, th}^{e Co}^m^m^{ittee b}^e^liev^e^{s it}^w^o^u^l^d^b^eⁱⁿ^ap^p^r^o^p^r^{iate to}^attr^ib^u^t^e
ⁱ^m^{proper act}ⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^anⁱⁿ^di^vⁱ^dual^bas^e^{d s}^o^l^e^l^y^onⁱⁿ^f^e^reⁿ^ces^aⁿ^{d s}^p^ecu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^aⁿ^{d, t}^h^us^{, does}
ⁿ^o^{t reach}^th^{is co}ⁿ^c^l^u^sioⁿ^{. Ne}^v^e^rth^e^le^{ss, th}^e^Co^m^m^ittee^w^o^u^l^d^ad^m^oⁿⁱ^s^h^{all Me}^m^b^{ers to}²⁸⁹
^av^oi^{d s}ⁱ^t^u^atⁱ^oⁿ^sⁱⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^h^e^v^eⁿ^anⁱⁿ^f^e^ren^c^e^mⁱ^gh^t^{be dra}^w^{n su}^gg^estⁱⁿ^gⁱ^m^{proper act}ⁱ^oⁿ^.
It is possible that a concealed personal financial interest in a matter about which a Member or
staff employee makes an intervention with a federal agency could provide the grounds for a
finding that such contact and conduct created a fraud against the United States. In United States v. ²⁹⁰
Gallup, for example, an employee of the Department of Housing and Urban Development was
charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States in influencing the granting of a contract in
which he had an undisclosed financial interest, in violation of HUD conflict of interest
regulations. The conspiracy count upheld in that case charged that the defendant and his brother-
in-law, with whom he shared a “finder’s fee” for that contract, had conspired and agreed:
^{[T]o def}^r^au^{d t}^h^e^Uⁿⁱ^t^{ed S}^t^at^e^s^depart^m^e^nt^{of H}^ousⁱⁿ^g^aⁿ^d^U^r^ban^D^e^v^e^l^o^p^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^aⁿ^d
^c^o^nc^e^rⁿⁱ^{ng i}^t^{s go}^ve^rⁿ^me^nt^a^l^aⁿ^d^c^o^nt^r^a^c^t^ua^l^fu^nc^tⁱ^o^{ns a}ⁿ^d^rⁱ^ght^s,^t^h^a^tⁱ^s^,^o^f^aⁿ^d^c^o^nc^e^rⁿⁱ^ng
^th^{e r}ⁱ^g^h^{t o}^f^t^h^{e U}ⁿ^ited^State^s^Dep^a^r^t^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^Ho^u^sⁱⁿ^g^aⁿ^d^Ur^b^aⁿ^Dev^e^lo^p^m^eⁿ^{t to}^h^a^v^e^its
^d^e^v^e^lo^p^m^en^{t co}ⁿ^t^racts^wⁱ^t^h^lo^{cal h}^o^u^sⁱⁿ^g^au^t^h^o^r^{ities p}^e^rf^o^r^m^e^dⁱⁿ^acco^rd^an^c^e^wⁱ^th^th^e^l^a^w^s
^o^f^th^e^Unⁱ^t^ed^States,^{HUD ru}^l^e^{s an}^d^reg^u^latⁱ^oⁿ^{s a}ⁿ^d^t^h^{e p}^r^o^v^isioⁿ^s^o^f^said^coⁿ^t^{ract, an}^dⁱⁿ
^h^oⁿ^e^st^aⁿ^{d i}^m^partⁱ^a^l^m^aⁿⁿ^e^r,^f^r^ee^f^r^o^m^decei^t^,^corru^ptⁱ^oⁿ^,^mⁱ^s^c^on^d^u^ct^,^f^r^au^{d, i}^m^proper²⁹¹
ⁱⁿ^f^l^u^eⁿ^{ce a}ⁿ^d^coⁿ^f^lic^{t o}^fⁱⁿ^ter^e^st.
Advisory Opinion No. 1 from the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, and Senate
Rule XXXVII on interventions and constituent service, while recognizing a Member’s legitimate
role in intervening in administrative matters, provides that certain conduct could render the means
of a Member’s intervention activity “improper,” or an “abuse” of the representational role of a
Member, regardless of the issue of the receipt or existence of any compensation or financial
benefits connected to one’s intervention. Such problematic conduct may concern such things as
threats made against administrators, or promises of favors or benefits to such agency personnel.
The guidelines adopted or recognized by either House of Congress with regard to such “conduct”
during interventions are more general ethical considerations and guidelines of propriety
concerning a legislator’s “proper” or “improper” conduct towards regulators and respect for the
“due process” of the administration of the law.
Many of the general ethical considerations involved in the guidelines on conduct of a Member or
his or staff in intervention in administrative matters were explored in the 1950’s by Senator Paul
Douglas of Illinois. A Subcommittee of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, chaired
by the late Senator Douglas, issued a committee print in 1951 entitled Ethical Standards in ²⁹²
Government, which made a number of recommendations and proposals in the area of
governmental ethics. In discussing what was then called the “problem of reference,” which the
subcommittee recognized as an important function of a Member of Congress, the subcommittee

²⁸⁹^H^.^R^.^R^p^t.^N^o^.¹⁰^0-^46,^s^upr^a^at^42-⁴³^.
²⁹⁰⁸¹²^F.^2d¹²⁷¹⁽¹⁰^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁷⁾^.
²⁹¹⁸¹²^F.^2d^at¹²⁷⁵^.
²⁹²^{S. Com}^m^.^P^r^int^,^“^E^th^ic^a^l^Staⁿ^da^{rds in G}^o^v^e^rnm^e^nt,”^Re^{port of}^a^S^ubc^om^m^itte^e^of^the^Com^m^itte^e^oⁿ^L^a^{bor a}ⁿ^d
^Publ^ic^W^e^lf^a^r^e^,^{82d C}^ong^.,¹^st^Se^s^s^.⁽¹⁹^51).

discussed the ethical considerations and standards which might apply to congressional
intervention in administrative matters. The Subcommittee concluded that it is ethically
permissible to recommend specific action on an administrative agency matter, and even to argue
“at length” for such result, as long as the matter is argued on its merits and the means used in the
intervention are not themselves “inherently damaging” to the administrative process:
^T^h^{ere are}^{a n}^u^m^b^{er of}^w^a^y^sⁱⁿ^w^h^ic^h^th^{e le}^gⁱ^s^l^ator^m^a^y^proce^e^dⁱⁿ^r^aⁱ^sⁱⁿ^g^t^h^e^s^e^m^a^t^t^e^r^s^.
^He^m^a^y^sⁱ^m^p^l^yⁱⁿ^trodu^{ce t}^h^e^con^s^tit^u^eⁿ^t^an^{d a}^s^{k f}^o^r^f^a^ir^coⁿ^s^id^er^atioⁿ^.^I^f^h^e^wⁱ^s^h^e^s^to^b^e
^v^e^r^y^co^r^r^{ect, h}^e^w^{ill also}^state^th^{at h}^e^{is as}^kⁱⁿ^g^f^o^rⁿ^o^thⁱⁿ^g^m^o^r^e^th^an^f^a^ir^coⁿ^s^id^er^atioⁿ^oⁿ
^th^e^m^e^rits^of^t^h^{e ca}^s^e^.^A^s^econ^d^procedu^r^{e is}^to^v^o^u^c^h^f^o^r^th^{e ap}^p^lican^tⁱⁿ^so^m^e^w^a^y^;^t^h^is
^a^m^oun^ts^{to a reco}^m^m^eⁿ^d^atio^{n f}^o^{r th}^{e con}^s^t^itu^eⁿ^{t, alt}^h^oug^hⁿ^o^{t n}^eces^s^a^ril^y^o^f^hⁱ^s^requ^es^t.
^T^h^{e th}^ir^d^step^{is to}^r^eco^m^m^eⁿ^d^th^at^f^a^v^o^r^a^b^l^{e actio}ⁿ^b^e^ta^k^eⁿ^oⁿ^t^h^e^m^a^tter^{at i}^s^s^u^{e. T}^h^is
^m^a^y^{be don}^{e in}^directl^y^as^w^e^l^l^as^directl^y^{, an}^d^m^a^y^{be s}ⁱ^m^p^l^y^s^t^{ated or arg}^u^e^{d at len}^g^t^h^wⁱ^t^h
^s^u^pportⁱⁿ^g^dat^a^an^{d ex}^pl^an^atⁱ^oⁿ^s^{. It}ⁱ^s^t^hⁱ^s^t^hⁱ^r^{d procedu}^r^e^w^hⁱ^c^h^gⁱ^v^e^s^ri^s^e^t^o^et^hⁱ^cal
^probl^em^s^.
^{* *}^*
^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^ators^h^a^v^e^{at leas}^{t t}^w^o^m^o^{ral obli}^g^ationsⁱⁿ^th^e^s^e^m^a^t^t^ers^of^ref^e^reⁿ^{ce. On}^{e i}^s^to
^m^a^k^e^s^u^{re t}^h^{at th}^e^y^{are s}^eekⁱⁿ^g^{to pu}^s^h^cas^e^s^on^l^y^oⁿ^th^eir^m^e^rits^{. It is}^al^w^a^y^s^pos^sⁱ^{ble to}
^m^a^k^e^su^r^e^t^h^{at t}^h^er^{e is}ⁿ^o^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^{al eco}ⁿ^o^mⁱ^{c in}^ter^e^st^w^h^ic^h^{is i}ⁿ^v^o^lv^ed^{. B}^u^{t it i}^s^m^o^r^e
^di^f^fⁱ^c^u^l^t^f^o^{r a l}^e^gⁱ^sl^at^{or t}^o^dra^w^t^h^{e l}ⁱⁿ^e^bet^w^eeⁿ^{proper an}^{d i}^m^{proper pers}^on^alⁱⁿ^t^e^res^t^s
^w^h^ic^h^{are es}^s^eⁿ^tiall^y^politicalⁱⁿ^ch^{aracter. T}^h^{at is}^{, a leg}ⁱ^s^l^at^{or w}^h^{o is}^s^e^e^kⁱⁿ^g^s^u^{pport in}^a
^pen^dⁱⁿ^{g election}^(aⁿ^d^elections^{are al}^w^a^y^s^peⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g⁾^m^a^y^f^e^{el th}^{at t}^h^eⁿ^{oble obj}^ectiv^{e of}
^r^eelectin^g^{a sto}^u^{t d}^e^f^eⁿ^d^er^o^f^th^{e p}^u^b^{lic in}^ter^e^s^t^s^m^a^y^j^u^sti^f^y^hⁱ^s^g^uⁱ^dⁱⁿ^g^th^{e h}^aⁿ^d^o^f^j^u^stice
^j^u^{st a little in}^{a r}^e^lati^v^e^l^y^mⁱⁿ^o^r^m^a^tter^.
^{A seco}ⁿ^d^m^o^r^a^{l o}^b^lig^a^tioⁿⁱ^s^to^m^a^k^e^s^u^r^e^t^h^{at t}^h^e^m^e^th^o^d^s^o^fⁱⁿ^ter^v^eⁿⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ
^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^ti^v^e^m^a^tter^s^ar^{e n}^o^{t th}^e^m^sel^v^{es so}ⁱⁿ^h^e^r^eⁿ^t^l^y^d^a^m^a^gⁱⁿ^g^to^th^{e ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^ti^v^e
^proces^s^or^t^o^legⁱ^s^l^ati^v^e-^ad^mⁱ^nis^t^rativ^e^relatioⁿ^s^th^at^t^h^ey^of^f^s^e^t^aⁿ^y^p^u^b^lⁱ^c^b^eⁿ^e^fⁱ^t^t^h^at^mⁱ^g^h^t²⁹³
^{be g}^aⁱⁿ^{ed f}^r^o^m^aⁿ^y^s^u^ch^le^gⁱ^s^l^ativ^{e pres}^s^u^re.
Senator Douglas in his later work and collection of lectures entitled Ethics in Government
expressed general ethical principles in relation to congressional intervention into administrative
matters which he propounded with the caveat that: “Probably there can be no fixed set of rules
governing the relationships between legislators and administrators which will be perfectly
satisfactory in all respects.” The ethical principles which Senator Douglas submitted “for
consideration” included the following:
⁽¹⁾^A^legⁱ^slato^r^sh^o^u^ldⁿ^o^{t i}^m^m^e^dⁱ^atel^y^coⁿ^c^lu^d^e^th^a^t^hⁱ^{s co}ⁿ^s^ti^tu^eⁿ^{t is al}^w^a^y^s^rⁱ^g^h^{t an}^d^t^h^e
^admⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^{rator is}^al^w^a^y^s^w^r^oⁿ^g^,^bu^{t as}^f^a^{r as}^po^s^sⁱ^{ble s}^h^ou^{ld tr}^y^{to f}ⁱⁿ^d^ou^{t t}^h^e^m^e^rits^o^f^each
^cas^{e an}^{d on}^l^y^m^a^k^e^s^u^ch^repres^en^tatⁱ^on^s^a^s^th^{e s}^itu^a^tion^perm^it^s^.
^{(2) A}^legⁱ^s^l^{ator s}^h^ou^{ld, of}^co^u^r^s^e^{, n}^o^{t accept a}ⁿ^y^m^oⁿ^e^y^{for repres}^en^tin^g^coⁿ^s^t^itu^eⁿ^t^s^or
^any^oⁿ^e^els^e^bef^o^{re g}^o^v^e^rnm^e^nt^departm^e^nts^{.... If}^{a leg}ⁱ^s^l^ator^accepts^m^oⁿ^e^y^,^en^tertai^nm^eⁿ^t^,
^o^r^v^a^lu^ab^{le p}^r^esen^{ts in}^r^e^tu^rⁿ^f^o^r^hⁱ^{s ser}^v^{ices, h}^e^{is u}^sⁱⁿ^g^hⁱ^s^p^u^b^{lic o}^f^fⁱ^{ce in}^r^ealit^yⁿ^o^{t f}^o^r
^t^h^{e co}^m^m^oⁿ^g^{ood bu}^t^f^o^{r pri}^v^at^{e g}^aⁱⁿ^.

²⁹³^E^t^hⁱ^cal^St^an^da^rd^{s i}ⁿ^Go^vern^m^ent^,^Co^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee P}^rⁱⁿ^t^,^S^eⁿ^a^t^e^L^a^b^o^r^Co^mmⁱ^t^t^ee,^S^p^eci^al^S^u^b^c^o^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee o}ⁿ^t^h^e
^Es^ta^blis^hm^eⁿ^{t of}^a^C^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on on Et}^hic^s^{in G}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt, 82 C}^ong^{., 1}^st^Se^s^s^.^29-³⁰⁽¹⁹⁵¹⁾^.

^{(3) In}^re^pres^en^tⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^di^vⁱ^du^alⁱⁿ^t^e^res^t^s^bef^o^{re adm}ⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ratⁱ^v^e^bodi^es^{, t}^h^{e l}^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^{or s}^h^ou^l^d^b^e
^co^u^r^teo^u^{s a}ⁿ^d^kⁿ^o^w^t^h^e^m^e^r^{its o}^f^t^h^{e case; h}^e^sh^o^u^ldⁿ^o^t^tr^y^to^b^u^ll^y^o^rⁱⁿ^tⁱ^m^id^{ate th}^e²⁹⁴
^of^fⁱ^cia^l^sⁱⁿ^v^o^l^v^{ed an}^{d h}^e^s^h^{ould m}^a^k^e^{it clear t}^h^{at th}^e^fⁱⁿ^a^{l d}^ecisⁱ^on^isⁱⁿ^t^h^{eir h}^aⁿ^d^s^.
The ethical guidelines expressed by the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct in
Advisory Opinion No. 1, and as suggested for consideration by the late Senator Douglas, came
into play in the investigation of the former Speaker of the House, Representative James C.
Wright. One of the charges investigated by the Committee and its special counsel concerned the
“possible exercise of undue influence in dealing with officials of the Federal Home Loan Bank ²⁹⁵
Board.” Although there were several incidents of intervention and contacts between Speaker
Wright and members of the Bank Board, and although certain Bank Board members such as ²⁹⁶
Edwin Gray felt that the Speaker “attempted to coerce them,” the House Committee on
Standards of Official Conduct did not find reason to believe that the Speaker exercised undue ²⁹⁷
influence over the Board, as there was no evidence of “a reprisal or threat to agency officials.”
The Special Counsel’s Report in the Wright matter argued that “undue influence” could be
evidenced by either the “exercise of influence for improper ends or by the use of improper ²⁹⁸
means.” The first intervention examined concerned a meeting in Congressman Wright’s office
between Edwin Gray, then Bank Board Chairman, several Bank Board staff and four Members of
Congress from Texas, including Representative Wright. The substance of the meeting was that the
Members of Congress had heard of reports that Bank Board regulators were using “heavy
handed” and “Gestapo-like” tactics against certain savings and loan banks in Texas, and the
Members present expressed and “passed their concerns on” to the Bank Board members. They
emphasized the poor economic conditions in Texas, and their belief that such conditions were
only temporary. Representative Wright had left the meeting early, and the other Congressmen
stayed. The Special Counsel found that the meeting between the Congressmen and the Bank ²⁹⁹
Board staff “represented a proper interaction.”
The second intervention and contact concerned inquiries and statements by Representative Wright
to Edwin Gray about an individual (Hall) and his financial institution, and the conduct of a
representative of the Bank Board who the Speaker felt was not “as flexible or understanding” as
he should be. The Speaker asked Chairman Gray “if there wasn’t anything I [Gray] could do ³⁰⁰
about this.” Gray testified that Representative Wright “did not threaten him or use coercive
terms,” but that because of the Member’s position, Gray felt that he had to do something, and ³⁰¹
believed that the Congressman “wanted the Bank Board to change its position regarding Hall.”
It further appears that Representative Wright may later have held up a recapitalization bill

²⁹⁴^E^t^hⁱ^{cs i}ⁿ^Go^vern^m^en^t^,^su^p^r^a^a^t⁸⁸^{, 8}⁹^,⁹⁰^.
²⁹⁵^C^o^m^m^itte^e^R^e^s^o^lution^of^P^r^e^l^imⁱⁿ^a^r^y^I^nquir^y^{, J}^une^9,¹⁹⁸⁸^.
²⁹⁶^Rep^o^r^t^o^f^S^p^eci^al^Couⁿ^s^el^Iⁿ^t^h^e^M^a^t^t^e^{r o}^f^S^p^{eaker Ja}^m^e^{s C.}^W^rⁱ^g^h^t^,^Jr.^,^Hou^s^{e Co}^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee o}ⁿ^S^t^and^a^rd^{s o}^f^Offⁱ^ci^al
^C^ond^uc^{t, 10}¹^st^C^o^ng^r^e^s^s^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{21, 19}⁸⁹^[^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^Spe^cⁱ^a^l^C^ouns^e^l^R^e^por^t^]^a^t²^16.
²⁹⁷^Sta^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^the^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on Sta}^nda^r^d^s^of^O^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^C^onduc^{t i}ⁿ^t^h^e^Ma^tte^r^of^R^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^J^a^m^e^s^C^.^W^r^ig^{ht, J}^r^.,
^A^p^ri^l¹³^,¹⁹⁸⁹^[^C^o^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee S}^t^at^emen^t^]^,^at⁸⁴^.
²⁹⁸^S^p^eci^al^Couⁿ^s^el^Repo^rt^,^s^upr^a^a^t¹⁹^3.
²⁹⁹^Id^.^a^t²¹^8.
³⁰⁰^Id^.^a^t²²^5.
³⁰¹^Id^.^a^t²²^5-²²⁶^.

affecting the Bank Board “to show his displeasure with the Bank Board’s treatment of Hall ³⁰²
specifically and of Texas savings and loans in general.” Although the Special Counsel argued
that these actions may have constituted improper activity because no merits of the case were
argued in asking for reconsideration of an agency decision, and because of the alleged use of
holding legislation “hostage” to express the Member’s displeasure, the House Committee on
Standards of Official Conduct, as noted above, did not issue even a “statement of alleged
violations” because of such activity, and thus dropped all charges of undue influence concerning
these contacts.
Other activities and interventions included: “intercession on behalf of a constituent who
expressed a complaint” about the Bank Board, and the Congressman’s expression to the Board for ³⁰³
his hope for “improved” regulatory conditions; complaints from the Congressman to Edwin
Gray that a friend and political fundraiser had been “mistreated” by Bank Board regulators, that
Gray needed to meet with his friend personally to hear his story, and that because of Speaker
Wright’s power, Gray decided to appoint an independent counsel to investigate the constituent’s ³⁰⁴
treatment by the Bank Board; that in expressing complaints to then Chairman Gray about over-
zealous regulators, the Congressman said that he had heard that certain regulators were
homosexuals and had “established a ring of homosexual lawyers” in Texas, and that the Member ³⁰⁵
asked if Chairman Gray could “get rid of” one regulator in particular; Representative Wright’s
intervention directly with the Chairman Gray to ask for a delay in a closing of a thrift institution ³⁰⁶
in Texas, and asking Gray to report back; a meeting initiated by Bank Board personnel, and an
alleged indirect request from Representative Wright to have another Bank Board litigator
removed.
The House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, examining the activity of Speaker
Wright concerning all of these interventions and contacts, found no undue influence or abuse of
his official influence or position in his expressions of interest in agency regulatory matters. The
Committee believed that some of the Congressman’s conduct may have been “intemperate,” but
that displeasure with the personality and techniques of a Member in his expressions of interest in
a matter to an executive agency can not be used to interfere with or override the important duty of
a Member to “effectively represent persons and organizations having concern with the activities ³⁰⁷
of executive agencies.” Specifically, in dismissing these charges against Speaker Wright, the
Committee found:
^I^t^{is clear}^th^a^t^uⁿ^d^e^r^o^u^r^coⁿ^s^ti^tu^tioⁿ^a^{l f}^o^r^m^o^f^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^t^h^er^{e is a co}ⁿ^s^taⁿ^t^teⁿ^s^ioⁿ
^bet^w^eeⁿ^th^{e le}^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e a}ⁿ^{d ex}^ecu^ti^v^e^bran^ch^es^reg^a^rdiⁿ^g^t^h^{e des}ⁱ^r^e^s^o^f^l^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^t^o^r^s^oⁿ^t^h^e^oⁿ^e
^h^aⁿ^d^aⁿ^d^t^h^e^a^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^o^f^a^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^oⁿ^t^h^e^o^t^h^e^rⁱⁿ^c^a^r^r^yⁱⁿ^g^o^u^t^t^h^eⁱ^r^r^e^s^p^e^c^tⁱ^v^e^r^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ilitie^s.

³⁰²^Id^.^a^t²³^5.
³⁰³^S^p^eci^al^Couⁿ^s^el^{’s Repo}^rt^,^s^upr^a^a^t²⁴^0.
³⁰⁴^Id^.^at²⁴⁰^-²⁵^5.^T^h^{e S}^p^eci^al^Couⁿ^sel^argu^ed^t^h^at^t^hⁱ^sⁱⁿ^t^e^rven^tⁱ^o^{n was i}^m^p^r^o^p^e^{r b}^ecau^{se t}^h^{e Con}^g^ress^man^so^u^g^h^t^“t^o
^inf^l^ue^nc^e^the^B^a^nk^B^o^a^r^d^to^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^its^le^g^iti^m^a^te^a^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e^r^e^s^pons^e^s^,”^aⁿ^{d tha}^t^a^lth^oug^{h t}^h^e^m^e^thods^a^ppe^a^r^e^d
^pr^o^p^e^r^{, he}^w^a^s^inte^ndi^ng^“^aⁿ^im^pe^r^m^is^sⁱ^ble^pur^p^o^s^e^.”^Id^.^at²⁵⁴^-²⁵⁵^.^T^h^{e Co}^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee d}ⁱ^d^no^t^{agree t}^h^at^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^t^e^rven^tⁱ^oⁿ
^w^a^sⁱ^m^pr^ope^r^,^aⁿ^d^{no c}^h^a^r^g^e^s^w^e^r^e^s^u^s^t^aⁱ^ne^d^by^the^C^o^m^m^itte^e^c^o^nc^e^r^ning^aⁿ^y^inte^r^v^eⁿ^tions^.
³⁰⁵^Id^.^at²⁵⁵^-²⁵^9.^S^p^eci^al^Co^un^sel^argu^ed^f^o^{r vi}^o^l^atⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^Ho^u^s^{e R}^u^l^e^{s b}^ecau^{se o}^f^t^hⁱ^s^co^nd^u^c^t^.^Id^.^a^t²^58-²⁵^{9. T}^h^e
^Co^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee d}ⁱ^dⁿ^o^t^{agree an}^d^no^c^h^arges^w^e^{re su}^st^aiⁿ^e^d^b^y^t^h^{e Co}^mmi^t^t^{ee co}ⁿ^cernⁱⁿ^g^an^yⁱⁿ^t^e^rven^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^o^r^agen^cy
^coⁿ^t^act^s.
³⁰⁶^Id^.^a^t²⁶^4-²⁶⁹^.^T^h^e^Spe^cⁱ^a^l^C^o^un^s^e^{l did}^not^fⁱ^{nd a}ⁿ^y^t^hing^im^pr^ope^r^{in t}^h^is^r^e^q^u^e^s^{t in}^a^s^kⁱ^ng^“^f^or^a^br^ie^f^de^lay^{in a}ⁿ
^a^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e^r^e^s^pons^e^”^r^a^the^r^th^aⁿ^a^“^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^{in t}^h^e^r^e^s^p^oⁿ^s^e^.”^Id^.^a^t²⁶^9.
³⁰⁷^Co^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee S}^t^at^e^m^en^t^,^s^upr^a^a^t⁸⁴^.

^T^h^{e as}^s^e^rtion^t^h^{at t}^h^{e ex}^erci^s^e^of^un^du^e^inf^l^u^eⁿ^{ce can}^ar^is^{e bas}^e^{d u}^pon^{a le}^gⁱ^s^l^ator’^s
^ex^p^r^essioⁿ^s^o^fⁱⁿ^ter^e^{st j}^e^o^p^a^r^d^{izes th}^{e ab}^ilit^y^o^f^Me^m^b^er^{s ef}^f^ecti^v^el^y^to^r^e^p^r^esen^{t p}^e^r^s^oⁿ^s
^an^d^o^r^g^aⁿⁱ^zatioⁿ^s^h^a^vⁱⁿ^g^coⁿ^c^erⁿ^w^ith^t^h^{e acti}^v^itie^{s o}^f^ex^ec^u^tⁱ^v^{e ag}^eⁿ^cies.
^A^cco^r^dⁱⁿ^g^l^y^,^w^h^{ile i}^t^m^a^y^w^e^{ll b}^e^th^{at Rep}^r^eseⁿ^tati^v^e^W^r^ig^h^t^w^a^{s i}ⁿ^te^m^p^er^{ate in}^hⁱ^s
^d^ealin^g^s^wⁱ^t^h^r^e^p^r^esen^tati^v^e^s^o^f^th^{e Fed}^e^r^a^{l Ho}^m^e^L^o^an^B^aⁿ^k^B^o^ar^d^,^th^{e Co}^m^m^{ittee i}^sⁿ^o^t
^pers^u^a^{ded t}^h^at^t^h^{ere i}^s^reas^on^t^o^belⁱ^e^v^e^t^h^at^h^e^ex^erci^s^e^{d undu}^{e i}ⁿ^fl^u^eⁿ^{ce i}ⁿ^dealⁱⁿ^g^wⁱ^t^h
^th^{at ag}^eⁿ^c^y^{. In}^s^u^m^,^s^u^c^h^a^fⁱ^ndin^g^caⁿⁿ^o^{t res}^t^oⁿ^pu^{re inf}^e^reⁿ^{ce or circum}^s^t^an^{ce or, f}^o^{r th}^at
^m^a^t^t^e^{r, on}^t^h^e^t^echnⁱ^qu^e^an^d^pers^on^alⁱ^t^y^o^f^t^h^{e l}^e^gⁱ^sl^at^{or, bu}^t^,ⁱⁿ^s^t^ead,^m^u^s^t^{be bas}^e^{d on}³⁰⁸
^probativ^{e ev}^iden^{ce th}^{at a repris}^{al or th}^{reat to ag}^en^c^y^offⁱ^cial^s^w^a^s^m^a^de.
Members of Congress are often asked by constituents to provide a reference, referral or
recommendation for employment in the Federal Government. There is no current statutory
prohibition on Members of Congress providing a recommendation or referral letter for an
applicant for a federal position; however, hiring officials in the Federal Government are expressly
instructed by law only to receive and consider such “recommendations” from a Member as to the
“character or residence” of the applicant. Additionally, hiring officials may consider and receive
“statements” based on a Member’s personal knowledge or records, which evaluate such things as
an applicant’s work performance, ability, aptitude, qualifications and suitability.
The statute on federal personnel recommendations is a fairly long-standing provision which had
been changed for a period of a few years, where congressional recommendations had actually ^rd³⁰⁹
been prohibited as part of the so-called “Hatch Act” revisions enacted in the 103 Congress.
These amendments, which were passed in 1993 and went into effect in February of 1994, had
expressly prohibited a Member of Congress from making a recommendation on behalf of an
applicant for federal employment to most positions in the Federal Government on any basis,
including the basis of one’s political affiliation, except that a Member may have provided a
“statement” which “relates solely to the character and residence of the employee or applicant.”
Additionally, the amended statute had prohibited an applicant or an employee from seeking or
requesting from a Member of Congress or from a congressional employee any recommendation
for employment or other personnel action, other than the character reference described above.
However, in 1996 Congress amended the prohibitions on referrals and recommendations which
had been in effect since 1994, and returned the state of the law to that which it was prior to those ³¹⁰
1994-effective changes. The current statutory language is identical to the language of the law
prior to the now-repealed 1994 changes:
^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.^§³³^03.^Aⁿⁱⁿ^dividu^al^con^cern^e^{d in}^ex^a^m^ining^an^a^p^p^lⁱ^c^aⁿ^t^f^o^r^o^r^a^p^p^oⁱⁿ^tⁱⁿ^g^hⁱ^mⁱⁿ
^th^{e co}^m^p^etiti^v^e^serv^ice^m^a^yⁿ^o^t^receiv^e^o^r^c^oⁿ^s^id^{er a reco}^m^m^en^d^a^tioⁿ^o^f^th^{e ap}^p^lican^{t b}^y^a
^Sen^a^to^r^o^r^Rep^r^esen^tati^v^e^{, ex}^c^e^p^t^{as to}^th^{e ch}^{aracter or res}ⁱ^den^{ce of}^t^h^{e applican}^t.

³⁰⁸^Co^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee S}^t^at^e^m^en^t^,^at⁸⁴^.
³⁰⁹^P^.^L^.¹⁰^3-⁹⁴^,^O^c^t^obe^r^{6, 19}^93;^see¹⁰⁷^Sta^t^.¹⁰⁰¹^{, 1}⁰⁰⁶^.
³¹⁰^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e^B^r^aⁿ^c^h^A^ppr^opr^ia^tio^ns^A^c^{t f}^o^r^Fis^c^a^l¹⁹⁹⁷^,^P^.^L^.¹⁰^4-¹^97,^Se^c^tio^{n 3}^15,¹¹⁰^Sta^t^.²⁴¹⁶⁽¹⁹⁹⁶⁾^.

The current provisions of the law prohibit officials in the executive branch from receiving and
considering any recommendations from a Member of Congress of an applicant for a federal
position in the competitive service except as to the character and/or residency of the applicant, but
do not expressly prohibit a Member of Congress from making such recommendations on any
basis. This language has in the past been interpreted as actually anticipating that such referrals
and recommendations will be made, and as indicating that Members are not necessarily ³¹¹
prohibited from taking such action on behalf of applicants. Current federal law continues to
protect against potential political abuses in civil service hiring by prohibiting the consideration of
political factors by appointing officials in referrals from Members, the general prohibition for
anyone in the federal service to consider in recommendations or statements factors other than ³¹²
those that evaluate work performance, ability, qualifications and suitability, and the express ³¹³
prohibition on discriminating in employment matters on the basis of “political affiliation.”
Considering the statutory restraints on referrals, the rules against the consideration of factors
other than evaluation of work performance and suitability, and the prohibitions on political
influence in federal hiring, the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct has advised
that with respect to competitive service employments:
^I^f^th^{e Me}^m^b^er^d^o^e^{s n}^o^{t h}^a^v^e^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^{al k}ⁿ^o^w^l^ed^g^e^o^f^t^h^e^ap^p^lican^t’^s^w^o^r^k^ab^ilit^y^o^r
^perf^orm^aⁿ^{ce, th}^{e let}^t^{er of}^recom^m^eⁿ^d^ation^m^a^y^addres^s^onl^y^th^{e applicant’s}^ch^{aracter or}³¹⁴
^resⁱ^den^ce.
Furthermore, the Committee notes that if a Member does not have personal knowledge of the
applicant’s work ability or performance, either through that constituent’s work for or with the
Member’s office, then such “recommendation” for the competitive civil service should not be on ³¹⁵
official congressional letterhead stationery, but rather on the Member’s personal stationery.
With regard to letters of recommendations concerning positions in the competitive service the
Senate Select Committee on Ethics has advised its Members that:
^...Mem^bers^{are n}^o^w^f^r^{ee to}^w^rⁱ^t^{e a letter on}^beh^a^lf^of^{or relatin}^g^{to a pers}^on^s^w^h^{o is}^a^p^p^l^yⁱⁿ^g
^o^r^uⁿ^d^er^coⁿ^s^id^er^atioⁿ^f^o^r^{a p}^o^s^itioⁿ^,^o^r^w^h^o^is^u^p^f^o^r^{a p}^r^o^m^o^tioⁿⁱⁿ^th^{e E}^x^ec^u^tⁱ^v^{e B}^r^an^ch^,
^an^d^m^a^yⁱⁿ^c^l^u^d^{e a}ⁿ^yⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^at^ioⁿ^b^earⁱⁿ^g^oⁿ^t^h^{e s}^u^itabⁱ^lⁱ^t^y^o^f^t^h^{e p}^e^r^s^oⁿ^f^o^r^t^h^{e p}^o^s^itioⁿ^.
^Ho^w^e^v^e^{r, Ex}^ecu^ti^v^e^B^r^an^ch^e^m^p^l^o^y^ees^m^a^y^onl^y^{be able to t}^a^k^e^s^u^ch^a^l^e^t^t^e^r^(w^h^e^th^e^rⁱⁿ^t^h^e
^f^o^r^m^of^{a reco}^m^m^eⁿ^d^ation^{or s}^t^ate^m^en^{t) i}ⁿ^to^coⁿ^s^id^er^atioⁿⁱ^f^{it is b}^a^sed^oⁿ^t^h^{e Me}^m^b^er^’^s

³¹¹^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^Cⁱ^v^{il Se}^r^v^ic^e^C^o^m^m^issⁱ^{on, “}^A^R^e^por^{t o}ⁿ^A^lle^g^e^{d I}ⁿ^f^l^ue^nc^eⁱⁿ^P^e^r^s^on^ne^{l A}^c^tions^a^t^t^h^e^G^e^ne^r^a^l
^Se^r^v^ic^e^s^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tion”⁽^S^e^p^te^m^b^e^r¹⁹⁷³⁾^,^re^printe^dⁱⁿ¹^Su^bc^o^m^m^itte^e^{on Ma}ⁿ^pow^e^r^a^{nd C}ⁱ^v^il^Se^r^v^ic^e^,^H^ous^e^rd
^Com^m^itte^e^{on Post Of}^fⁱ^c^e^a^{nd Civ}^{il Se}^rv^ic^e^,^Com^m^{. P}^r^int^93-²²^{, 9}³^C^ong^.,^2d^Se^s^s^.¹³⁽¹⁹⁷⁴⁾^.^Se^e^a^l^s^o^H^.^{R. R}^p^t.^th^th
^N^o^{. 1}^04-²⁸^2,¹⁰⁴^C^ong^.,^2d^Se^s^s^.⁽¹⁹⁹⁶⁾^{; S.R}^e^p^t^.¹⁰^4-³^23,¹⁰⁴^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^2d^Se^s^sⁱ^on⁽¹⁹⁹⁶⁾^{, r}^e^p^o^r^ting^H^.^R^.³⁷⁵⁴^,^th
¹⁰⁴^Con^g^ress.
³¹²^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 2}³⁰²⁽^b⁾⁽²⁾^.
³¹³⁵^U.S^.^C.^§²³⁰²^(b⁾⁽¹^)(E).^Se^e^a^l^s^o^“^C^iv^{il Se}^r^v^ic^e^R^u^le^s^,^”^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 3}³⁰¹^,^note^,^§^4.^2.
³¹⁴^H^ous^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on Sta}^nda^r^d^s^of^O^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^C^ond^uc^{t, Me}^m^o^r^a^nd^u^m^{, “}^E^m^p^lo^y^m^eⁿ^{t R}^e^c^o^m^m^e^nda^tions^,”^O^c^to^be^r^1,
¹⁹⁸^8.
³¹⁵^Id^.^{: “}^W^he^the^r^a^pa^rtic^ula^r^le^tte^r^o^f^re^c^o^m^m^e^nda^tion^m^a^y^be^coⁿ^sⁱ^d^ered^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^b^u^sⁱⁿ^ess,^and^m^a^y^t^h^ere^f^o^r^{e b}^e
^w^r^itte^{n on}^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^le^tte^rhe^a^d^{, de}^p^e^nds^oⁿ^w^h^e^t^he^{r the}^pro^pos^e^d^le^tt^e^r^m^a^y^be^m^a^ile^{d us}^ing^the^f^r^aⁿ^k^unde^r^the
^r^e^g^u^la^tions^of^the^Fr^aⁿ^kⁱ^ng^C^o^m^mⁱ^ss^ion...^{. A}^c^c^o^r^d^ing^to^Fr^aⁿ^kⁱ^ng^C^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on r}^e^g^u^la^tions^,^Me^m^b^er^s^m^a^y^us^e^the
^f^r^aⁿ^k^{to m}^a^{il le}^tte^{rs of}^re^c^o^m^m^eⁿ^da^tio^{n f}^o^{r the}^f^o^ll^ow^ing^:¹⁾^aⁿ^a^p^plic^aⁿ^{t se}^e^k^ing^a^d^mⁱ^{ssion to a}^m^ilita^ry^a^c^a^d^e^m^y^;²⁾
^an^ap^p^lⁱ^cant^seekiⁿ^{g a p}^o^lⁱ^tⁱ^cal^app^oⁱⁿ^t^m^eⁿ^t^t^o^{a f}^e^d^e^r^a^l^o^r^S^t^at^{e gover}ⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^p^o^sⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^;^o^r³⁾^{an ap}^plⁱ^can^t^w^h^oⁱ^s^a
^cu^rren^t^em^p^l^o^y^e^e^,^{was a}^f^o^{rmer e}^m^p^l^o^y^ee,^o^r^h^a^{s w}^o^rked^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^e^M^e^m^b^{er i}ⁿ^an^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^cap^aci^t^y^an^d^t^h^e^l^e^t^t^e^{r rel}^a^t^e^s
^{to t}^h^e^d^u^tie^{s pe}^rf^orm^e^{d b}^y^the^a^p^plic^aⁿ^t.

^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^{al k}ⁿ^o^w^led^g^{e o}^r^r^eco^r^d^{s, o}^r^if^t^h^{e r}^eco^m^m^eⁿ^d^atioⁿ^{is li}^m^ited^to^th^{e ap}^p^licaⁿ^t^’^s³¹⁶
^ch^{aracter an}^{d res}ⁱ^den^ce.”
In addition to the permissibility of statements and recommendations for competitive service
positions which are made on the basis of a Member’s personal knowledge or records of the
constituent’s work, Member recommendations may also be made generally for “political”
positions in the federal or State governments, and with respect to appointments to the military
academies. However, recommendations are expressly prohibited by statute with respect to ³¹⁷
employment in the United States Postal Service.
Individual Government contracts are let according to federal acquisition rules and guidelines,
generally on a competitive basis, and while there is certainly some discretion to be exercised in
some cases, Government contracts are not to be awarded on the basis of political or personal
influence or pressure from a Member of Congress or other Government officer. A contract with
the United States Government is intended to be let with terms that are the most favorable to the
United States, that is, contract terms which favor the general public interest in terms of overall ³¹⁸
value and performance. Price and overall cost to the Government are generally the principle ³¹⁹
considerations in all Government contacting.
Contracts may not be awarded on the basis of personal or political favoritism, and all potential
contractors should be treated “with complete impartiality and with preferential treatment for ³²⁰
none.” General ethical standards in the executive branch similarly note that an executive
official is to “act impartially and not give preferential treatment to any private organization or ³²¹
individual.” Depending on the nature of communications, therefore, the intervention of a
congressional office in a procurement procedure to attempt to “influence” the letting of a contract
by a federal agency based on terms or factors other than those which the agency may properly
consider may involve conduct contrary to proper federal contracting principles and
administration, as well as general ethical precepts.
If a Member of Congress does wish to communicate with an agency on behalf of a business or
individual in his or her district or State, it is sometimes the practice to provide a letter of
introduction for the constituent business entity or individual, to ask for fair and prompt
consideration in the award of the contract or contracts, to request to be kept informed of the
process and, if the Member or the Member’s staff knows or has experience with the individuals

³¹⁶^Se^na^te^Ethⁱ^c^s^M^anu^al,^s^upr^a^at¹⁸⁷^,^ci^tⁱⁿ^{g “Dear Co}^l^l^eagu^{e” l}^e^t^t^e^{r o}^f^M^a^y¹^,¹⁹⁹⁷^.
³¹⁷^{39 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁰⁰²^.
³¹⁸^Fe^de^ra^{l A}^c^quisitio^{n Re}^g^u^la^tio^ns^[^F^A^R^]^,⁴⁸^C.F^.^R.^{§ 1}^.¹^02(a⁾^.
³¹⁹^In^t^h^{e “si}^m^p^lⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^p^r^o^c^u^r^em^en^t^p^r^o^{cess” co}ⁿ^t^ract^o^f^fⁱ^c^e^{rs are t}^o^“o^b^t^aiⁿ^s^u^pp^lⁱ^e^{s an}^{d servi}^ces^f^r^o^m^t^h^{e so}^u^r^{ce w}^h^o^s^e
^of^f^e^r^is^the^m^o^s^t^a^d^v^a^nta^g^e^ous^to^the^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt”⁽^F^A^R^{, 48 C}^.^F.R^.^§^13.¹⁰⁴⁾^;^{in a}^“^s^e^a^l^e^d^bi^d”^pr^oc^e^s^s^the^c^ontr^a^c^t^is
^{to be}^m^a^de^w^{ith a}^r^e^s^ponsⁱ^b^le^bi^d^d^e^r^w^hos^e^bid^is^“^m^os^{t a}^d^v^a^nta^g^eous^t^o^t^h^e^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt, c}^ons^ide^rⁱⁿ^g^only^pr^ic^e^a^nd
^t^h^{e p}^rⁱ^ce-rel^a^t^e^d^f^act^o^r^{s” (4}⁸^C.^F^.^R.^§¹⁴^-^.⁴⁰⁸^-1(a));^an^{d i}ⁿ^coⁿ^t^rac^tⁱⁿ^{g b}^yⁿ^e^go^tⁱ^a^tⁱ^o^{n “co}^st^o^r^p^rⁱ^{ce” p}^l^ay^{s a}
^“^dom^inaⁿ^{t r}^o^le^”ⁱⁿ^s^o^ur^c^e^s^e^le^c^tion,^bu^{t o}^t^he^r^“^t^r^a^de^of^f^”^f^a^c^t^or^s^,^s^u^c^h^a^s^the^rⁱ^s^k^of^uns^uc^c^e^s^s^f^{ul c}^ontr^a^c^t^pe^r^f^or^m^a^nc^e^,
^m^a^y^pr^ope^r^l^y^be^w^e^ig^he^{d to de}^te^r^m^ine^“^t^he^be^s^t^inte^r^e^s^t^of^the^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt”^{in a}^c^ontr^a^c^t^.^{48 C}^.^F.R^.^§§^15.¹⁰^1,
^15.¹⁰^1-¹^,¹⁵^.1⁰¹^-²^,¹⁵^-³^04.
³²⁰^FA^R^,^{48 C}^.^F.R^.^§§^1.¹⁰^2-²⁽^c⁾⁽³⁾^,^3.¹⁰^{1: “}^G^ov^e^r^nm^eⁿ^{t bus}ⁱⁿ^e^s^s^s^h^a^{ll be}^c^oⁿ^duc^te^{d in}^a^m^a^nne^r^a^b^o^v^e^r^e^pr^oa^c^h^a^nd,
^e^x^c^e^p^{t a}^s^a^u^thoriz^e^d^by^sta^t^ute^{or re}^g^u^la^{tion, w}^{ith c}^o^m^p^le^teⁱ^m^pa^rtia^lity^a^{nd w}^{ith pre}^f^e^r^eⁿ^tia^{l tre}^a^t^m^e^{nt f}^o^{r n}^one^.”
³²¹^Ex^e^c^u^tiv^e^O^r^de^r¹²⁶⁷⁴^{, A}^p^r^{il 1}²^,¹⁹⁸⁹^{, §}¹⁰¹⁽^h⁾^;^see^{5 C}^.^F.R^.^§²⁶^35.¹⁰¹⁽^b)⁽⁸⁾^.

involved in the business personally, the office may also choose to vouch for the character and ³²²
reputation of the business in the community. In some cases it may be appropriate to arrange for
interviews or appointments with officials of a federal agency. House and Senate guidance indicate
that all of these activities should be based primarily on the concept of the “overall public
interest,” treating similarly-situated constituents equally, and undertaking such actions ³²³
irrespective of political contributions or other political considerations. In communicating with
agencies and advocating a position and outcome, Members and staff are advised to address only
the merits of a matter, and as in all communications, the office may not use the “[d]irect or
implied suggestion of either favoritism or reprisal ... [for] action taken by the agency ³²⁴
contacted.” Members are advised to assure that representations made on their behalf “are ³²⁵
accurate and conform to the Member’s instructions....”
Members’ offices are strongly cautioned by the ethics committees in both the House and Senate
regarding any informal interventions into or communications to a court with respect to the merits ³²⁶
of matters in the judicial process. As a general matter, the separation of powers concept dictates
that the authority over resolution of individual legal cases and challenges resides within the ³²⁷
judicial branch of Government, and not the legislative branch. Furthermore, it is intended under
our system of Government that this judicial branch be composed of an “independent” judiciary
which will, in consideration of basic notions of due process and fairness, make decisions on the
facts before it grounded in the rule of law and/or equity, and not based upon political pressures,
partisan considerations or personal influences of those wielding authority in other branches of ³²⁸
Government.
More specifically, there are provisions of law and rule which limit, restrict and prohibit the
receipt of ex parte communications by a decision maker in an adjudicatory process, and efforts to
circumvent such rules may place a judge or magistrate in an uncompromising ethical position,
and thus prove counterproductive to one’s objective. The general ethical standards of conduct for
judges prohibit them from receiving or considering any ex parte communications on a pending
matter, that is, off-the-record or other informal communications from persons who are not parties
to the legal proceeding in question. The American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, in a provision which has been adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States
for federal judges, provides at Canon 3 that: “A judge should ... , except as authorized by law,

³²²^Ora^l^c^onta^c^t^{s to}^a^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^m^a^y^be^log^g^e^{d by}^the^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^{, a}^{nd w}^r^itte^{n c}^o^m^m^unic^a^{tions m}^a^de^pa^{rt of}^t^h^e^a^d^mⁱ^nistra^tiv^e
^reco^rd^o^f^t^h^{e con}^t^ract^p^r^o^ced^u^r^e.
³²³^H^ous^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on Sta}^nda^r^d^s^of^O^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^C^ond^uc^{t, A}^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y^O^p^inio^{n N}^o^{. 1}^,^sup^r^a^{; Sen}^a^te^Ru^{le XL}^III.
³²⁴^H^ous^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on Sta}^nda^r^d^s^of^O^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^C^ond^uc^{t, A}^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y^O^p^inio^{n N}^o^{. 1}^,^sup^r^a^.
³²⁵^Id^.;^an^d^Sen^a^{te Ru}^le^X^L^III(4^).^No^t^e^{ex p}^a^r^t^e^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^r^u^le^s^un^de^r^the^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e^P^r^oc^e^dur^e^s^A^c^{t f}^o^r
^cert^aⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^al^ag^en^c^y^p^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^{g an}^d^al^l^a^d^j^u^dⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^.⁵^U.^S^.^C^.^§⁵⁵⁷^(d^).
³²⁶^H^ous^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on Sta}^nda^r^d^s^of^O^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^C^ond^uc^t,^E^t^hⁱ^{cs Ma}^nua^l^,^sup^r^a^a^t²^53-²⁵^{4 (}¹⁹⁹³⁾^;^Se^na^te^Se^le^c^t
^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on Ethic}^s^,^Se^na^te^Ethⁱ^c^s^M^anual^{, a}^t¹⁷^{8 (}²⁰⁰³⁾^.
³²⁷^Un^ited^{States Co}ⁿ^s^t^itu^tⁱ^oⁿ^{, A}^r^{ticle III, Sectio}ⁿ¹^.
³²⁸^No^te,^Ha^m^ilton,^The^Fe^de^ra^{list P}^ape^rs^,^No^.⁷⁸^,^regardⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e n}^ecessi^t^y^o^f^t^h^{e “co}^m^p^l^e^t^eⁱⁿ^d^e^p^eⁿ^d^e^{nce o}^f^t^h^{e co}^u^r^t^s
^of^jus^tic^e^,^”^a^{nd a}^g^r^e^eⁱ^ng^w^{ith Mo}^nte^s^quie^u^tha^t^“^t^he^r^e^isⁿ^o^li^be^r^t^y^if^the^pow^e^r^of^judg^ing^be^not^s^e^p^a^r^a^te^{d f}^r^o^m^the
^l^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^v^{e an}^d^execu^tⁱ^v^{e p}^o^w^ers.^{” T}^h^{e S}^u^p^r^em^{e Co}^u^r^t^h^a^{s no}^t^e^d^:^“A^Ju^dⁱ^ci^ar^y^f^r^ee^f^r^o^m^coⁿ^t^ro^l^b^y^t^h^{e E}^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^{e an}^d
^t^h^{e L}^e^gi^sl^at^u^r^{e i}^s^essen^tⁱ^a^lⁱ^f^t^h^{ere i}^s^{a ri}^gh^t^t^o^h^a^{ve cl}^ai^{ms d}^eci^d^e^{d b}^y^j^u^d^g^{es w}^h^o^{are f}^r^ee^f^r^o^m^p^o^t^en^tⁱ^a^l^do^mⁱⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ
^by^othe^r^br^aⁿ^c^h^e^s^of^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt.”^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^v^.^W^ill^,⁴⁴⁹^U^.^S.²⁰⁰^{, 2}¹⁷^-²¹^{8 (}¹⁹⁸⁰⁾^.

neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending ³²⁹
proceeding.” Similar ethical obligations concerning the making or the receipt of ex parte
communications attach to administrative law judges or other administrative personnel in
adjudicatory matters before federal agencies, under the provisions of the Administrative ³³⁰
Procedures Act.
Certain requests may, of course, be made from Members of Congress and Members’ offices to the
judiciary, including seeking from a clerk of the court information on the status of a judicial
matter, and the request for information on the public docket. Furthermore, while informal
attempts at persuasion or influence of a court or over a judge are not deemed proper, it is
acceptable for a Member of Congress who feels strongly about a legal matter, such as when the
outcome of the matter may affect large numbers of his or her constituents or otherwise impact his
or her State or district, to seek to formally intervene in a legal proceeding as a party, or to file a ³³¹
brief amicus curiae (friend of the court) in a matter on appeal.
The Senate Select Committee on Ethics specifically advises as follows:
^T^h^{e g}^eⁿ^e^r^a^l^ad^vⁱ^ce^o^f^th^e^Et^hⁱ^{cs Co}^m^m^ittee^coⁿ^cerⁿⁱⁿ^g^p^eⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^co^u^r^{t act}^ioⁿ^s^is^t^h^at
^Sen^a^{te o}^f^fⁱ^ce^{s s}^h^o^u^ld^r^e^f^r^aiⁿ^f^r^o^mⁱⁿ^ter^v^eⁿⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^s^u^ch^le^g^a^{l actio}ⁿ^s⁽^uⁿ^l^es^{s th}^{e o}^f^fⁱ^ce
^becom^e^s^{a party}^{to th}^{e s}^u^{it, or}^s^eeks^leav^{e of}^th^{e cou}^r^{t to in}^te^rv^en^{e as}^amⁱ^c^us^curⁱ^ae⁾^untⁱ^l
^th^e^m^a^t^t^{er h}^a^s^reach^{ed a res}^o^lutioⁿⁱⁿ^t^h^{e cou}^r^ts^{. T}^h^{e prin}^{ciple beh}ⁱⁿ^d^s^u^c^h^advⁱ^{ce is}^t^h^{at th}^e
^j^u^dⁱ^{cial s}^y^ste^m^{is t}^h^{e ap}^p^r^o^p^r^ia^{te f}^o^r^u^m^f^o^r^th^{e r}^e^so^lu^ti^oⁿ^o^f^l^e^g^a^l^dⁱ^s^p^u^t^es^aⁿ^d^,^t^h^e^r^e^f^o^r^e^,^t^h^e³³²
^s^y^ste^m^sh^o^u^ld^b^e^allo^w^e^d^to^f^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^wⁱ^t^h^o^u^{t i}ⁿ^ter^f^er^en^ce^f^r^o^m^o^u^tsid^{e so}^u^r^ces.
Similarly, the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct explains:
^W^h^{ere a Me}^m^b^{er believ}^e^s^it^neces^s^a^r^y^{to at}^te^m^p^{t to a}^f^f^{ect t}^h^{e ou}^tco^m^{e i}ⁿ^{a pen}^dⁱⁿ^g
^cas^{e, h}^e^{or s}^h^{e h}^a^s^{a v}^a^riet^y^of^option^s^.^A^Me^m^b^er^w^h^o^has^relev^a^{nt inf}^o^r^m^at^ion^cou^l^d
^provⁱ^d^{e i}^t^t^o^{a part}^y^’^s^couns^el^,^w^h^{o cou}^l^{d t}^h^eⁿ^fⁱ^l^eⁱ^t^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e cou}^r^t^aⁿ^{d n}^o^tⁱ^fy^al^l^partⁱ^e^s^.
^A^lterⁿ^ati^v^el^y^,^t^h^{e Me}^m^b^er^co^u^l^d^see^k^to^f^{ile a}ⁿ^a^m^ic^u^s^c^u^rⁱ^{ae, o}^r^f^r^ien^d^o^f^th^e^co^u^r^{t b}^r^ief^.
^{Yet an}^o^t^h^e^r^o^p^tioⁿ^,ⁱⁿ^an^ap^p^r^o^p^r^{iate case, m}ⁱ^g^h^{t b}^e^to^seek^toⁱⁿ^ter^v^eⁿ^{e as a f}^o^r^m^a^l^p^a^r^t^y^to
^th^{e proceedin}^g^.^A^Me^m^b^{er cou}^l^{d als}^o^m^a^k^e^{a s}^p^eech^on^th^{e H}^o^u^s^{e f}^l^{oor or place}^{a s}^t^a^t^em^eⁿ^t
ⁱⁿ^th^e^C^ongr^es^sⁱ^onal^Recor^d^a^s^to^th^{e leg}ⁱ^slati^v^{e in}^teⁿ^t^b^e^hⁱⁿ^d^th^{e la}^w^.^A^Me^m^b^er^sh^o^u^ld
^ref^r^ain^,^h^o^w^e^v^e^{r, f}^r^o^m^m^a^kⁱ^{ng an}^of^f-^t^h^e-^reco^r^d^co^m^m^uⁿⁱ^cat^ioⁿ^to^th^{e p}^r^esidⁱⁿ^g^ju^d^g^e^,^a^sⁱ^t
^cou^l^{d cau}^s^e^t^h^{e j}^u^dg^{e to recu}^s^e^hⁱ^m^-^{or h}^e^rs^el^f^f^r^o^m^fu^rt^h^e^{r con}^s^ideration^of^t^h^{e cas}^e.
^W^h^{ere a Me}^m^b^{er does}^h^a^v^e^pers^on^al^kⁿ^o^w^l^ed^g^e^abou^{t a}^m^a^{tter or a part}^y^{to a}
^proceedin^g^,^th^e^Me^m^b^er^m^a^y^c^oⁿ^v^e^y^t^h^at^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion to t}^h^{e c}^o^u^r^{t t}^h^rou^g^h^re^gu^{lar c}^h^ann^e^ls
ⁱⁿ^th^{e p}^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^(e.g^{., b}^y^su^b^m^ittiⁿ^g^an^s^w^{ers to}ⁱⁿ^terro^g^a^t^o^rⁱ^e^s^,^b^eⁱⁿ^g^d^e^p^o^s^e^d^,^o^r^t^e^s^tⁱ^f^yⁱⁿ^g
ⁱⁿ^cou^r^{t). Me}^m^b^er^s^an^{d e}^m^p^l^oy^ees^s^h^o^u^{ld als}^o^{be a}^w^{are th}^at^s^p^{ecial procedu}^r^es^{are to be}

³²⁹^C^ode^of^C^ond^uc^{t f}^o^r^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^J^udg^e^s^{, J}^udicⁱ^a^l^C^onf^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, C}^aⁿ^on^3,A⁽⁴⁾⁽¹⁹⁹²⁾^.
³³⁰^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 5}⁵⁷⁽^d)^.^Se^e^dis^c^us^sⁱ^oⁿ^of^f^o^r^m^a^l^inte^r^v^eⁿ^tions^a^{nd a}^d^ju^dic^a^tionsⁱⁿ^P^a^r^t^I^I^of^this^r^e^por^t.
³³¹^A^sⁿ^o^t^ed^earlⁱ^e^r,^no^pri^v^at^{e co}^m^p^en^satⁱ^oⁿ^o^r^t^hⁱⁿ^g^o^f^val^u^e^m^a^y^b^e^recei^ved^b^y^{a M}^e^m^b^{er f}^o^{r p}^r^o^f^essⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^servi^ces
^re^nde^re^{d i}ⁿ^re^la^tio^{n t}^o^aⁿ^y^le^g^a^l^m^a^tte^{r, nor m}^a^y^sta^f^f^be^priv^a^t^e^l^y^c^o^m^p^eⁿ^sa^te^{d f}^o^{r a}^c^ting^a^s^a^ttorne^y^{s or a}^g^eⁿ^{ts f}^o^r
^priv^a^t^e^pa^rtie^{s in m}^a^tte^{rs in w}^h^ic^{h the}^Uni^t^e^d^Sta^t^e^s^{is i}ⁿ^te^r^e^s^t^e^d^or^is^a^pa^r^t^y^be^f^o^r^e^c^our^ts^or^f^e^de^r^a^{l a}^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^{. 5}
^U^.^S.C^.^a^p^p.^§⁵⁰^{2 (}^e^a^r^ne^{d i}ⁿ^c^o^m^e^lim^ita^tions^f^o^r^pr^of^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l s}^e^r^v^ic^e^s⁾^,^{18 U}^.^S^.^C^.^§§²⁰^1,²⁰^3,²⁰^4,^a^{nd 2}⁰⁵⁽^c^rⁱ^mⁱ^na^l
^c^onf^lic^{t of}^inte^r^e^s^t^a^{nd e}^t^hic^s^pr^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^ons⁾^.
³³²^Se^na^te^Ethⁱ^c^s^M^anu^al,^s^upr^a^a^t¹^78.

^f^o^llo^w^e^d^w^h^en^e^v^{er th}^e^y^receiv^e^{a s}^u^bpoen^a^s^e^e^k^ing^inform^at^ion^re^lating^{to of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^al³³³
^con^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al bus}ⁱⁿ^es^s^.
Contacting regulatory and administrative agencies or intervening into administrative matters by a
Member of Congress on behalf of constituents and others with interests affecting the Member’s
district or State, is considered an important discretionary function of an elected representative for
those whom he or she represents. It has become a fairly traditional role for Members of Congress
to express concern for, and to sometimes act as a “liaison” or spokesman for their constituents to
the unelected, and arguably less responsive, bureaucracy of the Federal Government. In the
process of such intervention it is expected that some “tension” between the desires of legislators
and those in the executive branch will naturally exist in our constitutional form of government.
While it may be a common, discretionary practice for a Member to intervene with or contact an
agency for a constituent there may, similar to any other official acts of Members, be several
ethical issues that arise in such interventions. In the first instance, it is important to assure that
nothing of value from a private source is received in connection with, in return for, because of, or
as compensation for the Member’s or the office’s intervention. Campaign contributions are of a
particular concern in this area. Although outright “bribes” or “extortion” in relation to the receipt
of campaign contributions and official interventions would require specific factual evidence of
corruption and would cover only the most blatant forms of misconduct, there are other, more
common and subtle ethical concerns concerning such contributions. Members have been advised
to avoid any indications of a connection or “linkage” between donations or solicitations of
campaign funds to or for the Member, and the assistance provided by that Member.
In light of the guidance, opinions and rules in the House and Senate on administrative
intervention and campaign funds, Members may be advised to institute office practices and
procedures which assure that requests for intervention are handled and evaluated in a
substantially similar manner for all constituents, and that decisions whether to act on any
particular request are made on the merits of the matter. The strength of the constituent’s position
and case, the principles of fairness or justice that may be involved in the matter, the overall public
interest in the matter, the consistency with past practices of the office, and the consideration of the
type of administrative proceeding involved and the type of intervention that would be necessary,
are all factors that may be involved in decisions on whether to intervene or not. In no event
should decisions be based on whether or not a constituent or other private petitioner has
contributed to or assisted the Member’s campaign; and merely because one has contributed to the
Member’s campaign does not disqualify that person from representation by the Member.
Members and staff should also be aware that there is no personal financial interest in the subject
matter of the intervention. As far as staff are concerned, recusals or written waivers may be
pursued in those instances.

³³³^Ethic^s^M^a^nu^{al f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^e^r^s^,^O^ffic^e^r^s^,^{and Em}^plo^{yees o}^f^t^h^{e U.}^S^.^Ho^u^s^{e o}^f^R^e^p^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^ves,^sup^r^a^a^t²⁵^3-²⁵⁴^.^T^h^e
^pr^oc^e^dur^e^s^c^o^nc^e^rⁿⁱ^ng^s^u^b^poe^na^s^of^Me^m^b^e^r^s^or^em^ploy^e^e^s^a^r^e^se^{t out}ⁱⁿ^c^u^r^r^e^{nt H}^ous^e^R^u^le^VI^I^I^{, a}^nd^pr^ov^ide^f^o^r
^notif^ic^a^tion^of^the^H^o^us^e^,^thr^oug^h^the^S^p^e^a^k^e^r^{, a}^{nd de}^te^r^m^ina^tions^t^o^be^m^a^de^c^onc^e^r^ning^t^h^e^r^e^le^v^a^ncy^a^{nd m}^a^te^rⁱ^a^lit^y
^o^f^t^h^{e o}^f^fⁱ^ci^al^l^y^r^e^l^a^t^e^dⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^requ^est^e^d^,^{as w}^e^l^l^{as c}^onside^r^a^tion^of^aⁿ^y^c^onf^lic^ts^w^{ith the}^priv^ile^g^e^{s of}^the^House
^{as an}ⁱⁿ^stit^u^tioⁿ^,^o^r^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^s^titu^tioⁿ^a^{l p}^r^iv^ileg^e^{s an}^d^im^m^uⁿ^{ities o}^f^M^e^m^b^{ers in}^th^{e Sp}^eech^o^r^Deb^a^te^clau^{se o}^f^th^e
^C^ons^tit^uti^on.

Finally, the means and methods of intervention by Members and the Members’ offices are matters
of ethical standards and guidelines expressed by the House and the Senate. The ethical
“guidance” expressed on the subject of the methods of intervention is generally directed at
assuring that a Member of Congress does not attempt to exert “undue influence” upon, and
therefore cause an unfair or unjustified governmental decision or action by, an agency through
coercive activities such as threats of reprisal against or promises of rewards for federal regulators
and administrators. This does not mean that a Member or staff may not, when appropriate,
express an opinion on a policy matter, argue a matter on the merits, or ask for consideration or
reconsideration of an action or decision based on statutory, regulatory, or legal interpretative
factors. While an office should not attempt to intimidate an administrator, it is obvious that some
administrators and regulators are more “thin skinned” than others, and a Member’s conduct will
most likely be judged not on the subjective feelings of the administrator, but on the more ³³⁴
objective conduct of the Member involved. In most of the cases of constituents asking for
assistance, a contact or intervention consisting of no more than a status inquiry, a request to be
kept informed of the process, an introduction of the constituent to the agency, and/or a request for
a fair and expeditious resolution of the issue, will be sufficient to express, and to alert the agency
of, the interest of the Member and the Member’s office in the matter.
^M^o^r^t^oⁿ^Ro^se^nb^e^r^g ^J^ack^Mas^k^ell
^Specialis^{t i}ⁿ^Am^erican^P^u^blic^L^a^w^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e A}^t^torn^e^y
^m^r^os^en^berg@^c^rs^.l^oc.^g^ov^{, 7-}⁷⁴⁸⁰^j^m^as^k^e^ll^@^c^rs^.loc.g^o^v^{, 7-}⁶⁹⁷²

³³⁴^Se^e^,^f^o^{r exa}^m^p^l^e,^Ethic^a^l^St^an^da^r^d^s^{in G}^o^v^e^r^nm^eⁿ^t^(Com^m^itte^e^Print),^s^upr^a^at²⁹^;^S^p^eci^al^Couⁿ^s^e^l^{’s Rep}^o^r^tⁱⁿ^t^h^e
^W^r^ig^{ht Ma}^tte^r,^s^upr^a^a^t¹^93-²²^6.