Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions
CRS Report for Congress
Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability
Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions
Updated March 30, 2004
Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability
Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions
One of the most crucial and difficult tasks in peacekeeping and related stability
operations is creating a secure and stable environment, both for the foreign
peacekeepers and for the indigenous population. During the past decade, the United
States and the international community have tried various approaches to providing
that security. Most of these approaches have included the use of United Nations
International Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL), whose forces are contributed on a case
by case basis by U.N. Member states. (While other countries usually contribute
police personnel from their own national forces, the United States contracts those it
contributes through a private corporation.) In a few cases, such as Afghanistan and
Iraq at this time, coalition and U.S. military forces, and not the United Nations, train
and work with indigenous police forces to provide security.
Despite continuing improvements over the past decade, the current system has
several drawbacks. UNCIVPOL has been unable to provide an adequate number of
well-trained policemen for individual operations and to deploy them rapidly. Their
police forces experience a lack of consistency in the type and levels of training and
a shortage of needed skills. Military forces, on the other hand, are usually not trained
to deal effectively with police situations. These deficiencies lead to three gaps that
impede the establishment of law and order, particularly those cases where not all
parties to the conflict are dedicated to peace or where criminal networks have taken
root. The first is the deployment gap, when international police are not available as
quickly as needed. The second is the enforcement gap, where those deployed lack
necessary skills, in particular combined military and policing “constabulary” skills,
as well as investigative and intelligence-gathering skills to deal with organized crime.
The third is the institution gap, where competent judicial and penal personnel are
needed to provide follow-up services to police work.
Policymakers have long recognized these problems. In February 2000, the
Clinton Administration sought to remedy them through Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) 71’s broad policy reforms and guidelines. Although it did not
allocate or request the necessary resources for effective implementation, the Bush
Administration is implementing some provisions. In August 2000, the U.N. Brahimi
Panel report proposed several remedies to improve the U.N. civilian police system,
as did another report by contributing nations. Some are being implemented.
Three pending bills would address policing and related capabilities for
peacekeeping and stability operations. H.R. 1414 would establish a rapidly
deployable U.N. civilian police corps. H.R. 2616 calls for NATO to establish a
security component to be used in post-conflict reconstruction environments and a
U.S. police reserve for use in international operations. S. 2127 provides for the
United States to develop a corps of rapidly deployable personnel, of which rule of
law personnel may be a part. Related options recommended by experts include
improving training, increasing international constabulary capabilities, and developing
a “stability force” to supplement police with judicial and prison personnel. This
report may be updated if warranted.
In troduction ......................................................1
Evolution of Roles and Functions.................................6
Problem Areas: System and Security Gaps..........................7
Current Systems and Reforms........................................9
United Nations Civilian Police System............................10
Perceived Problems, Proposed Reforms and Implementation.......11
U.S. Civilian Police Program....................................19
Perceived Problems, Proposed Reforms, and Implementation......21
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)......27
Options for Congress..............................................28
Legislative Proposals: Creating New and Upgrading Existing
H.R. 1414: Reform of U.N. Civilian Police System..............28
H.R. 2616: Improving U.S. and NATO Capabilities.............30
Relative Merits of Possible U.S. Reserve Models............31
Questions Regarding a NATO Constabulary Capability.......32
S. 2127: Strengthening Civilian Rule of Law and Other Capabilities.33
Other Options to Strengthen Current Capabilities and Address System
and Security Gaps ........................................33
Improve the Training and Professionalization of CivPol Personnel..33
Increase International Capability for Constabulary Forces.........34
Develop a “U.S. Force for Stability”..........................35
Appendix A: Policing in Selected U.N. Peacekeeping and Related Operations:
Appendix B: Historical Background..................................44
Early International and Cold War U.N. Police Operations.............44
Post-Cold War Evolution of International Police Assistance...........44
1989-Early 1992 and Recognition of Deployment and
Police Reform and Training Components Added: 1992-1994,
and Recognition of Enforcement Gap.....................46
Enforcement and Institutional Gaps in Somalia and Haiti......49
Covering the “Enforcement Gap” in Bosnia: the creation of
Special Constabulary Units in Bosnia, 1995-1999...........51
Mandates Granting Executive Authority: Kosovo and East Timor,
The author wishes to express her appreciation for research and editorial
assistance in preparing this report that was provided through the CRS Foreign
Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division’s Research Associate program.
Policing in Peacekeeping and Related
Stability Operations: Problems and
After over a decade of intensive experience with multifaceted peacekeeping and
peacebuilding operations,1 many analysts have concluded that establishing a secure
and stable environment is one essential element for achieving a sustainable peace. As
continued instability in Iraq and Afghanistan impedes the restoration of normal lives
for those countries’ inhabitants, and as Haiti exhibits renewed instability, some
Members of Congress are examining with renewed interest available tools to provide
effective security. While military forces are considered indispensable for establishing
initial security and often are also used to maintain law and order in peacekeeping and
related “stability” or “stabilization” operations designed to normalize conditions in
post-conflict and post-intervention environments, their use is often controversial.2
Over the past decade, international civilian police (known as “CivPol”) have become
increasingly recognized as generally more suited than military forces for most law
and order tasks, and their use has increased dramatically. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, in its March 2004 Report 108-248 accompanying the FY2005
foreign relations authorization bill (S. 2144), stated that it recognizes “the importance
of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, including its capability to deploy
1 “‘Peacekeeping’ is a broad, generic, and often imprecise term to describe the many
activities that the United Nations and other international organizations, and sometimes ad
hoc coalitions of nations or individual nations, undertake to promote, maintain, enforce, or
enhance the possibilities for peace. These activities range from providing election
observers, recreating police or civil defense forces for the new governments of those
countries, organizing and providing security for humanitarian relief efforts, and monitoring
and enforcing cease-fires and other arrangements designed to separate parties recently in
conflict. (CRS Issue Brief B94040, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues
of U.S. Military Involvement. p 2.) As used here, the term encompasses both “peace
enforcement” operations, sent to enforce an international mandate to establish peace, and
“peacebuilding” activities. Peacebuilding activities, usually undertaken in a post-conflict
environment, are designed to strengthen peace and prevent the resumption or spread of
conflict, including disarmament and demobilization of warring parties, repatriation of
refugees, reform and strengthening of government institutions, election-monitoring, and
promotion of political participation and human rights. “Stability” or “stabilization”
operations are terms that have come to be used recently, as they encompass peace operations
as well as post-intervention activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.
2 For general information on the use of U.S. military personnel in peacekeeping operations,
see CRS Issue Brief IB94040, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of
U.S. Military Involvement.
civil police forces, in promoting stability in post-conflict situations.”3 Policymakers
have recognized problems with their use and made efforts to deal with them.
Among the current issues for Congress are whether to provide for continued
improvements to the existing system and whether to build new U.S. and international
CivPol capabilities. CivPol advocates have advanced proposals to (1) facilitate the
recruitment and rapid deployment of adequate numbers of qualified police and
related law enforcement personnel to complex post-conflict missions, and (2) ensure
that such missions include personnel with the appropriate training and skills to
handle a range of law enforcement situations. These proposals encompass provisions
that would stress continued implementation of U.S. and U.N. reform efforts, as well
as provisions that would reform the existing system.
Most important among the reform efforts were two key documents that
recommended mechanisms to improve existing CivPol systems and approaches for
providing and using CivPol forces. One was the Clinton Administration’s February
2000 Presidential Decision Directive 71 (PDD-71), which specifically dealt with the
law enforcement aspects of peacekeeping operations.4 While its provisions were left
largely unimplemented by the Clinton Administration,5 the directive remains in effect
under the Bush Administration, which has begun implementing some measures. The
other was the United Nations’ August 2000 “Brahimi Panel” report,6 which dealt
with problems of U.N. peacekeeping operations in general, but also contained four
specific recommendations to address problems with the U.N. civilian police system,
particularly in the areas of recruitment, training, and deployment of international
civilian police personnel. The United Nations has begun implementing some of the
3 U.S. Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year, 2005, report
to accompany S. 2144. March 18, 2004. 108th Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 108-248
(Washington: GPO, 2003) p 15.
4 U.S. Text: The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations. February 24,
2000 [http:// www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-4.htm], hereafter referred to as PDD-71
White Paper; and U.S. Text: Summary of Presidential Decision Directive 71,
[http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-1.htm], hereafter referred to as Summary of
5 Many analysts asserted that implementation under the Clinton Administration was
impeded by insufficient political will, including ineffective interagency cooperation and the
lack of statutory authority and funding mechanism. See: William Lewis, Edward Marks,
and Robert Perito. Enhancing International Civilian Police in Peace Operations, Special
Report, United States Institute of Peace, April 22, 2002.
6 On March 7, 2000, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan convened the Panel on United
Nations Peace Operations under the chairmanship of Lakhdar Brahimi, commonly known
as the Brahimi Panel, to review the United Nations system for peacekeeping operations and
to make recommendations to enhance its capability and response capacity in conducting
future peacekeeping operations. The report was published as letters from the Secretary-
General to the General Assembly and the Security Council. United Nations, General
Assembly and Security Council, “Comprehensive review of the whole question of
peacekeeping operations in all their aspects,” identical letters dated 21 August 2000 from
the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the
Security Council, Fifty-fifth session, A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000. This
document henceforth will be referred to as the Brahimi Panel report.
Brahimi Panel recommendations and other proposed reforms, while others remain
Among the proposals recommended by advocates are: (1) the creation of a
reserve CivPol force, as could be contemplated under H.R. 1414 for the U.N. and as
proposed for the United States under H.R. 2616; (2) the diversification of
international police forces as currently constituted, including the establishment of
units of police with military skills (i.e., “constabulary forces”) to handle hostile
situations such as crowd control (as is suggested for NATO under H.R. 2616; and (3)
the creation of more robust civilian response mechanisms, as contemplated by S.
judges, prosecutors, and penal experts, in addition to CivPols, to create viable law
enforcement systems. An important consideration to many policymakers is whether
recommendations for improving the CivPol mechanisms could reduce reliance on
U.S. military forces in post-conflict operations or shorten the length of their
deployments to such operations.
This report will provide a brief synopsis of the evolution of the uses of
international police in peacekeeping operations, with a description of the problems
encountered. (Appendix A provides a synopsis, in chart form, of many of these
operations. Appendix B discusses in more detail the gradual expansion of policing
in U.N. and U.S.-led operations during the 1990s.) This report will then discuss the
current U.N., U.S., and European mechanisms for providing CivPols to international
operations, recommendations for improving those systems, and the status of their
implementation. It will then assess the various approaches that are recommended to
resolve continuing problems and provide options for the U.S. Congress for continued
improvements to the system. This report may be updated if warranted.
ASFAuxiliary Security Force in Somalia
CivPol International Civilian Police
CPDU.N. Civilian Police Division
HNPHaitian National Police
ICITAPU.S. Dept. of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative
Training Assistance Program
IFORNATO’s Implementation Force in Bosnia-Hercegovina
INLU.S. State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs
IPMInternational Police Monitoring Force, MFN police component
IPTFInternational Police Task Force in Bosnia
KFORNATO’s Kosovo Force
MNFMultilateral Force (in Haiti)
NATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization
ONUMOZU.N. Operation in Mozambique
ONUSALU.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador
OSCEOrganization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDD-71 Presidential Decision Directive 71
REACTOSCE Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams
SATU.N. Selection Assistance Teams
SFORNATO’s Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Hercegovina
UNAMIRU.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNCIVPOLU.N. International Civilian Police
UNCPCProposed U.N. Civilian Police Corps
UNDPU.N. Development Program
UNDPKOU.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNFICYPU.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNITAFUnited Task Force (U.S.-led ad hoc multilateral coalition in
UNLBU.N. Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy
UNMIHU.N. Mission in Haiti
UNMIBHU.N. Mission in Bosnia and Hercegovina
UNMIKU.N. Mission in Kosovo
UNPROFORU.N. Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia
UNSAS U.N. System of Standby Arrangements
UNTACU.N. Transition Administration in Cambodia
UNTAGU.N. Transition Assistance Group in Namibia
UNTAETU.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor
Note: This is a list of acronyms used two or more times in the text. Acronyms used only once are not
The international community has increasingly turned to CivPols to perform a
variety of functions in international peace operations. Between 1994 and 2000, the
number of international civilian police participating in U.N. operations
(UNCIVPOLs) increased fourfold. Despite a drop from that peak, the number of
currently deployed UNCIVPOLs is twice what it was nearly ten years ago.7 As of
February 29, 2004, 4,655 international civilian police, including 476 Americans,
were assisting with law enforcement tasks in the eight U.N. peacekeeping missions
with UNCIVPOL components. In addition, several nations, including the United
States, continue to provide bilateral assistance, especially training, to indigenous
police forces in a variety of post-conflict situations. Some analysts urge the eventual
deployment of sizable contingents of international civilian police to Afghanistan
(where the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom are now working to
recreate an indigenous police force) to Iraq (where the United States and Jordan are
doing the same), and to Haiti. As of February 29, 2004, five UNCIVPOL were
deployed to Afghanistan.
All U.S. assistance for law enforcement entities abroad is carried out within the
context of Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA),
adopted in 1975. Except for specific exempted cases, Section 660 prohibits aid to
train, advise, or provide financial support for police, prisons, or other law
enforcement forces of any foreign government, or for programs of internal
intelligence or surveillance on behalf of a foreign government. Among the
exceptions to Section 660 is one that states that it does not apply to assistance in8
post-conflict situations. Such assistance is provided, and the details regarding it are
worked out, on a case-by-case basis, as there is no specific statutory authority to9
regulate and fund such assistance.
7 Some analysts also note that the relative proportions of U.N. military peacekeeping
personnel and the numbers of UNCIVPOLs involved in U.N. operations have shifted. This
is due not only to the increase in UNCIVPOLs, but also, in large part, to the assumption by
NATO and ad hoc coalitions of the military aspects of peacekeeping operations. The
number of U.N. military peacekeepers peaked in September 1994, when 75,947 troops and
military observers were deployed in 16 U.N. operations, and 2,017 UNCIVPOLs were
deployed to those operations. In November 2000, the number of UNCIVPOLs peaked at
7,800, while the number of U.N. troops and military observers had declined to 30,601 in 15
operations. The number remained above 7,000 for nearly two years, from July 31, 2000
through June 30, 2002. As of February 29, 2004, there were 4,655 UNCIVPOL in eight of
the 15 U.N. peacekeeping operations, which had a total of 44,590 military troops and
8 Specifically, Section 660(b)(6) exempts assistance provided “to reconstitute civilian police
authority and capability in the post-conflict restoration of host nation infrastructure for the
purposes of supporting a nation emerging from instability, and the provision of professional
public safety training, to include training in internationally recognized standards of human
rights, the rule of law, anti-corruption, and the promotion of civilian police roles that support
9 Some analysts argue that despite the exception for post-conflict situations, the existence
Evolution of Roles and Functions
International civilian police forces have been used for a variety of purposes and
in many situations since at least the late 19th century. [See Appendices A and B.]
Since then, police forces with recruits from one to many nations have been used to
monitor and supervise local forces, conduct joint patrols with them, train and advise
them, and assist with their restructuring and reformation, including identifying and
expelling undesirable members. (The acronym SMART has been used to summarize
these functions, i.e.: Support for human rights, Monitoring, Advising, Reporting, and
Training.)10 Sometimes — particularly recently — the international forces have been
armed and granted arrest powers (referred to jointly as “executive authority”);
usually, they are not.11
During the past decade, policing in peacekeeping and related operations has
evolved through what might be described as five approximate phases of increasing
scope and complexity, aimed at establishing security. These phases have been
roughly, but not entirely, sequential and have tended to build on previous
experiences. (As analysts have noted, however, operations need not necessarily be
modeled after the latest operations.) The first two phases of this evolution involved
the expansion of U.N. activities and/or mandates from (1) monitoring mandates,
of a general prohibition on police assistance, and the lack of a specific funding authority,
discourages its provision and impedes its delivery. (There are various more general
authorities under which assistance to foreign police forces can be provided.) One recent
policy analysis of post-conflict needs argues that Congress should replace Section 660 “with
new legislation outlining available authorities....The replacement act should maintain
appropriate conditions on funding to protect human rights objectives and ensure
accountability, while rationalizing and consolidating the numerous amendments and
simplifying the mechanisms for applying resources to legitimate requirements.” Play to
Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the U.S. Army
(AUSA). January 2003.
10 Annika S. Hansen. From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations.
Adelphi Paper 343. Oxford, UK: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002.
p 22. (Hereafter referred to as From Congo to Kosovo.) Another source has a lengthier
read-out for the SMART acronym: “Supporting human rights, humanitarian assistance;
Monitoring the performance of the local LEA [Law Enforcement Authorities], prisons,
courts and implementing agreements; Advising the local police on humane effective law
enforcement, according to the international standards, laid down in the instruments
(conventions, covenants, and treaties on human rights); Reporting on situations and
incidents; Training the local law enforcement, in the best practice for Policing and human
rights.” Halvor Hartz, “Civpol: The UN Instrument for Police Reform,” in International
Peacekeeping, Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 1999, p 31. Hartz cites “A Trainers Guide on Human
Rights for CIVPOL Monitors,” a booklet published in 1995 by the Centre for Human Rights
and the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Training Unit as his source.
11 “Monitoring” functions, as described by one analyst in the context of monitoring
operations in Namibia, consist of three tasks: “accompanying local police in performing
their duties; receiving and investigating public complaints about the police; and supervising
investigations conducted by local police.” From Congo to Kosovo, op. cit., p 17.
which have been a constant of virtually all operations, through (2) the addition of
training components, beginning in a small, ad hoc manner in Cambodia, intensified
in El Salvador as part of the police reform effort, and made an important part of U.S.-
led and subsequent U.N. peacekeeping efforts in Somalia and Haiti, and (3) the
development of mandates that include substantial reform and restructuring of
existing police institutions or the creation of new institutions, as in Somalia and Haiti
and later operations. Two subsequent phases were (4) the addition of specially
constituted constabulary units, designed specifically to operate as such in hostile
situations, beginning with Bosnia, and (5) in the operations in East Timor and
Kosovo, the expansion of mandates to provide international police with “executive
authority” to bear arms and make arrests.12 (See Appendix A for a list of
UNCIVPOL and other police operations since 1989, and information on their
responsibilities and the number of police authorized and/or deployed on these
missions, and Appendix B for a narrative account of the evolution of CivPol
mandates and activities.)
This evolution reflected the international community’s growing awareness of
the broad range of security needs, and types of assistance required by indigenous
police forces in peace operations. Also, as the scope of international interventions
has broadened, policymakers and analysts have increasingly viewed ensuring public
security as the responsibility of the countries and organizations which have
intervened (to be provided jointly, where possible, with indigenous personnel). At
the same time, policymakers and analysts recognized several important problems.
These problems concerned the need for the adoption of clear and feasible mandates
(which is outside the scope of this paper) and the development of standards and
procedures for smooth and effective implementation.
Problem Areas: System and Security Gaps
As policymakers and analysts have grappled with improving the mechanisms
for implementing peacekeeping mandates, they have identified two problem areas,
or sets of “gaps,” which must be addressed in order to ensure public security. These
gaps are of concern to U.S. policymakers and are the subject of recent legislative
The first problem area might be labeled a system gap. This concerns what many
analysts perceive as a deficiency in the recruitment and training mechanisms of
12 The grant of executive authority to international police and military forces is highly
controversial, and there is considerable international debate over the utility and the wisdom
of granting CivPols such authority. PDD-71 mandated a conservative approach towards
conveying such authority to foreign forces, stating that in most cases indigenous police
forces should retain responsibility for local law enforcement, with exceptions made in cases
where indigenous police are unable to control local crimes. PDD-71 White Paper, op. cit.,
13 Other proposals, which are more operational in nature and will not be discussed at any
length here, are the need for more advance planning and procurement of resources, and the
need for the development of guidelines for the conduct of police and mechanisms to ensure
current systems. The problem is considered particularly acute for the United Nations,
which recruits volunteers from a wide variety of countries with different police
standards and policing practices. Because of this diverse pool, the United Nations
has for years encountered difficulties in recruiting an adequate number of well-
trained and professional policemen who can work together effectively. Besides a
large number who lack basic skills — including the ability to drive — and required
language capabilities, some of the early recruits (including both American and
foreign) allegedly engaged in corruption.14 Over the past decade, the United Nations
has adopted procedures to weed out obvious misfits. But, as missions have become
more complex and demanding, problems remain in recruiting personnel with all
needed skills. In addition, many analysts argue that additional training is required (1)
to improve and instill a common set of “generic” policing skills necessary for all
policing missions and a uniform standard of professionalism, and (2) to enhance their
ability to work together.
The second problem area is the presence of three security gaps in the ability of
the international community to establish law and order in peacekeeping and other
post-conflict situations.15 (Deficiencies in recruitment and training systems can
contribute to the first two of these gaps.) These gaps can be particularly troublesome
in situations where not all parties to the conflict are dedicated to peace or where
criminal networks have taken root, and where local authority has been removed or
replaced by an international intervention.
!The first of these security gaps is the deployment gap, or the failure
or inability to deploy police forces as quickly as needed, or in
adequate numbers to perform the mission assigned to them. This
was noted in the U.S. unilateral intervention in Panama in 1989, and
subsequently in some of the earliest international missions of the
1990s, for example in Cambodia. There, the UNCIVPOL mission
could not perform some of its mandated tasks because it took several
months to deploy CivPol components and some 10 months for the
mission to reach its authorized size. In Somalia, it took nearly a full
year to deploy the first dozen UNCIVPOL. In other cases, such as
Bosnia in the mid-1990s, the United Nations was able to recruit
only about half of the number authorized for the mission. Although
deployment time apparently has been somewhat reduced as missions
have become more complex, it still is not considered optimal. In
addition, a gap remains in the U.N.’s ability to deploy a sufficient
number of people with specialized skills.
14 See for example Andrew Higgins. As It Wields Power Abroad, U.S. Outsources Law and
Order Work. Wall Street Journal. February 2, 2004, pp A1, A12.
15 The terminology used in this paper regarding the three security “gaps” involved in
peacekeeping operations, the deployment gap, the law enforcement gap, and the institution
gap, is that of Oakley, et al., in Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M.
Goldberg, eds., Policing The New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Safety,
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998, hereafter referred to as
Policing the New World Disorder), pp. 11-13. Other analysts use other terms (in particular
the term “security gap”) for one or more of these gaps.
!The second is the enforcement gap, or the inability of deployed
police forces to assure the level of security needed to provide the
necessary climate to conduct normal policing operations. In these
cases, the police deployed often lack the necessary skills to handle
the situation, in particular the military skills needed to carry out
constabulary functions in hostile situations, and investigative and
intelligence-gathering skills to deal with organized crime. When
military forces have not been available to assist police in handling
hostile situations, either because they were in short supply (as
occurred in Somalia in 1993-1995) or because their mandate did not
include law enforcement functions (as in Bosnia in 1996),
peacekeeping operations have been compromised.
!The third is the institution gap, where the indigenous law
enforcement system lacks adequate numbers of honest and efficient
judicial and penal personnel, as well as sound judicial and penal
institutions, and thus are unable to effectively follow-up to police
work with prosecution and punishment necessary for sustainable
security. In many post-conflict situations, understaffed (if not
partially intimidated or corrupted) judiciaries and penal systems,
lacking even basic resources, have not been able to handle
effectively the increased workload that results from more efficient
Current Systems and Reforms
Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has provided
international police assistance through multilateral and unilateral mechanisms. The
United Nations has been the principal actor in international police operations, but
the European countries and regional organizations and the United States have also
played important roles.
The United Nations international civilian police system is currently the
mechanism through which much international civilian police assistance is provided
in multilateral operations. As of February 29, 2004, some 4,655 UNCIVPOL officers16
from 65 nations were serving in eight U.N. missions. About a fifth of those
countries (13) provide about two-thirds of those officers. The largest contributor is
Jordan (553) and the second largest is the United States (476). Other countries
contributing over 100 officers are: India (347), Germany (259), Turkey (194), the
Ukraine (192), Nepal (182), Malaysia (178), Romania (176), Pakistan (172),
Argentina (146), Poland (127), and the United Kingdom (126). Over 75% of those
UNCIVPOL (3,508) were serving in Kosovo, the largest UNCIVPOL mission by far,
as of February 29, 2004. Other missions are in Liberia (518), East Timor (303),
16 For updates and more detailed information, see
[http://www.un.org/ Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/index.htm] .
Sierra Leone (142), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (115), Cyprus (47),
Georgia (10), and Afghanistan (5).
Many nations have also provided training and reform assistance on an individual
basis, often within the context of multilateral efforts. During the early to mid-1990s,
the United States provided police assistance in two U.S. peacekeeping operations in
Somalia and Haiti, carried out under U.N. authority. The United States also took the
lead in developing police training programs in Somalia through the Justice
Department’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
(ICITAP), which continues to provide direct training and reform assistance. (For
more information, see Appendix B.) Many European Union (EU) member states
have contributed police assistance on an individual basis, including the United
Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Netherlands, France, Spain, and Italy.
Increasingly over the past decade, the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE), and more recently the European Union (EU) have taken the lead
in specific missions, often as an adjunct or follow-up to U.N. missions. For instance,
while the United Nations has had responsibility for the overall police mission in
Kosovo, the OSCE has provided CivPols to establish the new police academy and
train the members of the new police force there. The OSCE also has missions which
provide training assistance and support for building local police capacity in seven
other countries. In January 2003, the EU assumed responsibility from the United
Nations for the police mission in Bosnia. On December 15, 2003, the EU launched
its second police mission, the 200-strong PROXIMA mission in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia.
United Nations Civilian Police System
Background. U.N. Member States contribute police personnel on a voluntary
basis, following a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing a
peacekeeping operation.17 Most Member States have national police forces and their18
contributions consist of individual police officers or “formed” police units recruited
from their national forces. The U.N. philosophy of CivPol is based on international
standards for democratic community policing and human rights. The Charter-driven
principles of peacekeeping governing civilian police include: consent and
17 The Secretary-General makes recommendations on the modalities of the operation and
submits reports to the Security Council on the progress of the mission. Member States
usually finance U.N.-conducted peacekeeping operations through assessed contributions.
The U.S. Congress provides for the U.S. assessed contributions to nearly all U.N.
peacekeeping operations through the Department of State authorization and appropriation
bills, under the Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) section of the
international Organizations and Conferences account. CIPA funds are used to pay the U.S.
obligations for the special assessed accounts that the U.N. General Assembly establishes for
most peacekeeping operations. (For more information, see CRS Issue Brief IB90103, United
Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by Marjorie Ann Browne, updated regularly.)
18 “Formed” police units are those personnel deployed as whole or nearly-whole units with
their own equipment and other provisions. Often, formed police units consist of
constabulary forces, which are usually referred to as “specialized national contingents.”
cooperation of the local parties, impartiality, and minimal use of force (strictly in
self-defense), among others.19
Within the U.N. Headquarters, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(UNDPKO) provides political and executive direction, under the overall mandate or
charge of the U.N. Security Council, to all components of the operation in the field,
including the police mission.20 Within the UNDPKO, the Civilian Police Division
(CPD) provides for the policy and planning of civilian policing activities and for the
management of that aspect of the mission. Its responsibilities include oversight,
assistance to contributing Member States with their recruitment and selection of
CivPol personnel, and administration of the deployment and rotation cycles for all
international civilian police officers. Training-related activities are handled by the
UNDPKO training unit, however, as the CPD does not have a budget line for
training. In the field, UNCIVPOL personnel are under the command of the
UNCIVPOL Police Commissioner, who reports to the U.N. Secretary-General’s
Perceived Problems, Proposed Reforms and Implementation. The
Brahimi Panel report is the document widely cited as the authoritative analysis of the
many problems in the U.N. peacekeeping system and as the blueprint for
peacekeeping reform. Among its many topics, the report identified difficulties with
the recruitment and training of adequate police personnel, and impediments to their
deployment. It recommended four actions to strengthen the U.N.’s capacity to
rapidly deploy UNCIVPOLs and to conduct effective police missions. Two of these
concerned recruitment: (1) the establishment by each police-contributing Member
State of a “ready roster” of rapidly deployable, qualified CivPols; and (2) the
development by the United Nations of an on-call list of experts for advance mission
planning. A third involved training: the development of regional partnerships for
joint police training. The last — the identification of a national point of contact on
CivPol matters in each country — was procedural.21
In addition, between March 1998 and mid-August 2000, the UNDPKO held
three conferences with police-contributing nations to review U.N. policing operations
in order to identify problems with the U.N. system and to propose solutions. As a
result of these meetings, donor countries reached near consensus on proposals to
address problems with recruitment, training, deployment, and related problems.22
19 For more information on these principles, see: CRS Report 90-96 F, United Nations
Peacekeeping: Historical Overview and Current Issues, by Marjorie Ann Browne, January
20 Generally, this has included planning and support of the operations, as well as guidance
on policy and operational issues. UNDPKO coordinates with a number of U.N. departments
and offices, including Political Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs, Administration and
Management, Public Information, and the Office of Legal Affairs.
21 Brahimi Panel Report. op. cit., p 21.
22 UNDPKO convened these seminars in March 1998, July 1999 and August 2000. They
dealt with recruitment, training, deployment, logistics, and overall policy issues. For more
information, see: United Nations Secretariat, Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
There was some overlap between the Brahimi Panel recommendations and the
UNDPKO seminar proposals, as the UNDPKO proposals also called for the
incorporation of CivPol personnel under the U.N. standby arrangement system
created for military personnel, as well as measures to improve training. The
UNDPKO seminar recommendations also made a specific proposal for pre-
positioning of equipment in order to facilitate rapid deployment. Three other
UNDPKO recommendations concerned procedural and organizational impediments
to efficient operations.
Some of the Brahimi panel and UNDPKO seminar recommendations have been
implemented, although many analysts judge that significant problems remain with
the UNCIVPOL system. The following sections on recruitment, training, and
deployment discuss (1) the perceived problems in these areas, (2) the three Brahimi
and the three UNDPKO seminar reforms that were recommended to remedy
recruitment, training, and deployment problems, and (3) the status of reform
implementation. These sections also discuss constraints on UNCIVPOL reform in
Since the Brahimi Panel report was issued, some analysts find that the U.N. has
made progress in other areas. One of these is the reform of the operational, technical,
and internal management of UNDPKO, which was the subject of a Brahimi and of
UNDPKO seminar recommendations.23 These topics are outside the scope of this
The Brahimi Panel’s specific recommendations were based on a recognition that
the increasingly broad and complex UNCIVPOL operations, targeted at reforming
and restructuring local police, called for a new approach. This new approach
required more qualified and better trained law enforcement personnel working in
tandem with other rule of law professionals. The Brahimi Panel report defined this
new approach as a “doctrinal shift,” emphasizing reform and restructuring instead
of monitoring, advising, and training activities. Further, this doctrinal shift required
that the law enforcement personnel integrate their activities with those of rule of law
Report of the Seminar on the Role of Police in Peacekeeping Operations, New York, March
20-21, 1998; United Nations Secretariat, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Report
of the Follow-up Workshop on Civilian Police in United Nations Peacekeeping, New York,
July 29-30, 1999. Also see: Perito, Robert, The American Experience With Police In Peace
Operations, The Canadian Peacekeeping Press of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre: Canada,
2002, pp 94-96. References to the UNDPKO seminar recommendations are taken from
Perito, p 95.
23 There was one Brahimi and several UNDKPO seminar recommendations in this area. For
instance, one UNDPKO seminar recommendation called for an organizational change within
the CivPol office of the UNDPKO, proposing that the United Nations augment the small
group of six officers there who were responsible for supporting all UNCIVPOL missions.
Since that recommendation, according to the UNDPKO CivPol office, the number has been
increased gradually to 24, 20 of whom are professional staff, and four of whom are
experts (judicial, penal and human rights specialists) in order to strengthen all rule
of law institutions.24
The Brahimi Panel itself recognized that such a shift might stress U.N. Member
States by requiring them “to provide even more well-trained and specialized police
experts, at a time when they already face difficulties meeting current
requirements.”25 Further, some analysts see various problems with implementing this
approach. For one, it is controversial within the U.N. CivPol system, where the
UNDPKO and CPD perspective seems to be that the primary role and function of
UNCIVPOL personnel is building local police services capacity, according to some
experts. The reasoning undergirding this viewpoint is that broad and intrusive
undertakings would infringe on Member States’ perceptions of the inviolability of
national sovereignty and the principal of non-interference and, in any event, would
prove unfeasible because of limited personnel, material, and financial resources.
Nevertheless, the United Nations has taken steps towards greater use of a full
range of rule of law experts in peacekeeping operations by creating a new rule of law
unit. Still, a recent report of the Henry L. Stimson Center views progress towards
integrating rule of law-related components as “lagging” as the UNDPKO received
only two of the six posts it requested for planning rule of law operations, leaving it
“nearly as hard-pressed” to deploy a mission “with a substantial criminal justice
component (police, prosecutors, judges, corrections)...as it was three years ago.”26
(For further discussion on the use of such experts, see the option on the development
of a U.S. “stability force,” below.)
Recruitment. The current ad hoc system of recruiting civilian police from
a wide range of U.N. Member nations results in three problems, the first two of
which are the subject of specific reforms proposed by the Brahimi Panel report and
the UNDPKO seminar. First, the United Nations still experiences uneven results in
recruiting police who can meet minimum standards and who, in many cases, lack
experience with community policing and international human rights standards, even
though efforts to improve the overall quality reportedly have had some success.27 In
addition, as UNCIVPOL roles have expanded, the United Nations has experienced
significant difficulties in recruiting police officers with specialized skills. A third
problem is the absence of a comprehensive U.N. civilian police strategy, including
a methodology for determining mission needs, which has made it difficult to
determine the appropriate authorized strength and necessary skills for a mission,
24 Brahimi Panel Report, op. cit., p 20.
26 William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, and Moira K. Shanahan. The
Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations. Washington, D.C.: The Stimson
Center, December 2003, p 106.
27 According to one former deputy commissioner of the U.N. Bosnia police mission, there
were periods during his 14-month tenure that 10-15 percent of the police officers sent to the
mission did not meet the basic criteria. J. Michael Stiers, in testimony. Civilian Police and
Police Training in Post-Conflict OSCE Areas. Hearing before the Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe. [CSCE 107-1-4] September 5, 2001, p 46.
according to some analysts.28 This in turn, they argue, complicates the process of
recruiting an adequate number of suitable civilian police personnel with skills
appropriate for mission requirements.
Despite increasingly complex mandates and responsibilities for UNCIVPOL
missions, the United Nations only requires Member States to provide officers who
meet basic criteria, excluding other mission-specific requirements.29 Currently, the
criteria for civilian police include (1) a minium age of at least 25, (2) five years of
service in a national police force with community policing experience, (3)
proficiency in one of the official U.N. languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French,
Russian or Spanish), (4) possession of a driver’s license, (5) ability to operate a four-
wheel drive vehicle, and (6) meeting medical standards. Executive authority
missions require police officers with firearms experience. Pre-selection testing and
induction training in contributing countries are encouraged but not mandatory.
Many analysts assert that some civilian police personnel still do not meet the
basic selection criteria, especially language, driving, and firearms skills, despite U.N.
efforts to improve the quality of recruits. Since 1996, the United Nations has sent
Selection Assistance Teams (SATs) to provide guidance to Member States in
selecting police candidates. The SATs and induction tests conducted in the field have
focused on the basic language, driving, and firearms requirements which are
necessary for all monitoring missions.30 Some retraining and retesting of basic
requirements continue in the mission upon arrival. (In the U.N. Mission in Bosnia-
Hercegovina, retesting reportedly accounted for “approximately one quarter of the
28 In determining such requirements, UNDPKO does undertake on-the-ground assessments
of such factors as the character of the local population, the ratio of indigenous police to the
local population, local crime statistics and the causes of criminality.
29 Criteria verified as current as of March 19, 2004. Additional desired, but not essential,
competencies include knowledge of (1) Member State laws and penal systems; (2) Member
State constitution and legal authorities; (3) basic crime scene skills; (4) communications
equipment and radio procedure; (5) firearms use; (6) basic policing skills, including foot
patrols, vehicle patrols, domestic intervention, traffic control, accident site reporting, map-
reading, and report writing and interviewing skills; (7) basic negotiation and conflict
resolution skills; (8) problem-solving strategies; (9) basic first aid and stress management;
and (10) other official U.N. languages. The United Nations also prefers recruits with
previous UNCIVPOL mission experience and seeks to have 10% female participation in
national contingents. For more information, see United Nations, Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, Selection Standards and Training Guidelines for UNCIVPOL,
First Draft, May 1997.
30 Ibid. p12.
total induction period.”31) Until recently, these deficiencies resulted in high
repatriation costs as well as lags in deployment.32
Recruitment for specialized skills has been even more difficult, according to
many analysts. UNDPKO reportedly has had better success recruiting for general
skills than in recruiting in advance for specialists in areas such as training,
investigations, organized crime, forensics, drug trafficking, and police intelligence.
Specialists have often been recruited from within the missions after UNCIVPOL
personnel have arrived.
Three of the Brahimi Panel and the UNDPKO seminar recommendations
concerned the advance recruitment of personnel (i.e., before a mission is authorized)
in order to improve the quality of recruits and also to speed deployment. Although
analysts consider activities in the pre-deployment stage crucial to holding down the
costs of dealing with unqualified personnel, success has been mixed in implementing
!The Brahimi Panel Report recommended that Member States
establish, under the U.N. System of Standby Arrangements
(UNSAS), a national “ready roster” of pre-selected and trained
CivPol personnel available for deployment on short notice. [The
report specified that such “national pools” be comprised of “serving
police officers ... augmented, if necessary, by recently retired police
officers who meet the professional and physical requirements....”33]
Similarly, the UNDPKO seminar recommendations proposed that
the UNSAS be enhanced by the creation of an effective ready roster
of international police personnel, to be made possible by an increase
in the number of participating countries, the creation of job
descriptions, and the identification of personnel by specialization.
A March 2003 report of the U.N. Special Committee on
Peacekeeping Operations “welcomed the considerable progress
made in strengthening” UNSAS “for military, civilian police and
civilian personnel.”34 Nevertheless, the December 2003 Henry L.
31 United Nations, General Assembly, Management audit of the United Nations civilian
police operations: Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning
of the United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of the
Internal Oversight Services, Fifty-fifth session, Agenda items 116 and 126, A/55/812, March
32 According to Robert M. Perito, the first SAT team sent (in the mid-1990s) to donor
countries to assist with selection for the Bosnia mission saved the United Nations “an
estimated $527,360.00 based on what it would have cost to repatriate officers who would
have failed the tests upon arrival in theater.” Sept. 5, 2001 hearing before the Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe. op. cit., p 46.
33 Brahimi Panel Report. op. cit., p 20.
34 United Nations, General Assembly. Comprehensive review of the whole question of
peacekeeping operations in all their aspects: Report of the Special Committee onth
Peacekeeping Operations. 57 session. Agenda item 78. Doc. # A/57/767. March 28,
Stimson Center evaluation of progress on the Brahimi
recommendations found that “too few states have created...national
pools of candidates for international operations....”35 The report
found the lack of individual candidates to be a major weakness, and
recommended that countries “replace ‘bidding for slots’ on these
on-call lists” with real candidates with professional experience and
familiarity with UN rules, procedures, and operational
!The Brahimi Panel Report also called for the United Nations to
maintain an “on-call list of 100 police officers and related
experts”who would be available on seven days notice for advance
mission planning and early deployment while a UNCIVPOL force
is being mobilized. In February 2002, UNDPKO established a 100-
person on-call roster of civilian police personnel to recruit for
specialized expertise and to provide leadership for new missions. As
of March 2004, 10 of the 89 police-contributing Member States
have nominated specific individuals for the on-call lists (although
these individuals have not necessarily been screened or trained for
U.N. operations.) The United Nations has also held training
exercises to make the on-call system more efficient.37
In addition, the United Nations has made another effort to improve recruitment
for specialists. Since spring 2003, SAT visits now include substantive skills among
the selection criteria.38 “Substantive” skills include those skills related to
management, planning, training, mentoring, and operations such as criminal
investigations, forensic analysis, and traffic control, among others.
Analysts have also pointed to perceived shortcomings in U.N. procedures and
processes that they believe undermine recruitment efforts. Most importantly, in a
U.N. audit issued in 2001, analysts faulted the apparent absence of standardized
criteria to determine the number of civilian police to authorize at the outset of a
mission and to justify their continued presence.39 (For the United Nations Mission
in Bosnia and Hercegovina, UNMIBH, the criteria considered the ratio of
UNCIVPOL to local police forces. But for the United Nations Mission in Kosovo,
UNMIK, the criteria expanded to consider local crime statistics, local police strength,
35 The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations. p 80.
36 The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations. op. cit., p XXVII.
37 Ibid., p 12.
38 As mentioned in United Nations, General Assembly. Implementation of the
recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Report of the
Secretary-General, Fifty-seventh session, Agenda item 78, Comprehensive review of the
whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, A/57/711, January 16, 2003.
p 12. Implementation of this measure was verified March 11, 2004.
39 Management audit of the United Nations civilian police operations, op.cit., p. 9.
and local population.) In addition, the audit faulted UNDPKO for not consistently
applying assessment systems to ensure that skills were appropriately matched to
specific missions. In one example, civilian police personnel reportedly perform non-
policing functions, reducing the number of police available for policing functions.40
Nearly 18 percent of the civilian police in UNMIBH and UNMIK, and 10 percent in
the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), were
assigned to mission headquarters. Administrative functions — in areas such as
personnel, procurement, developing databases, and logistics — accounted for eight
percent of the total number of the police officers in these three missions.
Training. Mission-preparedness training routinely varies among police-
contributing Member States and, in some cases, is considered inadequate. Even
among well qualified personnel, the lack of uniformity in experience and
standardized training can undermine the effectiveness of a UNCIVPOL mission.
Some of the impediments to assembling a coherent force were explained by a 2003
report of the U.N. Secretary-General: “the police component of a mission may
comprise officers drawn from up to 40 countries who have never met one another
before, have little or no United Nations experience, and have received little relevant
training or mission-specific briefings, and whose policing practices and doctrines
may vary widely.”41
Presently, Member States are responsible for providing pre-deployment generic42
and mission-specific training to the civilian police personnel that they contribute
to police missions. In the mission area, UNCIVPOL personnel undergo in-theater
training, which covers standard operating procedures, safety and security, and human
rights, computer, and local language training.
Experts have cited three main reasons for inadequate pre-deployment training.
First, Member States do not possess adequate police trainers with peacekeeping
experience or training skills. Second, Member States lack the resources to conduct
pre-deployment training programs. Third, national training programs differ widely
among police-contributing countries.
One each of both the Brahimi Panel and the UNDPKO recommendations
concerned training. The Brahimi Panel recommended that contributing nations
should develop regional partnerships for joint police training exercises in accordance
with U.N. standard operating procedures. The UNDPKO seminars recommended
40 Ibid. p 16.
41 Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations. op. cit., p 14.
42 Generic peacekeeping training includes: (1) the background and framework on U.N.
peacekeeping operations; (2) the organization of U.N. headquarters offices, particularly
UNDPKO, in New York and the peacekeeping missions headquarters; (3) the concepts
definitions, principles, and legal basis of peacekeeping missions; (4) general human rights
and humanitarian concepts; and (5) administrative, logistics, and safety matters, and issues
related privileges and immunities. Mission-specific training covers the role and functions
of UNCIVPOL, history of the region, mandated responsibilities, culture, and mission
that U.N. educational materials and training programs be used to help Member States
pre-train personnel to be available for rapid deployment. According to the Stimson
Center, “Evidence is scant that many member states have ... with the possible
exception of the European Union ... moved toward regional training partnerships.”43
The UNDPKO Training Unit has made some efforts at improving pre-deployment
training by developing and distributing four training publications to assist Member
States with their pre-deployment training program.44 (UNDPKO also is planning to
write a training publication to address international standards for police.
Additionally, as part of the SAT, training specialists visit Member States to provide
resources and advise on pre-deployment training programs.) Recently, UNDPKO has
developed common training standards, including standardized “generic training
modules” to provide for more uniformity in the level of competence of deployed
peacekeepers, including police.45
PDD-71 identified training as one area where the United States could make a
contribution to increasing the capabilities of other nations to perform CivPol
operations. While asserting that the “training and preparedness of individuals and
units being supplied to coalition peace operations should remain a national
responsibility,” PDD-71 recognized that “international organizations or other
organizing bodies may need to supplement national training from time to time.” It
therefore called for the State Department’s International Narcotics Control and Legal
Affairs (INL) office (now the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs) to “maintain the capacity to provide tailored training packages
to U.S. and international CIVPOL when requested by the organizing body or the
contributing state and when appropriate U.S. funding or appropriate reimbursement
is available.”46 Under a new State Department CivPol program, the State Department
seeks to acquire capabilities to invite foreign police officers to train with the U.S.
contingent, although no precise arrangement or program has been decided upon. (See
the discussion on the new CivPol cadre program in the section on the United States,
Deployment. The deployment of UNCIVPOL is a highly complex
undertaking, involving the definition of missions needs, the rapid recruitment of
adequate and qualified personnel, and the procurement of material and equipment,
all within the context of coordinating contributions from many nations. Historically,
the deployment times for UNCIVPOL missions have ranged from six to eighteen
months due to insufficient human, material, and financial resources. The Brahimi
Report cited four reasons for the deployment lag, the first of which — the lack of a
standing police force — would require a major organizational change and was not the
43 The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations. op. cit., p XXIV.
44 These training publications include: Selection Standards and Training Guidelines for
United Nations Civilian Police (1997), United Nations Civilian Police Course Curriculum,
United Nations Civilian Police Handbook, and English Language course for United Nations
45 Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations, op. cit., p 17.
46 PDD-71 White Paper, op. cit., p 9.
subject of a recommendation. The Brahimi Panel and UNDPKO seminar
recommendations sought to address the other three: (1) the lack of a reserve corps of
mission leadership, (2) the unreliability of current standby arrangements, and (3) an
insufficient supply of ready equipment.
The Brahimi Panel defined an “effective and rapid deployment” period for a
peacekeeping mission, including the UNCIVPOL component, as within four to 12
weeks of a Security Council authorization. Optimally, the Brahimi Panel report
recommended full deployment within 30 days for “traditional” peacekeeping
missions and within 90 days for complex emergencies after an authorized Security
Council mandate for a peace operation. It recommended that a mission headquarters
be installed and functioning within 15 days for complex emergencies.
Uncertainty exists as to whether the 30-90 day rapid deployment time frame (for
military and police personnel) can be met, according to the Special Committee on
Peacekeeping Operations.47 The Committee alluded to three constraints on rapid
deployment: the inability of the current U.N. system to handle concurrent (or nearly
concurrent) deployment of two or more missions, the limited capacity of the civilian
standby arrangements system with regard to region-specific expertise, and the need
for contributing states to exercise the political will to quickly deploy well-trained and
equipped civilian police personnel.
As mentioned in the section on recruitment, above, some reform is underway
regarding the United Nations System for Standby Arrangements (UNSAS) for
personnel and equipment. This reform will enable the United Nations to deploy more
rapidly in the future, as will the development of the 100-person on-call roster of
civilian police personnel. Following the UNDPKO recommendation that equipment
be pre-packaged and stored at the U.N. Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy (UNLB) for
rapid deployment at the beginning of new missions, the United Nations has improved
its procurement and management of strategic deployment stocks at UNLB (for all
components of peace missions.) Nevertheless, there has been no program developed
to prepare UNCIVPOL for rapid deployment. Although many U.N. Member States
have developed generic rapid deployment programs, few currently possess the
capability to deploy rapidly.48
U.S. Civilian Police Program
Background. The Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) manages the U.S. CivPol program, with
responsibility for policy development, training, oversight, and coordination with the
United Nations and other contributing countries. Unlike most other countries, the
United States does not have a large national police force to draw from and no
47 Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations, op. cit., p 12.
48 Regarding information in this paragraph, see The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN
Peace Operations, op.cit., especially pp XXIV-XXV, 79-83, and 90-93.
permanently established system for contributing personnel to police operations.49
Instead, on a case-by-case basis for each mission, the State Department recruits
civilian police personnel from local and municipal law enforcement agencies through
a commercial contractor. Through the end of March 2004, DynCorp International,
a CSC Company, has been the sole supplier of civilian police personnel under a State
Department contract. As of April 1, 2004, the State Department will initiate a new
arrangement. In February 2004, the State Department contracted two companies,
DynCorp and Civilian Police International LLC (a joint venture of L-3 and MPRI),
to maintain rosters of up to 2,000 personnel whom they have recruited and
prescreened. A third contract for the same purpose was issued in March to a joint
venture formed by PAE Government Services, Inc., and HomeLand Security
Corporation. These companies will use their rosters as the basis for bidding on
contracts to actually deploy CivPol personnel, both for replacements for existing
operations and for people for new operations. (See below for further discussion.)
As there is no specific authority and thus no dedicated budget line for the U.S.
CivPol program, it is usually funded through various State Department regional
bureaus and the State Department’s Peacekeeping account. Most U.S.CivPol officers
receive a base salary ranging from $50,000-100,000 depending on the mission. Those
participating in U.N. missions receive a subsistence allowance which ranges from
$75-95 per day. In some cases, they also receive danger pay.
The total cost of U.S. CivPol personnel varies according to mission, with recent
annual costs ranging from $100,000 per U.S. CivPol officer in Kosovo to $150,000-
$175,000 per officer in Iraq, according to a representative of DynCorp, the private
contractor currently providing police service in those areas. The Kosovo cost figure
covers the cost of an officer’s salary, equipment, transportation and “MWR”
(morale, welfare, and recreation) support, such as exercising equipment and Internet
connections. The higher Iraq figure also includes the cost of providing security, food,
and housing. These expenses are covered by the United Nations in Kosovo.50 As a
point of comparison, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the
incremental cost per troop (i.e., the cost over and above paying their salaries and
maintaining them during peacetime) of posting soldiers to Iraq as of September 2003
ranged from $179,000, when the estimate was based on a twelve-month rotation
schedule, to $206,000, when based on a standard six-month rotation schedule. The
latter also was based on a slightly higher number of reserve component soldiers,
which cost considerably more to deploy than to maintain in peacetime.51
49 Most other contributing States have substantial federal police forces that operate
throughout their countries, from which they can draw personnel. The United States cannot
draw from such a permanent pool because its public security forces that perform community
policing functions are municipal, not federal. (Federal police forces include such units as
the National Park Service’s U.S. Park Police and the U.S. Capitol Police.) The United States
is the only country to use contractors for international police service.
50 Telephone interview with Richard Cashon of DynCorp, December 3, 2003.
51 U.S. Congressional Budget Office. Letter to the Honorable Robert C. Byrd. September
3, 2003. This letter can be accessed through [http://www.cbo.gov]. A news article in
November 2003 computed the costs as slightly higher based on the number of troops
As of March 27, 2004, some 1,016 U.S. CivPol and support personnel were
participating in international CivPol missions. Four of these were in U.N. missions:
Kosovo (479 police officers/26 support personnel), Liberia (75/2), East Timor (18/2),
and Sierra Leone (1 officer). In addition, four police officers were seconded to
Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) missions and one was
seconded to the OSCE headquarters for mission liaison in Vienna, Austria. Some
contributions: Afghanistan (30/20) and Iraq (295/63). As of that date, the United
States also provided six police officers to monitor several high-profile prisoners in
a prison in Israel, although that deployment is not considered an international police
Perceived Problems, Proposed Reforms, and Implementation. U.S.
policymakers have recognized that the United States, like other nations, has problems
in recruiting and deploying qualified CivPol personnel. The major points of PDD-71
were designed to enhance U.S. response capacities, including improving operational
activities. PDD-71 set forth policy and provided guidance for the provision of U.S.
CivPol personnel, including their recruitment, training, management, and
deployment, as well as for the improvement of the capacity of foreign police to
participate in peace operations.
Some of the perceived problems with the U.S. CivPol contingents are similar
to those cited for the U.N. civilian police system. These include inefficiency in
matching individual skills with mission requirements, inconsistencies in levels of
training and professionalism, and lag in deployment. Many analysts emphasize a
continued need to improve the current system, even though perceptions about the
U.S. civilian police program have become more positive with ongoing
improvements over the last few years.
In what was intended as a major innovation in the U.S. CivPol system —
building upon the PDD-71 mandate — the Department of State has issued contracts
(as mentioned above) for the establishment and maintenance of a reserve cadre of up
to 2,000 U.S. law enforcement personnel, who would be available for international
police service on short notice.53 The intention of establishing a reserve cadre was
deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, and to supporting areas. The per troop figure for Iraq was
given as $20,000 per month ($240,000/year), for Afghanistan it was $23,000 per month
($276,000/year). Bradley Graham. “Disparity in Iraq, Afghanistan War Costs Scrutinized.”
The Washington Post. November 11, 2003, p A13.
52 Figures provided by DynCorp, March 27, 2004.
53 Information on this cadre was taken from the State Department’s Request for Proposal
(RFP, i.e., bidding information). As detailed by the RFP, cadre would be recruited from
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, and be comprised of generalists and
specialists, including law enforcement generalists (45%), certified trainers (12%), border
police (3%), crimes against persons investigations (4%), property crimes investigators (3%),
supervisory/management (7%), court security specialists (2%), corrections officers (3%),
intelligence officers (2%), custom specialists (2%), crime scene investigators (4%), senior
to facilitate the rapid deployment of well-qualified CivPols. Under the State
Department’s Request for Proposal (RFP), the contractor was to be responsible for
recruitment, training, and procurement services, as well as pre-deployment and
deployment support.54 As envisioned by the bidding proposal, the new cadre of U.S.
civilian police would “eliminate the requirement to conduct from scratch,
recruitment, selection, and training activities each time the U.S. contributes police
to an international CivPol operation.”55 The RFP also called for the contractor to
identify technical advisors, who are not police officers, who could be called upon to
assist with establishing institutional capabilities in police, judicial, and corrections
The State Department’s decision to award contracts for the new CivPol cadre
program to multiple companies, rather than one as originally envisioned, has raised
some questions about whether the process will be as expeditious as originally
planned. While there may be some advantages to be gained by continued
competition for CivPol deployments, and the greater number of applicants from
which to choose, which some may judge necessary because of the Iraq and
Afghanistan missions, some analysts fear that these advantages will be offset by
additional costs and delays. Moreover, the extent to which the original RFP
provisions continue to apply are unclear as the new contracts have not been made
public. Further details are discussed below under the appropriate headings.
Recruitment. While the current recruitment program has enabled the United
States to provide CivPols to U.N. police missions for several years, and more
recently to dispatch them unilaterally to Iraq, experts have disagreed on the relative
utility of this recruitment method. DynCorp (to date, and other companies in the
future) recruits police officers who are serving or have recently served with state and
local law enforcement agencies. Most police officers take a leave of absence; others
resign to perform international police service, and some are recent retirees. Many
analysts recognize that the system draws from overextended municipal and state
forces. In recent years, problems with adequate police staffing of municipal and state
departments have been exacerbated by the repeated call-ups of U.S. military reserve
forces for homeland security, Afghanistan, and Iraq, as a significant number of U.S.
police officers are members of the reserve, according to some analysts.
Some analysts assert that the United States has not obtained uniformly high
quality recruits through the current contracting system because municipal and state
police departments are generally unwilling to allow their most valuable officers to
commanders (1%), dignitary protection officers (3%), civil disorder specialists (3%),
organized crime investigators (2%), and traffic accident investigators (4%). U.S.
Department of State, S-LMAQM-03-R-0109, accessible through
[http://www.fedbizopps.gov] (Vendors/Department of State/Office of Logistics
Management/Posted October 15, 2003.) Accessed March 2004.
54 The pre-deployment and deployment support was to include “contract program
management, uniforms and equipment, transportation arrangements and per diem for basic,
in-service, and specialized training programs.” Ibid., Section C.2.2.
55 Ibid., Section C.3.
take extended leaves. Some suggest that the United States might be able to recruit
a more professional and qualified force if it were able to provide state and municipal
governments with some compensation or reimbursement for detailing police officers
to CivPol missions. (This would apparently require new legal arrangements,
however. Currently, law enforcement agencies receive no financial incentives for
officers participating in international police service.) Some also argue that the
recruitment of individual U.S. police officers, rather than of formed police units, has
made the U.S. police contingent less cohesive. This contributes to the already varied
mix within UNCIVPOL forces.56
In addition, some analysts assert that the U.S. selection criteria do not accurately
reflect mission requirements. Current employment selection criteria for civilian
police candidates vary according to mission, but all include (1) U.S. citizenship, (2)
eight years of work experience, with at least five years as an active sworn civilian law
enforcement (LE) officer, and currently serving as a sworn LE office or recently
separated from LE service within five years, (3) an unblemished record, (4) valid
drivers license and ability to drive a standard transmission 4x4 vehicle, (5) excellent
health and ability to pass physical, agility, and psychological tests, (6) valid U.S.
passport, and (7) ability to communicate in English. Most also require the ability to
qualify with a 9mm semi-automatic handgun.57 Nevertheless, the Department of
State apparently satisfies its recruitment goals for basic skills and is making
improvements in recruiting for specialized skills. For the Kosovo, East Timor, and
Iraq police missions, requirement qualifications were expanded to include two years’
experience in a specialized area.
The problem of recruiting high quality and specialized personnel may be
addressed to some extent by the new State Department CivPol cadre program. The
State Department’s bid solicitation document for that program indicated that nearly
55% of the total cadre would be comprised of specialists. In addition, minimal police
officer qualifications were to include interpersonal, leadership, training and
negotiation skills, knowledge of international police standards, and experience
working in multicultural environments.
The CivPol cadre program bid solicitation also states that individuals selected
for the program would “receive training on an annual basis in policing skills
recognized across the United States as essential to conducting effective law
enforcement.” The intention of offering such training, according to a State
Department official, was to create an incentive for high quality officers to join the
program by providing training which might help that officer achieve a promotion or
56 Because it does not have a significant national police force, the United States does not
participate in the U.N. on-call and UNSAS police lists.
57 For a complete list of qualifications by mission, see the DynCorp website at
[http://www.policemission.com]; accessed July 19, 2003. Qualified applicants undergo a
background investigation, which includes criminal and financial check, a personal history
statement, reference check, police department internal affairs review, performance
evaluation for the past two years, biography, medical and psychological examination, and
an oral interview.
other career goal.58 A precise program had not been developed, however. Whether
sufficient funding would be provided to offer such training to all members of the
three separate cadre lists (i.e., potentially as many as 6,000 people) that will be
maintained under the new program is unclear.
Training. Training for U.S. CivPols is complicated by the inconsistencies in
the levels of skills and professionalism among the individual police officers recruited
from the many police departments across the country. As a result, some experts have
viewed the training program’s length and content as insufficient. Under the current
U.S. CivPol program, U.S. police officers undergo several days of pre-deployment
training (the length depending on the mission), referred to as Police Assessment,
Selection, and Training (P.A.S.T). Currently, the pre-deployment training curriculum
includes: (1) United Nations and peace operations, (2) International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) vis — a-vis international
CivPol program, (3) mission overview and history of the region, (4) U.S. military
in peace operations and civil-military relations, (5) team building, (6) lifestyle in the
mission, (7) human rights, (8) contractor logistical support, (9) personal safety and
defensive tactics, and (10) use of the expandable police baton and aerosol subject
restraint. In addition, candidates undergo driving, language, and firearms tests.
As described in the bid solicitation documents of the new State Department
CivPol cadre program, an improved training curriculum being developed by INL
would meet nation-wide Police Officer Standards and Training (POST) certification
requirements and be consistent with international principles of democratic policing
and human rights, with ongoing training courses in policing skills, specialized and
in-service training. This new training program would seek recognition and
certification from U.S. and select foreign law enforcement organizations and police
academies. As mentioned above, the new CivPol cadre program also contemplates
additional training to be provided on an annual basis. Some have wondered whether
training costs may be higher under the new three-contractor cadre system than
originally anticipated because of a possible increased number of annual trainees and
facilities for pre-deployment training, and associated administrative requirements.
Deployment. The U.S. CivPol contingent can currently deploy to a U.N.
operation within 30-45 days following a U.N. Security Council authorization.
Currently, the United States fulfills the deployment requirement as recommended by
the Brahimi Panel report, but falls short of expectations contemplated in proposed
legislation (H.R. 1414, discussed in the Options section below), which calls for
deployment capability for UNCIVPOL no later than 15 days following authorization
by a U.N. Security resolution.
Whether the United States will be able to maintain its current deployment
capability under the new CivPol cadre system is being questioned by some analysts,
however. As detailed in the bid solicitation documents of the program, the contractor
would maintain a database of commercial sources capable of providing basic and
personal equipment on a “standby arrangement,” which could likely decrease
58 Telephone interview with Robert Gifford, Police Program Manager, INL. March 19,
deployment time. Additionally, the contractor would develop a logistics support
team to provide advanced logistical and administrative support in the mission for the
U.S. police contingent that could also augment lacking operational capabilities of the
United Nations and regional organizations.59 This team would deploy in advance of
the U.S. CivPol contingent. It is not clear, however, to what extent those provisions
continue to apply under the actual contracts issued for the new system. Also unclear
is the extent to which deployments may be slowed by the need for a new round of
bidding with each new mission.
Most European countries deploy police recruited from their national police
forces to international CivPol operations. (The United Kingdom is the major
exception because, as in the United States, its police are organized largely at the local
level.60) As major contributors to U.N. and, more recently, European-sponsored
police missions, European governments have recognized for several years that reform
of their own deployment systems were important to substantially improving
international CivPol capabilities.
European Union.61 Since 1999, the EU has developed goals and procedures
to improve the quality and timeliness of European contributions to U.N., OSCE, and
EU police missions. At the June 2000 meeting of the EU heads of state and
government in Feira, Portugal (known as the Feira European Council), Member
States agreed to develop a 5,000 civilian reserve police force (individual police
officers or integrated police units) for international peace operations (with 1,00062
police deployable within 30 days) by 2003. The development of police capabilities
takes place within the context of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
adopted at the December 1999 Helsinki Summit of European heads of state and
government. Police capabilities would include both civil status and police forces,63
capable of performing constabulary functions. In June 2001, the Göteborg
[Sweden] European Council adopted a Police Action Plan, which establishes a
59 Unlike other countries, the United States has routinely provided various types of support
for the civilian personnel which it provides to U.N.-led operations, including uniforms,
equipment and supplies, as well as administrative, medical, and health services.
60 Even though they are local, all police forces in Britain come under the jurisdiction of the
Home Secretary, which calls upon police to volunteer for foreign service and must receive
the consent of local police authorities to deploy volunteers. Telephone interview with a
Home Secretary official, March 24, 2004.
61 Information in this section was verified by an EU office as accurate and current as of
February 26, 2004.
62 European Union. Press Report on the 2386th Council Meeting (Section on the Police
Capabilities Commitment Conference.) General Affairs. 13802/01 (Presse 414), Brussels,
November 19, 2001, p 20. [Accessible through the EU website’s Newsroom link.] The Feira
European Council also called for increased civilian capabilities in three areas beside
policing: rule of law, civil administration and protection of civilians in disaster and other
common requirement for selection and training of police, as well as guidelines for
command and control and for inter-operability.64 The EU also established the Rapid
Reaction Mechanism (RRM) to provide flexible funding arrangements for civilian
crisis management operations for a six-month period.
As of late February 2004, EU Member States have committed up to 5,000 police
officers for crisis management operations. Of this number, 1,400 could be available
for rapid deployment within 30 days. As part of their commitments, Member States
have also undertaken to provide up to 13 rapidly deployable, integrated police units,
ranging from 60 to 110 officers each. Two Member States have offered to provide
four headquarters units for police missions, two of them for rapid deployment. In
November 2003, personnel from 22 European countries attended a joint exercise in
Italy in order to test the inter-operability of integrated police units at the headquarters
The EU launched its first ESDP mission on January 1, 2003: the EU Police
Mission in Bosnia and Hercegovia (BiH), as a successor mission (without executive
authority) to the U.N. International Police Task Force. Under a three year mandate,
the mission aims to establish sustainable policing arrangements for BiH in
accordance with European and international “best practices.” The mission consists
of almost 500 police officers and 70 civilian experts from 33 states.65 Its annual
budget is US $47.2 million (38 million Euros at an exchange rate of 1.24
On December 15, 2003, the EU began its second police mission (EUPOL
Proxima) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with an authorized strength
of 200 police and civilian personnel. Its first year budget is US$18.6 million (15
million Euros), including start-up costs of $ 9.1 million (7.3 million Euros.) All of
the EU Member States, except Portugal, are participating.
EU Member States have met their goal for the commitment of police officers,
and exceeded the goal for the number available for rapid deployment. Nevertheless,
some analysts are skeptical that the reformed EU crisis management and rapid
reaction capabilities will substantially improve the EU’s ability to respond. One
factor — EU Member States’ willingness to surrender national sovereignty to EU
foreign policy coordination — may prove the most problematic.66
64 Ibid., p 21.
65 Some 80% of the personnel who serve in the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) are
from the 15 EU Member States: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom. The remaining 20% of personnel are from 18 non-EU countries:
Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania,
Norway, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey
and the Ukraine. The United States and Malta were also invited to participate.
66 See, for example: Caroline Earle, EU Contributions to Peace Operations: Development
of an European Rapid Reaction Force and Civilian Capacity. Peace Operations Fact Sheet
Series, The Henry L. Stimson Center, May 2002; and Alexandra Novosseloff, The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The
OSCE is also enhancing its operational capabilities, including a capability for rapid67
deployment of CivPols and other civilian experts. As of February 25, 2004, the
OSCE has some 160 CivPols conducting policing activities in eight countries:
Albania, Azerbijan, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia (Skopje),
and Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo).
At the Istanbul Summit in November 1999, the Heads of State and government
of OSCE participating States created the Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation
Teams (REACT) program. The purpose of the program is to enable the OSCE, when
circumstances require, to identify, select and deploy experts in the areas of conflict
prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict missions. Current policing
activities emphasize training, reform, and development of local police, rather than
basic monitoring functions. The REACT program has developed the capability for
participating States to each establish its own database of qualified civilian experts,
including CivPols, with knowledge and experience in the broad range of areas needed
to promote security, from human rights, rule of law, civil and political affairs
(including elections) to economic and environmental stabilization. Its objective is
to deploy such personnel within two to eight weeks of posting positions for a specific
Since the establishment of the REACT program in April 2001, the OSCE and
its 55 participating States (which include non-European States, most notably the
United States and Canada) have taken various steps to implement and improve the68
program. This includes creating national websites to recruit personnel for the
program or providing mechanisms to receive such applications via the OSCE69
website. As with the U.N. lists, many OSCE participating States (for a variety of
efficiency, legal, and privacy concerns) prefer not to nominate specific individuals
to the OSCE availability list until specific field requirements are known.
Nevertheless, some participating States have provided numerical commitments in
specific fields of expertise. The OSCE developed a framework of standards
covering both educational and experience requirements which identify the skills
European Security and Defense Policy, Current Issues and Objectives. Future of Peace
Operations Project Roundtable on European Capacities for Peace Operations. The Henry L.
Stimson Center, November 25, 2002.
67 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Conflict Prevention Centre, April
Chris, European Approaches to Civilian Crisis Management, Basic Special Report on
Roundtable Discussion, British American Security Information Council, March 2002.
68 Information in this paragraph was provided by electronic correspondence from Barrie
Meyers, Senior Advisor to the OSCE Director of Human Resources, November 21, 2003,
and by telephone interview, February 25, 2004.
69 Eight participating States have developed such websites; 31 receive applications via the
OSCE website, and contact information for two others is available on the OSCE website.
The United States, which is an OSCE participating State, maintains a website with links to
the private companies through which U.S. citizens are contracted for secondment to OSCE
missions. See: [http://www.usosce.rpo.at/archive/misc/employment.htm].
needed for its activities. Based on an assessment of past and current OSCE field
activities, the OSCE developed a staffing matrix which is used to assist participating
States in recruiting qualified candidates.70
Through REACT, the OSCE recruits CivPols capable of performing advising,
mentoring, reform and development functions. OSCE general minimum requirements
for civilian police are similar, but not identical, to U.N. and U.S. requirements. They
are (1) graduation from a recognized police training school, (2) active police
experience, (3) ability to communicate in English, (4) negotiation and interpersonal
skills, (5) mapping skills, and (5) first aid experience. Desired skills include liaison
experience with non-law enforcement organizations (e.g., NGOs) and the ability to
operate police radio equipment. The mission specific requirements for police officers
focus on specific skills.71 OSCE also recruits law enforcement administrators,
including senior and middle management, with eight to 20 years of experience in law
enforcement and police management plus relevant field and subject expertise.
Options for Congress
In the 108th Congress, Members introduced three bills with the intent of
strengthening U.S. and international capabilities to conduct CivPol missions and
other rule of law missions. H.R. 1414 is intended to improve UNCIVPOL
capabilities. H.R. 2616 addresses perceived problems with U.S. CivPol capabilities
and would create capabilities within NATO to handle international post-conflict
stabilization and reconstruction efforts. S. 2127 seeks to improve the United States’
ability to provide civilian capabilities to respond to crises abroad. These proposals
build upon prior U.N. and U.S. efforts to improve international capabilities. In
addition to these proposals, analysts advance three related options to address
perceived deficiencies in training, in capabilities for performing constabulary
functions, and in creating viable law enforcement and rule of law institutions.
Legislative Proposals: Creating New and Upgrading Existing
H.R. 1414: Reform of U.N. Civilian Police System. Representatives
McGovern and Houghton introduced H.R. 1414, the International Rule of Law and
Antiterrorism Act of 2003, on March 25, 2003. The bill proposes substantial reform,
if not innovation, to make UNCIVPOL rapidly deployable and more effective, as
well as a measure to address UNCIVPOL recruitment and training problems.
70 In addition to civilian policing, required fields of expertise include human rights, rule of
law, democratization, elections, economic and environmental affairs, press and public
information, media development, political affairs, administration and support, general
staff/monitoring functions, and military affairs.
71 These include, but are not limited to, police trainers, community police advisers, police
reform advisers, police project managers, program experts, curriculum development officers,
field training coordinators, accountability program managers, reporting/analysis officers,
technical assistance assessment officers (in all fields of policing, including border policing),
and heads of police department units, development units, and law enforcement.
The bill calls for the Administration to encourage negotiations within the United
Nations for the establishment of a professional United Nations civilian police corps
(UNCPC) and requests the U.N. Secretariat to prepare a report concerning the
establishment of such a corps. The bill does not define “professional” nor does it
mandate specific arrangements, in particular, whether the force would be a standing
or an on-call force. It does set forth a sense of Congress statement that the corps
should be (1) “available for rapid deployment” to peace operations within 15 days of
a U.N. Security Council authorization of a peacekeeping operation, and that it should
be (2) composed of an “appropriate number of law enforcement professionals
recruited and employed by the United Nations who are appropriately trained and
equipped for civilian policing functions” in U.N. peace operations. (Although these
points seem to suggest either the formation of a standing force72 or a force of paid
reservists that train together, some proponents state that the bill only intends for the
structure to be negotiated with the United Nations.)73 The bill also expresses a sense
of Congress that the corps should be given “appropriate resources to do its job
properly, including funding, equipment, training, logistical support, and staffing.”
The staff would include corrections and judicial law enforcement professionals.
In addition to the establishment of a UNCPC, the bill would encourage
improvements in the current system. It would direct the Secretary of State to work
within the United Nations “to establish standards and training programs for
international civilian police.”
Proponents of H.R. 1414 view the bill as a vehicle to address several problems
regarding the use of UNCIVPOL personnel in police missions, most importantly the
deployment gap and, to a lesser extent, the enforcement gap. Some proponents
argue that such a measure should address other issues, such as creating a mechanism
to ensure adequate and continued funding and specifying a size for the proposed
The bill’s findings state that the creation of a professional U.N. police corps
would allow the United Nations to take responsibility more quickly and effectively
for maintaining a secure environment. The findings argue that this would greatly
reduce the number of combat soldiers needed to perform civilian police tasks in
peacekeeping and other post-conflict situations, and allow for their earlier
withdrawal. The findings also point to the corps as a mechanism to raise the
72 In the 107th Congress, Representatives McGovern and Houghton, as well as
Representatives Lewis, Pelosi, Frank, and Millender-McDonald introduced H.R. 938, United
Nations Rapid Deployment Act of 2001, on March 28, 2001 to increase U.N. response
capability to impending crises. In response to the Brahimi Panel Report, the proposed
legislation aimed to address the deployment gap posed by the current ad hoc U.N.
arrangement for providing CivPol personnel to peace operations. The proposed legislation
had 56 sponsors, but faced strong criticism over the requirement of standing U.N. civilian
police corps, according to some analysts.
73 Don Kraus, Executive Director of the Campaign for U.N. Reform, states that negotiators
could choose a standing, reserve, or on-call model, “or some other model that none of us
have thought of.” E-mail correspondence, July 23, 2003.
standards and skill levels of UNCIVPOL personnel and make them more
Opponents fear that the bill would result in the establishment of a standing
corps, which they regard as too costly and too problematic. Many argue that Member
States, including the United States, would be reluctant to establish a standing corps
because it could increase assessed contributions in order to cover the cost of a
standing UNCPC. If, on the other hand, Member States funded the force through
voluntary contributions rather than mandatory assessments, many analysts fear that
it would not be sustainable. Many analysts have also expressed concern over giving
the United Nations responsibility for the administration of a permanent UNCPC,
given its limited management capacity. In addition, some fear that a permanent
police corps would permit the United Nations to infringe on national sovereignty,
perhaps contrary to U.S. interests, although proponents of H.R. 1414 point out that
the United States could veto any proposed use of such a corps.
H.R. 2616: Improving U.S. and NATO Capabilities. To enhance
existing U.S. capabilities and create new international capabilities to provide
reconstruction assistance in post-conflict situations, Representatives Farr, Wolf,
Hoeffel, Leach, and Wexler introduced H.R. 2616, the Winning the Peace Act of7475
2003, on June 26, 2003. Among its provisions, the bill contains sense of Congress
statements proposing two new mechanisms to provide security in post-conflict
situations where reconstruction efforts are underway.
One of those proposed mechanisms, the establishment of a U.S. civilian police
reserve, may constitute a substantial upgrading of the current ad hoc U.S. CivPol
system. According to the proposal, this reserve of law enforcement officers would
be capable of (1) serving overseas as an interim police force in post-conflict
situations, and (2) of training and equipping indigenous civilian police forces in such
situations. The bill also suggests a procedure by which the United States would
establish the civilian police reserve. Through Section 8 of the bill, Congress would
call upon the President to establish a task force comprised of federal, state, and local
law enforcement officials to develop the reserve.
A second proposal calls for a new NATO mechanism to provide a broad range
of military and policing services in post-conflict situations. It calls upon the
Administration to propose to NATO that (1) selected NATO units be trained and
equipped to provide security in reconstruction situations, and (2) NATO establish an
“integrated security support component” to provide that training and equipment. If
NATO were to accept the proposal, the bill authorizes the President to commit
74 Senators Edwards, Reed, and Roberts introduced a Senate version of the bill, S. 1235, on
June 11, 2003. S. 1235 does not include provisions on civilian policing.
75 This legislation draws on the concepts elaborated and recommendations made in Play to
Win, a joint report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the
Association of the United States Army. These were developed by the bipartisan Commission
on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, of which Rep. Farr was a member. See: Play to Win: the
Final Report of the Bipartisan Commission On Post-Conflict Reconstruction, January 2003,
accessible through the CSIS website [http://www.csis.org].
personnel to the support component; such personnel should be capable of providing
for the security of civilians, “including serving as a police force.” The illustrative
tasks that the bill specifies that the selected units be able to perform include one
requiring constabulary skills, i.e., “the control of belligerent groups and crowds,” as
well as those requiring policing, investigative, and intelligence skills, i.e.,
“apprehending targeted persons or groups, performing anti-corruption tasks, and
supporting police investigations.” (For more information on constabulary forces and
their functions, see the option on constabulary forces, below.)
Relative Merits of Possible U.S. Reserve Models.Proponents argue
that the proposed legislation would provide U.S. support for increasing international
capabilities to provide a security environment in which post-conflict reconstruction
can occur. In particular, a civilian police reserve would help bridge the deployment
gap, as the availability of a pool of on-call officers would expedite the deployment
of U.S. civilian police. It is unclear, however, whether the intention of the legislation
was to establish a civilian police reserve in line with the State Department's current
private sector model as described earlier or to establish a new U.S. government
reserve force, along the lines proposed under the “stability force” model discussed
Proponents of the private contractor model argue that it is preferable because
commercial contractors can often respond more quickly and because use of the
private sector avoids the creation of new government bureaucracies. Opponents of
this model might find that limitations often cited regarding the use of commercial
contractors in military operations may also apply to policing operations. For
example, commercial contractors may not exhibit the same dedication to their job in
situations where unexpected changes may occur, particularly in the level of risk and
the conditions of the job. Some opponents of a government-sponsored reserve might
concede that a federal agency could conceivably deploy a reserve CivPol force as
efficiently and speedily as a private contractor, but only if civilian law enforcement
personnel were maintained as paid reservists, such as under the U.S. military reserve
system, at a cost some policymakers may consider prohibitive.
Proponents of the government-created model argue that a government reserve
is a more potent symbol of U.S. commitment, more responsive to U.S. policy, and
might well prove a more cohesive force than a privately-contracted force. In
addition, proponents argue, its members would be more accountable. Further, some
argue that a government agency could better guarantee the quality of recruits, as it
would have greater incentives to establish more stringent screening mechanisms. In
addition, it might more easily to draw qualified CivPol personnel from local and state
police departments, as discussed in the U.S. CivPol section above, if a compensation
system were established for departments that provided personnel to federal service;
it might be easier to establish such a compensation under a federal reserve model
than under a private contractor reserve model.
The desirability of pre-deployment training also could influence judgments
regarding the relative merits of a government-sponsored vs. a government-contracted
reserve force. If the police reservists regularly trained together as U.S. military
reservists do, and established mechanisms for coordination with military forces, they
arguably could prove a more effective and reliable contingent than those assembled
under the current ad hoc model. This might be easier under a government-created
model than under a contractor model.
Questions Regarding a NATO Constabulary Capability. The NATO
constabulary capability could help bridge the enforcement gap as it would provide
through NATO the full range of skills needed in post-conflict situations, according
to proponents. Some question, however, whether NATO, a military organization,
is the wrong venue for any force with policing functions. Many analysts argue that
the use of military forces for policing functions may, in the words of PDD-71, “over
an extended period ... send inappropriate signals to civil authorities and the local76
population....” Some critics also argue that the creation of such a reserve within
NATO may duplicate current European Union structures and possibly add one more
source of friction in U.S.-European relations.
Additional Considerations.Some analysts argue that the bill should
contain additional provisions on equipment, training, and coordination with the
military. For one, they argue that without a previous commitment of equipment by
the United States, the deployment of U.S. and other police reservists may well be
delayed while needed supplies are assembled. In addition, some argue that the
creation of U.S. or international reserves, without the provision of standardized
training, would only perpetuate the lack of conformity in policing styles that is
viewed as undermining current operations. In addition, many of the problems of past
operations might be repeated in the future if mechanisms weren’t established, and
perhaps some joint training provided, with the U.S. and other military forces.
Other critics are skeptical of the need for such forces, or of the need for the
commitment of U.S. police officers to them. Some critics argue that by creating
police reserves, the bill may only draw upon existing police resources, which are
already in short supply, and would contribute to tensions with local and state
76 PDD-71 White Paper, op. cit., p 11. PDD-71 does, however, recognize a constabulary
role for military forces. It states that “U.S. military forces shall maintain the capability to
support constabulary functions abroad, and if necessary carry out constabulary functions
under limited conditions for a limited period of time.” p 10.
77 Recently, law enforcement officials have raised concerns over a possible drain on
municipal and state police forces because of the large number of law enforcement officers
serving in the Reserves and National Guard. With continuing guard and reserve call-ups for
homeland defense and overseas military deployment levels, additional demands for law
enforcement personnel may limit the supply. In addition, law enforcement agencies may
face financial hardship by holding a position open (up to one year for most police missions)
until an officer resumes active duty.
Sheriff Stephen Oelrich of Alachua County in Gainesville, Florida is one of several law
enforcement officials who has personally participated in, and had his men volunteer for, the
U.S. CivPol program. Despite his support for the program, he states that over-reliance on
municipal law enforcement agencies will likely limit supply for the U.S. CivPol program,
especially in the absence of financial incentives. PDD-71 states that state and municipal
governments should be reimbursed for the costs related to “their participation” in the
provision of U.S. CivPol to field operations. (PDD-71 White Paper, op.cit., p 4) Telephone
S. 2127: Strengthening Civilian Rule of Law and Other Capabilities.
On February 25, 2004, Senators Lugar and Biden, introduced the Stabilization and
Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004 (S. 2127), which, according to the
report accompanying the bill (S.Rept. 108-147), would reorganize government
structures “to strengthen the capacity of civilian foreign affairs agencies to respond
quickly and effectively to overseas crises, including post-conflict and other complex
emergencies.” To that end, S. 2127 would provide $80 million to hire up to 250
personnel and designate employees of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) to comprise a Response Readiness Corps, and
to augment that corps by maintaining a “Response Readiness Reserve” roster. The
roster would consist of federal employees and at least 500 non-government
personnel. All Corps and Reserve personnel would be trained specifically for such
missions. Within three years of enactment, the bill would require that 10% of State
Department and USAID personnel be identified and trained for this force. Although
this measure is interpreted as intended, at least in part, to address the institution gap
created by delays in deploying rule of law personnel, neither the legislation nor
Senator Lugar’s floor statement in introducing the bill specify the types of personnel
who are to be recruited and the extent to which this cadre would include “stability”
(i.e., police and other rule of law) experts versus reconstruction experts is not clear.
See the section below on the development of a Stability Force for related opinions
on such a capability.
Other Options to Strengthen Current Capabilities and
Address System and Security Gaps
Improve the Training and Professionalization of CivPol Personnel.
Many experts assert that substantially increased and improved training, especially
in basic functions, and professionalization of existing CivPol personnel might
significantly assist in bridging the deployment gap. As the scope and mandate of
police missions have increased, pre-deployment training has not kept pace with the
needs, according to some analysts. Instead, in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, and East
Timor, training adjustments were made in the field on a case-by-case basis.
Recognizing the importance of adequate and appropriate training, PDD-71 proposed
that the United States “maintain the capacity to provide tailored training packages to
U.S. and international CivPol when requested by the organizing body or the
contributing state and when appropriate U.S. funding or appropriate reimbursement78
Some analysts continue to argue that increased police training would be
desirable: one recent think tank report recommends a “robust” increase in funds for
such training, as many nations find the cost of training prohibitive for large numbers
interview, July 2003.
78 PDD-71 White Paper, op. cit., p 9. Despite recognizing the need for some foreign
assistance, PDD-71 maintained that contributing nations should continue to bear
responsibility for training the personnel they supplied to peace operations.
of personnel.79 As discussed earlier, the State Department’s new CivPol cadre bid
solicitation proposal included a provision for U.S. training of foreign police
personnel, although there has been no decision on a program or arrangements for
such training. The content and scope of such a program may depend on the amount
of funding available.
Increase International Capability for Constabulary Forces. Another
option to address the deployment and enforcement gap, urged by many analysts, is
the strengthening of existing international constabulary capabilities in the small
number of nations that already have them and the creation of new capabilities in the
nations that do not. (H.R. 2616, discussed above, proposes incorporating a unit
capable of performing constabulary functions within NATO.) Constabulary police
perform a variety of tasks that require less force than combat, but more force than
routine law enforcement activities. As defined by PDD-71, constabulary tasks
include the regulation of peoples’ movements when necessary to ensure safety;
interventions “to stop civil violence, such as vigilante lynchings or other violent
public crimes” and to “stop and deter widespread or organized looting, vandalism,
riots or other mob-type action;”and the dispersal of “unruly or violent public80
demonstrations and civil disturbances.”
Less heavily armed than combat soldiers, constabulary forces are trained in both
military and policing skills and use those combined skills to carry out their duties,
making them essential for a variety of hostile situations that occur more frequently
in post-conflict areas than in nations at peace. When deployed on peacekeeping
missions, constabulary police often are equipped with their own communication and
logistical support. Also, constabulary forces usually can deploy more rapidly than
other CivPols because they typically are deployed as “formed units” (i.e., in groups
that have previously worked together and will continue to do so) instead of as
Many analysts argue for the establishment of specialized paramilitary units, such
as those available in other countries, citing them as the most appropriate forces to81
conduct constabulary tasks in peacekeeping operations. Presently, several countries
already have national police forces or specialized paramilitary police units, that are
trained as constabulary forces, such as the Italian carabinieri, the French
gendarmerie, and the Spanish Guardia Civil, among others. As noted by several
analysts (as well as PDD-71), these resources can be [and often are] severely strained
by high deployment rates when deployed to numerous U.N. peacekeeping82
79 For instance, see Play to Win, op. cit.. Recommendation #8 proposes that Congress fund
“a robust increase in funding for police training.”
80 PDD-71 White Paper, op. cit., pp 9-10
81 PDD-71 White Paper, op. cit., p 10.
82 The PDD-71 White Paper, ibid., warned that ‘suitable partners may not always be
available, or a short lag time may occur before a civilian, paramilitary force becomes
operational in a specific situation.” Also see: Chuck Call and Michael Barnett, Looking for
(Some also argue that the U.S. army should develop its own active duty
constabulary force to augment the military police (MPs), who are usually called
upon to perform constabulary functions in peacekeeping and related operations. As
much of the U.S. army MP capability resides in the reserve, shortages occur when
peacekeeping deployment rates are high. According to some reports, Army analysts
and policymakers are considering this option. However, Army leaders have long
resisted structuring the service to facilitate peacekeeping operations, arguing that a
military force is weakened if it is structured to fulfill secondary missions, such as
peacekeeping, rather than its primary warfighting mission.83 With the subsequent
U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, many analysts have questioned
whether military forces can be said to have won a war if they have not established the
conditions for a durable peace, as do some military personnel who believe Army
forces are most valuable if they are adaptable and capable of performing security
tasks in high, medium, and low-intensity conflict environments.)
Proponents of such forces argue that, as an intermediary security force for peace
operations capable of handling some violent situations which are beyond the
capabilities of CivPol, constabulary forces can reduce reliance on combat soldiers to
engage in policing activities, as well as shorten their withdrawal time from post-
conflict situations, according to many analysts.84 (Currently, regular military forces
often perform constabulary functions in peacekeeping operations, despite their lack
of training and resources.)
Despite these possible advantages, analysts are uncertain whether other
countries would be willing to augment their constabulary capabilities, or whether
countries that do not now possess such capabilities might want to develop them for
deployment abroad. Drawing an analogy with U.S. localities that they perceive as
stressed by the temporary deployment of police officers abroad, some analysts judge
that, like the United States, other countries are increasingly concerned about meeting
Develop a “U.S. Force for Stability”. A final option to address the
institution gap in peace operations is the development of rapidly deployable units of
law enforcement and rule of law personnel to ensure “sustainable security.” Several
analysts have urged the development of U.S. and international capabilities to rapidly
deploy a full range of rule of law professionals in addition to police (i.e., judicial
branch officials such as judges and prosecutors, and prison personnel, among
a Few Good Cops: Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and CIVPOL, International Peacekeeping,
vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 1999), p 54.
83 PDD-71 recognized this attitude as the dominant reality when it was promulgated, stating
that its directive for the U.S. military to maintain a constabulary capability “in no way
obligates the U.S. military to conduct these tasks in any particular operation or to develop
specialized constabulary units dedicated to this mission.” PDD-71 White Paper, op. cit., p
84 Looking for a Few Good Cops: Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and CIVPOL. op. cit.. pp
others).85 The United States currently deploys personnel with experience in justice
and corrections systems through Department of Justice contracts, funded by the State
Department’s INL CivPol program. The State Department’s new CivPol cadre
program, as discussed above, requests contractors to identify such personnel in an
effort to create a capability within the CivPol to deploy them. To many analysts,
however, the current system does not provide the full range of necessary personnel
in a timely manner.
Robert S. Perito, currently a special advisor to the Rule of Law Program at the
United States Institute for Peace (USIP) has been a primary proponent of such units.
Most recently, in a book published by the United States Institute for Peace, Perito
outlines a comprehensive proposal for integrating military and civilian personnel to
form a “U.S. force for stability” that would constitute part of U.S. intervention
forces86 In a less extensive work on the same subject, Perito and a co-author stated
that this proposal constitutes “a new approach to post-conflict intervention” that
would close security gaps and break the cycle of impunity caused by a law
enforcement authority vacuum in the post-conflict period.87 As proposed, the U.S.
stability force would be comprised of four elements: (1) robust military forces, (2)
civilian constabulary units, (3) civilian police, and (4) rule of law professionals
(lawyers, judges, and corrections experts). Under the Perito model, these forces
would deploy concurrently (and not sequentially as is now the practice) in order to
provide the needed security from the outset, and to decisively bridge the deployment,
enforcement, and institution gaps. Civilian personnel would be present in the field
from the outset in order to take over law enforcement functions as soon as security
conditions permit, or immediately following the end of the major combat phase.
As Perito outlines the functioning of this model,88 the military role shifts at the
end of major combat operations from combat to providing perimeter security.
Concurrently, constabulary units take responsibility for internal security. The
function of these units, comprised of both military and civilian personnel, is to
suppress lawlessness and other forms of civil disorder. Next, civilian police
augment the military and constabulary forces to maintain and restore public safety.
Justice experts (judges, prosecutors, and court administrators) complete the force
package by ensuring the restoration of the rule of law. Over time, the preponderance
85 See, for example, Play to Win, op. cit. Recommendation #3 proposes that the U.S.
government establish an agency to create and maintain on-call lists of post-conflict
reconstruction experts, among them judicial specialists, police, and penal officers, and
provide support for mobilizing these experts as needed. PDD-71 identified such an initiative
as a high priority and instructed that “programs must be developed that enable the U.S. to
respond quickly to help establish rudimentary judicial and penal capacity during peace
operations and complex contingencies.” PDD-71, op. cit., p 6.
86 Robert M. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for
a Postconflict Stability Force. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press,
87 Field, Kimberly C., and Robert M. Perito, “Creating a Force for Peace Operations:
Ensuring Stability with Justice,” Parameters, Winter 2002-03, p 78.
88 Perito provided details on the working of the stability force model in an interview in
of personnel shifts from military to civilian, and the military component cedes
operational control over law enforcement functions to the civilian component. Perito
states that his model is similar to the current organization of the NATO military and
U.N. civilian security forces in Kosovo.
Two recent reports provide related recommendations. A November 2003 report
of the National Defense University (NDU) also recommends the concurrent
deployment of civilian “stabilization and reconstruction” personnel with combat
forces, in order to expedite the transfer of nation-building responsibilities to civilians.
The report recommends the creation of a standing interagency stabilization and
reconstruction team within the government, and the development of an “on-call”
civilian crisis management corps of medical, legal, language, and law enforcement
personnel from state and local governments and the private sector.89 A March 2004
report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommends the
establishment of an Agency for Stability Operations reporting directly to the
Secretary of State. The agency would be responsible for preparing for such
operations, as well as the management and deployment of a Civilian Stability
Operations Corps of 200-300 U.S. government civilians, who are organized, trained
and equipped for conducting such operations, and of a Civilian Stability Operations
Reserve of an unspecified number of non-government civilians with related expertise
who would be on-call for rapid deployment.90
Proponents of a “stability force” model argue it has many advantages. Many
analysts view the early deployment of rule of law personnel as essential to providing
security from the outset of an operation, which they argue will enhance the
possibilities for long-term stability and democracy in an intervened or post-conflict
country. Many also view such a structure as permitting the earlier withdrawal of
military personnel than would otherwise be possible.
Nevertheless, as proposed by Perito, such a force would require certain changes
in current U.S. practices. For the military, it would require the development of
significant constabulary capabilities, including an increased number of military
police. And, for the international civilian police component, as proposed by Perito,
constabulary and police personnel would be provided by a new federal agency, which
would recruit active duty and retired officers as temporary federal employees, instead
of being hired through contractors as is the current practice.
Because of these changes, the creation of such a force could prove controversial.
Arguments related to such a restructuring of military forces are discussed above, in
the section on constabulary forces. And, perspectives on the relative merits of a
89 Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, eds. Transformation for Stabilization and
Reconstruction Operations. Working Paper. Center for Technology and National Security
Policy, National Defense University. November 12, 2003. See pp 105-108 and 121-122 for
90 Clark A. Murdock, Michèle A. Flournoy, Christopher A. Williams, and Kurt M.
Campbell, principal authors. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New
Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report. Center for Strategic and International Studies. March 2004.
See pp 64-65.
government-employment versus a government-contracted model for CivPol
deployments are discussed in the section on H.R. 2616, above. This model, however,
is not necessarily a reserve as proposed in H.R. 2616.
While the model might offer advantages in establishing security more rapidly
in countries in crisis than recruiting on an ad hoc case-by-case basis through a
civilian contractor, the ease of deployment will depend on the method used to recruit
and hire personnel. (Perito favors federalizing at least the CivPol component of the
stability force, rather than hiring CivPols through private contractors.) Personnel
hired at the time a mission is conceived under a lengthy federal employment process
might be less quickly deployable than those called up under a reserve system, or a
stand-by on-call system, as envisioned under S. 2127, discussed above. The
availability of personnel for rapid deployment may well depend on the arrangements
under which they are recruited. If, as with the U.S. military reserve component, law
enforcement and rule of law personnel are to commit to deploy immediately when
called, they may require the type of benefits (i.e., pension, salaries for regular
training) such as members of the U.S. military reserve component receive.
Appendix A: Policing in Selected U.N. Peacekeeping and Related Operations: 1989-2004
(Data Current as of February 2004)
Aegis/OperationDurationMandate/Scope of ActivitiesUNCIVPOL andOther Police Presence
ibiaU.N. Transition Assistance Group April 1989 -Monitor elections, ceasefire, and withdrawal and1,500 maximum
(UNTAG)March 1990demobilization of military forces; monitoring and observingdeployed.
local police and extraction of national elements of South
African police force from local police stations
U.N. Angola Verification MissionMay 1991 - Verify work of joint government-opposition monitoring126 authorized for most
II (UNAVEM II)Feb. 1995teams charged with verifying and monitoring the neutralitypart, but there were
of Angolan National Police; Verify integration of a newfluctuations; 89 deployed
iki/CRS-RL32321police force.as of Oct. 1991, reduced
g/wto 18 by Dec. 1994.
s.orU.N. Angola Verification MissionFeb. 1995 -Verify and monitor the neutrality of the Angolan National260 authorized;
leakIII (UNAVEM III)June 1997Police, and quartering of the rapid reaction police.255 in field as of 1995,
://wiki288 as of June 30, 1997.
httpU.N. Observer Mission in AngolaJuly - Oct. 1997400
U.N. Operation in El SalvadorJuly 1991 -Create new police force; monitor existing national police’s631 authorized; 315
(ONUSAL)April 1995actions while new force under creation.maximum deployed.
bodiaU.N. Transitional Authority inFeb. 1992 -Supervise and control Cambodian police force; monitor to3,500 authorized;
Cambodia (UNTAC)September 1993ensure that law and order maintained effectively and3,359 maximum
impartially; assist with elections; assist with security fordeployed.
Aegis/OperationDurationMandate/Scope of ActivitiesUNCIVPOL andOther Police Presence
U.N. Protection ForceMarch 1992Monitor local police compliance with human rights standards900 initially deployed.
(UNPROFOR)(initialand facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons in
deployment ofSerb-controlled areas of Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia
CivPol toand the Krajina region.
U.N. Confidence RestorationMarch 1995 -Established to replace UNPROFOR in Serb-controlled areas 530 initially authorized.
OperationJan. 1996of Western Slavonia, the Krajina region and Eastern
( U N CRO ) Slavo nia.
U.N. Transitional AdministrationJan. 1996 -Create new police force and develop a police training
iki/CRS-RL32321in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja andWestern SirmiumJan. 1998program in area as part of program to effectively integrateEastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium into
g/w(UNT AE S) Cr o a tia.
leakU.N. Civilian Police SupportJan. 1998 - Oct.Took over from UNTAES to monitor police performance.
Gro up 1998
httpsniaU.N. Protection ForceJune 1992-Initial purpose was to monitor flow of relief supplies to40 initially deployed.
(UNPROFOR) extension of(deployment ofpreclude weapons smuggling; took on tasks of restrictingSeveral increments
police presence into Bosnia-CivPol toabusive behavior by local police in certain areas andfollowed.
HercegovinaBosnia) -regulating influx of refugees and relief supplies.
U.N. Mission in Bosnia andDec. 1995 -Monitor and observe law enforcement activities and inspect1,721 authorized
Hercegovina (UNMIBH)Dec. 2002facilities; advise and train personnel.(known as the
International Police Task
Force, or IPTF.)
European Union Police MissionJanuary 2003 -Same531 deployed as of April
(EUP M) P r esent 2003.
U.N. Protection ForceDec. 1992 -UNPROFOR mandate to monitor Macedonia’s border areas26 authorized.
(UNPROFOR) extension intoMarch 1995and report on possible threats.
Aegis/OperationDurationMandate/Scope of ActivitiesUNCIVPOL andOther Police Presence
U.N. Preventive DeploymentMarch 1995 -Same26 authorized and
(UNP RE DEP )
ambiqueU.N. Operation in MozambiqueDec. 1992 -Monitor all police activities; verify strength and location of1,115 authorized; 1,087
(ONUMOZ)Dec. 1994government police forces; verify consistency of policemaximum deployed.
actions with peace agreement and with respect for human
rights and civil liberties; monitor elections, monitor and
verify reorganization and retraining of quick reaction police,
including activities, weapons and equipment. Provide
technical support to National Police Commission. Verify
that activities of private security agencies are consistent with
g/wUnited Task Force (UNITAF - ADec. 1992 -Re-establish and train Somali police forceNo #s available for either
s.ormaliaU.S.-led multilateral coalition)March 1993operation.
U.N. Operation in Somalia IIMay 1993 -Re-establish and train Somali police force
://wiki(UNOSOM II)March 1995
httpandaU.N. Assistance Mission in1993 - 1996Monitor, supervise, and train Rwandan police.60 authorized initially,
Rwandarising to 120 authorized in
U.S.-led Multilateral ForceSept. 1994 -Create, develop, and train a new Haitian National Police820
(MNF) International PoliceMarch 1995Force (HNP)
Monitoring Force (IPMF)
Vet ex-soldiers to serve on the Haitian Interim Public
Security Force. Supervise same.
Create, develop, and train a new Haitian National Police
U.N. Mission in HaitiDeployedAssist with professionalizing the Haitian police and900 authorized; 847
(UNMIH)March 1995-maintaining a secure and stable environment in which tomaximum deployed.
June 1996continue the establishment and training of the HNP.
Aegis/OperationDurationMandate/Scope of ActivitiesUNCIVPOL andOther Police Presence
U.N. Support Mission in HaitiJuly 1996 - Support and contribute to the professionalization of the300 authorized, 225
(UNSMIH)June 1997HNP, including training specialized units in crowd control,deployed as of June 1997.
the rapid reaction force, and palace security.
U.N. Transition Mission in HaitiAug. - Nov.Assist with professionalizing HNP, particularly at the250 authorized.
(UNTMIH)1997supervisory level and training specialized police units. Also
mentoring, guiding in daily tasks, and assisting coordination
of UNDP technical advisers and bilateral donors.
U.N. Civilian Police Mission inDec. 1997 -Promote respect for human rights; reinforce HNP and300 authorized, including
Haiti (MIPONUH)March 2000judiciary.a special police unit.
International Civilian SupportMarch 2000 -Consolidate results achieved by previous missions and by100 unarmed, non-
iki/CRS-RL32321Mission in Haiti (MICAH) Feb. 2001 MICIVIH. Further promote human rights, and reinforce theuniformed; not all police
g/wHNP and the judiciary.or police-related.
leakeoneU.N. Observer Mission in SierraLeone (UNOMSIL)July 1998- Oct.1999Advise local police officials on police practice, training,equipment and recruitment; and advise on planning of55 authorized, 3 deployedinitially; 107 later
://wikireform and restructuring of the police force, and monitorprogress on the latter. authorized but notdeployed.
U.N. Mission in Sierra LeoneOct. 1999-Coordinate with and assist the Sierra Leone law enforcement170 authorized on 24
(UNAMSIL) Presentauthorities in the discharge of their responsibilities (as ofSept. 2002; 52 deployed
Feb. 7, 2000).as of Feb. 28, 2002.
U.N. Mission in KosovoJune 1999 -Provide interim law enforcement services while developing4,472 CivPol as of Oct.
(UNMIK)Presentand transferring responsibilities to a professional and2002; force of 3,024
impartial Kosovo Police Service. After transfer, provideexpected to be maintained
advisory services.through 2004. Also 1,165
special unit police, and
283 border police.
OSCE Mission in KosovoJuly 1999 -Establish new Kosovo Police Academy and train recruits.Not available.
P r esent
t TimorU.N. Transitional AdministrationOct. 1999 -Provide security and maintain law and order1,640 authorized
in East Timor (UNTAET)
Aegis/OperationDurationMandate/Scope of ActivitiesUNCIVPOL andOther Police Presence
U.N. Mission in Support of EastMay 2002Provide interim law enforcement and public security, and1,250 initial strength
Timor (UNMISET)May 2002 - assist with the development of the East Timor Police Serviceauthorized
P r esent (ET P S)
mocratic RepublicU.N. Organization Mission in theNov. 1999-Mandate expanded over time from assessing the needs and134 authorized according
the CongoDemocratic Republic of thePresentcapabilities of local police, and providing advice andto UN website; 119
Congo (MONUC)assistance to local authorities, to training local trainers anddeployed as of January
overseeing training programs in certain areas.2003, according to
beriaU.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)Sept. 2003 -Assist with national police training.1,115 authorized; 41
iki/CRS-RL32321Presentdeployed as of Nov. 30,2003.
leak: Peacekeeping Fact Sheets accessible through the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations website [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home.shtml]; fact sheet on the
Police accessible at [http://ue.eu.int/eupm]; OMIK information accessible through the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) website [http://www.osce.org];rd
://wiki Nations. The Blue Helmets, 3 edition, New York, 1996; Erwin A. Schimidl, Police in Peace Operations, Informationen Zur Sicherheitspolitik,
httpdesverteidigungsakademie/Militärwissenschaftliches Büro of Austria) No. 10, September 1998; Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot Goldberg, eds. Policing the Newld Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998, and Robert M. Perito, The American Experience with Police
ations, Clementsport, Canada: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2002.
This chart excludes a number of U.N. civilian police missions whose numbers were under 100 authorized or deployed.
Appendix B: Historical Background
Early International and Cold War U.N. Police Operations
The dispatch of groups of bilateral and multilateral international policemen to
advise and train local police forces predated the First World War. European nations
sent police units in the late 1800s to provinces of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire
and to Albania in 1913-1914 to create a new police force. Early police monitors were
deployed to guard the Suez Canal in 1882, and under the League of Nations to the
Saarland in 1935.91
The first use of U.N. civilian police in a peacekeeping operation took place in
1960 with the U.N. Operation in the Congo, when first a Ghanaian contingent was
deployed for a few months, and next a Nigerian contingent which remained for about
a year after the U.N. operation ended in 1964. They were tasked with assisting the
Congolese police in maintaining order. Subsequently, in 1962-63, the United
Nations provided a U.N. Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) to administer
West New Guinea during the transition from Dutch to Indonesian rule and recruited
Philippine police officers to assist the local force. The U.N. Peacekeeping Force in
Cyprus (UNFICYP), beginning in 1964 and continuing to the present day, was the
first operation where the term UNCIVPOL was used, and the first multilateral U.N.
police force. UNFICYP CivPols assisted Cypriot police in maintaining order and
providing security in sensitive areas in hopes of diffusing tensions.
Post-Cold War Evolution of International Police Assistance
Predominance of Monitoring Mandates, Cambodia, et al.: 1989-
Early 1992 and Recognition of Deployment and Institution Gaps. The
earliest post-cold war operations with mandates limited to or focused primarily on
monitoring the performance of local police officers commenced in 1989 through
1992. Two of the earliest post-cold war operations, in Namibia (1989-1990), and the
Western Sahara, (starting in 1991 and continuing intermittently, with the latest
UNCIVPOL presence there recorded in November 2003) took place in areas where
there were well-trained police forces, as did the U.N. operations of the Cold War
period.92 The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia
was established to monitor the electoral process leading up to South West Africa’s
independence. Unarmed CivPol monitors were to assist with this mission. In the
field, the UNCIVPOL mission increased to patrolling separate from the local police
91 Information in this paragraph is drawn from Erwin A. Schmidl. Police in Peace
Operations. Vienna, Austria: Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik, 1998; Roxane D. V.
Sismanidis. Police Functions in Peace Operations: Report for a workshop organized by the
United States Institute of Peace, March 1997 (which drew on Schmidl’s work); and Robert
M. Perito. The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations. Clementsport,
Canada: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2002.
92 Police in Peace Operations, op. cit., p 39.
and investigating complaints about them.93 According to one analyst, UNTAG
became a model for future missions in the early 1990s, setting the three main tasks
for the early monitoring missions: “accompanying local police in performing their
duties; receiving and investigating public complaints about the police; and
supervising investigations conducted by local police.”94 UNTAG was followed in
where the United Nations established a temporary administration to carry out a
referendum to decide on the future status of the former Spanish colony — a
referendum that is yet to be held because of continued opposition by Morocco.
Two other operations with strictly monitoring mandates — Angola (UNAVEM
II and III, 1991-1995) and Cambodia (1992-1994) — occurred in more difficult
situations with less established institutions and in the wake of tenuous peace accords.
Despite the limited mandates, actors in the field occasionally decided additional
functions were necessary. Police monitors were also deployed in another tenuous
situation through the U.N. Protection Force peacekeeping operation (1992-1995) to
the new states created by the break-up of Yugoslavia, with CivPols deployed in 1992,
first to Croatia, then to Bosnia-Hercegovia, and last to Macedonia for a variety of
monitoring functions. Their missions were largely overwhelmed by the escalation
of armed conflict which many analysts attribute to an inadequate mandate and
insufficient number of UNPROFOR military forces.
The U.N. Transition Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC) was one of the last
and certainly the largest and most ambitious U.N. peacekeeping operation in which
police served a strictly monitoring mandate. A broad operation in other respects,
UNTAC did little to increase the scope of police operations and powers in the
mandate. As a result, the UNTAC police mission underwent a significant shift of
responsibilities in the field. As rethought, the focus of the UNTAC police unit was
to investigate complaints of violations of political liberties and human rights. When
Cambodian police failed to apprehend those cited as suspects of such violations by
UNCIVPOLs, the U.N. Secretary-General’s representative began in January 1993
bestowing arrest powers on CivPols, by directive and for the first time in a U.N.
operation, and mandating the establishment of an UNTAC jail. Both actions,
however, came too late to make the operation effective according to some analysts.95
Cambodia was one of the first places where the slowness of deployment, which
took some 10 months to get to the field in full strength due to problems of raising a
large force, was noted as a hindrance to the effective performance of the entire
operation.96 It was also quickly recognized that although UNTAC had been assigned
the task of ensuring law and order, the numbers of authorized police were inadequate
for such a task. As a result of this deployment gap, the UNTAC police mission
93 Police in Peace Operations, op. cit., pp 33, 35.
94 From Congo to Kosovo, op. cit., p 17.
95 Janet E. Heininger. Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia. New
York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994. p 81.
96 Peacekeeping in Transition. op. cit., p 79.
initially underwent another adjustment, cutting the scope of its efforts from ensuring
law and order to monitoring elections.
While not an explicit part of the UNTAC mandate, the operation contemplated
a limited amount of training for Cambodian police, and UNTAC police quickly
recognized the need for training not only the police, but also the judiciary. According
to one analyst, “once in the field, they could clearly see the value of [such]
training....” As few resources were available, according to the same source, “Some
civil police undertook makeshift training using their own training manuals...”97
Analyses of the UNTAC operation, among others, led to the concept of the
development of an “institution gap” as UNTAC police were perceived as unable to
promote justice due to the lack of an adequate and independent judicial system,
which had been “systematically removed by the [previous] Pol Pot regime,” to punish
those that UNTAC police apprehended.98 As a result, analysts developed the idea
of deploying integrated “justice packages” of justice and penal officials, as well as
Police Reform and Training Components Added: 1992-1994, and
Recognition of Enforcement Gap. Reform of police forces became a “pivotal”
element for the first time in the U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).
According to one analyst, ONUSAL “constituted the most radical attempt to date to
put internal security forces under civilian control” with the international community
supplying “unprecedented levels of technical assistance, training, on-the-job
supervision, and material assistance to the new police force.”99 The reform role for
international police forces was established through January 1992 peace accords,
negotiated with the mediation of the United Nations from April 1990, which put an
end to El Salvador’s decade long civil war. The accords were detailed on security
affairs, calling for the dismantling of the military-controlled security forces and the
creation of a new National Civilian Police force (Policía Nacional Civil, or PNC),
and had a general reference to the reform of the judicial system.100
ONUSAL, which had started operations in July 1991 with the dispatch of
human rights monitors even before a cease-fire was declared, provided UNCIVPOLs
beginning in March 1992. Their mandate included the broad and vague direction to
cooperate “in ensuring a smooth transition and assisting police authorities,” and also
the function of “accompanying officers and members of the [existing] National
97 Peacekeeping in Transition, op. cit., p 82.
98 Trevor Findlay. Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC. SIPRI Research Report
No 9. New York, Oxford University Press, 1995, p 67.
99 William Stanley. International Tutelage and Domestic Political Will: Building a New
Civilian Police Force in El Salvador, in Otwin Marenin, ed. Policing Change, Changing
Police: International Perspectives. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1996, pp 40-41.
100 George R. Vickers, Renegotiating Internal Security: The Lessons of Central America, in
Cynthia J. Arnson, ed. Comparative Peace Process in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1999. pp 395-396.
Police in the performance of their duties.”101 These functions occurred during a two-
year transition period while a new police academy was created and the recruits for
the CNP force were trained. Although the emphasis of the ONUSAL police
operation was on verification and field work,102 ONUSAL also was responsible for
overseeing the formation of the new police academy and police force. The U.N.
Development Program (UNDP) took over the management role, soliciting and
coordinating international contributions from Spain, Norway, and Sweden, with the
United States and Chile providing assistance under bilateral agreements.103
The establishment of the new police force, which was seen as a crucial element
in the country’s reconciliation and democratization processes, was considered a
success by many analysts, even though the overall police operation encountered
significant problems. One analyst pointed to the success as “sufficient to convince
contributing governments that civilian police deployment in a peacekeeping
operation had come to stay,” despite her judgment that the success was
“overshadowed by high crime rates and the continued meddling of the El Salvadorian
While the Salvadoran experience may have been the first charged with creating
a new police force, subsequent missions in the next few years had at least an implicit,
if not an explicit, training and/or reform mandates. The first of these was the
Mozambique civilian police operation authorized in February 1994 (although the
U.N. Operation in Mozambique, ONUMOZ actually began in December 1992).
ONUMOZ’s civilian police mission was heavily monitoring, but a small training
assistance component came under the mandate’s provision to provide technical
support to the Mozambican police. According to one analyst, ONUMOZ was “a
precursor to later training and police reform missions, in that CivPol were to
‘monitor and verify the process of reorganization and retraining of the Quick
Reaction Police.’ It is important to note, however, that ONUMOZ was not itself
conducting the training.”105 An important part of international Mozambique police
support came towards the end of and after the formal UN operations, with follow-up
police reform programs conducted for several years, primarily through bilateral
training, particularly by the Spanish Guardia Civil.106 Training was an explicit part
of the mandate of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR, 1993-1996).
In two other countries — Somalia and Haiti — international forces made
concerted training and reform efforts. Both of these efforts were initiated as U.S.
101 Policing the New World Disorder, op. cit., p 109.
102 Policing the New World Disorder, op. cit., p 111.
103 Policing the New World Disorder, op. cit., p 125.
104 From Congo to Kosovo. op. cit., p 21.
105 From Congo to Kosovo, op. cit., p 17. The quote contained within this quote is cited as
from United Nations. UNDPKO/Civilian Police Unit, Briefing on Civilian Police Unit and
UNCivPol in UN Missions. New York: Civilian Police Unit, DPKO, 17 September 1997,
operations. The U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF, December 1992-March
1993), multilateral coalition began efforts to provide humanitarian assistance and to
help restore order in Somalia, where competing factions had fought to assert power
after the collapse of the lengthy dictatorship of Siad Barre. In the context of a large
military operation, UNITAF began the task of establishing an interim Auxiliary
Security Force (ASF), despite the lack of a specific mandate under the authorizing
Security Council resolution (UN SCR 794), although it had originally intended to
leave the reorganization of Somali police forces to the U.N. force which was to
follow.107 The ASF was intended to “enforce locally agreed upon laws and be
controlled by the community: in essence, [to be] a community police force,”108 and
eventually was present in 17 cities and towns.109 As perceived by one of its
organizers, the ASF “would eliminate the need for UNITAF troops to serve as police,
not only freeing them for other duties but avoiding confusion about their role and
reducing friction with the local population, thus minimizing casualties on both sides.
A police force would also enable Somalis to deal with ordinary criminal activity (as
distinct from organized looting and robbery) and give them some responsibility for
their own affairs. Finally, it would create jobs and provide income to several
thousand otherwise unemployed Somalis.”110 UNITAF encouraged the Somali
police who, according to at least one analyst, were respected by the Somali
population “to act on their own while the allied military forces were available as
back-up near the police stations.”111 Substantial assistance was provided for the ASF
by UNITAF, the United Nations, and individual nations through bilateral assistance.
According to one analyst:
The U.N. Development Program (UNDP) paid salaries and operating expenses,
provided equipment and office furnishings, and refurbished police stations.
Italian, Dutch and German police experts arrived under UNDP auspices to work
with the new force.... The Italians provided uniforms, nightsticks and whistles.
UNITAF provided surplus vehicles and radios brought from Saudi Arabia after
Operation Desert Storm. UNITAF military forces, particularly contingents from
Morocco, Botswana and the United Arab Emirates, provided training, weapons,
and conducted joint patrols in their sectors. The World Food Program provided112
food rations for ASF members and their families.
107 Robert M. Perito. The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations.
Clementsport, Canada: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2002, p 28.
108 Policing the New World Disorder, op. cit., p 189.
109 Policing the New World Disorder, op. cit., p 194.
110 John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections
on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace,
1995. p 88. [Hereafter referred to as Somalia and Operation Restore Hope.]Robert Oakley
had served in Somalia as U.S. Ambassador from 1982-1984, and was sent by President
George H.W. Bush as his special envoy to Somalia during the UNITAF period to oversee
and coordinate U.S. civilian activities there.
111 Police in Peace Operations, op. cit., p 51.
112 The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations. op. cit., p 29.
A smaller U.N. military force, the U.N. Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II),
took over from UNITAF in May 1993,113 by which time the 5,000 ASF members
were operating in the capital of Mogadishu and 17 other cities and towns114 and the
ASF was considered a credible and popular police force. In December 1993, the
U.N. announced that UNOSOM II would re-establish a 10,000 member Somali
police force by the end of 1994,115 even as the militant Somali faction led by General
Mohamed Farah Aidid increasingly challenged U.N. forces. Despite ambitious plans
for reconstructing not only the Somali police, but also the courts and prisons, the
U.N. efforts foundered due to inadequate staffing and funding. It took nearly a full
year after UNITAF departed for the first of the 54 members of the UNCIVPOL to
arrive and another two months for the unit to reach full strength. Even after they
arrived, there were enough training and cultural differences among them to impede
the development and delivery of a coherent program.116 In the interim, UNOSOM
II military forces worked with the U.S. Justice Department’s International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) to develop basic police courses
and, in March 1994, ICIPTAP sent its own trainers to conduct courses for Somali
The programs collapsed, however, amid the escalating violence and insecurity,
which was largely attributed to an insufficient U.N. military presence. ICITAP
withdrew in June 1994, and the UNCIVPOLs left in March 1995 with the forced
U.N. withdrawal. While the UNITAF ASF is judged as achieving some success in
providing police forces that offered protection to citizens and enjoyed a legitimacy
that it conferred by extension upon UNITAF, its success was attributed by some
analysts to the commitment of UNITAF to back it up when it faced a level of
violence that it could not control.
Nevertheless, by the end of the 1990s, the need for the development and reform
of existing police institutions was widely recognized. The August 2000 Brahimi
Panel Report recommended a “doctrinal shift” in the use of civilian personnel in
peace operations.117 According to the panel, the primary role and function of CivPol
personnel should be to build local police services capacity.
Enforcement and Institutional Gaps in Somalia and Haiti. UNOSOM
II’s lack of a commitment to back up UNCIVPOLs, like that which the UNITAF had
made to the ASF, contributed to the development of the concept of a law
“enforcement gap.” Analysts perceived in Somalia, as previously in Cambodia and
as in several future operations, that the presence of an adequate police force to
maintain law and order in normal circumstances may not be sufficient to control the
113 Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, op. cit., pp 49-50.
114 The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations, op. cit., p 30.
115 Policing the New World Disorder, op. cit., p 206.
116 The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations, op. cit., p 33.
117 United Nations, General Assembly Security Council, Comprehensive review of the whole
question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, identical letters dated 21 August
2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President
of the Security Council, Fifty-fifth session, A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, p 20.
sporadic outbreaks of violence or more organized violent challenges in post-conflict
situations, often due to the lack of a widely-accepted peace accord. As a result, the
use of military force may be needed to maintain law and order, often in a primary role
when violence is high, other times as a supplement to police forces when the level
The Somalia operation also demonstrated several other problems, in the
judgment of many analysts. These were that (1) an international civilian police force
cannot function where there is no effective cease-fire, (2) UNCIVPOL missions,
because of the sheer diversity of their experiences, are not, as currently constituted,
particularly well-suited for training local police, and (3) an “institutional” gap (i.e.,
the lack of adequate courts and prison system) and lack of a political settlement will
undermine even successful police reform efforts in the long run.118
Similar gaps were highlighted in Haiti, where six years of intensive U.S. and
U.N. police reform efforts demonstrated dramatically, in the opinion of some
analysts, the problems created by the institutional gap. Reform efforts in Haiti began
under the U.S.-led Multilateral Force (MFN, Sept 1994- March1995). The MFN’s
police component, the International Police Monitoring Force (IPM), with about 820
monitors from 20 countries, was formed to create, develop, and train a new Haitian
national police force (HNP). (As a complementary step, the IPM vetted former
members of Haiti’s armed forces in order to select those fit to serve on an interim
public security force which the IPM also supervised.) IPM members were allowed
to carry arms, to use force when necessary, and to make arrests, as were members of
the UNCIVPOL which followed.119 The UNCIVPOL under the subsequent U.N.
Mission in Haiti (UNMIH, which actually deployed in force from March 1995
through June 1996) took over the monitoring and training functions. Three
subsequent U.N. follow-on missions were sent to Haiti over the next five years
(through March 2000) to continue work professionalizing the Haitian police.
Analysts note careful coordination between the military and the MNF and
UNMIH civilian police to establish and maintain public security while the HNP was
trained and deployed.120 For instance, when the IPMs were slow to deploy in
sufficient strength and with a sufficient degree of organization to deter violence, the
United States adjusted MFN rules of engagement to permit the military forces to
detain and, as necessary, shoot those committing serious crimes and commenced
aggressive patrolling. The interim public security force was rapidly forced to further
fill the deployment gap before the planned deployment of the HNP between June
1995 and February 1996. MNF military police conducted separate patrols and joint
patrols with the IPMs and the IPSF. The MNF military police also provided training
with the IPMs at Haitian police stations on basic matters such as patrolling,
performing desk operations, and the appropriate use of force.
118 The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations, op. cit., pp 36-37.
119 Policing the New World Disorder, op. cit., p 220.
120 Policing the New World Disorder, op. cit., p 221. Further information in this paragraph
is from subsequent pages in the same source.
Unlike Somalia, in Haiti there was a smooth transition between the U.S.-led
MNF and the succeeding U.N. operation, and the military forces of UNMIH also
served to bridge the law enforcement gap.121 UNMIH, like the MNF, provided rapid
back-up to the UNCIVPOL, as well as MPs to police stations for liaison and
technical assistance. UNMIH also contributed to the restoration of stability by
continuing military patrols to deter crime and political violence. As the HNP
deployed, the UNCIVPOLs moved from a law enforcement role to a mentoring,
monitoring, and on-the-job training role. UNMIH military forces also monitored
HNP performance. Despite the ability of planners in the Haitian operations to
compensate for the deployment and enforcement gaps, the institutional gap — the
overcrowded prisons and the inept if not corrupt judicial system — proved a severe
impediment to the establishment of public security.122
Covering the “Enforcement Gap” in Bosnia: the creation of Special
Constabulary Units in Bosnia, 1995-1999. By mandate, the United Nations
had full responsibility for international police assistance in Bosnia from 1995-2002.
Under its mandate, that assistance was largely limited to monitoring, which was
emphasized in the first year of the operation, and training, which later took on greater
importance. The United Nations was assigned this role by the December 1995
Dayton Accords, under which the three competing populations in Bosnia agreed to
a joint government overseen by a complex international mechanism, in order to put
an end to their conflict. It carried out the role through the International Police Task
Force (IPTF), a component of the U.N. Mission to Bosnia and Hercegovina
(UNMIBH). The U.N. responsibility encompassed seven distinct functions: (1) to
monitor, observe and inspect law enforcement (LE) activities and facilities,
“including associated judicial organizations, structures and proceedings;” (2) to
advise LE personnel and forces; (3) to train LE personnel; (4) to facilitate the parties’
LE activities within the purview of the IPTF mission; (5) to assess threats to public
order and to offer advice concerning LE agencies’ abilities to deal with those threats;
(6) to advise the Bosnian government authorities on how to organize effective
civilian LE agencies; and (7) to accompany Bosnian LE personnel in the performance
of their duties as the IPTF deemed appropriate.123 In January 2003, the European
Union took responsibility for monitoring and training police in Bosnia, as well as
contributing to the development of police institutional structure, through the EU
Police Mission (i.e., the EUPM).
In practice, the 1,721 authorized unarmed IPTF CivPols, who lacked any
enforcement powers, quickly proved inadequate to the task of ensuring public order
among the three still openly hostile groups. (IPTF began deploying in January 1996
and reached full strength some eight months later, in August.124) This deficiency had
121 Policing the New World Disorder, op. cit. Information in this paragraph is taken from
122 Policing the New World Disorder. op. cit., p 237.
123 This list of functions is taken from The American Experience with Police in Peace
Operations, op. cit., p 51.
124 Andy Bair and Michael J. Dziedzic, The International Police Task Force, in Larry
been feared during the Dayton negotiations by those, including principal U.S.
negotiator Richard Holbrooke, who had argued not only for a stronger mandate for
the international CivPol, but also for a policing function for the NATO peacekeeping
Implementation Force (IFOR).125
Several analysts point to the early 1996 transfer of control of certain areas of
Sarajevo, with the relocation of many residents in early 1996 when only a few
hundred IPTF personnel had been deployed, as an early test for both the IPTF and
IFOR. IFOR provided much needed assistance to the still-organizing IPTF, with civil
affairs police specialists helping to plan the operation (as well as providing other
assistance in organizing the force),126 and thus, to compensate in part for the slow
deployment of IPTF personnel. In some analysts’ judgment, the death of only one
person during the weeks of relocation was a “remarkable accomplishment,”127 but
the gutting, burning, and booby-trapping of many dwellings in the process pointed
to an “enforcement gap” given that IPTF had “neither the authority nor the resources
to act” and IFOR refused to act in a law enforcement capacity in the absence of an
imminent threat to life. In the opinion of one analyst, the result, a flight of Bosnian
Serbs from Sarajevo suburbs, led to the perception of yet another U.N. failure in
Bosnia, and a loss of credibility for understaffed and under-resourced IPTF, which
lacked law enforcement powers. “Arguably,” she writes, “it took the IPTF almost
a year to recover from its inability to live up to exaggerated expectations and made
it more difficult to gain popular confidence.”128 In late 1996, the smaller NATO
Stabilization Force (SFOR) replaced IFOR; operating under the same provisions of
the Dayton Peace Accord as IFOR, it provided backup when the IPTF did not possess
adequate force to maintain public order.
The “enforcement gap” in Bosnia was also covered in another way: the
development of “specialized units” within the IPTF, a term that meant paramilitary
forces (i.e., police forces specially trained in certain military skills necessary to
handle exceptional law enforcement situations, especially hostile groups).
Paramilitary and paramilitary-like police units from foreign nation, principally the
Gendarmarie from France, the Carabinieri from Italy, and the Guardia Civil from
Spain, had taken part in other policing operations. In the early 1990s, they were
integrated into international CivPols and not assigned special functions. By the late
1990s, however, the utility of such police to fill “a perceived gap between military
capabilities and the abilities of unarmed police monitors” was recognized. The first
place that the gap was filled with such a unit was in Bosnia in 1998, when the
Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) was formed. The MSU was assigned the tasks
Wentz, ed., Lessons From Bosnia, The IFOR Experience. Washington, D.C.: National
Defense University, 1997, p 143.
125 International Crisis Group. Policing the Police in Bosnia: A Further Reform Agenda,
ICG Balkans Report No. 130. May 10, 2002, pp 4-5.
126 Michael J. Dziedzic and Andrew Bair. Bosnia and the International Police Task Force,
in Policing the New World Disorder, op. cit., p 302.
127 The International Police Task Force, op. cit., p 151.
128 From Congo to Kosovo, op. cit., p 86.
of protecting elected officials and those who returned to their former homes in hostile
areas, and could be called upon to back up the IPTF in preserving public order.129
The Bosnia experience was successful enough to warrant the formation of such units
in Kosovo and East Timor.130
Mandates Granting Executive Authority: Kosovo and East Timor,
1999. The final expansion of the mandates and powers of international civilian
police occurred in two peacekeeping operations that began in 1999: the U.N. Mission
in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET). In both operations, the UNCIVPOLs were given mandates that included
“executive authority” powers (i.e., the authority to carry arms and make arrests). In
both cases, the decision to provide international police forces with executive
authority reflected the absence of any legitimate, effective local authority.
After the end of the coalition air war against Serbia, NATO and the United
Nations took responsibility for stabilizing Kosovo and providing continuing security
there. Beginning in June 1999, and continuing to the present day, NATO has
provided a military presence through the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the United
Nations has taken responsibility for all civil administration functions, including
policing, through UNMIK. In addition, the OSCE was given responsibility, under
the UNMIK structure, for overseeing and training the Kosovo Police Service (KPS),
comprised of a growing number of local police officers.
In East Timor, the U.N. Transitional Administration (UNTAET) provided a
complete civil administration from October 1999 through May 2002 for East Timor
as it made a transition from its former status as a province of Indonesia to self-131
government as an independent state. With Indonesia’s decision to leave the
province after protracted civil conflict, and its withdrawal of all Indonesian security
forces, a complete security vacuum would have existed without a mandate for U.N.
forces, in conjunction with the Australian-led military peacekeeping force (the
International Force in East Timor or INTERFET), to exercise executive authority.
Despite these cases, a mandate for the exercise of executive authority is judged
by many analysts as highly problematic and unlikely to be a wise choice in many
other future situations. Although some analysts and practitioners argue that
“executive authority is inevitable when there is no local police force to monitor or132
train,” the number of available international civilian police personnel capable of
responsibly and effectively exercising such authority is limited, and forces of such
police will be even more difficult to recruit and deploy in a timely manner than forces
with more limited mandates. In cases where local police forces exist, but may be
129 From Congo to Kosovo, op. cit., p 71.
131 The United Nations, which since 1960 had listed East Timor as a non-self governing
territory administered by Portugal, had never recognized Indonesia’s 1976 militaryth
integration of East Timor as its 27 province after civil war had broken out in East Timor
over the issue of its future status.
132 From Congo to Kosovo, op. cit., p 28.
considered as unsuited to perform their duties without considerable, and time-
consuming vetting, practitioners and policymakers will make case by case decisions
regarding the desirability of executive policing. For many, sovereignty
considerations will be an additional important factor to weigh.