Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress
Updated October 2, 2008
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
In February 2008, as part of its proposed FY2009 budget, the Navy submitted
to Congress the FY2009 version of its annual 30-year shipbuilding plan. The 30-year
plan is intended to support the Navy’s goal of achieving and maintaining a 313-ship
fleet. The Navy first presented the 313-ship plan to Congress in February 2006.
Although the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan, if implemented, would
generally be adequate to achieve and maintain a fleet of about 313 ships, it does not
include enough ships to fully support certain elements of the 313-ship fleet
consistently over the long run — shortfalls would occur in areas such as amphibious
lift capability and the number of attack submarines. The FY2009 30-year plan,
moreover, includes new assumptions about extended service lives for amphibious
ships and destroyers. If these longer service lives are not achieved, it could increase
the shortfall in amphibious lift capability and create a shortfall in the number of
cruisers and destroyers.
The Navy this year has increased its estimate of the average annual cost to fund
the 30-year plan by about 44% in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. The Navy’s new
estimated cost for implementing the 30-year plan is about 7% less than estimates
issued by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The Navy downplayed CBO’s
estimates in 2007, referring to them in testimony as “worst-case analysis” or as an
“extremely conservative” estimate.
The increase in the Navy’s estimated cost for implementing the plan is so large
that the Navy no longer appears to have a clearly identifiable, announced strategy for
generating the funds needed to implement the 30-year plan, at least not without
significantly reducing funding for other Navy programs or increasing the Navy’s
programmed budget in coming years by billions of dollars per year
Concerns about the Navy’s prospective ability to afford the 30-year shipbuilding
plan, combined with year-to-year changes in Navy shipbuilding plans and significant
cost growth and other problems in building certain new Navy ships, have led to
strong concerns among some Members about the status of Navy shipbuilding and the
potential future size and capabilities of the fleet. This report will be updated as
events warrant.

Contents
Introduction and Issue for Congress...................................1
Background ......................................................2
Proposed 313-Ship Fleet........................................2
FY2009-FY2013 Shipbuilding Plan...............................3
FY2009 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan................................5
Oversight Issues for Congress........................................6
Adequacy of Proposed 313-Ship Fleet..............................6
Adequacy of Shipbuilding Plan for Maintaining 313 Ships.............6
Summary ................................................6
Shortfalls Relative to 313-Ship Goals..........................7
Affordability and Executibility of Shipbuilding Plan.................12
Overview ...............................................12
June 2008 CBO Report....................................13
FY2009 Legislative Activity........................................14
FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5658/S. 3001)..............15
House ..................................................15
Senate ..................................................16
Compromise .............................................16
FY2009 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329)........16
House ..................................................16
Senate ..................................................17
Compromise .............................................17
Appendix A. Potential For Changing 313-Ship Proposal..................18
In General...................................................18
Amphibious and MPF(F) Ships..................................19
Cruisers and Destroyers........................................20
SSBNs .....................................................20
Appendix B. Modified Description of Required Number of Aircraft Carriers..21
Appendix C. Adequacy of Planned 313-Ship Fleet......................22
Specific Ship Categories.......................................22
Amphibious Ships........................................22
Attack Submarines........................................22
Aircraft Carriers..........................................22
Overall Number of Ships.......................................23
Appendix D. Affordability of Navy 30-Year Plan in 2006-2007............25
Appendix E. Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate...............27
Size of the Navy..............................................27
Shipbuilding Rate.............................................28

List of Tables
Table 1. Recent Navy Ship Force Structure Proposals.....................3
Table 2. Navy FY2009-FY2013 Shipbuilding Plan.......................4
Table 3. Navy FY2009 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan.......................5
Table 4. Navy Projection of Future Force Levels.........................7
Table 5. Projected Shortfall Relative to 313-Ship Force Structure............8
Table 6. Projected Amount of Amphibious Lift.........................10
Table 7. Average Annual Shipbuilding Costs...........................14
Table 8. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948...............28
Table 9. Battle Force Ships Procured or Projected, FY1982-FY2013........29

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding
Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction and Issue for Congress
In February 2008, as part of its proposed FY2009 budget, the Navy submitted
to Congress the FY2009 version of its annual 30-year shipbuilding plan. The 30-year
plan is intended to support the Navy’s goal of achieving and maintaining a 313-ship
fleet. The Navy first presented the 313-ship plan to Congress in February 2006.
Although the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan, if implemented, would
generally be adequate to achieve and maintain a fleet of about 313 ships, it does not
include enough ships to fully support certain elements of the 313-ship fleet
consistently over the long run — shortfalls would occur in areas such as amphibious
lift capability and the number of attack submarines. The FY2009 30-year plan,
moreover, includes new assumptions about extended service lives for amphibious
ships and destroyers. If these longer service lives are not achieved, it could increase
the shortfall in amphibious lift capability and create a shortfall in the number of
cruisers and destroyers.
The Navy this year has increased its estimate of the average annual cost to fund
the 30-year plan by about 44% in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. The Navy’s new
estimated cost for implementing the 30-year plan is about 7% less than estimates
issued by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The Navy downplayed CBO’s
estimates in 2007, referring to them in testimony as “worst-case analysis”¹ or as an²
“extremely conservative” estimate.
The increase in the Navy’s estimated cost for implementing the plan is so large
that the Navy no longer appears to have a clearly identifiable, announced strategy for
generating the funds needed to implement the 30-year plan, at least not without
significantly reducing funding for other Navy programs or increasing the Navy’s
programmed budget in coming years by billions of dollars per year.
Concerns about the Navy’s prospective ability to afford the 30-year shipbuilding
plan, combined with year-to-year changes in Navy shipbuilding plans and significant
cost growth and other problems in building certain new Navy ships, have led to

¹ Source: Transcript of spoken testimony of Vice Admiral Paul Sullivan before the
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee
on March 20, 2007.
² Source: Transcript of spoken testimony of Allison Stiller before the Defense subcommittee
of the House Appropriations Committee on April 25, 2007.

strong concerns among some Members about the status of Navy shipbuilding and the
potential future size and capabilities of the fleet.
The issue for Congress that is discussed in this report is how to respond to the
Navy’s proposed force structure and shipbuilding plans. Decisions that Congress
makes on this issue could significantly affect future U.S. military capabilities, Navy
funding requirements, and the Navy shipbuilding industrial base.
Background
Proposed 313-Ship Fleet
Table 1 shows the composition of the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet, which the
Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006, and compares the 313-ship plan
to other recent Navy ship force structure proposals. In September 2008, it was
reported that the Navy is conducting a force-structure review that could lead to a
change in the planned size and composition of the fleet;³ for further discussion, see
Appendix A.

³ Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Undergoing A New Force Structure Review Due This Fall,”
Inside the Navy, September 29, 2008.

Table 1. Recent Navy Ship Force Structure Proposals
Early-2005 Navy2002-2004
2006 Navyproposal for fleet ofNavy2001 QDR
Ship typeproposalfor 313-260-325 shipsproposalplan for310-ship
ship fleetfor 375-ship Navy^aNavy260-ships325-ships
Ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs)1414141414
Cruise missile44442 or 4^b
submarines (SSGNs)
Attack submarines4837415555
(SSNs)
Aircraft carriers11/12^c10111212
Cruisers, destroyers,886792104116
frigates
Littoral Combat556382560
Ships (LCSs)
Amphibious ships3117243736
MPF(F) ships^d12^d14^d20^d0^d0^d
Combat logistics3024264234
(resupply) ships
Dedicated mine00026^e16
warfare ships
Other^f 20 10 11 25 25
Total battle force313/314260325375310 or 312
ships
^Sources^:^{U.S. Nav}^y^d^a^ta.
^{a. I}ⁿ^{itial co}^m^p^o^s^itioⁿ^.^Co^m^p^o^s^itioⁿ^w^a^{s su}^b^s^eq^u^eⁿ^tly^m^o^dⁱ^fⁱ^ed^.
^b.^T^h^{e report}^on^t^h^{e 2001 Q}^D^R^di^{d n}^o^t^m^eⁿ^tⁱ^oⁿ^{a s}^p^eci^fⁱ^{c f}ⁱ^g^u^r^e^f^o^r^S^S^G^N^s^.^T^h^e^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ratⁱ^oⁿ^’^s
^propos^{ed F}^Y^{2001 Departm}^eⁿ^t^o^f^D^e^f^eⁿ^s^{e (DOD) bu}^dg^{et requ}^es^{ted f}^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^{to s}^u^{pport th}^e
^coⁿ^v^e^r^s^ioⁿ^o^f^tw^o^av^ailab^l^{e T}^r^id^en^{t SSB}^{Ns in}^to^{SSGNs, an}^d^th^{e r}^e^tir^em^en^{t o}^f^tw^o^o^t^h^e^r^T^r^id^en^t
^S^S^B^N^s^{. C}^oⁿ^g^r^e^ss,ⁱⁿ^m^a^rkⁱⁿ^g^u^p^t^hⁱ^s^requ^es^t^,^s^u^pport^e^{d a pl}^an^t^o^con^v^e^rt^al^l^f^o^u^r^av^ai^l^a^bl^e
^SSB^{Ns into}^SSGNs.
^{c. 11 carriers}^,^an^{d ev}^en^tu^ally^{12 carriers}^.
^d.^T^oday^’^s^{16 Maritim}^{e P}^r^epos^itionⁱⁿ^g^{Force (MP}^F⁾^s^h^ips^{are in}^ten^d^{ed prim}^arily^{to s}^u^pport^Marin^e
^C^o^rps^operation^s^as^h^o^{re, rath}^{er th}^an^Nav^y^com^b^at^operation^s^,^an^d^th^u^s^{are n}^o^{t cou}ⁿ^t^{ed as}^Nav^y
^b^a^{ttle f}^o^r^{ce sh}^ip^{s. T}^h^{e Nav}^y^’^s^p^l^anⁿ^e^d^MP^{F (}^F^u^t^u^r^e)^shⁱ^p^s^,^h^o^w^e^v^e^r^,^m^a^y^b^e^cap^ab^{le o}^f
^con^t^ribu^tin^g^{to Nav}^y^com^b^at^cap^abilities^(f^{or ex}^am^ple,^by^s^u^pportin^g^Nav^y^aircraf^t^operation^s^).
^Fo^r^th^{is r}^easoⁿ^{, MP}^F(^F)^sh^ip^{s ar}^{e co}^uⁿ^t^ed^h^e^r^e^{as b}^a^{ttle f}^o^r^{ce sh}^ip^s.
^{e. T}^h^{e f}ⁱ^g^u^r^{e of}^{26 dedicated m}ⁱⁿ^e^w^a^rf^{are s}^h^ipsⁱⁿ^clu^d^es^{10 s}^h^ip^s^m^aⁱⁿ^tain^{ed in}^{a redu}^ced
^m^o^b^ilizatioⁿ^statu^s^called^Mo^b^ilizatioⁿ^Cate^g^o^r^y^B^.^Sh^ip^{s in}^th^{is statu}^s^ar^{e n}^o^{t r}^ead^ily
^d^e^p^l^o^y^a^b^l^e^an^{d th}^u^s^{do n}^o^{t cou}ⁿ^t^as^{battle f}^o^{rce s}^h^ips^.^T^h^{e 375-}^s^h^{ip propos}^{al th}^u^s^im^p^lⁱ^e^d
^tran^s^f^errin^g^th^es^{e 10 s}^h^ips^{to a h}ⁱ^g^h^e^{r readin}^es^s^s^t^atu^s^.
^f^.^In^cl^u^d^es^{, am}^on^g^ot^h^e^{r t}^hⁱⁿ^g^s^{, com}^m^aⁿ^d^s^hⁱ^p^s^an^{d s}^u^pport^s^hⁱ^p^s^.
FY2009-FY2013 Shipbuilding Plan
Table 2 shows the Navy’s FY2009-FY2013 ship-procurement plan. The plan
includes 47 new construction ships in FY2009-FY2013 — a reduction of 13 ships,
or about 22%, from the 60 new-construction ships that were planned for FY2009-

FY2013 under the Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget. Most of the 13-ship reduction
is due to an 11-ship reduction in the number of Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs)
planned for FY2009-FY2013, which is a consequence of the Navy’s 2007
restructuring of the LCS program.
Table 2. Navy FY2009-FY2013 Shipbuilding Plan
(Ships funded in FY2007 and FY2008 shown for reference)
Total
FY 07 FY 08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 F Y 09-
FY13
CVN-211 11
SSN-7741 1 1 12228
DDG-10002^a0^a1 11115
CG(X)112
LCS0^b1 2334618
LPD-171 0
LHA(R)1 0
TAKE1 0^c 2^c2
JCC(X)11
TATF0
JHSV^d 11111 5
MPF(F) TAKE 0
MPF(F) LHA(R)1 1
MPF(F) LMSR11
MPF(F) MLP111 3
Total5 4^c788121247
Subtotal: ships535558629
other than LCSs
^Source:^N^a^v^y^F^Y^{2009 bu}^dg^et^s^u^bmⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^.
^Key:^CVN-2¹^{= Ford (C}^VN-^{21) clas}^sⁿ^u^c^lear-^pow^{ered aircraf}^t^carrier.^SSN-⁷⁷⁴^{= Vir}^gⁱⁿ^{ia (}^SSN-
^{774) cl}^as^sⁿ^u^c^l^ear-^pow^{ered at}^t^ack^s^u^bm^ariⁿ^e.^CG^(X)⁼^C^G^(X)^clas^s^cruⁱ^s^e^r.^D^D^G^-1000^{= Z}^u^m^w^alt
^(DDG-^{1000) clas}^s^des^t^roy^e^r.^C^G^(X)⁼^C^G^{(X) clas}^s^cruⁱ^s^e^r.^LC^S^{= L}^itto^r^a^{l Co}^m^b^{at Sh}^ip^.^LP^D^-¹⁷
⁼^San^Aⁿ^toⁿⁱ^o⁽^L^P^D^-¹⁷⁾^{class am}^p^h^ib^io^u^s^sh^ip^.^L^H^A(R)^{= L}^H^A⁽^R)^{class am}^p^h^ib^io^u^s^assau^{lt sh}^ip^.
^TA^K^E^=L^ew^is^an^{d C}^l^ark^(T^A^K^E-¹⁾^c^l^a^s^s^r^e^s^u^pply^s^h^ip.^T^A^KE^-M^PF(F)^{= Mo}^dⁱ^fⁱ^ed^T^A^{KE in}^ten^d^ed
^f^o^r^MP^F(^F)^sq^uad^r^oⁿ^.^M^{PF(F) L}^H^{R(A) (als}^{o called}^M^{PF(F) Aviation}⁾^{= Modi}^fⁱ^e^d^L^H^A⁽^R⁾
ⁱⁿ^t^e^nd^e^d^f^o^{r MPF}⁽^F⁾^s^q^u^a^dron^.^L^M^S^R^-M^PF(F)^{= Modi}^fⁱ^{ed l}^a^rg^{e, m}^e^di^u^m^-^s^{peed, rol}^l^-^on^/^r^ol^l^-^of^f
⁽^L^MSR)^sealif^{t sh}^ipⁱⁿ^ten^d^ed^f^o^r^MP^F(^F)^sq^u^a^d^r^oⁿ^.^M^L^P-M^PF(F)^{= Mo}^b^{ile L}^aⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^P^l^atf^o^r^m^sh^ip
ⁱⁿ^ten^d^ed^f^o^r^MP^F(^F)^sq^u^a^d^r^oⁿ^.^TA^TF⁼^o^c^e^a^ngoⁱ^{ng fl}^e^e^t^t^ug.^J^CC(X)^{= J}^oⁱⁿ^{t com}^m^aⁿ^d^an^{d con}^t^rol
^ship^.^JHS^V^{= J}^oⁱⁿ^{t Hig}^h^-^Sp^eed^{Vessel tr}^an^sp^o^r^{t sh}^ip^.
^{a. T}^w^{o DDG-}^1000s^w^e^{re procu}^r^{ed in}^FY^{2007 u}^sⁱⁿ^g^s^p^lit-^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^{FY2007 an}^{d FY2008.}
^b^.^A^l^t^h^o^ugh^t^w^o^{LCSs w}^e^r^e^o^rⁱ^gⁱⁿ^a^l^l^y^fund^e^dⁱⁿ^FY^{2007, t}^h^{e N}^a^v^y^can^cel^{ed t}^h^es^{e s}^hⁱ^p^s^as^part^ofⁱ^t^s
^{2007 res}^t^ru^ct^u^rⁱⁿ^g^of^t^h^{e L}^C^S^prog^ram^.
^c^.^A^l^t^h^o^{ugh Co}^ngr^e^{ss fund}^e^d^t^h^e^p^r^o^c^ur^e^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^oⁿ^e^T^A^K^E^fo^r^N^a^vy^useⁱⁿ^FY^{2008, t}^h^{e N}^a^v^yⁱ^s
^u^sⁱⁿ^g^m^u^ch^of^t^hⁱ^s^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^t^o^com^p^l^e^t^e^t^h^{e cos}^t^of^t^h^{e T}^A^K^E^f^uⁿ^d^{ed i}ⁿ^F^Y^{2007. (T}^h^e^N^a^v^y
ⁱ^s^u^sⁱⁿ^g^m^u^ch^of^t^h^e^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^t^h^at^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^s^h^a^{d prov}ⁱ^d^{ed f}^o^{r t}^h^{e F}^Y^{2007 T}^A^K^Eⁱⁿ^t^u^rn^t^o^pay
^f^o^{r cos}^t^g^r^ow^t^h^on^T^A^K^E^s^procu^r^{ed i}ⁿ^earlⁱ^e^r^y^e^a^r^s^.⁾^T^h^e^N^a^vy^c^o^nse^q^ue^nt^l^y^no^w^r^e^c^o^r^d^s
^zero^T^A^K^E^s^as^procu^r^{ed i}ⁿ^F^Y^{2008 (rat}^h^e^{r t}^h^an^on^{e), an}^{d t}^h^{e t}^o^t^a^lⁿ^u^m^{ber of}^s^hⁱ^p^s^of^al^l^kⁱⁿ^d^s
^procu^r^{ed i}ⁿ^F^Y^{2008 as}^f^o^u^r^(rat^h^e^r^t^h^an^fⁱ^v^e^).^Oⁿ^e^of^t^h^{e t}^w^{o T}^A^K^E^s^requ^es^t^e^{d f}^o^{r F}^Y²⁰⁰⁹
ⁱ^s^t^h^{e s}^a^m^e^T^A^K^E^t^h^at^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^s^ori^gⁱⁿ^al^l^y^f^uⁿ^d^{ed i}ⁿ^F^Y^2008.
^d^.^Sh^ip^{s sh}^o^wⁿ^ar^{e th}^o^s^{e b}^eⁱⁿ^g^p^r^o^c^u^r^ed^f^o^r^Nav^y^u^s^{e. A}^d^d^itioⁿ^a^{l J}^H^{SVs ar}^{e b}^eⁱⁿ^g^p^r^o^c^u^r^ed
^sep^a^r^a^tely^f^o^r^A^r^m^y^u^s^{e an}^d^ar^{e n}^o^{t sh}^o^wⁿⁱⁿ^th^{e Nav}^y^’^s^sh^ip^b^u^ildⁱⁿ^g^p^l^an^.

FY2009 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
Table 3 shows the Navy’s FY2009 30-year ship-procurement plan.
Table 3. Navy FY2009 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
(including FY2009-FY2013 FYDP)
^FShip type (see key below)
^Y^C^S^L^S^S^S^A^C^M^S^T
^V^C^C^S^S^S^W^L^P^u^O
^N^S^N^G^B^S^F^F^p^T
^N^N^(F)^t^A
^L
⁰⁹¹²¹¹¹¹⁷
¹⁰¹³¹²¹⁸
¹¹²³²¹⁸
¹²¹¹⁴²²²¹²
¹³²⁶²¹¹¹²
¹⁴¹⁶²²²¹³
¹⁵²⁶²¹²¹³
¹⁶¹²⁶²¹¹²
¹⁷²⁶²¹¹¹²
¹⁸²⁶²¹¹¹¹³
¹⁹²⁴²¹¹¹⁰
²⁰²²²²²¹⁰
²¹¹²²²⁷
²²²²¹¹²²¹⁰
²³¹²¹²³⁹
²⁴²²¹¹²²¹⁰
²⁵¹³²¹²²¹¹
²⁶³²¹²²¹⁰
²⁷³²¹⁶
²⁸¹⁷
²⁹¹³¹¹¹¹¹⁹
³⁰³²¹¹⁸
³¹³¹¹¹¹⁷
³²³¹²¹²¹¹¹¹
³³³¹¹¹¹⁷
³⁴¹³²²¹¹¹⁰
³⁵⁵¹¹¹¹¹
³⁶³⁵²¹¹¹
³⁷³⁵¹⁹
³⁸¹³⁵²²¹³
^Source:^Repor^t^t^o^C^ongr^es^s^on^Annual^L^{ong-Range Pl}^{an f}^o^r^C^ons^t^r^uctⁱ^{on of}^N^a^val^Ves^s^e^l^s^f^o^r^FY
²⁰⁰⁹^.
^Key^:^FY^{= Fis}^{cal Year;}^CVN^{= aircraf}^t^car^rⁱ^e^r^s^;^SC⁼^s^u^rf^{ace com}^b^atan^ts^{(i.e., cru}ⁱ^s^e^rs^an^d
^des^t^roy^e^rs^);^LC^S^{= L}^itto^r^a^{l Co}^m^b^{at Sh}^ip^s;^SSN^{= attack}^s^u^bm^arin^es^;^SSG^N⁼^c^r^uise^mⁱ^ssile
^s^u^bm^arin^es^;^SSB^N^{= b}^a^{llistic m}ⁱ^{ssile su}^b^m^arⁱⁿ^es;^AWS^{= am}^ph^ibiou^s^w^a^rf^{are s}^h^ips^;^CL^F^{= com}^b^at
^lo^gistic^{s fo}^r^c^e⁽ⁱ^.^e^.^,^r^e^sup^p^l^y⁾^ship^s;^M^PF(F)^{= Mar}^itim^{e P}^r^ep^o^s^itioⁿⁱⁿ^g^Fo^r^{ce (}^F^u^t^u^r^e)^sh^ip^s;^Supt
^{= s}^u^pport^s^hⁱ^p^s^.

Oversight Issues for Congress
Adequacy of Proposed 313-Ship Fleet
Some observers have questioned whether the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet
includes sufficient numbers of certain ships. Areas of concern include planned
numbers of amphibious ships and attack submarines. For additional discussion of the
issue, see Appendix C.
Adequacy of Shipbuilding Plan for Maintaining 313 Ships
Summary. Table 4 shows the Navy’s projection of future force levels that
would result from fully implementing the Navy’s FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan.
As shown in the table, the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan, if implemented,
would generally be adequate to achieve and maintain a fleet of about 313 ships.
Under the FY2009 30-year plan, the Navy is to reach a total of at least 313 ships in
FY2019 — three years later than under the FY2008 30-year shipbuilding plan. A
primary cause of the three-year delay is the FY2009 plan’s 13-ship reduction in the
total number of ships planned for procurement in FY2009-FY2013. Most of the 13-
ship reduction is due to an 11-ship reduction in the number of Littoral Combat Ships
(LCSs) planned for FY2009-FY2013, which is a consequence of the Navy’s
restructuring of the LCS program in 2007.⁴
Although the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan would generally be adequate
to achieve and maintain a fleet of about 313 ships, it does not include enough ships
to fully support certain elements of the 313-ship fleet consistently over the long run
— shortfalls would occur in areas such as amphibious lift capability and the number
of attack submarines. The Navy’s report on the 30-year plan states: “While in the
main this plan achieves the necessary raw numbers of ships and sustains the
shipbuilding industrial base, there are certain time periods where the ship mix, and
therefore inherent capability of the force, varies from that required as a result of
funding constraints and the timing of legacy fleet service life limits.”⁵
The FY2009 30-year plan includes new assumptions about extended service
lives for amphibious ships and destroyers. If these longer service lives are not
achieved, it could increase the shortfall in amphibious lift capability and create a
shortfall in the number of cruisers and destroyers.

⁴ For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS) Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.
⁵ U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval
Vessels for FY 2009, p. 5.

Table 4. Navy Projection of Future Force Levels
(resulting from implementation of 30-year shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3)
^FShip type (see key below)
^Y^C^S^L^S^S^S^A^C^M^M^S^T
^V^C^C^S^S^S^W^L^I^P^u^O
^N^S^N^G^B^S^F^W^F^p^T
^N^N^(F)^t^A
^L
⁰⁹¹¹¹⁰⁹²⁵³⁴¹⁴³¹³¹¹⁴⁰¹⁷²⁸⁶
¹⁰¹¹¹¹¹²⁵²⁴¹⁴³²³⁰¹⁴⁰¹⁷²⁸⁷
¹¹¹¹¹¹³²⁵²⁴¹⁴³⁴²⁸¹⁴⁰¹⁷²⁸⁹
¹²¹¹¹¹⁰³⁵³⁴¹⁴³⁴²⁹¹⁴⁰¹⁸²⁹⁰
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Shortfalls Relative to 313-Ship Goals. The FY2009 version of the 30-
year shipbuilding plan, like the FY2008 and FY2007 versions, does not include
enough ships to fully support all elements of the planned 313-ship force structure
over the long run. As shown in Table 5 below, however, the total projected shortfall
in the 30-year plan relative to the 313-ship force structure has been reduced from

about 39 ships two years ago to 15 ships today. The reduction in the shortfall from
about 39 ships two years ago to about 26 ships one year ago was due primarily to a
Navy decision to insert additional destroyers into the final years of the FY2008 plan.
The reduction in the shortfall from about 26 ships a year ago to 15 ships today is due
primarily to a new assumption incorporated into the FY2009 plan to extend the
service lives of the Navy’s 62 Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers by
five years (from 35 years to 40).
Table 5. Projected Shortfall Relative to 313-Ship Force
Structure
Projected shortfall by shipFY2007FY2008FY2009 (FY09-
type, in numbers of ships,(FY07-FY36)(FY08-FY37)FY38) plan of
under...plan ofplan ofFeb. 2008
Feb. 2006Feb. 2007
Amphibious ships 1 1 0^a
Attack submarines (SSNs) 8 8 7
Cruise missile submarines 4 4 4
(SSGNs)
Ballistic missile submarines 0 0 2^b
(SSBNs)
Cruisers and destroyers~26~10 0
MPF(F) ships 0 0 2
Total projected shortfall~39~2615
Source: CRS analysis of Navy data.
a. Although the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan would support a force of 32 or 33
amphibious ships, as opposed to 31 called for in the 313-ship plan, the 32- or 33-ship
force would include nine LPD-17 class ships, as opposed to the 10 called for in the
313-ship plan. The Marine Corps states that fully meeting the requirement for an
amphibious force capable of lifting the assault echelons of 2.0 Marine Expeditionary
Brigades (MEBs) would require a 33-ship amphibious force that includes 11 LPD-17s.
b. Although the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan includes 12 replacement SSBNs rather
than the 14 called for in the 313-ship plan, the Navy has testified that the 12 new
SSBNs would be sufficient to perform the missions of today’s 14-ship SSBN force
because the 12 new ships would be built with life-of-the-ship nuclear fuel cores and
consequently would not require mid-life refuelings. The Navy states that the need for
today’s SSBNs to be taken out of service for some time to receive mid-life refuelings^th^th
is what drives the need for a 13 and 14 SSBN.
Amphibious Ships. Although the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan would
support a force of 32 or 33 amphibious ships, as opposed to a total of 31 called for
in the 313-ship plan, this 32- or 33-ship force would include 9 San Antonio (LPD-17)

class amphibious ships, as opposed to the 10 called for in the 313-ship plan.⁶ The
Navy’s report on the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan states:
While the mix of the 33 [amphibious] ships reflected in this plan differs slightly
from the USMC requirement, it represents acceptable risk considering the
amphibious ships planned for decommissioning are not scheduled for
dismantling or sinking to permit mobilization at a later date if required. The
decommissioning ships are being replaced with newer more capable LPD 17 and
LHA 6 class ships. The Navy will maintain the 33-ship requirement for
amphibious shipping through the FYDP while these new ships are integrated into
the battleforce. Consequently, there will be no amphibious ship capability gaps⁷
through at least FY 2019.
The Marine Corps states that lifting the assault echelons of 2.0 Marine
Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) — a requirement that reflects Marine Corps
responsibilities under U.S. war plans — would require a 33-ship amphibious force
that includes 11 LPD-17s.⁸ Table 6 shows the Marine Corps’ calculation of the
amount of amphibious lift, relative to the 2.0 MEB lift goal, resulting from the 32-
or 33-ship amphibious force that is projected in the Navy’s FY2009 30-year
shipbuilding plan. The table presents the five different elements of amphibious lift.
In the table, a figure of 1.0 in a cell would meet 100% of the 2.0 MEB lift goal for
that lift element, a figure of 1.5 would exceed by 50% the 2.0 MEB lift goal for that
element, and a figure of 0.75 would meet 75% of the 2.0 MEB lift goal for that
element.
As can be seen in the table, the Marine Corps calculates that the projected 32-
or 33-ship amphibious force would
^!roughly meet the lift goal for VTOL aircraft spaces;
^!exceed the lift goal for troops, space for cargo, and spaces for LCAC
landing craft; and
^!fall short of meeting the lift goal for space for vehicles.

⁶ Congress, as part of its action on the FY2008 defense budget, provided $50 million in
advance procurement funding for a 10th LPD-17 to be procured in a fiscal year after
FY2008. The FY2009 shipbuilding plan, like the FY2008 shipbuilding plan, does not^th
include a 10 LPD-17, and calls for ending LPD-17 procurement with the ninth ship, which^th
was procured in FY2008. A 10 LPD-17, at a cost of $1,700 million, is the number-two
item on the Navy’s FY2009 Unfunded Requirements List (URL) and the first item presented
in the Marine Corps’ FY2009 URL.
⁷ U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval
Vessels for FY 2009, p. A-3.
⁸ The 33-ship force that would fully meet the 2.0 MEB lift requirement includes 11 large-
deck amphibious assault ships (LHAs/LHDs), 11 LPD-17s, and 11 LSD-41/49 class
amphibious ships.

Table 6. Projected Amount of Amphibious Lift
(Relative to 2.0 MEB lift requirement, Resulting From Amphibious Force
Supported By FY2009 Navy 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan)
2008 2009 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Troops 1.46 1.35 1.38 1.45 1.42 1.35 1.49 1.59
Vehicle (sq. ft.)0.770.750.800.900.880.931.051.17
Cargo (cu. ft.)2.021.901.922.072.041.952.282.49
VTOL aircraft1.020.930.941.071.060.971.181.31
LCACs 1.81 1.75 1.79 1.79 1.75 1.77 1.65 1.50
Source: U.S. Marine Corps data provided to CRS, March 11, 2008. Calculations are based
on 15 operational ships per MEB. A figure of 1.0 in a cell would meet 100% of the 2.0
MEB lift goal for that lift element; a figure of 1.5 would exceed by 50% the goal for that
element; and a figure of 0.75 would meet 75% of the goal for that element.
If the Navy cannot extend the service lives of amphibious ships as much as
assumed in the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan, then the amount of amphibious
lift capability in future years could be less than that shown in Table 6.
Attack Submarines (SSNs). Although the 313-ship plan calls for a total of
48 SSNs, the 30-year shipbuilding plan does not include enough SSNs to maintain
a force of 48 boats consistently over the long run. The Navy projects that the SSN
force will drop below 48 boats in 2022, reach a minimum of 41 boats (14.6% less
than the required figure of 48) in FY2028 and FY2029, and remain below 48 boats
through 2033. The Navy has completed a study on various options for mitigating the
projected SSN shortfall. One of these options is to procure one or more additional
SSNs in the period FY2008-FY2011. The issue is discussed in more detail in another
CRS report.⁹
Converted Trident Submarines (SSGNs). Although the 313-ship plan
calls for four SSGNs, the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan includes no
replacements for the four current SSGNs, which the Navy projects will reach
retirement age and leave service in FY2026-FY2028. The Navy’s report on the 30-
year shipbuilding plan states:
Plans for recapitalization [i.e., replacement] of the OHIO class submarines
that have been converted to SSGN have been deferred until their warfighting
utility can be assessed. Should their replacement be required, it will be necessary
to integrate their procurement with other ship and submarine recapitalization¹⁰
efforts planned for the post-FY 2020 period.
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs). Although the FY2009 30-year
shipbuilding plan includes 12 replacement SSBNs rather than the 14 called for in the

⁹ CRS Report RL32418, Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal and Procurement Rate:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
¹⁰ U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval
Vessels for FY 2009, p. 8.

313-ship plan, the Navy has testified that the 12 new SSBNs would be sufficient to
perform the missions of today’s 14-ship SSBN force because the 12 new ships would
be built with life-of-the-ship nuclear fuel cores and consequently would not require
mid-life refuelings. The Navy states that the need for today’s SSBNs to be taken out
of service for some time to receive mid-life refuelings is what drives the need for a

13^th and 14^th SSBN.

Cruisers and Destroyers. Although the FY2009 30-year plan assumes a 5-
year service life extension for the Navy’s 62 DDG-51s, a Navy official was quoted
after the FY2009 30-year plan was released as stating that the Navy had not yet¹¹
officially approved the idea of extending the service lives of those ships. One
potential oversight issue for Congress is why the 30-year plan assumed a 5-year
service life extension for the DDG-51s if the Navy had not yet officially approved the
idea. If the Navy approves the idea, a second potential oversight issue for Congress
is whether the Navy will actually be able to extend the service lives of the DDG-51s
and operate them in a cost-effective manner for 40 years, given the wear and tear that
might accrue on the ships in coming years, as well as the DDG-51 design’s space,
weight, and electrical-power capacities. If a five-year service life extension for the
DDG-51s proves infeasible or not cost-effective, a shortfall in cruisers and destroyers
similar to that shown in the FY2008 column in Table 5 might reappear.
MPF(F) Ships. The projected two-ship shortfall in MPF(F) ships is due to a
decision to drop two Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class dry cargo ships from the
shipbuilding plan. These two ships were previously planned for procurement in
FY2010 and FY2011. Navy officials have stated the two ships were removed from
the plan pending the completion of a study on the MPF(F) concept of operations, and
that the two ships might be put back into the shipbuilding plan next year, following
the completion of this study.¹²
Aircraft Carriers. As mentioned earlier, the Navy projects that the carrier
force will drop from the current figure of 11 ships to 10 ships for a 33-month period
between the scheduled retirement of the carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) in November

2012 and scheduled the entry into service of its replacement, the carrier Gerald R.

Ford (CVN-78), in September 2015. The Navy projects that the force will increase
to 12 carriers starting in FY2019, when CVN-79 is commissioned.
10 USC §5062 requires the Navy to maintain an aircraft carrier force of at least
11 operational ships. As it did for FY2008, the Navy for FY2009 requested a
legislative waiver from Congress that would permit the Navy to reduce the carrier
force to 10 operational ships for the 33-month between the retirement of the

¹¹ Zachary M. Peterson, “Destroyer Extension Part of 313-Ship Plan,” NavyTimes.com,
February 11, 2008.
¹² See, for example, U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for
Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009, p. 9.

Enterprise and the entry into service of the Ford. The issue is discussed further in
another CRS report.¹³
Affordability and Executibility of Shipbuilding Plan
Overview. One of the most significant features in the FY2009 30-year
shipbuilding plan, compared to the FY2008 30-year plan, is an apparent increase of
roughly 44% in real (inflation-adjusted) terms in the Navy’s estimated average annual
cost to implement the 30-year plan. This roughly 44% real increase is not due to
significant changes in the composition of the 30-year plan, because the types and
quantities of ships to be procured under FY2009 30-year plan are generally the same¹⁴
as those in the FY2008 30-year plan.
In 2007, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that last year’s
version of the 30-year plan would cost roughly 35% more per year to implement than
the Navy was estimating. The Navy in 2007 downplayed CBO’s higher cost
estimate, referring to it in testimony as “worst-case analysis”¹⁵ or as an “extremely¹⁶
conservative” estimate. The Navy’s estimated cost for the FY2009 30-year plan,
however, is about 7% less than CBO’s estimates for the cost of the plan.
In 2006 and 2007, the Navy had a clearly identifiable strategy for achieving the
shipbuilding budget that the Navy then estimated would be needed to implement the
30-year shipbuilding plan. CRS and CBO discussed in reports and testimony in 2006
and 2007 how the Navy’s strategy for executing the shipbuilding plan depended on
a series of five assumptions concerning the future size and composition of the Navy’s
budget and the costs of future Navy ships. As noted by both CRS and CBO in 2006
and 2007, all five of these assumptions could be viewed as risk items for the plan,
because there were grounds for questioning whether each of them would be borne
out. (For additional discussion, see Appendix D.)
The new increase in the Navy’s estimated cost for implementing the 30-year
plan is so large that the Navy no longer appears to have a clearly identifiable,
announced strategy for generating the funds needed to implement the 30-year plan,
at least not without significantly reducing funding for other Navy programs or
increasing the Navy’s programmed budget in coming years by billions of dollars per
year.

¹³ CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
¹⁴ The FY2009-FY2038 plan includes 296 ships, or about 1.7% more than the 291 ships in
the FY2008-FY2037 plan. The types of ships procured under the two plans are essentially
the same, and the total numbers of each type being procured are in most cases similar.
¹⁵ Source: Transcript of spoken testimony of Vice Admiral Paul Sullivan before the
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee
on March 20, 2007.
¹⁶ Source: Transcript of spoken testimony of Allison Stiller before the Defense
subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on April 25, 2007.

June 2008 CBO Report. A June 2008 CBO report on the Navy’s FY2009

30-year shipbuilding plan states that CBO’s analysis indicates the following:

— Executing the Navy’s most recent 30-year shipbuilding plan would cost an
average of about $27 billion a year (in [FY]2009 dollars), or more than double
the $12.6 billion a year that the Navy has spent, on average, since [FY]2003....
Since CBO testified on this topic on March 14, [2008], the Navy provided
additional information that led CBO to increase its estimate of the annual cost of
the shipbuilding plan from $25 billion to $27 billion.
— After releasing its [report on the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan], the
Navy discovered a calculation error that caused the costs initially reported in the
[FY]2009 plan to be about 10 percent higher than the Navy now expects them to
be. After correcting for that error, the Navy’s estimate of the costs of
implementing its 30-year shipbuilding plan is about 10 percent less than the
estimates that CBO has prepared during the past three years.
— The Navy’s [FY]2009 budget request appears to depart from all of the
budgetary assumptions used to develop the service’s [FY]2007 and [FY]2008
shipbuilding plans.
— CBO’s estimates of the costs of the Navy’s shipbuilding program through
the period covered by the [FY]2009-[FY]2013 Future Years Defense Program
are about 30 percent higher than the Navy’s estimates. In particular, CBO
estimates that the DDG-1000 guided-missile destroyer and the CG(X) future
cruiser would probably cost significantly more than the Navy currently estimates.
— For the [FY]2009-[FY]2020 period — described as the “near term” in the
Navy’s plan — CBO estimates that new-ship construction alone would cost
about 13 percent more than the Navy indicates.
— For the period beyond [FY]2020 — described as the “far term” in the
Navy’s plan — CBO estimates that costs would be about 8 percent greater than¹⁷
the Navy projects.
Table 7, which is taken from CBO’s June 2008 report, summarizes Navy and
CBO estimates of the cost to implement the 30-year shipbuilding plan.

¹⁷ Source: Cover letter to Congressional Budget Office, Resource Implications of the Navy’s
Fiscal Year 2009 Shipbuilding Plan, Washington, 2008. (June 9, 2008) The cover letter,
dated June 9, 2008, is from Peter Orszag, Director, CBO, and is addressed to Representative
Gene Taylor, the Chairman of the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee, with copies to Representative Roscoe Bartlett, the
Ranking Member of the subcommittee, and Representatives Ike Skelton and Duncan Hunter,
the Chairman and Ranking Member, respectively, of the House Armed Services Committee.

Table 7. Average Annual Shipbuilding Costs
(from June 2008 CBO report; figures in billions of constant FY2009 dollars)
New-ship constructionNew-ship construction (including
SSBNs), plus:
ExcludingIncludingNuclearNuclear refuelings, LCS
SSBNsSSBNsrefuelingsmission modules, and
surface combat-ant
modernization
Actual Navy11.111.112.412.6
spending,
FY03-FY08
Average annual cost as estimated by:
Navy 20.4 23.2^a 24.4^b 25.2^b
CBO22.425.0 26.2 26.9
CBO’s estimate of the cost to fully fund the Navy’s 313-ship fleet^c
22.5 25.5 26.7 27.4
Memorandum: Navy’s estimate average annual cost in 2006 and 2007
n.a. 16.1 17.2^b 18.0^b
Source: Table 3 from Congressional Budget Office, Resource Implications of the Navy’s
Fiscal Year 2009 Shipbuilding Plan, Washington, 2008. (June 9, 2008) p. 14.
a. The Navy’s estimate for new-ship construction plus the Navy’s cost target for SSBNs
under the FY2007 and FY2008 shipbuilding plans.
b. The Navy’s estimate for new-ship construction and cost target for SSBNs plus CBO’s
estimates for the additional costs.
c. CBO’s estimates of the costs to buy all of the attack submarines, guided-missile
submarines, ballistic missile submarines, logistics ships, and amphibious ships needed
to maintain a 313-ship fleet.
FY2009 Legislative Activity
For legislative activity on selected individual Navy shipbuilding, conversion,
and modernization programs, see:
^!CRS Report RS20643 on the CVN-78 aircraft carrier program;
^!CRS Report RL32109 on the DDG-1000 and DDG-51 destroyer
programs;
^!CRS Report RL34179 on the CG(X) cruiser program;
^!CRS Report RL33741 on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program;
^!CRS Report RS22595 on the Aegis cruiser and destroyer
modernization program;
^!CRS Report RL34476 on the LPD-17 amphibious ship program;
^!CRS Report RL32418 on the Virginia (SSN-774) class attack
submarine program; and
^!CRS Report RS21007 on the Trident SSGN submarine conversion
program.

FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5658/S. 3001)
House. The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 110-652
of May 16, 2008) on H.R. 5658, included comments on aircraft carrier force structure
(page 81), attack submarine force structure requirements (pages 81-82), and service
life extensions for existing attack submarines (page 82), and stated that:
The committee remains concerned with the totality of the Navy
shipbuilding plan. The committee is not confident that the current mix of planned
ship procurement is the most effective way to balance the need for quantity
versus capability across the spectrum of naval requirements. Considering likely
budget constraints for shipbuilding procurement, it is evident that the long-range
plan is unaffordable.
The committee is also concerned with short-term affordability. The key to
efficient shipbuilding is stability in programs and commonality between
programs. With stability, the shipbuilder can reasonably invest in infrastructure
improvements for increased efficiency. Commonality allows savings in order
quantity across programs as well as life-cycle savings in maintenance and repair
parts. The goal of a 313-ship fleet will never be achieved until very difficult
decisions are made concerning quantity, capability, affordability, and stability.
The committee remains committed to building a capable naval force in
sufficient quantity to protect the nation’s interests. This force must consist of
major combatant vessels with multiple warfighting capabilities. It must also
include ships with specific roles and missions, from operations in the littoral
regions, to the projection of power ashore from a sea-base. The balance of
capabilities within this force and the affordability of sustaining this force is the
key task before both the Navy and Congress throughout the foreseeable future.
The committee disagrees with the submitted Future Years Defense Plan and
budget request for: canceling the Amphibious Landing Ship-Dock (LPD 17)
program at 9 ships; canceling the procurement of the 13th and 14th Dry Cargo
Ammunition Ships (T-AKE); not requesting funding to increase the build rate of
Virginia class deliver a coherent strategy for Littoral Combat Ship acquisition.
The committee authorizes a reallocation of funding in the Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy account and the National Defense Sealift Fund. The committee^th
recommends: full funding for the 10 ship of the LPD 17 class; an increase in
advance procurement funding for the Virginia class submarine program,
necessary for the procurement of 2 ships in fiscal year 2010; advance
procurement for the final 2 ships of the T-AKE class; and advance procurement
for the construction of DDG 51 class destroyers or DDG 1000 class destroyers.
The committee notes that due to the overall delay in the DDG 1000 destroyer
program, the Navy would be unable to execute the full funding request in fiscal
year 2009 for the third ship of the planned seven ship class. Additionally, the
committee is concerned with potential significant cost overruns in the DDG 1000
program and considers it prudent to pause the program until technological
challenges are completely understood.
The committee authorizes these programs without prejudice to any specific
program. The committee also understands the Navy is strongly considering
re-starting the DDG 51 class destroyer upgraded with an improved radar system

to fill an urgent need in ballistic missile defense. The committee would only
support that decision if the industrial base for surface combatant construction is
not affected. The committee expects the Secretary of Defense, subject to the
availability of appropriations, to enter into advance procurement and advance
construction contracts for the construction of surface combatants balanced
between the two current surface combatant shipyards, taking into account
workforce challenges still in effect on the Gulf Coast due to the lingering
economic effects of Hurricane Katrina.
The committee expects the budget submission for fiscal year 2010 to
contain a funding request for the 11th ship of the LPD 17 class, a two-one-two
build strategy (two ships in 2010, one ship in 2011, and two ships in 2012 and
following years) for the Virginia class submarine program, the balance of full
funding for the 13th T-AKE, and a comprehensive decision on the acquisition
plan for surface combatants including the plan for the Littoral Combat Ship class.
The committee expects the Navy to solve the capacity and capability issues
of the surface combatant, amphibious warfare, and submarine combatant forces
before beginning multiple new starts in programs to field the maritime
prepositioning force (future) (MPF(F)). The committee is supportive of the
requirement to constitute a seabase with a flotilla of vessels from which both
combatant and non-combatant operations ashore could be launched. However,
the committee is not convinced the seabase should be composed of
non-combatant vessels such as the planned MPF aviation ship (MPF LHA) and
the MPF landing platform ship (MPF MLP). The committee directs the Secretary
of the Navy, along with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of
the Marine Corps, to report to the congressional defense committees within 60
days after the date of enactment of this Act, on the size and composition of the
naval amphibious force necessary (without the MPF LHA and MPF MLP
vessels) to conduct operations from a seabase, with a force comprising two
marine expeditionary brigades (MEB). (Pages 82-83)
Senate. The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 110-335
of May 12, 2008) on S. 3001, included report language on certain individual Navy
shipbuilding and modernization programs (see pages 76-80).
Compromise. In lieu of a conference report, there was a compromise version
of S. 3001 that was accompanied by a joint explanatory statement. Section 4 of S.
3001 states that the joint explanatory statement “shall have the same effect with
respect to the implementation of this Act as if it were a joint explanatory statement
of a committee of conference.” S. 3001 and the accompanying joint explanatory
statement contain bill and report language on certain individual Navy shipbuilding
and modernization programs, but not on overall Navy force structure or shipbuilding
plans.
FY2009 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329)
House. The House Appropriations Committee did not file a report on the
FY2009 defense appropriations bill. On July 30, 2008, Representative John Murtha,
the chairman of the Defense subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee,
issued a press release summarizing the subcommittee’s markup of the bill that same
day. The press release mentions recommended changes to the funding amounts

requested for certain individual Navy shipbuilding programs, but does not discuss
overall Navy force structure or shipbuilding plans.¹⁸
Senate. The Senate Appropriations Committee did not file a report on the
FY2009 defense appropriations bill. On September 10, 2008, the committee issued
a press release summarizing the markup of the bill that day by its Defense
subcommittee. The press release mentions recommended changes to the funding
amounts requested for certain individual Navy shipbuilding programs, but does not¹⁹
discuss overall Navy force structure or shipbuilding plans.
Compromise. In lieu of a conference report, there was a compromise version
of the FY2009 defense appropriations bill that was incorporated as Division C of
H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329 of September 30, 2008. (H.R. 2638, the FY2009
Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill, was amended to become a
consolidated appropriations bill that includes, among other things, the FY2009
defense appropriations bill.) The compromise version of H.R. 2638 was
accompanied by an explanatory statement. Section 4 of H.R. 2638 states that the
explanatory statement “shall have the same effect with respect to the allocation of
funds and implementation of this Act as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a
committee of conference.” The explanatory statement outlines funding levels for
individual Navy shipbuilding programs and discusses some of the programs in report
language, but does not discuss overall Navy force structure or shipbuilding plans.

¹⁸ July 30, 2008, press release from The Honorable John P. Murtha, entitled “Murtha
Summary of the FY09 Defense Appropriations Bill,” p. 2.
¹⁹ September 10, 2008, press release from Senate Appropriations Committee, entitled
“Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Approves Fiscal Year 2009 Defense
Appropriations Bill,” p. 2.

Appendix A. Potential For Changing
313-Ship Proposal
In General
A September 29, 2008 press report stated:
The Navy is conducting a force structure review that could change the
number of ships the service needs in the 2020 time frame to maintain sea control
and support the maritime strategy issued last year, the Navy’s top programmer
told Inside the Navy in an exclusive interview last week.
“The 313 plan, as it’s known, was based on a force-structure analysis done
in 2005 and it has served us very well,” Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, deputy
chief of naval operations for integration of capabilities and resources, said Sept.
24. “But as we look at the changes in the security environment in the newly
published maritime strategy, we felt it was appropriate to work through a similar
methodology that we did in 2005 to make sure that we have our force structure
correct.”
Since Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead took over last fall,
he has has continually referred to the 313-ship mark as a “floor,” meaning the
minimal number of ships the Navy needs to conduct its myriad missions.
McCullough would not say if the number of ships the Navy wants in its
future fleet will change.
“I’m not going to tell you if it’s more or less or anything until we work
through the reviews with leadership,” he said....
The new force structure review should be complete in conjunction with the
release of the 2008 Naval Operations Concept, which will outline how the Navy,
Marine Corps and Coast Guard will operate in accordance to the tri-service²⁰
[Navy-Marine Corps-Coast Guard] maritime strategy published last October.
An April 2008 press report stated that:
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead has ordered internal
reviews into the Navy’s long-term basing requirements and strategies, as well as
needs for personnel, ships and aircraft, a Navy spokesman said.
The reviews, which probably will not be made public, will produce an
“internal working document” that will help Roughead and other top Navy
commanders plan into the coming decades, Navy spokesman Cmdr. Jeff Davis
said. The findings probably will be incorporated into future quadrennial defense
reviews, shipbuilding plans and budget requests, Davis said.

²⁰ Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Undergoing A New Force Structure Review Due This Fall,”
Inside the Navy, September 29, 2008.

Roughead mentioned his review of the Navy’s basing requirements and
strategy — what he called a “force rating” and Davis called a “strategic
lay-down” — in response to questions from a House panel in March....
Davis described the four other reviews Roughead requested when he took
over:
* Force structure, including the numbers of aircraft and ships.
* The life span of those aircraft and ships.
* The Navy’s personnel requirements, including end strength and skill sets.
* Infrastructure requirements, including details about the physical state of²¹
the Navy’s bases.
Amphibious and MPF(F) Ships
The Navy’s February 2008 report on the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan
stated that the Department of the Navy “is reviewing options to increase assault
echelon amphibious lift to 33 ships to meet USMC requirements.”²² The report also
states:
The Commandant of the Marine Corps has determined that a minimum of
33 amphibious ships is necessary to support their assault echelon lift
requirements; specifically, he has requested a force of 11 aviation capable
amphibious ships, 11 LPDs and 11 LSDs. The Chief of Naval Operations²³
supports the Commandant’s determination.
The Navy’s February 2007 report on the FY2008 30-year shipbuilding plan
stated:
Future combat operations may require us to revisit many of the decisions
reflected in this report, including those associated with amphibious lift. As the
Navy embarks on production of the Maritime Prepositioning Force in this FYDP,
the Navy will continue to analyze the utility of these ships in terms of their
contribution to, and ability to substitute for, the assault echelon forces in the
Navy’s future battle-force inventory. The current force represents the best
balance between these forces available today. However, changing world events
and resulting operational risk associated with the various force structure elements
that make up these two components of overall lift will be analyzed to ensure the
Navy is not taking excessive risk in lift capability and capacity. While there
needs to be a balance between expeditionary and prepositioning ships for
meeting the overall lift requirement, future reports may adjust the level of

²¹ Philip Ewing, “CNO Orders Far-Reaching Base, Force Reviews,” NavyTimes.com, April

21, 2008.

²² U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval
Vessels for FY 2009, p. 5.
²³ U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval
Vessels for FY 2009, p. A-3.

support in one or both of these solutions. Any adjustments made in these
capabilities will have to be accommodated in light of the resources available and
could require the Navy to commit additional funding to this effort in order to²⁴
support the overall balance of our shipbuilding program.
Cruisers and Destroyers
The Navy testified in July 2008 that it no longer wants to procure additional
Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers, and instead now wants to restart procurement
of Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) destroyers. The Navy’s new plan, if implemented,
would change the planned composition of the Navy’s destroyer fleet and possibly²⁵
change the planned total number of cruisers and destroyers.
SSBNs
The Navy has testified in 2007 and 208 that its next-generation ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs) are to be fueled with a nuclear fuel core sufficient for the ships’
entire expected service lives. Consequently, the Navy has testified, these SSBNs, in
contrast to today’s SSBNs, would not need a mid-life nuclear refueling. As a result,
the Navy testified, the Navy in the future may be able to meet its requirements for
SSBN deployments with a force of 12 SSBNs rather than 14.²⁶ This testimony
suggests that the Navy might at some point change the required number of SSBNs
in the 313-ship plan from 14 to 12. The Navy’s February 2008 report on the FY2009
shipbuilding plan continues to state that the 313-ship force-structure includes 14
SSBNs, but the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan includes 12 SSBNs rather than 14.

²⁴ U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval
Vessels for FY 2008, p. 5.
²⁵ For further discussion of the Navy’s preferred new course for destroyer procurement, see
CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs: Background,
Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
²⁶ Source: Transcripts of Navy testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee, March 29,
2007, and to Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of House Armed Services
Committee, March 14, 2008.

Appendix B. Modified Description of Required
Number of Aircraft Carriers
In late-March 2007, the Navy modified its description of the number of aircraft
carriers in the 313-ship proposal. From February 2006 through early March 2007,
the Navy described the 313-ship proposal as one centered on, among other things, 11
aircraft carriers.²⁷ In late March 2007, the Navy modified its description of the 313-
ship proposal to one centered on, among other things, 11, and eventually 12, aircraft
carriers, the modification being the addition of the phrase “and eventually 12.”²⁸
The Navy’s modification of its description of the number of aircraft carriers in
the 313-ship proposal occurred about a week after the decommissioning of the
aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy (CV-67), which occurred on March 23, 2007. The
decommissioning of the Kennedy reduced the Navy’s carrier force from 12 ships to
11. The Navy had proposed decommissioning the Kennedy in its FY2006 and
FY2007 budgets, and opponents of the Kennedy’s retirement had resisted the
proposal. If the Navy, prior to the Kennedy’s decommissioning, had described the
313-ship fleet as one centered on, among other things, 11, and eventually 12, aircraft
carriers, opponents of the Kennedy’s decommissioning might have cited the
“eventually 12” part as evidence that the Navy really requires 12 carriers, not just

11.²⁹

The Navy’s February 2008 report on the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan
states that the 313-ship plan includes 11 carriers and does not include a reference to
“eventually 12” carriers, but the long-range force projection in the report continues
to show a total of 12 carriers in FY2019 and subsequent years.

²⁷ See, for example, Navy testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on March

1, 2007 (transcript of hearing).

²⁸ See, for example, Navy testimony before the Defense subcommittee of the Senate
Appropriations Committee on March 28, 2007, and before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on March 29, 2007 (transcripts of hearings).
²⁹ For additional discussion of the debate over the Kennedy’s retirement, see CRS Report
RL32731, Navy Aircraft Carriers: Retirement of USS John F. Kennedy — Issues and
Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

Appendix C. Adequacy of Planned 313-Ship Fleet
Specific Ship Categories
Amphibious Ships. Some observers have questioned whether the Navy’s
proposed total of 31 amphibious ships within the 313-ship fleet will be sufficient.
The Marine Corps has stated that a total of 33, including 11 San Antonio (LPD-17)
class ships, would be needed to meet the Marine Corps’ requirement for having a
force capable of lifting the assault echelons of 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigades
(MEBs). The issue is discussed in more detail in another CRS report.³⁰
Attack Submarines. Some observers have questioned whether the Navy’s
proposed total of 48 attack submarines within the 313-ship plan will be sufficient,
and have suggested that a total of 55 or more would be more appropriate, particularly
in light of requests for forward-deployed attack submarines from U.S. regional
military commanders, and the modernization of China’s naval forces, including its
submarine force. The issue is discussed in more detail other CRS reports.³¹
Aircraft Carriers. Some observers have questioned whether the Navy’s
proposed total of 11 aircraft carriers through FY2018 will be sufficient, particularly
in light of past Navy plans that have called for 12 carriers, the Navy’s testimony in
2007 that the 313-ship proposal includes a requirement for an eventual total of 12
carriers, and Navy plans to increase the carrier force back to 12 ships in 2019 and
maintain it at that level thereafter. The latter two points, they argue, suggest that the
Navy would actually prefer to have 12 carriers between now and FY2019, rather than

11.

Observers have expressed concern that the current carrier force of 11 ships will
temporarily decline further, to 10 ships, during the 33-month period between the
scheduled retirement of the carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) in November 2012 and
scheduled the entry into service of its replacement, the carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-
78), in September 2015. Even if an 11-carrier force is adequate, these observers
argue, a 10-carrier force might not be, even if only for a 33-month period.
10 USC §5062 requires the Navy to maintain an aircraft carrier force of at least
11 operational ships. The Navy for FY2009 is requesting a legislative waiver from
Congress that would permit the Navy to reduce the carrier force to 10 operational
ships for the 33-month between the retirement of the Enterprise and the entry into
service of the Ford. The Navy made the same request as part of its FY2008 budget
submission; Congress did not act on the request in FY2008.

³⁰ CRS Report RL32513, Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning
Ship Programs: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
³¹ CRS Report RL32418, Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal and Procurement Rate:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke; and CRS Report RL33153,
China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

Overall Number of Ships
Some observers have questioned whether the overall planned total of 313 ships
would be adequate, particularly in light of Navy plans in recent decades for larger
total numbers of ships.
One possible method for assessing the appropriateness of the total number of
ships being proposed by the Navy is to compare that number to historical figures for
total fleet size. Historical figures for total fleet size, however, might not be a reliable
yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of the Navy’s proposed 313-ship fleet,
particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the
missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and
the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing missions all change
over time.
The Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 battle force ships
at the end of FY1987,³² and as of June 5, 2008, had declined to a total of 280 battle
force ships. The FY1987 fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission
requirements that focused on countering Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential
multi-theater NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, while the June 2008 fleet is intended to
meet a considerably different set of mission requirements centered on influencing
events ashore by countering both land- and sea-based military forces of potential
regional threats other than Russia, including non-state terrorist organizations. In
addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed substantially from the June 2008 fleet in areas
such as profusion of precision-guided air-delivered weapons, numbers of Tomahawk-
capable ships, and sophistication of C4ISR systems.³³
In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, to include, as a possible
example, a greater emphasis on being able to counter improved Chinese maritime
military capabilities.³⁴ In addition, the capabilities of Navy ships will likely have
changed further by that time due to developments such as more comprehensive

³² Some publications, such as those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have stated
that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however, is
the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of
battle force ships. The battle force ships figure is the number used in government
discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total number of active ships has
been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical
Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a total of 337 active ships,
while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle
force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of
battle force ships in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this case
overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule
to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the Navy
over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
³³ C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance.
³⁴ For a discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications
for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

implementation of networking technology and increased use of ship-based unmanned
vehicles.
The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing
its stated missions; the 280-ship fleet of June 2008 may or nor may not have been
capable of performing its stated missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain
number of ships may or may not be capable of performing its stated missions. Given
changes over time in mission requirements, ship mixes, and technologies, however,
these three issues are to a substantial degree independent of one another.
For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are
not necessarily a reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to
perform its stated missions. An increasing number of ships in the fleet might not
necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions is increasing,
because the fleet’s mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship
numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing number of ships in the
fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated missions is
decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly
than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time
that ships are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than
offset reductions in total ship numbers.
Previous Navy force structure plans, such as those shown in Table 1, might
provide some insight into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure
plan, but changes over time in mission requirements, technologies available to ships
for performing missions, and other force-planning factors suggest that some caution
should be applied in using past force structure plans for this purpose, particularly if
those past force structure plans are more than a few years old. The Reagan-era plan
for a 600-ship Navy, for example, was designed for a Cold War set of missions
focusing on countering Soviet naval forces at sea, which is not an appropriate basis³⁵

for planning the Navy today.
³⁵ Navy force structure plans that predate those shown in Table 1 include the Reagan-era
600-ship plan of the 1980s, the Base Force fleet of more than 400 ships planned during the
final two years of the George H. W. Bush Administration, the 346-ship fleet from the
Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (or BUR, sometimes also called Base
Force II), and the 310-ship fleet of the Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR. The table
below summarizes some key features of these plans.
Features of Recent Navy Force Structure Plans
Plan600-shipBase Force1993 BUR1997 QDR
Total ships~600~450/416^a346~305/310^b
Attack submarines10080/~55^c45-5550/55^d
Aircraft carriers15^e1211+1^f11+1^f
Surface combatants242/228^g~150~124116
Amphibious ships~75^h51ⁱ36ⁱ36ⁱ
Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD and U.S. Navy data.
a. Commonly referred to as 450-ship plan, but called for decreasing to 416 ships by end of
(continued...)

Appendix D. Affordability of Navy 30-Year Plan in
2006-2007
In 2006 and 2007, the Navy’s position was that for its shipbuilding plan to be
affordable and executable, five things needed to happen:
^!The Navy’s overall budget needed to remain more or less flat (not
decline) in real (inflation-adjusted) terms.
^!Navy Operation and Maintenance (O&M) spending needed to
remain flat (not grow) in real terms.
^!Navy Military Personnel (MilPer) spending needed to remain flat
(not grow) in real terms.
^!Navy research and development (R&D) spending needed to decrease
from recent levels and remain at the decreased level over the long
run.
^!Navy ships needed to be built at the Navy’s currently estimated
prices.
The Navy said that the first four things were needed for the Navy to be able to
increase the shipbuilding budget from an average in FY2002-FY2007 of about $9.6
billion per year in FY2008 dollars to a long-term average of about $15.4 billion per
year in FY2008 dollars — an increase of about 60% in real terms.³⁶ The fifth thing
on the list, the Navy said, was needed if all the ships in the shipbuilding plan were
to be affordable within an average annual shipbuilding budget of $15.4 billion in
FY2008 dollars.

³⁵ (...continued)
FY1999.
b. Original total of about 305 ships was increased to about 310 due to increase in number
of attack submarines to 55 from 50.
c. Plan originally included 80 attack submarines, but this was later reduced to about 55.
d. Plan originally included 50 attack submarines but this was later increased to 55.
e. Plus one additional aircraft carrier in the service life extension program (SLEP).
f. Eleven active carriers plus one operational reserve carrier.
g. Plan originally included 242 surface combatants but this was later reduced to 228.
h. Number needed to lift assault echelons of one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus
one Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).
i. Number needed to lift assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs. Note how number needed to meet
this goal changed from Base Force plan to the BUR plan — a result of new, larger
amphibious ship designs.
³⁶ Source: CBO telephone conversation with CRS, May 31, 2006. See also Statement of J.
Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director, and Eric J. Labs, Principal Analyst, [On] Potential
Costs of the Navy’s 2006 Shipbuilding Plan, [Testimony] before the Subcommittee on
Projection Forces Committee on Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives, March 30,

2006.

Some observers in 2006 and 2007 questioned whether all five of the above
things would happen, arguing the following:
^!The need in coming years to fund an increase in Army and Marine
end strength could, within an overall DOD budget that remains more
or less flat in real terms, require funding to be transferred from the
Air Force and Navy budgets to the Army and Marine Corps budgets,
which could, for a time at least, lead to a real decline in the Air
Force and Navy budgets.
^!DOD in the past has not been fully successful in meeting its goals
for controlling O&M costs.
^!The Navy does not have full control over its MilPer costs — they
can be affected, for example, by decisions that Congress makes on
pay and benefits.
^!While the Navy may be able to decrease R&D spending in coming
years as a number of new systems shift from development to
procurement, it may be difficult for the Navy to keep R&D spending
at that reduced level over the long run, because the Navy at some
point will likely want to start development of other new systems.
^!Several Navy shipbuilding programs have experienced significant
cost growth in recent years, and CBO estimates that Navy ships will
cost substantially more to build than the Navy estimates.
If one or more of the five required things listed above did not happen, it was
argued in 2006 and 2007, it might become difficult or impossible to execute the
Navy’s shipbuilding plans. The risk of the plan becoming unexecutable, it was
argued, might become particularly acute starting in FY2011-FY2013, when the Navy
planned to increase procurement rates for cruisers and destroyers and for submarines.

Appendix E. Size of the Navy and
Navy Shipbuilding Rate
Size of the Navy
Table 8 shows the size of the Navy in terms of total number of ships since
FY1948; the numbers shown in the table reflect changes over time in the rules
specifying which ships count toward the total. Differing counting rules result in
differing totals, and for certain years, figures reflecting more than one set of counting
rules are available. Figures in the table for FY1978 and subsequent years reflect the
battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules established in
the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy.
As shown in the table, the total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached
a late-Cold War peak of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter.³⁷
The Navy fell below 300 battle force ships in August 2003 and included 280 battle
force ships as of June 5, 2008.
As discussed in Appendix C, historical figures for total fleet size might not be
a reliable yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of the Navy’s proposed 313-ship
fleet, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the
missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and
the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing missions all change
over time. For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the
Navy are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s
ability to perform its stated missions. An increasing number of ships in the fleet
might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions is
increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly
than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing number of
ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated
missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining
more rapidly than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the
percentage of time that ships are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly
enough to more than offset reductions in total ship numbers.

³⁷ Some publications have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of
FY1987. This figure, however, is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not
the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle force ships figure is the
number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total
number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For
example, the Naval Historical Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy
included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the
Navy included a total of 317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships
in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another year is thus an apple-to-
oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of
ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons
of the number of ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single
counting method.

Table 8. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948
FY^a Num b e r F Y^a Num b e r F Y^a Num b e r
1948 737 1969 926 1990 547
1949 690 1970 769 1991 526
1950 634 1971 702 1992 466
1951 980 1972 654 1993 435
1952 1,097 1973 584 1994 391
1953 1,122 1974 512 1995 373
1954 1,113 1975 496 1996 356
1955 1,030 1976 476 1997 354
1956 973 1977 464 1998 333
1957 967 1978 468 1999 317
1958 890 1979 471 2000 318
1959 860 1980 477 2001 316
1960 812 1981 490 2002 313
1961 897 1982 513 2003 297
1962 959 1983 514 2004 291
1963 916 1984 524 2005 282
1964 917 1985 541 2006 281
1965 936 1986 556 2007 279
1966 947 1987 568 2008
1967 973 1988 565 2009
1968 976 1989 566 2010
^Source:^Co^m^p^iled^b^y^CRS^u^sⁱⁿ^g^{U.S. Nav}^y^d^a^{ta. Nu}^m^b^er^{s sh}^o^wⁿ^r^e^f^l^{ect ch}^an^g^e^s^o^v^er^tim^eⁱⁿ^th^e
^ru^l^e^s^s^p^eci^f^yⁱⁿ^g^w^hⁱ^c^h^s^hⁱ^p^s^couⁿ^t^t^o^w^a^rd^t^h^e^t^o^t^a^l^.^Fⁱ^g^u^r^es^f^o^{r F}^Y^{1978 an}^{d s}^u^bs^equ^eⁿ^t^y^ears^ref^l^ect
^th^{e battle f}^o^{rce s}^h^ips^couⁿ^tin^g^m^e^th^{od, w}^h^ich^is^th^e^s^e^t^of^couⁿ^tin^g^ru^les^es^tablis^h^e^{d in}^th^{e early}^1980s
^f^o^{r pu}^blⁱ^c^polⁱ^c^y^di^s^c^u^s^sⁱ^on^s^of^t^h^{e s}ⁱ^{ze of}^t^h^{e N}^a^v^y^.
^{a. Data f}^o^{r earlier y}^ears^m^a^y^{be f}^o^{r th}^{e en}^{d of}^th^{e calen}^{dar y}^{ear (or}^f^o^{r s}^o^m^e^oth^e^{r poin}^t^du^rin^g^th^e
^y^{ear), rath}^{er th}^an^f^o^{r th}^{e en}^{d of}^th^{e f}ⁱ^s^{cal y}^ear.
Shipbuilding Rate
Table 9 shows past (FY1982-FY2008) and projected (FY2009-FY2013) rates
of Navy ship procurement.

Table 9. Battle Force Ships Procured or Projected,
FY1982-FY2013
(Procured FY1982-FY2009; projected FY2010-FY2013)
⁸²⁸³⁸⁴⁸⁵⁸⁶⁸⁷⁸⁸⁸⁹⁹⁰⁹¹⁹²⁹³⁹⁴⁹⁵⁹⁶⁹⁷
¹⁷¹⁴¹⁶¹⁹²⁰¹⁷¹⁵¹⁹¹⁵¹¹¹¹⁷⁴⁴⁵⁴
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