9/11 Commission Recommendations: The Senate Confirmation Process for Presidential Nominees

CRS Report for Congress
9/11 Commission Recommendations: The Senate
Confirmation Process for Presidential Nominees
Updated March 23, 2005
Betsy Palmer
Analyst in American National Government
Government and Finance Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

9/11 Commission Recommendations: The Senate
Confirmation Process for Presidential Nominees
Summary
On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, issued its final report, detailing the
events up to and including the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks upon the United
States. The report contained 41 recommendations on ways to prevent future
catastrophic assaults, including a series of proposals designed to improve the
presidential appointments process as it relates to the top national security officials at
the beginning of a new administration. On October 6, the Senate passed legislation
(S. 2845) to implement many of the changes recommended by the 9/11 Commission.
The House on October 8 passed its version of the legislation (H.R. 10). The
President signed the final version of the bill on December 17, 2004 (P.L. 108-458).
Two other measures dealing with the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations (S. 2774
and H.R. 5040) were introduced in early September.
The 9/11 Commission recommended that the Senate adopt rules requiring
hearings and votes to confirm or reject national security nominees within 30 days of
their submission at the start of each new presidential administration. Implicit in the
proposal is the assumption that there is a problem with the process for nominating
and confirming presidential appointees. Analysis of Senate consideration of the
initial nominations by Presidents William J. Clinton and George W. Bush to the posts
covered by the recommendation shows that the commission’s proposed timetable was
not met in 14 of the 49 cases, suggesting this is an issue in a minority of cases.
The Constitution gives the Senate a role in the presidential appointments
process, but the parameters of that role have never been clearly defined. The current
process is regulated by a mixture of formal rules and informal customs, as well as by
political interactions between the President and Senators. Implementing the
commission’s proposal would presumably require instituting procedures that
guarantee committee consideration of each nomination, at least at a hearing, and a
final vote on each by the full Senate. Changes of this kind would involve new
restrictions on both the power of committee chairs to control the agenda of their
committees and the rights of Senators to delay or block nominations through holds
and extended debate. These changes would likely also alter the relationship between
the legislative and executive branches, weakening the negotiating posture of the
Senate in relation to the President, particularly if they were to be extended to
additional nominations.
Procedures adequate to implement the commission’s recommendation would
resemble an expedited procedure, such as those used in resolutions of approval and
disapproval of executive actions. Procedural changes of this kind could be achieved
by amending the Standing Rules of the Senate, changing the Standing Orders of the
Senate, passing a Constitutional Amendment enacting an expedited procedures
statute, or reaching a unanimous consent agreement.
This report will be updated as events warrant.

Contents
The 9/11 Commission’s Proposal.....................................2
Congressional Response........................................2
Scope of the Issue.............................................3
Recent Experience.............................................4
Advice and Consent................................................6
The Current Process............................................8
Implementation of the 9/11 Commission’s Recommendation................9
Committee Proceedings.........................................9
Floor Consideration...........................................10
Implementation Requirements...................................12
Necessary Elements.......................................13
Means of Implementation......................................14
Expedited Procedures Statute...............................14
Amending Senate Rules....................................14
Constitutional Amendment.................................14
Unanimous Consent.......................................15
Standing Order...........................................15
Implications for the Confirmation Process.............................15
The Balance of Nomination Politics..............................15
Changing Politics Rather Than Rules.............................17
Broader Implications..........................................18
Alternative Approaches........................................19
Existing Rules...........................................19
Expiring Nominations.....................................20
List of Tables
Table 1. Initial Appointments by President George W. Bush to Top Positions
at the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State,
and the Central Intelligence Agency ..............................21
Table 2. Appointment Information for Four William J. Clinton Appointees
Who Continued in Office Under President George W. Bush...........25
Table 3. Initial Appointments by President William J. Clinton to Top Positions
at the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State, and the Central
Intelligence Agency ...........................................26

9/11 Commission Recommendations:
The Senate Confirmation Process for
Presidential Nominees
On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, issued its final report, detailing
the events up to and including the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.
The commission made 41 recommendations to Congress and the President on ways
to prevent future catastrophic assaults. As a part of its recommendations concerning
“Unity of Effort in the Congress,” the 9/11 Commission included a series of
proposals designed to improve the presidential appointments process as it relates to
the top national security officials during presidential transitions.
Recommendation: Since a catastrophic attack could occur with little or no notice,
we should minimize as much as possible the disruption of national security
policymaking during the change of administrations by accelerating the process
for national security appointments. We think the process could be improved
significantly so transitions can work more effectively and allow new officials to¹
assume their new responsibilities as quickly as possible.
In the specific steps needed to implement this recommendation, the 9/11
Commission mentions the Senate confirmation process in a single sentence: “The
Senate, in return, should adopt special rules requiring hearings and votes to confirm²
or reject national security nominees within 30 days of their submission.”
This short proposal appears to require major changes in the way the Senate
conducts its part of the process. The 9/11 Commission’s report did not say how to
implement or enforce their recommendation. This report addresses these questions
and also discusses the rationale for and implementation of the recommendation.

¹ The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11
Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (Washington: GPO, 2004), p. 422. Hereafter cited as The 9/11
Commission Report.
² The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 422.

The 9/11 Commission’s Proposal
On November 27, 2002, Congress created a commission charged with
investigating the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. The
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as
the 9/11 Commission, was to
make a full and complete accounting of the circumstances surrounding the
attacks, and the extent of the United States’ preparedness for, and immediate
response to, the attacks; and…investigate and report to the President and
Congress on its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective³
measures that can be taken to prevent acts of terrorism.
The panel’s July 22 report was the culmination of a series of hearings and
investigations by the panel and its staff into the terrorist attacks. The report included
a wide-ranging series of proposals to change intelligence agencies of the executive
branch and some committee structures within the legislative branch.
The 9/11 Commission’s recommendations on the appointment process are
designed to make it quicker and more predictable for a relatively small group of
nominees. The proposal is relatively sparse on details, and implementing it would
require the Senate to flesh out the plan substantially; however, it is clear that the
recommended changes in the Senate’s confirmation process would provide a certain
up-or-down vote by the full chamber on all National Security Team nominees within
a definitive time frame (30 days) after a nomination is made at the start of an
administration.
Congressional Response
On October 6, the Senate passed, by a vote of 96-2, legislation (S. 2845),
introduced by Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Chair Susan Collins and
Ranking Member Joseph I. Lieberman, that would implement many of the 9/11
Commission’s recommendations. As introduced, the bill did not address the 9/11
Commission’s proposal to institute a time-frame for Senate consideration of national
security nominees at the start of a new presidential administration. During
consideration of the measure, Senators adopted by voice vote an amendment that
added “sense of the Senate” language to the bill. It states that the “Senate
committees to which these nominations are referred should, to the fullest extent
possible, complete their consideration of these nominations, and, if such nominations
are reported by the committees, the full Senate should vote to confirm or reject these
nominations within 30 days of their submission.” This is, essentially, an affirmation
of the current confirmation process.
The House-passed version of the bill contains a different approach. The bill (an
amendment to S. 2845, formerly H.R. 10, which passed by a vote of 282-134) would
require that the Office of Personnel Management create a list of all national security
positions which require Senate confirmation.

³ P.L. 107-306, 116 Stat 2383.

The House provision would not change the current system for the top level of
national security appointees, such as the Secretary of Defense, who are Level I
employees on the Executive Schedule. The President would chose his nominee and
submit their name to the Senate for its advice and consent. The nominee would not
be confirmed in the position without Senate action.
For Executive Schedule Level II employees, such as the Deputy Attorney
General, and Executive Level III employees, such as an under secretary of State,
however, the House provision would require that the Senate act within 30 days of
receiving a nomination, or the nomination would go into effect without action by the
Senate. Finally, for Level IV and Level V national security employees who currently
require Senate confirmation, the House provision would remove that requirement and
make them appointed at the discretion of the President.
The House-passed bill does not contain any details about how the Senate would
implement the change for Level II and Level III employees, concerning the 30-day
deadline, but it is reasonable to assume that the analysis of the 9/11 Commission’s
recommended 30-day deadline would be applicable (see section “Implementation of
the 9/11 Commission’s Recommendation”).
On November 20, House and Senate conferees on the 9/11 legislation reported
out a compromise measure. It includes the Senate-passed “sense of the Senate”
provision on presidential nominations, not the House-passed language. Last-minute
objections prevented either chamber from voting on the compromise measure at that
time, but Congress returned in early December to consider the bill.⁴ The House
passed the bill by a vote of 336-75 on December 7, 2004, and the Senate followed
suit the next day, passing the bill by a vote of 89-2. President George W. Bush
signed the bill into law on December 17, 2004 (P.L. 108-458).
Scope of the Issue
The National Security Team, as defined by the 9/11 Commission, would
include roughly 31 positions from the Defense Department, the Homeland Security
Department, the Justice Department, the State Department, and the Central
Intelligence Agency. The group extends from the heads of the departments down
through and including the Under Secretary positions.⁵
In testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on July 30,
Commission Chair Thomas Kean told Members that the Senate should “treat these
nominations unlike other nominations in that they recognize the speed with which we
need those people in place.”⁶ The report of the 9/11 Commission also pointed out
that the time for transition between the Clinton Administration and the Bush

⁴ Walter Pincus, “Passage of Intelligence Bill Called Doubtful: Lawmakers Say Bush,
Cheney Need to Lobby,” Washington Post, Nov. 22, 2004, p. A3.
⁵ Jonathan Stull, communications assistant, 9/11 Commission, telephone conversation with
the author, Aug. 9, 2004.
⁶ Transcript of committee hearing on LexisNexis, accessed on Aug. 20, 2004, p. 45.

Administration was shortened. “The dispute over the election and the 36-day delay
cut in half the normal transition period. Given that a presidential election in the
United States brings wholesale change in personnel, this loss of time hampered the
new administration in identifying, recruiting, clearing and obtaining Senate
confirmation of key appointees.”⁷
The commission’s recommendations built on the work of a series of
commissions and scholars who have investigated the appointment process generally
over the last 20 years. Virtually all of the studies reached a similar conclusion: that
it takes too long to get presidential nominations through the appointment process.
The Presidential Appointment Initiative, for example, a project of the Brookings
Institution, found in 2001 that “there is ample evidence that the process for both
nominating and confirming talented citizens to presidential service is failing at its
most basic tasks.”⁸ That followed a similar study in 1996 called the 20^th Century
Task Force on the Presidential Appointment Process, which called for prohibiting
Senators from delaying consideration of nominee by using extended debate, called
a filibuster.⁹
“That the nomination and confirmation process is broken is a truism now widely
accepted by both Republicans and Democrats,” wrote congressional scholars Norman
Ornstein and Thomas Donilon in 2001. “The lag in getting people into office
seriously impedes good governance. A new president’s first year — clearly the most
important year for accomplishments and the most vulnerable to mistakes — is now
routinely impaired by the lack of supporting staff. For executive agencies, leaderless
periods mean decisions not made, initiatives not launched, and accountability not
upheld.”¹⁰
Recent Experience
One of the complaints about the nominations process from scholars and
commissions has been that nominations can get bogged down in the Senate
confirmation process, sometimes falling victim to parliamentary devices that can
prevent a final vote on the nomination from taking place. An analysis of data on how
the Clinton Administration and the current Bush Administration were able to fill
those offices considered to make up the National Security Team at the beginning of
their administrations shows that Senate delay does not tend to be a major problem for
this subset of nominees. The Senate did not reject any of the National Security Team
nominations in either administration.¹¹

⁷ Ibid, p. 198.
⁸ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, The State of the Presidential
Appointment Process, hearings, 107^th Cong., 1^st sess., Apr. 4-5, 2001 (Washington: GPO,

2001), p. 285.

⁹ Ibid, p. 188.
¹⁰ Norman Ornstein and Thomas Donilon, “The Confirmation Clog,” Foreign Affairs, vol.

79, no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 2000), p. 89.

¹¹ That is not to say that the Senate never rejects a nominee. During the George H.W. Bush
(continued...)

The amount of time it took nominations to work their way through the Senate
varied widely in this small sample, from one day for secretaries of state and defense
in both administrations, to 128 days for the Defense Department’s Under Secretary
for Policy in the Clinton Administration. For both administrations, the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of State were confirmed on Inauguration Day.
As Table 1 shows, of the 31 positions in the Bush Administration that would
be included in the new deadline, 22 were confirmed ahead of the 30-day schedule,
four were holdovers from the Clinton Administration (and did not require
reconfirmation) and five nominations took longer than 30 days to win Senate
confirmation. The median elapsed days from submission of the nomination until
Senate confirmation was 21 days.
As Table 1 also shows, for all National Security Team nominees, the process
of nomination by the President took longer than the process of confirmation by the
Senate. In some instances, the delay between the start of the vacancy to the choice
of a presidential nomination was two to three times longer than the time from
nomination to confirmation.
Of the five nominations that exceeded 30 days for Senate confirmation in the
Bush Administration, all were confirmed within 73 days — four of the five were
confirmed in less than 60 days. In all five instances, the delay between the start of
the vacancy and the choice of nominee was longer than the time between the
nomination and confirmation of the nominee.
As Table 2 shows, the four holdovers from the Clinton Administration had a
longer confirmation time during their original consideration by the Senate. The mean
time for those nominations was 75 days.
As Table 3 shows, the Clinton Administration’s National Security Team
members were also confirmed largely ahead of the 30-day deadline. For the 23
positions covered by the definition,¹² seven were considered by the Senate for more
than 30 days. One was a holdover from the previous administration (and did not
require reconfirmation), one of those was confirmed at 36 days, another at 44 days,
the next after 47 days and another at 51 days. The remaining two nominees had
lengthy confirmations — one was 122 days and the final one was 128 days.
Table 3 also shows, however, that, as with the Bush Administration, the delays
by the Clinton Administration in making its appointments were generally longer than

¹¹ (...continued)
Administration, the Senate rejected the nomination of former Senator John R. Tower to be
Secretary of Defense by a vote of 47-53 on Mar. 10, 1989. Also, President Clinton
withdrew the nomination of Anthony Lake to be Director of Central Intelligence on Apr. 18,
1997, after three days of contentious confirmation hearings by the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence.
¹² The number of positions for the Clinton Administration is smaller than those for the Bush
Administration because the Department of Homeland Security did not exist and the position
of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence had not been created.

the Senate confirmation process. Typically, the time to presidential nomination was
significantly longer than the Senate confirmation, sometimes several times as long.
As this information shows, the 9/11 Commission’s proposal for an accelerated
Senate confirmation process would not have affected 35 of the 49 National Security
Team nominations that were in office before the 30-day deadline. A review of the
data on the speed with which new administrations have been able to get their
National Security Team members in place suggests this is an issue in a minority of
cases.
Advice and Consent
The recommendation of the 9/11 Commission would deal with only a small
subset of the presidential nominations considered by the Senate. With respect to the
offices included in the National Security Team, however, it would place substantial
new conditions on how the Senate carries out its role in confirming presidential
nominees. While the Constitution includes the Senate in the confirmation process,
it does not spell out how the chamber should fulfill its role of providing advice and
consent to a nomination. The extent of legislative and executive control of the
process has in many respects remained undetermined.
In response to this Constitutional indeterminancy, some have asserted that the
Senate should have a co-equal role with the President in the process.
The Senate’s responsibility for confirming presidential nominees, although fixed
firmly in the Constitution, remains unsettled in its application. The Senate was
not meant to be a passive participant. Delegates to the Philadelphia convention
believed that the Senate would be knowledgeable about nominees and capable
of voting wisely. Yet, for the most part, it has acted cautiously, uncertain of the
scope of its own constitutional power. The source of this uncertainty is not the
Constitution. Nowhere in that document, or in its history, is there an obligation
on the part of the Senate to approve a nomination. On the contrary, the burden
should be on the President to select and submit a nominee with acceptable¹³
credentials.
Others have said the Senate should play a lesser role, allowing the President
greater leeway in his choices for office than is currently the case. Law professor John
C. Eastman told the Senate Rules Committee on June 5, 2003, that
... the appointment power is located in Article II of the Constitution, which
defines the powers of the President, not in Article I, which defines the powers of
the legislature. As the Supreme Court itself has noted, by vesting appointment
power in Article II, the framers of our Constitution intended to place primary

¹³ Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President (Lawrence,
Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1997), p. 38.

responsibility for appointments in the President. The “advice and consent” role¹⁴
for the Senate, then, was to be narrowly construed.
The practice of the Senate, however, has not systematically reflected either of
these perspectives. Historically, much of the regular order of business on the
nomination and confirmation of presidential appointments has been regulated not by
strict, formal rules, but rather by informal customs that can change (and have
changed) over the years, as the relative balance of power between the President and
the Senate ebbs and flows. It is these traditions which form the process, according
to appointments expert Michael J. Gerhardt.
These informal arrangements — those not clearly required or clearly prohibited
by the Constitution — have come to define the dynamic in the federal
appointments process. The informal arrangements through which the system
operates — including senatorial courtesy; logrolling; individual holds, “blue
slips”; consultation between presidents, members of Congress, and other
interested parties, including judges; interest group lobbying; strategic leaking by
administrations, senators and interest groups; manipulation of the press; the
media’s effort to influence the news; and nominees’ campaigning — are the sum
and substance of the federal appointments process. Studying these arrangements
provide even greater illumination than studying Supreme Court decisions or the
Constitution itself of how the different branches of the federal government¹⁵
interact on matters of mutual concern.
Under these informal customs, individual Senators have, historically, been
deeply involved in the nomination and confirmation process. The procedures and
traditions that have developed have tended to protect the autonomy of individual
Senators to choose how to fulfill the advice and consent role, rather than to dictate¹⁶
the process for all Senators.
It is this combination — unwritten Senate traditions and the protection of each
Senator’s rights — that has led critics of the process to call for changes similar to
those proposed by the 9/11 Commission. “[T]he Senate’s confirmation process is
entirely consistent with all of its other norms, traditions and rules. Concern for the
rights and prerogatives of individual senators gives rise to numerous opportunities
for obstruction and delay,” argued political scientists Nolan McCarty and Rose¹⁷
Razaghian.

¹⁴ Testimony of Professor Eastman, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration, Senate Rule XXII and Proposals to Amend This Rule, hearings, 108^th Cong.,^st
1 sess., June 5, 2003. The testimony is available online from the committee website at
[http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2003/060503Eastman.htm], visited Mar. 22, 2005.
¹⁵ Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Appointments Process: A Constitutional and Historical
Analysis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), p. 338.
¹⁶ See CRS Report RL31948, Evolution of the Senate’s Role in the Nomination and
Confirmation Process: A Brief History, by Betsy Palmer.
¹⁷ Nolan McCarty and Rose Razaghian, “Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to
Executive Branch Nominations 1885-1996,” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 43,
issue 4 (Oct. 1999), p. 1125.

The Current Process
With respect to nominations to the National Security Team, the
recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission would require some major changes
in the way the Senate typically conducts its business. In exchange for a relatively
quick and predictable process, Senators as a group and as individuals would
relinquish some of their current rights under the Senate’s rules and practices.
Under current practice, once the President has chosen an individual for a
position, the nomination is submitted to the Senate, and referred to the committee
with jurisdiction over the agency or office which the nominee would fill. The
committee may or may not act on the nomination. If the committee approves the
nomination, it goes before the full Senate, which may or may not take up the
nomination on the floor. If the Senate does proceed to consider the nomination, it
may or may not proceed to a final vote. A final vote of the full Senate is required for
a nomination to be confirmed. The President gives to the confirmed nominee a
commission with the seal of the United States, and the individual is sworn into
office.¹⁸
Nominations are part of the executive business of the Senate (the other
component being ratification of treaties). These are matters that come directly from
the President and require the Senate’s approval to implement. The Senate treats these
items as separate from its legislative business: they are placed on a different calendar
(the Executive Calendar), and the Senate must be in executive session to consider
them. The official record of Senate action on treaties and nominations is known as
the Executive Journal, while the record of Senate action on legislation and other
matters is called the Senate Journal.
In practice, the chair of the committee of jurisdiction generally has the discretion
whether to move the nominee through his or her committee or not. The action can
take the form of a hearing at which the nominee testifies or a markup of the
committee to formally approve the nomination and send it on to the full chamber, or
both. If the committee reports a nomination, the majority leader may ask unanimous
consent, or move, that the Senate enter executive session to take it up. He is not
required to take either action. (In principle, any Senator may move to take up a
nomination, but in practice the Senate treats this action as the prerogative of the
majority leader.) If the Senate agrees to take up the nomination, it may proceed to
a final vote, but again, it is not required to do so.
While a nomination is pending before the Senate, any Senator or group of
Senators may act to delay or defeat the nomination by extended debate, called a
filibuster. The Senate custom of “holds,” which can allow a Senator or group of
Senators to delay consideration of a measure or matter, has also been used to prevent
full Senate consideration of nominations.

¹⁸ For more on the role of the executive branch during the appointment process, see CRS
Report RL31346, Presidential Appointments to Full-Time Positions in Executive^th
Departments During the 107 Congress, 2001-2002, by Henry B. Hogue.

While the vast majority of presidential nominees receive Senate action, not all
do. Senate rules do not require that a nominee receive consideration. “There is
nothing inherent in the appointments process that forces action, as there is, for
example in the budget process. If the Congress fails to act on the budget, the
unpleasant prospect of a government shutdown looms. This usually inspires action,
even if it is not always completed by the first day of the new fiscal year. An
appointment carries no similar sense of urgency,” noted political scientist G. Calvin
Mackenz i e.¹⁹
In the case of nominees, by contrast, if the Senate does act, there is no
established time frame for that action. “The mere fact that the President submits a
name for consideration does not obligate the Senate to act promptly,” wrote
separation-of-powers scholar Fisher.²⁰
Implementation of the 9/11 Commission’s
Recommendation
Committee Proceedings
The 9/11 Commission’s proposal, and most likely the House-passed provision
to S. 2845, would presumably require that Senate committee chairs schedule
confirmation hearings on the proposed members of the National Security Team. If
hearings were not held on the nominee in a timely fashion or the nomination not
reported out after a certain number of days, the nomination would presumably be
discharged, either automatically or through a motion to discharge. As a result of this
change, a nomination could come before the full Senate for consideration without
having had a hearing in the committee of jurisdiction. While some argue that too
many nominations are subject to Senate confirmation hearings, it is unlikely that
Senators would want to skip such a step in the case of the Secretary of State or
Secretary of Defense.
This change would constitute a major change in the established prerogative of
committee chairs. The power of committee chairs to control the agenda of their
panels is longstanding. Several times in recent years, committee chairs have refused
to grant a nominee a hearing, and effectively prevented the Senate from being able
to act on the nomination.²¹ The Senate can discharge a committee from consideration
of a nomination, and frequently does so by unanimous consent when the nominations
concerned are non-controversial. When there is opposition, however, the process to

¹⁹ G. Calvin Mackenzie, “The State of the Presidential Appointments Process,” in his
Innocent Until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments Process,
(Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 34.
²⁰ Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President, p. 27.
²¹ Donna Cassata, “Weld Blows Bitter Kisses As Curtain Comes Down,” CQ Weekly, vol.
55, Sept. 20, 1997, p. 2240; Stewart M. Powell, “Clinton threatens to bypass Senate in
naming of civil rights nominee, Tampa Tribune, Dec. 13, 1997, p. 4.

discharge the committee from further consideration of the nomination is difficult and
subject to filibuster, and has been used rarely.
Responding to concerns that committee chairs were too powerful in their ability
to block consideration of legislation, the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act created
a new Senate rule to allow a majority of a committee to call a meeting without the
approval of the chair. ²² It is rarely used, perhaps because of the inherent political
consequences of challenging a committee chair’s authority, because the chair retains
control over the agenda for any new meeting scheduled, or because the threat is
sufficient to bring about action by the chair.
Implementing the 9/11 Commission’s proposal would require guaranteeing
action on a nominee at the committee level. It would accordingly weaken the power
of the chair to use his or her position to block a nomination.
Floor Consideration
The deadline proposed by the 9/11 Commission and the House also would seem
to exclude the possibility of Senators placing holds on these nominees to postpone
their consideration for any length of time. It would mean that votes on these specific
nominations would have to be protected against being delayed by a filibuster.
Senators have several times refused to allow the Senate to reach a final vote on
a nomination, thus permitting a filibuster, or extended debate, to kill that
nomination.²³ In other instances, a Senator or a group of Senators has placed a
“hold” on a nomination, which can also effectively kill the nominee’s chance for
confirmation. The system of “holds” is not a formal part of the Senate rules; rather,
it is a practice honored by the Senate leadership. If a Senator or a group of Senators
tell their leader they want to place a hold on a nomination (or a piece of legislation),
the leader may decide to honor that request and not schedule the nomination for floor
consideration. The leader also may decide to honor the hold for a specific period of
time or not at all. The power of the hold lies in its implicit threat — that if the item
is scheduled for floor consideration, the concerned Senator and his or her allies might
wage a filibuster and try to prevent a final up or down vote on the matter.²⁴
Holds and filibusters are essentially two versions of the negative power of the
Senate and its Members — the ability to stop something from happening, whether it
be passage of piece of legislation, ratification of a treaty or confirmation of a
nomination. The 9/11 Commission’s recommendation, which calls for a guaranteed
up or down vote on all nominees in the National Security Team, would require
altering these traditions. In order to ensure that nominees receive a final vote, it
would be necessary to preclude the possibility of a successful filibuster. If the
nomination had to be acted upon within 30 days, the hold would lose its power as

²² Senate Rule XXVI.
²³ See CRS Report RL32878, Cloture Attempts on Nominations, by Richard S. Beth and
Betsy Palmer.
²⁴ See CRS Report 98-712, “Holds” in the Senate, by Walter J. Oleszek.

well — under those rules, a delay of a day, even a week, is unlikely to be detrimental
to a nominee’s ultimate confirmation.
Many critics argue that Senators should not be able to use these powers to block
action on nominations, that it distorts the confirmation process and prevents the full
chamber from working its will. “Holds, mentioned nowhere in Senate rules, are
antidemocratic and probably unconstitutional (although not likely subject to judicial
review since the courts tend to be deferential to political questions)…Yet the hold
subjects nominations to a single senator’s veto,” argue Ornstein and Donilon.²⁵
Political scientist Christopher J. Deering wrote that the practice of holds has
been destructive to the confirmation process. “[M]embers of the Senate of both
parties have placed holds on particular individuals. In some cases, the nominee is the
target, in other cases merely a pawn, but in either case the use of the nominees as, in
effect, hostages has undermined the integrity of the system.… [T]he use of such
holds is a serious abuse of the current system.”²⁶
As political scientist Barbara Sinclair has noted, however, holds are not
meaningful unless they are backed up by the threat of filibuster. Therefore, it is the
Senate’s tradition of unlimited debate on most subjects, including nominations, that
is at the heart of this dispute. Sinclair observed:
As long as members are willing to back their holds with actual extended debate,
the leaders are faced with an impossible situation when floor time is short.
Assuming that the bill is not “must” legislation, calling it up is likely to consume
scarce time unproductively, time for which the leaders have multiple and²⁷
clamorous requests.
Supporters of the Senate’s tradition of unlimited debate argue that it is a
necessary component of the chamber’s procedures. “Advocates of restrictions on
debate rest their case on the cliches of democracy, and transform government by a
majority from an imperfect device into an eternal principle,” wrote Senate historian
Lindsay Rogers. “Yet curiously enough, freedom of debate, although sanctioning
minority control by avoirdupois rather than by argument, has proved to be a valuable
safeguard against executive inefficiency and corruption,” he concludes.²⁸
Senator J.W. Fulbright, in 1957, during Senate debate on a proposal to change
its rules to make it easier to invoke cloture and end debate, defended extended debate
this way:

²⁵ Norman Ornstein and Thomas Donilon, “The Confirmation Clog,” p. 96.
²⁶ Christopher J. Deering, “Damned if You Do and Damned if You Don’t,” in G. Calvin
Mackenzie, ed., The In-and-Outers: Presidential Appointees and Transient Government in
Washington (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 117.
²⁷ Barbara Sinclair, The Transformation of the U.S. Senate (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1989), p. 131.
²⁸ Lindsay Rogers, The American Senate (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1968),
pp. 5, 7.

The great distinction between the Senate and the other body of Congress
is the power of the Senate to examine and to subject approval of measures to
delay, in order that the people themselves may be able to understand
controversial issues. I hope Senators will not take seriously the argument that
democracy is in some way equivalent to majority rule, because there is nothing
whatsoever to such an argument. There is nothing in our Constitution which in
any respect implies, directly or indirectly, that majority rule should be the rule²⁹
of the Senate.
Others have argued that the full Senate must be able to act on presidential
nominees and not allow one or several Senators to block a confirmation vote.
Political scientist Brannon P. Denning put it this way:
The notion of “advice and consent” is mutable. It has evolved from an alleged
“rubberstamp” into a right to inquire into the jurisprudential commitments of
Supreme Court nominees, to a right to disapprove nominees because a particular
senator believes that they are not “ambassadorial quality.” Tools for facilitating
“consensus” — said to be the raison d’etre of most Senate rules and procedures
— have, in short order, been fashioned into weapons of minority rule.…
[C]ustoms like the “hold” and the prerogative of committee chairs have, lately,
been exercised not for the benefit of the Senate as an institution, or even for the³⁰
benefit of a particular party, but for the benefit of individual senators.
Implementation Requirements
Rules implementing the requirements outlined above would have the main
features of an expedited procedure. Expedited procedures are tools used by the
House and Senate that can override the normal parliamentary procedure to ensure
relatively quick action on a particular measure or matter. Examples of expedited
procedures, also known as “fast track” provisions, include the Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Act of 1990 and the Trade Act of 1974, the process by which
Congress considers most trade agreements.³¹
Given its call for a deadline-mandated, up or down vote on each nominee in the
National Security Team, the most likely way to implement the 9/11 Commission’s
recommendation or the House-passed provision of S. 2845 would be for the Senate
to create a new expedited procedure that would apply to this specific set of
nominations. Expedited procedures have not previously been used in the Senate to
consider executive business, so enactment of the 9/11 Commission’s
recommendations would be precedent-setting. That would not necessarily, however,
be a barrier to using expedited procedures for executive business.

²⁹ Remarks of Senator J.W.Fulbright, U.S. Senate, Congressional Record, vol 103, Jan. 4,

1957, p. 208.

³⁰ Brannon P. Denning, “Reforming the New Confirmation Process: Replacing “Despise and
Resent” with “Advice and Consent,” Administrative Law Review, vol. 53, no. 1, p. 27.
³¹ See CRS Report 98-888, “Fast-Track” or Expedited Procedures: Their Purposes,
Elements and Implications, by Christopher M. Davis.

Necessary Elements. An expedited procedure reflecting the 9/11
Commission’s recommendation and the House provision would need to include a
time limit for action by the committees on nominations referred to them. This
provision might require that the committee hold a hearing on the nomination and³²
report it to the full chamber by a set time after receiving it, such as 20 days. An
effective expedited procedure would need to include an enforcement mechanism at
this stage, so that if the committee did not act, either the nomination would
automatically be discharged from committee and placed on the Executive Calendar,
making it available for consideration by the full chamber, or a motion to do so would
be in order.
An effective expedited procedure also would need to provide some controls
regarding Senate floor action. Currently, under Senate precedents, a Member may
move to go into executive session to take up a particular nomination without that
motion being subject to debate, and thus a filibuster. The nomination itself, however,
is subject to debate and, therefore, to filibuster. The expedited procedure would need
to foreclose the possibility of filibustering a nomination, probably by placing a limit
on the total amount of time the Senate could spend debating the nomination of a
member of the National Security Team.
How much debate time would be required could be a tricky question to decide.
The Senate spent no floor time debating the two nominations for Under Secretary of
State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs it has approved during the Bush
Administration. That position is included in the 9/11 Commission’s definition of the
National Security Team. The Senate might, however, want to be sure it includes
sufficient debate time to consider other members of the National Security Team, such
as Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State or Attorney General.
In general, the Senate does not tend to include in its expedited procedures a
provision automatically calling a measure to the floor.³³ Usually, the expedited
procedure would make it in order for the majority leader or another Member to bring
the matter up. If desired, the expedited provision for National Security Team
nominations could include such a provision, requiring that within several days after
the end of committee consideration, the Senate take it up. This provision would need
to specify when, in the Senate’s normal course of daily operations, the nomination
would come up. Because this procedure would be designed to apply to nominations,
it also would need to provide for a motion that the Senate go into executive session
or that the Senate be considered to have gone into executive session at a specified
time.
Finally, to implement the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation fully, the
expedited procedure would need to require an up or down vote at the end of the
debate for each nominee included in the National Security Team.

³² Those crafting the expedited procedure also would need to decide whether they wanted
to measure the time in calendar days or only those days in which the Senate was in session.
³³ CRS Report 98-888, ‘Fast-Track’ or Expedited Procedures: Their Purposes, Elements,
and Implications, by Christopher M. Davis.

In spite of all the requirements of an expedited procedure, it is possible that the
Senate as a body might refuse to act on a particular nomination. The majority leader
might simply decline to call it up. It is not apparent how any form of procedure could
provide effective recourse in this situation. Expedited procedures in existing statutes
often provide that if Congress does not act on a presidential proposal within a
specified time, the proposal goes into effect. Permitting a nomination to be treated
as confirmed without affirmative action by the Senate, however, would not likely be
acceptable to the Senate, and the validity of such an outcome might well be
questioned on constitutional grounds.
Means of Implementation
The Senate could institute procedures to implement the 9/11 Commission’s
proposal or the House provision in several ways: by enacting an expedited procedures
law, by amending the Senate’s standing rules or its standing orders, through adoption
of a unanimous consent agreement, or by passage of a constitutional amendment.
Expedited Procedures Statute. Language to create an expedited procedure
for the National Security Team could be included in a larger bill to implement other
elements of the 9/11 Commission’ recommendations, such as the creation of a
Director of National Intelligence. If the expedited procedures legislation were³⁴
subject to a filibuster, 60 votes would be required to invoke cloture. Legislation
including an expedited procedure, however, could be enacted into law only through
the constitutional lawmaking process, requiring action by the House of
Representatives and the President as well as by the Senate. This method of
implementation raises the question whether the Senate would be willing to involve
the House and the President in making changes to the confirmation process, a matter
which is bound up in with its own rules and special constitutional prerogatives.
Amending Senate Rules. Similar changes also could be implemented by
amending the Senate rules. This approach would have the advantage to the Senate
of not having to go through the House or be signed by the President; rather, the
changes would take effect as soon as the Senate adopted them. The difficulty with
this approach is that, if the changes to the rules were opposed by a filibuster, it would
take a two-thirds vote of those present, as many as 67 Senators, to invoke cloture and
cut off debate, which is a very high threshold to meet.
Constitutional Amendment. The Senate also could try to amend the
Constitution to redefine the confirmation process along the lines of the 9/11
Commission’s recommendations. This approach might be considered less promising
because constitutional amendments must be passed by two-thirds of those voting, or
as many as 67 votes. In addition, once in place, such a change would be
extraordinarily difficult to reverse or modify.

³⁴ The only item which requires a higher threshold for invoking cloture is a change to the
Senate’s rules. Any change to the Senate’s rules which is filibustered requires the votes of
two-thirds of those present and voting (67 if all Senators vote) to invoke cloture. When the
Senate lowered the cloture threshold from two-thirds voting to 60, it did not lower it for
changes to the rules.

Unanimous Consent. The Senate also could try to amend its rules to
conform to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations by a unanimous consent
agreement. For this approach to succeed, all Senators would have to agree on a plan
to implement the new confirmation procedure — one objection would prevent the
agreement from going into effect. Unanimous consent agreements have been used
to structure debate on specific nominations. This agreement, however, would be
binding into future Congresses, unless it specified otherwise or was modified by
another unanimous consent agreement.
Standing Order. Finally, the Senate could try to amend its rules through
adoption of a Standing Order, which would take the form of a simple resolution.
Such a Standing Order would have effects like those of a rule, but the resolution
would require 60 votes for cloture if it was filibustered, not two-thirds of Senators
voting. Such a standing order resolution was used for the creation of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (S.Res. 400, 94^th Congress).
Implications for the Confirmation Process
The Balance of Nomination Politics
One impact of the ability of a Senator to filibuster a nominee has been that
negotiations over other matters, both with the executive branch and among fellow
Senators, have been broadened to include all matter of Senate business, a concept
known as linkage. For example, a Senator’s objections to a particular nominee might
be disposed of by permitting that Senator to offer an amendment to a bill that is soon
to be considered on the Senate floor. Taking nominations out of this equation could
shift the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches.
“The appointments process is deeply contentious, and as legislative
policymaking has grown more difficult in recent decades, the process has
increasingly become a venue for pitched battles over the shape of public policy,”
wrote appointments expert Mackenzie. He continued:
More and more, the contentiousness in the appointments process is driven not by
questions of the fitness of nominees but by policy disagreements. Senators vote
against nominees, and nominations fail, because the appointments process has
become a policy battleground… This is not a new phenomenon, this use of the
appointments process to wage policy battles. In fact, it has always been a³⁵
characteristic of the appointments process.
Mackenzie noted that President Andrew Johnson fought with the Senate over several
of his nominees to head the national bank and of Roger Taney to be Secretary of the
Treasury. What is different now, he said, is the extent to which those connections are
made.

³⁵ Mackenzie, “The State of the Presidential Appointments Process,” pp. 27-28.

Political scientists Nolan McCarty and Rose Razaghian studied more than 100
years of Senate action on nominations. They said: “The thrust of our theory is that
the supermajoritarianism of the Senate in general and the confirmation process in
particular gives partisan and ideological minorities a strategic opportunity to have an
impact on public policy by delaying nominations that would pass on a simple
majority vote.”³⁶
For some, the ability to engage in extended debate on (and effectively block)
measures or matters is what empowers the Senate to deal on equal footing with the
President in their fights over both nominations and legislation. Political scientist
Rogers argued that “For the fact of the matter is, as I hope to show, that, as the much
vaunted separation of powers now exists, unrestricted debate in the Senate is the only
check upon presidential and party autocracy. The devices that the framers of the
Constitution so meticulously set up would be ineffective without the safeguard of
senatorial minority action.”³⁷
Some also believe that the Senate’s opportunity to play a vigorous role in the
nomination and confirmation process is essential to the public’s trust in the process.
“Nonetheless, the process of vetting and voting on the president’s candidates for high
position is an essential balance wheel in our complicated form of government. It
lends legitimacy to the whole structure, and it is worth the occasional loss of a good
person,” wrote former judge, and former Member of Congress, Abner Mikva.³⁸ He
continued:
Neither branch always chooses good people, as history shows, and frequently the
best people don’t get appointed. Learned Hand never made it to the Supreme
Court. Nonetheless, political involvement, including confirmation by the very
political Senate, offers a reality check on who gets the power to make very
important judicial decisions for life. The case is a little less compelling for
appointments to the executive branch, but it still can be made. Most of the
federal work force come into their positions and are protected in them, by a civil
service system based on meritocracy. For those relatively few policy makers
whose appointments require Senate confirmation, an extra “look see” is³⁹
justified.
Others believe that the delaying strategies being employed by some in the Senate
detract from that legitimacy.⁴⁰
And some contend that it is not right to use nominations as bargaining chips in
legislative negotiations. “The Senate’s constitutional and institutional role of advice
and consent is being supplanted by informal, extra-constitutional customs that allow

³⁶ McCarty, “Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch Nominations

1885-1996,” p. 1126.

³⁷ Rogers, The American Senate, p. 164.
³⁸ Abner J. Mikva, “Lawful Pursuits,” Legal Times, Apr. 14, 1997, p. 31.
³⁹ Mikva, “Lawful Pursuits,” p. 32.
⁴⁰ G. Calvin Mackenzie, “The State of the Presidential Appointment Process,” p. 26.

individual senators to effectively veto the President’s nominees — even if only to
gain leverage with the executive branch on an unrelated matter,” wrote Denning.⁴¹
Changing Politics Rather Than Rules
Any change to the confirmation process of the kind proposed by the 9/11
Commission would almost certainly also influence the balance of power between the
executive and the legislative branches. The ability to block a final vote on a
nomination has become a critical element in the Senate’s power relationship with the
President, both for its action, or inaction, on the nomination itself and, frequently, for
a Senator or group of Senators to gain leverage in negotiations on other matters. A
vote deadline, for example, could still lead to a defeat, so requiring a vote could lead
to more presidential defeats or to pressure to go along with the President so as to not
hand him a defeat.
Political scientist Burdett Loomis observed that trying to change the Senate’s
rules may not be an effective plan. “Is there any indication that the Senate might
smooth the way for future nominees? Given the profound changes in the chamber
over the past twenty-five years — the greater latitude allowed individual members
and the intense partisanship that dominates much decision-making — it seems
unlikely that reformers would profit much from attempting to reshape Senate
procedures.”⁴² Instead, he argued, “Striving to “govern together” by bridging the
separate institutions may be valuable than seeking to change an institution that has
proved highly resistant to structural reforms.”⁴³
If the history of the confirmation process is more about practices than rules,
perhaps it would be useful to consider informal changes in the dynamics that
undergird the process. Instead of setting up timetables for action, this approach
would build upon a view that the problem is not procedural, but political.
Political scientist Christopher J. Deering wrote that politics has always been a
part of the process. “The relationship between the executive and legislative branches
has been and remains essentially political. That should not change. The Senate’s
role in the review of executive personnel is but one example of that political
relationship. The Senate’s role in the confirmation process was designed not to
eliminate politics but to make possible the use of politics as a safeguard. From the
outset the political motivations of the two branches were to be a protection against
tyranny.”⁴⁴

⁴¹ Denning, “Reforming the New Confirmation Process: Replacing “Despise and Resent”
with “Advice and Consent,” p. 41.
⁴² Burdett Loomis, “The Senate: An “Obstacle Course” for Executive Appointments?” in
Innocent Until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments Process, G.
Calvin Mackenzie, ed. (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 170.
⁴³ Loomis, “The Senate: An “Obstacle Course” for Executive Appointments?” p. 171.
⁴⁴ Deering, “Damned if You Do and Damned if You Don’t,” pp. 118-119.

“The one enduring characteristic of the process is that it is as deeply and
intensely political now as it has always been,”⁴⁵ agreed Mackenzie. The process is
political, he asserted, because its results can have a major impact on policy-making,
and therefore, politics.
Conflict occurs in the appointment process for a very simple reason.
Appointments matter. Were that not the case, presidential administrations would
not have several dozen White House aides devoting full time to appointment
decisions; Senate committees would not hold hundreds of hours of confirmation
hearings; interest groups, agencies, political parties and members of the House
would not spend their time and resources trying to shape appointments decisions.
Yet they do all these things, and they do them because they think it makes a⁴⁶
difference who gets appointed to serve in particular federal offices.
As a result, when the process has worked, it frequently was because the two
branches of government found a way to make it work. “The appointment power
operates in a framework of studied ambiguity, its limits established for the most part
not by court decisions but by imaginative accommodations between the executive
and legislative branches,” wrote separation-of-powers scholar Fisher.⁴⁷
Broader Implications
The 9/11 Commission’s proposal provides an occasion for the Senate to
evaluate the larger question of its confirmation process and its role in the presidential
appointment process. Adoption of the recommendation, for example, could open the
door to consideration of ever more nominations through expedited procedures. What
would a new process mean for other presidential nominations, particularly those to
the judiciary?
For several years, the Senate has been debating the proper role of the President
and Senators in the nomination and confirmation of the nation’s federal judges.
During the Clinton Administration, critics charged that the Judiciary Committee was
not acting on all the nominations it needed to. During the Bush Administration, the
controversy has been over the use of the filibuster to block a final vote on a judicial
nominee.⁴⁸
Before the 9/11 Commission released its recommendations, Senator Arlen
Specter had introduced a resolution that would establish a “protocol” for the
confirmation of federal judges. His plan (S.Res. 327) would establish timetables for
action at both the committee and Senate floor stages, and it would effectively prohibit

⁴⁵ Mackenzie, “The State of the Presidential Appointments Process,” p. 27.
⁴⁶ G. Calvin Mackenzie, The Politics of Presidential Appointments (New York: Free Press,

1981), p. xix.

⁴⁷ Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President, p. 48.
⁴⁸ Helen Dewar, “Senate Democrats Block 3 More Bush Judicial Nominees,” Washington
Post, July 23, 2004, p. A5; Jennifer A. Dlouhy, “Parties Use Judicial Standoff to Play to
Core Constituents,” CQ Weekly, Oct. 19, 2002, p. 2722.

filibusters of judicial nominations. President George W. Bush on October 30, 2002,
proposed a similar plan for the Senate’s confirmation process.⁴⁹
S.Res. 138, introduced by Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist on June 26, 2003,
would set up a diminishing threshold for invoking cloture on presidential
nominations that are subject to Senate approval. The threshold necessary for
invoking cloture would drop each time the Senate voted on a cloture motion on a
particular nominee until it reached 51 Senators, a majority of the chamber.
Given the interest already expressed, some Senators might want to expand the
9/11 Commission’s recommendations to include a broader number of presidential
nominees. The 30-day timetable would likely have to be adjusted to allow the Senate
to complete its work on a larger number of nominations.
On the one hand, this action could put in place a definitive system for the
consideration of presidential nominees — it could bring order and predictability to
the entire process. On the other hand, it might rush the process for some nominees
and make it more difficult for Senators to defeat a nomination they oppose.
Alternative Approaches
Existing Rules. Instead of, or in addition to, instituting new procedures to
expedite action, the Senate might exercise more control over threatened filibusters
against nominations by enforcing more stringently its existing rules. Under current
procedures, debate on nominations and treaties is in some respects easier to limit than
on legislative matters. First, the motion to proceed to consider a nomination may be
offered in a non-debatable form, whereas the motion to proceed to consider
legislation is usually debatable. Second, the “Two Speech Rule” of the Senate limits
each Senator to two speeches per day on any given question. With respect to
legislative matters, this rule is not a viable deterrent to extended debate, for each new
amendment is viewed as a new question on which each Senator may speak two more
times. On un-amendable matters, such as nominations, the Two Speech Rule could
more effectively be used as a procedure to limit debate indirectly.
Under current interpretations, however, the two-speech rule has proved to be an
ineffective deterrent against extended debates on nominations because it has been
interpreted to apply to the calendar day. On each new calendar day every Senator is
able once again to make two speeches on the pending nominee. As a result, since
the late 1980’s, the Senate has rarely sought to enforce this rule. A reinterpretation
of the rule in its application to nominations could make it more effective.
Given such an interpretation, it would be easier for Senate leaders to overcome
filibusters against a nominee by forcing opposing Senators to speak at length. In
modern practice, most filibusters feature delay by means other than debate (quorum
calls or agreements to turn to other items of business). In effect, the threat of a
filibuster is treated as though the Senate is being prevented, through extended debate,

⁴⁹ See CRS Report RS21506, Implications for the Senate of President Bush’s Proposal on
Judicial Nominations, by Betsy Palmer.

from reaching a final conclusion on the measure or matter at hand. Keeping the
Senate in continuous executive business session for consideration of a nomination
could make it more difficult for Senators to sustain a true filibuster, and, perhaps,
reduce the incidence of filibuster threats.
Expiring Nominations. Another approach might be to place a time limit on
a presidential nomination. While such a requirement might seem counterintuitive,
it would prevent an endless delay in filling the position in question. If the Senate did
not act on a nomination after a defined period of time, say 60 days, it would
automatically be returned to the President. While the President would have the
ability to renominate the individual in question, if he so chose, he could also take the
opportunity to reconsider his choice without the politically sensitive problem of
asking a nominee to step aside.

CRS-21
Table 1. Initial Appointments by President George W. Bush to Top Positions at the Departments of Defense,
Homeland Security, Justice, and State, and the Central Intelligence Agency
^D^ays^E^l^ap^s^e^d
^from^D^ays^from
^Firs^{t Con}^f^irm^e^d^Da^te^Iⁿ^au^gu^rati^on^,^a^D^ays^E^l^ap^s^e^d^Iⁿ^au^gu^rati^on^,^a
^Nomⁱⁿ^a^ti^on^{to th}^e^No^mⁱ^na^tioⁿ^Eⁿ^actm^en^t,^or^b^from^Eⁿ^actm^en^t,^b
^Sena^t^e^Co^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee o}^f^Posⁱ^{tion by Pres}^ident^{Received in}^Co^nfirm^a^tioⁿ^Va^ca^ncy^to^Nomⁱⁿ^a^ti^on^to^{or V}^a^can^c^y^to
^Posⁱ^ti^on^Tⁱ^tl^e^Ju^ri^s^dⁱ^c^ti^on^G^e^{orge W}^.^Bu^s^h^t^h^{e Sena}^t^e^Da^te^No^mⁱ^na^tioⁿ^Co^nfirm^a^tioⁿ^Co^nfirm^a^tioⁿ
^rt^m^e^nt^o^f^Def^e^nse
^A^rm^{ed Serv}^ices^Don^a^{ld R}^u^m^s^f^e^ld^c^01/^20/⁰¹^01/^20/⁰¹¹¹¹
^pu^t^y^S^ecret^ary^A^rm^{ed S}^e^rvⁱ^ces^Pau^l^D^.^Wol^f^owⁱ^t^z^02/^15/⁰¹^02/^28/⁰¹²⁶¹³³⁹
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32551}^d^e^r^Secr^etar^y^-^A^c^q^u^isitioⁿ^,
^g/w^c^hno^l^o^gy^,^aⁿ^d^Lo^gi^stⁱ^c^s^A^r^m^e^{d S}^e^rvⁱ^ces^Edw^a^{rd C}^.^A^l^dri^d^g^e^{, Jr.}^04/^23/⁰¹^05/^08/⁰¹⁹³¹⁵¹⁰⁸
^s^.or
^le^ak^{der Secretary}^-^C^o^m^p^troller^A^r^m^e^{d S}^e^rvⁱ^ces^D^o^v^S^.^Z^a^k^h^eⁱ^m^03/^13/⁰¹^05/^01/⁰¹⁵²⁴⁹¹⁰¹
^Ch^ief^Fin^aⁿ^c^{ial Of}^fⁱ^cer
^://wiki
^h^ttp^{der S}^ecret^ary^-^Polⁱ^c^y^A^rm^{ed S}^e^rvⁱ^ces^D^o^u^g^l^as^{J. F}^eⁱ^t^h^04/^30/⁰¹^07/^12/⁰¹¹⁰⁰⁷³¹⁷³
^{der Secretary}^-^P^e^rs^onⁿ^e^{l an}^d^A^r^m^e^{d S}^e^rvⁱ^ces^D^a^vⁱ^{d S}^.^C^.^C^h^u^04/^30/⁰¹^05/^26/⁰¹¹⁰⁰²⁶¹²⁶
^es^s
^d^e^r^Secr^etar^y^-^Iⁿ^tellig^en^ce^d^A^r^m^e^{d S}^e^rvⁱ^ces^S^t^eph^eⁿ^A^.^C^a^m^bon^e^02/^04/⁰³^03/^07/⁰³⁶⁴³¹⁹⁵
^ary^of^t^h^{e A}ⁱ^{r F}^o^rce^A^rm^{ed S}^e^rvⁱ^ces^Jam^e^s^G^.^R^o^ch^e^05/^07/⁰¹^05/^24/⁰¹¹⁰⁷¹⁷¹²⁴
^ary^of^t^h^{e A}^r^m^y^A^r^m^e^{d S}^e^rvⁱ^ces^T^h^om^as^{E. Wh}ⁱ^t^e^05/^01/⁰¹^05/^24/⁰¹¹⁰¹²³¹²⁴
^ary^of^t^h^{e N}^a^v^y^A^r^m^e^{d S}^e^rvⁱ^ces^G^o^rdon^En^g^l^an^d^04/^30/⁰¹^05/^22/⁰¹¹⁰⁰²²¹²²
^rt^m^e^nt^o^f^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Securit}^y^a
^ary^G^ov^ern^m^en^t^a^l^A^f^f^aⁱ^r^s^T^h^o^m^a^s^{J. R}ⁱ^dg^e^01/^07/⁰³^01/^22/⁰³⁴³¹⁵⁵⁸
^ty^Secretary^G^ov^ern^m^en^{tal A}^f^f^a^irs^G^ordon^En^g^l^an^d^e^01/^07/⁰³^01/^30/⁰³⁴³²³⁶⁶

CRS-22
^D^ays^E^l^ap^s^e^d
^from^D^ays^from
^Firs^{t Con}^f^irm^e^d^Da^te^Iⁿ^au^gu^rati^on^,^a^D^ays^E^l^ap^s^e^d^Iⁿ^au^gu^rati^on^,^a
^Nomⁱⁿ^a^ti^on^{to th}^e^No^mⁱ^na^tioⁿ^Eⁿ^actm^en^t,^or^b^from^Eⁿ^actm^en^t,^b
^Sena^t^e^Co^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee o}^f^Posⁱ^{tion by Pres}^ident^{Received in}^Co^nfirm^a^tioⁿ^Va^ca^ncy^to^Nomⁱⁿ^a^ti^on^to^{or V}^a^can^c^y^to
^Posⁱ^ti^on^Tⁱ^tl^e^Ju^ri^s^dⁱ^c^ti^on^G^e^{orge W}^.^Bu^s^h^t^h^{e Sena}^t^e^Da^te^No^mⁱ^na^tioⁿ^Co^nfirm^a^tioⁿ^Co^nfirm^a^tioⁿ
^{der Secretary}^-^B^o^{rder an}^d^C^o^mme^r^c^e^,^S^cⁱ^eⁿ^c^e^A^s^a^H^u^t^c^hi^nsoⁿ^e^01/^10/⁰³^01/^23/⁰³⁴⁶¹³⁵⁹
^an^sp^o^r^tatioⁿ^Secu^r^ity^an^{d T}^r^an^s^port^a^tⁱ^oⁿ
^{der Secretary}^-^Em^erg^eⁿ^c^y^G^o^ve^rⁿ^m^e^nt^a^l^A^ffaⁱ^r^s^Mⁱ^c^ha^e^l^D^.^B^r^o^wⁿ^f^na^na^na^na^na
^e^s^s^an^{d R}^e^s^pon^s^e
^{der Secretary}^-^In^f^o^rm^ation
^aly^s^is^an^{d In}^f^r^as^tru^c^tu^re^Iⁿ^tellig^en^ce^Fr^an^k^Lⁱ^b^u^tti⁰⁴^/²⁸^/⁰³⁰⁶^/²³^/⁰³¹⁵⁴⁵⁶²¹⁰
^t^ectioⁿ
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32551}^e
^g/w^{der Secretary}^-^Man^a^g^e^m^eⁿ^t^Gov^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^{al A}^f^f^a^irs^J^an^{et Hale}^01/^21/⁰³^03/^06/⁰³⁵⁷⁴⁴¹⁰¹
^s^.or
^le^ak^{der Secretary}^-^Scien^{ce an}^d^c^hno^l^o^gy^C^o^mme^r^c^e^,^S^cⁱ^eⁿ^c^e^an^{d T}^r^an^s^port^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^C^h^arl^e^s^{E. McQ}^u^eary^02/^14/⁰³^03/^19/⁰³⁸¹³³¹¹⁴
^://wiki^rt^m^e^nt^o^f^J^u^st^ice
^h^ttp
^t^o^rn^ey^G^eⁿ^e^ral^J^u^dⁱ^cⁱ^a^ry^Johⁿ^A^s^h^c^rof^t^01/^29/⁰¹^02/^01/⁰¹⁹³¹²
^pu^t^y^A^t^t^o^rn^ey^G^eⁿ^e^ral^J^u^dⁱ^cⁱ^a^ry^L^a^rry^D^.^T^h^om^ps^on^03/^22/⁰¹^05/^10/⁰¹⁶¹⁴⁹¹¹⁰
^{Federal B}^u^reau^of^Ju^di^ci^ary^R^obert^S^.^Mu^el^l^e^{r, III}^07/^18/⁰¹^08/^02/⁰¹²³¹⁵³⁸
^e^stig^atioⁿ⁽^F^B^I⁾
^rt^m^e^nt^o^f^St^a^t^e
^etar^y^F^o^r^eigⁿ^Relatioⁿ^s^Co^lin^L^.^P^o^w^e^ll^c^01/^20/⁰¹^01/^20/⁰¹¹¹¹
^pu^t^y^S^ecret^ary^F^orei^gⁿ^R^e^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^Rⁱ^ch^{ard L}^.^A^r^mⁱ^t^a^g^e^03/^08/⁰¹^03/^23/⁰¹⁴⁷¹⁵⁶²
^{der Secretary}^-^Econ^om^ic,
^sine^ss,^aⁿ^d^A^g^rⁱ^c^u^ltur^a^l^F^o^rei^gⁿ^R^e^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^A^l^an^L^a^rs^on^(H^ol^dov^er)ⁿ^aⁿ^aⁿ^aⁿ^aⁿ^a

ⁱ^r^s

CRS-23
^D^ays^E^l^ap^s^e^d
^from^D^ays^from
^Firs^{t Con}^f^irm^e^d^Da^te^Iⁿ^au^gu^rati^on^,^a^D^ays^E^l^ap^s^e^d^Iⁿ^au^gu^rati^on^,^a
^Nomⁱⁿ^a^ti^on^{to th}^e^No^mⁱ^na^tioⁿ^Eⁿ^actm^en^t,^or^b^from^Eⁿ^actm^en^t,^b
^Sena^t^e^Co^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee o}^f^Posⁱ^{tion by Pres}^ident^{Received in}^Co^nfirm^a^tioⁿ^Va^ca^ncy^to^Nomⁱⁿ^a^ti^on^to^{or V}^a^can^c^y^to
^Posⁱ^ti^on^Tⁱ^tl^e^Ju^ri^s^dⁱ^c^ti^on^G^e^{orge W}^.^Bu^s^h^t^h^{e Sena}^t^e^Da^te^No^mⁱ^na^tioⁿ^Co^nfirm^a^tioⁿ^Co^nfirm^a^tioⁿ
^{der S}^ecret^ary^-^G^l^obal^A^f^f^aⁱ^r^s^F^orei^gⁿ^R^e^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^Pau^l^{a J. D}^obri^aⁿ^s^k^y^04/^04/⁰¹^04/^26/⁰¹⁷⁴²²⁹⁶
^{der Secretary}^-^A^r^m^s^C^oⁿ^t^rol^F^o^rei^gⁿ^R^e^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^Johⁿ^R^.^Bol^t^oⁿ^03/^08/⁰¹^03/^23/⁰¹⁴⁷¹⁵⁶²
^Iⁿ^terⁿ^atioⁿ^a^{l Secu}^r^ity
^{der S}^ecret^ary^-^Man^a^g^e^m^eⁿ^t^F^o^rei^gⁿ^R^e^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^G^r^an^t^S^.^G^r^een^{, Jr.}^03/^08/⁰¹^03/^28/⁰¹⁴⁷²⁰⁶⁷
^d^e^r^Secr^etar^y^-^P^o^litical^F^o^rei^gⁿ^R^e^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^{Marc I. G}^r^os^s^m^an^03/^08/⁰¹^03/^23/⁰¹⁴⁷¹⁵⁶²
ⁱ^r^s
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32551}
^g/w^{der Secretary}^-^P^u^blic^Fo^r^e^igⁿ^Relatioⁿ^s^Ch^ar^lo^{tte L}^.^B^eer^s^g^06/^29/⁰¹^09/^26/⁰¹¹⁶⁰⁵⁸²¹⁸
^s^.or^pl^om^acy^an^{d Pu}^blⁱ^c^A^f^f^aⁱ^r^s
^le^ak^ra^{l Int}^e^llig^{ence Ag}^ency
^://wiki^ecto^r^o^f^Cen^t^r^a^{l I}ⁿ^tellig^en^ce^Iⁿ^tellig^en^ce^G^e^o^r^ge^J^.^T^e^ne^t^na^na^na^na^na
^h^ttp^(h^ol^dov^er)
^pu^t^y^Dⁱ^rect^{or of}^C^eⁿ^t^ral^Iⁿ^tellig^en^ce^J^o^{hn E}^.^M^c^La^ughlⁱⁿ^na^na^na^na^na
^en^ce^(h^ol^dov^er)
^pu^t^y^Dⁱ^rect^{or of}^C^eⁿ^t^ral^Joaⁿ^A^.^D^e^m^p^s^e^y
^en^{ce -}^Co^m^m^uⁿ^ity^Iⁿ^tellig^en^ce^(h^ol^dov^er)^na^na^na^na^na
^na^ge^m^e^nt
^e^dⁱ^an^el^ap^s^e^d^d^ays⁵⁵²¹⁹⁶
^e^an^el^ap^s^e^d^d^ays⁶⁵²⁶⁹⁰
^T^hⁱ^s^t^a^bl^{e w}^a^s^creat^{ed by}^H^eⁿ^r^y^{B. H}^o^g^u^e^{, A}ⁿ^al^y^s^tⁱⁿ^A^m^eri^can^N^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^G^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^{, C}^R^S^{, A}^u^g^.^{18, 2004.}
^h^{e H}^o^m^e^l^aⁿ^d^S^ecu^ri^t^y^A^c^t^of^{2002 (P.L}^{. 107-}^{296), w}^hⁱ^c^h^creat^{ed t}^h^e^D^e^part^m^eⁿ^t^of^H^o^m^e^l^aⁿ^d^S^ecu^ri^t^y^,^w^a^s^sⁱ^gⁿ^e^dⁱⁿ^t^o^l^a^w^on¹¹^/²⁵^/⁰²^.^T^h^{e p}^o^s^itioⁿ^o^f^Un^d^e^r^Secr^etar^y^o^f
^Def^eⁿ^s^{e f}^o^{r In}^tellig^en^{ce w}^a^s^{created by}^P^.^L^.^107-^{314, s}^{ec. 901(a), en}^{acted 12/02/02.}

CRS-24
^cyⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^atioⁿ^f^o^{r Mu}^eller’^{s p}^r^ed^ecesso^{r, L}^o^uⁱ^{s J}^.^Freeh^{, is f}^r^o^m^th^{e FB}^I’^{s h}ⁱ^sto^r^y^p^a^g^e^{, av}^ailab^l^{e at [h}^ttp^://^www.^f^bⁱ^.^g^o^v^/lib^r^e^f^/^dⁱ^r^ecto^r^s/f^r^eeh^.h^tm^]^.
^ltho^{ugh the}^fir^s^{t d}^a^y^the^ne^w^P^r^e^s^id^eⁿ^{t sub}^m^itte^d^no^mⁱ^na^tio^{ns t}^o^the^Se^na^te^w^a^{s I}ⁿ^a^ugur^a^tio^{n Da}^y^,^Se^na^te^c^o^m^m^itte^e^s^he^ld^h^earⁱⁿ^g^s^oⁿ^so^m^e^to^pⁿ^o^mⁱⁿ^a^tioⁿ^s^b^e^f^o^r^e^th^{at tim}^e
^an^{d th}^{e Sen}^a^{te w}^a^s^th^eref^{ore ready}^{to con}^f^irm^th^em^oⁿ^th^{e sam}^e^d^a^y^th^ey^w^e^r^eⁿ^o^mⁱⁿ^a^ted^.
^h^is^pos^ition^w^a^s^{created by}^P^.^L^.^107-^{314, s}^{ec. 901(a), en}^{acted 12/02/02.}
ⁿ^Jan^.^{27, 2003, Pres}ⁱ^d^en^t^Bu^s^h^anⁿ^o^uⁿ^{ced h}ⁱ^sⁱⁿ^t^eⁿ^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^desⁱ^gⁿ^a^t^e^En^g^l^an^{d, H}^u^t^c^hⁱⁿ^s^on^{, H}^a^l^e^{, an}^{d on}^{e ot}^h^e^{r i}ⁿ^di^vⁱ^du^al^a^{s a}^c^tⁱⁿ^g^o^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^sⁱⁿ^t^h^eⁱ^rⁱⁿ^ten^d^ed^p^o^s^itioⁿ^s^.⁽^U^.S.
^P^r^es^iden^{t (Georg}^{e W}^.^B^u^s^h^{), “}^D^ig^es^{t of}^Oth^e^{r W}^h^{ite Hou}^s^{e A}ⁿⁿ^o^uⁿ^cem^en^ts^,”^W^{eekly C}^o^{mpilation of Pr}^es^{idential Documents}^{, v}^o^l^.^{39, Jan}^.^{27, 2003, p.}^145.)^T^h^es^{e act}ⁱ^oⁿ^s
^w^e^re^tak^eⁿ^uⁿ^d^{er S}^ection^{1511(c)(1) of}^th^{e act. (In}^f^orm^a^tion^recei^v^e^{d f}^r^om^Departm^eⁿ^t^of^Hom^e^lan^d^S^ecu^rity^{, Of}^fⁱ^{ce of}^th^{e Depu}^ty^Secretary^,^vⁱ^{a teleph}^on^{e con}^v^e^rs^ation^,^J^aⁿ^.
^{28, 2003.) En}^g^l^an^{d, H}^u^t^c^hⁱⁿ^s^on^{, an}^{d H}^a^l^e^w^e^{re l}^a^t^e^{r con}^fⁱ^r^m^e^{d as}^s^h^owⁿ^.
^ccordiⁿ^g^t^o^D^H^S^s^o^u^r^ces^{, Brow}ⁿ^w^a^s^appoiⁿ^t^{ed u}ⁿ^d^{er S}^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{1511(c)(2) of}^t^h^{e act}^{, w}^hⁱ^c^h^provⁱ^d^es^t^h^at^recon^fⁱ^r^m^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^by^t^h^{e Sen}^a^{te is n}^o^{t r}^e^q^u^ir^ed^b^y^th^{e law}^f^o^r^“^aⁿ^y^o^f^fⁱ^cer
^w^h^os^{e ag}^en^cy^is^tran^s^f^{erred to th}^{e Departm}^eⁿ^t^pu^rs^u^aⁿ^t^{to th}^is^act^an^d^w^h^os^{e du}^ties^f^o^llowⁱⁿ^g^s^u^ch^tran^s^f^{er are g}^e^rm^an^{e to th}^os^{e perf}^orm^e^{d bef}^o^{re s}^u^ch^tran^s^f^{er.” (In}^f^o^rm^ation
^receiv^e^{d f}^r^om^Departm^eⁿ^t^of^Hom^e^lan^d^S^ecu^rity^{, Of}^fⁱ^{ce of}^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^ativ^{e A}^f^f^a^irs^,^vⁱ^{a teleph}^on^{e con}^v^e^rs^ation^,^{Mar. 12, 2003.)}^{He w}^as^prevⁱ^o^u^s^l^yⁿ^o^mⁱⁿ^a^t^e^{d t}^o^{be depu}^t^y^di^rect^or
^of^t^h^{e F}^e^deral^Em^erg^eⁿ^c^y^Man^a^g^e^m^eⁿ^t^A^g^en^cy^(F^EMA⁾^on^03/^21/^{02 an}^{d con}^fⁱ^r^m^e^{d on}^08/^01/^02.
^echⁿⁱ^cally^B^eer^{s w}^a^{s n}^o^mⁱⁿ^a^ted^tw^{ice. Sh}^{e w}^a^{s f}ⁱ^r^s^{t n}^o^mⁱⁿ^a^ted^oⁿ⁰⁶^/²⁹^/⁰¹^aⁿ^d^th^{is n}^o^mⁱⁿ^a^tioⁿ^w^a^{s r}^e^tu^rⁿ^ed^to^th^{e P}^r^esid^en^t^on^08/^03/^01at^t^h^{e beg}ⁱⁿⁿⁱⁿ^g^of^{a 31-}^day^S^eⁿ^a^t^e
^{recess u}ⁿ^d^{er th}^{e p}^r^o^v^isioⁿ^s^o^f^Sen^a^{te R}^u^{le XXXI, P}^a^rag^r^ap^h⁶^o^f^th^{e Stan}^dⁱⁿ^g^R^u^{les o}^f^th^{e Se}ⁿ^a^t^e^.^S^h^e^w^a^sⁿ^o^mⁱⁿ^a^ted^ag^ain^oⁿ⁰^{9/04/01. T}^h^{e 31 day}^s^of^th^{e Sen}^a^{te reces}^s
^ar^{e n}^o^{t in}^clu^d^edⁱⁿ^th^{e calcu}^latioⁿ^s^{, in}^th^{is r}^o^w^,^o^f^d^a^y^s^elap^sed^.

ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32551}
^g/w
^s^.or
^le^ak
^://wiki
^h^ttp

CRS-25
Table 2. Appointment Information for Four William J. Clinton Appointees Who Continued in Office
Under President George W. Bush
^Sena^t^e^M^o^s^t^Recent^Da^te^D^ays^E^l^ap^s^e^d^D^ays^E^l^ap^s^e^d^D^ays^E^l^ap^s^e^d
^C^o^mmi^t^t^e^e^Appo^int^{ee t}^o^t^h^e^A^p^p^r^oxⁱ^m^ate^No^mⁱ^na^tioⁿ^from^from^from
^of^Posⁱ^tion^Da^{te o}^f^a^{Received in}^Co^nfirm^a^tioⁿ^Va^ca^ncy^to^Nomⁱⁿ^a^ti^on^to^Va^ca^ncy^to
^Posⁱ^ti^on^Tⁱ^tl^e^Ju^ri^s^dⁱ^c^ti^on^(Con^fi^rm^ed⁾^Va^ca^ncy^t^h^{e Sena}^t^e^Da^te^No^mⁱ^na^tioⁿ^Co^nfirm^a^tioⁿ^Co^nfirm^a^tioⁿ
^rt^m^e^nt^o^f^St^a^t^e
^{der Secretary}^-^Econ^om^ic,^Fo^r^e^ign
^sine^ss,^aⁿ^d^A^g^rⁱ^c^u^ltur^a^l^R^e^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^A^l^an^L^a^rs^on^07/^17/⁹⁹^10/^08/⁹⁹^11/^18/⁹⁹⁸³⁴¹¹²⁴
ⁱ^r^s
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32551}^ra^{l Int}^e^llig^{ence Ag}^ency
^g/w^ecto^r^o^f^Cen^t^r^a^{l I}ⁿ^tellig^en^ce^Iⁿ^tellig^en^ce^Geo^r^g^e^J^.^T^eⁿ^e^t¹²^/¹³^/⁹⁶⁰⁴^/²¹^/⁹⁷⁰⁷^/¹⁰^/⁹⁷¹²⁹⁸⁰²⁰⁹
^s^.or
^le^ak^pu^t^y^Dⁱ^rect^{or of}^C^eⁿ^t^ral^Iⁿ^tellig^en^ce^J^o^{hn E}^.^M^c^La^ughlⁱⁿ^b^06/^27/⁰⁰^07/^13/⁰⁰^10/^18/⁰⁰¹⁶⁵⁸⁷⁴
^en^ce
^://wiki^pu^t^y^Dⁱ^rect^{or of}^C^eⁿ^t^ral^Iⁿ^tellig^en^ce
^h^ttp^en^{ce -}^Co^m^m^uⁿ^ity^Joaⁿ^A^.^D^e^m^p^s^e^y^c^10/^11/⁹⁶^11/^07/⁹⁷^05/^22/⁹⁸³⁹²¹²²⁵¹⁴
^na^ge^m^e^nt
^e^an^el^ap^s^e^d^d^ays¹⁵⁵⁷⁵²³⁰
^T^hⁱ^s^t^a^bl^{e w}^a^s^creat^{ed by}^H^eⁿ^r^y^{B. H}^o^g^u^e^{, A}ⁿ^al^y^s^tⁱⁿ^A^m^eri^can^N^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^G^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^{, C}^R^S^,^A^u^g^.^{18, 2004.}
^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^on^t^h^{e depart}^u^r^{e dat}^e^f^o^{r L}^a^rs^on^’^s^predeces^s^o^r,^St^ua^r^t^Eⁱ^z^eⁿ^st^a^t^,ⁱ^s^fr^o^m^O^ffi^c^e^o^f^P^e^r^s^o^nne^l^M^a^na^ge^m^e^nt⁽^O^P^M⁾^records^.^T^h^{e departu}^r^{e date f}^o^{r T}^eⁿ^e^t’^s^predeces^s^o^r,
^J^o^hⁿ^{M. Deu}^t^ch^{, is n}^o^tedⁱⁿ^{R. J}^e^f^f^r^ey^Sm^ith^{, “}^H^avⁱⁿ^g^Lⁱ^f^t^ed^th^{e CI}^A^’^{s Veil, Deu}^t^ch^Su^m^s^Up^{: I}^T^o^ld^Yo^u^So^,”^T^h^{e W}^a^s^hⁱ^ngt^{on Pos}^t^{, D}^{ec. 26, 1996, p. A}^25.^J^o^hn^G^o^r^don^,
^w^h^o^p^r^eced^ed^McL^a^ughlin,^r^e^p^o^r^t^e^d^l^y^t^o^o^k^aⁿ^e^w^p^o^s^itio^{n as o}^f⁰⁶^/²⁷^/⁰⁰^,^b^u^{t his p}^r^{ecise d}^a^{te o}^f^d^e^p^a^r^t^ur^{e f}^r^o^m^{the CI}^A^co^uld^no^{t b}^e^d^e^ter^mⁱⁿ^ed⁽^A^sso^c^iated^P^r^{ess On}^lin^e,
^“^C^lin^ton^Nam^e^s^New^{No. 2 at C}^I^A^,^J^uⁿ^e^{29, 2000). Dem}^p^s^e^y^w^a^s^th^e^fⁱ^rs^{t pers}^on^{to h}^o^{ld th}^{e pos}^ition^of^Depu^ty^{Director of}^C^eⁿ^t^r^{al I}ⁿ^tellig^en^{ce f}^o^r^Co^m^m^uⁿ^ity^Man^a^g^e^m^eⁿ^t^,
^w^hⁱ^c^h^w^a^s^creat^{ed by}^P.L^.^104-^{293, s}^{ec. 805, en}^act^{ed 10/}^11/^96.
^h^{e S}^eⁿ^a^t^e^adj^o^u^rⁿ^e^{d on}^07/^27/^{00 an}^{d recon}^v^eⁿ^e^{d on}^09/^05/^{00. T}^h^{e 39 day}^s^of^t^h^at^reces^s^{are n}^o^tⁱⁿ^cl^u^d^{ed i}ⁿ^t^h^{e cal}^cu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^{, in}^th^is^row^,^of^day^s^elaps^e^d.^st^th^st^nd^th
^h^{e S}^eⁿ^a^t^e^adj^o^u^rⁿ^e^{d on}^11/^13/^{97 at}^t^h^{e en}^{d of}^t^h^{e 1}^s^e^s^sⁱ^on^of^t^h^{e 105}^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^s^an^{d recon}^v^eⁿ^e^{d on}^01/^27/^{98. T}^h^{e 74}^day^s^bet^w^een^t^h^e¹^an^{d 2}^se^ssioⁿ^{s o}^f^the¹⁰⁵^Co^ngr^e^s^s
^ar^{e n}^o^{t in}^clu^d^edⁱⁿ^th^{e calcu}^latioⁿ^s^{, in}^th^{is r}^o^w^,^o^f^d^a^y^s^elap^sed^.

CRS-26
Table 3. Initial Appointments by President William J. Clinton to Top Positions at the Departments of Defense,
Justice, and State, and the Central Intelligence Agency
^D^ays^E^l^ap^s^e^d
^from^D^ays^from
^Firs^{t Con}^f^irm^e^d^Da^te^Iⁿ^au^gu^rati^on^,^D^ays^E^l^ap^s^e^d^Iⁿ^au^gu^rati^on^,
^Nomⁱⁿ^a^ti^on^{to th}^e^No^mⁱ^na^tioⁿ^Ena^c^t^m^eⁿ^t^,^from^Eⁿ^actm^en^{t, or}
^S^eⁿ^a^{te Com}^mⁱ^ttee^Posⁱ^{tion by Pres}^ident^{Received in}^a^Co^nfirm^a^tioⁿ^{or V}^a^can^c^{y to}^Nomⁱⁿ^a^ti^on^to^Va^ca^ncy^to
^Posⁱ^ti^on^Tⁱ^tl^e^{of Ju}^ri^s^dⁱ^c^ti^on^Willia^m^J^.^Clint^oⁿ^t^h^{e Sena}^t^e^Da^te^No^mⁱ^na^tioⁿ^Co^nfirm^a^tioⁿ^Co^nfirm^a^tioⁿ
^rt^m^e^nt^o^f^Def^e^nse
^ary^A^r^m^e^{d S}^e^rvⁱ^ces^L^e^s^A^s^piⁿ^01/^20/⁹³^01/^20/⁹³¹¹¹
^u^ty^Secr^etar^y^A^r^m^ed^Ser^v^ices^W^illiam^J^.^P^e^r^r^y⁰²^/²⁴^/⁹³⁰³^/⁰⁵^/⁹³³⁵⁹⁴⁴
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32551}^d^e^r^Secr^etar^y^f^o^r^A^c^q^u^isitioⁿ^A^r^m^ed^Ser^v^ices^J^o^hⁿ^{M. Deu}^t^ch⁰³^/²⁵^/⁹³⁰⁴^/⁰¹^/⁹³⁶⁴⁷⁷¹
^g/w
^s^.or^m^p^tr^o^ller^A^r^m^ed^Ser^v^ices^J^o^hⁿ^J^.^Ham^r^e^b^08/^04/⁹³^10/^25/⁹³¹⁹⁶⁵¹²⁴⁷
^le^ak
^{der S}^ecret^ary^-^Polⁱ^c^y^A^rm^{ed S}^e^rvⁱ^ces^F^r^an^k^Wi^sⁿ^er^02/^23/⁹³^07/^01/⁹³³⁴¹²⁸¹⁶²
^://wiki^{der Secretary}^-^P^e^rs^onⁿ^e^{l an}^d
^h^ttp^es^s^c^A^r^m^e^{d S}^e^rvⁱ^ces^Edwⁱⁿ^D^o^rn^01/^27/⁹⁴^03/^15/⁹⁴⁵⁸⁴⁷¹⁰⁵
^ary^of^t^h^{e A}ⁱ^{r F}^o^rce^A^rm^{ed S}^e^rvⁱ^ces^S^h^ei^l^a^{E. Wi}^dn^al^l^07/^22/⁹³^08/^05/⁹³¹⁸³¹⁴¹⁹⁷
^ary^of^t^h^{e A}^r^m^y^A^r^m^e^{d S}^e^rvⁱ^ces^T^o^g^o^D^.^Wes^t^Jr.^11/^05/⁹³^11/^20/⁹³²⁸⁹¹⁵³⁰⁴
^ary^of^t^h^{e N}^a^v^y^A^r^m^e^{d S}^e^rvⁱ^ces^Johⁿ^H^.^D^a^l^t^oⁿ^07/^01/⁹³^07/^21/⁹³¹⁶²²⁰¹⁸²
^rt^m^e^nt^o^f^J^u^st^ice
^t^o^rn^ey^G^eⁿ^e^ral^J^u^dⁱ^cⁱ^a^ry^Jan^e^t^R^eⁿ^o^02/^26/⁹³^03/^11/⁹³³⁷¹³⁵⁰
^u^ty^A^tto^rⁿ^ey^Gen^e^r^a^l^J^u^d^iciar^y^P^h^illip^Hey^m^anⁿ⁰⁵^/⁰⁷^/⁹³⁰⁵^/²⁸^/⁹³¹⁰⁷²¹¹²⁸
^{Federal B}^u^reau^of^J^u^diciary^L^ou^is^J^.^Freeh^d^07/^20/⁹³^08/^06/⁹³¹¹⁷¹⁸

^v^e^stig^atioⁿ⁽^F^B^I⁾

CRS-27
^D^ays^E^l^ap^s^e^d
^from^D^ays^from
^Firs^{t Con}^f^irm^e^d^Da^te^Iⁿ^au^gu^rati^on^,^D^ays^E^l^ap^s^e^d^Iⁿ^au^gu^rati^on^,
^Nomⁱⁿ^a^ti^on^{to th}^e^No^mⁱ^na^tioⁿ^Ena^c^t^m^eⁿ^t^,^from^Eⁿ^actm^en^{t, or}
^S^eⁿ^a^{te Com}^mⁱ^ttee^Posⁱ^{tion by Pres}^ident^{Received in}^a^Co^nfirm^a^tioⁿ^{or V}^a^can^c^{y to}^Nomⁱⁿ^a^ti^on^to^Va^ca^ncy^to
^Posⁱ^ti^on^Tⁱ^tl^e^{of Ju}^ri^s^dⁱ^c^ti^on^Willia^m^J^.^Clint^oⁿ^t^h^{e Sena}^t^e^Da^te^No^mⁱ^na^tioⁿ^Co^nfirm^a^tioⁿ^Co^nfirm^a^tioⁿ
^rt^m^e^nt^o^f^St^a^t^e
^ary^F^orei^gⁿ^R^e^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^Warren^C^h^ri^s^t^oph^er^01/^20/⁹³^01/^20/⁹³¹¹¹
^pu^t^y^S^ecret^ary^F^orei^gⁿ^R^e^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^C^lⁱ^f^t^oⁿ^R^.^Wh^art^oⁿ^01/^20/⁹³^01/^26/⁹³¹⁶⁶
^{der Secretary}^-^Econ^om^{ic an}^d^F^o^rei^gⁿ^R^e^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^Joan^{E. S}^p^ero^03/^16/⁹³^03/^31/⁹³⁵⁵¹⁵⁷⁰
^rⁱ^cu^ltu^r^a^{l A}^f^f^a^ir^s
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32551}^{der Secretary}^-^Global^e^F^o^rei^gⁿ^R^e^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^Tⁱ^m^o^t^h^y^{E. Wi}^rt^h^03/^08/⁹³^04/^21/⁹³⁴⁷⁴⁴⁹¹
^g/wⁱ^r^s
^s^.or^{der Secretary}^-^In^tern^ation^a^l
^le^ak^r^ity^A^f^f^a^ir^s^F^o^rei^gⁿ^R^e^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^L^yⁿⁿ^{E. D}^a^vⁱ^s^03/^05/⁹³^03/^31/⁹³⁴⁴²⁶⁷⁰
^://wiki^{der S}^ecret^ary^-^Man^a^g^e^m^eⁿ^t^F^o^rei^gⁿ^R^e^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^{J. Bri}^aⁿ^A^t^w^ood^03/^05/⁹³^03/^31/⁹³⁴⁴²⁶⁷⁰
^h^ttp
^d^e^r^Secr^etar^y^-^P^o^litical^F^o^rei^gⁿ^R^e^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^Pet^e^{r T}^a^rn^of^f^02/^26/⁹³^03/^10/⁹³³⁷¹²⁴⁹
ⁱ^r^s
^{der Secretary}^-^P^u^blic^f^Fo^r^e^igⁿ^Relatioⁿ^s^Ev^elyⁿ^Sim^oⁿ^o^w^itz^06/^24/⁹⁹^07/^30/⁹⁹²⁴⁶³⁶²⁸²
^pl^om^acy^an^{d Pu}^blⁱ^c^A^f^f^aⁱ^r^s^Lⁱ^eberm^aⁿ
^ra^{l Int}^e^llig^{ence Ag}^ency
^ecto^r^o^f^Cen^t^r^a^{l I}ⁿ^tellig^en^ce^Iⁿ^tellig^en^ce^{R. J}^a^m^e^{s W}^o^o^l^sey⁰¹^/²⁰^/⁹³⁰²^/⁰³^/⁹³¹¹⁴¹⁴
^pu^t^y^Dⁱ^rect^{or of}^C^eⁿ^t^ral^Iⁿ^tellig^en^ce^W^illiam^{O. Stu}^d^em^an^g^02/^21/⁹²^04/^08/⁹²³⁸⁴⁷⁸⁵
^tellig^en^ce
^pu^t^y^Dⁱ^rect^{or of}^C^eⁿ^t^ral^Joaⁿ^A^.^D^e^m^p^s^e^y
^tellig^en^{ce -}^Co^m^m^uⁿ^ity^h^Iⁿ^tellig^en^ce^11/^07/⁹⁷^05/^22/⁹⁸³⁹²¹²²⁵¹⁴
^a^na^ge^m^e^nt
^e^dⁱ^an^el^ap^s^e^d^d^ays⁴⁴¹⁷⁷¹
^e^an^el^ap^s^e^d^d^ays⁹⁰³⁰¹²⁰

CRS-28
^T^h^is^{table w}^a^s^{created by}^th^{e au}^th^{or w}^ith^ex^ten^s^iv^{e as}^sⁱ^s^t^an^c^e^fr^o^m^H^e^nr^y^B^.^H^o^gue^,^Aⁿ^a^l^y^s^tⁱⁿ^A^m^e^rⁱ^c^aⁿ^N^a^tⁱ^o^na^l^G^o^ve^rⁿ^m^e^nt^,^CRS.
^ltho^{ugh the}^fir^s^{t d}^a^y^the^ne^w^P^r^e^s^id^eⁿ^{t sub}^m^itte^d^no^mⁱ^na^tio^{ns to}^the^Se^na^te^w^a^{s I}ⁿ^a^ugur^a^tio^{n Da}^y^,^Se^na^te^c^o^m^m^itte^e^s^he^ld^h^earⁱⁿ^g^s^oⁿ^so^m^e^to^pⁿ^o^mⁱⁿ^a^tioⁿ^s^b^e^f^o^r^e^th^{at tim}^e
^an^{d th}^{e Sen}^a^{te w}^a^s^th^eref^{ore ready}^{to con}^f^irm^th^em^on^th^{e s}^a^m^e^day^th^ey^w^e^{re n}^o^mⁱⁿ^a^ted.
^h^{e S}^eⁿ^a^t^e^adj^o^u^rⁿ^e^{d on}^08/^7/^{93 an}^{d recon}^v^eⁿ^e^{d on}^09/^07/^{93. T}^h^{e 30 day}^s^of^t^h^at^reces^s^{are n}^o^tⁱⁿ^cl^u^d^{ed i}ⁿ^t^h^{e cal}^cu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^{s, in}^th^{is r}^o^w^,^o^f^d^a^y^s^elap^sed^.
^h^is^pos^ition^w^a^s^{created by}^P^.^L^.^103-^{160, s}^{ec. 903, en}^{acted 11/30/93.}
^’^s^predeces^s^o^{r, W}^illiam^{S. Ses}^sⁱ^on^s^,^w^a^s^fⁱ^{red by}^P^r^es^iden^t^C^lin^ton^on^J^u^ly^19,^{1993. A}ⁿ^{a P}^u^g^a^{, “}^C^lin^ton^fⁱ^res^FB^I’^s^S^es^sⁱ^on^s^,^ex^{pected to n}^a^m^e^N.Y.^j^u^dg^e,”^T^h^{e Bos}^t^{on G}^l^obe^,
^Ju^l^y^{20, 1993, p. 1.}
ⁱ^r^t^h^w^a^s^coⁿ^f^ir^m^e^dⁱⁿ^to^th^e^p^o^s^itioⁿ^o^f^co^uⁿ^s^elo^r^at^th^{e Dep}^a^r^t^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^{State. A}^f^ter^{a r}^e^o^r^g^aⁿⁱ^zatioⁿ^,^th^{e n}^a^m^e^o^f^th^{e p}^o^s^itioⁿ^b^ecam^{e u}ⁿ^d^{er secretary}^o^f^{State f}^o^{r g}^l^o^b^a^{l af}^f^a^irs.
^J^o^hⁿ^{M. Go}^sh^k^o^{, “}^S^{tate Dep}^a^r^t^m^eⁿ^t^Reo^r^g^aⁿⁱ^{zes Ran}^k^s^{; A}^s^Maⁿ^y^{as 4}⁰^Dep^u^ty^A^ssistan^{t Secr}^etar^y^J^o^b^W^{ill Disap}^p^ear^,”^T^h^{e W}^a^s^hⁱ^ngt^{on Pos}^t^{, F}^e^{b. 6, 1993, p. A}⁸^.
^h^is^pos^ition^w^a^s^{created by}^P^.^L^.^105-^{277, s}^{ec. 1313, en}^{acted 10/21/98.}
^d^em^an^w^a^s^{a h}^o^ldov^{er f}^r^om^th^{e prev}^iou^s^B^u^s^h^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ration^.^Stu^d^em^an^’^s^predeces^s^o^{r, R}ⁱ^ch^{ard J}^.^{Kerr, res}ⁱ^gⁿ^e^{d on}^J^aⁿ^.¹^4,^1992.^El^aiⁿ^e^S^cⁱ^o^lⁱⁿ^{o, “}^N^{o. 2 C}^.^I.A^.^O^f^fⁱ^ci^al^Q^uⁱ^t^s
^Pos^t^,^”^Th^{e New Yo}^{rk Times}^{, Jan}^.^{14, 1992.}^st^th
^h^is^pos^ition^w^a^s^{created by}^P^.^L^.^104-^{293, s}^{ec. 805, en}^acted^on^{10/11/96. T}^h^{e Sen}^a^{te adj}^o^u^rⁿ^e^{d on}^{11/13/97 at th}^{e en}^{d of}^t^he¹^s^e^s^sⁱ^on^of^t^h^{e 105}^Co^ngr^e^{ss a}ⁿ^d^r^e^c^o^nve^ne^d^oⁿ
^01/^27/^{98. T}^h^{e 74 day}^s^bet^w^een^t^h^{e 1}^st^an^{d 2}^nd^se^ssioⁿ^{s o}^f^the¹⁰⁵^th^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^s^{are n}^o^{t in}^clu^d^{ed in}^th^{e calcu}^lation^s^{, in}^th^is^row^,^of^day^s^elaps^e^d.

ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32551}
^g/w
^s^.or
^le^ak
^://wiki
^h^ttp