Consolidating Intelligence Appropriation and Authorizing a Single Committee: 9/11 Commission Recommendations and Alternatives

CRS Report for Congress
Consolidating Intelligence Appropriation and
Authorization in a Single Committee: 9/11
Commission Recommendation and Alternatives
October 29, 2004
Sandy Streeter
Analyst in American National Government
Government and Finance Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Consolidating Intelligence Appropriation and
Authorization in a Single Committee:
9/11 Commission Recommendation and Alternatives
Summary
On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) issued its final report on the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Among other findings and recommendations, the commission stated that existing
congressional oversight was “dysfunctional” and recommended two alternative
proposals to change the existing intelligence committee structure: (1) replace the
existing Senate and House Select Intelligence Committees with a joint committee on
intelligence; or (2) consolidate intelligence appropriation and authorization functions
in existing intelligence authorization committees. This report discusses the second
of these two proposals. (For information on the first proposal, see CRS Report
RL32525, A Joint Committee on Intelligence: Proposals and Options From the 9/11
Commission and Others, by Frederick M. Kaiser; and CRS Report RL32538, 9/11
Commission Recommendations: Joint Committee on Atomic Energy — A Model for
Congressional Oversight?, by Christopher M. Davis.)
Under existing Senate and House rules, intelligence appropriations are under the
jurisdiction of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. Each committee
distributes these appropriations among five appropriations subcommittees,
predominantly the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees. The 9/11 Commission
recommended transferring jurisdiction over intelligence appropriations from the
Senate and House Appropriations Committees to the intelligence authorization
committees in each chamber.
Proponents of the commission’s proposal have contended that its adoption
would (1) improve congressional oversight of intelligence, (2) counter-balance the
commission’s proposed consolidation of executive branch intelligence activities, (3)
provide a more integrated perspective on national intelligence spending, (4) attract
Members to the consolidated intelligence committees, and (5) provide clear
congressional accountability on intelligence within Congress. Opponents argue that
consolidation would (1) reduce oversight of program quality, (2) weaken intelligence
oversight, (3) shortchange intelligence needs of the military, (4) concentrate too
much power in intelligence committees, and (5) increase spending.
Opponents may accordingly argue that it would be preferable to adopt the
alternative recommendation of the 9/11 Commission to consolidate authorizing
responsibility for intelligence in a joint committee. A third approach would be to
consolidate responsibility for intelligence appropriations in a new subcommittee of
each the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations. On October 9, 2004, the
Senate adopted S.Res. 445, instituting this approach in the Senate. This action was
based on a proposal by the Senate Majority and Minority Whips, the leaders of a
bipartisan working group appointed by the Majority and Minority Leaders.
This report will be updated.

Contents
Most Recent Developments..........................................1
In troduction ......................................................1
9/11 Commission’s Recommendation..................................2
Description ...................................................2
Existing Committee Jurisdiction Over Intelligence....................3
Appropriations Jurisdiction..................................3
Authorizing Jurisdiction....................................4
Senate ...............................................6
House ...............................................6
Precedent for Consolidation..........................................7
Separation of Authorization and Appropriation......................7
Consolidation Between 1878 and 1922.............................8
Separation of Authorization and Appropriation Resumes 1920-1922.....10
Comparison of Earlier Period to Today ...........................10
Prospective Effects................................................12
Arguments in Favor of Consolidation.............................12
Arguments Against Consolidation................................15
Alternatives to Consolidating Authorization and Appropriation.............17
Joint Committee on Intelligence.................................17
Separate Intelligence Appropriations Subcommittee Within
Appropriations Committees.................................18
Current Legislation...............................................18
Legislation Regarding the Senate.................................18
Consolidating Responsibility for Intelligence Appropriation and
Authorization in Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.....18
Separate Senate Intelligence Appropriations Subcommittee........19
Legislation Regarding Senate and House..........................19
Requiring Congressional Action on 9/11 Commission’s
Congressional Oversight Proposals in 108^th Congress.........19
List of Tables
Table 1. Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittee Jurisdiction over
Intelligence Community Entities..................................5

Consolidating Intelligence Appropriation and
Authorization in a Single Committee:
9/11 Commission Recommendation and
Alternatives
Most Recent Developments
On October 7, 2004, the Senate rejected, by a vote of 23-74, a proposal by
Senator John McCain to transfer jurisdiction over appropriations related to funding
intelligence matters from the Senate Appropriations Committee to the Senate Select¹
Committee on Intelligence. On October 9, 2004, the Senate adopted S.Res. 445,
which included a provision establishing a new Subcommittee on Intelligence within
the Senate Committee on Appropriations (for more information on this approach, see
“Current Legislation” below).
Introduction
On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) issued its final report on the
September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The
report contained the commission’s findings as well as its recommendations for
corrective measures that can be taken to improve the protection of the United States
against future terrorist attacks. In its report, the commission stated that existing
congressional oversight of intelligence was “dysfunctional,” due to the limitations of
the existing congressional intelligence authorizing committees.² The commission
recommended two alternative proposals to change the current intelligence committee
structure: (1) replace the existing Senate and House Select Intelligence Committees
with a joint committee on intelligence; or (2) consolidate intelligence appropriation
and authorization functions in the existing intelligence authorizing committees,
thereby enhancing the power of the authorizing committees. The commission
explained:

¹The proposal was in the form of an amendment (S.Amdt. 3999) to an amendment in the
nature of a substitute (S.Amdt. 3981) to S.Res. 445.
²U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11
Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (Washington: GPO, 2004), pp. 419-420, available at
[http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html], visited Oct. 21, 2004 (hereafter referred to as
Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report).

Whichever of these two forms are chosen, the goal should be a structure —
codified by resolution with powers expressly granted and carefully limited —
allowing a relatively small group of [M]embers of Congress, given time and
reason to master the subject and the agencies, to conduct oversight of the
intelligence establishment and be clearly accountable for their work. The staff
of this committee should be nonpartisan and work for the entire committee and³
not for individual members.
This report focuses on the commission’s second proposal, to consolidate
appropriation and authorization functions in the existing Senate and House Select
Intelligence Committees. The report (1) describes the proposal; (2) compares it to^th
the existing committee system; (3) describes a 19 century precedent for
consolidation; (4) provides selected arguments in favor of consolidation as well as
against; (5) discusses two alternatives to consolidating authorization and
appropriation functions: a Joint Committee on Intelligence and separate intelligence
appropriations subcommittees in the Senate and House Committees on
Appropriations; and (6) describes current legislation.
For information on the proposed joint committee on intelligence, see CRS
Report RL32525, A Joint Committee on Intelligence: Proposals and Options From
the 9/11 Commission and Others, by Frederick M. Kaiser; and CRS Report
RL32538, 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
— A Model for Congressional Oversight?, by Christopher M. Davis, both available
at [http://www.crs.gov/].
9/11 Commission’s Recommendation
Description
The 9/11 Commission proposes combining intelligence authorization and
appropriation authorities under a single committee in each chamber, specifically, the
existing Senate and House select intelligence authorization committees. The
commission would transfer jurisdiction over intelligence appropriations from the
Senate and House Appropriations Committees to the intelligence authorization
committees.
The commission also recommends (1) reducing the membership of the
intelligence committees from the existing 17 Senate panel members and 20 House
panel members (plus two ex officio members on each) to seven or nine members in
each chamber; and (2) making the terms of the committees’ members indefinite, as⁴
opposed to the existing term limits. In addition, the commission calls for both

³Ibid., p. 420.
⁴In the Senate, no Senator may serve for more than eight years of continuous service on the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (S.Res. 400, 94^th Cong., sec. 2(b)). All members
of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, except the chair and ranking
member, may not serve during more than four Congresses in a period of six successive
(continued...)

intelligence committees to be granted subpoena power. The commission is in favor
of continuing the policy of reserving seats on each intelligence committee for one
member of each of the following panels: the Committees on Armed Services; Foreign
Affairs (or International Relations); and the Judiciary; and the Defense
Appropriations Subcommittees.⁵
Existing Committee Jurisdiction Over Intelligence
Currently, authorization and appropriation authorities for discretionary spending
are under the jurisdiction of two separate types of committees. Authorizing
committees are responsible for reporting legislation that establishes, continues, or
modifies agencies, program, projects, or activities (referred to as authorizing
measures). The Senate and House Appropriations Committees report measures that
providing funding (budget authority⁶) for certain agencies, programs, projects, and
activities (appropriations measures).
The Senate and House Committees on Appropriations have jurisdiction over
appropriations for the intelligence community. The Senate and House Select
Intelligence Committees and Armed Services Committees generally have jurisdiction
over intelligence authorizations.
Appropriations Jurisdiction. Under the Senate and House Appropriations
Committees, jurisdiction over appropriations for the 15 agencies (or units) of the⁷
intelligence community is split among five subcommittees. All of the intelligence
agencies and units are administratively part of various U.S. departments, except two:
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Office of the Director of Central
Intelligence. Appropriations for all other intelligence agencies and units are reported
by the subcommittees with jurisdiction over the parent department.
The bulk of intelligence appropriations are under the jurisdiction of the Senate
and House Defense Appropriations Subcommittees, which have jurisdiction over all

⁴ (...continued)
Congresses (House Rule X, clause 11(a)(4)).
⁵Under existing requirements, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee includes two
representatives (a majority and a minority member) from four standing committees with
generally overlapping jurisdiction, while the House select committee includes only one
representative from each committee. The standing committees are the Senate and House
Appropriations Committees, Senate and House Armed Services Committees, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and House International Relations Committee, and Senate and House
Judiciary Committees.
For a discussion of these additional recommendations, see Commission on Terrorist
Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 419-421; and CRS Report RL32525, A Joint
Committee on Intelligence: Proposals and Options from the 9/11 Commission and Others,
by Frederick M. Kaiser.
⁶Congress provides budget authority instead of cash to agencies. Budget authority
represents the legal authority for federal agencies to make obligations requiring either
immediate or future expenditures (or outlays).
⁷The Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittees have parallel jurisdictions.

Department of Defense intelligence spending. The 9/11 Commission reports:
“[i]ntelligence agencies under the Department of Defense (DOD) account for
approximately 80 percent of all U.S. spending for intelligence....”⁸ The CIA and
Office of the Director of Central Intelligence are also under the jurisdiction of the
Defense Appropriations Subcommittees. (For Senate and House aApropriations
Subcommittees with jurisdiction over the intelligence entities, see Table 1.)
Authorizing Jurisdiction. The budget of the intelligence community is
divided into three components: National Foreign Intelligence Program; Joint Military
Intelligence Program; and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities. The
distinction between these programs is generally functional, as opposed to
organizational. The National Foreign Intelligence Program funds all foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence activities that support national needs, as opposed
to single departmental needs. The Joint Military Intelligence Program supports
DOD-wide activities, as opposed to individual military service needs. The Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities component funds DOD tactical military
intelligence activities to meet needs of the individual military services.
DOD agencies funded by the National Foreign Intelligence Program and the
DOD components include Defense Intelligence Agency; National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency; National Reconnaissance Office; and National Security Agency.
The National Foreign Intelligence Program also provides funding for (1) Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA); (2) Director of Central Intelligence; (3) Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (Department of State); (4) Directorate of Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection and Directorate of Coast Guard Intelligence
(Department of Homeland Security); (5) Office of Intelligence (Department of
Energy); (6) Office of Intelligence and the Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence
Divisions (Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Justice); and (7)
Office of Terrorism and Finance Intelligence (Department of the Treasury).
Authorization of the intelligence community is predominantly exercised by the
Senate and House Select Intelligence Committees and Armed Services Committees;
however, other committees may also have jurisdiction over some intelligence
activities.

⁸Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report , p. 86.

CRS-5
Table 1. Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittee Jurisdiction over
Intelligence Community Entities
SubcommitteeIntelligence Community Entity^a
mmerce, Justice, State, and the JudiciaryOffice of Intelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
(Department of Justice (DOJ));
Counterterrorism Division, FBI (DOJ);
Counterintelligence Division, FBI (DOJ); and
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Department of State (State
Department))
fenseDirector of Central Intelligence;
Central Intelligence Agency;
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32659}Defense Intelligence Agency (Department of Defense (DOD);
^g/wNational Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (DOD);
^s^.orNational Reconnaissance Office (DOD),
^le^akNational Security Agency (DOD);
^://wikiIntelligence entities of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps (DOD)
^h^ttpergy and Water DevelopmentOffice of Intelligence (Department of Energy (DOE))
meland SecurityDirectorate of Coast Guard Intelligence (Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)); and
Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (DHS)
ansportation/Treasury and GeneralOffice of Terrorism and Finance Intelligence (Department of the Treasury)
ernment
^h^e^so^u^r^ce^o^f^th^{e list o}^fⁱⁿ^tellig^en^{ce co}^m^m^uⁿ^ity^en^{tities is U.S. Natio}ⁿ^a^{l Co}^m^mⁱ^ssioⁿ^oⁿ^T^e^r^r^o^r^{ist A}^ttack^{s Up}^oⁿ^th^e^Un^ited^S^tates,^T^h^{e 9/}^{11 C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^{on Repor}^t^:^Fi^nal^Repor^t^of
^t^h^{e N}^a^tⁱ^onal^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^{on on T}^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^At^t^a^cks^U^{pon t}^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^{d St}^at^es^(Was^hⁱⁿ^g^t^on^:^G^P^O^,^{2004), pp. 407-}^408.

Senate. In the Senate, the Select Committee on Intelligence exercises
jurisdiction over authorizations of appropriations, both direct and indirect, for the⁹
following:
!Central Intelligence Agency;
!Director of Central Intelligence;
!Defense Intelligence Agency;
!National Security Agency;
!National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
!Intelligence activities of other agencies and units of DOD;
!Intelligence activities of the Department of State;
!Intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including all
activities of the Office of Intelligence; and
!Any department, agency, or subdivision which is a successor to any agency¹⁰
named above.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence exercises jurisdiction over
authorizations of one of the components, National Foreign Intelligence Program. The
Senate Committee on Armed Services exercises jurisdiction over the other two
components, DOD’s Joint Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence
and Related Agencies, in consultation with the Select Intelligence Committee. “As
such, intelligence activities and programs are authorized both in an annual¹¹
intelligence authorization and an annual defense authorization.” Smaller portions
of intelligence activities are under the jurisdiction of several other authorizing
committees (Senate Committees on Energy and Natural Resources, Finance, Foreign
Relations, and the Judiciary).
Other authorizing committees may obtain a sequential referral of bills reported
from the Select Intelligence Committees that include matters under their jurisdiction,
and the intelligence committee has corresponding authority with respect to bills
reported from other committees. The Senate Committee on Armed Services
routinely exercises this authority, while others have not.
House. In the House, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
exercises jurisdiction over legislation for and authorization of the entire intelligence
community. It has exclusive jurisdiction over only the National Foreign Intelligence
Program, including the CIA and the Intelligence Community staff. The committee
shares jurisdiction over the other two components of the intelligence community,
DOD’s Joint Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities, with the House Committee on Armed Services, typically through
sequential referrals. Other committees might claim jurisdiction to study and review
an intelligence or intelligence-related activity to the extent the activity directly affects

⁹The information on authorization committee jurisdiction over intelligence is a summary of
information provided in: CRS general distribution memorandum, Congressional Committee
Jurisdiction Over Intelligence, by Christopher M. Davis (Washington: Sept. 30, 2004),
available to Members of Congress and staff from the author.
¹⁰Ib i d .
¹¹Ib i d .

a matter under their jurisdiction.¹² Sequential referral authority, similar to the
Senate’s authority, also applies to House committees with jurisdiction over
intelligence.
As Congress analyzes the commission’s proposals, it may consider changing the
jurisdictions over intelligence of the various authorization committees. It could
consider, for example, consolidating the authorization authority over the intelligence
community in the House and Senate Select Intelligence Committees. Examples of
such consolidation would include providing (1) the Senate Select Intelligence
Committee with jurisdiction over the entire intelligence community; (2) both select
Intelligence Committees with exclusive jurisdiction over intelligence; or (3) Select
Intelligence Committees in both houses with exclusive jurisdiction over a portion of
the intelligence community. Congress may also be called upon to consider proposals
to provide exclusive jurisdiction over a new National Intelligence Program, as
proposed by the 9/11 Commission. The suggested reorganization would replace the
National Foreign Intelligence Program with a National Intelligence Program that
would be headed by a new National Intelligence Director. One of the commission’s
arguments in support of transferring intelligence appropriations is that it would help
ensure implementation of the commission’s proposals to consolidate intelligence in
the executive branch (see “Arguments in Favor of Consolidation” below).
Precedent for Consolidation
Separation of Authorization and Appropriation
Separate standing committees for spending and authorization have been a
congressional fixture for two centuries. In the late 19^th century, jurisdiction over
several general appropriations bills was transferred from spending committees to
authorization committees and then, after World War I, returned.
Since the House recognized the House Committee on Ways and Means as a
standing committee in 1802,¹³ and the Senate established the Senate Committee on
Finance in 1816, Congress has had separate standing committees for spending and
authorization. The House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees had
jurisdiction over both revenue measures and general appropriation bills¹⁴ until the
end of the Civil War. In 1865 and 1867, the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees, respectively, were established and jurisdiction over general

¹²Ib i d .
¹³The House Committee on Ways and Means was established to function as a permanent
committee in 1795, but was not formally recognized as a standing committee until 1802.
Louis Fisher, “The Authorization-Appropriation Process in Congress: Formal Rules and
Informal Practices,” Catholic University Law Review, vol. 29, 1979, p. 54.
¹⁴The phrase “general appropriation bill” in this report is not used according to the technical
definitions under House and Senate rules and precedents. General appropriations bills here
include any appropriations for a variety of activities as opposed to a single activity (or
purpose).

appropriation bills was transferred to the new committees. Both appropriations
committees have been in existence for almost 140 years.
Consolidation Between 1878 and 1922
Beginning in the last quarter of the 19^th century, the House and Senate
consolidated the appropriation and authorization functions of certain activities by
transferring jurisdiction over several general appropriations bills from the Senate and
House Appropriations Committees to various authorization committees. In the
House, the process began in 1878¹⁵ and was completed in 1885, when six of the bills
were transferred. In total, eight of the 14 general appropriations bills were transferred
to various authorization committees.¹⁶ This consolidation also fragmented
jurisdiction over appropriations bills among several committees, reducing central
committee control over spending. The House fragmentation lasted approximately 35
years, until all general appropriations bills were re-centralized in the House
Appropriations Committee in 1920.
In 1899, the Senate transferred jurisdiction over seven of the 14 general
appropriations bills to various authorization committees.¹⁷ According to the
committee history of the Senate Appropriations Committee, one additional bill, the
Rivers and Harbors bill, had not been considered a general appropriations bill and
had been under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Commerce since 1826.¹⁸ In
1922, the Senate re-centralized jurisdiction over all the general appropriations bills
in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
Scholars have suggested various theories to explain support for the
fragmentation of appropriating authority.¹⁹ Prominent among these opinions are that:

¹⁵For several years prior to 1878, the Rivers and Harbors appropriations bill was generally
sequentially referred to the Committee on Commerce and then the Committee on
Appropriations. In 1878, the Committee on Commerce was able to bypass the Committee
on Appropriations by suspension of the rules. The following year, the House changed the
rules, providing the Committee on Commerce with the same authority to report the Rivers
and Harbors bill as the Committee on Appropriations had regarding general appropriations
bills.
¹⁶These bills were Agricultural; Army; Consular and Diplomatic Affairs; Indian; Military
Academy; Naval; Post Office; and Rivers and Harbors. The bills remaining under the
jurisdiction of the House Appropriations Committee were: Deficiencies; District of
Columbia; Fortifications; Legislative, Executive, and Judicial; Pensions; and Sundry Civil.
¹⁷These bills were Agricultural; Army; Indian; Military Academy; Naval; Pension; and
Post-Office. The bills remaining under the jurisdiction of the Senate Appropriations
Committee were: Deficiencies; Diplomatic and Consular; District of Columbia;
Fortifications; Legislative, Executive, and Judicial; and Sundry Civil.
¹⁸U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Senate Committee on Appropriations: 135^th
Anniversary, 1867-2002, S. Doc. 13, 107^th Cong., 2^nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 2002), p. 6.
¹⁹For more information, see David Brady and Mark A. Morgan, “Reforming the Structure
of the House Appropriations Process: the Effects of the 1885 and 1919-1920 Reforms on
Money Decisions,” in Matthew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds., Congress: Structure
(continued...)

!House rank-and-file Members revolted because it was felt the House
Appropriations Committee was emphasizing economy at the expense of their
districts’ needs;
!Some Representatives felt the Appropriations Committee’s distribution of
spending was geographically biased;
!Some House Members felt the House Appropriations Committee had too
much power and was using it inappropriately;
!Some Representatives wanted a more equitable distribution of congressional
power;
!Some House Members wanted to reduce the influence of the 1885 chair of the
House Appropriations Committee, Samuel J. Randall, for policy and/or
personal reasons;
!Executive agencies and others opposed various practices Congress had
implemented to maintain control over the national purse strings;
!Junior Senators wanted greater access to power; and
!Some Senators opposed the dominance of 20 Senators on the Appropriations
and Finance Committees.
Some scholars have found that the devolution of several appropriations bills to
authorizing committees, in part, contributed to the increase in spending that occurred
after the decentralization. One of the scholars, political scientist Charles H. Stewart
III, argues that other factors, such as the economy and wars, also contributed to the
spending increase.²⁰

¹⁹(...continued)
and Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 207-234; Louis Fisher,
Presidential Spending Power (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975),
pp. 19-35; Stephen Horn, Unused Power: The Work of the Senate Committee on
Appropriations (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1970), pp. 53-57; D. Roderick
Kiewet and Matthew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and
the Appropriations Process (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 56-77;
Eric Schickler and John Sides, “Intergenerational Warfare: The Senate Decentralizes
Appropriations,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 15, Nov. 2000, pp. 551-575 ; Charles
H. Stewart, III, Budget Reform Politics: The Design of the Appropriations Process in the
House of Representatives, 1865-1921 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); U.S.^th
Congress, Senate, United States Senate Committee on Appropriations: 135 Anniversary,^th^nd

1867-2002, S. Doc. 13, 107 Cong., 2 sess. (Washington: GPO, 2002), pp. 4-15; and W.

Thomas Wander, “Patterns of Change in the Congressional Budget Process, 1865-1974,”
Congress and the Presidency, vol. 9, Autumn 1982, pp. 23-49.
²⁰For more information, see David Brady and Mark A. Morgan, “Reforming the Structure
of the House Appropriations Process: the Effects of the 1885 and 1919-1920 Reforms on
Money Decisions,” in Matthew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds., Congress: Structure
and Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 207-234; CRS Report 93-
729, The House Appropriations Process, 1789-1993, by Louis Fisher (archived report); and
Charles H. Stewart III, Budget Reform Politics: The Design of the Appropriations Process
in the House of Representatives, 1865-1921 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989),
pp. 133-215. For an opposing view, see D. Roderick Kiewet and Matthew D. McCubbins,
The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 56-77.

Separation of Authorization and Appropriation
Resumes 1920-1922
The House in 1920 and the Senate in 1922 resumed the separation of
authorization and appropriation functions. In response to the dramatic increase in²¹
expenditures and the national debt as a result of World War I, Congress decided to
centralize budgetary decisionmaking in both the executive and legislative branches.
In 1920, the House re-centralized all the general appropriations bills in the House
Appropriations Committees. A year later, Congress passed the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921, which established the Bureau of the Budget (later
reorganized as the Office of Management and Budget) and gave the President the²²
responsibility for preparing and submitting the annual budget to Congress. Shortly
thereafter, the Bureau of the Budget recommended reorganizing general
appropriations bills on administrative rather than topical lines. The House
Appropriations Committee soon adopted this recommendation. Procedural
difficulties arose almost immediately, however. While the House had reorganized
its bills along administrative lines and had re-centralized all the appropriations bills
under the House Appropriations Committee, the Senate continued to organize its bills
along topical lines and to fragment committee jurisdiction of appropriations bills
among several committees. As a result, in 1922, the Senate re-centralized all general
appropriations bills in the Senate Appropriations Committee and accepted the²³
organization of appropriations bills along administrative lines.
Comparison of Earlier Period to Today
As during the earlier period, fragmentation of committee jurisdiction over
spending exists today. Currently, most spending is controlled by the Senate Finance
and House Ways and Means Committees (by virtue of their jurisdiction over major
entitlement programs) and the Senate and House Appropriations Committees.
Comparatively small amounts of spending are under the jurisdiction of several other
authorizing committees, generally in the form of entitlements. Examples of
entitlement programs include Social Security, Medicare, unemployment
compensation, and various veterans benefit programs. Approximately 57% of all
FY2003 spending was for entitlements; about 38% was controlled by the²⁴
appropriations committees.
There are significant differences between the earlier period and today that limit
the applicability of this precedent to the 9/11 Commission proposal. First, the means
by which authorization committees perform their basic function has changed.

²¹Louis Fisher found that federal expenditures increased from $700 million before World
War I to $12.7 billion and $18.5 billion by 1918 and 1919, respectively. The total national
debt increased from $1 billion in 1916 to over $25 billion by 1919. CRS Report 93-729 S,
The House Appropriations Process, 1789-1992, by Louis Fisher (archived report).
²²Ib i d .
²³It also transferred the Rivers and Harbors bill, which became a general appropriations bill.
²⁴U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Historical Budget Data (Washington: CBO, 2004),
available at [http://www.cbo.gov/], visited Oct. 29, 2004.

Authorization committees are basically responsible for evaluating the effectiveness
of various existing and potential programs and policies, or assessing program quality
(the program-quality analysis). Appropriations committees are responsible for
selecting items to be funded, determining the funding levels of each, and examining
whether funds are spent according to congressional intent (the budget analysis).
During the earlier period, authorization bills were permanent law that established an
agency and provided broad missions for the agency. Those enactments did not
explicitly provide authorization of subsequent appropriations. Occasionally, the
original act was amended by a subsequent authorization act. Annual appropriations
acts typically provided more detailed guidance to the agency than the authorization
act by setting funding levels for individual activities within the agency. Today,
authorizations for discretionary spending²⁵ agencies and programs frequently provide
spending guidance to the appropriations committees, through authorization of
appropriations. They are typically temporary, on an annual or multi-year cycle.²⁶ In
many cases, they establish and change programs or projects and also provide detailed
directives to the agencies as well.
Second, the 9/11 Commission proposal would transfer jurisdiction over all
intelligence appropriations, for both the program activities and administrative
activities, to the select intelligence committees. During the earlier period only
program expenses were generally transferred. Earlier, appropriations bills were
organized by topic, generally separating program activities of a department from its
salaries and contingent expenses.²⁷ As a result, the military activities of the War
Department, for example, were under the jurisdiction of the Committees on Military
Affairs (authorizing committees), while the salaries and contingent expenses of the
civilian administration of the War Department were under the jurisdiction of the
Appropriations Committees. Today, appropriations measures are organized along
administrative lines; funding for both programs and salaries of a department (or
agency) are included in the same regular appropriations bill.
Third, there are different institutional controls for spending today. During the
earlier period, there was no institutionalized mechanism to coordinate revenue and
spending decisions or establish enforceable spending ceilings. Today, under the
congressional budget process, Congress (1) sets annual total spending ceilings and
revenue floors; (2) distributes the spending among the various committees with
jurisdiction, setting committee spending ceilings; and (3) may enforce these decisions
through points of order and a reconciliation process.²⁸

²⁵The intelligence spending that the 9/11 Commission would transfer to the select
intelligence committees is discretionary spending.
²⁶Multi-year reauthorizations generally range from two to five years.
²⁷The agricultural appropriations act was an exception; funding for program activities,
salaries, and contingent expenses were all included.
²⁸For information on the congressional budget process, see CRS Report 98-721, Introduction
to the Federal Budget Process, by Robert Keith and Allen Schick; and CRS Report
RS20095, The Congressional Budget Process: A Brief Overview, by James V. Saturno.

In order to inform Members of Congress and the public of the effect of
congressional budgetary decisions and to provide information for budget enforcement
purposes, much of the budgetary information is publicly available. The various
spending ceilings are available, including the total spending ceilings, committee
spending ceilings, and appropriations subcommittee ceilings. Funding levels
provided in measures considered by Congress are also available. Spending priorities
are publicly debated during consideration of the annual budget resolution. Members
enforce spending ceilings publicly through points of order on the Senate and House
floors.
The classified character of intelligence spending might present difficulties for
transferring intelligence appropriations to the authorization committees. Under the
existing budget process, the spending ceilings associated with the intelligence
authorization committees could not be publicly enforced. Neither the total ceilings
for the intelligence committees nor the total amount of spending provided in the
intelligence appropriations bills would be public. Therefore, intelligence
appropriations would not be part of the congressional budget process. While the 9/11
Commission recommended declassification of total intelligence spending, many
Members are opposed.²⁹ Members may consider a modification of the existing
budget process that would allow the inclusion of classified spending.
Under present practices, classified intelligence spending has been made a part
of the annual budget process by including the bulk of it in the regular Defense
appropriations bills. The intelligence spending has been hidden in lump-sum
amounts in the annual Defense regular appropriations bills. These bills are a part of
the congressional budget process. Spending ceilings for the appropriations
subcommittees with jurisdiction, Defense Appropriations Subcommittees, are
enforceable and publicly available. The total amount provided in these bills is
publicly available. These bills are also subject to other spending ceilings associated
with the annual budget resolution.
Prospective Effects
Arguments in Favor of Consolidation
Improve Congressional Oversight³⁰ of Intelligence. The 9/11 Commission
states that adopting its package of congressional intelligence oversight reforms and,
in particular, either of its committee restructuring proposals, would substantially
improve the current inadequate congressional intelligence oversight capability.
“Under the terms of existing rules and resolutions,” the commission reasoned, “the

²⁹For more information, see CRS Report 94-261, Intelligence Spending: Should Total
Amounts be Made Public?, by Richard A. Best, Jr., and Elizabeth B. Bazan. The 9/11
Commission proposes declassifying the total intelligence spending level, see Commission
on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report, p 416.
³⁰“Congressional oversight refers to reviewing, monitoring, and supervising federal
agencies, programs, activities, and policy implementation. CRS Report 97-936,
Congressional Oversight, by Frederick M. Kaiser.

House and Senate intelligence committees lack the power, influence, and sustained
capability”³¹ to meet the nation’s daunting intelligence challenges. Supporting the
transfer of appropriations authority, the vice chair of the 9/11 Commission, former
Representative Lee H. Hamilton, told the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence that “unless you have the power of the purse, unless you can control the
money, you’re not going to get effective oversight.”³²
Supporters furthermore contend that stronger intelligence oversight committees
are needed due to the secretive nature of intelligence. Former Representative
Hamilton also argued:
The only place you get independent oversight of the intelligence community is
in Congress. You don’t get it in the media; they don’t have the information. You
don’t get it in special interest groups; they don’t have the information, either.
Only you [Congress] can give robust oversight.... We think a robust oversight by
the Congress is hugely important to monitor what goes on and to keep an eye on
the activities of this vast intelligence community, which operates as it must in
secrecy.³³
Contribute Toward Implementing the 9/11 Commission’s Proposed
National Intelligence Director and National Counterterrorism Center.
Proponents argue that transferring appropriations authority to the intelligence
authorizing committees would help ensure successful implementation of the
commission’s proposals to establish a National Intelligence Director (NID) and
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The 9/11 Commission states: “[u]nity
of effort in executive management can be lost if it is fractured by divided
congressional oversight.”³⁴ Existing committee jurisdiction over intelligence
agencies and activities that would constitute the NID is spread over several
authorization committees and appropriations subcommittees. Proponents explain a
single committee in each chamber would improve efforts to promote a systematic
review of executive branch intelligence activities.
Counter-Balance Proposed Centralization of Executive Branch Intelligence.
The 9/11 Commission proposes centralizing executive branch national intelligence
authority under a National Intelligence Director. Some argue that a consolidation of
appropriation and authorization functions (or establishing a joint committee) is

³¹Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 419-420.
³²Testimony of Representative Lee H. Hamilton, House Select Intelligence Committee Holds
Hearing on September 11 Commission Report, testimony before House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Aug. 11, 2004, available at [http://www.cq.com/displaytran
scripts.do], visited Oct. 20, 2004.
³³Testimony of Representative Lee Hamilton, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed
Services, House Armed Services Committee Holds Hearings on September 11 Commission^th^nd
Report, hearings, 108 Cong., 2 sess., Aug. 10, 2004, available at [http://www.cq.com/
displaytranscripts.do], visited Oct. 20, 2004 (hereafter referred to as Representative Lee
Hamilton, House Armed Services Committee Holds Hearings on September 11 Commission
Report).
³⁴Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 420.

needed to provide additional control over the executive branch centralization of
intelligence power. The consolidation would provide the intelligence committees
with budgetary leverage over the executive branch to ensure strong congressional
checks.³⁵
Provide Clear Congressional Accountability. Some proponents reason that
consolidating intelligence authorization and appropriation into a single committee in
each chamber ensures clear congressional accountability. There would be a single
committee in each chamber that would be responsible for intelligence, instead of at
least two committees in each chamber: the respective Select Committees on
Intelligence and Committees on Appropriations.
Reduce Conflicting Congressional Directives to Intelligence Entities. Under
the existing committee structure, the Select Intelligence Committees propose various
intelligence policies and programs for the intelligence community. The
Appropriations Committees may provide conflicting direction to the intelligence
community through, for example, the funding decisions they make regarding each
intelligence policy and program. Consolidation would reduce these conflicting
directives.
Provide More Integrated Perspective on National Intelligence. Others
maintain consolidation is needed to ensure that intelligence spending decisions are
made within the context of a more integrated perspective on national intelligence
needs than exists today. That is, the needs of various programs and entities in the
intelligence community are evaluated and coordinated, and the intelligence spending
priorities are established. This approach contrasts with current practices in the
appropriations subcommittees, which, it is argued, focus on the intelligence needs of
individual departments (the departmental perspective on intelligence). The Defense
Appropriations Subcommittees, for example, may focus on the military intelligence
needs of the Department of Defense at the expense of national intelligence needs.
Some also argue that under present arrangements, intelligence needs sometimes
may not be adequately funded due to competing non-intelligence needs, since the
appropriations subcommittees must balance spending needs of both intelligence and
non-intelligence programs and activities.
Attract Members to Intelligence Committees. Transferring jurisdiction over
appropriations to the intelligence committees might make membership on those
committees more attractive. Intelligence committees may also become more
attractive if the 9/11 Commission’s proposal to change membership on the
intelligence committees from limited terms to indefinite terms is adopted. Increasing
the attractiveness of intelligence committee membership would help to ensure
continuity of membership and, therefore, more informed and consistent oversight.

³⁵Testimony of Senator J. Robert Kerrey, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Government Reform, 9-11 Commission’s Recommendations, hearings, 108^th Cong., 2^nd sess.,
Oct. 6, 2004, available at [http://www.cq.com/displaytranscripts.do], visited Oct. 6, 2004;
and Representative Lee Hamilton, House Armed Services Committee Holds Hearings on
September 11 Commission Report.

Arguments Against Consolidation
Reduce Oversight of Program Quality. Opponents maintain that
consolidation would significantly reduce oversight of program quality. Under the
existing separation of the two functions, authorization committees are responsible for
program quality (the program-quality analysis) and the appropriations committees
are responsible for items of appropriations and for examining whether funds are spent
according to congressional intent (the budget analysis). Under contemporary
conditions, budgetary control is frequently considered the more important form of
power, but budget analysis requires substantial expenditures of time and effort. As
a result, it is possible that committees with consolidated jurisdiction would focus
chiefly on this aspect of their work, and that program quality might consequently
receive inadequate attention.
May Weaken Intelligence Oversight. Some opponents argue that due to the
secretive nature of intelligence, providing only one committee in each chamber with
jurisdiction over intelligence oversight would weaken oversight. As mentioned
previously, Congress is the only institution able to conduct intelligence oversight.
In order to reduce the chances of enactment of faulty policies, checks and balances
within Congress are needed, such as an authorization committee and an
appropriations committee with different responsibilities. Competitive analysis of
intelligence in Congress would also be lost if a single committee had jurisdiction
over intelligence. There is also congressional concern that if the two intelligence
committees eventually develop close, supportive relationships with the intelligence
agencies, rigorous congressional intelligence oversight would be weakened, not
strengthened. Some argue that it would be less likely that four separate committees
would be co-opted.
Shortchange Intelligence Needs of the Military. Some might contend that
the proposal would result in a detrimental shift in intelligence spending priorities
from the intelligence needs of the military to those of national policymakers. Under
the existing committee structure, the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees focus
primarily on intelligence needs of the military. Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Ranking
Member of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, stated:
Linking Defense and Intelligence is critical. DOD cannot operate without
good intelligence. The Defense Subcommittee has ensured that intelligence
resources support the needs of the warfighter. Today, the Defense Subcommittee
reviews the recommendations of both the Armed Services and Intelligence
Committees. The Appropriations Committee can minimize redundancies and³⁶
make sure that the needs of both Defense and Intelligence are met.
Increase Spending. Some maintain that if intelligence spending remains
classified and appropriations are transferred to the Select Intelligence Committees,
institutional checks on funding for intelligence will be reduced, and spending will
therefore tend to increase. Under present arrangements, as explained above in

³⁶Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol.

150, Oct. 7, 2004, p. S10635.

Comparison of Earlier Period to Today, much information on intelligence spending
is not publicly available. As a result, ceilings set on total intelligence spending could
not be enforced through the existing congressional budget process. Some may argue
that, without visible spending controls, there would be little ability to restrain
intelligence spending.
Set a Precedent for Dispersion of Appropriations. In the opinion of some
Members, transferring intelligence appropriations to the select intelligence
committees might set a precedent for transferring appropriations for other
discretionary spending programs and activities to applicable authorizing committees.
Other Members of Congress may support establishing such a precedent. Opponents
of the proposal to merge authorization and appropriation functions could maintain
that any piecemeal or major overhaul of the current committee structure should be
preceded by a thorough analysis of the effect such a change would have. Congress
should examine, for example, the possible delay in completing appropriations bills
that such a merger might create. One suggested solution is to restructure the
jurisdiction of the Senate and House authorization committees.
Concentrate Too Much Power in Intelligence Committees. Intelligence
committees with jurisdiction over both authorization and appropriations, in the
opinion of some, might be too powerful, particularly if the intelligence committees
also have exclusive authorization jurisdiction. Currently, the funding decisions of
the appropriations committees about intelligence policies and programs may provide
a check, review, and constraint on the policy decisions of the intelligence
committees. Under a structure that consolidates authorization and appropriation
jurisdiction, this check would be lost.
In addition, reducing the size of the intelligence committee and changing
membership to indefinite terms could have the long-term effect of reducing the
number of Members with knowledge of the secret intelligence policies and practices.
As a result, it is possible that fewer Members will be willing to question the
intelligence committees recommendations.
May Require a Bicameral Approach. If only one chamber transfers
appropriations jurisdiction to its select intelligence committee, opponents might
argue that fewer of the claimed benefits of a unified policy focus would be realized.
In addition, difficulties in the conference process would result. The Senate and
House Appropriations Subcommittees have traditionally had parallel jurisdictions
over individual regular appropriations bills, and each subcommittee pair has
conferenced on a single regular appropriations bill. The result would be one chamber
approving a unified intelligence appropriation bill, and the other passing a defense
appropriations bill containing most intelligence, while with the rest would be in other
appropriations bills. The defense appropriations bill in the latter chamber, unlike that
in the former, would include both intelligence and non-intelligence spending, as
would the other appropriations bills containing intelligence spending.³⁷ Opponents

³⁷For example, the Commerce-Justice-State-the Judiciary regular bill would include FBI
intelligence spending and Homeland Security regular bill homeland security intelligence
(continued...)

of consolidation might maintain that it is unclear how measures passed by the two
chambers would be reconciled in a final version of the legislation.
Alternatives to Consolidating Authorization
and Appropriation
Congress is considering various alternatives to the 9/11 Commission proposal
to consolidate authorization and appropriation. Two are discussed below. The first
is the 9/11 Commission’s other recommendation: a Joint Committee on Intelligence.
The second is a proposal to establish an Intelligence Appropriations Subcommittee
in each of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees.
Joint Committee on Intelligence
As an alternative to combining intelligence authorization and appropriation
authorities, the 9/11 Commission recommended replacing the existing Senate and
House select intelligence authorization committees with a joint committee on
intelligence. This joint committee would be modeled after the former Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy (joint committee, 1947-1977). (For more information,
see CRS Report RL32538, 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy — A Model for Congressional Oversight?, by Christopher M. Davis.)
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which had jurisdiction over the former
Atomic Energy Commission and nuclear energy, was established as an 18-member
committee with an equal number of Members from each chamber. Virtually unique
among joint committees, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had authority to³⁸
report legislation to both the Senate and House.
Those who have studied the joint committee have concluded that it became one
of the most powerful committees of Congress. There are several reasons for the joint
committee’s power. The joint committee had exclusive legislative and oversight
jurisdiction and, therefore, committee policy competition was limited to the Senate
and House Appropriations Committees. Also, the joint committee had exclusive
access to restricted data not available to other congressional committees, and strong³⁹
leverage over the nuclear activities of the executive branch. (For detailed
information on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, see CRS Report RL32525,
A Joint Committee on Intelligence: Proposals and Options From the 9/11
Commission and Others.)

³⁷(...continued)
funding.
³⁸The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 established the joint committee as well as the Atomic
Energy Commission, which the committee oversaw. CRS Report RL32525, A Joint
Committee on Intelligence: Proposals and Options From the 9/11 Commission and Others,
by Frederick M. Kaiser.
³⁹CRS Report RL32538, 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy — A Model for Congressional Oversight?, by Christopher M. Davis.

Separate Intelligence Appropriations Subcommittee
Within Appropriations Committees
Another alternative proposal calls for the establishment of separate intelligence
appropriations subcommittees in the Senate and House Appropriations Committees.
This option would transfer intelligence appropriations from the existing
appropriations subcommittees, predominantly the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittees, to the new intelligence subcommittees.
This recommendation, proponents reason, would have several advantages over
the 9/11 Commission recommendation. It would retain program-quality and budget
analyses in separate appropriations and authorization committees, which would be
lost under the 9/11 Commission’s proposal. Also, it would not concentrate power
predominantly in a single committee in each chamber or set a precedent for
transferring appropriations to authorization committees, and it would likely be more
easily implemented than the 9/11 Commission recommendation.
Another argument offered in favor of this approach is that it retains certain
advantages of the 9/11 Commission’s consolidation proposal. Proponents state, for
example, that intelligence spending decisions would be based on a more
comprehensive national perspective on intelligence. Some argue that concentrating
intelligence spending could be used to counter consolidation of intelligence power
in the Executive, whether the congressional committees were intelligence
appropriations subcommittees or intelligence authorization committees with
appropriations power.
The disadvantages to establishing intelligence appropriations subcommittees,
opponents argue, are that this approach too would be likely to (1) increase spending,
unless the total intelligence amount is declassified or existing budget procedures are
modified; and (2) shortchange the intelligence needs of the military. Also, concern
has been expressed that congressional accountability would be more diffuse than
under the 9/11 Commission proposal. Instead of two committees focusing entirely
on intelligence, there would be four committees only focusing on intelligence.
Current Legislation
Legislation Regarding the Senate
Consolidating Responsibility for Intelligence Appropriation and
Authorization in Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. On October 7,

2004, the Senate rejected, by a vote of 23-74, a proposal by Senator John McCain,⁴⁰⁴¹

to transfer appropriations, rescissions, and spending authority related to funding
intelligence matters from the Senate Appropriations Committee to the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence. The proposal was in the form of an amendment (S.Amdt.

⁴⁰Rescission refers to a statutory provision cancelling previously enacted budget authority.
⁴¹Spending authority refers to budget authority that is not enacted in appropriations acts.

3999) to the amendment in the nature of a substitute (S.Amdt. 3981) to S.Res. 445,

the intelligence committee reorganization resolution.
Separate Senate Intelligence Appropriations Subcommittee. On
October 9, 2004, the Senate adopted, by a vote of 79-6, S.Res. 445, an intelligence
committee reorganization resolution, which establishes a separate Subcommittee on
Intelligence in the Senate Appropriations Committee (see §402). S.Res. 445 clarifies
that the Appropriations Committee will identify the intelligence activities to be
transferred to the new subcommittee.
It also provides that as soon as possible after the 109^th Congress convenes, the
Senate Appropriations Committee is responsible for reorganizing the appropriations
subcommittees to ensure that the existing number of subcommittees (13) remains
(see §402). The original amendment in the nature of a substitute (S.Amdt. 3981) to
the resolution would have preserved the 13 subcommittees by merging the Military
Construction and Defense Subcommittees. This language was replaced with the final
language by an amendment (S.Amdt. 4015) proposed by the Chair of the Military
Construction Subcommittee, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison. The amendment was
adopted by a vote of 44-41 on October 9. Since the Senate and House appropriations
subcommittees have customarily retained parallel jurisdictions, the House is expected
to respond to the Senate’s action.
Legislation Regarding Senate and House
Requiring Congressional Action on 9/11 Commission’s^th
Congressional Oversight Proposals in 108 Congress. On October 7,

2004, the House rejected, by a vote of 203-213, a proposal that, among other^th

provisions, would have required the Senate and House to establish in the 108
Congress either of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations to establish (1) a Joint
Committee on Intelligence; or (2) a single committee in each chamber with
jurisdiction over both intelligence authorizing and appropriating authorities. The
proposal was in the form of an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 10,
the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act, and was proposed by Representative
Robert Menendez