Child Welfare Financing: An Issue Overview

CRS Report for Congress
Child Welfare Financing:
An Issue Overview
April 6, 2005
Emilie Stoltzfus
Analyst in Social Legislation
Domestic Social Policy Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Child Welfare Financing: An Issue Overview
Summary
Child welfare programs are designed to protect children from abuse or neglect.
Services may be offered to stabilize and strengthen a child’s own home. If this is not
a safe option for the child, however, he or she may be placed in foster care while
efforts to improve the home are made. In those instances where reuniting the child
with his or her parents is found to be impossible, a child welfare agency must seek
a new permanent (often adoptive) home for the child.
In FY2003, the most recent year for which complete data are available, the
federal government provided states with some $6.9 billion in funding dedicated to
child welfare purposes. Most of this funding is authorized under Title IV-B and Title
IV-E of the Social Security Act. Apart from these dedicated federal child welfare
funds, however, states also use non-dedicated federal funds—including the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, Medicaid, and the
Social Services Block Grant—to meet child welfare needs. The most recent data
available (for state fiscal year 2002) suggests that states spent at least $4.8 billion in
non-dedicated funds for child welfare purposes. While non-dedicated funding
streams have increased resources to child welfare agencies, current legislative and
administrative proposals may jeopardize their continued use for child welfare.
The way that the federal government distributes dedicated child welfare money
to states has been criticized as inflexible, out of sync with federal child welfare policy
goals, and antiquated. Because most dedicated federal child welfare funding (about
65% in FY2003) may be used only for foster care, critics charge that states have
inadequate funds to prevent removal of children from their homes or to allow
children to be reunited with their parents. In addition, a state’s ability to claim most
of the dedicated child welfare funds is directly related to the number of foster and
adoptive children it assists who meet the income, family structure, and other
program rules of the now defunct Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program (as that program existed on July 16, 1996).
Attention to federal child welfare financing has focused almost exclusively on
dedicated child welfare funding streams and is driven in part by the belief that the
current structure hampers the ability of state child welfare agencies to achieve
positive outcomes for children. This assumption is not easy to prove. However, it
is possible to say that the AFDC link, which ties federal funding in foster care and
adoption assistance to increasingly antiquated income standards, over time, will
erode the share of program costs for which states may seek federal reimbursement.
Recent proposals to alter how dedicated federal child welfare funds are distributed
included some that would link eligibility for federally supported foster care and adoption
assistance to TANF income rules and others that would remove income restrictions
entirely. The latter proposals, which would greatly expand the number of children for
whom the federal government would be committed to providing support, have typically
sought to cap (or block grant) some or all of what is now open-ended federal funding for
foster care and adoption assistance and/or to reduce the share of costs paid for each
eligible child by the federal government. This report will not be updated.

Contents
Background ..................................................1
Federal Interest in Child Welfare..................................3
Federal Funding Dedicated to Child Welfare Purposes.................4
What Does this Money Support?..............................5
What Kind of Funds Are Available?...........................6
How Are Child Welfare Funds Provided to States?...............6
Trends in Child Welfare Spending................................9
Adoption Assistance.......................................9
Foster Care..............................................11
Services for Child Welfare..................................15
Non-Dedicated Funding........................................18
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)...............20
Social Services Block Grant (SSBG)..........................23
Medicaid ...............................................26
Proposals for Change..........................................28
The “Look Back”.........................................29
Capping or Block Granting Foster Care Funds..................33
Calls for New Funding Sources..............................36
Conclusion ..................................................38
Appendix A.....................................................40
Congressional Interest in Child Welfare, Selected Legislation..........40
Appendix B.....................................................42
Recent and Proposed Funding For Child Welfare—Funds Distributed
on a Discretionary or Competitive Basis.......................42
Appendix C—Federal Funds Dedicated to Child Welfare, Distribution
by State....................................................43
Appendix D—Actual Distribution of Foster Care Funds and
Hypothetical Distributions of Capped Foster Care Funds..............58
List of Figures
Figure 1. Share and Amount of Dedicated Federal Child Welfare Funds
by Program Type, FY2003.......................................5
Figure 2. Share of Federal Dedicated Child Welfare Funding
by Program Type, Selected Fiscal Years............................9
Figure 3. Average Share of Title IV-E Foster Care
Administrative Claims by Category, FY1999-FY2003................13

List of Tables
Table 1. Recent and Proposed Funding for Federal Child Welfare Programs—
Funds Distributed to all Eligible States.............................4
Table 2. Kinds of Federal Funding....................................6
Table 3. Federal Grants Dedicated to Child Welfare Purposes and Distributed
to All Eligible States...........................................7
Table 4. Title IV-E Adoption Assistance: Monthly Federal Cost per Eligible
Child, Selected Fiscal Years....................................10
Table 5. Title IV-E Foster Care: Monthly Federal Cost per Eligible Child,
Selected Fiscal Years..........................................12
Table 6. Non-Dedicated Federal Spending by State Child Welfare Agencies..19
Table 7. TANF Spending by Child Welfare Agencies, by State.............21
Table 8. SSBG-Appropriated Funds Spent by Child Welfare Agencies,
by State.....................................................24
Table 9. Funding Level for the Social Services Block Grant in
Nominal and Constant (FY2003) Dollars, Selected Years.............26
Table 10. Medicaid Spending by Child Welfare Agencies, by State.........27
Table C-1. Dedicated Federal Child Welfare Funding Available
for Services FY2001-FY2004, by State............................44
Table C-2. Dedicated Federal Child Welfare Funding for the Foster Care
Program, FY2001-FY2003, by State..............................48
Table C-3. Dedicated Federal Child Welfare Funding for the Adoption
Assistance Program, FY2001-FY2003, by State.....................52
Table C-4. Dedicated Federal Child Welfare Funding for Independent
Living, FY2001-FY2003, by State................................55
Table D-1. Actual Distribution of Federal Title IV-E Foster Care Funds,
FY1999-FY2003 .............................................59
Table D-2. Actual Distribution of Title IV-E Foster Care Funds,
FY2003 and Hypothetical Distribution of Funds (at the FY2003 Funding
Level), Based on a State’s Share of Certain Child Populations..........62
Table D-3. Actual and Hypothetical Distribution of Title IV-E Foster Care
Funds, Based on Historical Expenditures..........................65

Child Welfare Financing:
An Issue Overview
Current law links a state’s ability to claim federal foster care and adoption
assistance to the 1996 income and other program rules of the former cash welfare
program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). This means that as the
number of foster care and adoptive children who meet the static income rules of the
now-defunct AFDC program inevitably declines, the federal government’s share of
support for all children in need of protection will decline. Apart from this specific
concern about the federal financing structure, some advocates and policymakers
consider the way that federal funds for child welfare programs are distributed to
states to be counterproductive to the overall goals of federal child welfare policy.
Common charges are that the current structure does not grant states the flexibility
needed to meet the needs of children and their families, and that it encourages states
to rely too heavily on foster care. A connection between the specific federal
financing structure and the ability of states to achieve positive outcomes for the
children and families is hard to establish. Nonetheless the assumption of a link
between these two factors has helped drive recent attention to the federal child
welfare financing structure.
The purpose of this report is to describe the federal interest in child welfare (as
expressed by Congress); describe the current level and structure of federal dedicated
child welfare financing and examine trends in the appropriation and spending of this
money; and to review the extent to which states rely on non-dedicated federal funds
for child welfare purposes. Finally, the report discusses the future federal
commitment to child welfare financing, along with the concepts of flexibility and
accountability, as these relate both to current law and to recent proposals to alter
federal child welfare financing.¹
Background
Total spending by child welfare agencies has been increasing and all sources of
public funding—federal, state, and local—have contributed to this growth. According
to the most recent available survey by the Urban Institute, in state fiscal year (SFY)
2002 child welfare agencies expended more than $22.2 billion on child welfare
purposes of which just over half ($11.3 billion) was from federal sources. The
federal share of total child welfare spending has risen—from 43% in SFY1996 to

51% in SFY2002—and, at least for the most recent years, nearly all of this increased

¹ I am grateful to Gene Falk, Melinda Gish, Joe Richardson, Carmen Solomon-Fears, and
Karen Spar for their insightful comments on this report.

funding has been from federal funds not specifically dedicated to child welfare (i.e.,
TANF and Medicaid).²
Over roughly the same time period, the number of children reported as victims
of child abuse and neglect and the number of children in foster care have declined
while the number of children adopted out of the foster care system has risen
significantly. Whether these positive demographic trends are in some part related to
the increased child welfare spending has not been determined. At the same time, and
despite these positive trends, state child welfare agencies—as a whole—have been
found unable to meet many of the outcome measures established with regard to the
central goals of federal child welfare policy. These goals are related to safety and
permanency for children and primarily seek to—
^!prevent child abuse and neglect and to protect and care for children
who must be removed from their homes;
^!find permanent, stable homes for children who must be removed
(primarily through family reunification or adoption); and
^!enhance the well-being of children and the ability of families to meet
their children’s needs.
The failure of states to meet the federal outcome measures established may be
linked to any number of things—for instance, perhaps the federal measures do not
accurately capture what states achieve, or the degree to which states were unable to
comply with federal outcome measures has been over-stated, or perhaps states are
struggling to meet more complex needs than ever before.
Some child welfare advocates and administrators, however, believe that the
current federal financing system contributes to states’ difficulties or, at the least,
hampers their efforts to achieve positive outcomes for children. This assumption,
combined with concern about the “look back” to AFDC, may prompt the 109^th
Congress to consider proposals to alter the federal child welfare financing structure.
Recent proposals—including legislation introduced in the 108^th Congress,
recommendations from the nonpartisan Pew Commission on Children in Foster Care
released in May 2004, and a policy option again offered in the Administration’s
FY2006 budget proposal—have in some part focused on the perceived need for
greater flexibility in state use of federal funds and removing or replacing eligibility
rules that link open-ended entitlement funding for adoption and foster care costs to
the 1996 program rules of the now defunct AFDC program.

² See Cynthia Andrews Scarella, Roseana Bess, Erica Hecht Zielewski, Lindsay Warner, and
Rob Geen, The Cost of Protecting Vulnerable Children IV: How Child Welfare Funding
Fared during the Recession (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 2004), pp. 6-8, 13.
(Hereafter cited as Scarella et al., The Cost of Protecting Vulnerable Children IV.) States
report on spending for their own state fiscal year to the Urban Institute. Some states have
a fiscal year that mirrors that of the federal government (i.e., Oct. 1 through Sept. 30);
however, other states use different months for a fiscal year (e.g., July 1 through June 30).

Federal Interest in Child Welfare
The central focus of federal child welfare funding is to ensure safe and adequate
care is provided to all children. In many cases this requires providing support and
services to both children and their care-taking families. Under the U.S. Constitution,
the well-being of children and families has traditionally been understood as a primary
duty of state governments. Nonetheless, congressional interest in improving child
welfare is longstanding and, as Congress has authorized new funds for state child
welfare programs, it has also required states to enact policies and meet certain
standards related to those programs. Thus, while state and local governments are the
primary administrators of child welfare programs, and policies and practices can and
do vary significantly by political jurisdiction, certain federal standards must be met
in all locations to ensure continued federal child welfare funding.³
The largest federal funding streams specifically for child welfare purposes are
authorized to support children in foster care and children who are adopted out of
foster care (primarily). Some children need to be removed from their homes and
placed in foster care to ensure their safety and well-being (which is another way of
saying for their own “welfare”). This is true without regard to their parents’ income
or resources. However, when Congress initially authorized funds for federal foster
care (1961) it did so as part of what was then the nation’s cash welfare program,
AFDC. Thus its focus was not on ensuring the safety and well-being of all children
removed from their homes, but only those children who Congress had already
defined to be of federal concern (i.e., children in poor families who were eligible for
federal cash aid).
In 1980, when Congress established federal foster care as an independent
program (rather than a component of AFDC), and for the first time established
federal adoption assistance, it relied on this prior law to define the population of
foster and adoptive children for whom the federal government would assume specific
(and open-ended) financial responsibility. At the same time, the 1980 legislation
sought to give states an incentive to provide the protections and services to all
children in foster care and it linked the new foster care and adoption assistance
program to the much longer standing Child Welfare Services program. Since 1935
that program has been authorized to serve all children—without regard to income.
However, Congress has provided much more limited funding, and on a discretionary
basis, for this purpose.
During the 1990s Congress passed additional laws asserting that nearly every
protection required of a child for whom the federal government provides funding
must be extended to all children in foster care, regardless of whether the federal
government pays any of their foster care expenses. (Examples of these protections
are written case plans and regular reviews of those plans.) Thus while the federal
government has expanded the group of children in which there is a federal interest
—at least from the perspective of providing protections and monitoring the
achievement of outcomes—it has not similarly expanded the share of children in

³ See CRS Report RL31242, Child Welfare: Federal Program Requirements for States, by
Emilie Stoltzfus.

foster care for whom it claims specific financial responsibility. On the contrary,
under current law, as amended by P.L. 104-193 (1996), the share of children for
whom the federal government has asserted financial responsibility will decline.
(Appendix A provides a short legislative history of federal interest in child welfare.)
Federal Funding Dedicated to Child Welfare Purposes
States receive some federal funds that are explicitly dedicated to child welfare
purposes and which must be used for those purposes.⁴ These are available primarily
through Title IV-B and Title IV-E of the Social Security Act and grants authorized
by the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA). The combined FY2005
appropriations for these programs were approximately $7.6 billion. Table 1 (below)
lists each of these programs and their recent and proposed funding levels. See
Appendix C for information on the distribution of these funds by state.
Table 1. Recent and Proposed Funding for Federal Child
Welfare Programs—Funds Distributed to all Eligible States
^F^unding^by^fⁱ^sca^l^y^e^a^r
⁽ⁱⁿ^millioⁿ^s^o^f^d^o^lla^rs)
^Pres^ident’s
^FY²⁰⁰⁶
^Program^request²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰⁵
^Tⁱ^tl^{e I}^V^{-B of th}^{e S}^o^{cial Security Act}
^C^hⁱ^l^d^Wel^f^{are S}^e^rvⁱ^ces²⁹²²⁹⁰²⁸⁹²⁹⁰²⁹⁰
^P^r^o^m^o^tin^g^Saf^e^an^d^Stab^{le Fam}^ilies³⁷⁵⁴⁰⁴⁴⁰⁴⁴⁰⁴⁴¹⁰
^Tⁱ^tl^{e I}^V^-E^{of th}^{e S}^o^{cial Security Act}
^Fo^ster^Car^e^a^4,519^4,485^4,974^4,896^4,643
^A^d^o^p^tio^{n A}^ssistaⁿ^c^e^a^1,342^1,463^1,700^1,770^1,797
^(C^h^a^f^{ee) In}^depen^d^en^t^Lⁱ^vⁱⁿ^g¹⁴⁰¹⁴⁰¹⁴⁰¹⁴⁰¹⁴⁰
⁽^C^ha^fe^e⁾^E^d^uc^a^tⁱ^o^{n a}ⁿ^d^T^r^aⁱⁿⁱ^{ng V}^o^uc^he^r^s⁰⁴²⁴⁵⁴⁷⁶⁰
^{Child Abus}^{e Prevention and T}^reatm^{ent Act}^b
^Basⁱ^{c S}^t^at^{e G}^r^an^t^s²²²²²²²⁷²⁷
^Co^m^m^uⁿ^ity^-^B^ased^Gr^an^{ts f}^o^r^th^e³³³³³³⁴³⁴³
^P^r^ev^en^tion^of^C^h^{ild A}^b^u^s^{e an}^{d Neg}^l^ect
^Source:^T^a^{ble prepared by}^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^).
^{a. T}^h^{e Fos}^t^{er C}^a^{re an}^{d A}^doption^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^an^ce^prog^ram^s^are^f^uⁿ^d^ed^on^a^m^aⁿ^d^atory^,^open^-^en^{ded bas}ⁱ^s^.
^F^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^am^ouⁿ^t^s^s^h^owⁿ^f^o^{r F}^Y^{2002 an}^{d F}^Y²⁰⁰³^{are es}^tⁱ^m^at^{ed t}^o^t^a^l^f^e^deral^ex^pen^dⁱ^t^u^res^bas^e^d

⁴ The dedicated funding sources described in this report are appropriated and made available
to all eligible states by formula distribution or by other program rules. The federal
government also provides approximately $200 million in dedicated child welfare-related
funds, which are generally available on a competitive grant basis; states may or may not be
eligible grant applicants. These programs and their recent and proposed funding levels are
displayed in Appendix B.

^on^s^t^at^{e cl}^ai^m^s^m^a^{de f}^o^{r t}^h^os^{e y}^ears^.^A^m^ouⁿ^t^s^s^h^owⁿ^f^o^{r F}^Y^{2004 an}^{d F}^Y^{2005 are}^t^h^e
^a^p^p^r^o^p^rⁱ^a^t^e^d^a^m^o^uⁿ^t^s^w^hⁱ^c^h^,^lⁱ^k^e^t^h^e^P^r^e^sⁱ^d^eⁿ^t^’^s^r^e^q^u^e^s^t^f^o^r^F^Y^{2006, r}^e^p^r^e^s^eⁿ^t^aⁿ^e^s^tⁱ^m^a^t^e^d
^f^e^d^e^r^a^{l sp}^en^dⁱⁿ^g^f^o^r^th^at^y^ear^.^Read^er^s^sh^o^u^ldⁿ^o^te^th^at^th^{ese ap}^p^r^o^p^r^iatioⁿ^lev^e^{ls ar}^{e ty}^pⁱ^cally
^hi^ghe^r^t^h^aⁿ^t^h^e^fi^na^l^fundⁱ^{ng a}^m^o^unt^.
^b^.^P^r^o^g^r^a^m^au^th^o^r^izatioⁿ^f^o^r^th^{e Ch}^ild^r^eⁿ^’^{s J}^u^stice^A^c^t^g^r^an^ts^{are als}^oⁱⁿ^clu^d^{ed u}ⁿ^d^{er C}^A^P^T^A^.^T^h^es^e
^g^r^an^{ts ar}^{e d}ⁱ^strⁱ^b^u^ted^to^{all elig}^ib^{le states b}^y^f^o^r^m^u^l^{a. Ho}^w^e^v^e^r^,^th^e^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^f^o^r^th^{ese g}^r^an^ts
^{($20 m}^illionⁱⁿ^{FY2001 an}^{d each}^s^u^bs^equ^eⁿ^t^fⁱ^s^{cal y}^{ear) is}ⁿ^o^t^{appropriated bu}^{t m}^a^{de av}^ailable
^o^u^t^o^f^th^{e Cr}^im^{e Victim}^{s Fu}ⁿ^d^{as sp}^ecifⁱ^edⁱⁿ^th^{e Victim}^{s o}^f^Cr^im^{e A}^c^{t (}^P^.L^{. 9}⁸^-⁴⁷³^,^a^s
^am^en^d^e^d⁾^.^T^h^e^Cr^im^e^Victim^s^Fuⁿ^d^coⁿ^s^{ists o}^f^cr^imⁱⁿ^{al f}ⁱⁿ^e^{s, p}^eⁿ^a^{lties an}^d^o^t^h^e^r^assessm^en^ts
^{collected by}^th^{e f}^e^{deral treas}^u^r^y^an^{d is}^admⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^{ered by}^th^{e Departm}^eⁿ^t^of^J^u^s^tice.
What Does this Money Support? Dedicated child welfare funding is
appropriated for four basic purposes:
^!adoption assistance (administration, training and subsidies for
adopted children);
^!foster care (administration, case planning and placement, training,
and maintenance (i.e., room and board));
^!services (child protective, family support, preservation, or
reunification services and adoption promotion and support); and
^!independent living (assistance for those leaving foster care without
a new permanent home).
In FY2003 (the most recent year for which foster care and adoption assistance
expenditure data are available) combined federal funds appropriated for services
totaled 11% of the dedicated child welfare funding ($750 million) while 65% of the
funds ($4.5 billion) was spent on the federal foster care program (including
maintenance payments, administration, training and data collection). The remaining
federal expenditures were for adoption assistance (21%, $1.5 billion for subsidies,
administration and training), and independent living (3%, $182 million). (See Figure

1 below.)

Figure 1. Share and Amount of Dedicated Federal Child
Welfare Funds by Program Type, FY2003
^Iⁿ^de^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^t^Li^vⁱⁿ^g^Se^r^vⁱ^c^e^s
^{$182 m}^illi^oⁿ^{$750 m}ⁱ^l^lⁱ^oⁿ
^3%¹¹^%
^A^dop^tⁱ^oⁿ
^$¹^.⁵^b^illi^oⁿ
^Fo^s^t^e^r^C^a^r^e²¹^%
^$⁴^.⁵^b^illi^oⁿ
⁶⁵^%
^Source:^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^).

What Kind of Funds Are Available? The kind of appropriation included
in federal law can have a significant effect on the availability of federal child welfare
funds for particular purposes. Federal law provides for both mandatory and
discretionary appropriation of child welfare funding. Mandatory appropriations,
sometimes called entitlement funding, may be capped or open-ended. (See Table 2.)
Table 2. Kinds of Federal Funding
^Dis^cretionary^A^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^au^th^o^r^izatioⁿ^lev^e^{l is in}^clu^d^edⁱⁿ^th^{e leg}ⁱ^slatioⁿ^th^{at au}^th^o^r^izes
^t^h^{e prog}^ram^.^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^s^h^a^s^t^h^{e di}^sc^r^e^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^appropri^a^t^e^al^l^,^s^o^m^e^{, or}
ⁿ^oⁿ^e^o^f^th^{e f}^uⁿ^d^{s th}^{at ar}^e^au^th^o^r^ized^f^o^r^th^{e p}^r^o^g^r^a^m^.^T^h^u^s^th^{e u}^ltim^ate
^{funding level is}^deter^m^{ined vi}^{a the annual appr}^opr^iations^pr^oces^s^.
^M^a^nda^t^o^ry^—^T^h^e^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^lev^e^l^is^{a p}^a^r^t^o^f^th^{e leg}ⁱ^slatioⁿ^th^{at au}^th^o^r^izes^th^e^p^r^o^g^r^a^m^.
^ca^pped^C^ongr^es^s^mus^t^{annually appr}^opr^iate^funds^{at the s}^p^{ecified level}^.
^M^a^nda^t^o^ry^—^T^h^{e f}^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^lev^e^l^m^a^tch^e^s^th^e^am^o^uⁿ^t^o^f^elig^ib^{le claim}^s^m^a^d^e^uⁿ^d^er^th^e
^o^p^en-^e^nded^legⁱ^slatioⁿ^th^{at au}^th^o^r^{izes th}^{e p}^r^o^g^r^a^m^.^C^ongr^es^s^m^u^s^t^annual^l^y^ens^u^r^e
^t^h^a^t^eⁿ^o^{ugh fund}^{s a}^r^e^a^v^aⁱ^l^a^b^l^e^so^{that ever}^{y eligible expens}^e^for^w^h^ich
^{a s}^t^{ate s}^eeks^r^e^imbur^s^e^{ment, can be}^{paid out of the feder}^a^{l tr}^eas^u^r^y^.
^Source:^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^).
How Are Child Welfare Funds Provided to States? The factors that
determine the distribution of federal child welfare funds to each state vary by
program. In general, the number of federally eligible foster care and adoptive
children is key for the distribution of most dedicated child welfare funds. Separate
factors include state per capita income, the relative size of states’ child populations
or total foster care populations. Table 3 includes a description of each of the federal
child welfare programs, along with a description of the program’s purpose,
distribution factors, and kind of appropriation.

CRS-7
Table 3. Federal Grants Dedicated to Child Welfare Purposes and Distributed to All Eligible States
^Kⁱ^{nd, lev}^e^{l a}^{nd (}^l^eng^t^h)^o^f^f^unding
^Program^Pu^rp^os^es^a^u^t^h^o^r^iza^t^ioⁿ^D^ist^r^ibut^io^{n f}^a^ct^o^r^{s a}^{nd f}^e^dera^{l m}^a^t^c^h
^Tⁱ^tl^{e I}^V^{-B of th}^{e S}^o^{cial Security Act}
^a^r^e^Im^prov^{e pu}^{blic ch}^{ild w}^e^lf^are^s^e^rv^ices^{to prev}^en^t^Dⁱ^s^c^r^e^tⁱ^onar^y^-^$325^m^illion^Minⁱ^m^u^m^a^llotm^en^{t of}^{$70,000 to each}^s^t^{ate. S}^t^ate’^s^relativ^e
^r^e^m^o^v^a^{l o}^f^ch^ild^r^eⁿ^;^fⁱⁿ^d^f^o^ster^o^r^ad^o^p^tiv^{e h}^o^m^e^s⁽^p^e^r^m^a^ne^nt^{- i}ⁿ^d^e^fiⁿⁱ^t^e⁾^s^h^{are of}^popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^uⁿ^d^{er ag}^{e 21 an}^{d s}^t^at^e’^s^{per capi}^t^a^av^erag^e
^f^o^r^ch^ild^r^eⁿ^w^h^o^canⁿ^o^{t r}^e^m^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^th^eir^h^o^m^e^s;ⁱⁿ^com^e^{. (Federal m}^a^tch^:^75%)
^an^{d of}^f^e^{r appropri}^a^t^e^reuⁿⁱ^fⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^e^rvⁱ^ces^.
^otiⁿ^{g S}^a^fe^P^r^ov^{ide f}^uⁿ^d^s^f^o^{r f}^o^u^r^categ^ories^of^s^e^rv^ic^e^s^:^M^andat^or^y—capped^-^{$305 m}^illion^,^plu^s^Set-^asid^{es o}^r^allo^tm^en^{ts ar}^{e m}^a^d^e^f^o^r^tr^ib^{es, ter}^rⁱ^t^o^rⁱ^{es, co}^u^r^t
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}^a^b^le^m^ilies^f^a^mⁱ^l^y^pres^erv^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^f^a^mⁱ^l^y^s^u^pport^,^tⁱ^m^e-^lⁱ^mⁱ^t^e^d^reuⁿⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^an^{d adopt}ⁱ^oⁿ^prom^otⁱ^oⁿ^an^d^Dⁱ^s^c^r^e^tⁱ^onar^y^-^$200^m^illion⁽^t^hr^o^{ugh FY}²⁰⁰⁶⁾^im^prov^em^en^{t, an}^{d res}^earch^an^{d ev}^alu^a^tion^.^State’^s^rel^a^tⁱ^v^e^s^h^{are of}^ch^ildren^receivⁱⁿ^g^f^ood^s^t^am^ps^.^(F^ederal^m^a^tch^:^75%⁾
^g/w^s^u^pport^.
^s^.or^Tⁱ^tl^{e I}^V^-E^{of th}^{e S}^o^{cial Security Act}
^le^ak
^t^{er Care}^Reⁱ^m^b^u^r^s^e^st^a^t^e^s^fo^r^c^o^st^of^room^an^d^boa^r^d^M^andat^or^{y - open-ended}^-^as^m^u^ch^A^{ll elig}^ib^{le claim}^s^su^b^m^itted^b^y^{a state ar}^{e r}^e^im^b^u^r^s^ed^.
^://wiki^pay^m^en^t^s^an^{d cas}^{e p}^l^aⁿⁿⁱⁿ^g^on^beh^a^l^f^of^elⁱ^gⁱ^b^l^e^m^oⁿ^e^y^{as is r}^e^q^u^ir^ed^to^p^a^y^{all elig}^ib^le^(Federal^m^a^tch^ran^g^e^s^f^r^om^50%-^83%^(th^e^low^e^{r th}^{e s}^t^ate’^s^per
^h^ttp^f^o^s^t^e^r^c^hⁱ^l^d^r^eⁿ^aⁿ^d^f^o^r^r^e^l^a^ted^elig^ib^le^claim^s^(perm^aⁿ^eⁿ^t^-ⁱⁿ^defⁱⁿ^ite)^cap^{ita in}^co^m^e^th^{e h}ⁱ^g^h^e^r^th^{e f}^e^d^e^r^a^{l m}^a^tch⁾^f^o^r^m^aⁱⁿ^ten^aⁿ^c^e
^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tioⁿ^,^tr^ainⁱⁿ^g^an^d^d^a^{ta co}^llectioⁿ^co^sts.^pay^m^en^t^s^an^d^adoptⁱ^oⁿ^s^u^bsⁱ^dⁱ^e^s^;^50%^f^o^{r adm}ⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ratⁱ^oⁿ^an^d
^d^a^{ta co}^llectioⁿ^an^d⁷⁵^%^f^o^r^tr^ainⁱⁿ^g^r^e^lated^to^th^{ese p}^r^o^g^r^a^m^s^.)^op^ti^on^R^e^im^bu^rs^{e s}^t^ates^f^o^{r cos}^t^of^adoption^s^u^bs^idies^f^o^r
^aⁿ^c^e^elig^ib^{le sp}^{ecial n}^eed^{s ch}^ild^r^eⁿ^aⁿ^d^f^o^r^r^e^lated
^t^r^aⁱⁿⁱ^{ng a}ⁿ^d^a^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^r^a^tⁱ^o^{n c}^o^st^s.
^f^ee^P^r^ov^{ide f}^uⁿ^d^s^f^o^{r s}^e^rv^ices^{to f}^o^s^t^{er ch}^ildren^uⁿ^d^er^M^andat^or^y—capped^-^$140^m^illion^State’^s^relativ^e^s^h^are^of^th^{e n}^a^tion^a^{l f}^o^s^t^{er care cas}^{eload (m}^os^t
^t^{er Care}^ag^{e 18 an}^{d f}^o^rm^{er f}^o^s^t^{er y}^o^u^t^h^w^h^{o leav}^{e f}^o^s^t^er⁽^p^e^r^m^a^ne^nt^{- i}ⁿ^d^e^fiⁿⁱ^t^e⁾^cur^r^eⁿ^tⁿ^u^m^bers^{), ex}^{cept th}^{at n}^o^s^t^{ate m}^a^y^receiv^e^les^s^th^an
^{care w}ⁱ^t^h^ou^t^{a perm}^an^en^t^h^o^m^e⁽^a^ge^d^18-^{21) t}^o^{$500,000 or th}^{e am}^ouⁿ^t^of^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^{it receiv}^e^{d f}^o^{r th}^is^prog^ram
^h^e^lp^th^em^tr^an^sitioⁿ^toⁱⁿ^d^e^p^eⁿ^d^en^{t liv}ⁱⁿ^g^.ⁱⁿ^F^Y^{1998. (F}^ederal^m^a^t^c^h^:^80%⁾
^t^io^{n a}ⁿ^d^V^o^u^c^h^e^rs^v^a^l^u^{ed at}^up^t^o^{$5,000 f}^o^{r col}^l^e^g^e^Dⁱ^s^c^r^e^tⁱ^onar^y^-^{$60 m}^illion^State’^s^relativ^{e s}^h^{are of}^th^{e n}^a^tion^a^l^f^o^s^t^er^care^cas^{eload (m}^os^t
ⁱ^ning^e^d^uc^a^tⁱ^o^{n o}^r^vo^c^a^tⁱ^o^na^l^t^r^aⁱⁿⁱ^{ng fo}^r^c^u^r^r^eⁿ^t^o^r⁽^p^e^r^m^a^ne^nt^{- i}ⁿ^d^e^fiⁿⁱ^t^e⁾^cu^rren^{t n}^u^m^bers^{). (Federal m}^a^tch^:^80%)

^uchers^f^o^rm^er^f^o^s^t^er^y^o^u^t^h^w^h^{o leav}^{e f}^o^s^t^{er care w}^ith^ou^t
^{a perm}^an^en^{t h}^o^m^e⁽^u^p^{to ag}^{e 21, or ag}^{e 23 if}
^en^{rolled in}^s^c^h^{ool i}ⁿ^trainⁱⁿ^g^an^{d receiv}ⁱⁿ^g
^v^o^u^c^h^e^{r w}^h^en^reachⁱⁿ^g^{21 birth}^d^ay^{) an}^{d f}^o^r
^chⁱ^l^d^ren^adopt^{ed ou}^t^of^f^o^s^t^{er care (ag}^e^{16 or}
^ol^der).

CRS-8
^Kⁱ^{nd, lev}^e^{l a}^{nd (}^l^eng^t^h)^o^f^f^unding
^Program^Pu^rp^os^es^a^u^t^h^o^r^iza^t^ioⁿ^D^ist^r^ibut^io^{n f}^a^ct^o^r^{s a}^{nd f}^e^dera^{l m}^a^t^c^h
^{Child Abus}^{e Prevention and T}^reatm^{ent Act}
^r^an^ts^Im^prov^{e ch}^{ild protectiv}^{e s}^e^rv^ices^.^Dⁱ^s^c^r^e^tⁱ^onar^y^-^{part of}^{$120 m}^illion^a^Minⁱ^m^u^m^allotm^en^{t of}^{$50,000 to each}^elig^{ible s}^t^ate^;^S^t^a^t^e’^s
⁽^t^hr^o^{ugh FY}²⁰⁰⁸⁾^rel^a^tⁱ^ve^{share of}^popu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^uⁿ^d^{er ag}^{e 18. (F}^ederal^m^a^t^c^h^:
^100%⁾
^m^m^unit^y^-^P^r^o^v^id^{e f}^uⁿ^d^{s to}^a^l^l^s^t^{ates f}^o^r^dⁱ^strⁱ^b^u^tioⁿ^to^Dⁱ^s^c^r^e^tⁱ^onar^y^-^{$80 m}^illion^b^O^u^t^of^fⁱ^rs^t^70%^of^gr^aⁿ^t^:^S^t^at^e’^s^rel^a^tⁱ^v^{e s}^h^{are of}^t^h^e
^{sed Child}^c^o^m^m^uni^t^y^gr^o^u^p^s^e^nga^ge^dⁱⁿ^a^r^a^ng^e^o^f^c^hⁱ^l^d⁽^t^hr^o^{ugh FY}²⁰⁰⁸⁾^popu^lation^uⁿ^d^{er ag}^e^{18, ex}^{cept th}^{at n}^o^s^t^{ate m}^a^y^receiv^e^les^s
^ab^u^s^{e an}^dⁿ^e^g^l^{ect p}^r^ev^en^tioⁿ^activ^ities.^t^h^an^{$175,000. R}^e^m^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^30%^aw^{arded bas}^e^d^on^am^ouⁿ^t^of
^no^n-fe^d^e^r^a^l^fund^{s l}^e^ve^r^a^ge^d^fo^r^c^o^m^m^uni^t^y^-b^a^s^e^d^c^hⁱ^l^d^a^b^use
^prev^en^tⁱ^oⁿ^pu^rpos^esⁱⁿ^prevⁱ^o^u^s^y^ear.^(F^ederal^m^a^t^c^h^:^100%⁾
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}
^g/w
^s^.or
^le^ak^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^).
^://wikiⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^f^o^{r C}^A^P^T^A^{State Gran}^ts^an^{d f}^o^{r Dis}^c^retion^a^ry^Gran^ts^uⁿ^d^{er C}^A^P^T^A^(w^hⁱ^ch^{are n}^o^{t in}^clu^d^{ed in}^th^is^{table) are part of}^t^h^e^s^a^m^e^au^t^h^ori^zatⁱ^oⁿ^l^e^v^e^l^.^T^hⁱ^s^w^a^s^s^e^t^at^$120^m^illion^f^o^{r FY2004 an}^{d s}^u^ch^s^u^m^s^asⁿ^eces^s^a^ry^f^o^{r FY2005-}^{FY2008. T}^h^{e total FY2005 appropriation}^uⁿ^d^{er th}^is^au^th^orization^w^a^s^$⁵⁹^m^illioⁿ^.
^h^ttpⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^au^th^orization^w^a^s^s^e^{t at $80 m}^illion^f^o^{r FY2004 an}^{d s}^u^ch^s^u^m^s^asⁿ^eces^s^a^ry^f^o^{r FY2005-}^FY2008.

Trends in Child Welfare Spending
Total dedicated federal child welfare spending grew by 516% between FY1983
and FY2003 (the most recent year for which Title IV-E Foster Care and Adoption
Assistance expenditure data are available). Viewed in constant (FY2003) dollars
these funds increased from $1.1 billion in FY1983—soon after the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 ( P.L. 96-272) reorganized or established
most of the major components of the current system—to $6.9 billion in FY2003.⁵
The share of all dedicated child welfare funds expended through the Title IV-E
Foster Care program has been in decline for close to a decade while the share of those
funds expended for the Title IV-E Adoption Assistance program is up sharply.
Although dedicated child welfare funding for services has increased, the share of
these funds for services declined since FY1983 and has been relatively stagnant since
FY1990.
Figure 2. Share of Federal Dedicated Child Welfare Funding by
Program Type, Selected Fiscal Years

^Fo^ste^r^ca^r^e^A^d^op^tⁱ^on^Se^rvⁱ^c^e^s^Iⁿ^de^pe^ndeⁿ^t^Lⁱ^vⁱⁿ^g
^78%^76%
^73%^69%
⁶⁵^%⁶⁵^%
³²^%
^19%²¹^%
¹³^%^12%^11%^14%^12%^10%
^6%^10%^3%
^2%^2%^1%^2%^2%
¹⁹⁸³¹⁹⁹⁰¹⁹⁹⁵¹⁹⁹⁸²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰³
^Source:^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^).
Adoption Assistance. Among the four categories of federal dedicated child
welfare funding, the Adoption Assistance program has seen the most dramatic
growth. Spending rose some 6,166% from $23.4 million in FY1983 to some $1.463
billion in FY2003. Over that same period the share of all federal child welfare funds
dedicated to Adoption Assistance increased from 2% to 21%. (See Figure 2 above.)
⁵ Throughout this discussion of spending trends for dedicated federal child welfare dollars,
amounts are presented in constant FY2003 dollars and percentage changes in spending are
presented based on a comparison of those same constant dollar amounts. FY2003 dollars
were calculated from an average annual (Oct. through Sept.) Consumer Price Index for All
Urban Consumers (CPI-U).

The substantial growth in spending for adoption is consistent with strong federal
support for adoption as a permanent placement option for children who cannot return
to their biological parents. In addition, growth in program spending between FY1983
and FY2003 should be expected both because the program was in its infancy in
FY1983 and because the 1980 law that established Adoption Assistance (P.L. 96-
272) provided it with an open-ended and mandatory funding authorization. This kind
of funding authority allowed the program cost to grow along with the number of
adopted children eligible for subsidies.
In FY1983, just over 5,300 children received a federally subsidized adoption
assistance payment, a fraction of the more than 314,700 who received such a subsidy
in FY2003. Over this same time period, the average monthly cost to the federal
government for each program-eligible child has fluctuated while remaining relatively
stable—rising about 6%—from $367 in FY1983 to $383 in FY2003. (See Table 4.)
Thus, the substantial growth in the caseload largely explains the substantial growth
in federal program cost.
Table 4. Title IV-E Adoption Assistance: Monthly Federal Cost
per Eligible Child, Selected Fiscal Years
(in constant FY2003 dollars)
¹⁹⁸³¹⁹⁹⁰¹⁹⁹⁵¹⁹⁹⁸²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰³
^TO^TA^{L pr}^o^g^r^a^m^$367^$344^$390^$388^$403^$383
^Subsidy^$329^$266^$291^$286^$303^$308
^Admⁱ^nistra^tioⁿ^N^A^$71^$87^$86^$86^$70
^Source:^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^).
^No^te:^NA^{= Data n}^o^{t av}^ailab^l^{e. T}^h^{e to}^{tal p}^r^o^g^r^a^m^co^{sts in}^clu^d^{e ad}^o^p^tioⁿ^su^b^s^id^y^,^r^e^lat^e^d
^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tioⁿ^,^tr^ainⁱⁿ^g^,^an^d^d^e^m^oⁿ^s^tr^atioⁿ^co^sts.^T^h^e^r^e^f^o^r^{e th}^{e su}^m^o^f^th^{e p}^e^r^ch^ild^su^b^s^id^y^an^d
^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tioⁿ^co^{sts d}^oⁿ^o^{t eq}^u^a^{l th}^{e to}^{tal p}^e^r^ch^ild^co^{st f}^o^r^th^{e p}^r^o^g^r^a^m^.
Adoption Assistance Costs Projected to Increase. With the 1997
Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA, P.L. 105-89) Congress sought to encourage
adoption by enacting new/shorter time frames for required case (permanency)
planning for children in foster care and by providing incentive funds to states that
increased the number of children adopted out of foster care. The number of children
adopted out of foster care was an estimated 37,000 in FY1998, climbed to 51,000 by
FY2000 and, despite a decline in the foster care caseload size, has remained
relatively stable in number since that year.⁶ In its March 2005 baseline, the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects the number of children receiving
Adoption Assistance will continue to grow, reaching an estimated 482,000 children

⁶ The estimated number of adoptions out of foster care was 50,000 in FY2001, 53,000 in
FY2002 and, although this number is still expected to rise with new data reports, is now
estimated at 49,000 for FY2003. The total number of children in foster care peaked in
FY1999 at 567,000 and has declined each year since then, reaching 523,000 in FY2003
(most recent year for which data are available).

by FY2010 and an estimated 586,000 by FY2015. This growth is projected despite
the current link between the program rules of the now defunct AFDC program (as it
existed on July 16, 1996) and eligibility for federal adoption assistance.⁷
The majority of children adopted from public foster care are eligible for
adoption assistance (roughly estimated as 74%), the median age at which these
children are adopted remains at just over six years of age, and children remain
eligible until their 18^th birthday. Thus children who receive Adoption Assistance
now—and who were adopted immediately following ASFA—will likely continue to
receive these federal subsidies until at least FY2010. Meanwhile, as states continue
to complete high numbers of foster child adoptions, they are joined each year by
increasing numbers of newly adopted children.
The policy goals and dynamics of Adoption Assistance are very different from
those of Foster Care. Foster care is assumed to be a temporary setting. Good
practice dictates that foster children be reunited with families or, if necessary, placed
for adoption within the shortest time frame possible. Thus the policy goal is
generally to reduce the length of time a child would be counted as a part of the foster
care caseload. By contrast, if adoption is the best permanency option for a child, the
goal is to have the adoption completed as early as possible in the child’s life and thus
to increase the length of time a child receives Adoption Assistance. Overall, and
consistent with the strong support of adoption by Congress, spending of dedicated
child welfare funds for adoption assistance has been rising steadily and can be
expected to continue to rise.
Foster Care. Federal spending for foster care continues to represent the
largest share of total dedicated child welfare funding. At the same time, its share of
that funding pie has been in decline for about a decade (in large part due to the
growth in the share of spending for adoption assistance). In FY1983, just under one-
third (65%) of all dedicated federal child welfare funding was expended under the
foster care program. That share increased at least through FY1990 and in that year
(through FY1994) stood at approximately 78% of total dedicated child welfare
spending. Beginning with FY1995, the share of federal dedicated child welfare funds
expended for the foster care program began to decline. By FY2003 it had essentially
returned to its FY1983 share of the pie. (See Figure 2 above.) Across those same
two decades federal dollars expended for foster care have increased by 513%
(virtually the same as the rate of increase for total dedicated child welfare spending)
—from $732 million in FY1983 to $4.5 billion in FY2003.
Because the Foster Care program, like Adoption Assistance, receives federal
funding on an open-ended and mandatory funding basis, some of the change in
program spending might be attributed to changes in caseload size. However, an
analysis of state claims for foster care shows that changes in the size of the federally
eligible caseload cannot alone explain the change in federal program costs. The size

⁷ AFDC eligibility rules (including income) apply to the child and the family from which the
child was removed. Federal law prohibits application of an income test to an adoptive
family to determine a child’s eligibility for Adoption Assistance. Children who are eligible
for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits do not need to meet the AFDC rules.

of the Title IV-E Foster Care caseload (a subset of all children in foster care)
generally rose from close to 93,400 children in FY1983 through FY1998, when it
crested at close to 305,200 children; it has declined each year since then and stood
at 242,200 in FY2003. Over the same time period, the average monthly cost to the
federal government for each program-eligible child rose from $653 to $1,543. The
growth in total program cost per eligible child—while coming to a near standstill in
recent years—nonetheless continued through FY2003.⁸
Table 5. Title IV-E Foster Care: Monthly Federal Cost
per Eligible Child, Selected Fiscal Years
(in constant FY2003 dollars)
¹⁹⁸³¹⁹⁹⁰¹⁹⁹⁵¹⁹⁹⁸²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰³
^TO^TA^{L pr}^o^g^r^a^m^$653^$1,080^$1,186^$1,149^$1,438^$1,543
^M^a^int^e^na^nce^$456^$609^$618^$598^$629^$582
^(room^an^d^b^oard⁾
^Admⁱ^nistra^tioⁿ^N^A^$442^$469^$457^$644^$773
^Source:^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^).
^No^te:^NA^{= Data n}^o^{t av}^{ailable. T}^o^{tal prog}^ram^cos^t^sⁱⁿ^clu^d^{e f}^o^s^t^{er care m}^aⁱⁿ^tena^{nce (room}^an^d
^b^o^a^r^d⁾^,^as^w^e^ll^as^r^e^lated^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tioⁿ^,^tr^ainⁱⁿ^g^,^d^e^m^oⁿ^s^tr^atioⁿ^an^d^{State A}^u^to^m^a^ted^Ch^ild^W^e^lf^ar^e
^In^f^o^rm^ation^Sy^s^t^em^(SA^C^W^I^{S) cos}^t^s^.^T^h^eref^{ore th}^{e s}^u^m^of^per^ch^{ild m}^aⁱⁿ^ten^aⁿ^{ce an}^{d adm}ⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ration
^co^{sts d}^oⁿ^o^{t eq}^u^a^{l th}^{e to}^{tal p}^e^r^ch^ild^p^r^o^g^r^a^m^co^sts.
States seek federal reimbursement for eligible foster care expenses by
submitting claims in several program categories, including foster care room and
board (maintenance payments), program administration (including case planning),
training, and data system development and operation (i.e., State Automated Child
Welfare Information System, SACWIS). When viewed as federal cost per eligible
child, claims for foster care maintenance payments have been relatively stable for
more than 15 years, while claims for administration have risen significantly over the
same time period.⁹ In FY1987 states made foster care administrative claims worth
$506 million compared to administrative claims worth $2.2 billion in FY2003. The
average monthly cost per eligible child for these administrative claims was $373 in

⁸ The eligible caseload referred to here is the average monthly number of children for whom
a state may claim reimbursement for foster care maintenance payment claims, as reported
by HHS in its annual Title IV-E expenditure data. The total foster care caseload (including
children who are eligible for federal reimbursement and those who are not and expressed
as the number of children in foster care on the last day of the given fiscal year) was an
estimated 269,000 in FY1983. The total caseload rose through FY1999, when it was an
estimated 567,000 and has since declined in each year to 523,000 in FY2003.
⁹ This analysis begins with FY1987 because data on administrative claims (separate from
training claims) are not available before that year. There were large changes in claims for
SACWIS (i.e., data system development and operation) and for training within this time
frame. However, because these claims represent a relatively small portion of the total
program cost (3% and 5%, respectively, of FY2003 foster care claims) they are not believed
to be driving federal costs.

FY1987 compared to $773 in FY2003. By contrast, the federal share of claims for
foster care maintenance payments rose from $717 million in FY1987 to $1.7 billion
in FY2003. The average monthly cost per eligible child for these claims was $528
in FY1987 and $582 in FY2003.¹⁰ (See Table 5 for information in additional years.)
What’s Going on with Administrative Claims? The largest share of state
foster care administrative claims—an average of between 68%-75% of those claims
for FY1999 to FY2003—are linked to “child placement services.” These include
claims submitted for case planning and management as well as claims for pre-
placement casework. Accordingly, the bulk of foster care administrative claims, at
least in recent years, reimburses states for caseworker time spent making referrals for
services and developing case plans designed to prevent removal of a child from
his/her home; developing, revising or reviewing a foster child’s permanency plan;
preparing for and participating in related judicial proceedings; making a child’s
placement; and for the supervision or management of those cases. Between 3% and
4% of administrative claims for FY1999 to FY2003 were related to determining
eligibility for the program and the remainder were claimed under the category of
“other,” which might include setting foster care payment rates and recruiting and
licensing foster care providers.¹¹ (See Figure 3 below.)
Figure 3. Average Share of Title IV-E Foster Care
Administrative Claims by Category, FY1999-FY2003

^Ot^he^r
^{$548 m}^illioⁿ
^C^a^s^e^pl^aⁿⁿⁱ^ng²⁸^%^De^te^r^mⁱⁿ^e
^{$985 m}ⁱ^l^lⁱ^oⁿ^E^lig^ib^ilit^y
^50%^{$80 m}ⁱ^llioⁿ
^4%
^P^r^e-^p^l^ac^e^m^en^t
^{$358 m}ⁱ^llioⁿ
^18%
¹⁰ Changes in the relative share of administrative and maintenance payment claims are
affected by new reporting requirements that, effective with FY2000, required states to
submit claims for their demonstration projects in a separate category. For purposes of this
discussion, demonstration costs are not included in either administrative or maintenance
payment totals for FY2000-FY2003.
¹¹ Based on analysis of administrative claim data provided by HHS for FY1999-FY2003
(FY2003 data are estimates). Comparable administrative claiming data for years prior to
FY1999 were not available. Some claims related to operation of the State Automated Child
Welfare Information System (SACWIS) are reported by states as administrative claims.
However, HHS generally excludes these costs when it reports the total amount of
administrative claims—as is also done in this analysis and throughout this report.

^Source:^Coⁿ^g^r^essioⁿ^{al Resear}^ch^Ser^v^{ice (}^CRS)^b^a^sed^oⁿ^T^{itle I}^V^-^E^Fo^ster^Car^e^ex^p^eⁿ^d^itu^r^e^d^a^{ta b}^y
^admⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ratⁱ^v^{e cl}^ai^m^cat^eg^ory^(F^Y^1999-^F^Y²⁰⁰³⁾^provⁱ^d^ed^by^U^.^S^.^D^e^part^m^eⁿ^t^of^H^eal^t^h^an^{d H}^u^m^aⁿ
^S^e^rv^ices^;^(F^Y2003^{data are es}^tim^ates^{). Becau}^s^eⁿ^o^{t all s}^t^ates^report^admⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rativ^e^s^p^en^din^gⁱⁿ^each
^categ^ory^and^e^s^p^ecially^becau^s^e^s^o^m^e^s^t^ates^report^{all or m}^o^s^t^s^p^en^din^g^as^“^o^th^{er,” th}^is^fⁱ^g^u^r^{e is}
^ex^{pected to h}^a^v^e^ov^ers^t^{ated th}^{e “}^o^th^{er” categ}^ories^.^If^on^ly^{data f}^r^om^th^{e 40 s}^t^ates⁽ⁱ^nc^l^u^dⁱ^ng^t^h^e
^Dis^t^rict^of^C^o^lu^m^b^ia)^th^at^{reported s}^p^en^din^gⁱⁿ^each^of^th^{e categ}^ory^f^o^{r all f}^o^u^r^y^ears^of^th^e^an^aly^s^is
^areⁱⁿ^cl^u^d^ed^t^h^e^t^h^e^av^erag^{e F}^Y^1999-^F^Y^{2003 s}^h^ares^of^s^p^en^diⁿ^g^by^admⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ratⁱ^v^{e cat}^eg^ory^w^o^u^l^d
^b^e⁵⁴^%^f^o^{r case p}^l^anⁿⁱⁿ^g^;²¹^%^f^o^{r p}^r^e-^p^l^acem^en^{t; 3}^%^f^o^{r d}^e^termⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^elig^ib^ility^{; an}^d²²^%^f^o^{r o}^t^h^e^r.
The cost of foster care “administration” then may be substantially related to the
permanency planning and other requirements imposed by federal law. In 1994
Congress made provision of pre-placement services a mandatory condition of funding
(effective no later than the first day of FY1997) and required HHS to establish a new
monitoring system to ensure state compliance with these and other federal child
welfare policies (P.L. 103-432). In 1997, the Adoption and Safe Families Act
increased the frequency of certain permanency planning requirements (from every 18
months to every 12 months) and added new caseworker responsibilities (related to
seeking termination of parental rights).
A second important factor, and one that clearly skews the per-eligible-child cost
of Title IV-E foster care administration, is the ability of states to make “pre-
placement” claims. Federal law requires that the child welfare agency must make
reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of children from their homes. Accordingly,
federal policy permits states to seek reimbursement for applicable costs for these
foster care “candidates” (e.g., caseworker time related to providing referrals to
services or for case planning, etc.).¹² The ability of states to claim reimbursement of
such pre-placement costs means that the universe of children for whom states may
make administrative claims is larger than the universe of children for whom they may
make foster care maintenance payment claims. Although hard data on the number
of children for whom states make “candidate” claims are not available, HHS has
recently estimated that in FY2002 the average monthly number of children for whom
states made candidate claims was 144,600.¹³

¹² Candidates must also meet certain other Title IV-E eligibility requirements, including
those linked to the old AFDC program.
¹³ A third factor that might affect administrative claims is the practice some states had of
making Title IV-E administrative claims for candidates on a broader basis than HHS now
allows and also the practice of claiming administrative costs for otherwise eligible children
who were placed in unlicensed homes (usually those of relatives). HHS has already ended
or (in the case of claims for the otherwise eligible child placed with a relative) is seeking to
end these practices. In July 2001, asserting that some states had too expansively interpreted
the meaning of “candidate,” HHS issued a policy announcement (ACYF-CB-PA-01-02)
detailing which children may be considered a candidate for foster care. Most of this policy
guidance was subsequently incorporated into the official Child Welfare Policy manual,
although provisions that would have denied states the ability to make Title IV-E
administrative claims for children living in unlicensed foster care homes were delayed and
then placed on indefinite hold pending release of formal rules. On Jan. 31, 2005, HHS
published a notice of proposed rulemaking concerning Title IV-E administrative claims with
regard to candidates for foster care, children placed in unlicensed relative homes, and
children temporarily moved to ineligible placement settings. HHS estimates that the “policy
(continued...)

Foster Care Costs Projected to Decline. In its March 2005 baseline,
CBO projects the federally eligible foster care caseload will continue to decline,
dipping to 195,000 by FY2010 and declining further to 162,000 by FY2015. This
projected decline is consistent with the Administration’s assumptions which, in both
its FY2005 and FY2006 budgets, notes a “decrease in children and payments” for
foster care in explaining its estimated total foster care costs for those years.¹⁴ The
total foster care caseload (both federally eligible and those not eligible) has been in
decline. However, both the Administration and CBO’s projected reduction in the
eligible caseload may be in large part due to the program rules that require a child to
have been removed from a family that would have met the income eligibility
requirements to receive cash aid under the former AFDC program (as they existed
on July 16, 1996). The statute does not provide any mechanism for inflation
adjustment of these 1996 rules. Thus, the amount of money a state used nearly a
decade ago to determine whether a family was financially needy continues to apply
for purposes of determining Title IV-E foster care eligibility. Because the real value
of this dollar amount continues to erode, over time, fewer and fewer children are
expected to be eligible for federal foster care. (For more discussion of the link
between AFDC and Title IV-E eligibility see The “Look Back” below.)
Overall, federal spending for Title IV-E foster care claims makes up the largest
share of total dedicated child welfare spending but federal spending for Title IV-E
Foster Care is no longer growing and, due largely to the shrinking caseload, is
expected to continue to decline. Administrative claims have recently overtaken
claims for foster care maintenance payments as the largest share of Title IV-E claims.
The bulk of these administrative claims are for case planning and pre-placement costs
associated with federally required protections for children, and some of these costs
are associated with children who are not yet in foster care but who require services
to prevent their removal from the home.
Services for Child Welfare. Federal spending for services more than
doubled (107% increase) between FY1983 and FY2003, growing from $363 million
to $750 million. Across this same period, however, the share of total dedicated child
welfare funding appropriated for services declined from just under one-third of the¹⁵
dedicated dollars (32%) in FY1983 to 11% of the funding in FY2003. One of the

¹³ (...continued)
clarification” could result in a reduction of federal reimbursement for administrative claims
of $65-$78 million for FY2006. See Federal Register, vol. 70, no. 19, pp. 4803-4808.
¹⁴ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families
FY2005 Budget Justifications, p. C-4 and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Administration for Children and Families FY2006 Budget Justifications, p. G-5. For
FY2005 this decrease in the base funding represented $78.7 million; for FY2006 it
represented $210.5 million.
¹⁵ For the purposes of this paper, funding for services is defined to include grants under the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) that are distributed by formula to all
eligible states; and the grants under Title IV-B of the Social Security Act (Child Welfare
Services and Promoting Safe and Stable Families), which are also distributed by formula to
all eligible states. (In FY1983 this category also includes $60 million (valued in constant
(continued...)

most often repeated criticisms of the federal child welfare funding structure is that
the bulk of the funding is only available once a child has been removed from his or
her home; funding to prevent removal is more limited. This is true, however, as
noted above, a great deal of “foster care” funding in fact supports the work of
developing and reviewing both pre-placement and in-placement service plans, or
activities which might legitimately be called a service. Outside of that critical
support for the logistics of case planning, however, funding for services (e.g.,
counseling, mental health or substance abuse treatment services)—whether intended
to prevent removal (support and preserve a family) or to allow for reunification or
improve child and family well-being—is relatively scarce.
In 1980 when Congress debated enacting the current Foster Care and Adoption
Assistance programs (P.L. 96-272), the need for services to prevent the removal of
children from their homes was a key consideration, and Congress included a number
of measures designed to ensure that states used new funds authorized in the
legislation for services (as opposed to foster care). That legislation expressly linked
the Title IV-B Child Welfare Services program with the new Title IV-E Foster Care
program, capped the amount of Child Welfare Services dollars that states could
spend for foster care, and allowed states to transfer some of their Title IV-E funds for
use in the Child Welfare Services (Title IV-B) program, under certain conditions.
That is, states that wished to transfer funds were required to have in place certain
protections for children in foster care and also to select a Title IV-E funding ceiling
for a given fiscal year. If the state had greater claims than the ceiling, it would not
be reimbursed for those costs; if, however, the state submitted fewer claims for Title
IV-E funds than its selected ceiling, the extra funds (subject to certain limits) could
be transferred to the state’s Child Welfare Services (Title IV-B) program. Between
FY1981 and FY1991, states transferred approximately $218 million (or $406 million
measured in FY2003 dollars) from their Title IV-E funds to the Title IV-B Child
Welfare Services program.¹⁶
The design of the transfer provisions, however, meant that as appropriations for
Title IV-B grew, the value of the transfer to states declined. Although between 20
and 29 states transferred funds under the provision in each of FY1982-FY1985, by
FY1990 just two states transferred any money and effective with FY1994 Congress
repealed these provisions entirely (P.L. 103-432). Just before this repeal, Congress
enacted a significant new source of funding. P.L. 103-66 established Subpart 2 of
Title IV-B of the Social Security Act and provided funding for family preservation
and family support services. (P.L. 105-89 amended this subpart, renaming it the
Promoting Safe and Stable Families Program, adding new funding, and requiring

¹⁵ (...continued)
FY2003 dollars) in funds that states transferred from Title IV-E to Title IV-B under a
special incentive program that no longer exists.)
¹⁶ P.L. 96-272 provided that state foster care funding ceilings were mandatory in any year
for which the Title IV-B appropriation reached its full authorization level. This occurred
in one year only (FY1981). The transfer provisions, and the methods by which a state could
choose a given funding ceiling are described in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways
and Means, Green Book 1990, pp. 775-776.

states to spend some funds on two new categories: time-limited (15 months)
reunification and adoption promotion and support.)
Despite these efforts, dedicated child welfare funding for services remains small
relative to funding for Adoption Assistance and Foster Care. The most obvious
reason for the difference is that none of the dedicated service funding is available on
an open-ended basis, and with the exception of some of the Promoting Safe and
Stable Families Program money, none is mandatory. Authorization of open-ended
mandatory funding allows actual funding to move with changes in the value of the
dollar (inflation/deflation), size of the eligible population, and changes in program
requirements. By contrast, discretionary funding authorization mean that each year,
the needs of a given program will be weighed against a multitude of other
discretionary budget needs. And while a mandatory capped funding authorization
usually guarantee a minimum level of money will be available, it does not necessarily
provide for increases to match inflation or new program costs. (See Table 2 for
description of kinds of funding authorizations.)
Congress has consistently used the discretion afforded by CAPTA and Title IV-
B of the Social Security Act to fund grants under these programs below their full
authorization levels. Child Welfare Services (Title IV-B, Subpart 1) has been
authorized to receive $325 million in every year since FY1990 but its funding peaked
in FY1994 at $294 million; in FY2005 it received $290 million. Laying aside the
difference in the value of $325 million in FY2005 compared to its value in FY1990,
this means that actual appropriations for this program peaked at about 90% of its
funding authorization and have since declined. Even less of the program’s authorized
funds have been appropriated under CAPTA. In FY1996, when CAPTA funding was
first appropriated under the current grant structure, actual funding was $58 million
—or roughly one-third (35%) of the $166 million authorized. While this may have
been a program low point, the recent high point—$102 million appropriated under
CAPTA in FY2005—represents only about one-half (51%) of the $200 million¹⁷
authorized beginning in FY2004. Finally, while the mandatory portion of funding
for the Promoting Safe and Stable Families program grew in each year for which the
authorizing statute provided that it would, additional discretionary appropriations that
were first authorized for FY2002 have ranged between roughly one-third and one-
half of the total $200 million authorization level.
Overall, funding for services in child welfare has lagged far behind growth in
funding for Foster Care and Adoption Assistance—despite a longer standing funding
authorization and a great deal of rhetorical support. The type of funding authorized
(i.e., mostly discretionary) is a key distinction that explains much of this difference

¹⁷ Total CAPTA funding was authorized at $166 million for FY1996 and such sums as
necessary for FY1997-FY2001. Program funding authorization had expired for FY2002 and
FY2003, although Congress continued to fund the program at prior year levels. For FY2004
CAPTA was authorized at $200 million and it is authorized at such sums as necessary for
FY2005-FY2008. The FY2005 comparison of appropriated to authorized funding level then
uses the most recent specific amount of authorized funding. In addition, because of the way
the authorization level is written in the law, the comparison is made between funding
authorization and appropriation for three CAPTA grants, even though only two of these are
distributed to all eligible states by formula.

Non-Dedicated Funding
Non-dedicated federal funding for child welfare purposes is funding that is not
solely authorized for child welfare purposes but which states may choose to draw
down or expend for those purposes. Non-dedicated sources of federal child welfare
funding include: Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), Medicaid, the
Social Services Block Grant (SSBG), Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Social
Security Survivors Benefits.¹⁸ There are virtually no federal reporting requirements
that provide data for an analysis of state child welfare agencies’ use of non-dedicated
federal funding sources. However, since 1996 the Urban Institute has conducted four
surveys of state child welfare expenditures and these surveys provide the best overall
picture of the use of non-dedicated federal funds for child welfare.
For state fiscal year (SFY) 2002, state child welfare agencies reported spending
at least $4.8 billion from these non-dedicated funding sources alone. However, not
all state agencies were able to report the amount of spending out of each of these
funding streams and because spending by other state agencies (e.g., the TANF
agency) may also support child welfare purposes, this number should be viewed as
a low estimate of total non-dedicated federal funding of child welfare.¹⁹ Based on
the available information, the median share of total federal child welfare spending
derived from non-dedicated federal funding equaled nearly half of all the federal
dollars (47%) expended by state child welfare agencies in SFY2002. However, the
use of non-dedicated federal funding by each state varied considerably from a high
of 75% of total federal child welfare funds expended in Alabama to less than 2% of
total federal child welfare funds expended in North Carolina.²⁰ (See Table 6.)

¹⁸ For children who are eligible for SSI (Title XVI of the Social Security Act) or Social
Security Survivors Benefits (Title II), states may act as the “representative payee” of this
money on behalf of the child. The right of states to act in this capacity, and to use these
funds to reimburse their foster care costs on behalf of that child was recently upheld by the
U.S. Supreme Court Washington State v. Keffler, 537 U.S. 371 (2003).
¹⁹ Calculated using data collected by Urban Institute for its survey of state child welfare
agencies expenditures in SFY2002.
²⁰ Readers should also bear in mind that there was considerable range (28%-79%) across the
states in their reliance on federal (as opposed to state and local) funds for all child welfare
spending. For more information, see Scarella et al., Protecting Vulnerable Children IV, pp.

9, and 22-28.

Table 6. Non-Dedicated Federal Spending
by State Child Welfare Agencies
(as reported by states to the Urban Institute for SFY2002)
^Sha^{re o}^f^t^o^t^a^l^Fe^d^e^ra^l^Child^St^a^t^e
^Welf^a^{re spending}^f^r^o^m^no^n-
^{dedicated s}^o^urces^#^N^a^m^{e (}^$^a^m^o^unt^{in m}^illio^ns)
^71%^-^75%²^A^l^a^bam^a^{($132), T}^eⁿⁿ^e^s^s^{ee ($139)}
^66%^-^70%⁴^N^e^w^H^a^m^p^s^hⁱ^r^{e ($18), O}^r^eg^on^{($116), S}^o^u^t^h^C^a^rolⁱⁿ^a^{($113), Wy}^omⁱⁿ^g^($10)
^61%^-^65%⁴^Idah^{o ($18), Iow}^a^{($91), R}^h^{ode Is}^l^aⁿ^d^{($51), V}ⁱ^rgⁱⁿⁱ^a^($137)
^A^rⁱ^z^on^{a ($89), C}^o^l^o^{rado ($103), Mas}^s^ach^u^s^et^t^s^($149),
^56%^-^60%⁷^N^o^rt^h^D^a^k^o^t^a^{($14), S}^o^u^t^h^D^a^k^o^t^a^{($14), T}^e^x^a^s^($306),
^Wes^t^Vⁱ^rgⁱⁿⁱ^a^($51)
^51%^-^55%⁶^G^e^orgⁱ^{a ($121), K}^aⁿ^s^as^{($59), N}^e^bras^k^a^{($32), N}^e^w^Y^o^rk^{($737), O}^k^l^a^h^o^m^a^{($67), V}^e^rm^on^t^($23)
^46%^-^50%⁶^A^l^as^k^a^{($15), D}ⁱ^s^t^ri^ct^of^C^o^l^u^m^bⁱ^a^{($36), F}^l^ori^d^{a ($215),}^N^e^w^Jers^ey^{($87), U}^t^ah^{($27), Was}^hⁱⁿ^g^t^on^($95)
^41%^-^45%⁴^Illin^ois^{($311), Mich}^ig^an^{($191), Min}ⁿ^e^s^o^{ta ($94),}^Penⁿ^s^y^l^v^aⁿⁱ^{a ($274)}
^36%^-^40%⁵^K^eⁿ^t^u^c^k^y^{($48), L}^o^uⁱ^sⁱ^an^{a ($47), Mary}^l^aⁿ^d^($74),^Mi^s^sⁱ^s^sⁱ^ppi^{($13), N}^e^v^a^{da ($17)}
^31%^-^35%¹^N^ew^Mexⁱ^{co ($14)}
^26%^-^30%²^Iⁿ^dⁱ^aⁿ^a^{($32), Mi}^s^s^o^u^rⁱ^($90)
^21%^-^25%⁴^Mon^t^an^{a ($5), H}^a^w^aⁱⁱ^{($9), Wi}^s^c^on^sⁱⁿ^{($38), C}^a^lⁱ^f^ornⁱ^a^($430)
^16%^-^20%¹^D^el^aw^{are ($3)}
^11%^-^15%¹^M^aiⁿ^e^($7)
^6%^-^10%²^A^rk^an^s^a^s^{($4), O}^hⁱ^o^($33)
^1%^-⁵^%¹^N^o^rt^h^C^a^rolⁱⁿ^{a ($3)}
^{Data n}^o^{t av}^ailab^l^e¹^Coⁿⁿ^ecticu^t
^Source:^T^a^{ble prepared by}^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{). B}^a^s^e^{d on}^{data reported to}
^th^{e Urban}^In^s^titu^{te f}^o^{r its}^s^u^rv^ey^of^s^t^at^{e ch}^{ild w}^e^lf^{are ag}^en^cy^ex^pen^d^itu^resⁱⁿ^SFY2002.
^No^te:^T^h^{e percen}^t^a^g^e^(an^d^dol^l^a^{r am}^ouⁿ^t^s⁾^s^h^owⁿ^{are bas}^e^{d on}^t^h^{e t}^o^t^a^l^m^oⁿ^e^y^report^e^d^by^{a s}^t^at^e
^as^s^p^en^{t by}^th^{e ch}^{ild w}^e^lf^{are ag}^en^cy^ou^{t of}^T^A^{NF, SSB}^{G, Medicaid, SSI, an}^{d Socia}^l^S^e^c^u^rⁱ^t^y
^Su^r^v^iv^o^r^{s B}^eⁿ^e^f^{its as a sh}^ar^{e o}^f^its^to^{tal r}^e^p^o^r^ted^fed^e^ra^l^ch^{ild w}^e^lf^{are s}^p^en^din^g^{(dedicated, n}^oⁿ^-
^{dedicated an}^{d “}^o^th^{er”). Som}^e^s^t^ates^u^s^{ed on}^{e or}^m^o^r^e^o^f^th^{ese f}^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^str^eam^{s b}^u^{t w}^e^r^eⁿ^o^{t ab}^{le to}
^{report th}^{e ex}^{act am}^ouⁿ^t^{. (See, f}^o^{r ex}^am^{ple, s}^t^ates^lis^{ted as}^“^D^{ata n}^o^{t av}^{ailable” in}^Ta^{bles 7}^a^{nd 1}⁰
^o^f^t^hⁱ^s^r^e^p^o^r^t.)^Fo^r^th^{ese states th}^{e to}^{tals sh}^o^wⁿⁱⁿ^th^{is tab}^l^{e ar}^{e b}^a^sed^oⁿ^th^{e f}^e^d^e^r^a^{l ch}^il^d^w^e^l^f^a^r^e
^s^p^en^diⁿ^g^t^h^ey^report^e^d^{and cat}^e^gorⁱ^z^ed^{. Mu}^ch^of^th^{e “}^o^th^{er” f}^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^m^a^y^w^e^{ll be n}^oⁿ^-^dedicated
^fund^s^t^h^a^t^s^t^a^t^es^w^e^{re n}^o^{t able to categ}^{orize by}^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^s^t^ream^{. How}^e^v^e^{r, as}^th^is^categ^ory^w^a^s
^believ^e^{d to in}^clu^d^{e C}^A^P^T^A^f^uⁿ^d^s^an^{d m}^a^y^als^o^h^a^v^eⁱⁿ^clu^d^ed^oth^e^r^dedicated^ch^ild^w^e^lf^{are f}^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g

⁽^a^v^a^ilab^l^{e to}^cer^tain^{states o}^r^lo^{calities o}ⁿ^{a d}ⁱ^scr^e^tioⁿ^a^r^y^b^a^sis)^{it w}^a^s^ex^clu^d^ed^f^r^o^m^th^{e calcu}^latioⁿ
^of^{a s}^t^ate’^sⁿ^oⁿ^-^dedicated^f^e^{deral f}^uⁿ^d^s^{total. For}^m^o^r^e^co^m^p^{lete d}^e^{tails o}ⁿ^th^{is sp}^en^dⁱⁿ^g^,^r^ead^er^{s ar}^e
^en^cou^r^ag^{ed to s}^{ee Scarella et al.,}^T^h^{e C}^o^s^t^of^Pr^ot^ectⁱ^{ng Vul}ⁿ^er^abl^{e C}^hⁱ^l^d^r^e^{n IV}^{, pp. 22-}^30.
The Urban Institute surveys demonstrate the growing importance of non-
dedicated funds to state child welfare programs, show the great variation in their use
by states, and indicate that in recent years the largest growth in spending of federal
funds for child welfare purposes has occurred not with dedicated child welfare funds
but instead with TANF and Medicaid. Information on state child welfare agencies’
use of TANF, SSBG and Medicaid is discussed below.
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). TANF (Title IV-A
of the Social Security Act) is funded on a mandatory basis and its basic block grant
is capped at $16.5 billion annually.²¹ Federal reporting requirements for the TANF
block grant group spending for child welfare in a generic “other” category and so do
not permit analysis of TANF spending for child welfare purposes. However, data on
child welfare expenditures collected by the Urban Institute for state fiscal years 1996,
1998, 2000 and 2002, showed a decline in state use of Title IV-A (now TANF) funds
for child welfare purposes between 1996 and 1998, but an increase in every
subsequent survey.²² Based on its most recent survey, the Urban Institute reports that
in SFY2002, public child welfare agencies spent $2.7 billion in TANF funds for child
welfare purposes. (This includes $431 million in TANF funds transferred to SSBG
and expended from that fund for child welfare purposes.) This spending represented
roughly one-quarter (24.1%) of all federal resources spent that year by states for child
welfare purposes. The extent to which each state used TANF funds for child welfare
ranged from 50% of all federal funds used for child welfare in New York to 0% in
Nebraska.²³ (See Table 7 for more information.)

²¹ See CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block
Grant: A Primer on Financing and Requirements of State Programs, by Gene Falk.
²² Scarella et al., Protecting Vulnerable Children IV, p. 24.
²³ Figures are based on data provided by the Urban Institute from its survey of SFY2002
child welfare spending. The exact amounts and percentages differ slightly from what is
reported by Urban in Scartella et al., Protecting Vulnerable Children IV because that report
excludes TANF funds transferred to SSBG (and used for child welfare purposes) in its
discussion of state TANF spending for child welfare.

Table 7. TANF Spending by Child Welfare Agencies, by State
(as reported by states to the Urban Institute for SFY2002)
^Sha^{re o}^f^t^o^t^a^l^Fe^d^e^ra^l^St^a^t^e
^{Child Welf}^a^{re spending}
^fro^m^T^ANF^#^N^a^m^{e (}^$^a^m^o^unt^{s in m}^illio^ns)
^46%^-^50%¹^N^ew^Y^o^rk^($690)
^41%^-^45%⁷^A^ri^zon^a^{($72), F}^l^ori^d^{a ($191), Pen}ⁿ^s^y^l^v^aⁿⁱ^{a ($261), T}^e^x^a^s
^{($220), V}ⁱ^rgⁱⁿⁱ^a^{($97), Wes}^t^Vⁱ^rgⁱⁿⁱ^a^{($38), Wy}^omⁱⁿ^g^($6)
^36%^-^40%¹^Mⁱ^c^hⁱ^g^aⁿ^($171)
^31%^-^35%⁰^—
^26%^-^30%⁴^I^dah^o^{($8), K}^aⁿ^s^as^{($30), K}^eⁿ^t^u^c^k^y^{($35), N}^o^rt^h^D^a^k^o^t^a^($7)
^21%-^25%⁴^G^eorg^{ia ($50), Illin}^ois^{($168), Ok}^lah^o^m^a^{($28), Oreg}^on^($44)
^16%^-^20%⁸^A^l^a^bam^a^{($34), H}^a^w^aⁱⁱ^{($6), Iow}^a^{($24), Mary}^l^aⁿ^d^($34),
^Mon^t^an^{a ($4), N}^e^w^Jers^ey^{($35), S}^o^u^t^h^D^a^k^o^t^a^($5),
^Wi^s^c^on^sⁱⁿ^($30)
^11%^-^15%⁶^A^l^a^s^k^{a ($5), C}^a^lⁱ^f^ornⁱ^{a ($236), D}ⁱ^s^t^ri^ct^of^C^o^l^u^m^bⁱ^a^($11),
^L^o^uⁱ^sⁱ^an^{a ($13), S}^o^u^t^h^C^a^rolⁱⁿ^{a ($23), Was}^hⁱⁿ^g^t^on^($28)
^6%^-^10%¹⁰^A^r^k^aⁿ^s^as^{($3), C}^o^l^o^{rado ($11), In}^di^an^{a ($10), Mi}^s^sⁱ^s^sⁱ^ppi
^{($3), Mi}^s^s^o^u^rⁱ^{($27), N}^e^v^a^{da ($3), O}^hⁱ^o^{($25), R}^h^{ode Is}^l^aⁿ^d
^{($8), U}^t^ah^{($6), V}^e^rm^on^t^($4)
^1%^-⁵^%⁶^Maiⁿ^{e ($3), Mi}ⁿⁿ^e^s^o^t^a^{($9), N}^e^w^H^a^m^p^s^hⁱ^r^{e ($1), N}^e^w
^Mexⁱ^{co ($1), N}^o^rt^h^C^a^rolⁱⁿ^{a ($3), T}^eⁿⁿ^e^s^s^{ee ($8)}
^0%¹^N^ebras^k^{a ($0)}
^{Data in}^co^m^p^lete³^C^oⁿⁿ^ecticu^t^{, Delaw}^a^r^e^{, Massach}^u^s^etts
^Source:^T^a^{ble prepared by}^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{). B}^a^s^e^{d on}^{data reported to th}^e
^Urban^In^s^titu^te^f^o^r^its^s^u^rv^ey^of^s^t^{ate ch}^{ild w}^e^lf^{are ag}^en^cy^ex^pen^d^itu^resⁱⁿ^{SFY2002. T}^h^{e dollar an}^d
^p^e^r^c^eⁿ^t^a^ge^a^m^o^unt^{s sho}^w^{n he}^r^eⁱⁿ^c^l^u^d^e^al^l^T^A^{NF dollars}^ex^pen^d^{ed by}^th^{e ch}^{ild w}^e^lf^{are ag}^en^cy^,
ⁱⁿ^cl^udi^ng^th^o^s^{e th}^{at w}^e^r^e^fⁱ^r^s^{t tr}^an^sf^er^r^e^d^to^th^{e Social Serv}^ices^B^l^ock^Gran^{t (SSB}^G).
What Authority Permits Use of Tanf for Child Welfare Purposes?
Current law permits states to use TANF funds for child welfare purposes in several
ways. These include—
^!provision of certain services that are consistent with the general
purposes of TANF;
^!provision of services previously authorized under a state’s
Emergency Assistance plan as it was in place before enactment of
P.L. 104-193 (which replaced the prior federal program of AFDC as
well as the related Emergency Assistance and JOBS programs with
the TANF block grant); and
^!transfer of limited TANF funds to the SSBG grant (which explicitly
allows funding of a range of child welfare purposes).

The first stated purpose of TANF is to “provide assistance to needy families so
that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives.”²⁴
Federal guidance released with the final rules for the TANF block grant expressly
note that under this purpose certain child welfare costs, including “family
preservation activities, such as counseling, home visits, and parenting training ...
[are] allowable TANF costs because they are reasonably calculated to enable a child
to be cared for in his or her own home.”²⁵ In addition, this guidance noted, that while
payments for out-of-home placement (e.g., foster care maintenance payments) are not
allowed under the general purposes of TANF, states that provided for these payments
as a part of their pre-existing Emergency Assistance plan could continue to use Title
IV-A funds (now TANF) for this purpose. Nearly all states made some provision for
both family preservation services and foster care payments as part of their pre-
existing Emergency Assistance plans.²⁶ Finally, P.L. 104-193 provided that states
could transfer up to 10% of their TANF funds to SSBG. Transferred funds may not
be used to serve any families with incomes over 200% of the federal poverty level,
but beyond this restriction, may be used for any of that block grant’s broad social
service purposes. The use of SSBG for child welfare purposes is discussed below.
Future Availability of TANF for Child Welfare Purposes? Although
initial concerns that the economic recession in 2001 would reduce the availability of
TANF funds for child welfare purposes appear to have been unfounded (at least for
most states), child welfare advocates and administrators remain uncertain about their²⁷
long-term access to these funds. Current proposals to reauthorize the TANF block
grant include more stringent work requirements (H.R. 240, S. 6, S. 105, S. 667),
which may require states to allocate more of the block grant toward employment
related services only. Moreover, the proposed funding for the basic block grant
remains at the FY1997 appropriation level, which represents an estimated 17%

²⁴ Section 401(a)(1) of the Social Security Act.
²⁵ Federal Register, vol. 64, part 2, Apr. 12, 1999, p. 17762. The guidance indicates that in
certain cases, this kind of service to a family is an allowable cost even when the child is
temporarily placed out of the home (but only if the service is provided in order to reunite the
family). See pp. 17822-17823. Each June, HHS requires states to report their intended
spending for child welfare services (by categories and anticipated sources of funding) for
the upcoming federal fiscal year. Between FY2001 and FY2002 states anticipated an
increased reliance on federal funds to provide both family preservation and family support
services and the number of states reporting their intention to use TANF to fund these
services (especially family preservation) jumped significantly. See Analysis of States’
Annual Progress and Services Reports and Child and Family Services Plans (1999-2002),
James Bell Associates, Apr. 5, 2002.
²⁶ State Emergency Assistance plans defined eligibility for assistance and the length of time
that assistance could be provided. The rules that were in place before the creation of TANF
must also be applied when TANF funds are used. While Emergency Assistance was
generally defined as a support offered to meet a temporary need, some offered this
“temporary aid” for as long as 12 months. In addition, while income and/or resource tests
were used in some state EA plans, many provided that certain categories of children or
families were eligible, e.g., children at risk of abuse or neglect, children who had recently
been maltreated, or children receiving state-funded foster care maintenance payments, etc.
²⁷ Scarella et al., Protecting Vulnerable Children IV, p. 24.

decrease in the purchasing power of this grant (through FY2005). At the same time,
H.R. 240 and S. 105 would amend the purposes of TANF to make “child well-being”
the overarching goal of the program.
Social Services Block Grant (SSBG). Title XX of the Social Security Act
authorizes the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG), under which states may fund a
broad range of social services. SSBG is funded on a mandatory, capped basis;
beginning with FY2002, SSBG has been funded at $1.7 billion annually.²⁸ States
receive an allotment of this total funding based on their relative share of the national
population and they do not need to provide matching funds. For FY2002, states
reported expending more than $518 million in SSBG-appropriated funds—or just
under one-third (31%) of the total SSBG appropriation—for child welfare purposes.
However, more than half (53%) of all the dollars states transferred to SSBG for
FY2002 were used for child welfare services, and when these TANF-appropriated
dollars are added, the total SSBG expenditure for child welfare purposes in FY2002
rises to just over $1.0 billion (or 39% of total SSBG expenditures).²⁹
Spending for the three child welfare services that appear to have common
reporting categories in FY1979 and FY2002 (adoption services, foster care-children,
and protective services-children) was $480 million in FY1979 and $258 million in³⁰
FY2002 (without counting TANF transfer dollars spent on these purposes).
However, states were much more likely to report spending TANF-transfer dollars
(rather than SSBG-appropriated funds) for these three child welfare services. When
TANF transfer dollars are included, FY2002 spending out of SSBG for these
purposes rises to $634 million.
What Authority Permits Use of SSBG for Child Welfare Purposes?
The use of Title XX funds to provide child welfare services—particularly child
protection and foster care—is longstanding but the amount of funding available under

²⁸ As a general rule, capped mandatory (or entitlement) funds are provided at the level of
their entitlement cap in each given fiscal year. Funding for SSBG however has sometimes
risen above or fallen below its entitlement ceiling. And in some years, Congress has
adjusted the SSBG entitlement ceiling to match the level of appropriated SSBG funds. See
CRS Report 94-943, Social Services Block Grant (Title XX of the Social Security Act), by
Melinda Gish.
²⁹ These amounts and percentages are calculated from Table 3-1 of the SSBG Annual Report
2002 and are based on the six service categories identified by HHS in an Apr. 2004
conference presentation as child welfare services. These categories of services are:
Adoption, Foster Care-children, Home-based, Independent Living/Transitional, Prevention
and Intervention, and Protective Services-children. While services in a few of these
categories may have been provided for other than child welfare purposes, additional service
categories that were not included (e.g., counseling and case management) may have been
used for child welfare purposes. Finally, states reported a mixture of items in the “Other”
services category, including, in at least one case, “adoption subsidies.”
³⁰ Expenditure data by Title XX service category is available for FY1979, after which no
comparable data are available until FY1998. The amount of FY1979 spending for these
three services is shown in nominal dollars ($480 million—equal to $1.2 billion in FY2003
dollars) and was calculated based on the share of total funding reported as expended for
these purposes in that year multiplied by total FY1979 Title XX funding.

this Title has declined significantly. An original purpose of the Title XX Social
Services program (created by P.L. 93-647), and which remains a purpose under the
current SSBG (created by P.L. 97-35), was the provision of services designed for
“preventing or remedying neglect, abuse, or exploitation of children and adults
unable to protect their own interests, or preserving, rehabilitating or reuniting
families.”³¹ State use of SSBG for services to child welfare clients varies in both size
and kind of service. In FY2002, according to the data reported to HHS, 40 states
used some SSBG funds for child protective services, 35 for foster care, 35 for
prevention/intervention services, 35 for home-based services, 31 for adoption
services, and 17 for independent/transitional living.³²
States reported to the Urban Institute that spending of SSBG-appropriated funds
by the state child welfare agency accounted for a high of 34% (MA) to a low of 0%
(MT, NE, NC, and RI) of all federal funds it spent in SFY2002. (See Table 8.)
Table 8. SSBG-Appropriated Funds Spent
by Child Welfare Agencies, by State
(as reported by states to Urban Institute for SFY2002)
^{Share of total federal}^St^a^t^e
^{Child Welf}^a^{re spending}
^f^r^o^m^SSB^G^—
^a^ppro^p^ria^t^{ed f}^unds^#^N^a^m^{e (}^$^a^m^o^unt^{in m}^illio^ns)
^31%^-^35%²^I^dah^o^{($10), Mas}^s^ach^u^s^et^t^s^($84)
^26%^-^30%²^L^ouⁱ^sⁱ^aⁿ^a^{($31), Mi}^s^sⁱ^s^sⁱ^ppi^($10)
^21%^-^25%¹^S^ou^t^h^D^a^k^o^t^a^($5)
^16%^-^20%¹^Vⁱ^r^gⁱⁿⁱ^{a ($40)}
^11-^15%¹³^A^l^abam^{a ($23), A}^l^as^k^a^{($4), C}^o^l^o^ra^{do ($25), D}^e^l^a^w^a^{re ($3),}
^Illin^ois^($89),^In^dian^{a ($14), Iow}^a^{($17), Mary}^lan^d^($31),^New
^Jers^ey^{($21), T}^eⁿⁿ^e^s^s^{ee ($22)}^,^V^e^rm^on^t^{($6), Was}^hⁱⁿ^g^t^on
^{($28), Wes}^t^Vⁱ^rgⁱⁿⁱ^a^($13)
^6-^10%¹³^A^rⁱ^z^on^{a, ($16) C}^a^lⁱ^f^ornⁱ^{a ($162), G}^e^orgⁱ^a^($16),^H^a^w^aⁱⁱ^($2),
^K^eⁿ^t^u^c^k^y^{($8), Mi}ⁿⁿ^e^s^o^t^a^{($16), Mi}^s^s^o^u^rⁱ^{($26), N}^e^v^a^{da ($4),}
^New^Ham^p^sh^{ire ($}³⁾^{, New}^Mexⁱ^co^($³⁾^{, No}^rth^Dak^o^{ta ($}²⁾^,
^O^r^eg^on^{($13), Wy}^omⁱⁿ^g^($1)
^1-^5%¹⁴^A^r^k^aⁿ^s^as^{($1), D}ⁱ^s^t^ri^ct^o^f^Col^u^m^bⁱ^a^{($1), F}^l^ori^d^{a ($10),}
^K^aⁿ^s^as^{($6), Mai}ⁿ^{e ($1), Mi}^chⁱ^g^an^{($20), N}^e^w^Y^o^rk^($47),
^O^hⁱ^o^{($7), O}^k^l^a^h^o^m^a^{($6), Pen}ⁿ^s^y^l^v^aⁿⁱ^{a ($10), S}^o^u^t^h^C^a^rolⁱⁿ^a
^{($5), T}^e^x^a^s^{($8), U}^t^ah^{($2), Wi}^s^c^on^sⁱⁿ^($7)
^0%⁴^M^on^t^aⁿ^a^{($0), N}^e^bras^k^a^{($0), N}^o^rt^h^C^a^rolⁱⁿ^{a ($0), R}^h^ode
^Is^l^aⁿ^d^($0)
^{Data n}^o^{t av}^ailab^l^e¹^Coⁿⁿ^ecticu^t
^Source:^T^a^{ble prepared}^by^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^ear^ch^S^e^rvⁱ^{ce (C}^R^S^{). Bas}^e^{d on}^dat^a^report^e^{d by}
^s^t^ates^{to th}^{e Urban}^In^s^titu^{te f}^o^{r its}^s^u^rv^ey^of^s^t^ate^ch^{ild w}^e^lf^{are ag}^en^cy^ex^pen^d^itu^resⁱⁿ^{SFY2002. T}^h^e
^{data s}^h^owⁿⁱⁿ^th^is^{table ref}^l^{ect on}^ly^SSB^{G s}^p^en^din^g^f^o^r^ch^ild^w^e^lf^{are pu}^rpos^es^f^r^om^f^uⁿ^d^s^s^p^ecifⁱ^cally

³¹ Section 2001(3) of the Social Security Act.
³² Table 3-1 of the SSBG Annual Report 2002.

^appropri^a^t^e^{d f}^o^{r S}^S^B^G^.^T^h^ey^{do not}ⁱⁿ^cl^ude^f^uⁿ^d^s^t^r^an^s^f^{erred t}^o^S^S^B^G^f^r^om^T^A^N^F^an^d^s^u^bs^equ^eⁿ^t^l^y
^s^p^en^{t u}ⁿ^d^{er SSB}^{G ru}^les^f^o^{r ch}^{ild w}^e^lf^{are pu}^rpos^es^.
^No^te:^{Data in}^th^{is tab}^l^{e ar}^{e n}^o^{t d}ⁱ^r^ectly^co^m^p^ar^ab^{le to}^th^{e d}^a^{ta r}^e^p^o^r^ted^to^th^{e U.S. Dep}^a^r^t^m^eⁿ^t^o^f
^Health^an^{d Hu}^m^aⁿ^Serv^ices^{(HHS) an}^{d w}^h^ich^{are als}^o^dis^c^u^s^s^e^{d in}^th^{e tex}^t^{. A}^m^on^g^th^e^reas^on^s^f^o^r
^th^{is ar}^e—dⁱ^f^f^e^r^eⁿ^{ces in}^r^e^p^o^r^tin^g^/^su^r^v^eyⁱⁿ^g^r^e^q^u^ir^em^en^{ts an}^d^th^{e f}^{act th}^at^th^{e d}^a^{ta r}^e^p^o^r^ted^to^HHS
^{are f}^o^{r th}^e^fed^e^ra^l^fⁱ^s^{cal y}^{ear 2002 w}^h^{ile th}^{e data reported to}^th^e^Urban^In^s^titu^te^are^f^o^r^th^e^sta^t^e^fⁱ^s^cal
^y^ear.
Future Availability of SSBG for Child Welfare Purposes? In 1979,
when Congress debated the legislation that would put in place much of the current
child welfare financing structure, Title XX funding totaled close to $3 billion (or
roughly $7.8 billion in FY2003 dollars) and some 16% of this funding was used by
states for services categorized as adoption, foster care and child protective services
($480 million in FY1979 dollars; $1.2 billion in FY2003 dollars). Citing concerns
about the decline in the value of social services funding due to inflation, Congress
(as part of the same law that created the federal adoption assistance program and
established federal foster care as an independent program), raised the mandatory
funding level for the Title XX program.³³ Following an initial decline, P.L. 96-272
specified that funding for the program was to rise to nearly $3.4 billion by FY1985
(P.L. 96-272).³⁴ In 1981, however, P.L. 97-35 repealed the prior Title XX program
replacing it with SSBG. Funding under the new block grant was set at $2.4 billion
for FY1982 (or nearly $1 billion less in nominal dollars than was available in
FY1979). Nominal dollar funding for the program rose as high as $2.8 billion by
FY1990, but began to decline in FY1996 and by FY2001 had reached $1.7 billion
and has remained at this level through FY2005. (See Table 9.)

³³ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Social Services and Child Welfare
Amendments of 1979, report to accompany H.R. 3434, 96^th Cong., 1^st sess., H.Rept. 96-136,
p. 34; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare^th^st
Act of 1979, report to accompany H.R. 3434, 96 Cong., 1 sess., S.Rept. 96-336, pp. 59-61.
³⁴ U.S. Congress, Conference Committee, conference report to accompany H.R. 3434, 96^th
Cong., 2^nd sess., H.Rept. 96-900 (Washington, GPO, Apr. 28, 1980), pp. 60-63. The Title
XX entitlement ceiling for the program was to rise to $3.3 billion for FY1985. However,
the law also included under Title XX a separate $16.1 million in entitlement funding for
social services in the territories and separate matching funds for training (estimated $75
million). Funding for these separate accounts (which is also included in the approximately
$3 billion shown for FY1979 Title XX funding) was rolled into the single $2.4 billion
entitlement ceiling when the SSBG was created.

Table 9. Funding Level for the Social Services Block Grant in
Nominal and Constant (FY2003) Dollars, Selected Years
^F^unding^lev^e^l
⁽ⁱ^{n billio}^ns)
^Fi^s^c^al^year^N^o^mⁱⁿ^a^l^C^on^s^t^an^t
¹⁹⁸³^$2.7^$5.0
¹⁹⁸⁶^$2.6^$4.3
¹⁹⁸⁹^$2.7^$4.0
¹⁹⁹²^$2.8^$3.7
¹⁹⁹⁵^$2.8^$3.4
¹⁹⁹⁸^$2.3^$2.6
²⁰⁰¹^$1.7^$1.8
²⁰⁰³^$1.7^$1.7
^Source:^T^a^{ble prepared by}^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^{). T}^h^{e n}^o^mⁱⁿ^a^l^{dollar v}^a^lu^{e is}
^th^{e am}^ouⁿ^t^{appropriated in}^th^{e g}ⁱ^v^eⁿ^fⁱ^s^{cal y}^ear.^T^h^{e co}ⁿ^s^tan^t^d^o^llar^{is th}^{e v}^a^lu^e^o^f^th^{at am}^o^uⁿ^t^o^f
^m^oⁿ^e^yⁱ^fⁱ^t^h^a^{d been}^appropri^a^t^e^{d f}^o^{r F}^Y^2003.
In sum, the current child welfare financing structure was created in a context
where funding for a range of child welfare services was expected to be available
through Title XX, and in which the value of funding under the program was
expected, at least, to keep pace with inflation. Overall, while Title XX (SSBG)
remains an important source of funding for child welfare agencies, especially with
regard to child protective services, its value has declined greatly and its significance
as a share of total federal child welfare funding is declining.
Medicaid. Medicaid (Title XIX of the Social Security Act) is funded on an
open-ended basis that permits states to claim federal reimbursement for certain health
care related costs made on behalf of eligible (generally low-income, aged, blind, or
disabled) individuals. Eligible claims for services are matched at 50% to 83% (higher
for states with low per capita income and vice versa) and at 50% for administrative
claims. Total federal program outlays were $148 billion in FY2002 and are expected
to rise to $188 billion in FY2005.
The Urban Institute reports that state child welfare agencies expended $1.1
billion in federal Medicaid funds for child welfare clients in SFY2002. Between
SFY1996 and SFY2002, Medicaid spending by child welfare agencies increased 41%
(based on data from 39 states). Between SFY2000 and SFY2002, however, half of
the states (25) reported an increase in Medicaid spending by their child welfare
agency; 12 states reported a decrease over those two years and five states reported no
change.
As with other non-dedicated sources of child welfare funds, Medicaid spending
by child welfare agencies varies greatly by state. For SFY2002, Tennessee reported
that as much as 55% of the total federal resources expended by its child welfare

agency were from Medicaid, while eight states reported no such Medicaid spending.
(See Table 10).³⁵
Table 10. Medicaid Spending by Child Welfare Agencies, by
State
(as reported by states to the Urban Institute for SFY2002)
^S^h^a^{re of total}^fed^eral^St^a^t^e
^{Child Welf}^a^r^e
^spending^f^r^o^m
^me^dⁱ^c^aⁱ^d^#^N^a^m^{e (}^$^a^m^o^unt^{s in m}^illio^ns)
^51%^-^55%²^R^h^{ode Is}^l^aⁿ^d^{($41), T}^eⁿⁿ^e^s^s^{ee ($103)}
^46%^-^50%³^N^ebras^k^{a ($30), N}^e^w^H^a^m^p^s^hⁱ^r^{e($13), S}^o^u^t^h^C^a^rolⁱⁿ^{a ($84)}
^41%^-^45%¹^A^l^a^bam^a^($75)
^36%^-^40%¹^C^ol^{orado ($67)}
^31%^-^35%⁵^Dⁱ^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^of^C^o^l^u^m^bⁱ^a^{($24), Iow}^a^{($47), Mi}ⁿⁿ^e^s^o^t^a^($69),^O^r^eg^on
^{($55), U}^t^ah^($19)
^26%^-^30%¹^V^erm^oⁿ^t^($13)
^21%^-^25%⁵^G^eorgⁱ^a^{($54), Mas}^s^ach^use^t^t^s^{($61), N}^e^v^a^{da ($10), O}^k^l^a^h^o^m^a
^{($29), Was}^hⁱⁿ^g^t^on^($40)
^16%^-^20%⁶^A^l^a^s^k^a^{($6), K}^aⁿ^s^as^{($23), N}^e^w^Mexⁱ^{co ($8),}^N^o^rt^h^D^a^k^o^t^a^($5),
^So^ut^{h D}^a^ko^t^a⁽^$⁴⁾^,^W^y^o^mⁱ^{ng (}^$³⁾
^11%^-^15%²^N^ew^Jers^ey^{($29), T}^e^x^a^s^($70)
^6-^10%¹^Mⁱ^s^s^o^u^rⁱ^($31)
^1-^5%⁸^C^alⁱ^f^ornⁱ^{a ($33), D}^e^l^a^w^a^{re (}^a⁾^,^Flo^r^id^{a (}^$⁴⁾^{, I}^d^ah^o⁽^$¹⁾^{, I}^llin^oⁱ^s
^{($36), Mai}ⁿ^{e ($1), Mary}^l^aⁿ^d^{($9), Pen}ⁿ^s^y^l^v^aⁿⁱ^{a ($3)}
^0%⁸^A^rk^an^s^a^s^b^,^K^e^nt^uc^ky^,^Lo^ui^si^aⁿ^a^,^M^o^nt^aⁿ^a^,^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^,^O^hⁱ^o^b^,^b
^Vir^gⁱⁿ^{ia, W}ⁱ^scoⁿ^sin
^D^a^t^aⁿ^o^t^a^v^aⁱ^l^a^b^l^e⁸^A^rⁱ^z^on^{a, C}^oⁿⁿ^ecticu^t^{, Haw}^a^{ii, In}^dian^a,^Mich^ig^an^,^Mⁱ^s^sⁱ^s^sⁱ^p^pⁱ^,
^No^r^t^h^Car^o^lin^{a, W}^e^{st Vir}^gⁱⁿ^ia
^Source:^T^a^{ble prepared by}^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^ear^ch^S^e^rvⁱ^{ce (C}^R^S^).^Bas^e^d^on^dat^a^report^e^{d by}
^s^t^ates^{to th}^{e Urban}^In^s^titu^{te f}^o^{r its}^s^u^rv^ey^of^s^t^{ate ch}^{ild w}^e^lf^{are ex}^pen^d^itu^resⁱⁿ^SFY^{2002. Dollar}
^am^ouⁿ^t^s^s^h^owⁿ^ref^l^{ect on}^ly^th^os^{e th}^{at w}^e^{re ex}^pen^d^ed^vⁱ^a^th^e^ch^ild^w^e^lf^are^ag^en^cy^.^Doesⁿ^o^{t in}^clu^d^e
^Medicaid^s^p^en^din^g^f^o^{r rou}^tin^{e h}^ealth^ch^eck^u^p^s^an^d^pr^ocedu^r^es^{. Spen}^din^g^v^a^ries^by^s^t^{ate f}^o^{r a n}^u^m^ber
^of^reas^on^s^,ⁱⁿ^clu^dⁱⁿ^g^th^atⁿ^o^t^{all s}^t^ates^requ^ire^th^{e ch}^{ild w}^e^lf^{are ag}^en^cy^{to prov}^{ide Medicaid m}^a^tchⁱⁿ^g
^f^uⁿ^d^{s f}^o^r^cer^tain^ser^v^{ices to}^ch^ild^w^e^lf^ar^{e clien}^t^{s an}^dⁿ^o^{t all states in}^clu^d^e^th^e^sam^e^o^p^tioⁿ^a^{l ser}^v^ices
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^{a. D}^e^l^a^w^a^{re report}^e^{d s}^p^en^diⁿ^g^{$257,000 (1.3%}^ofⁱ^t^s^t^o^t^a^l^fe^d^e^r^a^l^chⁱ^l^d^w^e^l^f^{are s}^p^en^diⁿ^g⁾^ou^t^of
^Medi^cai^d.
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^m^illion^,^an^{d $367,000, res}^p^ectiv^ely⁾^bu^tⁱⁿ^each^s^t^{ate th}^is^s^p^en^din^g^{totaled les}^s^th^an^on^e-^h^a^lf^of
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What Authority Permits Use of Medicaid for Child Welfare
Purposes? Medicaid is a complex program. The kinds of services available and

³⁵ Scarella et al. The Cost of Protecting Vulnerable Children IV, pp. 26-27.

the eligible populations for those services vary by state. Foster care or adopted
children who meet the federal Foster Care or Adoption Assistance program eligibility
criteria are automatically deemed eligible for Medicaid services, and most foster care
or adoptive children who are not deemed so eligible are expected to be eligible under
Medicaid’s own program rules.³⁶
As the obligation of Medicaid to provide routine or preventive health care
services to eligible foster and adoptive children is expressly made in the law,
discussion of state child welfare agency spending on Medicaid does not refer to costs
associated with this health care. However, states use Medicaid to fund certain other
health care related services, including, according to the Urban Institute,
transportation, rehabilitative services, targeted case management, and therapeutic and
psychiatric services provided in residential treatment facilities. These are generally
optional services that some or all states may choose to provide under their state
Medicaid plan. The optional nature of these services helps to explain some of the
variety in the Medicaid spending for child welfare across all states.³⁷
Future Availability of Medicaid for Child Welfare Purposes? The
Bush Administration has in recent years sought to reduce claims made for foster care
children under certain optional services of Medicaid, including targeted case
management. The Administration’s FY2006 budget proposes to reduce the amount
of federal matching funds most states may claim for targeted case management
services and also to clarify reimbursement policies for both targeted case
management and rehabilitative services.³⁸ The Administration projects savings of $3
billion over five years from these proposals. Because these services are available to
many more Medicaid-eligible individuals than foster care children, the share of these
savings expected to come from state child welfare agency budgets is not known. At
the same time, this budget proposal illustrates the uncertainty that can surround the
availability of non-dedicated federal funding sources for child welfare.
Proposals for Change
Proposals intended to alter federal child welfare financing have focused
exclusively on dedicated funding under Title IV-B and Title IV-E of the Social
Security Act. However, the discussion of child welfare agencies use of non-
dedicated federal funds indicates that any of these proposed changes would occur in
a context of greatly varied use of these other federal funds.

³⁶ Federal law requires that children who are adopted out of foster care, but who do not meet
federal eligibility requirements for adoption assistance be provided with either Medicaid or
a comparable health care plan. See also CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum,
Medicaid Eligibility for Foster Care Children vis-à-vis the President’s FY2004 Reform
Proposals for Title IV-E and Medicaid, by Elicia Herz and Karen Spar, May 23, 2003,
(available from the authors).
³⁷ For additional reasons and discussion, see Scarella et al., The Cost of Protecting
Vulnerable Children IV, pp. 26-27.
³⁸ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, FY2006 Budget, Congressional Justifications, pp. 92-93.

Many of the recent proposals to change the federal child welfare financing
structure have sought to amend the eligibility requirements for the Title IV-E foster
care and adoption assistance programs (specifically to end the “look back
provision”). Other proposals have sought to cap (or block grant) funding for some
or all of the Title IV-E Foster Care program, which is currently funded on an open-
ended basis. Still others have sought new mandatory open-ended funding streams for
particular services (e.g., subsidized guardianship), new mandatory capped funding
for particular purposes, and other funds that would be made available only to those
states that improve their performance in specific areas (incentive funding). The
following section discusses some of the issues raised by the kinds of proposals
made.³⁹
The “Look Back”. Foster (and most adoptive) children for whom the state
may claim federal reimbursement of costs under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act
must meet certain eligibility requirements of the now defunct AFDC as that program
existed on July 16, 1996 (in the given state). These program rules include
determinations that (1) the family from which a child was removed would have been
found “needy” under the 1996 income standards in the state’s AFDC program; (2)
the child is “deprived” of parental care or support because one of the child’s parents
is absent from the home, incapacitated, dead, or unemployed; and (3) the child meets
age rules (under 18 years of age for most children).
Recent financing proposals have sought to change the link from the prior AFDC
program rules to the current state TANF program rules, or to remove any link to other
programs for eligibility. However, because foster care and adoption assistance are
funded on an open-ended basis—states may seek reimbursement for all eligible
claims—any change to the eligibility rules that increases the number of eligible
children represents an additional cost to the federal treasury. Thus, a number of
proposals that remove the link entirely have been coupled with some form of funding
cap and/or reduction in federal matching funds for eligible claims. Proposals to link
Title IV-E eligibility to TANF would likely have a cost as well. The exact effect of
this change on eligibility rates is hard to predict, although the cost is presumed to be
less.
Policymakers first established federal funding for foster care in the early 1960s.
At the time, child welfare advocates were concerned that no arrangements to ensure
the safe and proper care of children were being made by states that routinely denied
cash aid (i.e., AFDC) to families, including children, upon deeming a home⁴⁰
“unsuitable.” The practice reached national attention in 1960 after a newly passed

³⁹ A capsule review of financing proposals in the 108^th Congress is included in Scarella et
al., The Cost of Protecting Vulnerable Children, Appendix C, pp. 66-68. For a detailed side-^th
by-side of current law and two major proposals in the 108 Congress, request a copy of the
CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum, Child Welfare Funding in Titles IV-B and
IV-E of the Social Security Act and as Separately Proposed by the Pew Commission on
Children in Foster Care and by the Child SAFE Act of 2004 (H.R. 4856), by Emilie
Stoltzfus, Aug. 4, 2004.
⁴⁰ The program was called Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) at this time. It was renamed
(continued...)

Louisiana state law effectively removed 22,501 children from the state’s welfare
caseload by declaring as “unsuitable” any home where a mother bore a child out of
wedlock after receiving a cash aid check. Further investigation revealed that other
states had similar laws or policies in place that denied aid to needy children. The U.S.
Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW, predecessor to HHS) responded
to the controversy by informing states that as of July 1961, if a child otherwise
eligible for AFDC was denied aid because his/her home was declared unsuitable, the
state would be out of compliance with federal policy and thus ineligible for any
federal reimbursement of their AFDC costs. The new regulation provided that
assistance to such a child must be continued “during the time efforts are being made
to either improve the home conditions or to make arrangements for the child
el sewhere.”⁴¹
Responding in turn to this federal regulatory move, Congress acted to ensure
that states received funding for any foster care placements that might be expected to
result from the new AFDC policy. In essence, federal cash aid was to follow the
needy child to a new suitable home and thus the link between open-ended federal
funding for foster care and eligibility for cash aid AFDC was established at the
beginning of the program.⁴² In 1980, when Congress established Foster Care as an
independent program and created the Adoption Assistance program (P.L. 96-272),
it relied on the prior law to establish for what group of children the federal
government would share financial responsibility. Subsequently the 1996 law (P.L.

104-193), which abolished the AFDC program and replaced it with TANF,

maintained this connection by including the “look back” provision. The continuation
of a link between a newly abolished program and an on-going program likely
occurred as a matter of legislative convenience, and because the cost of changing the
link was unknown.⁴³

⁴⁰ (...continued)
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) by the 1962 Public Welfare Amendments
(P.L. 87-543).
⁴¹ U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, “Denial of Aid to Dependent
Children,” Social Security Bulletin, July 1961, p. 19; Louisiana Department of Public
Welfare, Twenty-Fourth Annual Report, July 1, 1960-June 30, 1961, pp. 5-6; Elizabeth
Wickenden and Winifred Bell, Public Welfare: Time for a Change (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1961), pp. 1-2.
⁴² Initially (P.L. 87-31) a child was eligible for federal foster care aid only if the family
he/she was removed from had been receiving cash aid just prior to the child’s removal. P.L.
90-248 (enacted Jan. 1968) expanded the eligibility criteria to include children who would
have been declared needy under the state’s AFDC program rules if they were still living in
their homes and if an application for this aid had been made. When Congress created the
Adoption Assistance program in 1980, it largely mimicked the then existing foster care
program with regard to establishing eligibility.
⁴³ A number of the welfare reform proposals under discussion in 1995-1996 included major
changes to child welfare financing—including a block grant of all identified child
protection/child welfare related funding streams. These changes would have removed
income eligibility requirements. However, they did not become a part of the final law and,
in the end, Congress appears to have sought a status quo solution by continuing to link
(continued...)

Virtually no one believes that the look back to a repealed program makes sense
today. Apart from administrative costs and presumed difficulties of determining
eligibility based on rules of a no longer existing program, given the lack of any
inflation-adjustment, the pool of Title IV-E eligible children could eventually shrink
to zero. This will result in a shift of costs to states and/or to non-dedicated federal
funds (e.g., TANF). In 1996, when the look back was established, the median state
need standard under AFDC (for a family of three) equaled 60% of the federal poverty
level; by 2005 that median was 48%.⁴⁴ This means that in as many as 25 states,
eligibility for the Title IV-E foster care program may only be established for children
removed from families with incomes less than half the federal poverty level (roughly
$8,000/year for a family of three).⁴⁵ In FY2003, an estimated 46% of all children in
foster care nationally were eligible for federal foster care maintenance payments.
This is down from the mid- to late-1990s when the share of all foster care children
eligible for Title IV-E support ranged from 51%-55%, but higher than the mid- to
late-1980s when that rate ranged between 35%-40%.⁴⁶
While the first consideration is often cost, the most basic question concerning
changing the look back provision is—for which children does the federal government
believe there is an obligation to provide some support for foster care and adoption
assistance? Proposals to link foster care and/or adoption assistance eligibility to
current state TANF rules seek to maintain a federal commitment to support the needs
of children from the poorest families. Removing all income eligibility rules would
have the advantage of eliminating the administrative burden of determining program
eligibility and would suggest a federal commitment to the protection of all children
in need of foster care. At the same time, because fewer than half of all foster children
are now eligible for Title IV-E Foster Care payments (estimated 46% for FY2003),
without other changes to the law, elimination of any income test could double (or
more) the cost of the federal foster care program. Federal eligibility under the

⁴³ (...continued)
eligibility for most federal adoption assistance and all federal foster care to the old AFDC
program rules.
⁴⁴ Calculations are based on an annualized monthly need standard for a family of three and
the federal poverty guidelines for a family of three. Some states had more than one need
standard (e.g., need was considered to vary by location in state); this analysis relies on a
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) compilation of 1996 need standards,
which assigned a single need standard to represent the entire state.
⁴⁵ The need standard is the maximum level of counted income that a family may have and
still be considered needy. Some states determined the amount of benefits available in a way
that meant not all “needy” families received cash aid (i.e., state need standard was higher
than its maximum cash benefit). However, for purposes of Title IV-E, a child may be an
eligible child if the family income met the state’s need standard (that is regardless of
whether or not the family would have been eligible for a cash benefit).
⁴⁶ Readers should be aware that data on the share of all foster care children who are eligible
for Title IV-E maintenance payments are notoriously bad, that the share of these “IV-E
eligible” children varies greatly by state, and also may vary depending on source of data.
The national percentages discussed here are based on a comparison of the total estimated
foster care caseload on the last day of the given year compared to the average monthly
number of children for whom IV-E claims were made in the same given year.

adoption assistance program is estimated to be closer to 74%; thus, costs for this
program would rise significantly, albeit not as dramatically. Accordingly, proposals
to remove all income eligibility for these programs have sought to simply cap the
amount of funds available for the programs, and/or to reduce or neutralize cost to the
federal treasury by reducing the federal matching rate for certain foster care and
adoption assistance claims.
Home of Removal and the Rosales Decision. In both its FY2005 and
FY2006 budgets, the Bush Administration has proposed amending the statute to
“clarify” Title IV-E eligibility rules that relate to a child’s “home of removal.” No
legislation has yet been introduced. However, as stated in the budget documents, the
intent of such legislation would be to effectively nullify a March 2003 decision in the
Ninth Circuit Court (Rosales v. Thompson, 321 F. 3d. 835). In its FY2006 budget,
the Administration projects the savings for the proposed “clarification” of this
statutory language to be $399 million for five years. (CBO projects the savings at
close to the same amount for those five years—$431 million.)⁴⁷
Prior to Rosales, HHS had held that states may only claim Title IV-E eligibility
if a child would have been eligible for AFDC (as the program existed on July 16,
1996, in the given state) in the home from which the child was removed for his/her
protection. The Rosales decision, however, held that if the child was no longer living
in the home considered unsafe but was instead living with another relative at the time
his/her parental home was found unsafe (i.e., contrary to his or her welfare), then the
child’s Title IV-E eligibility could be based on the relative’s home (rather than the
home found to be unsafe). Under AFDC program rules a child who is not living with
his/her biological parents but is living with a specified relative would nearly always⁴⁸
be considered eligible for cash aid. Thus the Rosales decision could expand the
ability of states in the Ninth Circuit (California—where the case originated;
Washington, Oregon, Arizona, Montana, Idaho, Nevada, Alaska, Hawaii) to
determine that children are eligible for Title IV-E foster care.
HHS has instructed states in the Ninth Circuit that they are to amend their plans
to comply with this court decision. State claims under this revised definition of
eligibility are expected to have only recently been made (if they have been made at
all) and the process of changing state plans and modifying how eligibility
determinations are done is presumed to be ongoing for most states in the Ninth
Circuit. In the meantime, HHS notes that states outside the Ninth Circuit may not

⁴⁷ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and
Families, “CBO Estimates for Foster Care & Adoption Assistance, Mar. 2005 baseline, Re-
estimate of Administration Proposals,” FY2006 Budget Justifications, G-13. The estimated
“savings” cited here relates to “budget authority.”
⁴⁸ This is due to how income and resources are counted. For a child living with his or her
parents, the income and resources of the parents must be considered in determining AFDC
eligibility. For a child not living with his or her parents but who is living with a specified
relative, only the income or resources of the child need be considered.

alter their state plans in this same way but must continue to determine eligibility
based on the child’s home of removal.⁴⁹
The Rosales decision would primarily impact projected federal child welfare
funding if legislation to make the statutory clarification is not made. As responded
to by HHS, the decision effectively establishes different rules for AFDC eligibility
in the Ninth Circuit states than for those in the rest of the nation. States in other
Circuits may also choose to challenge the HHS interpretation of the statute (with
regard to home of removal and determining AFDC eligibility) but it is not clear that
another court would reach the same conclusion as did the Rosales court. For Ninth
Circuit states the decision (unless nullified by Congress) would allow greater access
to Title IV-E funds and could change policy and practice with regard to relative
placements.
Capping or Block Granting Foster Care Funds. Advocates of capping
funding for foster care argue that doing this would give states more flexibility in how
they spend federal child welfare dollars and that it would be consistent with the
federal government’s commitment to ensuring that foster care remains a temporary
setting for most children. (Recent proposals have not suggested capping Adoption
Assistance funding.) Opponents of the block grant argue that a funding cap amounts
to the federal government reneging on its commitment to protect vulnerable children
—even in the best run state child welfare agency, caseloads may rise, and children
who must be removed from their homes need to be provided care in any case. Many
also question whether these proposals meaningfully increase state flexibility in use
of child welfare funds and they fear that block granting will ultimately mean less
federal money for foster care than would otherwise be the case.
Amount and Distribution of Capped Foster Care Funding. Proposals
to cap or block grant foster care funding have usually based those capped funding
levels on recent expenditure amounts and have made some provisions to expand the
amount of funding (using an inflation adjustment or other method) over a fixed
period of time. Because federal foster care spending has been declining—and is
expected to continue to do so—choosing a base historical spending period is an
increasingly critical part of any financing proposal. In addition, the share of funds
each state is expected to receive from this grant remains a key question. Here again,
recent proposals typically rely on past state expenditures, or a state’s share of overall
past expenditures (for a given period) to establish distribution of capped funds. For
a host of reasons—because states are eligible to receive different federal matching
rates, because they have shown different ability to draw down federal funding,
because they have made different choices about which federal funding sources to
pursue, because foster care reimbursement claims (within a given state) are
notoriously uneven from year to year, and because some states have experienced
recent changes in the size of their caseloads that effect the distribution of funds
(states with caseload growth get more dollars; those with declines fewer)—this piece

⁴⁹ See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and
Families, ACYF-CB-IM-04-03, Feb. 27, 2004, available online at [http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/
programs /cb/laws/im/im0403.pdf].

of any financing proposal is also critical. (See Appendix C for Title IV-E funding
amounts, and overall share, by state, for FY2001-FY2003.)
Setting total funding at or slightly above current spending for a program and
establishing distribution of that money based on prior distribution patterns has the
strong political advantage of ensuring no (or limited and measured) increased cost
to the federal treasury enabling a guarantee that no state sees a reduction in nominal
dollars available for foster care. At the same time, freezing the distribution levels
based on the amount of past claims made by a given state locks in any current
inequities in the federal child welfare financing structure and provides no mechanism
for changes in need for federal funding based on demographic changes (e.g., size of
child population, or the number of poor children in each state may shift over time),
foster care caseload spikes, or other factors not currently identifiable. (See
Appendix D, for hypothetical distributions of foster care funds using a variety of
baseline data.)
Some proposals have suggested availability of contingency funds to meet
unanticipated caseload spikes. Critical questions regarding contingency proposals
include when could the funds be accessed (e.g., what indicates that a caseload spike
is outside of the control of the child welfare agency), how much contingency funding
should be available, and are there other unpredictable circumstances that might
require access to contingency funds?
Flexibility. In the context of changing how federal child welfare funds are
distributed, “flexibility” usually means nixing the look back provision (states could
serve children without regard to the 1996 eligibility provisions of the now defunct
AFDC program) and allowing states to spend what are now foster care program funds
on any of the broad range of child welfare purposes, including services. Some
proposals have coupled broader eligibility for Title IV-E foster care (either complete
removal of the income test or modernizing the test by allowing states to use their
TANF income rules) with continued open-ended funding for foster care, and
authorization of new open-ended and/or capped mandatory funding for new services
or other child welfare purposes. These proposals would grant states flexibility to
spend federal dollars on more children and for a greater number of purposes
(although those purposes would remain defined by the federal government) and
would generally expand the use of federal funds to permit this flexibility. Other
proposals have advocated allowing states to spend federal funds on any foster care
child and for a broad range of services, while simultaneously seeking to cap foster
care funding and/or reduce the share of federal funding available for every eligible
child. Thus these proposals attempt to permit flexibility with little or no increase in
the amount of federal funding for child welfare.
Proponents of flexibility as part of capped funding proposals suggest that this
change would allow states to spend money on children before they are removed from
the home and thus to prevent their removal and costly placement in foster care. They
cite the continued desire of states to waive program rules and spend Title IV-E
dollars on a range of services as an indication of states’ belief that they can
accomplish more with the same money if they have flexibility to spend funds how

they choose.⁵⁰ In addition, they might point to the ability of states to redirect
spending currently used to determine eligibility (under 1996 AFDC program rules)
to provide services. Between FY1999-FY2003, state and federal spending (split 50-
50) for eligibility determinations averaged $177 million annually. This is a small
share of the overall foster care administrative cost; at the same time it is significantly
more than the combined funding available to states under CAPTA in FY2005 ($70
million).
Critics of capped funding proposals argue that the authority to use program
funds for the whole range of child welfare services could prove an empty promise
given that no, or relatively modest, new funds would be available. While they
acknowledge that a decrease in the size of a state’s foster care caseload could give
states some flexibility, they also point out that any unplanned increase in the size of
the caseload would apparently constrain state flexibility in spending more than is the
case now. Further, no one has proposed a reduction in the far more costly federal
program rules related to case planning; indeed many of these rules are aimed at a
central goal of the child welfare system—achieving timely permanency for children
in care. Between FY1999-FY2003, the average annual total case planning and
management costs for Title IV-E-eligible children alone was $2.0 billion. As this
cost, and the still more costly provision of room and board (the FY1999-FY2003
average annual federal and state maintenance payment costs for Title IV-E eligible
children was $3.4 billion) will remain relatively unchanged, critics charge that
finding money to spend on prevention of placement might not be possible.
Flexibility and Kind of Funding. With regard to federal dedicated child
welfare funding, programs that grant states the greatest degree of choice in how they
spend their money are the least well funded and have discretionary appropriations
(i.e., CAPTA and Child Welfare Services under Subpart 1 of Title IV-B), while the
programs that most constrain state choice in spending receive open-ended funding
(i.e., the Title IV-E Foster Care and Adoption Assistance programs) and offer states
virtually no ability to direct how they use these dollars (outside of waivers). There
is some logic to this; federal lawmakers like to know what they are buying. Without
a closely defined program authority, an open-ended funding stream is akin to writing
a blank check (limited simply by the ability of states to imagine ways to spend the
money and provide their own matching dollars). To protect the federal treasury then,
lawmakers create rules that limit the federal matching rate, and closely define on
whose behalf the money may be used and for what purposes. By contrast, fixed

⁵⁰ Under Section 1130 of the Social Security Act, states may seek waivers of certain federal
child welfare rules (contained in Title IV-B and Title IV-E of the Social Security Act) to
demonstrate innovative ways of using federal child welfare funds. Compared with states
that sought to implement waivers for what HHS defined as a “managed care” demonstration
project (generally services made available for various subsets of children via a contracted
private provider), states that operated flexible funding waivers (generally a range of pre-
placement or in-placement services made available to maltreated children, those at imminent
risk of placement and those in placement via a local/county public child welfare agency)
were more likely to complete the five-year waiver term and to seek its renewal. Brief
descriptions of these waivers are available on the HHS/ACF Children’s Bureau website at
[http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/progr ams/cb/initiatives/cwwaiver/summary.htm] .

funding programs may simply offer dollars with the directive that states spend these
resources to achieve certain broad purposes.
For some, the appeal of capped funding—provided it is available on a
mandatory instead of a discretionary basis—is that states may create a plan of
services within the guaranteed funding level. With regard to child welfare services
in particular, defining eligible children and families and the services for which child
welfare should pay, is sticky. In general, any child may be the victim of abuse and
neglect by a family member. The fact that poor children tend to experience
maltreatment more often than those who are not poor does not mean that all or even
most poor children are maltreated; neither does it mean that no child from a middle
or high income family will experience such maltreatment. Thus eligibility for
services related to child welfare needs tends to be broadly written and the need for
such a service is essentially decided by the caseworker (based on social work
principles). Further, many services (e.g., counseling, mental health treatment,
substance abuse treatment), might be considered the primary function of other public
agencies. Does the child welfare agency—and by extension federal child welfare
funding—bear responsibility for these service costs? Or should the responsibility of
the child welfare agency be to simply bring the child or parent to the service (paid for
out of another public source)? And if the service, which might be costly, doesn’t
exist (e.g., no appropriate substance abuse or mental health treatment services can be
accessed), is it the job of the child welfare agency, and by extension federal child
welfare funds, to build such capacity?
Capped mandatory funding could relieve federal lawmakers of some of these
eligibility and service need decisions and, might also allow states to design programs
that mesh best with their own needs and resources. At the same time, if the amount
of funding is decided without regard to current resources and needs, or if it is static
(meaning its value does not at least rise with inflation) it would seem to give states
less opportunity to alter the status quo.
Accountability. Advocates of change to the federal child welfare structure
have not called for less accountability but—in keeping with the proposed shift to cap
more of the dedicated child welfare funding—the meaning of accountability has
shifted from fiscal rules to outcome measures. Indeed, over more than two decades,
Congress has established mandatory data reporting for child welfare agencies,
required establishment of a new federal review system to gauge how well states
achieve the goals of federal child welfare policy, and has added significant new
program rules intended to better ensure the goals of safety and permanency for
children are achieved. While there is broad bipartisan appeal and support for these
efforts, the focus on accountability without significant new funding to achieve higher
standards (like the discussion of flexibility without new funding) has drawn criticism
from some advocates as well as those policymakers who believe the system is
fundamentally underfunded.
Calls for New Funding Sources. Some proposals have called for new
funding tied to achievement of specific goals (e.g., lower caseworker to client ratio),
or achievement of certain outcomes (e.g., reduced length of stay). Other recent
proposals have supported new or increased access to federal funds for training of
child welfare workers or to implement program improvements. The most ambitious

proposals have sought new open-ended funding for particular categories of services
or individuals, including subsidized guardianship.
Incentive or Performance Funding. On the whole, proposals for this type
of funding are relatively small in scale and may be popular with both those who
believe the current system is adequately funded, as well as with those who think it
is underfunded. The enactment of Adoption Incentives (P.L. 105-89), which
provides bonus funds to states that increase the number of children who are adopted
out of public foster care, coincided with continued and expanded growth in these
adoptions, and encourages the idea of performance funding.⁵¹ Along with the
significant task of ensuring that whatever measure is used adequately reflects a state’s
true performance, incentive proposals must be designed to avoid perverse incentives.
(For instance, if a state is to be rewarded for reducing the amount of time a child is
in foster care, how will the state’s performance be measured and will this incentive
encourage the state to reunify a child too quickly, compromising his/her safety.)
While many of these performance funding proposals would roughly follow the
Adoption Incentives model—authorizing a relatively small pot of funding to be
divvied out to states that meet the performance goals—a much broader kind of
performance funding proposal would link significant parts of existing federal funds
to achievement of certain performance goals. Although no formal legislation of this
type has been offered, informal proposals have suggested maintaining open-ended
funding for foster care but linking the amount of federal matching funds to the state’s
achievement of a specific outcome for a specific foster care child. (As a purely
hypothetical example: a state could receive a 75% federal match of program costs
for a child during the first year of his/her stay in foster care; this federal match would
be reduced to 50% if the child remained in care for more than three years, and to 0%
for a state extending more than five years.)
Subsidized Guardianship. New spending for subsidized guardianship has
been the focus of numerous proposals in recent years. Guardianship is a legal
relationship that grants custody and decision-making rights (e.g., with regard to
education) to an adult caretaker of a child. Proponents argue that federal support of
guardianship for children who cannot otherwise be adopted and who might otherwise
remain for many years in foster care, is consistent with the federal goal of finding a
permanent home for every foster care child. Currently, five states are operating under
waivers of the Title IV-E program that allow them to use Title IV-E funds for
subsidized guardianship (IL, MT, NC, NM, OR). Requests from two additional
states (MN, WI) to implement such waivers have been recently approved and at least
six additional states (AK, IA, ME, MI, NJ, VA) have similar requests pending.⁵²

⁵¹ For more information, see CRS Report RL32296, Child Welfare: The Adoption Incentives
Program, by Kendall Swenson.
⁵² Two additional states completed five-year waivers of which guardianship was a
component. These states either withdrew their original request for an extension (MD) or
were not granted an extension of the waiver (DE).

Eleven states use TANF to fund subsidized guardianship, and at least one state (SD)
uses SSBG funds for this purpose.⁵³
There appears to be broad sympathy for the provision of subsidized
guardianship; however, the cost of a new open-ended program continues to raise
concerns. Proponents argue that in addition to better meeting the needs of children,
the cost of guardianship (primarily due to less case management cost) is far less than
foster care. Thus, moving a child out of long-term foster care into permanent
guardianship saves money. Opponents might suggest that because many times
guardians are relatives, these family members should bear the largest responsibility
for the cost of raising their kin and, further, that such caretakers, regardless of their
own income, are usually eligible to receive TANF cash aid on behalf of the child
(child-only benefits).
Conclusion
Federal policymakers may choose to alter how dedicated federal funds for child
welfare purposes are made available to states. This change might be prompted by the
belief that the current system encourages states to over rely on foster care or
otherwise hampers states’ ability to achieve positive outcomes for children and
families. Alternatively, more limited change may be tied to the concern that the
federal statute currently links states’ ability to receive their largest share of child
welfare funds to static 1996 income rules and that if unchanged, this provision (the
“look back”) will erode federal support for children in need of protection. Any
changes made to the amount and/or distribution of dedicated federal child welfare
funds would occur in the context of greatly varied use by states of other federal funds
for child welfare, particularly TANF, Medicaid, and SSBG. The varied use of these
non-dedicated funds and their less certain availability for child welfare purposes,
adds complexity to the picture of federal support for child welfare.
Congress could choose to eliminate or replace the look back provision and to
leave unchanged the current structure for distributing child welfare funds. For
instance, they could strike the look back entirely or they could replace the current
AFDC link with a link to TANF, to a given percent of the federal poverty level, or
to some other eligibility standard. Costs for these options would vary in relation to
their effect on the size of the eligible Title IV-E caseloads (more children eligible -
more cost and vice versa). But any of these options would address the declining
federal support for foster care and adoption assistance that appears inherent in the
look back provision and would not need to address other aspects of the current
distribution of federal funds dedicated to child welfare (e.g., mix of open-ended
mandatory, capped mandatory, and discretionary funds).

⁵³ Children’s Defense Fund, State Subsidized Guardianship Laws At a Glance, Oct. 2004.
Of the states listed in this report as using TANF for subsidized guardianship programs, only
NJ is now seeking a Title IV-E waiver to fund this purpose. However, one of these states
(IN) had (at least temporarily) stopped adding new children due to a reduction in available
TANF funds, at least half made guardianship payments under the foster care payment level,
and not all of them directed this guardianship assistance to children leaving foster care.

More sweeping changes, as included in several recent proposals, would greatly
expand Title IV-E eligibility but would reduce the resulting cost to the federal
treasury by capping certain funds and/or reducing the federal matching rate for some
program purposes. If policymakers choose to design more sweeping changes to the
federal child welfare structure, they may need to explore for what purposes federal
child welfare funding might best be provided on a capped basis (affording states the
greatest ability to direct the use of these funds); if there are certain categories for
which they want to insist that states must spend a certain amount of federal dollars
(e.g., family preservation services, adoption promotion and support, or training for
child welfare workers who assess need for services); and if there are categories for
which the federal government should open, or keep open, its checkbook (e.g.,
subsidized guardianship, foster care room and board, case planning for children in
foster care, adoption assistance).

Appendix A
Congressional Interest in Child Welfare, Selected Legislation
Titles referenced in this table are a part of the Social Security Act
¹⁹¹²^P.L^.¹¹⁶^es^tablis^hes^{the federal Children’s}^B^u^reau^t^oⁱ^nve^stⁱ^g^at^e^an^d^report^on^al^l
^m^a^t^t^e^rs^rel^a^tⁱⁿ^g^t^o^t^h^{e w}^e^l^f^{are of}^chⁱ^l^d^ren^(P.L^{. 116).}
¹⁹³⁵^T^itle^V,^P^a^r^t³^o^f^th^{e o}^r^igⁱⁿ^al^S^o^ci^al^S^ecu^ri^ty^A^c^t^(P.L^{. 271) au}^th^ori^zes^fed^eral^C^hⁱ^l^d
^Welf^a^{re Serv}^{ices f}^unding^“^f^{or th}^e^p^r^otection^an^{d care of}^h^o^m^e^les^s^,^depen^d^en^{t, an}^d
ⁿ^e^g^l^{ected ch}^ildren^,^an^{d ch}^ildrenⁱⁿ^dan^g^e^{r of}^becomⁱⁿ^g^delin^qu^en^t.”
¹⁹⁶¹^S^t^a^t^e^s^{are given the tem}^p^or^{ary option to s}^eek^federal^funds^{for a child placed i}ⁿ
^fos^t^{er care}^—^p^rovⁱ^{ded t}^h^at^t^h^{e ch}ⁱ^l^d^w^a^s^rem^o^v^e^{d f}^r^om^{a h}^o^m^eⁱⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^h^he^/^s^h^e^w^a^s
^e^lⁱ^gⁱ^b^l^e^f^o^r^Aⁱ^d^to^Dep^eⁿ^d^en^{t Ch}^ild^r^eⁿ⁽^A^DC)^an^d^th^{at a j}^u^d^g^{e h}^a^d^d^e^ter^mⁱⁿ^ed^t^h^a^t
^r^e^m^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^th^{at h}^o^m^e^w^a^{s “}^c^oⁿ^tr^ar^y^to^th^{e w}^e^lf^ar^{e” o}^f^th^{e ch}^ild⁽^P^.L^{. 8}⁷^-³¹⁾^.
¹⁹⁶²^P.L^.^87-⁵⁴³^authorizes^{Federal fos}^t^{er care p}^a^y^m^eⁿ^ts^on^{a p}^erm^an^en^{t (i}ⁿ^d^e^fiⁿⁱ^te)
^ba^sis^{as p}^a^r^t^o^f^th^{e n}^e^w^l^y^r^eⁿ^a^m^e^d^Aⁱ^d^to^Fam^{ilies w}^ith^Dep^eⁿ^d^en^{t Ch}^ild^r^eⁿ⁽^A^FDC)
^prog^ram^;^als^o^requ^ires^coordin^a^tion^betw^een^C^h^{ild W}^e^lf^{are Serv}^ices^an^d^s^e^rv^ices^of^f^e^red
^und^e^r^A^F^D^C^.
¹⁹⁶⁷^{Federal fos}^t^{er care}^{eligibility ex}^panded^{to in}^clu^d^{e a ch}^{ild w}^h^o^w^oul^{d have}^been^elig^ib^le
^f^o^r^A^F^{DC if}^an^ap^p^licatioⁿ^f^o^r^th^{is aid}^h^a^d^b^een^m^a^d^e^;^{Child Welfare Services}^m^oved
^{to a n}^e^w^Tⁱ^tl^{e I}^V^-B^;^E^m^ergency^As^sⁱ^s^t^{ance is}^created⁽^a^{s p}^a^r^t^o^f^T^{itle I}^V^-^A⁾⁽^P^.L^{. 9}⁰^-
^{248, pas}^s^e^{d D}^{ec. 1967, s}ⁱ^gⁿ^e^{d i}ⁿ^t^o^l^a^w^Jan^.^1968).
¹⁹⁷⁴^C^hⁱ^l^d^A^b^u^s^{e Preven}^ti^on^an^d^T^r^e^a^t^m^eⁿ^t^A^c^{t (P.L}^{. 93-247, C}^A^P^T^A^{) en}^acted^{, r}^e^q^u^irⁱⁿ^g
^s^t^ates^{to h}^a^v^e^procedu^r^es^f^o^{r receiv}ⁱⁿ^g^an^dⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tig^atin^g^reports^of^ch^{ild m}^a^ltreatm^eⁿ^t^.
¹⁹⁷⁵^Tⁱ^{tle XX created w}ⁱ^{th an annual $}²^.⁵^b^illio^{n f}^unding^ceiling^{. (It prim}^arily^replaces
^w^h^at^{, bet}^w^een^1963-^{1972, h}^a^{d been}^open^-^en^{ded f}^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^of^s^o^ci^al^s^e^rvⁱ^ces^t^o^A^F^D^C^an^d
^“^pot^en^tⁱ^a^l^”^A^F^D^C^reci^pi^en^t^s^{.) A}^m^on^gⁱ^t^s^fⁱ^v^e^broad^g^o^al^s^{are “}^p^rev^eⁿ^tⁱⁿ^g^{or rem}^e^dyⁱⁿ^g
ⁿ^e^g^l^{ect, abu}^s^{e or ex}^ploitation^of^ch^ildren^an^d^ad^u^{lts u}ⁿ^a^b^l^{e to}^p^r^o^t^ect^th^eir^o^wⁿⁱⁿ^ter^e^st,
^{or pres}^ervⁱⁿ^g^,^reh^a^bilitatin^g^an^{d reu}ⁿ^itin^g^f^a^m^ilies^”^(P^.L^{. 93-}^647).
¹⁹⁸⁰^Th^e^A^d^op^ti^on^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^an^{ce an}^d^C^hⁱ^l^d^W^e^l^f^{are A}^c^{t (P.L}^{. 96-272}⁾^,^a^ke^y^s^t^o^ne^o^f^t^h^e
^cu^rren^{t f}^e^{deral ch}^{ild w}^e^lf^{are s}^t^ru^ctu^r^e^creates^{a federal adopti}^{on as}^sⁱ^s^t^ance^program^,
^est^a^{blishes f}^e^dera^{l f}^o^st^{er ca}^{re a}^s^aⁿ^independent^pro^g^r^a^m^(b^o^t^h^p^l^acedⁱⁿ^{a n}^e^w^T^itle
^IV-^E^),^an^d^lⁱⁿ^k^s^th^es^{e p}^r^ogr^a^m^s^{to a revam}^{ped Child Welfare Services}^program
^uⁿ^d^er^T^itle^I^V^-^B^.^Fuⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^f^o^r^T^{itle I}^V^-^E^{is o}^p^eⁿ^-^en^d^e^d^;^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^f^o^r^T^{itle I}^V^-^B^au^th^o^r^ized
^on^{a dis}^c^retion^a^ry^basⁱ^s^{at $266 m}^illion^.^T^h^{e la}^wⁱⁿ^t^eⁿ^d^s^{to dis}^c^ou^rag^e^f^o^s^t^{er care}
^placem^en^{t an}^{d in}^creas^{e th}^{e u}^s^{e of}^prev^en^tiv^e^s^e^rv^ices^.^{It au}^th^orizes^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^m^ech^an^is^m^s
^desⁱ^gⁿ^e^{d to en}^cou^r^ag^{e s}^t^ates^to^of^f^e^r^certain^protection^s^{to a g}^r^eaterⁿ^u^m^ber^of^ch^ildren
ⁱⁿ^f^o^s^t^{er care an}^{d to cap th}^eir^f^o^s^t^er^{care s}^p^en^din^g^.^T^h^{e law}^f^u^rth^e^{r prov}^ides^th^{at capped}
^m^a^{ndatory fundi}^ng^{for T}ⁱ^{tle XX Social Services}^is^{to ris}^e^{to $3.3 billion by}^FY1985^.
¹⁹⁸¹^Th^e^{Social Services}^B^l^ock^G^r^ant^(SSB^G⁾^cons^olidates^s^e^{veral s}^o^ci^{al s}^{ervice s}^p^ending
^s^t^ream^s^{into a rew}^{ritten T}ⁱ^{tle XX}^bu^t^m^aⁱⁿ^t^aⁱⁿ^s^t^h^e^pu^rpos^es^of^t^h^e^pri^o^{r prog}^ram^.^T^h^e
^SSB^{G f}^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^ceilin^g^is^s^e^{t at $2.4 billion}^f^o^{r FY1982 ris}ⁱⁿ^g^to^$2.7^billion^by^FY1986
^(P.L^{. 97-}^35).
¹⁹⁸⁶^F^e^deral^{(capped, m}^aⁿ^d^at^ory⁾^f^{unds f}^o^{r serv}^{ices t}^o^{help f}^o^st^er^ca^re^y^o^u^t^h^{, a}^g^e¹⁶^aⁿ^d
^ol^d^{er, m}^a^k^e^th^{e tran}^sⁱ^ti^on^{to i}ⁿ^d^e^p^eⁿ^d^eⁿ^t^lⁱ^vⁱⁿ^{g a}^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^on^{a tem}^p^{orary b}^a^sⁱ^s
^(P.L^{. 99-}^272);^Depa^rt^m^e^nt^o^f^H^e^a^l^t^h^a^{nd H}^u^m^a^{n Serv}^{ices required}^t^o^est^a^blish^aⁿ
^Advis^o^{ry Com}^mⁱ^{ttee to}^m^a^k^e^reco^m^m^e^ndations^on^da^{ta collection}^an^{d to is}^s^u^{e f}ⁱⁿ^a^l
^ru^l^e^s^f^o^{r m}^aⁿ^d^at^ory^col^l^ectⁱ^oⁿ^of^adoptⁱ^oⁿ^an^{d f}^o^s^t^{er care dat}^a^(P.L^{. 99-}^{509). F}ⁱⁿ^a^l
^r^e^g^u^l^atioⁿ^s^im^p^l^em^en^tin^g^th^{e r}^e^su^ltin^g^A^d^o^p^tioⁿ^an^d^Fo^ster^Car^e^Aⁿ^aly^s^{is an}^d^Rep^o^r^tin^g
^S^y^s^t^em^(A^F^C^A^R^S⁾^w^e^{re i}^s^s^u^{ed i}ⁿ^D^{ec. 1993.}

¹⁹⁹³^G^r^ants^{for fam}^{ily pres}^{ervation and}^fam^{ily s}^{upport s}^ervices^authorized^wⁱ^t^h^a^nnua^l
^m^aⁿ^d^atory^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^s^e^t^a^t^{$60 m}^illion^f^o^{r FY1994 ris}ⁱⁿ^g^{to at leas}^{t $255 m}^illion^by
^F^Y^{1998. In}^depen^d^en^t^lⁱ^vⁱⁿ^g^s^e^rvⁱ^ces^au^t^h^ori^zed^on^{a perm}^an^en^t^basⁱ^s^wⁱ^t^h^a^nnua^l^c^a^p^p^e^d
^m^aⁿ^d^atory^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^of^{$70 m}^illion^(P^.L^{. 103-}^66).
¹⁹⁹⁴^HHS^req^uⁱ^red^{to crea}^t^e^an^d^is^s^u^{e form}^{al regu}^l^ation^s^{for a n}^e^w^review^s^y^s^t^em^to
^b^e^tter^{assess state co}^m^p^lian^{ce w}^ith^f^e^d^e^r^a^l^ch^ild^w^e^lf^ar^e^p^o^licy⁽^fⁱⁿ^{al r}^e^g^u^l^atioⁿ^s^issu^ed
^Jan^.^2000);^ef^f^ectⁱ^v^{e n}^o^l^a^t^e^{r t}^h^an^O^c^t^.^1,¹⁹^96,^{child pro}^t^ect^io^{ns ext}^e^{nded t}^o^a^l^l
^{children in fos}^t^{er care}^{, an}^{d s}^t^ates^a^r^e^r^e^qu^{ired to h}^a^v^e^pre-^placem^en^{t prev}^en^tion
^s^e^rv^ices^;^{HHS authorized}^to^w^a^ive^{certain T}ⁱ^{tle I}^V^-B^or^I^V^-E^requirem^ents^{to allow}
^{up to 10 s}^t^ates^{to dem}^o^ns^tr^a^t^eⁱⁿ^novat^{ive us}^{e of federal}^{child w}^e^{lfare funds}^(P^.L^.
^103-^432).
¹⁹⁹⁶^P^e^rs^on^{al R}^e^s^pon^sⁱ^bility^an^{d W}^o^rk^Opportuⁿⁱ^t^y^A^c^t^{(PRWORA) repea}^{ls AFDC a}ⁿ^d
^E^m^{ergency As}^sⁱ^s^t^ance^an^d^cr^{eates th}^{e T}^e^m^p^o^r^ar^y^A^ssistan^{ce f}^o^r^Need^y^Fam^ilies
^(T^A^N^F⁾^bl^ock^g^r^an^t^.^Elig^ibilit^y^f^o^{r f}^e^dera^{l f}^o^st^{er ca}^{re a}^nd⁽^m^o^s^t⁾^a^d^o^p^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^ssist^aⁿ^ce
^rem^aⁱ^ns^link^e^{d t}^o^t^h^{e inco}^m^e^a^{nd f}^a^m^ily^s^t^{ructure rules}^{of the old AFDC program}
^(as^th^ey^w^e^{re in}^{place in}^gⁱ^v^eⁿ^s^t^{ate on}^Ju^ly^{16, 1996) (P}^.L^{. 104-}^193).
¹⁹⁹⁷^{Adoption and Safe Fam}^ilies^{Act (ASFA)}^increas^e^s^{frequency of cas}^e^pl^aⁿ^ning
^procedures^{, r}^e^q^u^irⁱⁿ^g^aⁿⁱⁿ^{itial p}^l^an^w^ithⁱⁿ¹²^m^oⁿ^t^h^s^o^r^r^e^m^o^v^a^{l (}^r^ath^e^r^th^en¹⁸⁾^an^d
^r^e^na^m^e^{s t}^hⁱ^s^p^r^o^c^e^{ss “p}^e^r^m^a^ne^nc^y^”^p^l^aⁿⁿⁱ^ng;^inst^it^ut^{es Tit}^l^{e IV-}^E^{rules int}^e^{nded t}^o
^ens^u^{re s}^a^fety^{of child}^is^pre-^emⁱⁿ^en^{t con}^cernⁱⁿ^{all placem}^en^{t decis}ⁱ^on^s^;^requires^s^t^ates
^{to initiate term}^inatio^{n of parental}^rights^proceedings^for^each^{child in fos}^t^{er care 15}
^{of th}^{e l}^a^s^t²²^m^oⁿ^t^h^s^{, u}ⁿ^l^es^s^g^{ood cau}^s^eⁿ^o^t^t^o^{do s}^o^;^es^tab^lⁱ^s^h^e^s^A^d^op^ti^on^Iⁿ^cen^ti^ves
^t^o^pay^s^t^at^es^bon^u^s^es^f^o^{r i}ⁿ^creasⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e n}^u^m^ber^of^chⁱ^l^d^ren^adopt^{ed ou}^t^of^pu^blⁱ^c^f^o^s^t^er
^care;^{requires a}^nnua^l^repo^r^t^o^f^st^a^t^{e a}^c^hiev^em^ent^o^f^{required o}^u^t^c^o^m^{es f}^o^{r children}^;
^ext^e^{nds a}^u^t^h^o^r^iza^t^io^{n o}^f^Subpa^rt²^o^f^Tit^l^e^IV-^B^,^r^e^na^mⁱ^{ng i}^t^t^h^e^P^r^o^m^o^tⁱ^ng^Sa^fe^aⁿ^d
^Stab^{le Fam}^ilies,^requiring^st^a^t^{e t}^o^{use f}^unding^f^o^{r t}^w^o^new^ca^t^e^g^o^r^{ies o}^f^serv^ices—
^a^d^o^p^tⁱ^oⁿ^pro^m^o^t^io^{n a}^{nd suppo}^r^t^a^{nd t}ⁱ^m^e^lim^it^{ed reunif}ⁱ^ca^tⁱ^oⁿ^—an^d^r^a^isin^g
^m^aⁿ^d^atory^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^cap^{to $305 m}^illion^by^FY2001;^ex^p^aⁿ^d^s^au^th^ori^t^{y of HHS}^toⁱ^s^s^u^e
^w^aⁱ^v^e^r^s^o^f^I^V^-^E^o^r^I^V^-^B^r^u^l^e^s^t^oⁱⁿ^c^l^u^d^e^u^p^t^o¹⁰^d^e^m^oⁿ^s^t^r^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^p^r^oj^ects^each^y^e^a^r
^t^h^r^o^{ugh FY}^{2002 (P.L}^{. 105-}^89).
¹⁹⁹⁹^{Capped entitlem}^{ent funding for i}^{ndependent living}^s^ervices^doubled^{to $140 m}^illion
^a^nnua^l^l^y^aⁿ^d^se^r^vⁱ^c^e^s^a^v^aⁱ^l^a^b^l^e^e^x^p^a^nd^e^d^,^aⁿ^d^se^r^vⁱ^c^e^s^fo^r^y^o^ut^{h w}^h^o^e^xⁱ^t^fo^st^e^r^c^a^r^e
^w^ith^ou^{t a perm}^an^en^{t h}^o^m^e^are^re^q^uⁱ^r^e^d^{; ren}^a^m^e^s^th^{e prog}^ram^C^h^af^{ee Fos}^t^{er C}^a^re
^In^depen^d^en^{ce (P.L}^{. 106-}^169).
²⁰⁰¹^Prom^{oting Safe and Stable Fam}^ilies^program^am^eⁿ^d^e^d^t^o^{provide additional}
^dis^{cretionary autho}^rⁱ^z^a^t^{ion of $200 m}^{illion annually}^;^es^tablis^hes^dis^cretionary
^{funding authorization ($60}^m^{illion annuall}^{y) fo}^{r education and training vouchers}
^f^o^{r C}^h^af^{ee f}^o^s^t^{er care y}^o^u^t^h^(P.L^{. 107-}^133).
^Source:^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^).

Appendix B
Recent and Proposed Funding For Child Welfare—Funds
Distributed on a Discretionary or Competitive Basis
^Fⁱ^na^{l f}^unding^by^fⁱ^sca^l^y^e^a^r
⁽ⁱ^{n m}^illio^{ns o}^f^do^lla^rs)^Pres^ident’s
^FY²⁰⁰⁶
^Program^request²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰⁵
^Tⁱ^tl^{e I}^V^{-B of th}^{e S}^o^{cial Security Act}
^C^h^{ild W}^e^lf^{are T}^r^ainⁱⁿ^g⁸⁷⁷⁷⁷
^Men^t^oriⁿ^g^C^hⁱ^l^d^ren^of^Pri^s^on^ers⁰¹⁰⁵⁰⁵⁰⁶⁰
^Tⁱ^tl^{e I}^V^-E^{of th}^{e S}^o^{cial Security Act}
^A^doptⁱ^oⁿ^In^cen^tⁱ^v^es⁴³⁴³⁸³²³²
^{Child Abus}^{e Prevention and T}^reatm^{ent Act}
^Discr^e^tioⁿ^a^r^y^Gr^an^ts
^(f^{or res}^earch^an^{d dem}^oⁿ^s^t^r^atⁱ^oⁿ⁾²⁶³⁴³⁴³²³²
^Victim^{s o}^f^{Child Abuse Act}
^C^h^ildren^’^s^A^d^v^o^cacy^C^eⁿ^t^ers⁹¹¹¹³¹⁵¹²
^C^o^u^r^t^A^ppoiⁿ^t^{ed S}^p^eci^al^A^d^v^o^cat^es¹²¹²¹²¹²¹²
^T^r^aⁱⁿⁱ^{ng fo}^r^J^u^dⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^P^e^r^s^o^nne^l²²²²²
^Oth^{er p}^r^ogram^s
^A^b^an^don^{ed In}^f^aⁿ^t^s^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^an^ce¹²¹²¹²¹²¹²
^A^doption^Opportuⁿ^ities²⁷²⁷²⁷²⁷²⁷
^A^doption^A^w^aren^es^s¹³¹³¹³¹³¹³
^Source:^T^a^{ble prepared by}^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^).

CRS-43
Appendix C—Federal Funds Dedicated to Child Welfare, Distribution by State
Table C-1. Dedicated Federal Child Welfare Funding Available for Services FY2001-FY2004, by State
(by fiscal year, in millions of dollars)
^Tⁱ^tl^{e I}^V^{-B of th}^{e S}^o^ci^al^{Security Act}^C^{hild Abus}^{e P}^{revention and T}^reatm^{ent Act}
^Prom^otiⁿ^{g S}^a^{fe an}^d^S^t^ab^l^e
^{Child Welfare Services}^Fa^m^ilies^S^t^a^t^e^G^r^aⁿ^t^s^Co^m^m^unit^y^-^B^a^s^{ed G}^r^aⁿ^t^s^To^t^a^{l t}^o^St^a^t^e
^St^a^t^e²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴
^a^$5.13^$5.30^$5.26^$5.14^$5.68^$7.22^$8.13^$8.49^$0.34^$0.36^$0.36^$0.35^$0.42^$0.47^$0.³²^$0.31^$11.57^$13.36^$14.07^$14.30
^k^a^0.44^0.40^0.27^0.29^0.58^0.79^0.88^0.85^0.10^0.¹⁰^0.10^0.10^0.24^0.24^0.25^0.19^1.36^1.53^1.50^1.44
^izon^a⁵^.21⁵^.24⁴^.97⁵^.46⁴^.88⁶^.35⁶^.75⁷^.47⁰^.41⁰^.43⁰^.43⁰^.46⁰^.53⁰^.56⁰^.53⁰^.57^11.04^12.57^12.69^13.96
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}^k^aⁿ^s^as^3.30^3.31^3.29^3.32^3.00^4.41^5.28^5.33^0.23^0.24^0.24^0.24^0.19^0.19^0.¹⁹^0.19^6.72^8.16^9.00^9.08
^g/w^lⁱ^f^ornⁱ^a^34.04^34.28^34.05^33.24^42.82^55.88^59.88^47.88^2.48^2.64^2.62^2.65^2.⁹⁵^2.55^2.84^2.95^82.29^95.35^99.39^86.72
^s^.or
^le^ak
^l^o^rado^4.10^3.94^3.91^4.02^2.56^3.³⁷^3.33^3.18^0.34^0.36^0.36^0.37^0.29^0.38^0.39^0.52^7.29^8.04^7.99^8.09
^://wikiⁿⁿ^ectⁱ^c^u^t^2.03^2.08^2.06^2.07^2.44^3.42^3.80^3.03^0.28^0.29^0.28^0.29^0.³⁸^0.39^0.40^0.43^5.12^6.17^6.55^5.82
^h^ttp^l^a^w^a^re^0.71^0.78^0.77^0.76^0.62^0.81^0.75^0.73^0.10^0.10^0.10^0.10^0.18^0.18^0.¹⁸^0.18^1.60^1.88^1.81^1.77
^t^{. of}^C^o^l^.^0.30^0.37^0.37^0.37^1.10^1.58^1.83^1.48^0.⁰⁸^0.08^0.08^0.08^0.19^0.19^0.¹⁹^0.19^1.66^2.21^2.47^2.13
^d^a^14.21^14.40^14.31^15.44^14.08^17.⁷⁰^18.70^16.93^1.02^1.07^1.06^1.12^0.98^1.00^0.99^1.05^30.30^34.17^35.06^34.54
^orgⁱ^a⁸^.74⁸^.89⁸^.83⁹^.13⁸^.97^12.35^12.61^12.27^0.61^0.66^0.65^0.67^0.83^0.82^0.⁸¹^0.87^19.15^22.72^22.91^22.95
^w^aⁱⁱ^1.16^1.23^1.22^1.27^1.40^2.18^2.50^2.02^0.13^0.13^0.13^0.13^0.46^0.60^0.76^0.87^3.14^4.15^4.61^4.30
^o¹^.73¹^.78¹^.76¹^.76⁰^.85¹^.07¹^.07¹^.31⁰^.15⁰^.1⁵⁰^.15⁰^.15⁰^.18⁰^.18⁰^.18⁰^.18²^.91³^.18³^.17³^.40
^oⁱ^s¹¹^.⁴⁵¹¹^.⁴⁶¹¹^.³⁸¹¹^.⁴¹¹²^.¹⁶¹⁶^.⁴⁸¹⁷^.⁸⁷¹⁶^.²⁷⁰^.⁹²⁰^.⁹⁶⁰^.⁹⁵⁰^.⁹⁵⁰^.⁸⁸⁰^.⁸⁹⁰^.⁸⁹⁰^.⁹⁰²⁵^.⁴⁰²⁹^.⁷⁸³¹^.⁰⁹²⁹^.⁵⁴
^an^a^a⁶^.⁵⁸⁶^.⁷⁵⁶^.⁷¹⁶^.⁶³^.⁹⁴⁵^.⁶⁶^.⁵⁷^.²⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰^.⁸⁴⁰^.⁸⁴⁰^.⁷⁸⁰^.⁵¹^.³⁶¹³^.¹⁵¹⁴^.¹³¹⁴^.³
^a^3.25^3.24^3.22^3.08^1.77^2.38^2.62^2.48^0.25^0.26^0.25^0.24^0.45^0.79^0.81^0.46^5.71^6.67^6.91^6.27
ⁿ^s^as^3.04^3.03^3.01^2.94^1.69^2.17^2.30^2.43^0.24^0.²⁵^0.25^0.24^0.62^0.75^0.67^0.73^5.59^6.20^6.22^6.34
ⁿ^t^u^c^k^y^4.72^4.68^4.65^4.37^4.63^6.⁴¹^6.87^7.61^0.31^0.33^0.33^0.31^1.70^1.74^1.70^2.03^11.36^13.17^13.55^14.31

CRS-44
^Tⁱ^tl^{e I}^V^{-B of th}^{e S}^o^ci^al^{Security Act}^C^{hild Abus}^{e P}^{revention and T}^reatm^{ent Act}
^Prom^otiⁿ^{g S}^a^{fe an}^d^S^t^ab^l^e
^{Child Welfare Services}^Fa^m^ilies^S^t^a^t^e^G^r^aⁿ^t^s^Co^m^m^unit^y^-^B^a^s^{ed G}^r^aⁿ^t^s^To^t^a^{l t}^o^St^a^t^e
^St^a^t^e²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴
^uⁱ^sⁱ^an^a⁵^.78⁵^.75⁵^.71⁵^.60⁷^.40^10.13^11.83^11.55^0.37^0.39^0.39^0.38^0.36^0.37^0.³⁵^0.34^13.92^16.64^18.28^17.87
^e¹^.35¹^.36¹^.36¹^.28¹^.13¹^.59¹^.68¹^.63⁰^.13⁰^.13⁰^.13⁰^.13⁰^.18⁰^.18⁰^.18⁰^.18²^.79³^.26³^.35³^.21
^l^aⁿ^d^4.49^4.57^4.54^4.54^4.35^5.⁸³^5.91^4.12^0.41^0.43^0.43^0.43^0.50^0.63^0.52^0.63^9.74^11.46^11.39^9.73
^s^ach^u^s^et^t^s^4.62^4.59^4.56^4.20^4.19^5.59^6.04^5.00^0.45^0.47^0.47^0.45^0.⁴⁹^0.46^0.75^0.44^9.75^11.12^11.82^10.09
^chⁱ^g^an^10.04^10.18^10.06^9.84^10.08^13.73^15.06^13.82^0.75^0.78^0.77^0.76^0.82^0.89^0.⁸³^0.98^21.69^25.57^26.72^25.40
ⁿⁿ^e^s^o^t^a^4.87^4.63^4.58^4.42^2.97^3.80^4.35^4.27^0.40^0.41^0.41^0.39^1.90^1.94^1.⁷⁵^1.39^10.14^10.79^11.09^10.48
^s^sⁱ^s^sⁱ^ppi^3.91^3.91^3.88^3.79^4.54^6.02^6.04^6.33^0.26^0.27^0.27^0.26^0.21^0.21^0.²¹^0.21^8.92^10.42^10.40^10.59
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}^s^o^u^rⁱ⁵^.99⁶^.02⁵^.99⁵^.85⁵^.67⁷^.57⁸^.59⁸^.86⁰^.43⁰^.45⁰^.45⁰^.43⁰^.45⁰^.47⁰^.47⁰^.46^12.55^14.51^15.49^15.61
^g/w^t^an^a⁰^.87⁰^.85⁰^.89⁰^.84⁰^.77¹^.07¹^.22¹^.13⁰^.11⁰^.11⁰^.11⁰^.11⁰^.18⁰^.18⁰^.18⁰^.18¹^.93²^.21²^.41²^.26
^s^.or
^le^ak^bras^k^a^1.95^1.91^1.88^1.84^1.17^1.68^1.85^1.66^0.17^0.18^0.18^0.17^0.19^0.19^0.¹⁸^0.18^3.49^3.95^4.08^3.85
^v^a^da^1.86^1.85^1.83^2.20^1.04^1.29^1.36^1.60^0.18^0.19^0.19^0.21^0.20^0.20^0.20^0.20^3.28^3.53^3.58^4.21
^://wiki^Ham^p^s^h^ire¹^.14¹^.17¹^.16¹^.11⁰^.54⁰^.72⁰^.82⁰^.72⁰^.1³⁰^.14⁰^.14⁰^.13⁰^.18⁰^.18⁰^.18⁰^.18¹^.99²^.20²^.30²^.15
^h^ttp
^w^Jers^ey^5.69^6.00^5.96^6.02^5.85^7.73^8.05^6.21^0.60^0.63^0.63^0.64^0.⁶²^0.64^0.63^0.65^12.76^14.99^15.27^13.51
^w^Mexⁱ^co^1.92^1.94^1.83^1.84^2.58^3.48^3.94^3.60^0.19^0.19^0.19^0.19^0.³³^0.26^0.55^0.49^5.02^5.87^6.51^6.11
^Yo^rk^b¹⁴^.²³¹⁴^.⁹⁴¹⁴^.⁸⁴¹⁴^.⁵⁸⁰⁰⁰²⁵^.⁷⁴¹^.²⁶¹^.³⁶¹^.³⁵¹^.³²¹^.²⁶¹^.³⁰¹^.³⁰¹^.²⁵¹⁶^.⁷⁵¹⁷^.⁶⁰¹⁷^.⁴⁹⁴²^.⁸
^C^a^rolin^a⁸^.41⁸^.31⁸^.23⁸^.58⁶^.59⁸^.61⁹^.72^10.19^0.⁵⁸^0.60^0.60^0.62^0.60^0.86^0.⁸¹^0.90^16.18^18.38^19.36^20.29
^rt^h^D^a^k^o^t^a^0.72^0.72^0.72^0.63^0.41^0.60^0.67^0.68^0.⁰⁹^0.10^0.09^0.09^0.18^0.18^0.¹⁸^0.18^1.40^1.60^1.66^1.58
ⁱ^o^11.81^11.77^11.69^11.58^9.59^12.22^12.15^12.55^0.83^0.86^0.85^0.84^1.36^0.85^0.85^0.89^23.60^25.70^25.54^25.87
^l^a^h^o^m^a^2.66^2.67^2.30^2.18^3.60^5.⁰²^5.67^5.63^0.29^0.30^0.30^0.29^1.37^1.29^0.95^0.84^7.92^9.29^9.22^8.94
^eg^on^3.50^3.45^3.44^3.50^2.68^3.69^4.36^5.23^0.28^0.²⁹^0.29^0.29^0.23^0.23^0.23^0.23^6.69^7.66^8.31^9.25
^l^vaⁿⁱ^a^a¹^.²¹¹^.⁴⁵¹^.³⁸¹^.⁰⁴¹⁰^.⁹⁶¹⁵^.⁰⁴¹⁵^.⁶¹⁴^.¹⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰^.⁹⁴⁰^.⁹³⁰^.⁹⁰^.⁹⁵²³^.¹²⁷^.⁴³²⁷^.⁹²²⁶^.¹⁰
^{ode Is}^l^aⁿ^d^1.00^1.03^1.02^1.00^1.05^1.50^1.71^1.65^0.12^0.12^0.12^0.12^0.²²^0.22^0.21^0.20^2.39^2.87^3.06^2.97

CRS-45
^Tⁱ^tl^{e I}^V^{-B of th}^{e S}^o^ci^al^{Security Act}^C^{hild Abus}^{e P}^{revention and T}^reatm^{ent Act}
^Prom^otiⁿ^{g S}^a^{fe an}^d^S^t^ab^l^e
^{Child Welfare Services}^Fa^m^ilies^S^t^a^t^e^G^r^aⁿ^t^s^Co^m^m^unit^y^-^B^a^s^{ed G}^r^aⁿ^t^s^To^t^a^{l t}^o^St^a^t^e
^St^a^t^e²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴
^t^h^C^a^rolin^a⁴^.63⁴^.74⁴^.71⁴^.54⁴^.2⁷⁶^.02⁶^.81⁶^.73⁰^.31⁰^.33⁰^.33⁰^.32⁰^.28⁰^.28⁰^.28⁰^.27⁹^.50^11.38^12.13^11.86
^u^t^h^D^a^k^o^t^a^0.86^0.77^0.71^0.64^0.58^0.84^1.00^0.96^0.¹⁰^0.11^0.11^0.10^0.18^0.18^0.¹⁸^0.18^1.72^1.89^1.99^1.89
ⁿⁿ^e^s^s^e^e⁵^.91⁶^.08⁶^.04⁶^.02⁶^.38⁸^.78⁹^.63⁹^.99⁰^.42⁰^.44⁰^.44⁰^.44⁰^.56⁰^.60⁰^.63⁰^.67^13.27^15.90^16.73^17.11
^x^a^s^24.68^24.24^24.08^24.68^26.83^34.11^35.14^33.16^1.61^1.70^1.69^1.73^1.58^1.63^1.64^1.67^54.70^61.68^62.54^61.25
^3.49^3.38^3.35^3.34^1.30^1.89^2.09^1.77^0.24^0.²⁵^0.25^0.25^0.29^0.29^0.28^0.30^5.32^5.80^5.96^5.66
^on^t⁰^.67⁰^.71⁰^.70⁰^.65⁰^.53⁰^.69⁰^.80⁰^.67⁰^.09⁰^.09⁰^.09⁰^.09⁰^.26⁰^.25⁰^.24⁰^.25¹^.55¹^.74¹^.83¹^.66
ⁱⁿⁱ^a^6.48^6.58^6.54^6.52^5.46^7.11^7.44^6.33^0.50^0.54^0.53^0.54^0.47^0.49^0.⁴⁸^0.49^12.92^14.72^14.99^13.88
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}^hⁱⁿ^g^t^on^5.73^5.56^5.51^5.42^4.93^6.29^6.61^5.84^0.46^0.47^0.47^0.47^0.⁴³^0.43^0.43^0.42^11.55^12.76^13.02^12.15
^g/w^t^Vⁱ^rgⁱⁿⁱ^a^2.12^2.08^2.07^1.97^2.⁷¹^3.75^4.23^3.68^0.16^0.16^0.16^0.16^0.²⁶^0.25^0.23^0.24^5.25^6.24^6.69^6.05
^s^.or
^le^ak^c^on^sⁱⁿ⁵^.67⁵^.61⁵^.56⁵^.40³^.11³^.94⁴^.38⁴^.96⁰^.42⁰^.43⁰^.43⁰^.42⁰^.43⁰^.42⁰^.40⁰^.42⁹^.62^10.40^10.78^11.19
^omⁱⁿ^g⁰^.64⁰^.62⁰^.62⁰^.52⁰^.35⁰^.47⁰^.49⁰^.47⁰^.08⁰^.09⁰^.09⁰^.08⁰^.18⁰^.18⁰^.18⁰^.18¹^.26¹^.35¹^.37¹^.25
^://wiki^Subt^o^t^a^l²⁷⁹²⁸¹²⁷⁸²⁷⁷²⁵⁷³⁴¹³⁶⁷³⁶⁸²⁰^.⁴²¹^.⁴²¹^.³²¹^.³³⁰^.⁰³⁰^.⁴³⁰^.³³⁰^.²⁵⁸⁶⁶⁷³⁶⁹⁶⁶⁹⁶
^h^ttp
^b^e^s^c^4.47^4.44^5.38^5.51^3.05^4.45^5.04^5.04^N^A^N^A^N^A^N^A^0.33^0.33^0.33^0.33^7.85^9.23^10.75^10.88
^rri^t^o^ri^es^d^8.46^6.95^6.90^6.91^8.29^8.98^9.79^8.93^0.62^0.59^0.59^0.59^1.22^1.²¹^1.21^1.21^18.59^17.72^18.49^17.63
^e^r^e^N^A^N^A^N^A^N^A^16.00^20.60^22.56^22.56^N^A^N^A^N^A^N^A^1.28^1.48^1.32^1.45^17.28^22.08^23.87^24.01
^T^o^tal²⁹²²⁹²²⁹⁰²⁸⁹²⁸⁴^b³⁷⁵⁴⁰⁴⁴⁰⁴^21.0^22.0^21.9^21.9^32.8^33.4^33.2^33.2⁶³⁰⁷²²⁷⁵⁰⁷⁴⁹
^T^a^{ble prepared by}^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^).^P^r^og^ram^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^am^ouⁿ^t^s^{to each}^s^t^ates^{are th}^{e “}^actu^a^{l” am}^ouⁿ^t^s^aw^arded^each^s^t^ate^f^o^{r th}^{e g}ⁱ^v^eⁿ^fⁱ^s^{cal y}^ear
^p^o^r^tedⁱⁿ^th^{e U.S. Dep}^a^r^t^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^Health^an^d^Hu^m^aⁿ^Ser^v^ices⁽^HHS)^,^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tioⁿ^f^o^r^Ch^ild^r^eⁿ^an^d^Fam^{ilies (}^A^CF)^B^u^d^g^{et J}^u^s^tⁱ^fⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^t^o^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^s^(F^Y^{2003 t}^h^ro^{ugh FY}^2006).
ⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^,^th^{e s}^u^m^of^each^s^t^ate’^s^g^r^an^ts^m^a^yⁿ^o^{t equ}^a^{l th}^{e dis}^p^lay^e^{d total of}^th^os^{e g}^r^an^ts^.
^{= No}^{t A}^p^p^licab^le.
^dian^a^an^d^P^eⁿⁿ^s^y^l^v^aⁿⁱ^a^didⁿ^o^t^m^{eet all th}^{e requ}^{ired s}^t^{ate plan}^as^s^u^ran^ces^an^{d s}^o^w^e^{re n}^o^{t elig}^{ible to receiv}^e^C^A^P^T^A^s^t^at^e^g^r^an^ts^{. T}^h^{e s}^t^atu^t^{e prov}^ides^th^{at all f}^uⁿ^d^s^appropriated
^{are to be dis}^t^ribu^{ted, by}^f^o^rm^u^l^{a, am}^on^g^elig^{ible s}^t^ates^{. Fu}ⁿ^d^s^th^{at w}^o^u^l^{d oth}^e^rw^is^{e g}^o^{to In}^dian^{a an}^{d P}^eⁿⁿ^s^y^l^v^aⁿⁱ^{a w}^e^{re th}^ere^f^o^{re di}^s^t^ri^bu^t^e^{d am}^on^g^al^l^t^h^{e ot}^h^e^{r s}^t^at^es^.

CRS-46
^York^ch^os^{e n}^o^{t to receiv}^e^P^r^om^otin^g^Saf^e^an^d^Stable^Fam^ilies^(P^{SSF) f}^uⁿ^d^sⁱⁿ^FY2001-^{FY2003. For FY2001 th}^e^s^t^atu^t^e^didⁿ^o^{t p}^r^o^v^id^{e f}^o^r^r^e^-^a^llo^tm^en^{t o}^f^th^{at m}^oⁿ^e^y^.^T^h^u^s
^th^{e $20.9 m}^illion^th^{at w}^a^s^{allotted to New}^York^w^a^s^retu^rn^{ed to th}^{e f}^e^{deral treas}^u^r^y^.^(T^hⁱ^s^is^th^{e reas}^on^th^at^th^e^total^f^uⁿ^d^s^dis^t^ribu^{ted in}^{FY2001 is}^s^h^owⁿ^as^{$284 m}^illion^rath^er
^th^an^th^{e $305 m}^illion^th^{at w}^a^s^{appropriated.) P}^.^L^.^107-^{133 prov}^id^{ed f}^o^{r re-}^a^llotm^en^{t of}^an^y^uⁿ^c^laim^{ed P}^{SSF f}^uⁿ^d^s^begⁱⁿⁿⁱⁿ^g^wⁱ^t^h^F^Y^2002.
^r^ibes^elig^{ible to receiv}^e^C^h^{ild Welf}^{are S}^e^rv^ices^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^receiv^e^an^am^ouⁿ^t^bas^e^{d on}^th^{eir popu}^lation^an^{d w}^h^ich^is^drawⁿ^ou^{t o}^f^th^{e in}^{itial allo}^tm^en^{t o}^f^th^{e state in}^w^h^ich^th^{e tr}^ib^e
^{is lo}^cated^{. T}^h^{e p}^r^o^g^r^a^m^au^th^o^r^izatioⁿ^s^f^o^r^b^o^t^h^th^{e P}^r^o^m^o^tin^g^Saf^e^an^d^Stab^{le Fam}^{ilies an}^d^CA^P^T^A’^s^C^o^m^m^uⁿⁱ^t^y^-^B^a^s^ed^Gr^an^{ts p}^r^o^v^id^{e f}^o^r^cer^tain^f^uⁿ^d^{s to}^b^e^{set asid}^{e f}^o^r
^elig^ib^{le tr}^ib^es^p^r^io^{r to}^allotm^en^{t of}^rem^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^f^uⁿ^d^s^{to elig}^{ible s}^t^ates^{. T}^r^ibes^{are n}^o^{t elig}^{ible to receiv}^e^C^A^P^T^A^’^s^s^t^{ate g}^r^an^ts^.
^s^u^s^{ed h}^e^{re, th}^{e territories}^ref^e^{r to—A}^m^e^rican^Sam^o^{a, Gu}^am^,^th^{e North}^e^rn^Marian^{a Is}^lan^d^s^,^P^u^{erto R}ⁱ^{co an}^{d th}^{e Virg}ⁱⁿ^Is^lan^ds^{. Each}^of^th^es^{e j}^u^ris^d^iction^s^receiv^e^{d s}^o^m^e^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g
^uⁿ^d^{er each}^on^{e of}^th^{e prog}^ram^sⁱⁿ^clu^d^{ed in}^th^is^table.
^t^h^e^{r g}^eⁿ^e^ral^l^y^ref^e^rs^t^o^t^echⁿⁱ^cal^as^sⁱ^s^t^an^{ce an}^d/^{or prog}^ram^ev^al^u^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^an^{d s}^u^pport^.^In^t^h^{e cas}^{e of}^Prom^otⁱⁿ^g^S^a^f^e^an^{d S}^t^ab^{le Fam}^{ilies, it also}ⁱⁿ^clu^d^e^s^a^s^e^t^-^a^sⁱ^d^e^f^o^r^C^o^u^r^t
^Im^prov^em^en^{t g}^r^an^ts^{. T}^h^{e totals}^f^o^{r th}^es^e^cou^r^t^g^r^an^ts^ran^g^e^{d in}^v^a^lu^{e f}^r^om^{$10 m}^illion^{to j}^u^s^t^ov^er^$13^m^illion^betw^een^FY2001^an^{d F}^Y^{2004. T}^h^{ere are n}^o^s^e^t^asⁱ^d^es^f^o^{r prog}^ram
^ev^alu^a^tion^,^techⁿⁱ^{cal as}^sⁱ^s^t^an^{ce or oth}^e^{r pu}^rpos^esⁱⁿ^clu^d^{ed in}^th^{e prog}^ram^au^th^orization^s^f^o^{r C}^h^{ild W}^e^lf^{are Serv}^ices^{or C}^A^P^T^A^s^{tate g}^r^an^ts.

ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}
^g/w
^s^.or
^le^ak
^://wiki
^h^ttp

CRS-47
Table C-2. Dedicated Federal Child Welfare Funding for the Foster Care Program, FY2001-FY2003, by State
(by fiscal year in millions of dollars)
^Fos^t^{er Care - T}ⁱ^{tle I}^V^-E^of^{the Social Security Act}
^M^a^{intenance paym}^ents^a⁽ⁱ^ncluding^b^{Child pla}^cem^ent^a^{nd a}^d^mⁱ^nist^ra^tⁱ^oⁿ^c
^T^o^{tal fos}^t^{er care to s}^t^ate^dem^o^nst^r^a^t^io^ns)⁽ⁱ^ncluding^SACWIS)^T^ra^ining
^St^a^t^e²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³
^a⁴^.75⁶^.51⁷^.10^12.23^17.74^15.01^2.17^2.56^1.73^19.16^26.81^23.83
^k^a^2.86^1.91^0.93^6.80^7.11^9.⁰⁰^0.95^0.00^0.65^10.61^9.02^10.57
ⁱ^z^on^a^19.81^20.89^23.12^24.31^16.41^16.58^0.61^2.68^3.57^44.73^39.99^43.27
^k^aⁿ^s^as^8.38^12.85^10.59^13.62^12.59^14.46^6.65^7.24^6.63^28.65^32.68^31.68
^lⁱ^f^ornⁱ^a^397.37^413.00^386.04^602.28^681.49^776.⁴³^57.30^76.79^76.04^1,^056.95^1,171.27^1,238.51
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}
^g/w^l^o^rado^9.12^13.62^18.04^33.42^32.88^50.63^0.87^0.86^0.72^43.41^47.36^69.40
^s^.orⁿⁿ^ectⁱ^c^u^t^31.85^13.06^22.07^59.79^34.46^34.71^3.47^2.66^1.55^95.11^50.17^58.33
^le^ak
^l^a^w^a^re^1.86^1.47^0.64^7.92^8.75^7.28^0.72^0.45^0.09^10.50^10.67^8.00
^://wiki^t^{. of}^C^o^l^.^12.58^15.84^12.28^14.⁰³^9.24^8.45⁰⁰⁰^26.61^25.08^20.73
^h^ttp^d^a^38.77^27.50^30.22^99.57^93.21^64.88^11.06^6.09^5.57^149.40^126.80^100.67
^orgⁱ^a^29.65^28.63^13.52^29.05^29.36^15.16^3.54^3.64^2.80^62.24^61.63^31.49
^w^aⁱⁱ^5.29^3.85^5.48^10.90^11.93^11.⁵⁷^3.36^1.27^1.21^19.54^17.05^18.26
^o¹^.65¹^.87²^.47³^.76³^.67³^.7⁰⁰^.05⁰^.16⁰^.29⁵^.45⁵^.69⁶^.47
^ois^175.62^209.¹⁹^225.37^103.30^104.27^109.63^10.40^7.74^7.28^289.32^321.21^342.27
^an^a^26.78^29.45^26.97^7.60^17.07^16.33^0.64^0.35^0.24^35.01^46.87^43.53
^a^14.37^11.51^10.37^10.64^7.96^8.⁴⁹^1.56^1.04^1.13^26.57^20.51^19.99
ⁿ^s^as^9.82^5.00^12.07^26.67^21.47^19.³⁴^1.20^1.89^1.51^37.69^28.36^32.93
ⁿ^t^u^c^k^y^28.63^28.13^29.59^15.45^16.61^14.09^12.08^9.43^4.29^56.16^54.17^47.97
^uⁱ^sⁱ^an^a^21.80^22.36^20.57^18.55^24.50^29.37^3.18^6.00^5.60^43.53^52.85^55.55
ⁿ^e^27.30^24.87^18.19^3.98^5.11^2.⁹⁷^2.43^3.45^0.86^33.71^33.42^22.02

CRS-48
^Fos^t^{er Care - T}ⁱ^{tle I}^V^-E^of^{the Social Security Act}
^M^a^{intenance paym}^ents^a⁽ⁱ^ncluding^b^{Child pla}^cem^ent^a^{nd a}^d^mⁱ^nist^ra^tⁱ^oⁿ^c
^T^o^{tal fos}^t^{er care to s}^t^ate^dem^o^nst^r^a^t^io^ns)⁽ⁱ^ncluding^SACWIS)^T^ra^ining
^St^a^t^e²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³
^l^aⁿ^d^65.58^64.26^59.73^65.62^70.17^66.19^5.96^6.79^5.23^137.16^141.21^131.16
^s^ach^u^s^et^t^s^33.80^31.33^23.43^34.44^23.49^44.69⁰⁰^0.24^68.25^54.82^68.35
^chⁱ^g^an^80.40^74.70^61.29^71.42^69.40^66.78^0.57^0.77^1.77^152.39^144.87^129.84
ⁿⁿ^e^s^o^t^a^22.77^22.63^19.79^46.78^40.59^42.34^10.64^11.25^6.11^80.19^74.48^68.24
^s^sⁱ^s^sⁱ^ppi^6.64^2.10^3.31^8.74^7.75^7.92^0.39^0.13^0.39^15.77^9.99^11.62
^s^s^o^u^rⁱ^21.66^24.90^19.75^37.18^36.22^34.22^8.95^5.99^4.47^67.79^67.11^58.45
^t^an^a⁵^.43⁵^.93⁶^.36⁴^.63³^.79²^.21⁰^.08⁰^.04⁰^.06^10.14^9.76^8.63
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}^bras^k^a^12.47^11.96^12.90^6.32^7.16^7.98^3.26^2.85^3.05^22.05^21.97^23.93
^g/w^v^a^da^4.14^3.85^7.26^7.06^9.21^10.¹⁴^1.24^0.77^0.78^12.45^13.83^18.19
^s^.or
^le^ak^Ham^p^s^h^ire⁴^.85⁵^.19⁶^.80²^.85⁵^.33⁶^.12⁰^.99¹^.28¹^.72⁸^.69^11.80^14.65
^://wiki^w^Jers^ey^34.02^32.55^25.32^26.05^40.70^32.33^1.74^3.83^-³^.00^61.80^77.09^54.66
^h^ttp^w^Mexⁱ^co^3.75^3.42^4.47^8.47^7.45^12.55^4.53^5.03^6.02^16.75^15.89^23.04
^w^Y^o^rk^340.80^296.06^183.80^173.78^173.01^252.25^8.39^10.56^9.94^522.97^479.63^445.99
^rt^h^C^a^rolⁱⁿ^a^41.59^32.92^32.49^28.69^28.⁹³^19.89^3.97^1.78^0.25^74.26^63.62^52.63
^rt^h^D^a^k^o^t^a^4.47^4.96^5.23^7.15^7.⁴⁷^4.70^1.04^0.68^0.59^12.65^13.11^10.52
ⁱ^o^107.42^119.41^124.01^81.82^89.32^91.¹⁵^12.77^13.22^10.69^202.00^221.95^225.85
^l^a^h^o^m^a^14.84^15.32^13.23^14.03^9.18^7.59^5.38^4.67^3.18^34.25^29.17^24.00
^eg^on^13.95^14.73^15.86^16.65^16.36^18.²⁵^0.75^0.80^1.07^31.35^31.88^35.18
ⁿ^s^y^l^v^aⁿⁱ^a^158.35^189.70^158.22^134.56^140.⁴⁷^146.42^13.87^15.09^15.76^306.78^345.25^320.39
^{ode Is}^l^aⁿ^d^4.66^4.50^4.73^8.43^9.⁰²^9.16^0.29^0.34^0.49^13.38^13.86^14.38
^u^t^h^C^a^rolⁱⁿ^a^19.16^12.46^12.25^15.88^19.⁵¹^7.57^3.85^3.35^3.10^38.90^35.33^22.91
^u^t^h^D^a^k^o^t^a^2.98^2.78^2.62^2.86^2.⁹³^2.81^0.08^0.08^0.03^5.92^5.79^5.46

CRS-49
^Fos^t^{er Care - T}ⁱ^{tle I}^V^-E^of^{the Social Security Act}
^M^a^{intenance paym}^ents^a⁽ⁱ^ncluding^b^{Child pla}^cem^ent^a^{nd a}^d^mⁱ^nist^ra^tⁱ^oⁿ^c
^T^o^{tal fos}^t^{er care to s}^t^ate^dem^o^nst^r^a^t^io^ns)⁽ⁱ^ncluding^SACWIS)^T^ra^ining
^St^a^t^e²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³
ⁿⁿ^e^s^s^e^e^15.56^15.54^17.58^18.60^9.02^6.⁸⁵^2.83^-⁰^.36^-^0.14^36.99^24.21^24.29
^x^a^s^81.42^75.21^90.19^32.70^66.37^57.⁴⁷^6.31^6.49^8.81^120.44^148.07^156.47
^3.31^3.08^3.59^14.59^15.04^15.²⁶^1.88^1.98^1.57^19.78^20.09^20.42
^on^t⁸^.89⁹^.07⁸^.27²^.60²^.41²^.27⁰^.82¹^.31⁰^.47^12.31^12.80^11.01
ⁱⁿⁱ^a^18.36^27.22^29.87^35.63^48.92^63.68^4.39^5.09^4.50^58.38^81.23^98.04
^hⁱⁿ^g^t^on^12.26^16.28^16.75^25.57^35.40^40.99^2.47^1.45^2.60^40.29^53.13^60.33
^t^Vⁱ^rgⁱⁿⁱ^a^17.75^18.60^18.97^3.35^3.⁸⁹^4.00^0.61^0.76^0.76^21.71^23.25^23.73
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}^s^c^on^sⁱⁿ^29.09^26.12^19.59^50.40^51.20^60.20^3.30^2.73^1.74^82.79^80.04^81.52
^g/w^omⁱⁿ^g¹^.26¹^.29⁰^.84¹^.02¹^.53¹^.22⁰^.00⁰^.06⁰^.07²^.28²^.89²^.13
^s^.or
^le^ak^Subt^o^t^a^l²^,⁰⁶⁰²^,⁰⁶⁰¹^,⁸⁸⁴²^,⁰⁹²²^,²⁰⁷²^,³⁷³²³⁴²⁴³²¹⁴⁴^,³⁸⁵⁴^,⁵¹⁰⁴^,⁴⁷¹
^://wiki^{erto R}ⁱ^co^d^9.91^13.44^14.00^0.00^0.00^0.00^0.00^0.00^0.00^9.91^13.44^14.00
^h^ttp
^T^o^tal²^,070^2,073^1,898^2,092^2,²⁰⁷^2,373²³⁴²⁴³²¹⁴^4,395^4,523^4,485
^T^a^b^l^e^p^r^e^p^a^r^e^d^b^y^t^h^e^Co^ngr^e^ssi^oⁿ^a^l^Re^se^a^r^c^h^Se^r^vⁱ^c^e⁽^CRS)^.^B^a^se^d^oⁿ^a^nnua^l^e^x^p^e^ndⁱ^t^u^r^e^fi^l^e^p^r^e^p^a^r^e^d^b^y^t^h^e^U^.^S.^D^e^p^a^r^t^m^e^nt^of^Health^an^{d Hu}^m^aⁿ^Serv^ices^(HHS).
^f^{ile in}^clu^d^es^f^e^{deral s}^h^{are of}^s^t^{ate claim}^s^as^m^a^{de by}^each^s^t^{ate, in}^clu^dⁱⁿ^g^certain^claim^s^w^h^ich^m^a^y^s^u^bs^equ^eⁿ^tly^{be dis}^a^llow^e^{d. If}^{a s}^t^{ate is}^s^h^owⁿ^as^receivⁱⁿ^g^aⁿ^e^g^a^tiv^{e am}^ouⁿ^t
^o^l^l^a^r^s^fo^r^a^gi^ve^{n ki}^nd^o^f^c^l^aⁱ^m^t^hⁱ^s^m^e^aⁿ^{s t}^h^a^t^aⁿ^a^d^j^u^st^m^e^ntⁱⁿ^fe^d^e^r^a^l^fundⁱ^{ng w}^a^{s m}^a^d^eⁱⁿ^t^h^e^gi^ve^{n fi}^sc^a^l^y^e^a^r^fo^r^p^rⁱ^{or claim}^s^.
^T^itle^IV-^E^o^f^th^{e So}^{cial Secu}^rity^A^c^{t d}^o^e^{s n}^o^{t au}^th^o^r^{ize trib}^es^to^receiv^e^dⁱ^{rect Fo}^{ster Care f}^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^f^r^o^m^th^{e f}^e^d^e^{ral g}^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^{. T}^r^ib^{es th}^{at w}ⁱ^sh^to^receiv^e^su^ch^T^{itle IV-}^E
^{s m}^u^st^se^e^k^t^h^e^s^e^fund^{s t}^h^r^o^{ugh a}ⁿ^a^g^r^e^e^m^eⁿ^t^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^e^st^a^t^e⁽^o^r^st^a^t^e^s⁾ⁱⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^{h t}^h^e^y^a^r^e^l^o^c^a^t^e^d^.^Wⁱ^t^h^r^e^ga^r^d^t^o^t^h^e^t^e^r^r^ito^rⁱ^{es, T}^{itle I}^V^-^E^p^e^r^m^{its A}^m^er^ican^Sam^o^a,^Gu^am^,^P^u^er^to
^an^d^th^e^Vir^gⁱⁿ^I^s^lan^d^s^to^dⁱ^r^ectly^o^p^e^r^a^{te T}^{itle I}^V^-^E^Fo^ster^Car^e^p^r^o^g^r^a^m^s^{. I}^t^d^o^e^{s n}^o^{t g}ⁱ^v^e^th^is^au^th^o^r^ity^to^th^e^No^r^t^h^e^rⁿ^Marⁱ^an^{a I}^s^lan^d^{s. Of}^th^{e ter}^r^ito^rⁱ^{es, o}ⁿ^ly^P^u^er^to^Rico
^r^r^en^tly^o^p^e^r^a^tin^g^{a T}^{itle I}^V^-^E^Fo^ster^Car^e^p^r^o^g^r^a^m^.
^h^es^{e data in}^clu^d^{e th}^{e portion}^of^ch^ild^s^u^pport^m^oⁿⁱ^es^collect^{ed on}^beh^a^lf^of^ch^ildren^receivⁱⁿ^g^T^{itle IV-}^E^f^o^s^t^{er care m}^aⁱⁿ^t^en^an^{ce pay}^m^en^ts^an^{d w}^h^ich^{are reim}^bu^rs^{ed to th}^{e f}^e^deral
^g^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^{. For FY2001-}^{FY2003 th}^{e f}^e^{deral s}^h^{are of}^ch^ild^s^u^{pport collection}^s^ran^g^e^{d f}^r^om^{$27 m}^illion^{to $32 m}^illion^.
^{report to HHS an}^y^cos^t^s^as^s^o^{ciated w}^ith^th^{eir dem}^oⁿ^s^tration^proj^ects^(w^aiv^e^rs^{) u}ⁿ^d^{er a s}^e^{parate ex}^pen^d^itu^{re categ}^ory^{. D}^e^m^o^nst^r^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^p^r^o^j^e^c^t^s^m^u^s^t^{be cos}^tⁿ^e^u^t^ral^t^o^t^h^e
^f^e^{deral g}^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^{. T}^h^u^s^“^d^em^on^s^t^ration^”^claim^s^{are th}^os^{e th}^at^w^o^u^l^{d prev}^iou^s^ly^h^a^v^e^been^m^a^{de u}ⁿ^d^{er th}^{e f}^o^s^t^{er care m}^aⁱⁿ^ten^aⁿ^{ce or f}^o^s^t^{er c}^a^r^{e adm}ⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ration^categ^ories^.
^T^h^{e ex}^{act dis}^t^ribu^tion^of^th^es^{e claim}^s^—if^th^{ere w}^e^{re n}^o^{t a dem}^ons^t^r^a^tionⁱⁿ^place—canⁿ^o^{t be k}ⁿ^o^wⁿ^{. For pu}^rpos^es^of^th^is^table^on^ly^{, all dem}^oⁿ^s^tration^claim^s^{are in}^clu^d^ed
ⁱⁿ^th^{e f}^o^s^t^{er care m}^aⁱⁿ^ten^aⁿ^{ce pay}^m^en^{t colu}^mⁿ^s^.

CRS-50
^e^p^o^r^{ts state claim}^s^r^e^lated^to^th^{e State A}^u^to^m^a^ted^Ch^ild^W^e^lf^{are In}^f^o^rm^ation^Sy^s^t^em^(SA^C^W^I^{S) (both}^f^o^{r dev}^e^lopm^en^{t an}^d^o^p^e^r^a^tioⁿ⁾^sep^a^r^a^tely^f^r^o^m^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tioⁿ^claim^s^.
^Fo^r^p^u^r^p^o^s^{es o}^f^th^{is tab}^l^{e o}ⁿ^ly^{, SA}^CW^I^S^claim^s^ar^{e in}^clu^d^edⁱⁿ^th^{e to}^{tal A}^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tioⁿ^co^sts.
^P^u^e^r^t^o^Rⁱ^c^o^b^e^gaⁿ^m^a^kⁱⁿ^g^claim^s^f^o^{r T}^{itle IV-}^E^Fos^t^{er C}^a^reⁱⁿ^{FY1999. It h}^a^sⁿ^o^{t y}^e^{t dev}^e^{loped th}^{e n}^eces^s^a^ry^cos^t^allocati^on^plan^th^{at s}^h^ou^{ld allow}^{it to receiv}^e^pro^g^r^a^m
^admⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rativ^{e an}^{d train}ⁱⁿ^g^claim^s^.

ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}
^g/w
^s^.or
^le^ak
^://wiki
^h^ttp

CRS-51
doption Assistance Program, FY2001-FY2003, by State
(by fiscal year in millions of dollars)
^Ado^p^tⁱ^oⁿ^Assist^aⁿ^c^e^—^Tit^l^e^IV-^E^{of the Social}^{Security Act}
^Subsidy^a
^T^o^tal^ad^op^ti^on^as^sⁱ^s^t^an^ce⁽ⁱ^{ncludes dem}^o^nst^r^a^t^io^ns)^Admⁱ^nist^ra^tⁱ^oⁿ^Traⁱ^ning
^St^a^t^e²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³
^a¹^.45²^.13³^.60⁴^.17¹^.12⁰^.61⁰^.92¹^.04⁰^.85⁶^.53⁴^.29⁵^.06
^k^a^4.63^5.09^5.82^0.72^0.49^0.⁴⁸^0.00^0.01^0.01^5.35^5.60^6.31
ⁱ^z^on^a^14.52^16.62^19.01^2.49^2.47^2.48^0.00^0.00^0.00^17.01^19.09^21.49
^k^aⁿ^s^as^5.42^3.43^6.28^1.43^1.07^1.50^0.01^0.02^0.02^6.87^4.52^7.80
^lⁱ^f^ornⁱ^a^134.40^175.11^201.00^40.48^43.61^41.77^2.14^2.49^2.36^177.01^221.21^245.14
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}^l^o^rado^9.53^13.02^14.50^5.08^3.36^2.63^1.29^1.40^1.29^15.90^17.78^18.42
^g/w
^s^.orⁿⁿ^ectⁱ^c^u^t^9.98^11.71^13.15^1.71^2.75^3.81^1.37^2.24^1.25^13.06^16.69^18.21
^le^ak^l^a^w^a^re^1.06^1.32^1.28^0.42^0.52^0.33^0.01^0.00^0.00^1.48^1.84^1.62
^://wiki^t^{. of}^C^o^l^.^2.33^6.63^4.45^3.53^2.24^4.19^0.00^0.00^0.00^5.87^8.87^8.64
^h^ttp^d^a^22.41^27.24^33.62^13.01^14.00^12.86^2.25^0.84^0.99^37.67^42.07^47.47
^orgⁱ^a^16.66^19.81^21.73^7.54^5.47^10.79^4.95^4.45^3.21^29.15^29.73^35.73
^w^aⁱⁱ^4.96^5.42^6.82^0.56^0.86^1.⁰¹^0.02^0.04^0.04^5.55^6.32^7.88
^o¹^.44¹^.66¹^.83⁰^.73⁰^.65⁰^.7⁶⁰^.00⁰^.00⁰^.00²^.17²^.31²^.59
^oⁱ^s⁵⁶^.²⁶⁶³^.⁰¹⁶⁶^.⁵⁰¹¹^.²⁹⁹^.²⁶⁸^.⁴⁶⁰^.²³⁰^.⁴⁸⁰^.⁴⁵⁶⁷^.⁷⁸⁷²^.⁷⁵⁷⁵^.⁴¹
^an^a^19.63^22.24^24.13^2.07^1.98^1.72^0.00^0.00^0.00^21.70^24.22^25.86
^a^18.45^20.30^21.83^2.69^2.63^2.⁹⁶^0.18^0.17^0.00^21.32^23.09^24.79
ⁿ^s^as^7.54^7.84^7.88^1.49^1.52^1.⁴¹^0.00^0.00^0.00^9.03^9.36^9.29
ⁿ^t^u^c^k^y^9.44^11.12^12.98^0.90^1.00^0.98^1.65^1.42^1.28^11.98^13.54^15.23
^uⁱ^sⁱ^an^a⁷^.72⁸^.45⁹^.30^10.78^2.44^2.20^2.48^0.66^0.85^20.98^11.55^12.35
^e⁶^.57⁷^.88⁹^.01¹^.05¹^.87¹^.83¹^.03²^.01¹^.13⁸^.66^11.76^11.98

CRS-52
^Ado^p^tⁱ^oⁿ^Assist^aⁿ^c^e^—^Tit^l^e^IV-^E^{of the Social}^{Security Act}
^Subsidy^a
^T^o^tal^ad^op^ti^on^as^sⁱ^s^t^an^ce⁽ⁱ^{ncludes dem}^o^nst^r^a^t^io^ns)^Admⁱ^nist^ra^tⁱ^oⁿ^Traⁱ^ning
^St^a^t^e²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³
^l^aⁿ^d^11.33^0.41^27.90^0.07^0.07^0.09^0.00^0.00^0.00^11.39^0.48^27.99
^s^ach^u^s^et^t^s^17.93^22.11^21.91^3.30^3.⁵⁰^2.66^0.00^0.00^0.00^21.24^25.62^24.57
^chⁱ^g^an^77.29^84.71^89.41^4.66^5.98^4.58^0.00^0.00^0.00^81.94^90.70^93.99
ⁿⁿ^e^s^o^t^a^9.70^10.68^11.93^2.91^3.74^5.46^1.69^1.86^1.57^14.29^16.27^18.96
^s^sⁱ^s^sⁱ^ppi^2.74^2.96^3.07^1.17^0.62^0.47^0.00^0.00^0.00^3.91^3.58^3.55
^s^s^o^u^rⁱ^12.07^15.06^18.63^4.57^4.91^4.78^0.00^0.00^0.00^16.63^19.97^23.40
^t^an^a²^.32²^.92⁴^.24²^.55¹^.68¹^.71⁰^.05⁰^.02⁰^.05⁴^.92⁴^.62⁶^.00
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}^bras^k^a^4.54^5.24^5.54^0.26^0.39^0.38^0.00^0.00^0.00^4.81^5.63^5.92
^g/w^v^a^da^1.62^2.41^2.32^0.87^0.85^0.⁷⁷^0.04^0.37^0.00^2.53^3.63^3.10
^s^.or^Ham^p^s^h^ire⁰^.98¹^.13¹^.37⁰^.35⁰^.3⁷⁰^.54⁰^.01⁰^.01⁰^.01¹^.34¹^.51¹^.92
^le^ak
^://wiki^w^Jers^ey^12.91^13.96^16.17^4.93^10.69^7.10^0.00^0.11^0.34^17.84^24.76^23.60^w^Mexⁱ^co^6.52^7.92^8.84^2.25^2.00^1.75^0.00^0.00^0.00^8.77^9.92^10.60
^h^ttp
^w^Y^o^rk^165.75^180.13^183.08^9.43^5.82^2.77^0.63^0.34^0.12^175.81^186.28^185.97
^rt^h^C^a^rolⁱⁿ^a^14.92^16.96^19.69^3.21^0.⁸⁴^0.51^0.36^0.05^0.20^18.49^17.85^20.39
^rt^h^D^a^k^o^t^a^1.31^1.58^1.93^0.43^0.⁴⁸^0.49^0.00^0.00^0.00^1.74^2.06^2.42
ⁱ^o^44.44^50.53^55.58^66.65^77.45^82.⁷³^10.32^9.72^7.09^121.41^137.69^145.40
^l^a^h^o^m^a^10.44^10.66^11.18^3.00^4.27^2.71^0.66^0.97^0.56^14.10^15.90^14.45
^eg^on^13.80^16.46^17.72^2.40^1.82^2.⁷⁷^0.00^0.00^0.00^16.20^18.28^20.49
ⁿ^s^y^l^v^aⁿⁱ^a^28.22^35.00^38.99^12.36^14.¹⁶^14.93^3.45^3.73^4.83^44.03^52.89^58.76
^{ode Is}^l^aⁿ^d^3.50^5.37^5.46^0.43^0.³⁹^0.34^0.19^0.34^0.44^4.12^6.10^6.24
^u^t^h^C^a^rolⁱⁿ^a⁸^.32^10.09^9.07^0.93^1.²¹^0.67^1.67^1.43^1.41^10.93^12.72^11.15
^u^t^h^D^a^k^o^t^a^1.23^1.46^1.83^0.15^0.¹⁶^0.14^0.00^0.00^0.00^1.37^1.62^1.98

CRS-53
^Ado^p^tⁱ^oⁿ^Assist^aⁿ^c^e^—^Tit^l^e^IV-^E^{of the Social}^{Security Act}
^Subsidy^a
^T^o^tal^ad^op^ti^on^as^sⁱ^s^t^an^ce⁽ⁱ^{ncludes dem}^o^nst^r^a^t^io^ns)^Admⁱ^nist^ra^tⁱ^oⁿ^Traⁱ^ning
^St^a^t^e²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³
ⁿⁿ^e^s^s^e^e⁸^.42⁹^.78^12.17^1.05^1.01^0.72^0.10^0.00^0.00^9.57^10.80^12.89
^x^a^s^32.66^37.29^40.26^5.82^5.68^6.⁷⁰^0.36^0.79^0.68^38.84^43.76^47.64
^4.03^4.45^4.96^1.09^0.92^0.⁸⁶^0.28^0.34^0.33^5.41^5.71^6.15
^on^t³^.93⁴^.70⁵^.26¹^.18¹^.37¹^.59⁰^.36⁰^.65⁰^.31⁵^.47⁶^.72⁷^.17
ⁱⁿⁱ^a^7.90^9.45^10.24^0.23^0.30^0.49^3.11^3.58^3.13^11.24^13.33^13.86
^hⁱⁿ^g^t^on^12.94^15.22^17.68^3.44^3.69^5.02^0.04^0.04^0.05^16.42^18.95^22.75
^t^Vⁱ^rgⁱⁿⁱ^a^4.94^5.06^5.94^2.28^2.⁹⁶^3.81^0.71^0.97^1.22^7.93^8.99^10.97
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}^s^c^on^sⁱⁿ^20.40^22.96^25.36^2.11^5.06^3.64^0.00^0.00^0.00^22.52^28.01^29.00
^g/w^omⁱⁿ^g⁰^.38⁰^.50⁰^.46⁰^.12⁰^.09⁰^.06⁰^.00⁰^.00⁰^.00⁰^.50⁰^.59⁰^.52
^s^.or^Subtotal⁹⁰²¹⁰³⁷¹¹⁶³²⁵⁶²⁶²²⁶⁴⁴³⁴³³⁶^1,201^1,342^1,463
^le^ak
^://wiki^{erto R}ⁱ^co^b^0.18^0.20^0.37^0.00^0.00^0.00^0.00^0.00^0.00^0.18^0.20^0.37
^h^ttp^T^o^tal⁹⁰²¹⁰³⁷¹¹⁶³²⁵⁶²⁶²²⁶⁴⁴³⁴³³⁶^1,201^1,342^1,463
^T^a^b^l^e^p^r^e^p^a^r^e^d^b^y^t^h^e^Co^ngr^e^ssi^oⁿ^a^l^Re^se^a^r^c^h^Se^r^vⁱ^c^e⁽^C^RS)^.^B^a^se^d^oⁿ^a^nnua^l^e^x^p^e^ndⁱ^t^u^r^e^fi^l^e^p^r^e^p^a^r^e^d^b^y^t^h^e^U^.^S.^D^e^p^a^r^t^m^e^nt^o^f^Health^an^{d Hu}^m^aⁿ^Serv^ices^(HHS).
^f^{ile in}^clu^d^es^f^e^{deral s}^h^{are of}^s^t^{ate claim}^s^as^m^a^{de by}^each^s^t^{ate, in}^clu^dⁱⁿ^g^certain^claim^s^w^h^ich^m^a^y^s^u^bs^equ^eⁿ^tly^be^dis^a^llo^w^e^d^.^T^h^{is f}^{ile is b}^e^liev^e^d^to^b^e^th^{e b}^e^{st estim}^{ate o}^f
^{l fe}^d^e^r^a^{l e}^x^p^e^nd^itur^e^{s und}^e^r^the^T^itle^I^V^-E^a^doptⁱ^oⁿ^as^sⁱ^s^t^an^{ce prog}^ram^.
^T^{itle IV-}^E^of^th^{e Social Secu}^rity^A^c^{t does}ⁿ^o^{t au}^th^{orize trib}^es^{to receiv}^e^{direct A}^doption^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^an^{ce f}^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^f^r^om^th^{e f}^e^dera^{l g}^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^{. T}^r^ib^{es th}^{at w}ⁱ^sh^to^receiv^e^su^ch^T^itle
^fund^{s m}^u^st^se^e^k^t^h^e^s^e^fund^s^t^h^r^o^ugh^aⁿ^a^g^r^e^e^m^eⁿ^t^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^e^st^a^t^e⁽^o^r^st^a^t^e^s⁾ⁱⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^e^y^a^r^e^l^o^c^a^t^e^d^.^Wⁱ^t^h^r^e^ga^r^d^t^o^t^h^e^ter^r^ito^rⁱ^{es, T}^{itle I}^V^-^E^p^e^r^m^{its A}^m^er^ican^Sam^o^{a, Gu}^am^,
ⁱ^{co an}^{d th}^{e Virg}ⁱⁿ^Is^lan^d^s^{to directly}^{operate T}^{itle IV}^-^E^A^doption^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^an^ce^prog^ram^s^.^{It does}ⁿ^o^{t g}ⁱ^v^e^th^is^au^th^orit^y^to^th^{e No}^r^t^h^e^rⁿ^Marⁱ^an^{a I}^s^lan^d^{s. Of}^th^{e ter}^r^ito^rⁱ^{es, o}ⁿ^ly
ⁱ^{co is}^cu^rren^tly^operatin^g^a^T^{itle IV-}^E^A^doption^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^an^{ce prog}^ram^.
^{report to HHS an}^y^cos^t^s^as^s^o^{ciated w}^ith^th^{eir dem}^oⁿ^s^tr^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^p^r^o^j^e^c^t^s⁽^w^aⁱ^ve^r^s^{) u}ⁿ^d^{er a s}^e^{parate ex}^pen^d^itu^{re categ}^ory^{. Dem}^oⁿ^s^tr^atioⁿ^p^r^o^j^{ects m}^u^{st b}^e^co^{st n}^e^u^t^r^a^{l to}^th^e
^f^e^{deral g}^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^{. T}^h^u^s^“^d^em^on^s^t^ration^”^claim^s^are^th^os^e^th^at^w^o^u^l^{d prev}^iou^s^ly^h^a^v^e^been^m^a^{de u}ⁿ^d^{er th}^{e adoption}^as^sⁱ^s^t^an^{ce s}^u^b^sⁱ^dy^{or adm}ⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ration^categ^ories^.^T^h^e^ex^act
^dis^t^ribu^tion^of^th^es^{e claim}^s^—if^th^{ere w}^e^{re n}^o^{t a dem}^oⁿ^s^trationⁱⁿ^place—canⁿ^o^{t be k}ⁿ^o^wⁿ^{. For}^th^e^pu^rpos^es^of^th^is^{table on}^ly^,^{all d}^e^m^oⁿ^s^tr^atioⁿ^r^e^p^o^r^ted^d^e^m^oⁿ^s^tr^atioⁿ^claim^s
^{are in}^clu^d^{ed in}^th^{e a}^d^o^p^tioⁿ^su^b^s^id^y^co^lu^mⁿ^s.
^u^{erto R}ⁱ^{co beg}^aⁿ^m^a^kⁱⁿ^g^claim^s^f^o^{r T}^{itle IV-}^E^A^doption^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^an^{ce in}^{FY1999. A}^s^of^{FY2003 it h}^a^{d n}^o^{t y}^e^{t dev}^e^{loped th}^{e n}^e^cessar^y^co^st^allo^catioⁿ^p^l^an^th^{at sh}^o^u^ld^allo^w^{it to}
^receiv^e^prog^ram^admⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rativ^{e an}^{d train}ⁱⁿ^g^claim^s^.

CRS-54
Table C-4. Dedicated Federal Child Welfare Funding for Independent Living, FY2001-FY2003, by State
(by fiscal years in millions of dollars)
^Independent^Livⁱ^ng^—Tit^{le IV-}^E^o^f^t^h^{e So}^cia^l^Securit^y^Act
^Educa^t^io^{n a}^{nd Tra}ⁱ^ning^a
^To^t^a^{l independent}^liv^ing^{Chafee Fos}^t^{er Care I}^{ndependence Program}^Vo^uchers
^St^a^t^e²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴
^a¹^.29¹^.34¹^.42¹^.54⁰^.43⁰^.50¹^.29¹^.34¹^.86²^.04
^k^a^0.50^0.50^0.52^0.55^0.¹⁶^0.18^0.50^0.50^0.68^0.73
^izon^a¹^.68¹^.55¹^.47¹^.61⁰^.47⁰^.52¹^.68¹^.55¹^.94²^.13
^k^aⁿ^s^as^0.68^0.69^0.74^0.76^0.22^0.25^0.68^0.69^0.96^1.01
^lⁱ^f^ornⁱ^a^27.57^26.99^26.24^26.11^8.38^8.52^27.57^26.99^34.62^34.63
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}
^g/w^l^o^rado^1.79^1.87^1.82^2.18^0.55^0.71^1.79^1.87^2.37^2.90
^s^.orⁿⁿ^ectⁱ^c^u^t^1.57^1.50^1.79^1.52^0.55^0.50^1.57^1.50^2.34^2.02
^le^ak^l^a^w^a^re^0.50^0.50^0.50^0.50^0.08^0.07^0.50^0.50^0.58^0.57
^://wiki^t^ri^ct^of^C^o^l^u^m^bⁱ^a^1.09^1.09^1.09^1.09^0.25^0.27^1.09^1.09^1.35^1.36
^h^ttp^d^a⁸^.02^10.08^7.92^8.27^2.53^2.70^8.02^10.08^10.45^10.96
ⁱ^a²^.80²^.69³^.01³^.12⁰^.92¹^.02²^.80²^.69³^.92⁴^.14
^w^aⁱⁱ^0.51^0.58^0.64^0.70^0.²⁰^0.23^0.51^0.58^0.84^0.93
^o⁰^.50⁰^.50⁰^.50⁰^.50⁰^.08⁰^.10⁰^.50⁰^.50⁰^.58⁰^.60
^oⁱ^s⁹^.4¹⁷^.9³⁷^.0³⁶^.3²²^.2⁵²^.0⁶⁹^.4¹⁷^.9³⁹^.2⁸⁸^.3⁸
^a²^.09²^.07²^.27²^.18⁰^.72⁰^.71²^.09²^.07²^.99²^.90
^a^1.13^1.20^1.26^1.34^0.⁴⁰^0.44^1.13^1.20^1.67^1.77
ⁿ^s^as^1.58^1.57^1.54^1.55^0.⁴⁷^0.51^1.58^1.57^2.01^2.05
ⁿ^t^u^c^k^y^1.33^1.37^1.64^1.74^0.52^0.57^1.33^1.37^2.16^2.31
^uⁱ^sⁱ^an^a¹^.36¹^.36¹^.36¹^.36⁰^.38⁰^.40¹^.36¹^.36¹^.74¹^.76
ⁿ^{e 0.74}^0.75^0.77^0.77^0.²³^0.25^0.74^0.75^1.01^1.02

CRS-55
^Independent^Livⁱ^ng^—Tit^{le IV-}^E^o^f^t^h^{e So}^cia^l^Securit^y^Act
^Educa^t^io^{n a}^{nd Tra}ⁱ^ning^a
^To^t^a^{l independent}^liv^ing^{Chafee Fos}^t^{er Care I}^{ndependence Program}^Vo^uchers
^St^a^t^e²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴
^l^aⁿ^d^3.14^3.10^3.00^3.05^0.91^0.99^3.14^3.10^3.91^4.04
^s^ach^u^s^et^t^s^2.61^2.76^2.90^3.²⁴^0.93^1.06^2.61^2.76^3.83^4.30
^chⁱ^g^an^6.11^5.54^7.49^5.24^1.00^1.71^6.11^5.54^8.49^6.94
ⁿⁿ^e^s^o^t^a^2.10^2.15^1.98^2.06^0.63^0.67^2.10^2.15^2.61^2.74
^s^sⁱ^s^sⁱ^ppi^0.75^0.77^0.73^0.76^0.22^0.25^0.75^0.77^0.95^1.01
^s^o^u^rⁱ²^.94³^.11³^.18³^.30¹^.02¹^.08²^.94³^.11⁴^.20⁴^.38
^t^an^a⁰^.50⁰^.53⁰^.50⁰^.50⁰^.15⁰^.16⁰^.50⁰^.53⁰^.65⁰^.66
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}^bras^k^a^1.29^1.47^1.49^1.59^0.47^0.52^1.29^1.47^1.96^2.10
^g/w^v^a^da^0.52^0.52^0.50^0.50^0.¹⁴^0.14^0.52^0.52^0.64^0.64
^s^.or
^le^ak^Ham^p^s^h^ire⁰^.50⁰^.50⁰^.50⁰^.5⁰⁰^.09⁰^.10⁰^.50⁰^.50⁰^.59⁰^.60
^://wiki^w^Jers^ey^2.30^2.30^2.63^2.84^0.84^0.93^2.30^2.30^3.47^3.77
^h^ttp^w^Mexⁱ^co^0.50^0.50^0.50^0.50^0.12^0.16^0.50^0.50^0.62^0.66
^w^Y^o^rk^12.31^11.63^11.59^11.59^3.47^3.45^12.31^11.63^15.06^15.04
^C^a^rolin^a²^.65²^.58²^.43²^.4¹⁰^.74⁰^.79²^.65²^.58³^.16³^.19
^rt^h^D^a^k^o^t^a^0.50^0.50^0.50^0.⁵⁰^0.08^0.10^0.50^0.50^0.58^0.60
ⁱ^o^4.69^4.85^5.25^5.31^1.⁶⁸^1.74^4.69^4.85^6.93^7.05
^l^a^h^o^m^a^1.91^2.02^2.17^2.23^0.69^0.73^1.91^2.02^2.87^2.96
^eg^on^1.72^1.78^1.64^2.22^0.⁵⁰^0.72^1.72^1.78^2.14^2.94
ⁿ^s^y^l^v^aⁿⁱ^a⁵^.30⁵^.24⁵^.20⁵^.34¹^.66¹^.74⁵^.30⁵^.24⁶^.86⁷^.08
^{ode Is}^l^aⁿ^d^0.61^0.59^0.59^0.⁶¹^0.19^0.20^0.61^0.59^0.78^0.81
^t^h^C^a^rolin^a¹^.09¹^.11¹^.16¹^.2⁴⁰^.37⁰^.40¹^.09¹^.11¹^.53¹^.64
^u^t^h^D^a^k^o^t^a^0.50^0.50^0.50^0.⁵⁰^0.11^0.12^0.50^0.50^0.61^0.62

CRS-56
^Independent^Livⁱ^ng^—Tit^{le IV-}^E^o^f^t^h^{e So}^cia^l^Securit^y^Act
^Educa^t^io^{n a}^{nd Tra}ⁱ^ning^a
^To^t^a^{l independent}^liv^ing^{Chafee Fos}^t^{er Care I}^{ndependence Program}^Vo^uchers
^St^a^t^e²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴
ⁿⁿ^e^s^s^e^e²^.52²^.51²^.35²^.35⁰^.72⁰^.77²^.52²^.51³^.07³^.12
^x^a^s⁴^.60⁴^.52⁴^.65⁵^.41¹^.42¹^.77⁴^.60⁴^.52⁶^.07⁷^.18
^0.53^0.50^0.53^0.50^0.⁰⁶^0.15^0.53^0.50^0.59^0.65
^on^t⁰^.50⁰^.50⁰^.50⁰^.50⁰^.10⁰^.12⁰^.50⁰^.50⁰^.60⁰^.62
ⁱⁿⁱ^a^1.70^1.70^1.75^1.71^0.56^0.56^1.70^1.70^2.31^2.27
^hⁱⁿ^g^t^on^2.03^2.11^2.18^2.33^0.66^0.76^2.03^2.11^2.84^3.09
^t^Vⁱ^rgⁱⁿⁱ^a^0.74^0.81^0.79^0.⁷⁷^0.25^0.25^0.74^0.81^1.05^1.02
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}^c^on^sⁱⁿ²^.25²^.56²^.54¹^.96⁰^.77⁰^.64²^.25²^.56³^.31²^.59
^g/w^omⁱⁿ^g⁰^.50⁰^.50⁰^.50⁰^.50⁰^.08⁰^.09⁰^.50⁰^.50⁰^.58⁰^.59
^s^.or
^le^ak^Subtotal^136.09^135.88^135.77^135.78^40.45^43.37^136.09^135.88^176.22^179.15
^://wiki^ert^o^Rⁱ^co^1.81^2.02^2.13^2.¹²^0.65^0.69^1.81^2.02^2.78^2.82
^h^ttp^e^r^b^2.08^2.10^2.06^2.09^0.62^0.67^2.08^2.10^2.69^2.76
^T^o^tal^139.98^140.00^139.96^139.99^41.⁷²^44.73^139.98^140.00^181.69^184.72
^T^a^{ble prepared by}^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^).^P^r^og^ram^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^am^ouⁿ^t^s^{to each}^s^t^ates^are^th^e^“^actu^a^l”^am^ouⁿ^t^s^aw^arded^each^s^t^{ate f}^o^{r th}^{e g}ⁱ^v^eⁿ^fⁱ^s^{cal y}^ear
^e^p^o^r^tedⁱⁿ^th^{e U.S. Dep}^a^r^t^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^Health^an^d^Hu^m^aⁿ^Ser^v^{ices (}^HHS)^,^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tioⁿ^f^o^r^Ch^ild^r^eⁿ^an^d^Fam^{ilies (}^A^CF)^B^u^d^g^{et J}^u^s^tⁱ^fⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^t^o^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^s^(F^Y^2003-^F^Y^2006).
^T^itle^IV-^E^o^f^th^e^So^cial^Secu^rity^A^c^t^d^o^e^sⁿ^o^t^au^th^o^r^{ize trib}^{es to}^receiv^e^an^y^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^f^r^o^m^th^{e f}^e^d^e^{ral g}^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^{. W}^ith^reg^ar^d^to^th^{e ter}^r^ito^rⁱ^{es, T}^{itle I}^V^-^E^p^e^r^m^its^A^m^er^ican
^o^a,^Gu^am^,^P^u^erto^Rico^an^d^th^{e Virg}ⁱⁿ^Islan^d^{s to}^dⁱ^rectly^recei^v^e^T^{itle IV-}^E^f^uⁿ^d^{s. It d}^o^e^{s n}^o^{t g}ⁱ^v^e^th^{is au}^th^o^r^ity^to^th^e^N^o^r^th^erⁿ^Marⁱ^an^{a I}^s^lan^d^{s. Of}^th^{e ter}^r^ito^rⁱ^{es, o}ⁿ^ly^P^u^er^to
^cu^rren^tly^receiv^e^{s T}^{itle IV-}^E^f^uⁿ^d^s.
^d^u^c^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^aⁿ^d^Tr^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^V^o^u^c^h^e^r^s^w^e^r^eⁿ^o^t^a^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^z^e^dⁱⁿ^F^Y^2001.^Thⁱ^s^v^o^u^c^h^e^r^p^r^o^g^r^a^m^w^a^s^e^s^t^a^b^lⁱ^s^h^e^d^b^y^P^.^L^.^107-^{133 (s}ⁱ^gⁿ^e^{d i}ⁿ^t^o^l^a^wⁱⁿ^Jan^.^{2002), w}^hⁱ^c^h^au^t^h^ori^{zed t}^h^e
^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^f^o^{r th}^em^begⁱⁿⁿⁱⁿ^g^w^ith^F^Y^{2002. T}^h^{e prog}^ram^receiv^e^{d its}^fⁱ^rs^{t f}^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^f^o^{r F}^Y^2003.
^h^{e s}^t^at^u^t^{e prov}ⁱ^d^es^t^h^at^t^h^e^U^.^S^.^D^e^part^m^eⁿ^t^of^H^eal^t^h^an^{d H}^u^m^aⁿ^S^e^rvⁱ^ces^m^u^s^t^res^e^rv^{e 1.5%}^of^t^h^{e f}^uⁿ^d^s^appropri^a^t^e^{d f}^o^r^th^{e C}^h^af^{ee Fos}^t^{er C}^a^{re In}^depen^d^en^{ce P}^r^og^ram^an^d
^t^h^e^E^d^uc^a^tⁱ^o^{n a}ⁿ^d^T^r^aⁱⁿⁱ^{ng V}^o^uc^he^r^s^fo^r^“e^va^l^u^a^tⁱ^o^n,^t^e^c^hni^c^a^l^as^sⁱ^s^t^an^{ce, perf}^orm^aⁿ^{ce m}^eas^u^r^em^en^{t, an}^{d data collection}^activ^it^ies.”

Appendix D—Actual Distribution of Foster Care
Funds and Hypothetical Distributions of Capped
Foster Care Funds
The purpose of the hypothetical distributions shown in this Appendix is not to
suggest that funding should be capped or that any of the hypothetical distributions
shown in this Appendix are the appropriate way to distribute funds or that the
FY2003 funding level is an appropriate one to use. Rather, these hypothetical
distributions are included to illustrate the critical importance of the factors used to
distribute capped funds, how those factors may change over time, and, for those
distribution methods referencing past (historical) expenditures, the significance of the
year or years selected.
Table D-1 shows actual funding level and distribution of Title IV-E Foster Care
funds to each state for FY1999-FY2003. (FY2003 is the most recent Title IV-E
expenditure data available.)
Table D-2 shows the actual distribution of Title IV-E Foster Care funds to each
state for FY2003 along with five hypothetical distributions. Total funding for each
of the hypothetical distributions is the FY2003 federal funding level, however the
distribution is based on a state’s relative share of certain child populations. These are
— (1) all children in the nation (including Puerto Rico) as shown by the 1990 census;
(2) all children in the nation (including Puerto Rico) as shown by the 2000 census;
(3) all children in foster care as of the last day of FY2001; (4) all children in foster
care as of the last day of FY2003; and (5) the average number of all foster care
children for FY2001-FY2003.
These hypothetical distributions demonstrate both the significance of the kind
of factors used to determine how states receive funds and the way these factors can
change with time.
Table D-3 shows the actual distribution of Title IV-E Foster Care funds to each
state for FY2003 and shows five hypothetical distributions. The total funding for
each of these hypothetical distributions is the FY2003 federal funding level, however
the distribution (or relative share of the funds) is based on the state’s relative share
of all federal foster care claims in (1) FY1999; (2) FY2000; (3) FY2001; (4) FY2002
and (5) average distribution of average funding for FY1999-FY2003.
These hypothetical distributions demonstrate the variation in level of claims
made by states from year to year and thus emphasize the significance of the year or
time period selected if funds were to be based on historical distributions.

CRS-58
Table D-1. Actual Distribution of Federal Title IV-E Foster Care Funds, FY1999-FY2003
(dollars in millions)
^Tⁱ^{tle I}^V^-E^Fos^t^{er Care—total fe}^{deral s}^h^{are of s}^t^{ate claim}^s
^FY^1999-FY²⁰⁰³
^St^a^t^e^FY¹⁹⁹⁹^FY²⁰⁰⁰^FY²⁰⁰¹^FY²⁰⁰²^FY²⁰⁰³^average
^a^{$13.2 0.33%}^{$13.2 0.31%}^$19.^{2 0.44%}^$26.8⁰^.59%^$23.8⁰^.53%^$19.2⁰^.44%
^k^a^{$9.4 0.23%}^{$11.0 0.26%}^$10.6^0.24%^$9.0⁰^.20%^$10.6⁰^.24%^$10.1⁰^.23%
ⁱ^z^on^a^{$54.3 1.35%}^{$45.1 1.06%}^$44.^{7 1.02%}^$40.0⁰^.88%^$43.3⁰^.96%^$45.5¹^.05%
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}^k^aⁿ^s^as^{$32.1 0.80%}^{$37.1 0.87%}^$28.^{7 0.65%}^$32.7⁰^.72%^$31.7⁰^.71%^$32.4⁰^.75%^lⁱ^f^ornⁱ^a^{$911.8 22.73%}^{$1,069.9 25.14%}^$1,057.^{0 24.05%}^$1,171.3^25.89%^$1,^238.5^27.61%^$1,089.7^25.14%
^g/w
^s^.or^l^o^rado^{$42.5 1.06%}^{$28.5 0.67%}^$43.^{4 0.99%}^$47.4¹^.05%^$69.4¹^.55%^$46.3¹^.07%
^le^akⁿⁿ^ectⁱ^c^u^t^{$91.8 2.29%}^{$97.0 2.28%}^$95.^{1 2.16%}^$50.2¹^.11%^$58.3¹^.30%^$78.5¹^.81%
^://wiki^l^a^w^a^re^{$8.3 0.21%}^{$12.1 0.29%}^$10.^{5 0.24%}^$10.7⁰^.24%^$8.0⁰^.18%^$9.9⁰^.23%
^h^ttp^t^ri^ct^of^C^o^l^u^m^bⁱ^a^$42.9^1.07%^$36.7^0.^86%^$26.6^0.61%^$25.1⁰^.55%^$20.7⁰^.46%^$30.4⁰^.70%
^d^a^{$120.8 3.01%}^{$146.5 3.44%}^$149.^{4 3.40%}^$126.8²^.80%^$100.7²^.24%^$128.8²^.97%
^orgⁱ^a^{$42.9 1.07%}^{$49.4 1.16%}^$62.^{2 1.42%}^$61.6¹^.36%^$31.5⁰^.70%^$49.5¹^.14%
^w^aⁱⁱ^{$15.8 0.39%}^{$19.0 0.45%}^$19.5^0.44%^$17.0⁰^.38%^$18.3⁰^.41%^$17.9⁰^.41%
^o^{$7.9 0.20%}^{$6.6 0.15%}^$5.5^0.12%^$5.7⁰^.13%^$6.5⁰^.14%^$6.4⁰^.15%
^ois^{$273.3 6.81%}^$299.^{0 7.03%}^$289.3^6.58%^$321.2⁷^.10%^$342.3⁷^.63%^$305.0⁷^.04%
^an^a^{$53.3 1.33%}^{$39.5 0.93%}^$35.^{0 0.80%}^$46.9¹^.04%^$43.5⁰^.97%^$43.6¹^.01%
^a^{$29.6 0.74%}^{$34.2 0.80%}^$26.6^0.60%^$20.5⁰^.45%^$20.0⁰^.45%^$26.2⁰^.60%
ⁿ^s^as^{$30.9 0.77%}^{$40.5 0.95%}^$37.7^0.86%^$28.4⁰^.63%^$32.9⁰^.73%^$34.1⁰^.79%
ⁿ^t^u^c^k^y^{$46.1 1.15%}^{$52.3 1.23%}^$56.^{2 1.28%}^$54.2¹^.20%^$48.0¹^.07%^$51.3¹^.18%
^uⁱ^sⁱ^an^a^{$50.1 1.25%}^{$46.5 1.09%}^$43.^{5 0.99%}^$52.9¹^.17%^$55.6¹^.24%^$49.7¹^.15%
ⁿ^e^{$32.2 0.80%}^{$34.3 0.81%}^$33.7^0.77%^$33.4⁰^.74%^$22.0⁰^.49%^$31.1⁰^.72%
^l^aⁿ^d^{$96.7 2.41%}^{$131.4 3.09%}^$137.^{2 3.12%}^$141.2³^.12%^$131.2²^.92%^$127.5²^.94%
^s^ach^u^s^et^t^s^{$75.7 1.89%}^{$66.5 1.56%}^$68.^{2 1.55%}^$54.8¹^.21%^$68.4¹^.52S^ou^%^$66.7¹^.54%
^chⁱ^g^an^{$136.0 3.39%}^{$149.6 3.51%}^$152.^{4 3.47%}^$144.9³^.20%^$129.8²^.89%^$142.5³^.29%

CRS-59
^Tⁱ^{tle I}^V^-E^Fos^t^{er Care—total fe}^{deral s}^h^{are of s}^t^{ate claim}^s
^FY^1999-FY²⁰⁰³
^St^a^t^e^FY¹⁹⁹⁹^FY²⁰⁰⁰^FY²⁰⁰¹^FY²⁰⁰²^FY²⁰⁰³^average
ⁿⁿ^e^s^o^t^a^{$72.6 1.81%}^{$78.5 1.84%}^$80.^{2 1.82%}^$74.5¹^.65%^$68.2¹^.52%^$74.8¹^.73%
^s^sⁱ^s^sⁱ^ppi^{$9.5 0.24%}^{$12.9 0.30%}^$15.^{8 0.36%}^$10.0⁰^.22%^$11.6⁰^.26%^$11.9⁰^.28%
^s^s^o^u^rⁱ^{$73.6 1.84%}^{$69.2 1.63%}^$67.^{8 1.54%}^$67.1¹^.48%^$58.4¹^.30%^$67.2¹^.55%
^t^an^a^{$7.8 0.19%}^{$10.6 0.25%}^$10.^{1 0.23%}^$9.8⁰^.22%^$8.6⁰^.19%^$9.4⁰^.22%
^bras^k^a^{$25.9 0.65%}^{$23.4 0.55%}^$22.^{0 0.50%}^$22.0⁰^.49%^$23.9⁰^.53%^$23.4⁰^.54%
^v^a^da^{$14.8 0.37%}^{$15.4 0.36%}^$12.4^0.28%^$13.8⁰^.31%^$18.2⁰^.41%^$14.9⁰^.34%
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}^w^H^a^m^p^s^hⁱ^r^e^{$11.8 0.30%}^{$9.5 0.22%}^{$8.7 0.20%}^$11.8⁰^.26%^$14.6⁰^.33%^$11.3⁰^.26%
^g/w^w^Jers^ey^{$45.6 1.14%}^{$60.4 1.42%}^$61.^{8 1.41%}^$77.1¹^.70%^$54.7¹^.22%^$59.9¹^.38%
^s^.or^w^Mexⁱ^co^{$14.4 0.36%}^{$16.8 0.39%}^$16.^{8 0.38%}^$15.9⁰^.35%^$23.0⁰^.51%^$17.4⁰^.40%
^le^ak^w^Y^o^rk^{$482.0 12.02%}^{$432.7 10.17%}^$523.^{0 11.90%}^$479.6^10.60%^$446.0⁹^.94%^$472.7^10.91%
^://wiki^rt^h^C^a^rolⁱⁿ^a^{$64.5 1.61%}^{$74.6 1.75%}^{$74.3 1.69%}^$63.6¹^.41%^$52.6¹^.17%^$65.9¹^.52%
^h^ttp^rt^h^D^a^k^o^t^a^{$11.2 0.28%}^{$11.9 0.28%}^{$12.7 0.29%}^$13.1⁰^.29%^$10.5⁰^.23%^$11.9⁰^.27%
ⁱ^o^{$207.9 5.18%}^{$200.7 4.72%}^$202.0^4.60%^$222.0⁴^.91%^$225.9⁵^.04%^$211.7⁴^.88%
^l^a^h^o^m^a^{$32.4 0.81%}^{$33.7 0.79%}^$34.^{3 0.78%}^$29.2⁰^.64%^$24.0⁰^.53%^$30.7⁰^.71%
^eg^on^{$31.5 0.79%}^{$28.9 0.68%}^$31.3^0.71%^$31.9⁰^.70%^$35.2⁰^.78%^$31.8⁰^.73%
ⁿ^s^y^l^v^aⁿⁱ^a^{$316.4 7.89%}^{$306.8 7.21%}^{$306.8 6.98%}^$345.3⁷^.63%^$320.4⁷^.14%^$319.1⁷^.36%
^ode^Is^l^aⁿ^d^{$12.6 0.31%}^{$13.0 0.31%}^{$13.4 0.30%}^$13.9⁰^.31%^$14.4⁰^.32%^$13.4⁰^.31%
^u^t^h^C^a^rolⁱⁿ^a^{$17.2 0.43%}^{$14.2 0.33%}^{$38.9 0.89%}^$35.3⁰^.78%^$22.9⁰^.51%^$25.7⁰^.59%
^u^t^h^D^a^k^o^t^a^{$4.6 0.11%}^{$5.6 0.13%}^{$5.9 0.13%}^$5.8⁰^.13%^$5.5⁰^.12%^$5.5⁰^.13%
ⁿⁿ^e^s^s^e^e^{$25.2 0.63%}^{$29.1 0.68%}^$37.^{0 0.84%}^$24.2⁰^.54%^$24.3⁰^.54%^$28.0⁰^.65%
^x^a^s^{$87.0 2.17%}^{$92.5 2.17%}^$120.4^2.74%^$148.1³^.27%^$156.5³^.49%^$120.9²^.79%
^{$21.0 0.52%}^{$21.5 0.50%}^$19.8^0.45%^$20.1⁰^.44%^$20.4⁰^.46%^$20.5⁰^.47%
^rm^on^t^{$12.0 0.30%}^{$13.7 0.32%}^$12.^{3 0.28%}^$12.8⁰^.28%^$11.0⁰^.25%^$12.4⁰^.29%
ⁱⁿⁱ^a^{$44.3 1.10%}^{$51.9 1.22%}^$58.^{4 1.33%}^$81.2¹^.80%^$98.0²^.19%^$66.8¹^.54%
^hⁱⁿ^g^t^on^{$29.3 0.73%}^{$33.4 0.79%}^$40.^{3 0.92%}^$53.1¹^.17%^$60.3¹^.35%^$43.3¹^.00%

CRS-60
^Tⁱ^{tle I}^V^-E^Fos^t^{er Care—total fe}^{deral s}^h^{are of s}^t^{ate claim}^s
^FY^1999-FY²⁰⁰³
^St^a^t^e^FY¹⁹⁹⁹^FY²⁰⁰⁰^FY²⁰⁰¹^FY²⁰⁰²^FY²⁰⁰³^average
^t^Vⁱ^rgⁱⁿⁱ^a^{$17.7 0.44%}^{$15.1 0.35%}^{$21.7 0.49%}^$23.3⁰^.51%^$23.7⁰^.53%^$20.3⁰^.47%
^s^c^on^sⁱⁿ^{$91.7 2.28%}^{$99.7 2.34%}^$82.^{8 1.88%}^$80.0¹^.77%^$81.5¹^.82%^$87.1²^.01%
^omⁱⁿ^g^{$2.2 0.05%}^{$2.4 0.06%}^$2.^{3 0.05%}^$2.9⁰^.06%^$2.1⁰^.05%^$2.4⁰^.05%
^Subt^o^t^a^l^{$4,004 99.8%}^{$4,244 99.7%}^$4,385^99.^8%^$4,510^99.7%^$4,471^99.7%^$4,323^99.7%
^ert^o^Rⁱ^co^{$7.3 0.18%}^{$11.1 0.26%}^{$9.9 0.23%}^$13.4⁰^.30%^$14.0⁰^.31%^$11.1⁰^.26%
^To^t^a^l^{$4,011 100%}^{$4,255 100%}^$4,395^100%^$4,523^100%^$4,485^100%^$4,334^100%
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}
^g/w^T^a^b^l^e^p^r^e^p^a^r^e^d^b^y^t^h^e^Co^ngr^e^ssi^oⁿ^a^l^Re^se^a^r^c^h^Se^r^vⁱ^c^e⁽^CRS)^b^a^se^d^oⁿ^a^nnua^l^e^x^p^e^ndⁱ^t^u^r^e^fi^l^e^fo^r^fo^st^e^r^c^a^r^e^p^r^e^p^a^r^e^d^b^y^t^h^e^U^{.S. Departm}^eⁿ^t^of^Health^an^{d Hu}^m^aⁿ^Serv^ices
^s^.or^h^is^f^{ile in}^clu^d^es^f^e^{deral s}^h^{are of}^s^t^{ate claim}^s^as^m^a^{de by}^each^s^t^{ate, in}^clu^dⁱⁿ^g^ceratin^claim^s^w^h^ich^m^a^y^s^u^bs^equ^eⁿ^tly^b^e^dⁱ^sallo^w^e^d^.^T^h^{is f}^ile^is^b^e^liev^e^d^to^p^r^o^v^id^{e th}^{e b}^e^st
^le^ak^a^t^e^o^f^a^nnua^{l fe}^d^e^r^a^{l e}^x^p^e^nd^itur^e^{s und}^e^r^the^T^itle^I^V^-E^fo^ste^r^c^a^r^e^p^r^o^g^r^a^m^.
^://wiki^T^h^es^e^dataⁱⁿ^clu^d^{e th}^{e portion}^of^ch^{ild s}^u^{pport m}^oⁿⁱ^es^collected^on^beh^a^lf^of^ch^ildren^receivⁱⁿ^g^T^{itle IV-}^E^f^o^s^t^er^care^m^aⁱⁿ^t^en^an^{ce pay}^m^en^ts^an^{d w}^h^ich^{are reim}^bu^rs^{ed to th}^e
^h^ttp^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^{. T}^h^{e f}^e^{deral s}^h^{are of}^ch^{ild s}^u^{pport co}^llection^s^ran^g^e^{d f}^r^om^{$25 m}^illionⁱⁿ^{FY2000 to $32 m}^illionⁱⁿ^FY2003;^com^p^arabl^e^dat^a^{are n}^o^t^av^ai^l^a^bl^{e f}^o^{r F}^Y^1999.

CRS-61
ctual Distribution of Title IV-E Foster Care Funds, FY2003 and Hypothetical Distribution of Funds (at the
FY2003 Funding Level), Based on a State’s Share of Certain Child Populations
($ in millions)
^{Child po}^pula^t^ioⁿ^{Children in fos}^t^{er care}
^Actua^l^(al^lⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vi^d^u^a^l^s^uⁿ^d^{er 18 years}^{of age)}^(total^cas^e^l^oad^as^{of l}^a^s^t^d^{ay of fi}^s^c^al^year)
^dist^ribut^ioⁿ
^St^a^t^e^FY²⁰⁰³^{1990 C}^eⁿ^s^u^s^{2000 C}^eⁿ^s^u^s^FY²⁰⁰¹^FY²⁰⁰³^A^v^{erage FY}^2001-FY²⁰⁰³
^a⁰^.5%^$23.8¹^,058,788^1.6%^$73.3¹^,123,422^1.5%^$68.7⁵^,859^1.1%^$48.2⁶^,079^1.2%^$52.1⁵^,940^1.1%^$49.9
^k^a^0.2%^$10.6^172,344^0.3%^$11.9^190,717^0.3%^$11.7¹^,993^0.4%^$16.4²^,040^0.^4%^$17.5²^,035^0.4%^$17.1
ⁱ^z^on^a¹^.0%^$43.3^981,119^1.5%^$68.0¹^,366,947^1.9%^$83.⁶⁶^,050^1.1%^$49.8⁷^,742^1.^5%^$66.4⁶^,668^1.2%^$56.1
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}^k^aⁿ^s^as^0.7%^$31.7^621,131^1.0%^$43.0^680,369^0.9%^$41.⁶²^,959^0.5%^$24.4³^,000^0.^6%^$25.7²^,977^0.6%^$25.0
^g/w
^s^.or^lⁱ^f^ornⁱ^a^27.6%^$1,238.5⁷^,750,725^12.^0%^$536.8⁹^,249,829^12.6%^$565.4^107,168^19.7%^$882.4^97,261^18.6%^$834.1^101,627^19.0%^$854.4
^le^ak^l^o^rado^1.5%^$69.4^861,266^1.3%^$59.⁷¹^,100,795^1.5%^$67.3⁷^,138^1.3%^$58.⁸⁸^,754^1.7%^$75.1⁸^,367^1.6%^$70.3
^://wikiⁿⁿ^ectⁱ^c^u^t^1.3%^$58.3^749,581^1.2%^$51.9^841,688^1.1%^$51.⁴⁷^,440^1.4%^$61.3⁶^,742^1.^3%^$57.8⁶^,730^1.3%^$56.6^l^a^w^a^re^0.2%^$8.0^163,341^0.3%^$11.3^194,587^0.3%^$11.9¹^,023^0.2%^$8.4⁸¹⁴^0.2%^$7.0⁹⁰⁸^0.2%^$7.6
^h^ttp
^t^{. of}^C^o^l^.^0.5%^$20.7^117,092^0.2%^$8.1^114,992^0.2%^$7.0³^,339^0.6%^$27.5³^,092^0.6%^$26.5³^,251^0.6%^$27.3
^d^a²^.2%^$100.7²^,866,237^4.4%^$198.5³^,646,340^5.0%^$222.9^32,477^6.0%^$267.4^30,677^5.9%^$263.1^31,706^5.9%^$266.6
^orgⁱ^a⁰^.7%^$31.5¹^,727,303^2.7%^$119.6²^,169,234^3.0%^$132.6^13,175^2.4%^$108.5^13,581^2.6%^$116.5^13,302^2.5%^$111.8
^w^aⁱⁱ^0.4%^$18.3^280,126^0.4%^$19.4^295,767^0.4%^$18.1²^,854^0.5%^$23.5²^,967^0.^6%^$25.4²^,861^0.5%^$24.1
^o⁰^.1%^$6.5^308,405^0.5%^$21.4^369,030^0.5%^$22.6¹^,114^0.2%^$9.2¹^,401^0.3%^$12.0¹^,254^0.2%^$10.5
^ois⁷^.6%^$342.3²^,946,³⁶⁶^4.5%^$204.1³^,245,451^4.4%^$198.4^28,202^5.^2%^$232.2^21,608^4.1%^$185.3^24,718^4.6%^$207.8
^an^a¹^.0%^$43.5¹^,455,964^2.2%^$100.8¹^,574,396^2.1%^$96.2⁸^,383^1.5%^$69.0⁸^,899^1.7%^$76.3⁸^,641^1.6%^$72.6
^a^0.4%^$20.0^718,880^1.1%^$49.8^733,638^1.0%^$44.8⁵^,202^1.0%^$42.8⁵^,011^1.^0%^$43.0⁵^,150^1.0%^$43.3
ⁿ^s^as^0.7%^$32.9^661,614^1.0%^$45.8^712,993^1.0%^$43.6⁶^,409^1.2%^$52.8⁵^,781^1.^1%^$49.6⁶^,127^1.1%^$51.5
ⁿ^t^u^c^k^y^1.1%^$48.0^954,094^1.5%^$66.1^994,818^1.4%^$60.⁸⁶^,165^1.1%^$50.8⁶^,895^1.^3%^$59.1⁶^,625^1.2%^$55.7
^uⁱ^sⁱ^an^a¹^.2%^$55.6¹^,227,269^1.9%^$85.0¹^,219,799^1.7%^$74.6⁵^,024^0.9%^$41.4⁴^,541^0.9%^$38.9⁴^,798^0.9%^$40.3
ⁿ^e⁰^.5%^$22.0^309,002^0.5%^$21.4^301,238^0.4%^$18.4³^,226^0.6%^$26.6²^,999^0.^6%^$25.7³^,103^0.6%^$26.1
^l^aⁿ^d^2.9%^$131.2¹^,162,241^1.8%^$80.⁵¹^,356,172^1.8%^$82.9^12,564^2.3%^$103.⁵^11,521^2.2%^$98.8^12,037^2.3%^$101.2
^s^ach^u^s^et^t^s^1.5%^$68.4¹^,353,075^2.^1%^$93.7¹^,500,064^2.0%^$91.7^11,568^2.1%^$95.2^12,608^2.4%^$108.1^12,229^2.3%^$102.8

CRS-62
^{Child po}^pula^t^ioⁿ^{Children in fos}^t^{er care}
^Actua^l^(al^lⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vi^d^u^a^l^s^uⁿ^d^{er 18 years}^{of age)}^(total^cas^e^l^oad^as^{of l}^a^s^t^d^{ay of fi}^s^c^al^year)
^dist^ribut^ioⁿ
^St^a^t^e^FY²⁰⁰³^{1990 C}^eⁿ^s^u^s^{2000 C}^eⁿ^s^u^s^FY²⁰⁰¹^FY²⁰⁰³^A^v^{erage FY}^2001-FY²⁰⁰³
^chⁱ^g^an^2.9%^$129.8²^,458,765^3.8%^$170.3²^,595,767^3.5%^$158.7^20,896^3.8%^$172.1^21,376^4.1%^$183.3^21,174^4.0%^$178.0
ⁿⁿ^e^s^o^t^a^1.5%^$68.2¹^,166,783^1.8%^$80.8¹^,286,894^1.8%^$78.7⁸^,167^1.5%^$67.2⁷^,338^1.4%^$62.9⁷^,852^1.5%^$66.0
^s^sⁱ^s^sⁱ^ppi^0.3%^$11.6^746,761^1.2%^$51.7^775,187^1.1%^$47.⁴³^,443^0.6%^$28.3²^,812^0.^5%^$24.1²^,980^0.6%^$25.1
^s^s^o^u^rⁱ¹^.3%^$58.4¹^,314,826^2.0%^$91.1¹^,427,692^1.9%^$87.3^13,349^2.5%^$109.9^12,516^2.4%^$107.3^12,972^2.4%^$109.1
^t^an^a⁰^.2%^$8.6^222,104^0.3%^$15.4^230,062^0.3%^$14.¹²^,008^0.4%^$16.5¹^,866^0.^4%^$16.0¹^,929^0.4%^$16.2
^bras^k^a^0.5%^$23.9^429,012^0.7%^$29.7^450,242^0.6%^$27.⁵⁶^,254^1.1%^$51.5⁶^,093^1.^2%^$52.3⁶^,259^1.2%^$52.6
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}^v^a^da^0.4%^$18.2^296,948^0.5%^$20.6^511,799^0.7%^$31.3²^,959^0.5%^$24.4²^,285^0.^4%^$19.6²^,845^0.5%^$23.9
^g/w
^s^.or^m^p^s^hⁱ^r^e⁰^.3%^$14.6^278,755^0.4%^$19.3^309,562^0.4%^$18.⁹¹^,288^0.2%^$10.6¹^,217^0.^2%^$10.4¹^,265^0.2%^$10.6
^le^ak^w^Jers^ey^1.2%^$54.7¹^,799,462^2.8%^$124.6²^,087,558^2.8%^$127.6^10,666^2.0%^$87.⁸^12,828^2.5%^$110.0^11,645^2.2%^$97.9
^://wiki^w^Mexⁱ^co^0.5%^$23.0^446,741^0.7%^$30.9^508,574^0.7%^$31.¹¹^,757^0.3%^$14.5²^,100^0.^4%^$18.0¹^,914^0.4%^$16.1^w^Y^o^rk^9.9%^$446.0⁴^,259,549^6.6%^$295.0⁴^,690,107^6.4%^$286.7^43,365^8.0%^$357.1^38,260^7.3%^$328.1^40,793^7.6%^$343.0
^h^ttp
^rt^h^C^a^rolⁱⁿ^a¹^.2%^$52.6¹^,606,149^2.5%^$111.2¹^,964,047^2.^7%^$120.0^10,130^1.9%^$83.4⁹^,534^1.8%^$81.8⁹^,730^1.8%^$81.8
^rt^h^D^a^k^o^t^a^0.2%^$10.5^175,385^0.3%^$12.1^160,849^0.2%^$9.8¹^,167^0.2%^$9.6¹^,238^0.2%^$10.6¹^,201^0.2%^$10.1
ⁱ^o^5.0%^$225.9²^,799,744^4.3%^$193.9²^,888,339^3.9%^$176.5^21,584^4.0%^$177.7^19,323^3.7%^$165.7^20,648^3.9%^$173.6
^l^a^h^o^m^a^0.5%^$24.0^837,007^1.3%^$58.0^892,360^1.2%^$54.⁵⁸^,674^1.6%^$71.4⁹^,194^1.^8%^$78.8⁸^,893^1.7%^$74.8
^eg^on^0.8%^$35.2^724,130^1.1%^$50.2^846,526^1.2%^$51.7⁸^,966^1.6%^$73.8⁹^,381^1.^8%^$80.5⁹^,149^1.7%^$76.9
ⁿ^s^y^l^v^aⁿⁱ^a⁷^.1%^$320.4²^,794,810^4.3%^$193.6²^,922,221^4.^0%^$178.6^21,237^3.9%^$174.9^21,768^4.2%^$186.7^21,480^4.0%^$180.6
^{ode Is}^l^aⁿ^d^0.3%^$14.4^225,690^0.3%^$15.6^247,822^0.3%^$15.1²^,414^0.4%^$19.9²^,334^0.4%^$20.0²^,377^0.4%^$20.0
^u^t^h^C^a^rolⁱⁿ^a⁰^.5%^$22.9^920,207^1.4%^$63.7¹^,009,641^1.^4%^$61.7⁴^,774^0.9%^$39.3⁴^,894^0.9%^$42.0⁴^,829^0.9%^$40.6
^u^t^h^D^a^k^o^t^a^0.1%^$5.5^198,462^0.3%^$13.7^202,649^0.3%^$12.4¹^,367^0.3%^$11.3¹^,580^0.3%^$13.5¹^,448^0.3%^$12.2
ⁿⁿ^e^s^s^e^e⁰^.5%^$24.3¹^,216,604^1.9%^$84.3¹^,398,521^1.9%^$85.5⁹^,679^1.8%^$79.7⁹^,487^1.8%^$81.4⁹^,508^1.8%^$79.9
^x^a^s³^.5%^$156.5⁴^,835,839^7.5%^$335.0⁵^,886,759^8.0%^$359.⁸^19,739^3.6%^$162.5^22,191^4.^2%^$190.3^21,094^4.0%^$177.4
^0.5%^$20.4^627,444^1.0%^$43.5^718,698^1.0%^$43.9¹^,957^0.4%^$16.1²^,033^0.^4%^$17.4²^,005^0.4%^$16.9
^rm^on^t⁰^.2%^$11.0^143,083^0.2%^$9.9^147,523^0.2%^$9.⁰¹^,382^0.3%^$11.4¹^,409^0.^3%^$12.1¹^,439^0.3%^$12.1
ⁱⁿⁱ^a^2.2%^$98.0¹^,504,738^2.3%^$104.2¹^,738,262^2.4%^$106.2⁶^,866^1.3%^$56.5⁷^,046^1.3%^$60.4⁷^,007^1.3%^$58.9

CRS-63
^{Child po}^pula^t^ioⁿ^{Children in fos}^t^{er care}
^Actua^l^(al^lⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vi^d^u^a^l^s^uⁿ^d^{er 18 years}^{of age)}^(total^cas^e^l^oad^as^{of l}^a^s^t^d^{ay of fi}^s^c^al^year)
^dist^ribut^ioⁿ
^St^a^t^e^FY²⁰⁰³^{1990 C}^eⁿ^s^u^s^{2000 C}^eⁿ^s^u^s^FY²⁰⁰¹^FY²⁰⁰³^A^v^{erage FY}^2001-FY²⁰⁰³
^hⁱⁿ^g^t^on^1.3%^$60.3¹^,261,387^1.9%^$87.4¹^,513,843^2.1%^$92.5⁹^,101^1.7%^$74.⁹⁸^,406^1.6%^$72.1⁸^,748^1.6%^$73.6
^t^Vⁱ^rgⁱⁿⁱ^a^0.5%^$23.7^443,577^0.7%^$30.7^402,393^0.5%^$24.6³^,298^0.6%^$27.2⁴^,069^0.8%^$34.9³^,529^0.7%^$29.7
^s^c^on^sⁱⁿ¹^.8%^$81.5¹^,288,982^2.0%^$89.3¹^,368,756^1.9%^$83.7⁹^,497^1.7%^$78.2⁷^,805^1.5%^$66.9⁸^,682^1.6%^$73.0
^omⁱⁿ^g⁰^.0%^$2.1^135,525^0.2%^$9.4^128,873^0.2%^$7.9⁹⁶⁵^0.2%^$7.9¹^,055^0.2%^$9.0⁹⁸³^0.2%^$8.3
^Subt^o^t^a^l^99.7%^$4,471^63,604,432^98.2%^$4,406^72,^293,812^98.5%^$4,419^536,281^98.4%^$4,416^515,451^98.5%^$4,420^525,431^98.5%^$4,418
^ert^o^Rⁱ^co^0.3%^$14.0¹^,154,527^1.8%^$80.0¹^,092,101^1.^5%^$66.8⁸^,476^1.6%^$69.8⁷^,585^1.5%^$65.0⁸^,080^1.5%^$67.9
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}^To^t^a^l^100%^$4,485^64,758,959^100%^$4,485^73,385,913^100%^$4,485^544,757^100%^$4,485^523,036^100%^$4,485^533,511^100%^$4,485
^g/w
^s^.or^T^a^{ble prepared by}^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^).

^le^ak
^://wiki
^h^ttp

CRS-64
ctual and Hypothetical Distribution of Title IV-E Foster Care Funds, Based on Historical Expenditures
($ in millions)
^H^y^po^t^h^et^ica^l^sha^{re o}^f^f^{unds (}^a^v^era^g^e
^Act^u^a^l^sha^{re o}^f^f^unding^f^o^{r t}^h^{e g}ⁱ^v^e^{n f}ⁱ^sca^l^y^e^a^r^Act^u^a^l^sha^{re o}^f^f^unds^FY^1999-FY²⁰⁰³⁾
^an^d^an^d^an^d
^{Hypothetical (FY2003) funding level}^Act^u^a^l^f^unding^lev^e^l^{Hypothetical (FY2003) funding level}
^St^a^t^e^FY¹⁹⁹⁹^FY²⁰⁰⁰^FY²⁰⁰¹^FY²⁰⁰²^FY²⁰⁰³^A^v^{erage FY}^1999-FY²⁰⁰³
^a⁰^.3%^$14.8⁰^.3%^$13.9⁰^.4%^$19.6⁰^.6%^$26.6⁰^.5%^$23.8⁰^.4%^$19.9
^k^a^0.2%^$10.5⁰^.3%^$11.6⁰^.2%^$10.8⁰^.2%^$8.9⁰^.2%^$10.6⁰^.2%^$10.5
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}^z^on^a¹^.4%^$60.7¹^.1%^$47.6¹^.0%^$45.7⁰^.9%^$39.7¹^.0%^$43.3¹^.0%^$47.1
^g/w^aⁿ^s^as^0.8%^$35.8⁰^.9%^$39.1⁰^.7%^$29.2⁰^.7%^$32.4⁰^.7%^$31.7⁰^.7%^$33.6
^s^.orⁱ^f^ornⁱ^a^22.7%^$1,019.5^25.1%^$1,127.8^24.0%^$1,^078.7^25.9%^$1,161.5^27.6%^$1,238.5^25.1%^$1,127.7
^le^ak
^l^o^rado^1.1%^$47.6⁰^.7%^$30.1¹^.0%^$44.3¹^.0%^$47.0¹^.5%^$69.4¹^.1%^$47.9
^://wikiⁿⁿ^ectⁱ^c^u^t^2.3%^$102.6²^.3%^$102.2²^.2%^$97.1¹^.1%^$49.8¹^.3%^$58.3¹^.8%^$81.2
^h^ttp^l^a^w^a^re^0.2%^$9.3⁰^.3%^$12.8⁰^.2%^$10.7⁰^.2%^$10.6⁰^.2%^$8.0⁰^.2%^$10.3
^t^ri^ct^of^C^o^l^u^m^bⁱ^a^1.1%^$48.0⁰^.9%^$38.7⁰^.6%^$27.2⁰^.6%^$24.9⁰^.5%^$20.7⁰^.7%^$31.5
^d^a³^.0%^$135.0³^.4%^$154.4³^.4%^$152.5²^.8%^$125.7²^.2%^$100.7³^.0%^$133.3
^orgⁱ^a¹^.1%^$48.0¹^.2%^$52.1¹^.4%^$63.5¹^.4%^$61.1⁰^.7%^$31.5¹^.1%^$51.3
^w^aⁱⁱ^0.4%^$17.7⁰^.4%^$20.0⁰^.4%^$19.9⁰^.4%^$16.9⁰^.4%^$18.3⁰^.4%^$18.6
^o⁰^.2%^$8.9⁰^.2%^$6.9⁰^.1%^$5.6⁰^.1%^$5.6⁰^.1%^$6.5⁰^.1%^$6.6
^ois⁶^.8%^$305.5⁷^.0%^$315.2⁶^.6%^$295.3⁷^.1%^$318.5⁷^.6%^$342.3⁷^.0%^$315.7
^an^a¹^.3%^$59.6⁰^.9%^$41.6⁰^.8%^$35.7¹^.0%^$46.5¹^.0%^$43.5¹^.0%^$45.2
^a^0.7%^$33.1⁰^.8%^$36.0⁰^.6%^$27.1⁰^.5%^$20.3⁰^.4%^$20.0⁰^.6%^$27.1
ⁿ^s^as^0.8%^$34.5¹^.0%^$42.7⁰^.9%^$38.5⁰^.6%^$28.1⁰^.7%^$32.9⁰^.8%^$35.3
ⁿ^t^u^c^k^y^1.1%^$51.6¹^.2%^$55.1¹^.3%^$57.3¹^.2%^$53.7¹^.1%^$48.0¹^.2%^$53.1
ⁱ^sⁱ^an^a¹^.2%^$56.1¹^.1%^$49.0¹^.0%^$44.4¹^.2%^$52.4¹^.2%^$55.6¹^.1%^$51.4
ⁿ^e⁰^.8%^$36.0⁰^.8%^$36.2⁰^.8%^$34.4⁰^.7%^$33.1⁰^.5%^$22.0⁰^.7%^$32.2
^l^aⁿ^d^2.4%^$108.2³^.1%^$138.5³^.1%^$140.0³^.1%^$140.0²^.9%^$131.2²^.9%^$132.0

CRS-65
^H^y^po^t^h^et^ica^l^sha^{re o}^f^f^{unds (}^a^v^era^g^e
^Act^u^a^l^sha^{re o}^f^f^unding^f^o^{r t}^h^{e g}ⁱ^v^e^{n f}ⁱ^sca^l^y^e^a^r^Act^u^a^l^sha^{re o}^f^f^unds^FY^1999-FY²⁰⁰³⁾
^an^d^an^d^an^d
^{Hypothetical (FY2003) funding level}^Act^u^a^l^f^unding^lev^e^l^{Hypothetical (FY2003) funding level}
^St^a^t^e^FY¹⁹⁹⁹^FY²⁰⁰⁰^FY²⁰⁰¹^FY²⁰⁰²^FY²⁰⁰³^A^v^{erage FY}^1999-FY²⁰⁰³
^s^ach^u^s^et^t^s^1.9%^$84.6¹^.6%^$70.1¹^.6^%^$69.6¹^.2%^$54.4¹^.5%^$68.4¹^.5%^$69.0
^chⁱ^g^an^3.4%^$152.0³^.5%^$157.7³^.5%^$155.5³^.2%^$143.7²^.9%^$129.8³^.3%^$147.5
ⁿⁿ^e^s^o^t^a^1.8%^$81.2¹^.8%^$82.7¹^.8%^$81.8¹^.6%^$73.9¹^.5%^$68.2¹^.7%^$77.4
^s^sⁱ^s^sⁱ^ppi^0.2%^$10.6⁰^.3%^$13.6⁰^.4%^$16.1⁰^.2%^$9.9⁰^.3%^$11.6⁰^.3%^$12.4
^s^s^o^u^rⁱ¹^.8%^$82.3¹^.6%^$73.0¹^.5%^$69.2¹^.5%^$66.6¹^.3%^$58.4¹^.6%^$69.6
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32849}^t^an^a⁰^.2%^$8.7⁰^.2%^$11.2⁰^.2%^$10.4⁰^.2%^$9.7⁰^.2%^$8.6⁰^.2%^$9.7
^g/w^bras^k^a^0.6%^$28.9⁰^.6%^$24.7⁰^.5%^$22.5⁰^.5%^$21.8⁰^.5%^$23.9⁰^.5%^$24.3
^s^.or
^le^ak^v^a^da^0.4%^$16.5⁰^.4%^$16.3⁰^.3%^$12.7⁰^.3%^$13.7⁰^.4%^$18.2⁰^.3%^$15.5
^w^H^a^m^p^s^hⁱ^r^e⁰^.3%^$13.2⁰^.2%^$10.0⁰^.2%^$8.9⁰^.3%^$11.7⁰^.3%^$14.6⁰^.3%^$11.7
^://wiki^w^Jers^ey^1.1%^$51.0¹^.4%^$63.7¹^.4%^$63.1¹^.7%^$76.4¹^.2%^$54.7¹^.4%^$62.0
^h^ttp^w^Mexⁱ^co^0.4%^$16.1⁰^.4%^$17.7⁰^.4%^$17.1⁰^.4%^$15.8⁰^.5%^$23.0⁰^.4%^$18.0
^w^Y^o^rk^12.0%^$539.0^10.2%^$456.1^11.9%^$533.7^10.6%^$475.6⁹^.9%^$446.0^10.9%^$489.2
^rt^h^C^a^rolⁱⁿ^a¹^.6%^$72.2¹^.8%^$78.6¹^.7%^$75.8¹^.4%^$63.1¹^.2%^$52.6¹^.5%^$68.2
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CRS-66
^H^y^po^t^h^et^ica^l^sha^{re o}^f^f^{unds (}^a^v^era^g^e
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^an^d^an^d^an^d
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^T^a^{ble prepared by}^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al R}^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice (C}^R^S^).