DOD Transformation Initiatives and the Military Personnel System: Proceedings of a CRS Seminar

CRS Report for Congress
DOD T ransformation Initiatives and the M ilitary
Personnel Sys tem: Proceedings of a CRS Seminar
Specialist in National De fense
Fo reign Affairs, De fense and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

DOD Transform ation Initiatives and the M ilitary
Personnel System: P roceedings of a CRS Seminar
On April 9 , 2003, the C ongressional R esearch Service s ponsored a s eminar for
the purpose o f ex amining t he Department of Defense’s t ransformation p lans,
assessing the impacts t hese plans might have on the military personnel s ys tem, and
discussing what issues thes e impact s might raise for Congress. This rep o rt
summarizes t hat seminar and provides a transcript of it.
The impetus for t his s eminar was t he Department of Defense’s ongoing efforts
to “t ransform” t he U.S. military. There are a number of c o m p e t i n g d efinitions of
preci sel y what “t ransform at i on” i s , but t h e t erm general l y refers t o a d ram at i c change,
a “quantum leap” ahead, i n mili t a r y p o w e r due to technological advances, n ew
operational concepts, and organiz ational changes.
Much of the d iscussion about transformation h as revolved around the advanced
technologies — especially information t echnologies — that allow t he U.S. military
t o det ect , t rack, and dest roy enem y t arget s m ore rapi d l y and w i t h great er preci si on.
Significant attention i s also bei n g direct ed towards devel oping new warfighting
concepts in order t o employ advanced technologies for max imum effect. Yet often
overlooked i n t he public debate has b een the o rganiz ational aspect, whi c h some
believe to be the m ost important and challenging component of transformation; and
central to any d iscussion of organizati onal change i s t he military personnel s ys tem.
The p anel i s t s for t hi s s em i n ar were Dr. D avi d C hu, t h e current Under S ecret ary
of Defense for Personnel and Readi n e s s and Dr. Bernard Rostker, Senior RAND
Fellow and Under S ecretary o f Defense for P ersonnel and Readiness during t he
Clinton Administration. Robert Goldich, a s peci alist i n national defense policy with
the C ongressional R esearch Service, served as a respondent on the p anel.
In their p resentations, t he participants generally agreed that the p ersonnel s ys tem
needed to be made more fl e x i b l e , efficient, and p roductive, although t hey d id not
always agree o n t he best way t o d o t his. Among other t hings, Dr. C hu advocated
increasing t he length of time that military personnel — especially senior officers —
s erve i n a gi ven assi gn m ent , rai si ng t h e m ax i m u m age for act i v e s ervi ce, a n d
modifying reserve obligations to provide for a “continuum of service.” He also
favored major revisions in the current DOD civilian p ersonnel s ys tem. Dr. R ostker
al so favored increas ing t he length of assign m e n t s , b ut he emphasized i nstituting
great er sel ect i v i t y i n bri n gi ng peopl e i nt o t he “career force, ” i ncreasi n g t he t ypi cal
length of service for those who are part of t he career force, eliminating “cliff ves ting”
for ret i rem ent t o com pensat e t hose not sel ect ed for t he career force, and accept i n g a
high er ratio of senior officer and enlisted p ersonnel. Mr. Goldich added a cautionary
note by arguing that recruiting a suffici ent number i ndividuals to serve i n t he military
shoul d n ot be taken for granted, and that a great challenge for the military in the
future will be sustaining a t raining s ys tem which can effectively convert citizens i nto
military personnel. None of the opinions, positions and policy recom m e n d a t i o ns
ex pressed b y t h e panelists reflect the v iews of CRS, which does not take positions
on public policy i ssues.

KeyCommentsofDr. DavidChu .....................................2
GeneralComments .............................................2
SpecificRecommendations ......................................2
KeyCommentsofDr. BernardRostker .................................3
GeneralComments .............................................3
SpecificRecommendations ......................................3
Selected CommentsofRobert Goldich .................................4
GeneralComments .............................................4
Appendix A: TranscriptoftheSeminar ................................5

DOD Transformation Initiatives and the
Military Personnel System:
Proceedings of a CRS Seminar
On April 9 , 2003, the C ongressional R esearch Service s ponsored a s eminar for
the purpose o f ex amining t he Department of Defense’s t ransformation p lans,
assessing the impacts t hese plans might have on the military personnel s ys tem, and
discussing what issues these impacts might raise f o r Congress. This report
su mmariz es t hat s eminar and p rovides a transcript of it. Conversational l angu age1
was ret ai ned s o as t o assure aut h ent i ci t y.
The impetus for t his s eminar was t he Department of Defense’s ongoing efforts
to “t ransform” t he U.S. military. There are a number of competing definitions of
preci sel y what “t ransform at i on” i s , but t h e t erm general l y refers t o a dram at i c change,
a “quantum leap” ahead, i n military p o w er d u e to technological advances, n ew
operational concepts, and organiz ational changes.
Much of the d iscussion about transformation h as revolved around the advanced
technologies — especially information t echnologies — that allow t he U.S. military
t o det ect , t rack, and dest roy enem y t arget s m ore rapi d l y and w i t h great er preci si on.
S i gn i fi cant at t ent i o n h as al so b e i n g d i rect ed t o wards d evel opi ng new w arfi gh t i n g
concepts in order t o employ advanced technologies for max imum effect. Yet often
overlooked i n t he public debate has b een the o rganiz atio n al aspect, which some
believe to be the m ost important and challenging component of transformation; and
central to any d iscussion of organizati onal change i s t he military personnel s ys tem.
The p anel i s t s for t hi s s em i n ar were Dr. D avi d C hu, t h e current Under S ecret ary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and Dr. Be r n a r d Rostker, Senior RAND
Fellow and Under S ecretary o f Defense for P ersonnel and Readiness during t he
Clinton Administration. Robert Goldich, a s peci alist i n national defense policy with
the C ongression a l R e s e a r c h Service, served as a respondent on the p anel. Key
comments m ade by t he participants are summarized bel ow. Additionally, at t he end
of each com m ent i s a p a g e num ber i n p arent h eses. T hi s refers t o t he page num ber
in this report where thei r verbatim comments have been transcribed.

1 T he s eminar was planned, orga nize d, and managed by Dr . Lawrence K app, Specialist i n
National Defense in the CRS Foreign Affairs, Defense, and T rade Divi sion. Dr. K app, an
officer in the U.S. Army Reserve, was ordered t o active duty effective October 12, 2003, and
has been unable t o participate i n t he final editing of t he transcript and i t s preparation f or
publication; Mr. Goldich performed these duties.

None of the opinions, positions and po licy recommendations ex pressed b y t he
panelists reflect any v iews of CRS, whi ch does not take positions o n p u b lic policy
Key C omments of D r. Davi d C hu
! Transformation i s a process, not a fix ed end-point. Transformation can also
be vi ewed i n t h e h i s t o ri cal cont ex t o f assessi ng whet her forces and doct ri n es
developed during t he Cold W ar era are appropriate for t he future or need to be
! Transformation revolves p rincipally around doctrine, organiz ation, and
people; hardware and t echnology are ge nerally of secondary importance. (pp.


! High ly motivated, quality people are critical to the s uccess o f our military
establishment. The force needs t o b e “above a v erage” and compensation
needs t o be s et at a l evel high enough to at t r act above average people in a
competitive m arket economy. (pp. 8-9)
! Personnel policies are not just important for t he active duty military, but also
for t he reserve component and DOD’s civilian workforce (both civil service
personnel and civilian contractors). (pp. 9-10)
Specific Recommendations
! Reduce t he frequency o f m oving active duty military pers onnel, and especially
senior officers, into different assign ments. Allow t hem t o s erve longer in their
positions in order t o m aster t heir responsibilities and max imize t heir value t o
the organization. (p. 11)
! E x t end t h e m ax i m u m age of act i v e s ervi ce sl i ght l y t o accom m odat e l o n g e r
careers for senior officers. (pp. 11-12)
! Reassess t h e m ilitary’s “s ocial compact ” t o keep up with changi ng soci al
ci rcum st ances i n Am eri can l i fe; for ex am p l e, l ook at ways t o i m p rove career
o pportunities for military spouses and t o p rovide more privacy for j u n i o r
enlisted p ersonnel i n t heir living quarters. (p. 12)
! Fo r reserve personnel, a s hift from t he traditional m odel o f reserve service —
one weekend a m ont h and t wo weeks p er year — t oward a m o re va r i a b l e
service obligation which is more intense during periods of national emergency
and l es s i ntense at other times. (p. 13)
! For civilian personnel, a revised pers onnel system that provides for more
flex ible hiring mechanisms, “pay ban d i n g ” i nstead of the current pay grade
system, and collective b argaining at t he national l evel as opposed to the l ocal
level. (pp. 13-15)

Key Comments of Dr. Bernard Rostker
! The military’s current p e r s onnel s ys tem i s l argely derived from t he system
developed n ear the end of W o rld W ar II and reflects a 1950s, d raft-era
mentality. (p. 15)
! More than half the defense budget is dedicat ed to pers onnel;2 t h erefore,
reforming t he personnel s ys tem s hould be a high priority. (pp. 15-16)
! The rapid turnover i n positions w h i c h i s common i n t he military arena
severel y l i m its the ability of leaders t o effectivel y m anage or reform t he
organiz ations they lead. (pp. 15-16)
! The comparativel y s hort l engt h of military careers allows talented people t o
leave when t hey are still very useful to the military. (p. 16)
! The G ol dwat er-Ni cho l s A c t added t hree t o fi ve years o f j oi nt “career
cont ent ”but t h e t yp i cal career was not l engt h ened t o accom m odat e t h i s . (p. 17)
! The retirem ent s ys tem essentially forces large numbers of people t o s tay i n t he
military until they reach 20 years o f s ervice. (p. 17)
! The D efen s e O fficer Personnel M anagement Act’s emphasis o n equity in
promotion opportunity for all offi cers undercu t s t he productivity and
efficiency of the force. (pp. 17-18)
Specific Recommendations
! A s t ri n gent syst em of sel ect i o n for t h e “com m and t rack.” Those s el ect ed for
this “command track” would be eligible for a military career. M ost of t hose
not selected would b e s eparated fro m t he service, although s ome would b e
al l o wed t o s erve ful l careers i n t echni cal t racks. (pp. 18-19)
! S everance p ay and v est ed p ensi ons for t hose s eparat ed earl y. (pp. 18-19)
! Longer careers, lasting i nto t he indi viduals late 50s and early 60s. (pp. 18-19)
! Lo wer t urnover i n j ob assign ments. (p. 18)
! A greater number o f p eople i n t he most senior grades. (p. 19)

2 T he percentage of the defense budget devoted t o manpower is dependent on definitions of
what is included i n t he category “ ma npower costs.” Using DOD’ s definition of “total pay
costs” — which would e xclude some costs r el ated to ma npower that are not compensation
for i ndivi duals — i ndicates that in recent years a bout 40% of the t otal DOD budget has gone
to manpower. T his estimate would not necessarily contradict that of Dr . Rostker, t herefore,
because it would r eflect different definitions. National Defense Budget Estimates for FY

2004. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2003: 121.

Selected Comments of R obert Goldich
! One s hould not assume that the military will always have a s ufficient s upply
of young people willing t o j oin t he military. (p. 20)
! The military lifes tyle is inherently demanding and i t i s difficult to find people
who are willing t o endure it. (p. 20)
! The military has t o be aware that identifyi ng and appealing t o t hose people
who might be attract ed to the military lifes tyle is absolutely crucial. (pp. 20-


! Caution s hould b e ex ercised in developi ng policies which appeal to individual
sel f-i nt er e s t — for ex am p l e, repl aci ng barracks w i t h pri v at e quart ers — as
they may undercut the s ense of military community. (p. 21)

Transcript of the Seminar 3
DR. KAPP: W ithout further ado, let’s get started. Again, for t hose o f you who came
a little bit l at er, m y nam e i s Lawrence K app. On behalf of the C ongressional
Research Service, which i s conducting t his s em inar, welcome. T he principles that
gu ide t he work of CRS all d e r i v e f r o m t he Service’s role i n k eeping t he Congress
informed. Throughout t h e l egislative p rocess, CRS provides comprehensive and
reliable res earch, analysis, and i nformation s ervices that ar e timely, objective,
nonpartisan and confidential. This seminar, as with all CRS events, i s b ased on the
concept t hat good policy evolves from d iscu ssions that present d iverse points o f v iew
so t h at congressi onal audi ences can have a b al anced vi ew o f t h e p ros and cons
associ at ed with public policy i ssues . Today’s program is titled DOD Transformation
Initiatives and the Military Personnel S ystem: Potential Issues for C ongress . This
seminar is being s imultaneously broadcas t via the W eb to the various offices of the
United S tates C ongress and i n order to p r eserve the confidentiality of attendees ,
cam eras wi l l not show t h e faces of anyone i n t h e audi ence, nor wi l l t h ey be i d ent i fi ed
The s treaming video that will be produced will be a one-time live presentation,
followed by video and audio clips, that will be made available on t he CRS website
within a s hort period of time. The basic ou t l i ne of the s eminar is as follows: I will
start o ff with some short opening remarks on t he topic and I will be followed by our
panelists, Dr. David C hu, Dr. Bernard Rostker, and M r. Robert Goldich, in that order.
Dr. C hu is currently serving as t he Under S ecretary o f D efense for P ersonnel and
Readines s i n t he Department of Defense. Dr. R ostker is currently a S enior Fellow at
RAND and h e was the former Under S ecretary o f D e fense for P ersonnel and
Readines s during t he Clinton Administration. Mr. Goldich is a S peci alist i n National
Defense i ssues wi t h t h e C ongressi onal R esearch S ervi ce, where h e s e r v e s as t he
senior military manpower analys t i n t he Fo reign Affai r s , D e f ense, and T rade
Division. Mr. Goldich will devote m ost of his time to commenting on t h e rem arks
of Dr. C hu and Dr. Rostker. Fo llowing the p re sentations of these gentlemen, I’ll open
it up to the audience for questions and answers. W e’ve set a fair amount of time aside
for t his, so please, don’t b e b ashful. This i s a great opportunity for you to ask
questions of some of these distinguished ex p erts in the military personnel field, and
I really hope yo u t ake full advantage o f t hat. So, l et’s get s tarted.
The Department of Defense h as currently embarked on a l ong- t e r m effort to
transform t he U.S. military. W hile t h ere are a number of competing definitions of
preci sely what transformation i s, the t erm generally refers to a dramatic change or a
quantum leap ah ead in military power due to technological advances, n ew war-
figh ting concepts, and organiz ational changes. O r p e rhaps, m ore p recisely in this
contex t, transformation refers t o t he proces s whereby the U.S. military seek s t o
remake itself b y i ncorporating t hese n e w t echnologies o r finding concepts and

3 T r anscript produced by EEI Production, Alexa ndria, V A. T echnical corrections ma de by
Lawr ence Kapp and Robert L. Goldich, Congressional Research Service.

organizational changes, with the ulti mate goal of generating dramatic increases in
In recent d ecades, s chol ars h ave i dent i fi ed num erous i n st ances i n hi st ory where
military forces have transformed t hemsel ves and thereby s ecured military advantage,
at least for a time. S ome commonly cited historical ex am ples i n cl u d e the
transformation of t he 14th Century English military to take advantage of t he longbow;
the t ransformation of t he French military in the l at e18 th Century, when the m anpower
and m aterial o f t he nation were h arnessed t o an unprecedented d egree t hrough t he
l evee en masse; and the German military’s transformation during t he period between
World W ar I and World W ar II to allow i t t o fight a blitzkrieg or “lightning war.” The
transformat i o n of t he German military during t he inter-war period is a particularly
i n t erest i n g ex am p l e because i t shows how t h ese s eparat e facet s o f t ransform at i o n —
technology, war-figh ting concepts, and organiz ational changes — can interact in a
synergistic way t o b ring about these dramatic ch an ges i n military power. For
ex ample, from t he perspective o f n ew tec hnology, blitzkrieg relied on t he maturing
of three relatively n ew technologies — tanks, a ircraft, and radios. From the
perspective o f war-figh ting concepts, b litz krieg relied o n n ew operational doctrines
which allowed commanders of the German pan z er [ armored] divisions to direct close
air s upport b y way of radio. From the p erspective o f o rganizational change, blitzkrieg
concent rat ed arm o red forces i n m aj o r un its — t he P a nz er divisions — rather t han
dispersing the t anks throughout infantry units in order t o provide t h e m with fire
support as t he French originally did . T h en, d iggi ng a little deeper into the
organiz ational change, we can discern s ome o f t h e impacts t hat t his n ew way o f
fighting — this blitzkrieg — h ad o n t h e German military personnel s ys tem: an
increased demand for people with new skills — m echanics, el ect rici ans , l a rge
numbers of supply p eople t o d eal with t h e p an z er d ivisions’ i ncessant demand for
fuel ; p i l o t s and n avi gat ors for t h e ai rcraft and so fort h; i n creased dem and for a l arge
number of people i ntelligent enough and motivat ed enough t o efficiently operate a
com p l ex s ys t em l i k e a t ank o r an ai rpl ane; and a need t o change t h e rat i o of offi cers,
noncommissioned o fficers and lower enlisted grades. Fo r ex ample, German aircraft
were usually navigated and piloted b y noncommissioned o fficers, and a German tank
company h ad a h igher p roportion o f o fficers and NCOs relative t o t he lower enlisted
ranks t h an an i n fant ry com p any d i d . T here was al s o a need for n ew career pat h s for
these p eople s erving in the aviation and armor fields and so on.
So, bringing t he discussion back to the present, t he U.S. military is currently in
the midst of a p rocess t o t ransform itself; and, durin g t h i s p rocess, much of
transformation h as revolved a r o u n d t he advanced technologies, especially
information t echnologies, which allow t he U.S. military to detect, t rack, and destroy
enem y t argets more rapidly and with great er preci sion. Some significant attention i s
also being d irected towards d eveloping new war-figh ting concepts in order t o employ
advanced technologies t o m ax imum effect . W e’ve seen a fair amount of discussion
of that during t he current operations in Iraq and how those n ew war-figh ting concepts
are working out in practice. Yet o ften overlooked i n t he public debate has b een the
organiz ational aspect, which some believe to be the m ost important and challenging
component of transformation and central to any d iscussion of organiz ational changes
is the military personnel s ys tem. So to enhance t he public debate on this topic, we’ve
assembled t his p anel to look at what DOD’s t ransformation p lans are, to assess what
impact those p lans might have on the military personnel s ys tem, and t o d iscuss what

issues this might raise for the C ongress. What types of capabilities are envisioned for
this transformed force? Which military occupational s peci alities will be in higher and
lower d emand i n t he future? W hat t yp es of physi cal , p sychol ogi cal , and i n t el l ect ual
abilities will people need in order t o fill the military speci alities r equired by
transformation? How will the military recruit and retain thes e people? What types of
pay and benefits package w i l l b e m o st attractive t o qualified i ndividuals? In what
ways will the t raining n eed s o f a tran sformed force be different than it is today? How
should career path be structured to enhance t he effectivenes s o f t h e transformed
force? What types of assignments will be more or less crucial i n t he future than they
To answer these questions our first s peaker will be Dr. David Chu. Dr. C hu was
sworn i n as t he Under S ecretary o f Defense for P ersonnel and Readiness o n J une 1,
2001. He is a p residential appointee confirmed b y t he Senate and h e i s t he Secretary
of Defense’s s enior policy advisor o n recrui t m ent , career devel opm ent , pay and
benefits for 1.4 million active-duty person n e l , 1.3 million Guard and R es erve
personnel, and 680,000 DOD civilians. He i s also responsible for overseeing the s tate
of military readiness. Dr. C hu earlier s erved i n government as Direct or of, and then
Assi st ant S ecret ary o f Defense for, P rogram Anal ysi s and Eval uat i on, from M a y
1981 to J anuary 1993. Dr. C hu received a Bachelor of Arts degree magna cum l aude
in economics and mathematics from Yal e University in 1964, and a do c t o r a t e i n
economics, also from Yale, in 1972. Please welcome Dr. C hu.
DR. C HU: It ’s a great pleasure t o b e with yo u t his m orning and t o h ave t he privilege
of participating i n t his p anel, b ecause I hope both for my fellow p anelists and from
your question i ntervention, to take back with me a wide range of views as t o how we
might confront the important issue i n front of us. I would at t he very begi nning like
to echo s omething that Larry hinted at, a nd that is how I would argue we should v iew
tran s f o r mation. Transformation i n t he end, as I t hink the p resent Secretary o f
Defense would emphasiz e, i s a journey, not a d estination. There i sn’t a fix ed point
out there — an answer at the b ack of the cal culus t ex tbook that we can look up and
say, “Aha, i f I just do the following things I will have achieved t his goal.” It does, of
course, h i s t o ri cal l y ari s e as an i ssue b ecause wi t h t h e end of t h e C ol d W a r , t h e
question t hat t he Congres s especially em phasiz ed, that the Department of Defense
had t o answer, was “Is t h e s am e s et of forces, t he sam e doct ri n e, t h e s am e s et of
pract i ces t h at charact eri z e t he C o l d W ar for t h e b et t er p art o f a ha l f cent u ry
appropriate to the challenges the United S tates will face in the deca des ahead? ” I
think m ost p eople agree probably not — t hat t here will be some cha n ge s , p e r h aps
some very substantial changes, i n all of the above as the Department moves forward.
One o f t he cri t i cal corol l ari es, I w o u l d a r g u e , i s t hat t ransform at i o n i s not , l et m e
underscor e n o t , e x clusively, p erhaps not even principally, a matter o f h ardware
changes, although t hat t ends to be the focus. There’s a l ot of interest in wh at will
technology d o for us, and how might that change the way the Department functions.
I would argue in general, that’s secondary; t hat t he issues of doctrine, organiz ation,
and ultimately people, really are t he primary issues in front o f the Department.
Technology can have a m ar k e d effect, s ometimes a sharp s hift — as t he ex amples
Larry suggested might argue — sometimes m ore gradual i n charact er.
I t h i nk m o st of yo u are aware o f t he present S ecret ary o f Defense’s favor i t e
ex ample o f t ransformation, and t hat i s t he vign ette of the s pecial operations soldier

calling i n p recision air s trikes from a stra tegi c bomber using a s atellite telephone on
horseback in Afgh anistan. And a more wonderful collage of ingredi e n t s w o u l d b e
di fficult to imagine. In fact it calls to mind t hat old sayi ng about how you s houl d
dres s for a wedding — s omething old, something n ew, s omething borrowed,
something blue. The old of course is cl early the horse, t he new you might argue i s t he
degree of precision that air m unitions att acking ground targets h ave achieved, the
b o rrowed you could argue is the s atellite telephone, t he blue, i f I can keep this
analogy going here this morning, I would contend i s t he sense o f t rue b lue, that is to
say t hat ultimately whet her or not this al l worked depended o n t he qualities of t hat
soldier o n horseback. W e could h ave all the m arvelous technology, the engineering,
and t he scientific community could conjure u p o n t he shelf. If that soldier could not
put it toget h e r , d id not know how to use t hat t echnology i n a way t hat was
appropriate to the m oment at h and, and t hat would enable t he pilots in the s trat egic
bomber actually to attack the t argets with preci sion munitions, everything would have
been for n augh t. I d o t hink that is a wonderful guide to thinking about the i ssues that
Larry has posed for u s t his m orning. Indeed it would b e i n m y j udgment the first of
a s e t o f assumptions that one might make about how one approaches the
transformation i ssue as far as people are concerned.
A s econd assumption, I would argue, i s t hat highly-motivat ed quality people are
critical to our success. (The first assumption i s t hat t ransformation i s not just about
hardware. It’s p rincipally about doctrine, organiz ati on, how we operate.) Although
I don’t t hink this is a n ew idea, I d o t hink we sometimes are a b it forgetful t hat t here
are continuing returns t o quality. This i s dem onstrat ed by research that colleagues of
Bernie and m e at R AND undertook some 20 years ago , i n which people i n v arious
Army and military occupation speci alities were put into simulated situations that
were very consistent with what the rea l w o rld would p resent and t hey were graded
on their p erformance. And t h e performan ce was t racked back to their underlyi ng
qualities — thei r preparations, t heir aptitudes, et c. One of t he things that was
interesting about these ex p eriments i s t hat t h e r e w a s n ’ t any t ail-off t o quality or to
returns t o quality about this. For ex ample, if yo u h ave a P atriot [ air defense missile]
operator — take a v ery appropriate ex am ple i n p resent day, this was b ack when
Patriot was brand new — t he person with the higher aptitude skills identified m ore
t arget s correct l y, t racked m o re t arget s correct l y, engaged m o re t arget s correct l y,
whi ch as w e’ve seen from v ari ous i n st ances wh i ch h ave s i n ce occurred i s t rul y a
critical parameter. It doesn’t fla tten o ff somehow. T here’s no sort of de minimus view
of what’s good here. I think you see t he impact of that kind of finding on the way the
Depart m ent of Defense over t he l ast t h ree d ecades has gradual l y rachet ed up i t s vi ew
of what is th e m i n i m u m quality we want in the force today. Some of you, Mr.
Goldich among them, are old enough t o rem ember t he near failure of the volunteer
force i n t he Seventies when C ongress act ually legi slat ed minimum quality standards
whi ch b y t oday’s v i ew o f what ’s good are l augh a b l y l o w. S o C ongress, i f I recal l
correctly, Bob, in that era s aid t wo-thirds of t he male non-prior s ervice enlistees had
to be high school diploma graduates. Now w e v i e w a n yt h ing l ess t han 90% as a
failure. In t hat era, i f you recall, the nadir in the l at e S eventies, I believe in the worst
year the Department had s omething like j us t over h alf o f t he male non-prior s ervice
enlistees were high school dropouts. I don’t want t o p r e t e n d t h at a h igh s chool
diploma i s an i ndicator of all goodness in terms o f p ersonnel qualities, but it certainly
is the case t hat i f you cannot get along with your high school principal, yo u are not
go i n g t o l i k e your dri l l sergeant . And s o, as we’ve al l s e e n i n r eam s o f research

through t he years, possessing a h igh s chool diploma — successfully naviga t i n g an
American high school — i s a strong predictor o f whether yo u get to the end of your
first t erm of enlisted s ervice. The aptitude scores are s trong predictors of whether you
can cope with the i nstructional m at erial we give you to take you from your ci vilian
stat us to a fully trai ned apprentice i n a military occupational s peci alty. Likewise, in
the S eventies, Congress s e t s tandard s for what’s now called t he Armed Forces
Qualification Tes t, that agai n, by today’s view, are l ow relative t o our current
ambitions. S o one of the l essons the Department has t aken away from all this
research — research has real l y had an i m p act here — i n i t s own ex p eri ence w i t h t h e
force i s [ that] high-quality counts. We are Lake W obegon. We ai m t o b e above-
average. This go es ex plosively t o an i ssu e which I know always makes t he budgeteers
a little queas y, which i s our compensation l evel , and the compensation package i n t he
Department of Defense n eeds t o b e competitive with that agenda. It’s not enough t o
match national averages . We have to do better t han n ational averages, other t hings
equal. That is, I think no great surprise to anyone wh o h as act u a lly served in the
military. I think we can see the payoff to that quality in the operations currently
t aking place in Iraq. You see i t i n t he ability of our young people under f i r e t o
improvise, t o cope with a n ew situation, indeed just to find their way around a foreign
ci t y. I t h i n k i t ’s am az i ng t h at t h ese uni t s have navi gat ed t hrough p l aces l i k e Baghdad
without any b ig issues being raised o f whether anyone’s lost or otherwise not in the
righ t p lace. That’s not an acci d ent. That’s t he result of insisting on high-quality
standards of entry, high-quality standards i n t raining, and high-quality standards t o
O n e o f t he corollaries I t hink of this proposition — t his goes d irect l y t o
something I know that those i n t he labor m ovement have always been fearful about
— i s t hat t he sometimes view t hat s ubstituting capital for labor or moving to a m ore
capital-intensive force, which i s clearly where t he American military is headed over
t h e d ecades, i s not a p rescri pt i o n for som ehow dum bi ng down t he t ask. Indeed i t ’s
somewhat the opposite, i n its effect that these are mac h i n es that require high er
aptitude, better qualified people. Thes e are, as t he labor movement would s ay, good
j obs. T hese requi re a h i gh educat i o n l evel . Increasi n gl y t h i s i s a force, as m any
peopl e h ere are aware, t h at h as s om e d egree o f col l ege ex peri ence, ei t h er acqui red
before it enters service or during t he course of its military career.
The t hird big assumption t hat I’d like t o emphasiz e as the s t a r ting point for
debate is that the i ssue o f what k ind o f p eople we n eed is a t otal force i ssue. I would,
if I might, carp a little bit about our title here tomorrow. It ’s not just about military
personnel which is often t aken to mean the active force. The t otal force i ssue i n t he
sense of active versus res erve — I’ll come back to this in just a s econd — it’s also
total force issue i n t e r ms of what’s the civil component of our force b ecause the
c i vilian component is equally important to the s uccess o f t his enterprise. T h e f a c t
t h at al l t hose t anks work i n Iraq despi t e ex traordinarily bad environmental conditions
is a t ri bute t o t he maintenance t hey’ve recei v e d , attributed al so to the underl yi ng
design of that equipment. That’s largely done by a civil workforce, whether contract
or serving i n t he United S tates government. Let me switch t hen, if I might, t o a little
stock t aking. W h ere d o we s tart from i n t his t r a n s f o r m a tional j ourney? W h ere are
we in terms o f t he Depar t m e n t ’ s p e o p l e? Fi rst o f all I t hink one of the great
transformations — and I’m s orry it wasn’t on your list, so I’m urging you to put it in
your future talks — that the United S tates military has gon e t h r o u gh has been the

notion t hat we woul d p e o p l e t his force with volunteers completely. That is truly a
revolution. When the United S tates — and I think t hat Bernie i s writing t he history
of this at the m oment, and can speak to it more thoroughly t han I can — but when the
United S tates undertook to move to a volunteer f o r c e i n t he early 1970s, n o n ation
had ever attempted a comparably sized e ffort, both absolutel y and relative t o
population. The British d id have a volunteer force m uch s maller i n absolute s ize
[ and] relative t o t he population, as I recall t he numbers. It w a s a r o c k y start. It
almost failed, as the ex amples I’ve des cribed tend to sugge s t . Indeed when I first
came t o t his Department — M r. Kapp was k ind enough not to mention how long ago
that was — the s enior military leadership tried t o t al k t o t hen S ecret ary of Defense
Caspar W einberger out of continuing our vol unt eer force. There w as great i n t ernal
dislike o f t his concept. It was a very different concept from b efore. You couldn’t
just draft people a n d tell them what to do. You act ually had t o get them to be
e n t h usi ast i c by your l eadershi p as t o t h ei r t ask at h and. The fact t h at t oday i t i s
something t ha t e very major country I w ould argue seeks t o emulate; even t he
Ru s s i a n s are moving toward a volunteer fo rce. Even the French are moving to a
volunteer force, which I think i s an ex t reme compliment in the military department,
[ and] i s , I t h i nk, a t ri but e t o t he success o f t hi s v ent u re. It d i d t ake 30 years and i t
took a l ot o f h e l p from t he Congress. The C ongress has b een very attentive t o t he
vol unt eer force i n m y j udgem ent , even when t h e E x ecut i v e Branch — i t ’s cert ai n l y
true of the 1970s — was a l ittle laggard in terms of pay. It was the Congress that
came i n and said, “No. You’ve go t t o d o b etter b y t hese people. You’ve go t t o t ake
care of t hem. You’ve got t o be m ore competitive with your pay s cal e.” That i s not
to imply that we can rest on our laurel s i n t his regard. I’ll come back to this in a
second. It really is a s ituation where I t hink the Department needs t o b e i n a process
of continuous improvement. W e m ust at all times b e s eeking t o b etter our situation.
W e need to be strategi c i n doing so, and we must recogn iz e t hat t he world around us
constantly changes. We are not in some kind of continuing equilibrium. There are
a l ot of forces pushing us into disequilibrium w i t h w hich t he Department needs t o
contend — t o which it must react. I want to comment on those i n j ust a second.
Second, in terms o f t aking s tock, I think one of the l essons, one of the t ake-
aways from t he pres ent s ituation, the m obilization of t he reserve forces in the United
S t at es, i s t hat t h e r e s e r v es are t oday a com p l et e vol unt eer force t oo. The m i n d s et
that people m ay on ce have had about the r eserves — these were s omehow people
evading military service, which was a hallmark of the draft era; people who were
reluctantly serving t here as oppo s e d t o o n active duty — that’s not true of the
reserves today and yo u can see i t i n t he fact that we have m o b i liz ed well over
250,000 Americans, often o n s hort notice, i nvariably at great personal d iffi culty in
terms o f s uddenly b eing uprooted from t heir family and civil life, sometimes at
subst ant i al fi n anci al sacri fi ce. W e have not had , I’m p roud to say, any s ignificant
i ssue rai sed b y reserves b ei ng cal l ed t o act i v e dut y. S p e a k i n g frankl y, we’ve h ad
more issues with grumpy employers writing and sayi ng, “Gee, I’m a little unhappy
my person is being called up.” I’ v e a c t ually had s ituations where t he person is
pleading, “Don’t l et my employer stan d i n t he way o f m y s erving t h e c ountry. I
trai ned for this. I wan t t o d o this. It’s m y duty.” Terrific s tory in terms of t he
responsiveness o f our people. Even a s itua tion where we’ve ex t ended t heir service
unex p ect edl y, cal l ed t hem t o d o m ore, t h ey have answered t h at cal l . I t hi nk we need
t o keep i n m i n d t he reserves are a vol unt eer force and we need t o t reat t h em t h at way.

Third, I t hi n k w e n eed to be willing t o praise our ci vilian workforce. It is a
terrific workforce. If yo u l ook at various polls, whether it’s P aul Light’s survey or
other i nstruments that have been used, t he Department of D e fen s e civil workforce
generally scores better i n t erms of how satisfied it is with its situation. [That] doesn’t
mean it’s p erfect, and there are a number o f i ssues ou t t h e r e , b ut we have a s trong
workforce, a h appier w o rkforce, particularly when it is in one of our so-called
demonstration p rograms. The C ongress has gi v en t h e Depart m ent of Defense — and
we’re grat eful for t hi s — l at i t ude over t he l ast t h ree d ecades t o ex peri m ent wi t h ot her
types of civil workforce arrangem ents than the s tandard Title 5 paradigm. I t hink the
record on that is clear. OPM’s done a b ig study on this, which was published, I t hink,
l ast year, t hat i n general t h ese are m u ch m o re s a t i sfi ed w orkforces when t h ey are
under t hese demonstration rules than thos e under t he Title 5 civil constrai nts. I
would u se the word “constraints” advisably. Title 5, as yo u all know, i s t he modern
day analog o f t he civil s ervice reforms o f t he 1880s. T hey were a great set o f reforms
for t he 1880s. They s ettled t he struggl e, dating b ack to the early 19 th Century, as to
what kind of federal workforce should w e h ave. Should we h ave one in J ackson’s
view that’s responsive t o political directi on, which s omeone kindly called t he spoils
system, o r s hould we h ave one that emphasiz es m erit principles? Those favoring t he
merit principle won t hat battle. But that battle has l ong since — that fight has long
since b een settled. We need to move on. Title 5 rules don’t l et yo u d o t hat. They are
ripe for revision i n m y j udgement and I t hink the j udgement o f m ost i n s ervice. Put
another way, t he ex cellence of our ci vil workforce is ach i e v e d des pite Title 5, not
because of i t s current st ruct ure. W h at does t hi s al l i m p l y i n t erm s o f changes for t he
future for t ransformation as Larry woul d h ave phrased to start out this session?
Fi rst of all for t he active force, it implies t hat one of the big issues that we need
to take on is [ t hat] we need to be more rational about how we assign people t o t heir
posts of responsibility. S pecifically, we n eed to move away from t he high turbulence
wo r l d t h a t s o m uch charact eri z ed t h e C ol d W ar — t he vi ew t h at every year or t w o
yo u change j obs. P art l y i n t h e o ffi cer corps, because t h at was u sed fo r preparat i o n
for m ore s enior responsibility, p artly because we had a high fraction o f force overseas
so yo u h ad a rot at i o n b ase i ssue wi t h t h e force as a whol e. W e need t o com e back t o
t h i s question o f how long someone spends in a j ob from t he perspective o f w h a t ’ s
best for t hat i ndividual, and for the o rganization, in terms of t en u r e i n a particular
post. I t hink the conclusion of a review lik e t hat which we have begu n i s t hat
t yp i cal l y people s hould s pend more time in a particular post, in order for that
individual, especia l ly in a t echnologically demanding age, to master the
responsibilities and to be able to gi ve back to the o rganization. It certainly is true of
t h e m ost s eni o r l eaders. If yo u l ook at t h e b ehavi o r o f p ri vat e corporat i ons, o n whi ch
RAND has done some ex cellent research fo r t he Department of Defense, what yo u
find is that typically CEOs spend an average of eigh t years o n t he job, and t hat s enior
ex ecutives typically who are placed in the position with the agenda of changi ng the
organiz ation — o f reshaping the o rganiz ation — generally spend at l east four or five
years i n a particular post, not the 1 8 m onths t o t w o years t hat charact eri z es m any of
our offi cer assi gn m ent s, especi al l y i n cl uding, unfortunately, o u r s enior officer
segm ents. A l o t o f t h i s i s a matter of administrative changes in the Department,
m anageri al changes, t o have peopl e s t ay i n s eni o r p o s t s l onger and at s eni o r l evel s
of responsibilities longer, than is now true. Congress has already enabled the
Department in this regard . It gave t he Department some years ago the authority to
keep four-st ar o ffi cers for 40 years. The Department rarely did t hat i n t he past — i n

t h e recent p ast . It gave t h e D epart m e n t t he aut hori t y t o keep t h ree-st ar offi cers
t h rough 3 8 years o f s ervi ce. Agai n t he Department rarely did t hat. W e are going to
s e e m o r e of t hat, in my judgment. W e are going t o be s eeking from t he Congress
some facilitating changes to raise t he max imum age for active s ervice a bit from t he
current level of62yearsofage,inorder to make this al l work i n t he normal
ci rcumstance. You can see t he first glimmerings of t his s ort of change already i n t he
decision by the P resident to invite General J ones t o m ove from b eing Commandant
of the M arine C orps to being S uprem e Allied C ommander i n E u r o p e , and
Comm an d e r of t he United S tates European Command. It ’s very historical in
charact er. G eneral l y once one has b een t h e C hi ef of S t aff o f a servi ce — t h ere are
a couple o f counter-ex amples over h istory — one sort of steps down and retires. S o
four years and you’re out. W ell, that’s not go ing t o b e t rue for General J ones — four
years and he’s on to another s enior post.
W ith the force as a whole, I t hink, one of the t h i n g s w e h a v e t o b e t houghtful
about is how we respond to the changing s ocial circumstances of Am erican life.
W h at that implies, I would argue, i s t hat we m ust constantly be asking ou r s elves:
“[ W h at] i s t he social compact — t he set o f understandings b etween us, our people,
and t heir families — as to what this is all going to be about? ” What we’re go ing t o
ask o f t hem and what we’re prepared to do for t hem i n return, needs constantly to be
reviewed. And I d o t hink there are a number of our practices in this regard that are
not consistent with modern, American realities. One of t he most important of which
is that, t yp ically now in most households as yo u know — t rue i n t he military as well,
although again this mix of research demonstr ating military spouses are at s ome
d i s a dvantage i n t his regard — and that is that both s pouses work. And often it’s
more than work. It’s a desire by the s pouse for a career. F r e q u ent moves are not
consistent with fulfilling t hat des ire. One of t he reas ons it’s attractive t o us t o ret hink
the question of assignment length is that a s ide benefit is, you gi ve the s pouse s ome
more stability. But more broadly, it will be incumbent upon us in the Department to
think about how do we advantage s pousal careers i n a situation where most spouses
are going to want to work and want t o devel op thei r career skills over time? To j ust
take another ex ample of a s ocial change t he Department will need to confront. As
yo u know, t he Departm e nt’s intellectual outlook on housing for single junior
enlistees is that they should live i n t he barracks. S o me of this is because we own t he
barracks, and we’ve go t b u s i n ess k eys b ackwards where we own t he bui l d i n g, we
want to fill it, as opposed to asking ourselves, what d o we want t o o ffer our people,
and, therefore, what kind of housing s hould we h ave? It is to me unclear why once
they’ve completed training of the i nitial s ort, why j unior enlisted p ersonnel — who
are, after all, typically go i n g t o be college as pirants who would [ rather] live off in
private s ector housing o ther than our choosing — why we s hould compel t hem t o live
in barracks? I know that military leadership will speak to good order and discipline,
and we’re all i n favor of that, but of course we allow m arried personnel, which i s t he
majority of our force, to live i n housing of t heir choice. Why not something s imilar
for j unior enlisted p ersonnel? In fact if yo u l ook at survey materials o n how
Am eri can yout h s ees us, and how t h ei r p arent s see u s, one of t h e great negat i v es i n
those s urveys is “living i n t he barracks,” t he lack of privacy, t he lack of a s ense that
yo u h ave a s pace of your own. S o t h erefore I t h i n k as we l ook at t h i s soci al com p act ,
one of the t hings t hat we ought to look at is why d o we h ave t hese practices as far as
housing, if indeed we are aiming at a college-bound generation i n t erms of how we’re
seeking t o populate t he enlisted force of the American military.

So much for t he active force. Quite briefly, let m e m ove quickly to the res erve
force. W h at we seek to create t here is a continuum of service. Recogn iz ing i t i s t ruly
a volunteer force, and t hat we are advantag ed by having those volunteers o n active
duty at t i m e s t h a t m a k e s ense for t he country as a whole, and we n eed to arrange
things so that it al s o m a k e s s en se to them . As you appreci at e t he paradigm [with
w h ich] we operate the reserves, it could not be more different from t hat — at least
offi ci al l y. O ffi ci al l y reserves are p eopl e w ho serve 3 9 d ays a year. O ne weekend a
month, two weeks i n t he summer. That ’s it. Now t hat’s not the reality, particularly
in the Air Fo rce which has b een more continuous in its use o f reserves. Bu t why is
i t t h a t w a y? W h y s hould i t b e t wo weeks i n t he summer? I’ve tried asking s en i o r
Adjutants General, “W h at would you do if we suddenly gave you 39 days a year and
yo u could u se them as yo u would like? ” At l east one of them would s ay, “I’d d o t hree
weeks i n t he summer i f I could b ecause two weeks i s t oo short. I don’t n eed all t hose
weekend drills during t he year. I need more time when the unit comes together with
a m ajor training range at its disposal when it could really take advantage o f it.” Now
the i ssue would be, would t he em ployers s it still for t hat? A l ot of practical problem s
t o sol v e i n t hat regard. Indeed for s om e k i n d o f s peci al i s t s , d o I need t o see you very
often at all? Let’s t ake a t rauma s urgeon. Once you’ve received b asic military
instruction of s ome kind, do I really need you t o come t o m y h o s p i t al t o practice
trauma surgery or am I better off letting you go to downtown W as h i n gt o n , DC or
downtown Baltimore to practice t rauma s urgery in your ci vil capacity, and have a
rel a t i onship with you t hat allows me when I need you — which is today, to b e
specific about this — t o call you up? A compact — s o we’re sayi ng to yo u t hat your
service i s going to be variable over time; m o r e i n t en s e in periods of national
em ergency, less in other periods of time. All our ru l e s , al l o ur administrative
practices in the Department militate agai nst t his kind of arrangem ent. We are starting
to try t o rei nvent those rules . One of the first objectives , first pilot [ project s] in this
regard, i s t o s ee if we can recruit a set of civilian ex perts in spect rum m anagem ent
to serve i n t he Individual R eady R eserve, where the understanding with them will be
ex actly the kind I just described — that we will as k of you intermittent service i n t he
military, but no t a s t ylized, flat, 39 days a year. One of the t hings t his required i n
order t o m ake t his all work well — t his i s where we’re go ing t o h ave t o come b ack
t o C ongress and engage i n appropriate dialogue with the m embers and t he
committees — i s t he stat utory requirement that you have a certain number of weeks
of training before you’re sent overseas. If you’re al ready t rai n ed as a s p e c t rum
m a nager and I s uddenly n eed yo u i n s outhwest Asia, do I really have to send yo u
through 12 weeks of t raining i n t he United S tates or 16 weeks, what ever it is, a rule
that derives from s ad ex perience with i nductees during t he Second W o rld W ar? S o
with reserves, t he continuous service for actives, m ore rational p attern of
For civilians, as m y comments would suggest, what we would seek in the
D e part m ent of Defense, t h e S ecret ary h as said publicly, i s a national s ecuri t y
personnel s ys tem. W e need to re c o gn i z e t h e Department of Defense h as a s et of
missions. T hey’re somewhat different fro m s ome o thers i n t he government. There
may be good government reas o n s for revisiting t he Title 5 constrai nts i n t hose
departments t oo, but in terms o f t he Defense Dep a r t m e nt there i s a real national
security agenda that needs t o be s atisfied. An operating mission needs t o be fulfilled.
I t hink the t hree big elements o f s uch a system that we would like t o s ee the C ongress
enact — and I’m hopeful we’ll be sending legi slative l angu age t o t he Hill, perhaps

even this we e k on this subject — are, first, m ore flex i ble, rapid, agile hiring
mechanis m s t h a n we have today. It takes u s, the Department of Defense t oday,
typically 90 days to hire somebody. That is not competitive i n t oday’s j ob market.
You go u p against high -technology compani es th a t are o ffering at college job fairs
offering jobs on th e s p ot, subject only t o due diligence checks. We instead say,
“Here are our forms. Please take our test. We’ll let you know.” That won’t cut it.
Particularly with the wave of retirem ents coming i n t he federal civil service s ys tem,
we’re not go ing t o s ucceed in repopulating t hat s ys tem with the quality we have today
if we can’t get m ore flex i ble h iring authority. C ongress has gi v e n t h e Ex ecutive
Branch some broad authorities i n t his regard, with the Homel an d S ecu rity Act.
We’re eager to have some of those authorities for the Department of Defense.
Second, we’re convinced after l ooking at the 20+ years o f t he [ C hina Lake, C A]
ex periment, and other d emonstration p roj ects C ongress has a u t h o riz ed i n t he civil
personnel s ys tem, that pay b anding, as oppos ed to the s tyliz ed grade s ys tem t hat now
describes m ost federal jobs, i s t he way t o go. As yo u know, i nstead of having grades
[ G S ] 1-15 i n t h e federal servi ce, what pay b andi ng does i s s ay for a broad career fi el d,
yo u h ave a s mall number, mayb e four, p ay bands. S o t here’s the apprentice p ay band,
t h ere’s a j ourneym an pay b and, t h ere’s an ex p ert p ay band, there’s a senior pay b and.
Once someone’s q u a l i f i e d i n t hat b and, it’s t he supervisor’s decision, not some
gradi n g s peci al i s t i n the Human R esources Department. It’s t he supervisors d ecision,
based upon the m arketplace, that he or sh e confronts what t o p ay tha t i n dividual.
You adjust t he pay as responsibilities undergo change. You don’t h ave t o rewrite the
job des cription, recompet e t he job which is the Title 5 s tructure today. So I’ve had
in my office a lady who is actually doing some additional responsibilities, and [I]
wanted to enlarge her job des cription. She pleaded with us, s uccessfully, not to do
t h at , b ecause i f we recom p et ed i t , she m i ght not wi n t hat j ob. That creat es a “not i n
my job des cription” kind of federal civil service. That ’s not the k i n d o f p l ace we
need to be. It’s not the k ind o f p lace that we want to be. I don’t t hink it’s t he kind
of place the country wants u s t o b e. Bu t t hat’s t he import o f t he rules under which
not only DOD but most federal d epartments operat e t oday. W e need t o change t h at
mentality and p ay banding is part of that . I know that many unions are s uspicious of
pay b anding. M r. Harnage h as already i ssu ed his p ress release d enouncing t his i dea.
I t hink the actua l p r a ctice d emonstrates that it’s not only s ound, but the workforce
will be happier with it. OPM h as done a s et of surveys o n t he federal government,
including Defense, and i f you break those s urveys down for Defense b etween those
workers who were in demonstration p rojects with pay b anding and t hose without, t he
ones i n p ay banding are h appier, but we have a union vote t o continue that practice
at its particular location. It ’s a m uch m ore flex i ble s ys tem . It d o e s t end t o tie
rewards and performance and t hat’s t he hard point I t hink wi t h some of the union
leadership. They’re w o rri ed t h at we will not be fair in doing that . I think t he
evidence is to the contrary and I think we can propose rules and m echanisms that will
m eet t h ei r concerns.
The final el em ent t hat we would like t o see in managi ng the civil s e rv i c e i n a
more modern fashion i s b argaining at t he national l evel on key human resource
issues . At t he moment the Department of Defen s e m u s t bargain at the l ocal level.
W e have 1,366 local unions at the Department of Defense and what that implies i s
that it takes a long time t o get anything changed. W e s tarted under Dr. Rostker’s
t enure t wo years ago t o get t o a resul t t o where i f you abused your charge card o r your

travel card we could collect from your ci vil s ervice salary. W e s till have 200 unions
to go in getting t hat change m ade. That is not the kind of agility that transformation
is all about. Le t m e c o n c l u de by sayi ng that I recogn iz e t hat what we’re go ing t o
sen d o u t h e re is a s et of ideas , a set of principles; we’ll have drafted legi slative
language I hope to Congress this week. I don’t want to argue that we have
necessarily found the b e s t way to solve t he challenges — t o m eet the challenges
ahead of us and s ol ve t h e p robl em s we face i n every i nst ance . I wel com e t h e
dialogue and d ebate with the C ongress and o thers i ncluding members i n t his p anel
this m o r n ing as t o what’s t he best way t o d o t his. I t hink together we can shape a
personnel s ys tem for the civilians, for the res erve forces, for the active force in the
United S tates t hat t ruly will meet the needs of t he 21st Century.
DR . KAP P : Thank you so m u ch for your com m ent s, Dr. C hu. Our n ex t s peaker i s
Dr. Bernard Rostker. Dr. R ostker is currently working as a S enior Fellow at R AND.
He has also held several government positions. Most r ecent l y he was Under
Secretary o f Defense for P ersonnel and Readiness during t he Clinton Administration.
Prior t o t his position, he served as the 2 5 th Under S ecretary o f t he Army, and before
that was Assistant S ecretary o f t he Navy for M anpower and R eserve Affairs. W h ile
i n t h i s rol e he was al s o n am ed S p eci al Assi st ant t o t he Deput y S ecret ary o f Defense
for Gulf W ar Illnesses. During the C arter Administration, Dr. R o s tker was t he
Principal Deputy Assistant S ecretary o f t he Navy for M anpower and R eserve Affairs,
a n d t hen D i rect or of S el ect i v e S ervi ce. As Di rect or of S el ect i v e S ervi ce h e
formulat ed the S el ective S ervice revitalization plan which resulted i n t he first m as s
Selective S ervice regi stration s in ce World W ar II. Almost 4 million young men
regi st ered. W el com e, D r. R o st ker.
DR. R OSTKER: Thank yo u v ery m uch. I w a n t t o associ at e m ys el f bot h wi t h
Lawrence’s rem arks and w i t h Davi d’s rem arks. The o n ly problem with David’s
remarks i s I’d like t o s ee the Administration go further and fas ter and I would like t o
ex plai n why. First of all, [the sign] s ays Dr. Rostker. There are many times I think
that is really incorrect, i n t hat I should address you as Trojan warriors, and t he name
here should b e C assandra, because Cassandra was P riam’s d augh ter and was cursed
with the ability to see t he future but that no one would listen t o her, and I would t el l
yo u t hat for the s ix years I was i n t he Clinton Administration, I was concerned about
the n eed for t ransforming t he military. W e h ad had a revolution i n military affairs.
W e had h ad a revolution i n business affa irs. W e had n o revolution i n p ersonnel
affairs. The p ersonnel s ys tem t h a t was developed at t he end o f W orld W ar II t o
largely correct the abuses of the s enior ity system, a personnel s ys tem t hat h ad seen
the C old W ar was s till in place. W o rld W ar II was over. The R ussians were gone,
but we still managed our personnel i n a system that largely reflected the d raft and
largely reflected the 1950s. At l east t hree times i n m y t enure — once i n t he Navy and
twice i n correspondence with the s enior l eadership at DOD — I wrote p apers arguing
for a revolution i n p ersonnel affairs, and I go t nowhere. The only s enior ex ecutive,
t h e onl y S ecret ary o f Defense o r D eput y S ecret ary o f Defense who got i t was Don
Rumsfeld and you see R umsfel d’s i nsights i n s ome of t he initiati v e s t h at David is
suggesting. You might ask why is this true? M ore t han half of t he budget is tied up
in personnel, and reform o f t hat portion of t he DOD budget should b e a h igh p riority.
I’ve refl ect ed on t h at and I have com e t o bel i eve i n t h e p robl em t h at R i chard D anz i g,
a colleague and t he second most recent p ast S ecretary o f t he Navy, h as spoken about
and h as written about. And that is the d ifficulties o f c h a n g i n g a mature institution

that on the s urface appears t o b e operating well. You don’t want t o tink er with
success. There i s n o questio n t h a t w e h a v e s uccess. W e have an outstanding
personnel s ys tem and the k inds of changes t hat S ecretary R umsfeld i s pushing, t hat
David t alked about in terms o f t he senior lead ership, t he senior uniformed leadership,
is pushing to a n ew plateau, and it’s d ifficu lt for people t o risk t hat. That difficulty
comes i n s everal flavors i f yo u w ill. The s enior ex ecutives are bewildered by the
personnel s ys tem, by the rules and regula tions. They don’t understand it and t hey’re
scared of c h a n ge. T hat i s reinforced by the career personnel m anagers who have
becom e ex pert s i n m anagi n g a set o f o u t d at ed rul es and can’t possi bl y t hi nk of t h e
worl d i n t erm s t h at are not capt u red b y t hose rul es. T hey’re ex pert s b ecause t h ey’re
in the box , bu t t h at box is their constraint and any thought outside of the box is
absolutely terrifying, because it comes from a new world that they don’t understand.
W h en S ecret ary R um sfel d cam e i n, and D avi d al l uded t o t hi s, cert ai n l y i n a m eet i n g
that he and I had as a transition, he really raised three points which I t hought go t t o
the h eart o f what Lawrence i s t alking about in terms o f t ransformation.
As David h as alluded t o, the first is the fact that we have this rapid t urnover i n
jobs. At one point in my tenure as Assistant S ecretary o f t he Navy, Fred P ang, who
was t he Assistant S ecret ary of Defense had us down t o m eet with Paul O’Neill. Paul
at the time was the President of Alcoa. He also was Chairman of the Board of the
R AND C o rporat i on. Thi s i s t h e s am e P aul O ’Nei l l who w oul d l at er be S ecret ary o f
the Treasury. Paul told us that Alcoa was the m ost p roductive aluminum company
in the world, and that the key to that was plant managers, and you had to find the bes t
peopl e t o b e p l ant m anagers and l eave t hem i n p l ace a m i n i m u m o f t en years. They
had t o b e able t o understand their environm ent. They had t o b e able t o change it, see
the effects o f changes, and make adjustments. Ten years. Paul thought that our base
commanders must be the analogy of the plant managers — t hat we needed to leave
our base commanders in place for t en years. Regardless of whether h e got the m ost
important or not most important people i n our family, t hat was his view. I s ai d, “But
we had a slightly different paradigm . W e l eft our base commanders in place no more
t h an t w o years.” H e s ai d, “How can t h ey creat e a p rogram and ex ecut e t h e p rogram
and adjust i f t hey’re only i n p lace for t w o ye a rs? ” I said, “W ell that’s not the
paradigm we work in. T heir j o b i s t o ex ecute a budget that they didn’t create and
create a budget that they wouldn’t h ave t o ex ecute.” He said, “How can yo u run an
institution like t hat? ” I said, “It beat s t he hell out of me, but that ’s ex actly what we
do.” David alluded t o, and you know, t hat our Chiefs of Staff s pend four years. I’m
reminded o f t he former President o f Gener al Electric t hat s aid i t t ook him about eigh t
years t o figure out the j ob and t hen GE t ook off. But what’s important is not just the
CNO o r t he Chief o f S taff who s pends four years. W h at’s important are t he [ d eputy
chiefs of staff] and t he heads of our institutions, and they spend on average less than
two years. There’s no way that you can master yo u r i n s t itution i n t hat time, t o say
nothing of reform your institution. So that was o n e o f t h e t hings t hat S ecret ary
Rumsfeld understood.
The s econd was t he issue o f t e n u r e . He was faced at the time of our brief
meeting, with t h e r et i r em ent of t he senior enlisted servicem an in the Air Force at
about age 42, I t hink. He said, “Here we found a t ruly superb person, and at 4 2 we’re
go i n g t o l et him go, to say nothing of then payi ng him for the rest o f h is life o n a
pension.” No company i n t he United S tates would l o o k t o w ards t aking its senior

managers and l etting t hem go at such a n early age, and yet we system atically built
The t hird thing t hat we d idn’t t alk about, but it is clear in his p ronouncements
that has an impact on our personnel s ys tem, and h ere I’m go ing t o reflect mainly on
the o fficer personnel s ys tem, is the emphasis o n j o i n t n e s s . You s ee it in the
application o f force in Iraq. This i s t ruly a j oint for c e . J o intness comes about
because of Gol d wat er-Ni chol s and t h e requi rem ent s o f Gol dwat er-Ni chol s. It adds
a minimum of t hree to five years of career content as you master your service s kills
and t hen have t o m as ter your joint s kills, and yet we t ry to operate that with no
addi t i onal h eadroom i n a career w h ere we l et peopl e l eave at 2 0 years, but m o re
i m port ant l y we force l arge num bers of peopl e t o s t ay t o 2 0 years b ecause we have a
cliff v esting s ys tem rather t han an accrual s ys tem, rather than a t ransferable annuity-
t ype syst em , whi ch i s what every o t h er em pl oyee i n t h e Uni t ed S t at es h as. And t h en
we say, “ Once you have become a s enior ex ecutive i n t he service t hat you have
limited t enure and you have t o be gone in your m i d -fi ft ies at 35 years of service.”
When Congress in its wisdom — and I t ruly mean that , s ometimes it’s referred t o i n
the d erogatory — but in its wisdom gave the Department the opportunity to ex tend
fl ag and general offi cer careers, i t was uni versal l y rej ect ed by t h e i ndi vi dual s ervi ce
personnel p lanners. They couldn’t possibly s ee how, i n t he box they had b een
working with, how they could use this additional t enure. Their p roblem was t hat i f
I hav e o n average my senior flag officer staying a little longer, t hat would reflect a
reduction i n t he promotion opportunity from colonel o r [ Navy] captain (O-6) t o flag
and t hat’s not fair. E verybody needs t he same promotion opportunity. It s ays s o i n
DOPMA. DOPMA dominat es by putting t he em phasis on equity for t he individuals,
not on the p roductivity of the force and t he efficiency of our force. W h at David h as
done in his flag i nitiatives is to change that. Effectively what t hey h ave b een able to
do is say, “W e’re go ing t o h ave t urbulence in the l ower flag ranks until we find the
stars — and I don’t m ean that by stars o n t he shoulders — and then we’re go ing t o
keep them longer. If t hat m eans t hat a year group or two o r t hree will have less of an
opportunity to get t hose s enior positions because they are encumbered b y a J i m J ones
or a Vern C lark, s o be it. The important thing i s t he management of the force and t he
quality of o u r l ead er s , not letting everybody have a little chance. When we gi ve
everybody a little chance, that may prevent us from having some failures — some
people who don’t work out — but it’s t he same tenure t hat we give t o our stars. W e
gi ve them a little bit of time and we t hen t ake t hat j ob and we s end i t down t he line
for t he crapshoot of who t h e nex t gu y i s going to be. C an yo u imagi ne running
W o rld W ar II and s aying t o E isenhower, “W ell yo u h ad yo u r year as the S upreme
Commander i n Europe, it’s now time to gi ve it to somebody else because we really
want to be egalitarian? ” It doesn’t happen t hat way in war. It shouldn’t h appen t hat
way i n p eace. It doesn’t h a p p e n t hat way in the civilian world. T here are cohort
problems. There are generational p robl em s, a n d s o m e p eopl e wal k out and get
promoted early on, and s ome v ery qualified people are in generations that are clogged
up. And you know what, t hat’s j ust t he wa y i t i s . Li f e is never m eant t o b e fair.
DOPMA unfortunately decid e d t h a t l i f e h ad to be fair at the ex p ense of the
productivity of our force.
These are not just theor e t i c a l p roblems. I guess the only s olace I h ad in my
recent t enure i n t he P entagon in t h e s e n s e of feeling t here was s omebody who was
listening to my cries was the t as kforce of the Defense Science Board. They s ai d —

and I’m go ing t o quote t hem — “Unless t he Department m a k e s c h a n ges in its
personnel and compensation s ys tems, t he force will be unprepared for 2 1st Century
needs. Quality people will not stay in suffici ent numbers, and those who do will lack
necessary skills and ex p ertise. A n ew personnel s ys tem i s n eeded — one unlike any
DOD has h ad before.” I completely s ubscr ibed to that. I gu ess I should h ave b ecause
I a c t u a l l y h ad a footnote at one critical point, and said the points m ade h ere were
present ed t o u s b y t he Under S ecret ary o f t he Arm y, Berni e R ost k er, s o I sort of
polluted t heir conclusions. I was glad t o h ave t his report b ecause I endorsed i t and
built my personnel p lan, my efforts as Under S ecretary o f Defense, around
implementing t heir recommendations, and I know David s hares t he enthusiasm for
Bu t I must te l l yo u m y p redecessor t hought this was all too radical and how
could he get away from implementing or addressing any o f t hese recommendations.
His criteria was stability. He wanted t o h av e s tability in the personnel s ys tem and not
m ake changes. Maki ng changes creat es wi nners and l osers. J u st as t h e p erson who
may now be a s tar and be promoted to a four-s tar j ob and s pend eigh t years as a four-
star is a winner, so a p erson who now doesn’t have that opportunity is a l oser. That,
agai n, i s t h e w ay l i fe i s. But t here are p eople who think t hat t hat i s really quite
terrible and what we need to do is work toward stability. One of our services ki nd
of got it. That is the Army i n t heir OPMS XXI system . The impet us for t he Army
moving to this system was l argely the observation t hat i n t heir command tracks —
and m ost o f t h e i r j unior officers came u p t hrough t heir combat arms — i n t heir
command tracks, if t h ey w e re going to have free flow with these promotions, with
the DOPMA pro m o t i o n opportunities, they were witnessing massive turnover i n
personnel. In stead of being a battalion co mmander for two years p lus, it was a year
because t h ey had t o run so m an y p e o p l e t h r o u gh t h i s syst em . S o t hey bui l t a
personnel s ys tem which has a stringent s election i nto t he command tracks and take
offi cers who are not sel ect ed for t he com m and t racks o r opt n o t t o go i n t o t h e
command track and give t hem t he opportunity to retrain i n a softer — i n a different
kind of job and then stay. S ome o f t hem will stay for 2 0 years. Some of them will
I like t hat s ys tem with one very important change. I would t ake m o s t o f t he
people who don’t qualify for command, are not selected for command, and I would
send them home. I would not have anyt hing like a 20-year retirement. They frankly
don’t want t o b e t here. T hey’d m uch rather h ave a v est e d p ension and s tart a n ew
career t h an have t o st ay i n t h e s ervi ce for anot her ei ght years j ust s o t hey can col l ect
thei r pension. Some may want t o t ransfer over and I would want t hem t o s pend a full
career, not a t runcat ed career of 20 years, but a ful l career l i k e you or I h ave i nt o your
late 50s or early 60s where you learn ex p ertise, yo u l earn your job, yo u l earn how to
do things . I would get away from t he rapid-turnover forc e. T hat was a force that
refl ect ed bot h t he draft and t h e n eeds for a m ass arm y alap o s t - W o r l d W a r II. It i s
not a force structure; it is not a p ersonnel s ys tem, that reflects t he needs for high ly-
qualified ex perts to man t he full range of s ys tems and j obs that we have. S o bas ically
what I would like t o s ee us do, certainly in the officer force, is turn DOPMA on its
head. Instead of 70% or so or 90% or so of the captains going on to be majors, I’d
cut t hat number way down t o a number co mmensurate with a m uch m ore continued
career syst em wi t h l onger t enures. I’d t h ank t hem for t h ei r s ervi ce, and I’d gi ve t h em
severance, t ransi t i onal p ay and a vest ed pension. But t hose who I would i nvite into

our career force, both i n t he technical speci alties as wel l as i n our command
speci alities, I would ex pect to have less of an “o u t ” i n t h e “up or out” system and
more of a “stay,” and m uch l onger tenures.
In my first life, act ually my second life i n t he Pentagon as Princi pal Deputy, the
Navy had i nstituted a revitalization of its warrant officer program. We took the bes t
of t h e s eni o r enl i s t ed, real l y st el l ar p erform ers, and we m ade t hem warrant offi cers
and t hen t he nex t year we t h rew h al f o f t hem out because we had a 50% prom ot i o n
opportunity between the W arrant Officer grades. J im W atkins who was a wonderful
personnel m anager for the Navy said, “This is nuts. We’re going to have a 100%
opportunity to promote t o t he nex t grade. The only reason you’ll be relieved i s for
cause, b ecause you’re not doing the j ob.” But h ere we’ve taken t he best people, the
survivors, the m ost s kills and t o s atisfy some notion of a pyramid, we’ve told half of
them to go home. We would have been better off leaving t hem i n t he enlisted ranks
and t hey w oul d h ave t hen s erved for anot her d ecade o f u seful s ervi ce t o t h e Navy.
That notion n eeds t o purvey our new p ers onnel s ys tem. After t he requirement — t he
n eed — for a l arge number o f j unior officers, when we are t alking now abou t o u r
seniors, we should b e v ery s elective — much more than we are t oday — and once
we’ve m ade t he selection, we shouldn’t b e u sing arbitrary rules to force p eople out
just to maintain pyramids. That would require the C ongress to be more flex ible in
terms o f worrying about how many colonels or lieutenant colonels we have. M uch
more looking at the p roductivity of the force and t he ex perience of the force. It
would b e a s tructure that would i ncrease m arkedly t he productivity, t he ex perience,
the ex pertise of our military and drive that down.
Monday — and t his will be my last remark — I had l unch with the C NO, Vern
Clark. I would t ell you that Vern has t erri ble p ersonnel p roblems. He’s go t t oo much
ret ent i on. Too m any p eopl e want t o s t ay. How d o you accom m odat e t h ese s uperb
performers i n t he current top s ix regu lations? How do yo u t hink about a Navy where
t h e recrui t d epot i s reduci n g accessi on requi rem ent s? He’s go t t o fi gure out how t o
reconceptualize his whole recruit t raining program , get people out of that institution
— t hat i nfrastructure — as he gets more an d m ore t enure i n t he system. That’s t he
payb ack for t he high er wages and the h igher p ay of people m ore s enior i n t he system.
It ’s a whole d iff e rent way o f t hinking. If we were s uccessful in not forcing p eople
— h is senior enlisted — out at 30 years o f s ervice, and got another five ye a rs o f
servi ce, i t ’s real l y am az i n g — we coul d even j ot requirements down further. But that
takes a whole n ew m i n d s et, a whole n ew set of relationships with Congress, a
willingnes s t o s ee more senior numbers, m ore s enior people, more s e n i or
compensat i o n , d i fferent kinds of retirem ent s ys tems. It’s all possible but the first
thing we s hould d o i s t ear DOPMA up, and t ear the enlisted regulations up, and build
the s ys tem b ased upon what our forces need today i n t erms of skills and capabilities,
and r e a p t h e b e n efi t s of an enl i s t ed force t h at want s t o b e t here, and st ays i n l arge
numbers d e s p i t e today despite the rules we put in thei r way to making the military
a t rue l ong-term career. W ell, I’ve probably rambled on long enough, Lawrence.
DR. KAPP: Thank you very much for rambling o n t hat l ong! Our final p anelist t oday
is Mr. R obert Goldich, a S peci alist i n National Def en s e w ith the C ongressional
Research Service. Bo b works primari l y in the fields o f d efense manpower and
personnel, defense o rganiz ation, Army and M arine C orps ground force s tructure and
doctrine, overall U.S. defense policy, and military history. Since he j oined CRS in

1972 he has published a large number o f CRS report s a n d a n a l ys es o n fields as
disparat e as military compensation, benefits, and retirem ent, con s cri ption and
volunteer force i ssues, t he reserve components and military education and training.
MR. G O LD ICH: Thank you. Fi rst I would associate m ys elf with probably what
almost everyt hing of what David s aid and although t his m ay surprise him, a fair
amount of what Bernie said. I think t here would b e a lot m ore agreement among the
three of us t han disagreem ent. But what s truck m e i n listening to what both David
and Bernie s aid i s t hat t hey s eem to almost take for granted a s upply o f p ersonnel
who, if the p roper p ersonnel m anagement and compensation policies were i n p lace,
would autom a t ically accrue to the military. But the m ain p roblem with that is that
if yo u don’t h ave enough young people i n t he country who are w illing to join the
military whet her or not the t angi ble benefits in monetary terms and in terms of career
satisfaction are there, then it doesn’t really matter.
I was thinking — t his m ade m e t hink a bout what we’ve b een seeing on TV and
reading about in the n ewspapers t he past several d ays. W h at we’ve s een a l ot of is
that what combat, p articularly ground combat, s till needs and what there appears t o
be no doubt that it will continue to require are s o m e o f t h e following: physical
courage, physical fitness — both s trengt h and endurance — s toicism i n t he face of
suffering, aggressiveness in the face of danger, a n d b l u n t l y the will to kill. Thes e
things app l y t o b o t h what t he Army would call combat s upport o r combat s ervice
support — support rather t han combat forces , and we can see t his i n P rivate Fi rst
Class J essica Lynch and he r a d v entures and the fellow s oldiers s he was with who
were very much combat service s upport and very much not combat soldiers. W hat
war i n general requires s till, even if one is not in the t heat er of war a n d not in a
combat position, are absolutely b rutally l ong work schedules demanding a great deal
of physical endurance, and a focus o n mi ssion accomplishment above personal and
family considerations. It’s v ery h ard to find p eople who are willing t o endure t hese
things , and in fact to get great satisfact i o n i n coping with them . And if you do not
get p eople whose mind s et is such that they are willing t o endure t hese things , t hen
it doesn’t really matter what your tangible benefits are.
So what I would s uggest that we need to think about are — or at least one form
of tran sformation i s t he tran sformation from civilian t o soldiers and the i nculcation
of soldierly attitudes, and I refer t o people i n all the military services not jus t t h e
A r m y when I s ay sol d i ers. T he gap b et ween t h e t hi ngs I j u st enum erat ed, an d t h e
more commonly known p rivations of the s oldier in the field and t he living s tandards
and condi t i ons of l i fe o f m odern m i ddl e-cl ass A m eri cans, pl aces a great er and great er
burden o n t he training system to reorient the s oldier toward life i n t he field o r aboard
ship, and toward life i n t he military generally. The reas on for t his i s t hat t here’s in
many ways a gap in soci ological terms. The civilian i s oriented t oward t he
individual, the s oldier toward the group. The civilian t ends to be oriented toward
self-interest , the s oldier toward gr oup-interest. The civilian t ends to be
entrepreneurial, whether in public service o r i n p rivate industry, the s oldier is more
committed t o t he collective mission. And what I think t he military has t o be aware
of with all of its personnel policies, is that it is absolutely crucial t hat t hey b e able t o
identify and appeal to people t hat have t hese attitudes — that look for a lifes tyle that
i n corporat es t h ese t hi ngs.

I would s uggest that one of the ways i n which we need to do that may well b e
to reinforce perhaps the t ransformation of t he ci vilian t o t he soldier. This might be
go ing against certain aspects o f conv e n t i onal wisdom. It might for i nstance m ean
that yo u might want more rather than less military housing, perhaps military family
h ousing. You might want more rather than less military base serv i ces an d
infrastruct ure. Why? Because this reinforces the i dea of t he military as a
community. It rei nforces the military et hic — the concept of a band of brothers, and
now s i s t e r s . This is frequently criticiz ed because people feel the p roblem — t his
would creat e a military more and m ore i solated from civilian life. I would s uggest
that this is not so. The military and t he people i n i t are bombarded with ci vilian i deas
and t houghts a n d c o ncepts 24 hours a day. The p roblem, I think, is resisting s ome
of t h i s pressure so t h at we have an effect i v e arm ed force. I w o u l d u rge al l of you,
when you’re thinking about all o f t he c oncrete aspects o f p a y and b enefits and
personnel m anagement an d w h a t w e should o r s hould not do with DOPMA, t he
Defense Officer Personnel M an agement Act, also t hink to yourselves, how will this
identify and how will it enable the military t o fi n d an d k eep individuals who like,
who hunger for t his v ery s pecial military lifestyle, b ecause I s uggest that there i s i n
many ways probably a fix ed quotient of people out in the population who are really
willing t o ex perience t his. If we develop t he right ways of finding thes e people and
keeping t hem once t hey are enlisted o r appointed in the military, find ways i n which
to m a i n tain and ret ai n t hem, that those policies will in many ways make our life
much eas ier i n t erms of dealing with recruiting and retention. In short, I t hink our
problem is not as much one of fine-tuning matters to deal with peopl e who may or
may not be interested in the military. T he problem is finding people who we know
will be interested in the military for a full career and bringing t hem i n. Thank you.
DR. KAPP: Thank you Bob, for t hose comments. That concludes t he presentation
portion o f t he s eminar, s o why don’t we j ust t ake a quick five minute b reak here.
[BREAK] Okay. D r. Rostker has as ked m e for the privilege of rebutting Bob’s
previous comments, so I am going to gi ve him a few m oments to rebut and t hen we
will go to the question and answer.
DR. R OSTKER: I would j ust t ake i ssue with Bob’s comments o n t wo or three l evels.
Number one, I am not at all concerned t hat t here are not young men and women who
want to join the military and I don’t t hink it ’ s t h at h ard to find them. As we t ake
t h ese o t h er changes and can reduce t he requi rements, that means we’re having to go
after l ess and less people. The p ersonnel s ys tem i s i nteresting. W e have historically
go tten i nto what’s o ften been described a s d eat h s pi ral s . W e h ave s hort ages. That
put s s t rai ns on peopl e. They l eave. That creates new s hortages and we spiral down.
Today we’re spiraling u p b ecause we have outstanding opportunities, we have good
readiness . W e h ave a well-structured force and people want t o s tay with us.
Unfort unat el y t h at put s p ressure on, sel f-correct i n g p ressure, b ecause i t reduces t h e
number o f p romotions that are available and therefore i t s ort o f d amps down. So I’m
not too concerned about — as Bob seems t o b e — that there’s not people who want
to be in the military. I am concerned about some of the m ore almost egalitarian —
Bob refers t o t hem as group th i n k — o f o u r military people [ compared to other
groups in our society] . W e h ave a s eries o f b eh av i o r s [ a bout military personnel
management] t hat don’t really reflect the [ personnel m anagement p ractices of t h e]
majority of institutions in this country. The Marine Corps, for ex ample, was the
servi ce [ whi ch] m o st rej ect ed t h e not i o n o f earl y prom ot i ons and accel erat ed

promotions. They wanted everybody to be promoted at the s ame time — t hey want
to stress the group dynamic. That’s fine when t hey’re looki ng out [ for] t heir soldiers.
It is not fine when you’re thinking about the long-term management of this force.
W e want t o i d ent i fy p eopl e who have l eadershi p , r e a l l eadershi p pot ent i al , and get
them into real leadership positions, and differentiate and distinguish t hem from t he
rest of the group. That does run counter to some of the i nclinations of our military
managers. I think t hat i s s omething that has t o b e fought and we h ave t o p ersevere
because it is too important to let mediocrity be the norm for our military.
DR. C HU: If I could j ust add one thought to the point that Bo b raised. It is a critical
assumption t hat we will have a s uffici ent s upply o f young men and women who are
willing t o put on the country’s uniform. Obviously some compensation i s d irected
toward ensuring that that assumption i s valid. M ore broadly, I think Bob implicitly
is pointing t o a period in the nation’s history when t h at as sumption was nearly
violated. And that is the 50s when the b irth cohorts we’re dealing with were the ones
out of the Great Depression in the 1930s a n d t h e y w e re v ery s mall relative t o t he
nation’s military needs. You cou l d argu e, therefore, that in that period it was —
quite apart from t he ot h e r e l e ments l eading t o t he same conclusion — essential t o
have conscription. Indeed that’s one of th e t hings I think t hat h elped l ead the country
to a volunteer force as t he Baby Boom generation m atured and came t o 1 8 years o f
age. We suddenly had a superfluity of young people relative t o what conscription
would h ave implied, which i s [ when] everybody was d rafted, which was t rue i n t he
50s. Basi cal l y al l m al es who coul d p ass any ki nd of m i n i m al m ent al a n d p h ys i cal
s c r e e n w e r e drafted i n t hat p eriod o f time because the n ation’s military was l arge
relative t o t he siz e of the b irth cohort. That all s aid, Bo b i s pointing at one of our
challenges go ing forward. The nation’s military as yo u know from poll results is one
of the m ost res pect ed institutions in American life t oday. That ’s been true roughly
since t he last Persian Gulf W ar. It was not al ways true. It certainly was not true in
the Vietnam period. I used t o attribute i t t o t he men who are i n t he Armed S ervice
that they made it into one of the m ost res pect ed institutions in our soci et y.
That all s aid, when yo u ask parents a n d what Bernie knows we like t o call
influencers — in othe r w o r d s , p eople who advise young people as t o what t hey
should do i n t erms of a first position out of high school or college, whatever t he case
may b e — as to whether t hey’d s ay, “Yes, the military’s a great choice,” you don’t
get t hat s ame enthusiastic response. So one of our challenges, and Congress has b een
very helpful o n t his point with various pi eces of legi slation s aying t hat t he military
should h ave equal access t o our high schools, to our colleges and universities for
recruiting purposes , and we’re very grat eful for t hat l egislative encouragem en t. You
need sometimes t he hammer t hat has come with it. But we will need to do more.
Hopefully you’ll see s oon, we hope, a sophisticated public diplomacy campaign will
begi n t o remind t he nation’s p arents an d t h e counselors i n t he high schools and
co l l e ges t hat military service act ually adds to people’s val ues and adds to thei r
lifetime compet ence in a way t h at goes far beyond the immediat e skill. In other
words, it’s not just that you’ll learn how to be a great mechanic, you’ll learn what i t
takes t o do a great job whatever your position i n life might be, and what it takes t o
be a good citizen, whatever role you might play in the economic fabric of our society.
I t hink that’s crucial. W e need to convince t he parents, the guidance counselors, the
uncles, the aunts, the b ig brothers and s isters, t hat when t he young person comes t o
yo u and says , “I’m t hinking of enlisting, ” you don’t s a y, “Oh, no. You don’t want

to do that.” W e w a n t t h em to say, “That’s a great choice. I’m p roud of yo u for
making that choice, and it’s s omething th at yo u ought to think s eriously about.”
DR. KAPP: Okay, l et’s open u p for the question and answer session, but let m e j ust
make two brief comments. A reminder t hat t his s eminar is being broadcas t via the
Web, so let m e reiterate that in order t o preserve confidentiality — of you — t hat we
will not be showing any faces, and yo u will not be identified b y n ame. S econdly, we
do have a wireless microphone he r e ; we will bring t hat over t o you when yo u t alk,
so that not only t he panelists can hear you, but the p eople listening on the W eb can
hear yo u as well. So do we have any questions? Yes, m a’am.
QUESTION: Can you hear me? Not to pile on even mo r e c o nceptual burdens on
reorganiz i ng personnel i ssues, but the question I have is not only outside the box but
sort of outside the universe o f I think how we look at foreign policy and particularly
military engagement. M y question regards how are we going to ex pand the concept
of jointnes s from t he military to the other foreign policy agencies? I will just gi ve you
a p ersonal anecdote b ecause that’s ho w I’m understanding and also watching t he
news. The job of t he military — i n t he last ten years certainly we’ve been seei ng this
more — h as been ex panding fr o m j u s t a combat role t o essentially one of social
stewardship. Certainly t he Iraq conflict t hat we’re involved i n right now illustrates
this every day on the news, but as well in Afghanistan, one of the big problem s right
now I s ee in terms o f h ow we organiz e our foreign policy p rofessionals is that the
only concept o f readiness i s within the military. W e don’t h ave it, for ex ample, for
the S tate Department; we have ex periments like t he Office of Transition Initiatives ,
or we have disaster relief, which i s like t he Offi ce of Forei gn Di s ast er Assi st ance, but
we don’t really have a combined j oint effort of the military and t he civilian. I would
argu e t hat younger people get this intuitivel y. I t hink it’s p robably not as pervasive
intellect ually as you go up. I have a friend right now who’s t he liaison with the civil
affairs i n Afghanistan, yet we only h ave one active civil affairs unit and now it’s i n
Iraq. It really, I think i s going to be a d e t r i m e n t to our on the ground policy i n
Afgh anistan, particularly when yo u h ave t hese really interesting i nnovations like t he
provisional reconstruct i o n t eam s. My question t hen i s do you see t he military,
es peci ally here on the Hill, going t o bat fo r t h i s k i n d of m uch m ore pervasive
readiness concept? Because yo u really don’t want t o h ave yo u r military doing
everyt hing. I think i t t hreat ens not only t he professional culture of the military, but
it’s also not how yo u want t o conduct your foreign policy ab r oad b ecause it’s
severely imbalanced. I would argue that our foreign policy right now in funding, and
in act ual implementation, is severely imbal anced, when you l o o k at traditional
instruments of power that any officer could t el l you that the United S tates needs t o
DR. R OSTKER: You’re raising really two i ssues if I might. One, you use t he term
jointness which would imply to me how do yo u get people i n uniform understanding
the importance o f s ome o f t hese o t her functions and having opportunities within a
career t o serve w i t h t h e S t at e Depart m ent , for ex am pl e. And w e n ee d t o ex p and
things like forei gn service officers and the like. The problem we have had i s t o do
that within the confines of a normal military career. S o o n c e w e have t rained
s o mebody like t hat and if they get t o t he rank of full colonel, they have to leave at
[ age 52] . S o t hat’s — a l onger career would give u s t he opportunity to in fact do that.

The s econd part of your statement implied t hat you r eally didn’t want t o h ave
people i n uniform having some of these functions, b ecause it is too military, i f you
will, and t hat t here is a need for a new class of federal officer who might not be quite
the military but could s erve thes e additional functions. I would s ay that ’s right, and
we’d have to think our way t hrough. Bu t t hat ’s not j o i n t n ess. That ’s a n ew cl ass o f
people. W e have i n h o meland defens easituationtoday, wherewehavea
Department of Homeland Defense and an Assi st ant S ecret ary for Ho m el and Defense.
One o f t he things that we’re go ing t o h ave t o s ort out is w h a t t h e role i s t hat t he
military will have, and I would s uggest that ’s a s orting out t h a t is not necessarily
go ing t o b e done at NORTHCOM with the military talking t o itself. There h as to be
a dialogue wit h t h e o t h e r agencies of government, s o t hat all are comfortable with
when and where the appropriate role for t he military is. But al l of t hat i s enabled
further i f we have a l onger career where p eople have time to learn t hese additional
DR. C HU: If I could j ust reinforce your messa ge to all. It would b e a great advantage
I t hink, to try t o get attention p aid t o t he issue t hat you’ve raised. As you know, M r.
Rumsfeld has been particu l arly critical of the i nability of the United S tates and its
allies t o ex t ricat e t hemsel ves from t he Balkans promptly in the military sense — that
basically there was a failure to devise a s trat egy for the prompt rei nvigoration of t he
civil government. J ust as you say, the military should not indefinitely be in this kind
of role, and I t hink that ’s certainly the agenda go i n g forward in Iraq as well. I do
thin k t h at — I would urge a little caution, that by implication you are implying we
should h ave m ost o f our civil aff ai r s capability in the active forces of the United
Stat es . The reality is, as I suspect you are aware, is that much of the t al ent i n t erms
of knowing how to administer a civil govern ment almost by definition resides in our
civil s ector. S ome o f t he great advantage I th ink o f t he reserve civil affairs s tructure
i s we can cal l o n l ocal pol i ce chi efs, l o cal j udges, l ocal adm i n i s t rat ors, who act ual l y
understand how to make a water system work a n d a s e wage system function, both
from t he technical perspective and in terms of how you organize i t administrativel y.
I would b e v ery cautious about throwing that advantage away. I t hink we’re much
better o ff having access t o s uch units prom ptly, and such talent on a m ore continuous
basis, as we’re tryi ng to do. Fi nal t hought. The good p e r f o r m a n c e of American
military units in these kinds of roles i s not , as I know you’ll appreciate, accidental.
One o f t he things we haven’t t ouched o n t his m orning much is how should t raining
be transformed. We’re on a similar pat h i n t he Department in that regard t hat
emphasiz es j ointness and emphasiz e s j o i ntness both i n t he sense across American
military branches but al so in the s ense of working with coalition partners and in the
sense of working with civil agencies, which i s critically imp o r t a nt as you suggest.
As you are aware, I t hink, when we send American military units into thes e s ituations
we try our very best to have them practice t he roles t hat t hey’re going t o fulfill. So
they don’t j ust s how up suddenly i n a peace-k eeping o r p eace-enforcement s ituation
hoping they’ll figure out what to d o . T h e y have actually trained for that particular
mission and gone to school on ho w t o d o t hat b efore t hey l eave. I t hink that’s a
critical part of making the United S tates government effective and I t hink one of the
things we need to figu re out is how we work with our sister agencies in broadening
the s cope of personnel p repared t o undertake t hese tasks.
DR. KAPP: Bob, did you have a comment?

MR. GOLDICH: Very b rief comment to continue with what David s aid. I t hink it’s
important to keep in mind, though, that one of the reasons American forces have been
effective i n t his role i s preci sely b ecau s e t h ey are a good military force i n t he
general l y accept ed s ense of t h e word. I t hi nk whi l e doi ng as m u ch as we can t o
facilitate thei r t raining i n t his regard, we need to make sure that in fact it does not in
any way detract from t heir attaining t he max imum amount of r e a d i n ess for
conventional military roles. Not only w ould t hat d amage t heir capabilities for
warfighting, it would also — paradox ically, from what m ost analyses h ave s hown —
damage their abilities t o b e effective p eacekeepers and the like.
DR. KAPP: Nex t question? Ma’am? Let’s get the microphone over t here if yo u
don’t mind.
QUESTION: This is for Dr. Chu. You t alked about how the reserve force are really
truly volunteers now, but yo u also refe rred t o t h e grumpy employers, and I’m
think i n g t h at the coercion now may b e m ore o n t he employers who have no
alternative under t he law but to let t he people go. Is the Department looking at all at
t h e cost s t o em pl oyers o f our i n creased use o f reserves?
DR. C HU: W e’re just starting t o get into that issue i n t he way t hat we s hould. W e
have, after much effort, s ucceeded in gettin g a legal ruling t hat we can actually ask
people who their empl o ye r i s . Y o u ’ll be interested to know in this era o f v arious
concerns that the Department has p reviously been precluded from s ayi n g I n e e d to
know who your employer is so I can address t he question you’ve raised. If I admitted
a s lightly out of school comment that’s also an advertisement, at least from evidence
I’ve seen, t he employer that tends to be at the grumpier end of the s cale i s a c t u a lly
the s ister f e d e r a l a gency. W e h ave s et up, recogn iz ing t he unusual n ature o f t his
mobilization, a proces s i n which em ployers could write in sayi ng: “My person is truly
critical. I forgot to color t he post k ey or critical,” which you are allowed under t he
law t o do, which m eans t he individual m ust t ransfer out of the R eady R eserve into
a s tand-by capacity, which of course people don’t [ usually] want t o go [ in to] . But
recogn iz ing t he unusual n ature o f t his s ituation, s i n c e S eptember 11, 2001,
employers could write in and s ay “I should have done this. Didn’t do it. This is my
key Arab lingu ist,” t o t ake t he kind of t h i n g t hat would qualify. I am amused t o
report t hat actually the p r i v a t e employers h ave b een generally terrific about this.
V e r y f e w i nquiries from p rivate employer s. The bulk o f t he inquiries come fro m
government employers, and especially federal agenci es, i n cl udi ng agenci es of t h e
Department of Defense. So I t hink the employer attitu d e , i n general , I would
emphasiz e, i s p retty good, particularly in the p rivate sector . M a n y p rivate sector
companies are stepping forward and continuing health plans even t hough our health
plan is pretty good, it’s j u s t o n e l e s s thing for the family to worry about if the
em ployer continues t he one the family’s al ready on. We’ve t aken steps t o improve
our health plan making everybody eligible essentially for Tricare P rime including
Tricare P rime Remote, a power th at C o n gres s gave us last year. S ome employers
have stepped u p and made up any d ifference i n s alary. I would emphasiz e I t hink the
salary issue h as been over-emphasiz ed t o t he press. W e have done surveys. W e’re
go ing t o d o a new s urvey s oon of this issue. The s urveys indicate — the o lder survey
indicat es that , regarding reservists mobilized for s ervice in the Bal kans, 1/3 indicat ed
they were making more than in civil life, 1/3 about the s ame, 1/3 l ess. More recent
surveys n arrowing the s cope of spouses — i nteresting d ifference h ere — ha l f the

spouses say t h e y’ r e m a king more as a family, as a household, with the p erson i n
military service [ than] t h e y were i n civil life, 1/3 s till say it’s l es s i n t hat
ci rcum st ance. S o i t spans a spect rum . Therefore I’m not sure t h ere’s a bi g em p l o yer
or compensation problem there t o s olve. I think we would plead with the C ongress,
let’s complete t he study it has asked for all reserve compensation, which i s due later
this year in Augu st [ 2003] , b efore we m ake b ig, n ew changes i n how we manage that
aspect of the system.
QUESTION: My question has to do with end s trengt h i n t he services . Given we have
open-ended commitments i n t he Balkans, in Afghanistan, Iraq, an ill-defined military
role in homel and defense and I’m sure some battles yet to be fought in the global war
on terrorism. D o w e h a v e s ufficient forces at t h e current l evel t o m ai nt ai n t he
operational t empo?
DR. C HU: The s hort answer as we b elieve is yes, but not if we have to operate under
al l t he rules now applicable to Department of Defense. I want particularly to
highlight the civil service rules in that regard. W e w o uld like a m odernized ci vil
servi c e s ys t e m s peci fi cal l y, b ecause i f yo u l ook at t h e i ndi vi dual post s wi t h t h e
Department of Defen s e t here are approx imately 300,000 people s erving in active
[military] s ervice doing things that a civilian — either ci vil s ervant or contract or —
could p erform. In m any cases these s houl d b e posts that civil s ervants ought to
occupy. It i s v ery h ard, under current rules, to get t he same kind of flex ibility, i f we
try t o m ove within the civil service, that we have with military personnel, which i s
why p eople all love military personnel and military units as the answer. So yo u h ave
various kind of national emerge n cies. Take for ex ample what h appened i n t he
airports after S eptember, 2001: the National Guard in the airports — not previously
thought to be a militar y m i s s i o n — probably wasn’t really a military mission, to
speak frankly about it. Bu t a great, flex i bl e f o r c e , r e s ponsive t o n eed, d id the j ob.
We now have TSA i n t he ai rports instead. M y point i s that we need the flex i bility
that these p roposed changes would give u s i n o rder to be able to start l ooking at the
active ranks, and sayi ng, t his doesn’t really need to be done by military person, it
could be done by a c i vilian and it ought to be an officer of the United S tates
governm ent and t herefore a ci v i l servant — not necessari l y a cont ract or i n every case.
So we want to convert some of those posts. If we can get t hat flex i bility, get these
ki n d s o f rules changes, no, there’s n o n eed for additional active end strength. W e
have to manage it differently. That would b e t he headline. W e’ve got to change our
practices. This i ncludes changing how U. S. forces are d eployed around the world
and how U.S . forces react t o depl oym ent . S o one of t h e k i nds of t h i n gs I’ve not
spoken about that w e a r e l ooking at, energiz ed by the S ecretary’s concern o n t his
point, i s why does i t t ake, in order t o h ave one unit forward, why does i t t ake t hree
or four back in the United S tates? Part of that mind s et of course is out of the C old
War as Bernie knows where yo u physically had t o h ave a unit forward all t he time.
W ith modern t r ansport and modern pre positioning concepts, it’s not actually
necessary to have the unit s itting t here physically al l t he time in order t o be
responsive. So if we can manage more modern way o f g e tting from here to there,
agai n, we think we can manage with the end strength we have.

DR. R OSTKER: There are also i ssues of indi vidual rotation and unit rotation. W e’ve
used unit rotation i n t he Balkans and yet w e’ve used individual rotation i n Korea.
Unit rotation t urns out to be very destabilizing. Once a unit i s notified t hat it’s going
to be moved, it has t o cross-level with people whose end of tours are up, all k inds of
o t h e r t hings. That creat es massive instabilities i n m uch l arger numbers of u n i t s .
Then you t ry to stabilize for a period and the like. The argument i s, well they’ve
come together, t hey know how to work together and all of these t hings and I t hink
that’s to be applauded. On the o ther hand, yo u h ave t he disadvantage i n t he Balkans
that the whole unit rotates at once and now yo u h ave t o get to know, t he local mayo r
has t o get to know a whole n ew set o f p eople w h o a r e coming i n with all o f t hose
friction points and opportunities for danger. Yet one of the m ost d ifficult hot spots
for u s now is Korea and we have done largely i ndividual replacements. I personally
come down on trying to manage this with individual repl acem ents. The one area
where I t h i n k w e d o n eed end s t rengt h rel i ef, where I t h i n k w e h ave gone way t oo far
in cuts, i s civil service. I don’t know about yo u all, but I’m s ure you may well h ave
had ex periences where you cal l up t he military office and you find you’re talking t o
a contractor. The work’s getting done. The contractor probabl y i s a retiree who’s
there b ecause we forced him out of the military. I think m any o f t hose functions by
logi c, by righ t s hould b e done by a federal employee and not by someone who h as
potentially different incentives in terms of profit m ax imization and the like. I t hink
we’ve gone way overboard in the notio n t h a t t he contractors can be more flex ible.
It will certainly be helped if we can have the kind of civil service reform t hat David
argu es for but I t hink that I’m uneasy with the ex t ent t o which we have contracted out
DR. KAPP: If I can act ually follow up on t he original quest i o n , i f m i l itary end
strength is pretty much considered to b e s t ab le, yet at the s ame time we’re looking
to add s pecial forces personnel, add military police p ersonnel and so forth — those
are s ome o f t he winner o c cupations. W hat are go ing t o b e t he loser o ccupations?
W h ere are we go i n g t o t ake t he t ransfers from ?
DR. C HU: I t hink you’re go ing t o s ee two k inds of transfers i n t he months and years
ahead. One as I’ve suggested is to look hard at the d egree t o which civilian p ersonnel
— m ost especially including civil s ervant s — could p erform functions that are now
discharged by uniformed personnel. W e fo r ex ample have a s ignificant uniformed
content i n our laboratories, particularly in one service. Is that really appropriate? W e
have various support agencies, including support agencies t o o ther age n c i e s i n the
United S tates gov ern m ent, that are military. That might at one time have been the
right an s w e r. T h e q uestion we’re raising i s, “i s t hat t he right way to do it today? ”
Second, and we h aven’t touched o n t his m uch, but there i s b eing kicked off now a b ig
revi ew of what yo u m i ght cal l t he act i v e-reserve m i x . In o t h er words, what uni t s
should b e i n active, the active components, and what units and capability should b e
in the reserve components. I t hink you’ll see s ome t radeoffs that put our capabilities
t h at are now reserved m o re ex cl usi v el y for t h e act i v e force and t he reserve
com m u n i t y and s ome capabilities t hat now have been disproportionately in the
reserve community m o v e d t o s ome degree of active s tatus t o facilitate the early
mobilization s tages. I d o t hink if we can get m o r e o f w h a t I call a continuum of
service here, this issue whether it’s active or res erve is less important. If you have
people who are willing t o v olunteer for a stat us that on short notice — maybe like
hours — and t he Air Force does t his already t o s ome ex t ent, we may call you up in

o r d e r t o b e t he port embarkation t eam or the aerial point of departure — p o r t o f
departure — whatever the case might be. This question about whether you’re active
or reserve b ecomes m oot. It b ecomes m ore o f a technical q u e s tion, not something
that governs how you act ually serve t he United S tates.
DR. R OSTKER: I think you al so have to l ook at the t hreat and where we are t oday.
[ In] t h i s w a r , two weeks ago , t he press was concerned t hat t here wasn’t enough
combat po w e r i n Iraq. The radio on the way in [ t his m orning] was talking about
Baghdad falling. It ’s still the one heavy division and the o n e l i gh t d i v i sion — t he
101 st [ plus elements of t he 82nd] . That’s t wo divisions out of ten. I t hink the Army
is go ing t o h ave t o come t o grips with what kind of force s tructure is commensurate
with the t hreat , and, as you s uggest, t here are other missions that may t ake different
kinds of troops, but the all too easy ans w e r i s i n c rease end strength. There’s too
much to go on to before yo u can justify t hat, and unless t he budgets go up, there s till
is the implied capital-labor tradeoff and m ost of t he services would rat her s ee more
money for moderniz ation. The Navy, for ex ample, i s both retiring s hips and t he
replacement s hips for a smaller Navy will be manned at m uch l ower levels, s o I don’t
think, based upon the t raditional m etrics, one could u se that to argu e for an increase
QUESTION: Gentlemen, you’ve spoken at l engt h about the importance o f
identifyi ng, grooming, and t hen holding ont o DOD seni or ex ecut i v es. Int egral t o t hat
i s t h e d evel opm ent o f t hose s eni o r ex ecut i v es earl y i n t h ei r career and t hat w oul d b e
profes s i onal military educa tion. I’d like t o h ear your thoughts o n t ransforming
professional military education i n t erms of jointness, duration, developmental
opportunities. Thank you.
DR. R OSTKER: W ell, we have a s uperb system of professional military education.
My only concern i s t hat we don’t h ave reasonable p ayback periods for t hose who go
through it. I m ean we’ll s end s omebody to IC AF, get a great education, we ex pect
them to serve t wo more years i n t he military because we’re forcing h im out either by
incentives or by tenure. I t hink we do a s uperb job, but I t hink it’s t he payb ack that
concerns me, and that payb ack would b e ensured by a l onger c a r e e r structure. W e
don’t d o as well o n t he c i v ilian side. It was one of the initiatives of the last
administration t o h ave a m ore robust t raining p rogram, and it was an i nitiative o f t he
Deputy S ecretary [ of Defense] J ohn W h ite. T here wa s o n l y o ne service t hat
supported t hat. He pushed i t t hrough. Bu t t hat was the Navy, and t hat was when I
was Assistant S ecret ary of t he Navy. There is not an et h o s of releas e time for
trai ning and career planning in the civilian s ide of t he Defense Department as well
developed as t here is on the military side, and that ’s unfortunate.
DR. C HU: I would argue that one of the p roblems with our professional education
is that we are s till tryi ng to conduct i t i n a manner t hat i s b est s uited t o t he interwar
period, and b y t hat I do not mean Persian Gul f wars, but back to [ t he period between]
W o rl d W ar I and W o rl d W ar II. That i s t o say t hat t he offi cer m u st t ake a year out
of hi s o r h er career, m o v e t o a l o cat i o n w here t h e educat ors s i t , and recei ve
instruction, often i n a classroom m o d e . T here’s good benefits to that convening
function, but one problem is that, as a result, only a smal l f r a c t i o n o f t he force can

benefit from what t hose i nstitutions have to offer. I’m very i ntrigued with an
initiative t hat t he President of Naval War C ollege has gotten Adm i ral Clark t o
approve, which is instead of making the fleet come to him, which creat es al l t he
problems I’ve j ust d escribed, h e’s going to take his i nstruction t o t he fleet. In o ther
words, he’s going t o s end his educational t eam to San Diego and t hey’re going t o
conduct i n a different way — which will be more t h e w a y some of the continuing
educat i o n m ast er’s degree program s ar e run — a Naval W ar College course in San
Diego . W e ’ve l ong done this to some degree for t he reserve forces and it’s a very
interesting i ssue t o m e. If it’s good enough t o get a reserve officer — who was after
al l not serving full-time — up on t he step in terms of j oint procedures , why can’t we
think about similar p aradigms for active o fficers? We’re very eager to learn i n t his
regard from t he best practices in the civil sect or. W e’ve talked to firms like IBM —
how do they do it? I’m not sure we want to emulate all aspects o f t heir models. At
l east i n t he case o f one fi rm , I asked ex act l y t h e quest i o n Berni e’s rai sed b ecause t h i s
firm — it’s about the s iz e of t he Marine Corps i n its employment — essentially
requires s omet hing similar t o our requirements. When you become a m anager you
have to go through a one-year course of inst ruction. But t hey do i t almost entirel y by
distance learning. They h ave only one w eek in which t hey convene the group, which
in my mind i s t oo little. But I did as k how does t he individual find time for t his i n
his o r h er work day and the answer was not encouraging: It ’s your first m anagerial
challenge. That’s not t h e r i ght way t o d o it. So we need to find, I t hink, a middle
ground between the way at least t hose p riva te sector ex amples accomplish t his, and
the way that we’re doing it now, t hat again takes advantage o f m odern technology,
keeps t he best of what we have, but moves forward.
DR.ROSTKER: Wehaveasuperb system of voluntary education. Every b ase h as
a vol-ed office. Universities are aggressive in placi ng instruct ors at our bases and on
our ships. Yo u g o out with the fleet an d i nstructors are flown out for t wo or three
weeks and peopl e t ake courses w hi l e t h ey’re at sea. You can do t h at for a vari et y o f
civilian univer s i t i es. I think picking up on David’s point, I don’t s ee one of those
universities bei ng NDU or the W ar Colleges and that ’s the way you get your trai ning.
You get your education t hrough t he same kind of thing. So if yo u can do a m aster’s
because yo u t hi nk t h at ’s a box t h at has t o now be checked, and yo u can do t h at i n
releas e time in vol-ed, w h y c an’t you do your professional military education i n
substantially the sam e ways?
MR. GOLDICH: I think, though, that it’s imp o r t a n t t o understand that the v arious
t yp es o f d istance l earning which you have mentioned are of unquest i o n e d
applicability to perhaps the lower, maybe even t he intermediate as pect of professional
military education. When you s tart getting up i nto t he war colleges, the s enior
service colleges, and perhaps to a certain ex tent the middle l evel , i t i s t he interaction
among officers from d ifferent services an d o t h e r countries that is at least as
s i gn ificant as t he actual course work, which in many ways is really true of wh at
happens in ci vilian education t o o . A professor once s ai d t hat t he most important
things that happened t o him in college happened i n t he dorms, not in the classrooms,
and m ost o f t he m h a p p e n e d a fter midnigh t. A certain amount of the s ame t hing is
true at the s enior l evel, s o I think we n eed to b e v e r y c a r eful about tryi ng to put
s o m e thing which is very much study at a h igh l evel, and applyi ng a k i n d o f
mechanistic model t o i t t hat might work very well at something which is more based
just on facts.

DR. R OSTKER: The professional military system is still pre-Goldwater-N i ch ols
dominant. For all of your joint s chools, it’s still pretty stove-piped, and the odd naval
officer who finds himself at Fort Leavenworth, it doesn’t really get t he Navy to
understand how they need to suppo r t l a nd warfare, o r t he Army officer who finds
himself at t he Air University is not going t o s olve this air-ground i n t e gration
probl em . T here needs t o b e a l ot m o re ex change.
DR. KAPP: Okay, I think we have time for about two m ore questions, s o why don’t
I d o you, sir, and t hen follow u p with yo u and that will conclude our seminar.
QUESTION: As yo u gentlemen p robably know , t he federal government’s facing a
potential human capital crisis, with regard to the fact that by 2004 almost 50% of the
federal govern m e n t w i l l be eligible for retirem ent. With this in mind, the
government is implementing and ex panding programs such as pay-for-performance,
federal s tudent loan repaym ent p rograms. W h at incentives, i f any, d o you think t he
mi litary needs t o implement in order t o i ncreas e or m ai ntai n t he attractivenes s t o
candidates, while still maintaining t hat quality level of applicants to the military?
DR. C HU: You’re speaking t o t hose who app lied for uniformed services or are you
speaking of t he ci vil system?
QUES T ION: The uniformed services.
DR. C HU: The uniformed services . I think first of al l it’s critical that we keep our
complete compensation p ackage, taking into account allowance and fringe b enefits
competiti v e w ith what people of similar qualities could enjoy in ci vil occupations.
We are t aking as a guide t he results of the 9th Quadrennial Review of Military
Compens a t i o n as a way o f t hinking about how much is enough, the answer t o t he
classic question “How m uch i s enough? ” One has t o obviously think about not only
what people might enjoy t his year, but what they might enjoy i n future years. I t hink
increas ingl y we are concluding that the kind of people t hat we’d like t o attract will,
as Berni e remarks, I believe, l ook not just at the immediat e compensation t hey
receive but what their lifetime or at least t heir nex t five years o r s o compensation’s
go ing t o l ook like. W h at yo u t hink yo u can look forward t o. W h at are t he prospects
for m e i f I join this system? That’s one of the reasons, as you know from our proposal
to Congress, we tried t o get away from t his v iew t hat t here’s a s ingl e across-the-
board pay raise that’s the right answer for every grade i n your service cell o n t he pay
table every year. W e are increasingl y m oving to a philosophy, at l east i n t erms of the
ex ecutive b ranch p roposal, t hat we will target the p ay pot for military personnel
against t hose areas o f greatest n eeds, an d t his year as yo u know it’s t he mid-career
enl i s t ed force, cont i nui ng a t rend [ o f] t h e l ast s everal years.
It ’s n o t by the way, i nterestingl y enough, consistent with some of Bernie’s
observat i ons, E -1s, where we’re post i n g j ust a 2% i n crease for E-1s because — put
it this way, if yo u don’t m ove out of E-1 i n t he first s ix months or so, you’re probably
not the person we want t o ret ai n i n t he military service. That ’s a t raining period i n
which you’re earning that salary. It’s a trai ning stipend m ore t han anything else. We
think we’re very co mpetitive i n t hat ran ge, but we’re not as co mpetitive as we n eed
to be for t he E-5, the E-6, t he E-7, and l ooking forward and one of the reasons we’ve
been aggr es s i ve about E-8 and E-9 p ay as well is that’s what the ambitious E-5

should b e l ooking forward t o. That’s what I could b eco m e . T h a t ’ s what I want to
I do t hink that it’s t he whole lifestyle that counts i n t erms of military families.
The mili t a ry likes to observe that the ret ention deci sion is made at the dinner t able
and I’m increasingl y convinced that one of the d inner t able issues that we have to do
a l ot better on i n t he military i s t h e q u a lity of the public school system in
communities around major military bases. To speak plainly, it’s not often where it
should be. This is not, I should emphasiz e, n ecessarily an issue o f rural versus urban.
There are some urban areas with school systems t hat, when I v isit a military base, and
ask p eople, wh a t ’ s the s chool system like for your child, I do not get t he kind of
confi d ent , happy answers I’d l i k e t o h ear. I get s ort o f “W ell, it’s okay, sir,” o r t hey
make some polite remark to me and t hen m y military assistant i s t old t he truth on t he
si de t h at i t st i nks. T hat ’s not accept abl e. I t hi nk i t ’s one of t h e i ssues i n whi ch we’d
like t o h ave a s tronger conversation with the C o n g r e s s : h o w d o we u se ex isting
federal p rograms t o t ry to strengthen the s chooling opportunities for the children of
our military personnel? My instinct is that counts for many families v ery h eavily in
t h ei r d eci si on do yo u want t o m ake t hi s a career. I’l l j ust gi v e you one vi gn et t e as an
ex ample. There is a long waiting line for military family housing at Quantico, not
because the houses are h ighly d esirable but because for h istorical reasons we run a
school on base that Defense p ays for — not a business we want t o ex p and I should
emphasiz e — t hat your c h i l d ren can only go t o i f you live o n t hat b ase. So people
are standing in line t o get in.
DR. R OSTKER: But the real i t y is we may have t o reconsider the Title 6 and start
payi ng because of this. This i s an absolut ely critical question. It was s o b ad in Guam
that we took over t he Guam school system.
DR. C HU: If I m ay interrupt, I do really want to urge a fire break agai nst t he solution
being Defense takes i t over. That ’s not a good answer, but at the s am e time simply
handing out federal money without any performance standards because yo u h ave
federal employees in the region i s also not a good answer. W e n eed to get a more
performance-oriented culture developed h ere where we ex pect schools t o m eet these
kinds of standards. Sorry.
DR. R OSTKER: You’ve now found one point where David and I disagree. A couple
of very quick things that relate t o t h e Q R M C. When David and I s tarted in this
business, and I would own up to the fact that we signed into RAND t h e first day
together in 1970, so that’s how long we’ve b een at this shoulder t o s houlder. W h en
we first s tarted, t here were issues about compensation, and t he clas s i c economist
answer was t hat com pensat i o n w as t h ere t o at t ract and ret ai n p eopl e. Through s om e
ab s o l utely stellar work of colleagues of ours, the right answer today i s attract an d
retain and m otivate p eople b ecause we’ve come t o understand that it’s t he structure
of t h e p ay t abl e. That vi ew perm eat es t h e r ecom m endat i ons of t h e l ast Q R M C .
W h a t we have effectively done is make the p ay line m uch s teeper. Actual l y i t
doesn’t cost u s v e r y m u c h , b ecause t h ere’s not a l ot of peopl e at t he t op, but i t
becomes t he go al for everybody in both t heir pe rformance behavior and retention
behavior, it’s s omething they can strive fo r. So we get a lot o f return for those dollars
that we gi ve to the m ost s enior p eople. In creasingl y t he most senior people are those
who’ve gone through t he voluntary education p rogram and h ave b achelor’s degrees

and m as ter’s degrees and s ometimes m ore t han one master’s degree. The C hief Petty
Officer of the C oast Guard h as a P h.D. Now what other enlisted force has t hat k ind
The l argest challenge we have i n bringing people i nto t his military i s t h e f act
that so many of our high school graduates are go ing t o college. W e h ave not yet
learned how to recruit for the enlisted ranks people going to college, o r even p eople
who h ave not succeeded i n col l ege but are i n a com m uni t y col l ege or t h ey’ve
dropped out of college and t he like . T h e p a radigm t hat we recruit you out of high
school is only h alf t rue. If yo u l ook at the s tatistics, about half of the people we bring
in, we b ring in before age 1 9 o r l ower. T hat m eans t here is another h alf t hat’s b een
out in the j ob market , out in the college market and are coming t o us as s econd or
third j obs. S ometh i ng hasn’t worked out well for t hem and so we may not be the
employer of first choice but they see s om ething in us and w e h a v e t h e benefits of
seei ng t h ei r p erform ance. S o we have t o l earn how t o st ruct ure our ent ry p rogram s
not to the h igh s chool graduating s enior, but to another group of people. W e have a
gr a d e s tructure which i s l argely negl ected but I t hink offers great potential for t h e
future and t hat’s our warrant programs. If you said to me, “How am I going t o recruit
computer speci alists, s ys tems engi neers i nto t he service — k i d s who have t raining
in microsystem NT have a certification from a 2-year college. W hat do I offer t hem
today? ” A little bit of advancem ent on t he enlisted rank? I’d like t o see them granted
warrant commissions much like t he A r m y d o es with pilots, with helicopter pilots,
and recognize t here’s a whole range of technici ans i n t he ci vilian s ect or who m ay not
aspire to be Chiefs of Staff and would not n ecessarily be particularly good candidates
or have the s kills we’d like t o s ee in the commissioned ranks, but certainly have more
than we o ffer i n t he en listed ranks. I’d like t o s ee us have many more programs to
bring warrant officers i nto all of our services. Enough for me.
MR. GOLDICH: One small point that’s very related t o what Bernie s aid i s t hat over
the p ast 2 0 t o 2 5 years, in a s tupendous achievement that the C ongress has b een very
important in bringi ng about, f o r t he first time in American history and mayb e t he
history of any modern co u ntry’s military force, we’ve rai sed t he pay for our career
officer corps t o t he point where it’s n o l onger genteel poverty, where i n fact if yo u
get i nto t he field grade officers, you’re doing fai rl y wel l — v ery w el l i n s om e cases.
And it’s not only important to keep that , it’s equally important when you’re talking
about having done that; l et’s keep that, and move on to other aspects o f compensation
such as David was talking about. Things t hat might be more difficult to measure but
which are important in terms of what people l ook at in terms of lifes tyles.
DR. KAPP: Our l ast question for you, sir.
QUESTION: It s o n t he educational p rograms, like t he vol-ed. I wanted t o know, t o
what ex tent does DOD c o n s i d e r those p rograms a benefit v ersus s ome k ind o f
perform ance enhancem ent b ecause when som e of t h ese s ervi ce m em b ers get t h e
education, they become more competitive and therefore m ay tend t o leave for the
DR. R OSTKER: W e found ex a ctly the opposite. If we can meet their educational
aspi rat i ons, t hey’l l st ay i n servi ce. W e ge t b e t t er ret ent i on. W e get l ess d i s ci pl i n e
[ p robl em s] and fast er p rom o t i ons from s ervi ce m em b e r s who are act i v e i n t he

voluntary education p rogram, s o t hat t he rewards i ncrease b y s t ayi ng i n t h e s ervi ce
through p romotion, and t hey don’t feel that the only way I’ll get m y college degree
i s i f I l eave b ecause I can’t earn i t i n s ervi ce. S o i t ’s b ecom e a v ery i m port ant part
of our pro g r a m a n d t h e m yt h t hat i f we t rain them, t hey’ll leave t urns out to be
DR. C HU: Let m e j ust add, I agree with what Bernie has t o s a y on this point. I
should also add we’re not actually sayi ng keep everybody for 2 0 o r 3 0 years. So we
are d e l i g h t e d i f p e o p le want to stay five or ten years, and t hat m ay be part of the
community that you’re speaking t o with your question. That’s fine with us. It’s not,
as Bernie’s em phasizing, we do not see i t as a loss if people t ake t heir skills and go
to the civil sector. Among other t hings they m ay becom e a ci v i l servant o r cont ract
employee for t he Department of Defense.
DR . R OS TKER : W e w o u l d l i k e i t t o b e t hat w hen t hey d o l eave, t h ey not l eave
because we’ve put barriers i n t heir way t o s ucceed in the military. W e would like t o
have the s el ection of t he best wanting t o s tay and we being s el ective, instead of the
best wanting t o l eave and we only can take those who don’t h ave opportunities o n t he
outside. But the v o l u n tary education p ro gram s are real l y val u ed by t h e s ervi ces
b ecau se they have had positive ret urns to our discipline, to our retention, and o u r
DR. KAPP: W ell, that concludes our seminar and I would like t o t hank all o f you for
taking your time ou t o f yo ur busy days t o come here and to thank you for your
thought provoking question s . I b e l i e ve some of our panelists may h ave t o l eave
immediat el y, but I’ll certainly be staying i f you’d like t o ask me any questions or if
you’d like t o call m e l ater my ex tension i s 77609; and t hank yo u again for coming.