Sudan: Economic Sanctions
CRS Report for Congress
Sudan: Economic Sanctions
Updated October 11, 2005
Dianne E. Rennack
Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Sudan: Economic Sanctions
Summary
The United States maintains a range of economic sanctions on the Government
of Sudan. The United States generally restricts foreign aid because Sudan has been
found, by the Secretary of State, to be a supporter of acts of international terrorism,
is operating under a military dictatorship, and has fallen into arrears in its debt
repayment. The United States has also suspended bilateral preferential trade
treatment, restricted commercial exports and imports, denied the export of defense
articles and defense services, and refused to support requests from Sudan for funding
or program support in the international financial institutions for reasons related to
terrorism, regional stability, and human rights — including religious freedom, worker
rights, and trafficking in persons.
Notwithstanding the restrictions, the Congress has made an effort to hone the
economic sanctions imposed against Sudan to distinguish between the Government
of Sudan and the people of the country, to relieve the latter from sanctions’ sting. In
2000, legislation was enacted to allow foreign aid to Sudan if it would be applied to
nongovernmental efforts “to provide emergency relief, promote economic self-
sufficiency, build civil authority, provide education, enhance rule of law and the
development of judicial and legal frameworks, support people-to-people
reconciliation efforts, or implement any program in support of any viable peace
agreement....” [§ 501 of the Assistance for International Malaria Control Act].
With Secretary of State Powell’s assessment that genocide has been committed
in the Darfur region of west Sudan, stated before the Committee on Foreign Relations
on September 9, 2004, and with continuing reports of extreme violence committed
against the civilian population of Darfur, and against those who have fled that region
to take up shelter in refugee camps along the Sudan/Chad border, the United States
must consider its relationship with Sudan, the effectiveness and impact of economic
assistance to Sudan, the appropriateness and impact of economic sanctions, and the
nexus of the two. Especially as it states the case of genocide before the United
Nations, which has not found the condition of “genocidal intent” among the
perpetrators of the violence, a new assessment of the use of economic sanctions
might be timely.
This report describes U.N. actions and U.S. economic sanctions currently in
place on Sudan, and the exceptions to those sanctions. It will be updated as events
warrant.
Contents
Background ..................................................1
Recent United Nations Actions...................................3
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1556........................3
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1564........................4
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1591........................5
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1593........................6
Restrictions on U.S. Foreign Aid..................................6
Restricting Aid to a Country in Default of Debt Repayment.........7
Restricting Aid to a Country After a Military Coup...............8
Other Restrictions on Foreign Aid in Annual Appropriations........9
Restrictions on Foreign Aid Pending in the Current Congressional
Session ..............................................9
Restrictions as a Result of Terrorism Designation....................10
Restrictions on Trade, Transactions and International Bank Funding.....11
National Emergency and Resulting Economic Sanctions..........11
Trafficking ..................................................12
Exceptions to Sanctions........................................13
Sudan Peace Act and Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004......14
List of Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Aid to Sudan Fiscal Years 1982-2005................8
Table 2. Sudan: Economic Sanctions Currently Imposed in Furtherance of
U.S. Foreign Policy or National Security Objectives..................17
Sudan: Economic Sanctions
Background
The United States maintains a range of economic sanctions on the Government
of Sudan.1 The United States generally restricts foreign aid because Sudan has been
found, by the Secretary of State, to be a supporter of acts of international terrorism,
is operating under a military dictatorship, and has fallen into arrears in its debt
repayment. The United States has also suspended bilateral preferential trade
treatment, restricted commercial exports and imports, denied the export of defense
articles and defense services, and refused to support requests from Sudan for funding
or program support in the international financial institutions for reasons related to
terrorism, regional stability, and human rights — including religious freedom, worker
rights, and trafficking in persons. As a member state of the United Nations, the
United States, is also required to cease the sale or supply of arms and related materiel
— transactions the U.S. government already blocks — to non-government entities
and individuals operating in Sudan, deny visas or passage through the United States
to those cited by the United Nations as those committing human rights atrocities in
Darfur, and freeze the assets of those cited.
On September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Powell testified before the Committee
on Foreign Relations to report his assessment of the current crisis in Darfur, in
Sudan’s western region bordering Chad.2 Secretary Powell reported that the U.S.
State Department had “concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur and
1 Generally, the term “economic sanctions” is defined as “coercive economic measures taken
against one or more countries to force a change in policies, or at least to demonstrate a
country’s opinion about the other’s policies.” Not everyone agrees that the withholding of
foreign aid is an economic sanction. Some contend that foreign assistance is not an
entitlement; no country should expect its availability. The denial of foreign assistance is
included in this discussion because it fits the definition used, that is: denial of foreign
assistance to force the Government of Sudan to change its behavior is in keeping with
“coercive economic measures taken....” For more on the use of economic sanctions, see
CRS Report 97-949, Economic Sanctions to Achieve U.S. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion
and Guide to Current Law, by Dianne E. Rennack and Robert D. Shuey. For the argument
against including foreign aid in any sanctions debate, see Helms, Jesse. “What Sanctions
Epidemic? U.S. Business’ Curious Crusade.” Foreign Affairs. January-February 1999.
The definition of “Government of Sudan” has changed over time, with each annual foreign
assistance appropriations measure and freestanding legislation trying to capture the term as
current conditions allow. This is somewhat addressed in the “Exceptions to Sanctions” and
“Sudan Peace Act and Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004” sections, particularly
in related footnotes.
2 “Powell Reports Sudan Responsible for Genocide in Darfur,”
[http://www.usinfo.state.gov]. See also U.S. Department of State. “Documenting Atrocities
in Darfur,” State Publication 11182. September 2004. 8 p.
that the Government of Sudan and the jinjaweid3 bear responsibility — and genocide
may still be occurring.” The Congress, also in mid-2004, declared “that the atrocities
unfolding in Darfur, Sudan, are genocide.4 In January 2005, however, an
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary
General concluded that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of
genocide. 5
This report outlines actions taken by the United Nations and the economic
sanctions currently imposed on Sudan by the United States — describing what is
restricted, the statutory basis for the sanctions, and where the authority lies to ease
or strengthen those restrictions.6
3 “Jinjaweid,” spelled a variety of ways, is described by the International Crisis Group as “a
loose collection of fighters of Arab background mainly from Darfur. Beginning in spring
2003, following a string of SLA [Sudan Liberation Army, a rebel group involved in a
north/south conflict that raged in Sudan for years] victories, Khartoum [the Sudanese
government] adopted a scorched earth strategy that relies more heavily on the Janjaweed to
target civilian populations suspected or supporting the rebellion ... Some Janjaweed build
on a tradition of the ‘Hambati’ or ‘social bandits’ among the Arab tribes. These are robbers
rejected by their communities for flouting established traditions but envied for their exploits.
Other elements are thought to be professional criminals, including some allegedly released
specifically to join or lead the militia. Building on existing ethnic tensions and a raider
culture, the government armed the Janjaweed to supplement the army and gave carte blanche
for looting and rape.”International Crisis Group. “Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis.”
Africa Report No. 76, 25 March 2004. p. 16. The crisis in Darfur is addressed by various
government and nongovernment organizations. See various reports at:
United Nations — [http://www.reliefweb.int/],
International Crisis Group — [http://www.crisisgroup.org],
State Department — [http://www.state.gov/p/af/],
U.S. Agency for International Development —
[http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/sudan/], and
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance —
[http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/ humanitari an_assistance/disaster_assistance/].
4 The House and Senate each passed resolutions (concurrent resolutions, though, in fact, the
texts of the two are at some variance) declaring “that the atrocities unfolding in Darfur,
Sudan, are genocide,” and calling on the Government of Sudan, the United Nations and its
member states, and the Administration to take appropriate immediate action. See
H.Con.Res. 467, which passed the House on July 22, 2004, by a vote of 422-0, and
S.Con.Res. 133, which was adopted in the Senate by unanimous consent on July 22, 2004.
See also CRS Report RL32605, Genocide: Legal Precedent Surrounding the Definition of
the Crime, by Judith Derenzo and Michael John Garcia.
5 The Secretary General established the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1564, in which he was tasked, in part, “to
determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred....” The International
Commission of Inquiry filed its report on January 25, 2005.
See [http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_ing_darfur.pdf].
6 For more detail on Sudan, Darfur, the North-South crisis and its resolution, and related
U.S. policy, see CRS Report RL32643, Sudan: The Darfur Crisis and the Status of the
North-South Negotiations; and CRS Issue Brief IB98043, Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis,
Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S. Policy, both by Ted Dagne.
Recent United Nations Actions
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1556. On July 30, 2004, the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1556 to condemn “acts of
violence and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by all
parties to the crisis” in the Darfur region of western Sudan, and to single out the
Government of Sudan for its primary responsibility to respect human rights, maintain
law and order, and protect the population of the region. In doing so, the Security
Council cited its authority, under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, to address threats
to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. By issuing UNSC
Resolution 1556, the Security Council calls on the Government of Sudan to facilitate
international relief of the humanitarian disaster, investigate human rights violations,
establish credible security conditions for the civilian population and those attempting
to assist them, and resume peace talks with all factions. The Security Council,
furthermore, endorses the African Union’s deployment of international monitors to
Darfur, and urges U.N. member states to materially support the African Union effort.
UNSC Resolution 1556 also requires U.N. member states to prevent the sale or
supply of arms and related materiel to non-government entities and individuals
operating in Sudan.7
The U.N. Security Council has demanded that the Government of Sudan “fulfill
its commitments to disarm the Janjaweed militias and apprehend and bring to justice
Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited and carried out human rights
and international humanitarian law violations and other atrocities.” The Security
Council requested that Secretary General Kofi Annan report in 30 days, and monthly
thereafter, on any progress of the Government of Sudan to fulfill its commitments,
and made it clear that it intends to take further steps against the Government of
Sudan “in the event of non-compliance.”
According to press reports, Secretary General Annan’s appointed envoy to
Sudan, Jan Pronk of the Netherlands, in his briefing to the Security Council that
constituted Secretary General Annan’s first required monthly report, concluded that
“there is no recent evidence linking Khartoum to Arab militias rampaging through8
black African villages in Darfur.” The United States publicly criticized the
7 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004), July 30, 2004. The vote was 13-
0, with China and Pakistan abstaining. Both countries have, in the past, abstained in voting
in favor of resolutions that would impose economic sanctions on other countries, contending
that sovereignty of the targeted state is compromised. China and Pakistan are each in the
difficult position of having its sovereignty contested by other states or by resident
populations over a region that it considers part of its national territory — for China, Tibet,
and for Pakistan, Kashmir. Thus, their abstentions might have less to do with Sudan than
with the larger political debate about sovereignty and borders. It should also be noted,
though, that China is Sudan’s leading trading partner, and is heavily invested in Sudan’s
emerging crude oil production capacity, an industry previously developed by U.S. and
Canadian oil companies.
8 Lynch, Colum. “U.N. Envoy to Sudan ‘Wrong,” Danforth Says.” The Washington Post,
September 3, 2004. p. A16.
conclusions, citing a report prepared by African Union monitors that contradicted Mr.
Pronk’s assessment, and urged the mobilization of more observers to the region.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1564. In his testimony before the
Committee on Foreign Relations on September, 9, 2004, Secretary of State Powell
announced that the State Department identified genocide in the events of Darfur, and
would return to the United Nations to call for immediate action. He declared: the
United States will call for a “full-blown and unfettered investigation” by the United
Nations to “confirm the true nature, scope and totality of the crimes our evidence
reveals.”9 It was acknowledged at the time, however, that adoption of sanctions in
the United Nations would be a hard won accomplishment, as China, Pakistan, Russia,
Britain, and others had stated that they were unlikely to support punitive measures10
at this time.
On September 18, 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1564 to
request Secretary General Annan to establish an international commission of inquiry
empowered to investigate “reports of violations of international humanitarian law and
human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of
genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a
view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable....”11 UNSC Resolution
1564 also declares the United Nations’ support of the African Union’s efforts to
expand and enhance its monitoring efforts that grew out of North/South cease-fire
negotiations, and encourages member states to provide material support for the AU
efforts, to fulfill their earlier pledges for humanitarian contributions, and to provide
sustained support to humanitarian efforts in Darfur and neighboring Chad.
UNSC Resolution 1564 declares the Security Council’s intent to impose
restrictions on Sudan’s oil industry, and travel and asset restrictions targeting
individual members of the Government of Sudan, if Sudan fails to meet the
requirement and intent of UNSC Resolutions 1556 and 1564. No timeframe for
further imposition of sanctions is stated, however.
Pursuant to Resolution 1564, in October 2004, the Secretary General appointed
a five-member International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, and requested it
report within three months. On January 25, 2005, the International Commission
reported its findings in four categories: (1) violations of international humanitarian
law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties; (2) whether or not acts of genocide
have occurred; (3) the identification of perpetrators of violations; and (4)
recommendations on how to hold those perpetrators accountable. The International
Commission “established that the Government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed are
9 Secretary Powell’s testimony of September 9, 2004, op. cit.
10 Lynch, Colum. “U.S. Drafts Resolution on Sudan Sanctions.” The Washington Post.
September 9, 2004. p. A21.
11 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004), September 18, 2004. The vote
was 11-0, with China, Pakistan, Russia and Algeria abstaining. See Hoge, Warren.
“Authority Is Approved for Sanctions Against Sudan,” The New York Times. September 19,
responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law
amounting to crimes under international law” and, in particular, found that:
... Government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, including
killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape
and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement,
throughout Darfur. These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic
basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity. The extensive
destruction and displacement have resulted in a loss of livelihood and means of
survival for countless women, men and children. In addition to the large scale
attacks, many people have been arrested and detained, and many have been held
incommunicado for prolonged periods and tortured. The vast majority of the
victims of all of these violations have been from the Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit,
Jebel, Aranga and other so-called “African” tribes.
The International Commission of Inquiry, at the same time, however:
... concluded that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of
genocide... the crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing, at least
as far as the central Government authorities are concerned.... The Commission
does recognize that in some instances individuals, including Government
officials, may commit acts with genocidal intent. Whether this was the case in
Darfur, however, is a determination that only a competent court can make on a12
case by case basis. [emphasis added]
The report of the International Commission of Inquiry, ambiguous in its findings
of no genocide, lack of “genocidal intent,” but acts possibly committed with
“genocidal intent,” and its call for a “competent court” to evaluate the evidence, led
to a flurry of international debate and diplomatic maneuvering. The United States
called on the United Nations either to establish a new “accountability tribunal” or
refer criminal investigations to the special tribunal in Tanzania that oversaw cases
related to the 1994 massacres in Rwanda, deploy peacekeepers and impose economic
sanctions that would have an impact on Sudan’s oil exports. Most other U.N.
Security Council members supported the International Commission of Inquiry’s
recommendation to have the International Criminal Court in The Hague oversee any
prosecution.13 And the Government of Sudan insisted that any prosecution of war
crimes in Darfur should be pursued in Sudan’s own courts.14
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1591. On March 29, 2005, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 1591 to require member states to “prevent entry into or
12 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations
Secretary General, January 25, 2005. p. 3-4.
13 For more on the International Criminal Court, and particularly the United States’ policy
toward it, see CRS Report RL31495, U.S. Policy Regarding the International Criminal
Court, by Jennifer Elsea.
14 See a series of articles written by Warren Hoge for The New York Times: “10,000
Peacekeepers Sought by U.S. for Southern Sudan,” February 15, 2005, p. 8; “Human Rights
Commission Urges U.N. To Act quickly on Darfur,” February 17, 2005, p. 9; “France
Asking U.N. To Refer Darfur To International Court,” March 24, 2005, p. 3.
transit through their territories of all persons,” identified by a newly formed
Committee of the Security Council, who “impede the peace process, constitute a
threat to the stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of international
humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities,” or violate the arms embargo
stated in Resolution 1556. Resolution 1591 also requires member states to “freeze
all funds, financial assets and economic resources” of those identified by the
Committee. The Resolution delayed the imposition of these two sanctions for 30
days, however, leaving enough time for the removal and relocation of most assets
held by an individual or entity subject to the sanction.15
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1593. Two days later, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 1593 to refer the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of16
the International Criminal Court.
Restrictions on U.S. Foreign Aid
Sudan has been denied U.S. foreign aid under the law since 1988, when it
defaulted on servicing its external debt. Subsequent developments — the military
overthrow of a democratically elected government in 1989, and support of acts of
international terrorism, as determined by the Secretary of State in 1993 — also
require that the United States deny foreign assistance to Sudan.
Humanitarian aid and food aid are exempted from the restrictions, however, and
from 1988 to 2001, such assistance to Sudan averaged more than $48 million each
year, primarily in food aid (see Table 1, below). This stands in contrast to 1987 and
earlier, when Sudan averaged more than $216 million per year, and aid ran the gamut
from food aid, development assistance, Economic Support Funds, military assistance
and International Military Education and Training (IMET).
Today, the United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to
Darfur. From February 2003 through September 2005, the United States provided
nearly $768 million to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in Darfur
and on the Chad/Sudan border.17
15 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005), March 29, 2005. The vote was
12-0, with Algeria, China, and Russia abstaining. Resolution 1591 also demands that the
Government of Sudan cease “conducting military flights in and over the Darfur region.”
16 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005), March 31, 2005. The vote was
11-0, with Algeria, Brazil, China, and the United States abstaining. For a range of views on
the prosecution options considered by the international community, see, for example
Lederer, Edith M., “Despite Calls for International Trails, Sudan Says Its Courts Should
Handle Darfur Abuses,” Associated Press, February 9, 2005; Power, Samantha, “Court of
First Resort,” The New York Times, February 10, 2005, p. 23; Wadhams, Nick, “France
Proposes Resolution Referring Sudan to International Criminal Court, Forcing U.S. Into a
Dilemma,” Associated Press, March 23, 2005; and Gedda, George, “U.S. Drops Objection
to International Criminal Court Trail of Sudanese War Criminals,” Associated Press, March
17 U.S. Agency for International Development:
(continued...)
The United States has also provided funding to support the African Union’s
deployment of cease-fire observers and human rights monitors to the region. The
United Nations has called for an expansion of the African Union forces to 7,700, with
possible supplement up to 12,000, with airlift and logistical help from NATO
(including the United States), the European Union, and Ukraine (a party to neither
NATO nor the EU).18
Restricting Aid to a Country in Default of Debt Repayment. In
December 1988, Sudan fell more than one year in arrears in servicing its debt to the
United States. This debt was accumulated in the form of non-grant U.S. foreign and
military aid. As a result, since 1988, Sudan has been denied most foreign assistance
pursuant to sections in both authorization and appropriations legislation.19 The
President may waive the restriction if he finds it in the U.S. national interest to do so.
Most recently, Sudan’s debt arrearage — along with its support of international
terrorism and its military dictatorship — was also cited by the State Department and
the Millennium Challenge Corporation as cause for ineligibility for assistance under
the terms of the Millennium Challenge Account.20
17 (...continued)
[http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/sudan/darfur.html]; and
situation reports of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance:
[http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/ humanitari an_assistance/disaster_assistance/].
18 “United States, Canada and Africa: NATO Commander Hails Security Efforts in Darfur,”
Africa News, October 5, 2005; Press Briefing on Sudan, Robert Zoellick, Deputy Secretary
of State, Department of State, May 27, 2005.
19 Even when foreign aid is denied, some forms of aid are allowed, notwithstanding the
prohibition. Such “notwithstanding” clauses, usually stated in annual foreign operations
appropriations, but sometimes stated in an authorizing measure, allow foreign aid to flow
for Child Survival programs, emergency food aid, nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining,
international narcotics control, tropical forestry and biodiversity conservation, debt-for-
nature swaps, and Peace Corps, to name a few. The President also has “special authority”
to furnish a limited amount of assistance each fiscal year to a country “without regard to any
provision” that would otherwise restrict funds “when the President determines...that to do
so is important to the security interests of the United States.” For the latter, see § 614 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2364).
Section 620(q) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2370(q)), and
§ 512 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 2005 (Division D of P.L. 108-447; 118 Stat. 2994) require a ban on foreign assistance
for countries in default. The latter is popularly referred to as the Brooke-Alexander
Amendment (or simply Brooke, as in a country is “Brooked”). Originally, the text in the
appropriations measure mirrored that in the authorization Act. The appropriations measure
was changed in FY2001 to refer to the government of any country, not just the country.
20 See the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (Title VI of P.L. 108-199; 22 U.S.C. 7701 et
seq.). Eligibility determination stated in Department of State Public Notice 4617 of
February 3, 2004 (69 F.R. 5887), and Millennium Challenge Corporation report of July 21,
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Aid to Sudan Fiscal Years 1982-2005
(in current U.S. $ millions)
Fiscal yearTotalFoodDAESFMilIMET
1982 253.0 26.9 24.9 100.0 100.0 1.2
1983 210.6 51.0 33.0 82.3 43.0 1.3
1984 243.9 51.1 26.3 120.0 45.0 1.5
1985 350.0 154.3 35.3 114.0 45.0 1.4
1986 138.3 50.0 61.2 10.0 16.1 0.9
1987102.675.221.3 — 5.01.0
198864.146.117.1 — — 0.9
198957.752.23.51.1 — 0.9
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and
Loan Authorizations. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign
Operations, country/account summaries, February 10, 2004. “Development Assistance” (DA)
includes Child Survival and Health and International Disaster Assistance funds. FY2004 DA includes
$20 million transferred from Iraq Reconstruction Funds. FY2002 Economic Support Funds (ESF)
includes $3 million in funds transferred from the Countries in Transition Account.
Note: Food aid is committed in the course of a year, thus no figure is projected for FY2005.
Mil = Military assistance. IMET = International Military Education and Training.
Restricting Aid to a Country After a Military Coup. On June 30, 1989,
Sudan’s democratically elected government, led by Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi,
was overthrown by that country’s military forces. As a result, Sudan is denied most
foreign assistance pursuant to the annual foreign operations appropriations.21 On
February 28, 1990, President George H.W. Bush invoked this section of law to
announce that aid, other than humanitarian assistance, would be denied Sudan. This
prohibition continues until the President can determine and certify to Congress that
democracy has returned to Sudan on the national level. Sudan is also deemed
ineligible for Millennium Challenge Account funding because of its military
dictatorship.
Other Restrictions on Foreign Aid in Annual Appropriations. Since
FY1989, the annual foreign operations appropriations act has explicitly prohibited22
Sudan from receiving aid under the Foreign Military Financing Program. FY2005’s
foreign operations appropriations act specifically denies Sudan eligibility for U.S.
debt restructuring programs “unless the Secretary of the Treasury determines and
notifies the Committees on Appropriations that a democratically elected government
has taken office.” The debt restructuring program includes debt accrued through the
International Affairs Budget Function 150 account, P.L. 480 agricultural loans, the
Export-Import Bank, and certain debt reduction programs enacted in prior years.
Sudan is also denied any assistance under the current foreign operations
appropriations “except as provided through the regular notification procedures of the
Committees on Appropriations.”
Restrictions on Foreign Aid Pending in the Current Congressional
Session. The foreign operations appropriations measure to fund programs through
FY2006, currently under consideration in the 109th Congress, seeks to continue the
restrictions on aid to Sudan related to democracy, foreign military financing, and
regular notification procedures. Restrictions on aid imposed because of military
regimes or debt arrearage, though not explicitly directed at Sudan, are also continued.
The proposal also makes available not less than $112.35 million in bilateral
economic assistance to Sudan for disease control programs and debt reduction. None
of those funds will be provided to the Government of Sudan, however, unless the
Secretary of State can determine and certify to Congress that (1) the Government of
Sudan has disarmed and disbanded government-supported militia groups operating
in Darfur; (2) the Government of Sudan and related militia groups are honoring the
cease-fire agreement of April 2004; and (3) the Government of Sudan allows
international humanitarian and human rights groups access to Darfur.23
21 See § 508 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2005 (Division D of P.L. 108-199; 118 Stat. 2992). Since FY1986,
annual foreign operations appropriations acts have denied foreign assistance to “any country
whose duly elected head of government is deposed by decree or military coup....” More
recently, since FY2002, “assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation
in democratic processes” is exempt from the aid ban.
22 See, for the current year, Title III of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2005 (Division D of P.L. 108-447; 118 Stat. 2987),
relating to Foreign Military Financing; Title II (118 Stat. 2986) relating to debt
restructuring; and § 520 (118 Stat. 2998), relating to notification procedures.
23 H.R. 3057, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2006, as passed the House June 28, 2005, by a vote of 393-32, and as
(continued...)
Restrictions as a Result of Terrorism Designation
In August 1993, the Secretary of State determined that the Government of Sudan
had “repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” As a result,
Sudan is subject to a long list of economic restrictions and a withdrawal of U.S.
foreign aid. U.S. exporters are required to obtain validated licenses for the export of
goods or technology to Sudan, and generally there is a presumption that the
Departments of Commerce (for dual-use goods) or State (for defense articles and
defense services) will deny the issuance of those licenses.24 As a U.S.-designated
supporter of international terrorism, Sudan is generally denied foreign assistance,
Millennium Challenge Account funding, agricultural aid, Peace Corps programs,
support through the Export-Import Bank, support in the international financial
institutions, opposition to loans or credits from the International Monetary Fund, and
withholding of trade preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences.25
In April 1999, at the height of debate in Congress over the effectiveness — and
unintended consequences — of economic sanctions, the Clinton administration
announced that it would remove food and medicine from its sanctions policies in
future applications, and it would issue new regulations for some countries — Iran,
Libya, and Sudan — denied access to U.S. agricultural and medical exports.26
Congress later enacted the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000 to place in permanent law the exemption of food and medicine exports in
sanctions regimes. For state sponsors of terrorism, including Sudan, the export of
agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical devices requires a license from the
Department of Commerce. U.S. government financing of commercial exports to
state sponsors of terrorism, including Sudan, is prohibited unless the President
23 (...continued)
passed the Senate, July 20, 2005, by a vote of 98-1. It is currently in conference.
24 Pursuant to § 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app.
25 Pursuant to § 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2371);
§ 527 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 2005 (Division D of P.L. 108-447; 118 Stat. 3002); § 607 of the Millennium Challenge
Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-199; 22 U.S.C. 7707); § 1621 of the International Financial
Institutions Act (P.L. 95-118; 22 U.S.C. 262p-4q); § 6 of the Bretton Woods Agreements
Act Amendments, 1978 (P.L. 95-435; 22 U.S.C. 286e-11); § 2(b)(1)(B) of the Export-Import
Bank Act of 1945 (P.L. 79-173; 12 U.S.C. 635(b)(1)(B)); and § 502 of the Trade Act of
1974 (P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. 2462). The President is also authorized to deny imports from
any country listed as a supporter of international terrorism under Section 505 of the
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83; 22 U.S.C.
2349aa-9), though this is not triggered automatically and has not yet been invoked against
Sudan. See, however, discussion of declaration of national emergency and resulting
sanctions.
26 New regulations to ease restrictions on agricultural and medical exports to Iraq, Cuba, and
North Korea were not issued. State Department officials contended that each of those
countries’ needs were being addressed by other means, through the United Nations or
nongovernmental organizations with which the United States was cooperating.
determines and certifies to Congress that such financing is in the United States’
national security interest, or should be provided for humanitarian reasons.27
Restrictions on Trade, Transactions and International Bank
Funding
Typically, as it is the case with Sudan, economic and diplomatic prohibitions are
multilayered, incrementally denying access to funds needed to legitimize a targeted
government. United States condemnation for Sudan’s military dictatorship in 1989
denied the country many forms of U.S. foreign aid. In 1991 President George H.W.
Bush suspended trade preferences afforded Sudan under the Generalized System of
Preferences. He cited the Government of Sudan’s failure to promote and protect
internationally recognized standards of worker rights.28 In 1993, the State
Department added Sudan to the list of countries found to be supporting acts of
international terrorism. In 1997, President Clinton invoked the most powerful
economic authority available to his office to prohibit nearly all trade and transactions
between the United States and Sudan. In each case, it is left to the President to
determine that improved conditions warrant a restoration of bilateral relations and
resumption of aid, trade, support in the banks, and transactions.
National Emergency and Resulting Economic Sanctions. On
November 3, 1997, President Clinton invoked authority under the National
Emergencies Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act29 to declare
that a national emergency existed because of the Government of Sudan’s “continued
support of international terrorism; ongoing efforts to destabilize neighboring
governments; and the prevalence of human rights violations, including slavery and
the denial of religious freedom....” He issued Executive Order 13067 to block
property and assets held by the Government of Sudan in the United States, and to
prohibit most transactions with Sudan.30 Executive Order 13067 prohibits a U.S.
person from engaging in any of the following:
27 The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387; 22
U.S.C. 7201 et seq.) has different rules for different state supporters of international
terrorism. Sudan is generally categorized with Iran and Libya. Easier conditions exist for
Syria and North Korea; Cuba is saddled with the most difficult terms. For further discussion
of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, see CRS Issue Brief
IB10061, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Status
and Implementation, by Remy Jurenas.
28 See §502(b)(2)(G) of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. 2462); Presidential
Proclamation 6282 (April 25, 1991; 56 F.R. 19525).
29 See P.L. 94-412 (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and P.L. 95-223 (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.),
respectively.
30 Executive Order 13067, signed November 3, 1997 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; 62 F.R. 59989).
Regulations, issued by the Department of the Treasury, implementing this Executive Order
may be found at 31 CFR Part 538. Executive Order 13067 was most recently continued
through November 3, 2005, by President Bush in a Notice of November 1, 2004 (69 F.R.
!import into the United States of any goods or services of Sudanese
origin, other than information or informational materials;
!export or reexport to Sudan of any goods, technology, or services
from the United States, except for donations of articles intended to
relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing, and medicine;
!facilitation of exports to or imports from Sudan;
!performance of a contract in support of an industrial, commercial,
public utility or governmental project in Sudan;
!grant or extension of credits or loans to the Government of Sudan;
!transactions related to transportation of cargo to or from Sudan, or
actual transportation to or from Sudan, including intermediate stops
in the country; and
!any other transaction that is committed with the intention of evading
or avoiding the other prohibitions.
In November 2000, Congress adopted legislation to require the Secretary of the
Treasury to consider approving licenses for the import of gum arabic from Sudan.
Gum arabic, a resin-based substance widely used in the manufacture of inks,
adhesives, soft drinks, confections, and medicines, is one of Sudan’s chief exports.
While U.S. manufacturers were denied gum arabic from Sudan, European
competitors could trade in the commodity freely. Congress found that Sudan held
a “virtual monopoly on the world’s supply of the highest grade of gum arabic” and
a prohibition on its importation under Executive Order 13067 was devastating to the
U.S. gum arabic processing industry.31 Gum arabic became the exception to the
comprehensive trade restrictions imposed by the Executive Branch.
Any executive order issued under the authority of the National Emergencies Act
and International Emergency Economic Powers Act requires annual renewal from the
President, and only the President may revoke such an order.
Trafficking
On September 9, 2003, President George W. Bush imposed economic sanctions
on Sudan — one among a half dozen countries — for having failed to meet the
minimum human rights standards and obligations set forth in the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000. The President noted that, as Sudan received no
nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance from the United States, he was
limited to denying funding for participation by Sudanese officials or employees in
educational and cultural exchange programs until Sudan complied with minimum
standards or make significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the law.32
31 See § 1464 of the Tariff Suspension and Trade Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-476; 114 Stat.
2000, p. B6; Letter to the editor, submitted by Representative Robert Menendez, responding
to the September 10, 2000, editorial, The Washington Post. September 28, 2000. p. A30;
and Raspberry, William. “Some Things Must Not Stand,” The Washington Post. October
2, 2000, p. A25
32 § 110(d)(1)(A)(ii) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (P.L. 106-386; 22 U.S.C.
(continued...)
In September 2005, however, the President moved Sudan from Tier 3
(sanctionable), as it was so designated by the Secretary of State in June 2005, to Tier
2 (watchlist) status, because of significant steps the government had taken to fight
trafficking.33 The State Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in
Persons reported, for those countries so elevated:
These countries took concrete actions to prosecute traffickers, protect victims,
and to prevent the crime of trafficking. They increased efforts to identify and
rescue trafficking victims, crafted new anti-trafficking legislation and procedures
among other significant measures. In several instances, these actions were taken
by countries facing resource constraints and/or significant internal political
challenges. This demonstrates what can be accomplished when the commitment
exists to combat trafficking in persons. We commend these governments for their
actions. Sudan was reassessed based in large part on the government’s
commitment to implement a plan of action to end sexual violence against women
in Darfur. We will look to the Sudanese government to ensure quick and34
effective implementation of the plan.
Exceptions to Sanctions
In fine-tuning the imposition of economic sanctions on Sudan, Congress made
an effort to distinguish between the Government of Sudan, the people of Sudan, and
areas of the country outside of control of the government, to make aid and commerce
available to the general population, with enactment of the following in the Assistance35
for International Malaria Control Act:
SEC. 501. ASSISTANCE EFFORTS IN SUDAN.
(a) ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES. — Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the President is authorized to undertake appropriate
programs using Federal agencies, contractual arrangements, or direct
support of indigenous groups, agencies, or organizations in areas
outside of control of the Government of Sudan in an effort to provide
emergency relief, promote economic self-sufficiency, build civil
authority, provide education, enhance rule of law and the
development of judicial and legal frameworks, support people-to-
people reconciliation efforts, or implement any program in support of
any viable peace agreement at the local, regional, or national level in
Sudan.
32 (...continued)
see CRS Report RL30545, Trafficking in Persons: The U.S. and International Response,
by Francis Miko.
33 Presidential Determination No. 2005-37 (70 F.R. 57481; September 21, 2005). See also,
Department of State. Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. Trafficking in
Persons Report, 2005. June 3, 2005. [http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2005/]
34 Department of State. Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. “Trafficking
in Persons: Country Reassessments.” September 22, 2005. [http://www.state.gov/g/tip/].
35 P.L. 106-570 (114 Stat. 3038; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note); enacted December 27, 2000.
(b) EXCEPTION TO EXPORT PROHIBITIONS. — Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, the prohibition set forth with respect to
Sudan in Executive Order 13067 of November 3, 1997 (62 Fed.
Register 59989) shall not apply to any export from an area in Sudan
outside of control of the Government of Sudan, or to any necessary
transaction directly related to that export, if the President determines
that the export or related transaction, as the case may be, would
directly benefit the economic development of that area and its people.
The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 2005,36 further limits the implementation of economic sanctions to only those
parts of the country under control of the Government of Sudan. Thus, despite fairly
comprehensive and longstanding restrictions on foreign aid imposed under various
statutes for terrorism, debt arrearage, or military dictatorship, language in the
Assistance for International Malaria Control Act, and subsequent acts, authorizes the
President to override those restrictions as they might apply to large portions of
Sudan’s population.
Congress also singled out the National Democratic Alliance of Sudan as exempt
from economic sanctions restricting foreign aid in the Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2005. Economic Support
Funds may be made available to that group “to strengthen its ability to protect
civilians from attacks, slave raids, and aerial bombardment by the Sudanese
Government forces and its militia allies...” though such funding is “subject to the
regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.”37
Sudan Peace Act and Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of
2004
The Sudan Peace Act, as originally enacted, requires the President to determine
and certify to Congress, on a semi-annual basis, whether “the Government of Sudan
and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement are negotiating in good faith and that
negotiations should continue.” Since its enactment, on October 21, 2002, the
36 The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-199; 118 Stat. 182), for
purposes of the Assistance for International Malaria Control Act, provides the following
definitions: “... the terms ‘areas outside of control of the Government of Sudan’ and ‘area
in Sudan outside of control of the Government of Sudan’ shall, upon conclusion of a peace
agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement,
have the same meaning and application as was the case immediately prior to the conclusion
of such agreement.”
The following year, the Foreign Operations Act, 2005 (§ 569 of division D of P.L. 108-
447 (118 Stat. 3025)), provides the following: “... the terms ‘Government of Sudan’, ‘areas
outside of control of the Government of Sudan’, and ‘area in Sudan outside of control of the
Government of Sudan’ shall have the same meaning and application as was the case
immediately prior to June 5, 2004, and, with regard to assistance in support of a viable peace
agreement, Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State and Abyei.”
37 Division D, Title II, of P.L. 108-447 (118 Stat. 2976).
President regularly made a positive determination, most recently on April 24, 2004.38
If the President found himself unable to make this determination, he was required to:
!instruct U.S. executive directors in the international financial
institutions to continue to vote against loans, credits, guarantees, or
extension of any of these, to the Government of Sudan;
!consider downgrading diplomatic relations;
!take all steps, unilateral and multilateral, to deny the Government of
Sudan access to oil revenues; and
!seek a U.N. Security Council Resolution to impose an arms embargo
on the Government of Sudan.
If these economic and diplomatic sanctions are imposed, the President could certify
at any time that good faith negotiations had resumed, and lift the sanctions.
The Sudan Peace Act also instructs the President to consider “downgrading or
suspending diplomatic relations between the United States and the Government of
Sudan...”, though this is not mandatory. The act also: (1) authorizes the President
“to provide increased assistance to the areas of Sudan that are not controlled by the
Government of Sudan to prepare the population for peace and democratic
governance, including support for civil administration, communications
infrastructure, education, health, and agriculture”; (2) requires the President to
suspend assistance for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), except for
aid related to health, education, and humanitarian assistance, if he finds that the
SPLM “has not engaged in good faith negotiations or has failed to honor the
agreements signed”; and (3) requires the President to suspend foreign aid to the
Government of Sudan if he finds that it has resumed objectionable human rights
behavior after he certifies to its cessation.
The Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004,39 however, also amended the
Sudan Peace Act to authorize the President to provide $100 million for FY2005 and
unspecified amounts for the subsequent two years, notwithstanding any other
provision of law, “to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace
agreement that applies to all regions of Sudan, including the Darfur region”. The
amended Act also authorizes the President to use $200 million in FY2005 “to
address the humanitarian and human rights crisis in the Darfur region and eastern
Chad, including to support the African Union mission in the Darfur region, provided
that no assistance may be made available to the Government of Sudan.”40
38 P.L. 107-245, enacted October 21, 2002 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note). Pursuant to § 6(a)(1)(A)
of the act: most recently on April 24, 2004: Presidential Determination No. 2004-29 (69
F.R. 24905). In October 2004, the President delegated reporting responsibilities under this
section of the Sudan Peace Act to the Secretary of State (Presidential Memorandum of
October 21, 2004; 69 F.R. 63039).
39 P.L. 108-497 (118 Stat. 4012), including amendments to P.L. 107-245.
40 Section 12(b) of the Sudan Peace Act, as added by the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act
of 2004, defines “Government of Sudan” to mean “the National Congress Party, formerly
known as the National Islamic Front, government in Khartoum, Sudan, or any other
(continued...)
The Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 requires the President to
impose the economic and diplomatic sanctions stated in the Sudan Peace Act (and
outlined above, relating to international financial institutions, oil revenues,
diplomatic relations, and an arms embargo)) as well as freeze U.S.-based assets of
senior officials of the Government of Sudan, within 30 days of enactment (which
occurred December 23, 2004). The President is authorized to waive implementation
if he finds it in the national interest to do so.
The Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 also continues restrictions
imposed on foreign aid in the foreign assistance appropriations Act, 2004, unless the
President finds that the following conditions, stated in the Sudan Peace Act, as
amended, are met, namely:
that the Government of Sudan has taken demonstrable steps to —
(A) ensure that the armed forces of Sudan and any associated militias
are not committing atrocities or obstructing human rights monitors or the
provision of humanitarian assistance;
(B) demobilize and disarm militias supported or created by the
Government of Sudan;
(C) allow full and unfettered humanitarian assistance to all regions of
Sudan, including the Darfur region;
(D) allow an international commission of inquiry to conduct an
investigation of atrocities in the Darfur region, in a manner consistent with
United National Security Council Resolution 1564 (September 18, 2004),
to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and
human rights law in the Darfur region by all parties, to determine also
whether or not acts of genocide have occurred and to identify the
perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those
responsible are held accountable;
(E) cooperate fully with the African Union, the United Nations, and
all other observer, monitoring, and protection missions mandated to
operate in Sudan;
(F) permit the safe and voluntary return of displaced persons and
refugees to their homes and rebuild the communities destroyed in the
violence; and
(G) implement the final agreements reached in the Naivasha peace
process and install a new coalition government based on the Nairobi
Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in the Sudan signed on June 5,
40 (...continued)
successor government formed on or after the date of the enactment of the Comprehensive
Peace in Sudan Act (other than the coalition government agreed upon in the Nairobi
Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in the Sudan signed on June 5, 2004).”
CRS-17
Economic Sanctions Currently Imposed in Furtherance of U.S. Foreign Policy or National Security
Objectives
Authority to Lift or
RationaleRestrictionStatutory BasisAuthority to ImposeWaive
eLimits foreign aid§ 620(q), Foreign Assistance Act of 1961Statutory requirementPresident may waive if he
(22 U.S.C. 2370(q))finds it in the national
interest
eLimits foreign aid§ 512, Foreign Operations, Export Financing,Statutory requirementPresident may waive if he
and Related Programs Appropriations Act,finds it in the national
(118 Stat. 2994)
iki/CRS-RL32606bt arrearageDenies Millennium Challenge§ 607, Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22MillenniumNo waiver; assessed each
g/wAccount fundingU.S.C. 7707)Challengefiscal year
s.orCorporation, though
leakbased on
determination
://wikipursuant to § 620(q),
httpForeign Assistance
Act of 1961 (above)
Limits foreign aid§ 508, Foreign Operations, Export Financing,Statutory requirementPresident may lift only
and Related Programs Appropriations Act,when he can determine
2005and certify that democracy
(118 Stat. 2992)is restored.
Denies eligibility for U.S. debtTitle II, Foreign Operations, Export Financing,Statutory requirementSecretary of the Treasury
restructuring programsand Related Programs Appropriations Act,determines and notifies
2005Congress that democracy
(118 Stat. 2986)is restored.
CRS-18
Authority to Lift or
RationaleRestrictionStatutory BasisAuthority to ImposeWaive
Denies Millennium Challenge§ 607, Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22MillenniumNo waiver; assessed each
Account fundingU.S.C. 7707)Challengefiscal year
Corporation, though
based on
determination
pursuant to § 508,
Foreign Operations
Appropriations
(above)
neral foreignDenies foreign military financingTitle III, Foreign Operations, Export Financing,Statutory requirementNo waiver
reasonsand Related Programs Appropriations Act,
iki/CRS-RL32606 2005
g/w(118 Stat. 2987)
s.orneral foreignLimits foreign aid§ 520, Foreign Operations, Export Financing,Statutory requirementPresident may waive if he
leak reasonsand Related Programs Appropriations Act,notifies the Committees
://wiki2005on Appropriations
http(118 Stat. 2998)
rrorismLimits the export of goods or§ 6(j), Export Administration ActSecretary of StateSecretary of State, after
technology(50 U.S.C. app. 2504(j))the President notifies
Congress
Prohibits transactions related to§ 40, Arms Export Control ActSecretary of StateSecretary of State, after
defense articles and defense(22 U.S.C. 2780)the President notifies
servicesCongress. President may
also waive per each
transaction
Congress may block a
rescission by joint
resolution
CRS-19
Authority to Lift or
RationaleRestrictionStatutory BasisAuthority to ImposeWaive
rrorismProhibits most foreign aid,§ 620A, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961Secretary of StateSecretary of State, after
agricultural aid, Peace Corps(22 U.S.C. 2371)the President notifies
programs, Export-Import BankCongress
fundingWaived by President, if he
finds “that national
security interests of
humanitarian reasons
justify a waiver...”
Denies Millennium Challenge§ 607, Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22MillenniumNo waiver; assessed fiscal
Account fundingU.S.C. 7707)Challengeyear
iki/CRS-RL32606Corporation, thoughbased on
g/w determination
s.orpursuant to § 620A,
leakForeign Assistance
://wikiAct of 1961 (above)
httprrorismDenies Export-Import Bank§ 2(b)(1)(B), Export-Import Bank Act of 1945PresidentPresident
financing(12 U.S.C. 635(b)(1)(B))
rrorismOpposes loans or funding through§ 1621, International Financial Institutions ActSecretary of theSecretary of the Treasury
international financial institutions(22 U.S.C. 262p-4q)Treasury, if a country(no waiver authority)
is listed under § 6(j),
EAA, or § 620A,
FAA
rrorismProhibits bilateral assistance§ 527, Foreign Operations, Export Financing,PresidentPresident, if he finds it in
and Related Programs Appropriations Act,the national security
2005interest, or for
(118 Stat. 3002)humanitarian reasons
iolation ofSuspends trade preferences§ 502(b)(2)(G), Trade Act of 1974PresidentPresident
rker rights(19 U.S.C. 2462)
CRS-20
Authority to Lift or
RationaleRestrictionStatutory BasisAuthority to ImposeWaive
Prohibits most imports, exports,National Emergencies ActPresidentPresident
ergencytransactions related to(50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.);[See Executive Order
,transportationInternational Emergency Economic Powers Act13067, issued Nov. 3,(Congress, however,
an rights,(especially 50 U.S.C. 1702)1997; 50 U.S.C. 1701legislated an exemption
ionalnote]for the import of gum
)arabic in 2000)
he Sudan Peace Act (P.L. 107-245; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), as amended at § 12 by the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-497; 118 Stat. 4012), authorizes the
President to provide assistance to Sudan in fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007, notwithstanding any other provision of law, “(A)... to support the implementation of a comprehensive
peace agreement that applies to all regions of Sudan, including the Darfur region; and (B) to address the humanitarian and human rights crisis in the Darfur region and eastern
iki/CRS-RL32606Chad, including to support the African Union mission in the Darfur region, provided that no assistance may be made available to the Government of Sudan.” The making available
g/wof any such assistance requires the President to certify to Congress on the Government of Sudan’s performance relating to human rights, military restraint, cooperation with the
s.orinternational community — including the United Nations, tasked with investigating atrocities in Darfur, and the African Union, mobilized to observe, monitor and protect certain
leakoperations in Sudan, the return of displaced persons, and implementation of a peace accord reached in June 2004. The act prohibits the Government of Sudan’s eligibility for
any of the $200 million authorized for FY2005; no such restriction is stated for the $100 million for FY2005 and “such sums as may be necessary” for FY2006 and FY2007.
://wiki
httpEconomic sanctions are also contained in § 6 of the Sudan Peace Act, and § 6 of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, but are each somewhat overtaken by various
peace accords, protocols, and agreements signed among the various parties, which change the make-up of the “Government of Sudan” against which sanctions would be imposed.
n May 12, 2004, the Secretary of State issued an annual notice, as required by § 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2781; Department of State Public Notice 4722;
69 F.R. 28185), citing countries failing to cooperate with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. Sudan was removed from the list, after having been cited since the list was first required
in 1997. Removal from the list would make Sudan eligible for transactions related to defense articles and defense services, if it were not restricted by other laws.
September 21, 2005, the President determined that the Government of Sudan was making positive strides in the fight against trafficking in persons, and redesignated the country
as a Tier 2 violator, to be put on the State Department’s watchlist but not subject to economic sanctions. In June 2005, the Department of State’s Office to Monitor and Combat
Trafficking in Persons had determined that Sudan was a Tier 3 violator and thus subject to the continuation of economic sanctions, pursuant to § 110, Trafficking Victims
Protection Act (22 U.S.C. 7107)