Constitutionality of Proposals to Prohibit the Sale or Rental to Minors of Video Games with Violent or Sexual Content or "Strong Language"

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

Introduc tion ............................................................................................................................... 1
First Amendment Principles......................................................................................................1
Violent and sexual material.................................................................................................2
Overbreadth .................................................................................................................... .... 3
Violent Video Game Decisions.................................................................................................4
Sexually Explicit Video Games Decision.................................................................................7
Application of the Decisions to the Proposal............................................................................8
Violent content....................................................................................................................8
Sexual content...................................................................................................................10
Application to “M”- and “AO”-rated video games...........................................................10
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 11
Author Contact Information...........................................................................................................11

It has been proposed that Congress prohibit the sale or rental to minors of video games that are
rated “M” (mature) or “AO” (adults-only) by the Entertainment Software Ratings Board. This
board is a non-governmental entity established by the Interactive Digital Software Association,
and its ratings currently have no legal effect. The Board’s website sets forth the criteria for its
“M” and “AO” ratings:
^T^{itles r}^a^ted^M⁽^M^ature)^h^a^v^e^con^t^eⁿ^t^t^h^at^m^a^y^be^suⁱ^t^a^bl^e^{for pers}^on^s^a^g^es^{17 a}ⁿ^{d ol}^der.
^T^itlesⁱⁿ^thⁱ^s^cate^g^or^y^m^a^y^co^ntainⁱⁿ^teⁿ^s^e^vⁱ^ol^en^{ce, blood and g}^o^{re, s}^e^xu^al^con^t^eⁿ^{t, a}ⁿ^d/or
^st^r^o^{ng l}^aⁿ^gua^ge^.
^T^{itles r}^a^ted^AO⁽^A^dult^s^Oⁿ^ly⁾^h^a^v^e^coⁿ^t^ent^t^h^a^t^sh^ou^l^d^on^l^y^{be pl}^ay^{ed b}^y^pers^ons¹⁸^y^ears
^an^d^o^l^d^e^r^.^T^{itles in}^th^{is categ}^o^r^y^m^a^yⁱⁿ^cl^u^d^{e p}^r^o^l^oⁿ^g^e^d^scen^{es o}^fⁱⁿ^ten^s^{e v}ⁱ^o^l^eⁿ^{ce an}^d^/^o^r¹
^g^r^aphⁱ^{c s}^e^x^u^a^l^con^t^eⁿ^t^an^{d nudi}^t^y^.
The primary constitutional issue that a proposal to prohibit the sale or rental to minors of video
games with “M” or “AO” ratings raises is whether it would violate the First Amendment’s
guarantee of freedom of speech. If it would not violate the First Amendment, then it would
constitute a valid regulation of interstate commerce within Congress’s power to enact under the ²
Commerce Clause. Congress would also apparently have the power to delegate the promulgation
of video game standards to a private entity, as the Supreme Court has upheld Congress’s power to ³
delegate regulatory power to private entities in other contexts.
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech,” but the Supreme Court allows various exceptions to this prohibition. Obscenity, for
example, is not protected by the First Amendment, but most sexually oriented material has not ⁴
been judged to be obscene and is protected by the First Amendment. Even a statute that restricts
protected speech on the basis of its content may be constitutional, but the Supreme Court
generally will uphold such a statute only if it passes “strict scrutiny.” This means that, to be found
constitutional, the statute must be necessary “to promote a compelling interest” and be “the least ⁵
restrictive means to further the articulated interest.” The Supreme Court has “recognized that
there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors.

¹^htt^p^://w^ww^.e^srb.org^/^e^s^rbra^ting^s^_^g^u^ide^.^a^s^{p (b}^ol^{d in}^origⁱⁿ^a^l^).^W^e^w^{ill re}^f^e^{r to “}^m^inors”^throug^h^out^{this re}^p^o^{rt, a}^s^it
^s^e^em^s^unlik^e^l^y^tha^t^{it w}^{ould m}^a^ke^a^dif^f^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^f^r^o^m^a^c^ons^tituti^on^a^l^s^t^a^ndp^oin^t^w^h^e^t^he^{r a}^pr^opos^a^l^a^pplie^d^to^17-^or
^18-^y^e^a^r^olds^.
²^“^T^he^Cong^re^s^s^s^h^a^{ll ha}^v^e^Pow^e^{r... T}^o^re^g^u^la^te^Com^m^e^r^c^e^{... a}^m^ong^the^s^e^v^e^ra^{l Sta}^t^e^s^....”^A^r^{t. I, § 8}^,^c^l^{. 3.}
³^Se^e^{, T}^HE^C^O^N^S^TI^TU^TIO^N^O^F^T^H^E^U^NI^T^E^D^S^TA^T^E^S^O^F^A^ME^RI^C^A^:^A^N^A^L^Y^{SIS A}^N^D^I^N^T^E^R^P^R^ETA^T^I^O^N⁽²⁰⁰²⁾^,^a^t^88-⁹⁰^;
^http:^//w^w^w^.c^r^s^.g^ov^/^p^r^o^duc^ts^/^c^ona^n/^A^r^tic^l^e^01/^topic^_^S1^_4^_4^_2.^htm^l^.
⁴^T^h^{e S}^u^p^r^em^{e Co}^u^r^t^h^a^{s creat}^ed^a^t^h^ree-p^a^rt^t^e^st^,^kno^wⁿ^{as t}^h^e^M^ill^e^r^t^e^st^,^t^o^d^e^t^e^rmⁱⁿ^e^w^h^et^h^e^{r a w}^o^{rk i}^s^o^b^s^cen^e.
^Th^e^M^ille^r^te^s^t^a^s^ks^{: “}⁽^a⁾^w^h^e^t^he^r^‘^t^he^a^v^e^r^a^g^e^pe^r^s^{on a}^pplyⁱ^ng^c^oⁿ^t^e^m^por^a^r^y^c^o^m^m^unit^y^s^t^a^nda^r^d^s^’^w^{ould f}ⁱ^{nd t}^h^a^t
^the^w^o^r^k^{, ta}^k^e^{n a}^s^a^w^hole^,^a^ppe^a^l^s^{to t}^h^e^pr^ur^ie^nt^inte^r^e^s^{t; (}^b⁾^w^h^e^t^he^r^the^w^o^r^k^de^pic^t^s^or^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^s^,^{in a}^pa^te^ntly
^of^f^e^ns^iv^e^w^a^y^,^s^e^x^u^a^l^c^onduc^{t s}^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^l^l^y^defⁱ^ne^{d by}^the^a^pplic^a^b^l^e^s^t^a^t^e^law^;^a^{nd (}^c⁾^w^h^e^t^he^r^the^w^o^r^k^{, ta}^k^e^{n a}^s^a
^w^hole^,^la^c^k^{s se}^{rious lite}^ra^ry^{, a}^r^tis^tic^{, p}^o^litic^a^l^,^{or sc}^ie^ntif^ic^v^a^lue^.^Mille^{r v}^.^Ca^lif^ornia^,⁴¹^{3 U.S}^.¹⁵^,^{24 (}¹⁹⁷³⁾^(c^ita^tioⁿ^s
^om^itte^d).^Se^e^{, C}^R^S^R^e^p^o^r^t^95-⁸⁰^4,^Ob^scen^ity^aⁿ^d^Iⁿ^d^ecen^{cy: Co}ⁿ^s^titu^ti^oⁿ^a^l^Priⁿ^cip^l^{es a}ⁿ^d^Fed^e^ra^l^S^t^a^t^u^t^es^{, by}^H^e^nr^y
^C^ohe^n.
⁵^Sa^ble^C^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^of^C^a^lif^or^nia^,^Iⁿ^c^.^v^.^Fe^de^r^a^l^C^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^C^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on, 49}^{2 U}^.^S^.¹¹⁵^,¹^{26 (}¹⁹⁸⁹⁾^.

This interest extends to shielding minors from the influence of literature that is not obscene by ⁶
adult standards.”
By “literature that is not obscene by adult standards,” the Court was referring to “[s]exual ⁷
expression which is indecent but not obscene.” It was not referring to material with violent
content, and the courts tend to treat restrictions on sexual material differently from restrictions on
violent and other non-sexual material. With respect to non-sexual material, the Supreme Court
requires that, “[w]hen the Government defends a regulation on speech as a means to redress past
harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must ... demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not
merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and ⁸
material way.” This is true even with respect to governmental restrictions on speech to which,
unlike “indecent” speech, the Supreme Court accords less than full First Amendment protection ⁹
and therefore applies less than strict scrutiny.
With respect to sexually explicit material, by contrast, the courts generally assume, without ¹⁰
requiring evidence, that it is harmful to minors, or to consider it “obscene as to minors,” even if
it is not obscene as to adults. They therefore find it not entitled to First Amendment protection
with respect to minors, whether it is harmful to them or not. Considering the constitutionality of a
federal statute that required cable television operators to prevent “signal bleed” to customers who
had not subscribed to channels primarily dedicated to sexually oriented programming, a federal
district court wrote:
^{We are t}^r^ou^bl^{ed by}^t^h^{e ab}^s^e^{nce of}^e^vⁱ^d^en^{ce o}^f^h^a^r^m^pres^eⁿ^t^e^{d bot}^h^bef^o^{re C}^ong^ress^aⁿ^d
^bef^o^{re u}^s^t^h^at^t^h^e^vⁱ^e^wⁱⁿ^g^of^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^l^bl^{eed of}^s^e^xu^al^l^y^ex^plⁱ^cⁱ^t^prog^ram^mⁱ^ng^caus^e^s^h^a^r^m^t^o
^ch^ildren^an^{d th}^a^t^th^{e av}^oidan^c^e^of^th^is^h^a^r^m^can^{be recog}ⁿⁱ^zed^as^{a c}^o^m^p^e^l^lⁱⁿ^g^S^t^at^eⁱⁿ^t^e^r^e^s^t^.
^W^e^recogⁿⁱ^{ze th}^{at t}^h^{e S}^u^pre^m^{e C}^o^u^r^t’s^j^u^ris^p^ru^den^{ce does}^{not requ}^{ire em}^{pirical e}^v^iden^ce.
^On^l^y^s^o^m^e^mⁱⁿⁱ^m^a^{l a}^m^oun^{t of}^ev^iden^{ce is}^requ^{ired w}^h^en^s^e^x^u^a^l^ly^ex^p^lⁱ^cⁱ^t^p^r^o^g^r^a^m^mⁱⁿ^g^an^d¹¹
^ch^ildren^{are inv}^o^lv^ed.
The court therefore found that the statute served a compelling governmental interest. It held the
statute unconstitutional, however, because it found that it did not constitute the least restrictive
means to advance the interest. The Supreme Court affirmed on the same ground, apparently
assuming the existence of a compelling governmental interest, but agreeing that a less restrictive
means could have been used.
In another case, a federal court of appeals, upholding the statute that bans “indecent” radio and
television broadcasts from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m., noted “that the Supreme Court has recognized that

⁶^Id^.
⁷^Id^.
⁸^T^u^rⁿ^e^r^B^r^oa^dc^a^s^ting^Sy^s^t^em^v^.^Fe^de^r^a^{l C}^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^C^o^m^mⁱ^ssion,⁵^{12 U}^.^S.⁶²^2,⁶⁶^{4 (}¹⁹⁹⁴⁾⁽ⁱⁿ^c^ideⁿ^ta^l
^rest^ri^ctⁱ^oⁿ^oⁿ^s^p^eech^).
⁹^Id^.^S^{ee a}^l^so^{, E}^d^eⁿ^fⁱ^e^l^{d v}^.^Fa^ne^,⁵^{07 U}^.^S.⁷⁶^1,⁷⁷^0-⁷^{71 (}¹⁹⁹³⁾⁽^r^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^tion^on^c^o^m^m^e^r^cⁱ^a^l^s^p^e^e^c^h⁾^;^Nⁱ^x^{on v}^.^S^h^rⁱ^nk
^Mis^s^ourⁱ^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt P}^A^C^,⁵²⁸^U^.^{S. 3}⁷⁷^,³⁹²⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁽^r^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^tioⁿ^{on c}^a^m^pa^ig^{n c}^ontrⁱ^b^u^ti^ons⁾^.
¹⁰^Inte^ra^c^tiv^e^Dig^ita^{l Sof}^t^wa^re^A^s^s^o^cⁱ^a^tion^v^.^St.^L^{ouis Co}^un^ty^{, Missouri,}³²⁹^F.3^d⁹⁵⁴^,⁹⁵⁹⁽⁸^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰³⁾^;^ci^tⁱ^ng
^Gⁱ^ns^be^r^g^v^.^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{, 390 U}^.^S^.⁶²⁹⁽¹⁹⁶⁸⁾^.
¹¹^P^l^a^y^bo^y^Ente^r^t^aⁱ^nm^eⁿ^{t G}^r^{oup, I}ⁿ^c^.^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 3}⁰^F.^Su^pp^{. 2}^d⁷^02,⁷^{16 (}^D^{. D}^e^l.¹⁹⁹⁸⁾^;^aff’^d^,⁵²⁹^U^.^S.⁸⁰³
⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.

the Government’s interest in protecting children extends beyond shielding them from physical
and psychological harm. The statute that the Court found constitutional in Ginsberg sought to
protect children from exposure to materials that would ‘impair[ ] [their] ethical and moral
development.... Congress does not need the testimony of psychiatrists and social scientists in
order to take note of the coarsening of impressionable minds that can result from a persistent ¹²
exposure to sexually explicit material....” A dissenting judge in the case noted that, “[t]here is
not one iota of evidence in the record ... to support the claim that exposure to indecency is ¹³
harmful—indeed, the nature of the alleged ‘harm’ is never explained.”
Despite the above rulings, it has been noted that—
^T^h^{e Co}^u^r^{t see}^m^{s to}^b^e^b^eco^mⁱⁿ^g^le^{ss ab}^so^lu^{te in}^vⁱ^e^wⁱⁿ^g^th^{e p}^r^o^t^ectioⁿ^o^f^all^mⁱⁿ^o^r^s
^(reg^a^rdles^s^of^ag^{e) f}^r^o^m^{all i}ⁿ^decen^t^m^a^{terial (}^r^e^g^a^r^d^l^e^s^s^o^fⁱ^t^s^e^d^u^c^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^v^a^l^u^e^an^d^p^a^r^eⁿ^t^a^l
^ap^p^r^o^v^al)^to^b^e^{a co}^m^p^ellin^g^g^o^v^erⁿ^m^en^ta^{l in}^ter^e^{st. I}ⁿ^strⁱ^kⁱⁿ^g^d^o^wⁿ^th^e^Co^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^s
^Decen^c^y^A^c^{t o}^f^1996,^th^{e C}^o^u^r^t^w^o^u^l^{d “n}^eit^h^{er accept n}^o^{r re}^j^{ect th}^{e Gov}^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^’s
^su^b^m^is^sioⁿ^th^a^t^t^h^e^Fir^s^t^Am^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^{t d}^o^e^sⁿ^o^t^f^o^r^b^id^{a b}^l^an^k^e^{t p}^r^o^h^ib^itioⁿ^oⁿ^all^‘ⁱⁿ^d^eceⁿ^t^’
^an^{d ‘}^p^ateⁿ^tl^y^off^eⁿ^sⁱ^v^e^’^m^e^s^s^a^g^e^s^co^mm^un^{icated to a 17-year-}^o^ld—n^o^m^a^tter^h^o^w^m^u^c^h
^va^l^u^e^t^h^e^me^s^s^a^g^e^ma^{y ha}^ve^aⁿ^d^r^e^ga^r^d^l^e^{ss o}^f^p^a^r^e^nt^al^approv^al^{. It}ⁱ^s^at^leas^{t clear t}^h^{at t}^h^e
^st^r^eⁿ^g^t^h^o^f^t^h^e^G^o^ve^rⁿ^me^nt^{’s i}ⁿ^t^e^r^e^stⁱⁿ^p^r^o^t^e^c^tⁱ^ng^mi^no^r^sⁱ^s^no^t^e^q^ua^l^l^y^s^t^r^o^{ng t}^h^r^o^ug^ho^u^t
^t^h^{e cov}^e^rag^e^o^f^t^hⁱ^s^{broad s}^t^at^u^t^{e.” R}^eⁿ^o^v^.^A^m^eri^can^Cⁱ^vⁱ^l^Lⁱ^bertⁱ^e^s^Uⁿⁱ^oⁿ^,^{521 U}^.^S^.^844,
^{878 (19}^97).^In^Pl^ayb^o^{y Ent}^e^r^t^aⁱ^nm^ent^G^r^oup^,⁵²⁹^U^.^S^.^at^825,^t^h^{e C}^o^u^r^t^w^r^ot^e:^“^E^v^eⁿ^upon
^th^{e as}^su^m^p^tioⁿ^t^h^{at t}^h^{e Go}^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^h^a^{s a}ⁿⁱⁿ^ter^e^{st i}ⁿ^su^b^s^ti^tu^tiⁿ^gⁱ^t^sel^f^f^o^rⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^ed^an^d
^e^m^p^o^w^e^r^e^d^p^a^r^eⁿ^t^{s, its}ⁱⁿ^ter^e^{st is}ⁿ^o^t^su^f^f^icieⁿ^t^l^y^co^m^p^elliⁿ^g^to^j^u^sti^f^y^th^is^wⁱ^d^e^sp^r^ead
^restrictioⁿ^oⁿ^sp^eech^{.” T}^h^{e Co}^u^r^{t also}^w^o^u^l^d^“ⁿ^o^t^dⁱ^sco^uⁿ^t^th^{e p}^o^ssib^ilit^y^t^h^{at a g}^r^ap^hⁱ^c
ⁱ^m^a^g^{e cou}^l^d^h^a^v^e^aⁿ^e^g^a^tⁱ^v^eⁱ^m^pac^t^on^a^y^oung^chi^l^d^{” (i}^{d. at}^{826), t}^h^ereby^su^gg^e^s^tⁱⁿ^g^a^g^aiⁿ¹⁴
^th^{at it}^m^a^y^ta^k^e^a^g^{e in}^to^acco^uⁿ^t^w^h^en^ap^p^l^yⁱⁿ^g^strⁱ^{ct scr}^u^tiⁿ^y^.
The Supreme Court has written:
^T^h^{e Fir}^s^t^Am^en^d^m^en^{t d}^o^c^trⁱⁿ^e^o^f^s^u^b^s^taⁿ^{tial o}^v^er^b^r^ead^th^{is a}ⁿ^ex^cep^tioⁿ^to^t^h^{e g}^eⁿ^e^r^a^{l r}^u^le
^th^{at a p}^e^r^s^oⁿ^to^w^h^o^m^{a sta}^t^u^t^e^m^a^y^b^e^coⁿ^s^tit^u^tioⁿ^a^ll^y^ap^p^lied^canⁿ^o^{t c}^h^alleⁿ^g^{e t}^h^{e s}^t^atu^t^e
^oⁿ^t^h^e^g^r^o^uⁿ^d^th^at^it^m^a^y^b^e^uⁿ^c^oⁿ^stit^u^tioⁿ^a^ll^y^ap^p^lied^to^o^t^h^e^r^s^{. T}^h^{e d}^o^c^trⁱⁿ^{e is}^p^r^ed^icated
^on^th^{e dang}^{er t}^h^{at an}^o^v^erl^y^{broad s}^t^atu^t^{e, if}^le^f^tⁱⁿ^place,^m^a^y^ca^u^s^{e pers}^ons^w^h^o^s^e
^ex^pres^sⁱ^{on is}^cons^tit^u^tioⁿ^a^ll^y^{protected to ref}^r^ain^f^r^o^m^ex^er^cisⁱ^{ng th}^eⁱ^{r righ}^t^s^f^o^{r f}^ear^of
^cri^mⁱⁿ^{al s}^aⁿ^c^tions^{. Ov}^erbreadth^doctrin^{e h}^a^s^wⁱ^de-^r^angⁱ^ng^eff^ects^,^f^o^{r a s}^t^atu^t^e^f^oun^{d to be}¹⁵
^su^b^s^taⁿ^tial^l^y^o^v^er^b^r^o^a^d^{is su}^b^j^{ect to}^f^{acial in}^v^a^lid^atioⁿ^.

¹²^A^c^{tion f}^o^r^C^h^ildr^e^n’^s^T^e^le^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on v}^.^Fe^de^r^a^{l C}^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^C^o^m^m^issⁱ^on,⁵⁸^F.3^d⁶⁵^4,⁶⁶^{2 (}^D^.C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁵⁾⁽^eⁿ
^ba^nc⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁵¹^{6 U}^.^S^.¹⁰⁴³⁽¹⁹⁹⁶⁾⁽^b^r^a^c^k^e^t^s^a^{nd ita}^lic^s^s^u^p^p^lie^d^by^the^c^our^t)^.^Gⁱ^ns^be^r^g^,^supra^f^o^o^t^no^t^e¹⁰^,
^infra^f^o^o^tⁿ^o^te⁴¹^,^up^he^{ld a}^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^s^t^a^t^ute^tha^t^pr^o^hⁱ^b^ite^{d t}^h^e^s^a^le^{to m}ⁱ^nor^s^of^w^h^a^t^the^C^o^ur^{t c}^a^l^le^{d “}^‘^gⁱ^r^lie^’^pic^t^ur^e
^m^a^g^a^zⁱ^ne^s^.^”^{390 U}^.^{S. a}^t⁶³^4.
¹³^Id^{. a}^t⁶⁷^{1 (}^D^.C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁵⁾⁽^E^dw^a^r^ds^{, C}^.^J^.,^dis^s^e^ntiⁿ^g⁾^.
¹⁴^Se^e^{, T}^HE^C^ONS^T^I^T^U^T^I^{ON O}^F^T^H^E^U^NI^T^E^D^S^TA^T^E^S^O^F^A^ME^RI^C^A^:^A^N^A^L^Y^{SIS A}^N^D^I^N^TER^PR^E^T^A^TIO^N⁽²⁰⁰⁴⁾^,^a^t¹²³³^{, n}^.¹¹⁴⁶
^(n.1¹⁷^{4 i}ⁿ^t^h^e^W^e^{b v}^e^{rsion a}^t^ht^t^p^://w^ww^.^c^rs.g^ov^/^p^ro^duc^ts/^c^ona^n/^Am^e^ndm^eⁿ^t01/to^pic^_³^_¹²^_¹²^.^ht^m^l^).
¹⁵^Ma^s^s^a^c^hus^e^tts^v^.^O^a^k^e^s^,^{491 U}^.^S^.⁵⁷^6,⁵⁸^{1 (}¹⁹⁸⁹⁾^{. T}^h^e^s^a^m^e^r^e^a^s^oⁿ^ing^w^ould^s^e^e^m^{to a}^pplyⁱ^f^a^s^p^eech^rest^ri^ctⁱ^oⁿ
^im^p^o^s^ed^oⁿ^l^y^civ^{il san}^c^tioⁿ^s^{, as c}ⁱ^v^{il as w}^e^{ll as cri}^mⁱⁿ^{al p}^eⁿ^a^{lties can}^ch^{ill s}^p^eech^{, as th}^{e co}^u^r^t^o^f^ap^p^{eals n}^o^t^edⁱⁿ^th
^Fe^de^r^a^{l Ele}^c^tio^{n C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^{on v}^.^Lanc^e^,⁶³^{5 F.}^2d¹¹³²^,¹¹^{41 (}⁵^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸¹⁾⁽^“^I^t^is^r^e^a^s^oⁿ^a^b^le^t^o^s^u^ppos^e^t^h^a^t^e^v^eⁿ^if
^se^c^{tion 4}⁴¹^b^w^e^re^ov^e^r^broa^{d it w}^oul^{d n}^o^t^ha^v^e^a^‘c^hilling^e^f^f^e^c^t^{’ s}^ubsta^ntia^l^eⁿ^o^u^g^h^t^o^j^u^stify^inv^o^kⁱ^ng^the^ov^e^r^bre^a^d^th
^e^x^c^e^p^{tion to}^the^staⁿ^di^ng^rule^{, si}ⁿ^c^e^{no o}ⁿ^e^ne^e^d^risk^c^r^im^ina^l^{or c}ⁱ^v^{il pe}^na^ltie^{s to}^te^{st the}^sta^t^ute^’^{s c}^onstit^uti^ona^lity^.”^).

What this means in the present context is that, if a retailer affected by the proposal under
consideration were to challenge it as violating the First Amendment, then it would not matter
whether the sale or rental to minors of a particular video game by that retailer could
constitutionally be proscribed. Even if the sale or rental to minors of that particular video game
could constitutionally be proscribed, the court would strike down the law on its face if it applied
to a substantial number of other video games whose sale to minors could not constitutionally be
proscribed. Put another way, the overbreadth doctrine renders a statute “invalid in all its ¹⁶
applications (i.e., facially invalid) if it is invalid in any of them.”
The Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of a statute that restricted minors’
access to violent video games, but every lower federal court—two courts of appeals and seven
district courts—that has ruled on such law has found it unconstitutional and issued an injunction ¹⁷
against its enforcement.
Two federal courts of appeals (the Seventh and Eighth Circuits) have considered the
constitutionality of local ordinances (Indianapolis’ and St. Louis County’s, respectively)
prohibiting making violent video games accessible to minors, and both refused to treat violent ¹⁸
material like sexual material or to find it “obscene as to minors.” Both courts, rather, held the
ordinances unconstitutional on the ground that the government had failed to present adequate
evidence that violent video games are harmful to minors.
What sort of evidence would be adequate to persuade a court that there was a compelling interest
in denying minors access to violent video games? In the St. Louis County case, the Eighth Circuit
held:
^B^e^f^o^r^e^th^e^Co^uⁿ^t^y^m^a^y^coⁿ^s^ti^tu^tioⁿ^a^ll^y^r^e^strⁱ^ct^th^e^sp^eec^h^a^t^is^su^e^h^e^r^e^{, t}^h^e^Co^uⁿ^t^y^m^u^st
^com^e^f^o^r^w^ard^wⁱ^t^h^e^m^pi^ri^cal^s^u^pport^f^o^{r i}^t^s^belⁱ^e^f^t^h^at^“vⁱ^o^l^eⁿ^t^”^vⁱ^{deo g}^a^m^e^s^caus^e
^p^s^y^c^ho^l^o^gi^c^a^l^ha^r^m^t^o^mi^no^r^s^.^Iⁿ^t^hⁱ^s^c^a^s^e^,^a^s^w^e^ha^ve^a^l^r^e^a^d^y^e^x^p^l^aⁱ^ne^d^,^t^h^e^Co^uⁿ^t^y^ha^s
^f^a^{iled to pres}^en^{t th}^e^“^s^u^b^s^t^aⁿ^ti^{al s}^u^pportin^g^e^v^iden^{ce” of}^h^a^r^m^req^u^{ired bef}^o^{re an}^ordiⁿ^aⁿ^c^e
^th^{at th}^reateⁿ^s^{protected s}^p^eech^can^{be u}^p^h^e^{ld. W}^eⁿ^o^{te, m}^o^reov^{er ... th}^a^t^t^h^e^C^o^uⁿ^ty^m^a^yⁿ^o^t
^sⁱ^m^p^l^y^s^u^r^mⁱ^s^{e th}^{at it i}^s^s^e^rvⁱⁿ^g^{a co}^m^p^elli^ng^s^t^{ate in}^tere^s^t^becau^s^e^“^s^ociet^yⁱⁿ^g^eⁿ^e^ral
^believ^e^s^t^h^{at con}^tⁱⁿ^u^e^{d ex}^po^s^u^{re to v}ⁱ^olen^{ce can}^{be h}^a^r^m^fu^{l to ch}^ildreⁿ^.^{” W}^h^{ere f}ⁱ^rs^t

¹⁶^A^d^a^,^G^ove^r^nor^of^G^u^am^v^.^G^u^am^Socⁱ^e^t^y^of^O^b^s^t^e^t^rⁱ^cⁱ^aⁿ^s^&^G^yⁿ^e^c^o^logⁱ^s^t^s^,⁵^{06 U}^.^S.¹⁰^11,¹⁰¹²⁽^S^c^a^lia^{, J}^,
^dⁱ^ssen^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^o^d^eⁿⁱ^al^o^f^certⁱ^o^ri^ari⁾^.^T^hⁱ^sⁱ^s^ap^p^a^ren^t^l^y^an^o^v^erst^at^e^m^en^t^,ⁱⁿ^t^h^at^t^h^e^d^o^c^t^rⁱⁿ^e,^{as no}^t^e^d^ab^o^v^e,ⁱ^s^on^{e o}^f
^s^ubs^ta^nti^a^l^o^v^erb^r^ead^t^h^.^T^h^{e S}^u^p^r^e^m^{e Co}^u^r^t^h^a^{s “i}ⁿ^sⁱ^s^t^e^d^t^h^at^{a l}^a^w^’^{s ap}^p^lⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^p^r^o^t^ect^ed^sp^eech^b^e^s^u^b^s^t^aⁿ^tⁱ^a^l^.^.^.
^be^f^o^r^e^a^pplyⁱ^ng^the^‘^s^tr^ong^m^e^dicⁱ^ne^’^of^ov^e^r^br^e^a^d^th^inv^a^lida^tⁱ^on.”^Vir^g^inia^v^.^Hⁱ^c^k^s^,⁵³⁹^U^.^S.¹¹^3,¹¹⁹^-¹^{20 (}²⁰⁰³⁾
^(c^ita^{tion om}^itte^d).
¹⁷^In^ever^y^{case b}^u^t^t^h^{e S}^e^ven^t^{h Ci}^r^c^uⁱ^t^’^{s an}^{d t}^h^{e Okl}^a^h^o^m^{a d}ⁱ^st^ri^ct^c^o^u^r^t^’^s,^t^h^{e cou}^r^tⁱ^s^s^u^ed^{a p}^e^rm^an^en^tⁱⁿ^j^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^.^Iⁿ
^the^Se^v^e^{nth Circ}^{uit c}^a^s^e^,^the^c^o^ur^{t f}^ound^the^plaⁱ^nt^if^fs^eⁿ^title^{d t}^o^a^pre^lim^ina^r^y^injunc^ti^on^b^ecau^{se t}^h^e^y^sh^o^w^ed^“a
^s^t^r^ong^lik^e^lih^oo^{d of}^ultⁱ^m^a^te^vⁱ^c^t^or^y^s^hould^the^C^ity^pe^r^s^is^{t w}^{ith th}^e^c^a^s^e^.^”^A^m^e^r^ic^aⁿ^A^m^us^em^eⁿ^{t Ma}^c^h^ine^A^s^s^o^cⁱ^a^tion^th
^v.^Ken^d^rⁱ^c^k,²⁴⁴^F.^3d⁵⁷^2,⁵⁸^{0 (}⁷^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁵³^{4 U.S}^.⁹⁹^{4 (}²⁰⁰¹⁾^.^Th^er^{e i}^s^no^sub^s^equ^eⁿ^t^r^e^po^r^t^ed
^d^ecisioⁿⁱⁿ^t^h^{e case. T}^h^{e Ok}^lah^o^m^{a fed}^e^{ral co}^u^r^{t f}^o^uⁿ^d^t^h^{e p}^l^aiⁿ^tⁱ^f^f^s^en^titled^to^a^p^r^elimⁱⁿ^ar^yⁱⁿ^juⁿ^c^tioⁿ^b^ecau^{se th}^ey
^“^a^r^e^s^ubs^ta^ntia^lly^lik^e^l^y^{to pre}^v^a^{il in t}^h^is^c^a^s^e^{... .”}^Ente^rtaⁱ^nm^eⁿ^{t Me}^rc^ha^nts^A^s^s^o^cⁱ^a^{tion v}^.^H^e^nry^,^CIV^-⁰⁶^-6^75-C
^(W^.D^{. O}^k^la^{., O}^c^tobe^{r 11}^{, 2}⁰⁰⁶^).
¹⁸^A^m^eri^c^aⁿ^A^m^u^s^emen^t^Ma^c^hⁱⁿ^{e A}^sso^ci^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^s^upr^a^f^o^o^t^no^t^e¹⁷^;^Iⁿ^t^e^rac^tiv^e^Digital^So^ftware^Assocⁱ^a^tion^,^sup^r^a
^f^o^o^tⁿ^o^t^e¹⁰^.^T^h^{e S}^t^.^L^o^uⁱ^{s “o}^rdiⁿ^an^{ce al}^so^rest^ri^ct^{s m}ⁱⁿ^o^r^{s’ acces}^{s t}^o^vi^d^e^{o ga}^m^e^s^wⁱ^t^h^st^roⁿ^g^sexu^al^coⁿ^t^en^t^,^bu^t
^plaⁱ^ntif^f^s^{do n}^o^{t c}^h^a^lle^ng^e^thos^e^p^r^ov^is^ions^of^the^or^dina^nc^e^.^”^Iⁿ^te^rac^tiv^e^Digit^a^{l S}^o^ftw^are^Assocⁱ^ati^oⁿ^,^s^upr^a^{, 32}⁹^F.^3d
^a^t⁹⁵^{6 n}^.^1.

^a^m^en^d^m^eⁿ^{t righ}^ts^{are at s}^t^{ake, “}^t^h^e^Gov^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^m^u^s^t^pres^en^t^m^o^{re th}^aⁿ^an^{ecdote an}^d¹⁹
^s^u^ppos^ition^.^”
St. Louis County also asserted that it has a compelling interest in “assisting parents to be the
guardians of their children’s well-being.” As to this the Eighth Circuit said that in no case “does
the Supreme Court suggest that the government’s role in helping parents to be the guardians of
their children’s well-being is an unbridled license to governments to regulate what minors read ²⁰
and view.”
In the Indianapolis case, Judge Richard Posner, holding for the Seventh Circuit that a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the Indianapolis ordinance was warranted, wrote:
^T^h^{e C}ⁱ^t^y^ri^gh^t^l^y^doesⁿ^o^t^res^t^on^“w^hat^e^v^er^y^oⁿ^e^kⁿ^o^w^s^{” abou}^t^t^h^e^h^a^r^mⁱⁿ^f^lⁱ^c^t^e^{d by}^vⁱ^ol^eⁿ^t
^vi^d^e^o^ga^m^e^s^.^T^h^e^s^e^ga^m^e^s^wi^t^h^t^h^eⁱ^r^c^a^r^t^o^oⁿ^c^h^a^r^acters^an^d^s^t^y^{lized m}^a^y^h^e^m^are^con^tⁱⁿ^u^o^us
^wⁱ^t^h^aⁿ^a^g^e^-^{old ch}^{ildren’s liter}^a^tu^{re on}^vⁱ^oleⁿ^{t t}^h^e^m^{es.... T}^h^{e C}ⁱ^t^yⁱⁿ^{stead appeals to}^social
^scien^{ce to}^estab^lis^h^th^{at g}^a^m^e^{s su}^c^h^{as “}^T^h^e^Hou^s^{e of}^th^e^{Dead” an}^{d “}^U^lti^m^a^{te Mortal}
^K^o^m^b^a^t³^,^”^ga^me^{s c}^u^l^t^ur^a^l^l^yⁱ^s^o^m^o^r^p^hⁱ^c^wⁱ^t^h⁽^a^nd^o^f^t^e^{n d}^e^rⁱ^va^tⁱ^ve^fr^o^m⁾^m^o^vi^e^s^aⁱ^me^d^a^t
^th^{e s}^a^m^e^un^{der 18 cro}^w^{d, are dan}^g^e^rous^{to pu}^blic^s^a^f^e^t^y^{. T}^h^{e s}^o^cial^s^c^ieⁿ^{ce e}^v^iden^{ce o}ⁿ
^w^h^ic^h^t^h^e^Cit^y^r^e^{lies co}ⁿ^sⁱ^s^t^s^p^rⁱ^m^ar^il^y^o^f^th^e^p^a^ir^o^f^p^s^y^c^h^o^lo^gⁱ^{cal s}^t^u^d^ie^{s t}^h^at^w^e
^m^e^ntⁱ^oⁿ^e^{d earl}ⁱ^e^{r.... T}^h^es^e^s^t^udi^es^{do n}^o^t^s^u^pport^t^h^{e ordi}ⁿ^a^{nce. T}^h^{ere i}^sⁿ^oⁱⁿ^di^catⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^at
^th^e^g^a^m^e^s^us^{ed in t}^h^{e s}^t^u^d^ies^a^r^{e s}ⁱ^m^{ilar to t}^h^os^{e i}ⁿ^th^e^record^of^t^hⁱ^s^cas^e^{or to oth}^e^r^g^a^m^e^s
^lik^el^y^{to be m}^a^rk^{eted i}ⁿ^g^a^m^e^arcadesⁱⁿ^In^dian^apolis^{. T}^h^e^s^t^u^d^ie^s^{do n}^o^{t f}ⁱⁿ^d^th^{at v}ⁱ^deo
^g^a^m^e^s^h^a^v^e^ev^{er caus}^e^{d any}^o^{ne t}^o^com^mⁱ^t^{a v}ⁱ^ol^en^t^act^{, as}^oppos^{ed t}^o^f^eelⁱⁿ^g^agg^r^es^si^v^e^,^o^r
^h^a^v^e^ca^u^s^{ed th}^{e av}^era^g^{e lev}^e^l^of^vⁱ^olen^{ce to in}^creas^{e a}^nyw^h^e^{re. A}ⁿ^d^t^h^ey^d^oⁿ^o^t^s^u^g^g^e^s^t^t^h^at
^{it is t}^h^eⁱⁿ^te^ra^ctive^ch^aract^{er of t}^h^e^g^a^m^e^s^,^as^oppos^{ed t}^o^t^h^e^vi^ol^en^{ce of}^t^h^{e i}^m^a^g^esⁱⁿ^t^h^e^m^,
^th^{at i}^s^t^h^{e ca}^u^s^e^of^t^h^{e a}^g^g^r^es^sⁱ^v^e^f^eel^ing^s^{. T}^h^e^s^t^u^d^ies^t^h^u^s^{are n}^o^{t e}^v^iden^ce^th^at^violen^t
^vⁱ^{deo g}^a^m^e^s^{are a}ⁿ^y^m^o^{re h}^a^r^m^fu^l^t^o^t^h^{e cons}^um^{er or t}^o^t^h^{e pu}^blⁱ^c^s^a^f^e^t^y^t^h^aⁿ^vi^ol^en^t²¹
^m^o^vⁱ^e^s^{or ot}^h^e^{r v}ⁱ^ol^en^t^,^but^pas^sⁱ^v^e^en^t^e^rt^ai^nm^eⁿ^t^s^.
Seven federal district courts—in Washington, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Oklahoma,
Louisiana, and California—have also struck down statutes that denied minors access to violent
video games. We discuss these seven cases in the order in which they were decided.
In 2004, a district court struck down a statute enacted by the state of Washington, finding that
“there has been no showing that exposure to video games that ‘trivialize violence against law ²²
enforcement officers’ is likely to lead to actual violence against such officers.”
In 2005, a district court struck down an Illinois statute that prohibited both violent and sexually
explicit video games, finding, with respect to the prohibition of violent video games, that
“defendants have failed to present substantial evidence showing that playing violent video games ²³
causes minors to have aggressive feelings or engage in aggressive behavior.”

¹⁹^Inte^rac^tiv^e^Digit^a^l^So^ftware^Asso^cⁱ^atioⁿ^,^sup^r^a^f^ootn^o^te¹⁰^,³²^{9 F}^.^{3d a}^t⁹⁵^{9 (c}^ita^ti^ons^om^itte^d).
²⁰^Id^{. a}^t⁹⁵^9-⁹⁶⁰^.
²¹^A^m^eri^c^aⁿ^A^m^u^s^emen^t^Ma^c^hⁱⁿ^{e A}^sso^ci^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te¹⁷^,²⁴^{4 F.}^3d^a^t⁵^78-⁵⁷^{9 (}^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^{in or}^ig^ina^l⁾^.^J^u^dg^e
^Posne^r^a^l^{so c}ⁱ^te^{d g}^r^e^a^t^lite^ra^ture^w^{ith g}^r^a^phic^de^sc^riptio^ns^of^vⁱ^oleⁿ^c^e^,^inc^l^u^dⁱⁿ^g^the^Od^yssey^,^T^h^{e Di}^viⁿ^e^Co^med^y^{, a}ⁿ^d
^W^a^r^an^{d Pe}^ac^e^,^{as w}^e^l^l^{as “t}^h^e^cl^assi^c^f^aⁱ^r^y^t^a^l^e^{s co}^l^l^ect^ed^b^y^G^rⁱ^m^m^,^Aⁿ^d^e^rsen^,^an^d^P^e^rraul^t^,^{” and}^c^o^mm^en^t^e^d^:^“T^o
^s^h^ie^{ld c}^hⁱ^l^dr^eⁿ^rⁱ^g^h^t^up^{to t}^h^e^a^g^e^of^{18 f}^r^om^e^x^pos^ur^e^{to v}ⁱ^oleⁿ^t^de^s^c^rⁱ^ptio^ns^aⁿ^d^im^a^g^e^s^w^ould^not^only^be^qu^ix^otic^,
^but^de^f^o^r^m^ing^;^{it w}^{ould le}^a^v^e^the^m^une^quip^p^e^d^t^o^c^o^pe^w^{ith the}^w^o^r^l^{d a}^s^w^e^k^now^it.”^Id^{. a}^t⁵⁷^7.
²²^Vⁱ^d^e^o^So^f^t^w^a^r^e^Deal^er^s^A^s^so^ci^atⁱ^oⁿ^v.^M^a^l^eⁿ^g^,³²^{5 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.^2d¹¹⁸⁰^,¹¹⁸⁸⁽^W^.^D^.^Wash^.²⁰⁰⁴⁾^.
²³^Ente^r^t^aⁱ^nm^eⁿ^{t Sof}^t^w^a^r^e^A^s^s^o^cⁱ^a^t^{ion v}^.^B^l^a^g^oje^v^ic^{h, 40}^{4 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.^2d¹⁰⁵¹⁽^N^.D^{. I}^l^l^.²⁰⁰⁵⁾^,^aff’^d^,⁴⁶^{9 F.}^3d⁶^{41 (}⁷^th
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

In March 2006, a district court struck down a Michigan statute that, in the court’s words,
“regulates the distribution of both sexually explicit video games and ultra violent explicit video
games to those under the age of 17. The plaintiffs only challenge the second part of the Act ²⁴
dealing with ultra violent explicit video games.” The court found that “defendants have failed to
present substantial evidence showing that playing violent video games causes minors to have ²⁵
aggressive feelings or engage in aggressive behavior.” The court also found that the statute
would have a “chilling effect” on video game retailers because it “would make the retailers
themselves responsible for determining which games are considered ultra-violent. Since they
could not determine this in advance, the retailers would likely steer clear of any game with the
potential of such violence in order to avoid civil and criminal liability, thus denying ²⁶
constitutionally protected free speech to minors and adults.” The court found, in addition, that
“[t]he defendants have also failed to consider less restrictive ways of achieving their interests ...
such as undertaking an advertising campaign to inform parents of the [voluntary] ratings system
[developed by the Entertainment Software Ratings Board] and what to watch out for when
purchasing games for their children, much like the theater industry did when ratings were first ²⁷²⁸
introduced.” Finally, the court found the Michigan statute to be “unconstitutionally vague.”
In July 2006, a district court struck down a Minnesota statute that would have imposed a civil
penalty of up to $25.00 on persons under 17 who knowingly rented or purchased a video game ²⁹
rated AO or M by the Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB). Minnesota is in the Eight
Circuit, so the court was bound by the holding of the Eighth Circuit case discussed above that
video games are protected speech and that governmental restrictions on their distribution are ³⁰
subject to strict scrutiny. The district court found that the state had failed to meet its burden of
providing “substantial, actual ‘empirical support for its belief that “violent” video games cause ³¹
psychological harm to minors.’” The court also found a violation of due process in the state’s
delegation of its authority to the ESRB to determine which video games a person under 17 may ³²
rent or purchase.
In October 2006, a district court in Oklahoma granted a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of a statute that “criminalizes the display, sale, or other dissemination of” violent ³³
video games, as defined by the statute. The court found that “[p]laintiffs present strong

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^Ci^r.²⁰⁰⁶^).^T^h^{e st}^at^{e ap}^p^eal^ed^t^h^e^dⁱ^st^ri^ct^cou^r^t^d^eci^si^oⁿ^on^l^y^wⁱ^t^h^resp^ect^t^o^sexu^al^l^y^e^x^p^lⁱ^cⁱ^t^vi^d^e^o^ga^m^e^s;^t^h^{e co}^u^r^t^o^f
^ap^p^eal^{s d}^eci^si^oⁿ^on^t^h^atⁱ^ssu^{e i}^s^di^scu^ssedⁱⁿ^t^h^{e n}^e^xt^sectⁱ^o^{n o}^f^t^hⁱ^s^rep^o^r^t^.
²⁴^Ente^r^t^aⁱ^nm^eⁿ^{t Sof}^t^w^a^r^e^A^s^s^o^cⁱ^a^t^{ion v}^.^G^r^a^nho^lm^{, 426}^F.^Su^pp.²^d⁶⁴^6,⁶⁴^{8 (}^E^.D^{. Mic}^h^{. 2}⁰⁰⁶⁾^.
²⁵^Id^{. a}^t⁶⁵^3.
²⁶^Id^.^a^t⁶⁵^4.
²⁷^Id^{. a}^t⁶⁵^4-⁶⁵⁵^.
²⁸^Id^{. a}^t⁶⁵^6.
²⁹^Eⁿ^t^e^r^t^aiⁿ^m^en^t^S^o^f^t^w^a^r^e^A^sso^ci^atⁱ^oⁿ^v.^Hat^c^h,⁴⁴^{3 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.^2d¹⁰⁶⁵⁽^D^.^Miⁿⁿ^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾^{. Th}^{e E}^S^R^B^’^s^A^O^an^d^M^r^a^tⁱⁿ^gs
^{refer t}^o^{sex as wel}^l^{as vi}^o^l^en^{ce (see p}^a^{ge 1}^o^f^t^hⁱ^s^rep^o^r^t⁾^,^so^w^e^mⁱ^g^h^{t ha}^v^e^disc^usse^{d th}^{is c}^a^s^e^{in e}ⁱ^t^h^e^r^this^{or t}^h^e^ne^x^t
^s^e^c^{tion of}^this^r^e^por^t^.
³⁰^Inte^rac^tiv^e^Digit^a^l^So^ftware^,^supra^f^o^o^t^no^t^e¹⁹^.
³¹^Ha^tch^,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te^29,⁴^{43 F. Sup}^p^{. 2d}^a^t¹⁰⁶⁹^{, qu}^oting^Iⁿ^te^rac^tiv^e^Digital^S^o^ftware^,^s^upr^a^f^ootⁿ^o^te¹⁹^,³²^{9 F.}^3d
^a^t⁹⁵^9.
³²^Id^{. a}^t¹⁰^70-¹⁰⁷¹^.
³³^Ente^r^t^ai^nm^eⁿ^{t M}^e^r^c^ha^nts^As^s^o^cⁱ^atio^{n v}^.^H^e^nr^y^{, s}^upr^a^f^oot^note¹⁷^.

arguments that the Act contains unconstitutional content-based restrictions and that the Act’s
language is unconstitutionally vague.”
In December 2006, a district court in Louisiana granted a permanent injunction against a statute ³⁴
that criminalized the distribution to minors of violent video games. The court found that, “when
it comes to regulating expression in order ‘to curb violent behavior,’ the State must satisfy the
standards set forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Under Brandenburg, the
government must prove that the target expression “is directed to inciting or producing imminent ³⁵
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.’” In addition, “the Statute cannot be
defended on the grounds that it is designed to protect minors from some form of ‘psychological ³⁶
harm,’ as that amounts to nothing more than ‘impermissible thought control.’” The court also
found the statute underinclusive because “violent video games are only ‘a tiny fraction of the
media violence to which modern American children are exposed,’” and found “that there are less
restrictive alternatives which would achieve the State’s goals ... including encouraging awareness ³⁷
of the voluntary ESRB video game rating system ... .” Finally, the court found the statute
unconstitutionally vague.
In 2007, a district court struck down a California statute that “requir[ed] that certain violent video ³⁸
games be labeled and prohibit[ed] the rental or sale of those games to minors.” The court found
that “there as been no showing that violent video games as defined in the Act, in the absence of
other violent media, cause injury to children. In addition, the evidence does not establish that
video games, because of their interactive nature or otherwise, are any more harmful than violent ³⁹
television, movies, internet sites or other speech-related exposures.”
As noted above, in 2005, a federal district court struck down an Illinois statute that prohibited
both violent and sexually explicit video games. The state appealed only with respect to sexually ⁴⁰
explicit video games, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Seventh Circuit applied strict
scrutiny and quickly found that the state’s identified purpose in “shielding children from indecent
sexual material and in assisting parents in protecting their children from that material” is “clearly”
compelling. The Seventh Circuit, however, found the Illinois statute to fail the second prong of
strict scrutiny because it “is not narrowly tailored and is overbroad.” This was because it banned
“access to material that has serious social value for minors,” even though doing so was ⁴¹
unnecessary for the state to achieve its stated purpose. Even apart from this problem, the court

³⁴^Ente^r^t^aⁱ^nm^eⁿ^{t Sof}^t^w^a^r^e^A^s^s^o^cⁱ^a^t^{ion v}^.^Fotⁱ^{. N}^o^{. 0}⁶^-⁴^31-^J^J^B^-^C^N⁽^M^.D^{. L}^a^{., D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^{4, 2}⁰⁰⁶⁾^.^T^h^is^opiⁿⁱ^{on g}^r^aⁿ^ts
^a^pe^r^m^aⁿ^eⁿ^{t injunc}^tⁱ^oⁿ^“^[^f^]^or^t^h^e^r^e^a^s^ons^s^e^{t f}^o^r^t^{h a}^t^the^he^a^r^ing^oⁿ^the^m^o^tions^of^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^29,²⁰^{06 a}ⁿ^{d i}ⁿ^t^h^e
^C^our^t’^s^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁴^,²⁰⁰⁶^R^u^li^ng^oⁿ^M^o^tio^{n f}^o^r^P^r^e^lim^ina^r^y^Iⁿ^junc^ti^{on a}ⁿ^d^Moti^on^{to D}ⁱ^s^m^is^s^.^”^T^h^e^A^u^g^u^s^t^24,²⁰⁰⁶
^r^u^ling^is^r^e^por^te^d^a^t⁴⁵¹^F.^Su^pp.^2d⁸²^{3 (}^M^.D^{. L}^a^{. 20}⁰⁶⁾^.
³⁵⁴⁵^{1 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.^{2d a}^t⁸³^{1 (c}^ita^ti^ons^om^itte^{d, e}^m^pha^{sis a}^dde^{d by}^the^dⁱ^stric^t^c^ourt)^.
³⁶^Id^.
³⁷^Id^{. a}^t⁸³^3.
³⁸^Vⁱ^d^e^o^S^o^f^t^w^a^r^e^Deal^ers^A^s^so^ci^atⁱ^oⁿ^v.^S^c^h^w^arzen^eg^ger,^No^.^C-0⁵^-0⁴¹⁸⁸^RM^W^(N.^D^.^Cal^.^,^A^u^gu^st⁶^,²⁰⁰⁷^),^slⁱ^p^o^p^.
^at¹^.
³⁹^Id^{. a}^t^15-¹⁶⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^s^upplie^{d b}^y^the^c^our^t)^.
⁴⁰^Eⁿ^t^e^rt^aiⁿ^m^en^t^S^o^f^t^w^a^re^A^sso^ci^atⁱ^oⁿ^v.^B^l^ago^j^evi^c^h^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^not^e^23.
⁴¹^T^h^e^Illinoⁱ^{s sta}^t^ute^ba^nne^d^the^sa^le^{or re}^nta^l^of^“^aⁿ^y^s^e^x^u^a^l^l^y^e^x^plic^{it v}ⁱ^de^{o g}^a^m^e^{to a}ⁿ^y^mⁱ^nor”^a^nd^de^fⁱ^ne^d
^“^s^e^x^ua^ll^y^e^x^plic^it”^a^s^a^ppe^a^ling^t^o^the^prur^ie^{nt i}ⁿ^te^re^{st of}^mⁱ^nor^s^a^nd^pa^te^ntly^of^f^e^ns^iv^e^w^{ith r}^e^s^p^e^c^t^{to m}ⁱ^nor^s^.^T^h^is
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

found that “the statute could still not survive strict scrutiny because the plaintiffs have identified
other less restrictive alternatives.... Most obviously, the State could have simply passed legislation
increasing awareness among parents of the voluntary ESRB ratings system.”
With respect to a First Amendment challenge to the prohibition of the sale or rental to minors of
video games with violent content, a court following the relevant precedents would apply strict
scrutiny, which means that it would uphold the provision only if it finds that it serves a
compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means. The determinative question with
respect to whether the prohibition serves a compelling interest would apparently be whether the
government can “demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the ⁴²
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.” All six cases cited
above found inadequate the government’s evidence as to the harm caused by violent video games,
but one cannot know whether a court in the future will consider the same research rejected by
courts in the past, or, if it does, whether it will find it more persuasive than have courts in the
past.
If a court were to find a compelling governmental interest in the prohibition of the sale or rental
of video games with violent content, then it would have to decide whether the prohibition
constituted the least restrictive means to advance the interest. A point in favor of the proposal’s
constitutionality with respect to this question is that video game stores would know from the “M”
or “AO” rating exactly which videos they could not legally sell or rent to minors. They would
not, therefore, face the situation that the court found that stores could face in one of the cases
discussed above, namely that, “[w]ithout wholesale, indiscriminate refusals to sell video games to
minors by store operators it appears impossible to protect sellers from prosecution.... Nor is it
reasonable to expect store clerks to play each level of each game to determine if it falls within the ⁴³
act’s definition of ultra-violent explicit.”
Under the proposal, however, although retailers would know which video games they were
prohibited from selling or renting to minors, they could nevertheless argue that the proposal
prevented them from selling or renting to minors some video games that are constitutionally
protected with respect to minors. In addition, producers of video games could argue that the
proposal’s vagueness would prevent them from knowing which video games would be rated “M”

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^de^fⁱ^nition^pa^ra^lle^{ls the}^fⁱ^{rst tw}^{o p}^r^ong^{s of}^the^M^ille^r^te^{st f}^o^{r o}^b^sc^eⁿ^ity^{, but om}^{its a}^pa^ra^lle^{l to}^the^t^h^ir^{d pr}^ong^{, w}^h^ic^{h is}
^tha^t^{, t}^o^be^obsc^eⁿ^e^,^m^a^te^ria^l^m^u^st^{, “}^t^a^k^eⁿ^a^s^a^w^hole^,^la^c^k^[^{] se}^riou^{s lite}^ra^ry^{, a}^r^tistic^{, politic}^a^l^,^{or sc}ⁱ^e^ntif^ic^v^a^lue^.^”
^Mille^{r v}^.^Ca^lif^ornia^,^sup^r^a^f^ootn^o^t^e^{4. I}ⁿ^Gⁱ^ns^be^r^g^v^.^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^,^sup^r^a^note^s¹⁰^aⁿ^d^12,^the^Su^pr^e^m^{e C}^our^t^u^phe^l^d^a
^s^t^a^t^ute^tha^t^pr^o^h^ib^ite^{d t}^h^e^s^a^le^to^mⁱ^nor^s^of^m^a^te^rⁱ^a^l^tha^t^the^s^t^a^t^ute^la^be^le^{d a}^s^“^h^a^r^m^f^{ul to m}ⁱ^nor^s^,^”^w^h^ic^{h it de}^fⁱ^ne^{d s}^o
^{as t}^o^p^a^ral^l^e^l^al^l^t^h^{ree p}^r^oⁿ^g^{s o}^f^{a p}^r^ed^ecesso^{r t}^o^M^ille^r^t^e^st^,^al^t^h^ou^gh^,^b^y^ap^p^l^yⁱⁿ^g^each^p^r^oⁿ^gⁱⁿ^t^e^rm^{s o}^f^mⁱⁿ^o^r^{s (i}^.^e^.^,
^“^a^ppe^a^l^s^{to t}^h^e^pr^urie^nt^...^inte^re^s^t^of^mⁱ^nors^,^”^e^t^c^.^{), the}^s^t^a^t^ute^,^lik^e^the^Illi^nois^vⁱ^de^{o g}^a^m^e^s^t^a^t^ute^,^a^p^plie^d^not^oⁿ^ly^to
^m^a^te^rⁱ^a^l^tha^t^w^a^s^obs^c^eⁿ^e^unde^r^t^h^e^M^ille^r^te^s^t^.
⁴²^Turⁿ^e^r^Br^oa^dc^as^tin^g^Sy^s^t^e^m^,^su^pra^f^o^o^t^no^t^e^8.
⁴³^Ente^r^t^aⁱ^nm^eⁿ^{t Sof}^t^w^a^r^e^A^s^s^o^cⁱ^a^t^{ion v}^.^G^r^a^nho^lm^{, 404}^F.^Su^pp.²^d⁹⁷^8,⁹⁸^{3 (}^E^.D^{. Mic}^h^{. 2}⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽ⁱ^s^s^u^ing^a^pr^e^lim^ina^r^y
ⁱⁿ^j^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^at^p^r^eced^ed^t^h^e^p^e^rman^en^tⁱⁿ^j^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿⁱ^ssu^{ed i}ⁿ^Ente^r^t^aⁱ^nm^eⁿ^t^Softw^ar^e^As^s^o^cⁱ^at^io^{n v}^.^G^r^anh^olm^,^s^upr^a
^f^ootnote²⁴⁾^.

or “AO” and therefore prohibited from being sold or rented to minors, and that the proposal’s
overbreadth would prohibit from being sold or rented to minors some video games that were
constitutionally protected with respect to minors. In other words, producers of video games could
argue that the proposal would chill their speech because it might deter them, for market reasons,
from producing video games that were constitutionally protected with respect to minors.
Producers, that is, might fear that some video games that were constitutionally protected with
respect to minors would be rated “M” or “AO” and therefore would not be sold or rented to
minors, and that there was not a sufficient adult market for such games to make it worthwhile for
them to produce them, or that, even if there were, the producers would make less money because
minors would not be allowed to purchase or rent video games that were constitutionally
protected.
A person challenging the prohibition of the sale or rental of video games with violent content as
overly restrictive might argue that the language that defines the “M” and “AO” ratings is vague
and overbroad. Specifically, such a person might argue that the phrases “intense violence,”
“sexual content,” “strong language,” and “nudity” are unconstitutionally vague, and that a video
game’s having one or more of these features does not necessarily cause it to lose First
Amendment protection as to minors, and therefore the prohibition on renting or selling to minors
video games with one or more of these features would render the proposal unconstitutionally
overbroad.
Note that the use of “and/or” in the “M” and the “AO” ratings means that “intense” violence
under the “M” rating need not include blood and gore (nor be “prolonged,” as under the AO
rating), and that “strong language” is sufficient for an “M” rating, even if it is unrelated to
violence or sex. The breadth of the ban on the sale or rental to minors of video with “strong
language” might be especially problematic. The Supreme Court has written:
^[^M^]ⁱⁿ^o^r^s^ar^{e en}^titled^to^{a sig}ⁿ^if^icaⁿ^t^m^e^a^s^u^r^{e o}^f^Fir^s^t^Am^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^{t p}^r^o^t^ectioⁿ^,^an^d^oⁿ^l^yⁱⁿ
^r^e^l^a^tⁱ^v^e^l^y^na^r^r^o^w^aⁿ^d^w^e^l^l^-d^e^fⁱⁿ^e^d^cⁱ^r^c^u^m^st^aⁿ^c^e^s^m^a^{y go}^ve^rⁿ^meⁿ^t^b^a^r^pu^blⁱ^c^di^s^s^e^mⁱⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ
^of^{protected m}^a^terials^{to th}^e^m^.^{... Speech}^th^{at is}ⁿ^eⁱ^t^h^e^{r obs}^ceⁿ^e^as^to^y^o^u^t^h^sⁿ^o^{r s}^u^bj^{ect to}
^s^o^m^e^ot^h^e^{r l}^e^gⁱ^tⁱ^m^a^t^{e pros}^cri^p^tⁱ^oⁿ^canⁿ^o^t^{be s}^u^ppres^s^e^{d s}^o^l^e^l^y^t^o^prot^ect^t^h^{e y}^oung^f^r^o^m⁴⁴
ⁱ^d^eas^{or i}^m^a^g^es^t^h^at^{a l}^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^tⁱ^v^{e body}^t^hⁱⁿ^ks^un^suⁱ^t^a^bl^e^f^o^{r t}^h^e^m^.
Furthermore, the Court has also found that the First Amendment applies “not only [to] ideas
capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but [to] otherwise inexpressible emotions as
well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot
sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual
speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be ⁴⁵
the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.” “Strong
language,” therefore, is protected speech, including generally for minors; the only exception the
Supreme Court has found is with respect to the use of “indecent” language on broadcast radio and ⁴⁶
television during hours—but not all 24—when children are likely to be in the audience.

⁴⁴^Erz^nozⁿⁱ^k^v^.^City^of^Ja^c^k^sonv^ille^{, 42}^{2 U.}^{S. 20}^{5, 21}^2-2¹⁴⁽¹⁹⁷⁵⁾^(c^ita^{tions om}^itte^d).
⁴⁵^C^oheⁿ^v^.^C^a^lif^or^nia^,⁴⁰^{3 U}^.^S.¹⁵^,²⁶⁽¹⁹⁷¹⁾^.
⁴⁶^Fe^de^r^a^{l C}^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^{on v}^.^P^a^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^Fou^nda^ti^on,⁴³⁸^U^.^{S. 7}²⁶⁽¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^.

Because the courts generally assume, without requiring evidence, that sexually explicit material is
harmful to minors, the proposal’s prohibition of the sale or rental of video games with sexual
content might more easily pass the “compelling governmental interest” prong of the strict
scrutiny test than would the proposal’s prohibition of the sale or rental of video games with
violent content. Even here, however, the “M” rating refers merely to “sexual content,” by contrast
with the “AO” rating’s reference to “graphic sexual content.” Sexual content, especially if it is not
graphic, does not necessarily constitute pornography, but may concern such subjects as birth
control and sexually transmitted diseases. (Video games may not typically address such matters,
but, under the substantial overbreadth doctrine discussed above, it might not be necessary that
they do for a court to find the proposal facially invalid.) It might be impossible for the
government to demonstrate a compelling interest in denying minors access to all material with ⁴⁷
sexual content. If a court did not rule on this question and instead applied the “least restrictive
means” prong of the strict scrutiny test, then it might find the proposal overbroad in applying to ⁴⁸
all material with sexual content in an effort to deny minors access to some of it. The “M” rating,
like the statute that the Seventh Circuit struck down in the one federal case that addressed a ban
on video games with sexual content, is not limited to material that is “obscene as to minors” (i.e., ⁴⁹
to material that taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value).
An “AO” rating may be imposed on video games with “graphic sexual content and nudity,” which
suggests that nudity alone would not suffice for an “AO” rating, though it might be considered
“sexual content” and suffice for an “M” rating. This seems problematic, because the Supreme
Court has written that nudity alone “does not place otherwise protected material outside of the ⁵⁰
First Amendment.” This statement was not made with reference to minors’ First Amendment
rights, but, if a court, in applying the First Amendment, took into account the ages of minors who
typically buy or rent video games, the extent of the nudity portrayed, and the manner in which it
is portrayed, then it might find the proposal’s coverage of nudity vague and overbroad.
Because the proposal would prohibit the sale or rental to minors of video games with either “M”
or “AO” ratings, the constitutionality of each of these prohibitions should be examined separately.
Video games with “M” ratings, as noted, “may contain intense violence, blood and gore, sexual
content, and/or strong language.” If a video game contained any one of these features, then it
would be rated “M” and could not be sold or rented to minors. If it would be unconstitutional to
prohibit the sale or rental to minors of video games simply because they contain strong language,
or simply because they contain sexual content—without regard to the particular strong language

⁴⁷^Se^e^,^t^e^xt^acco^m^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g^f^o^o^tⁿ^o^t^e¹⁴^,^s^upr^a^,^esp^eci^al^l^y^t^h^{e S}^u^p^r^em^e^Co^u^r^t^’^{s c}^o^mm^en^tⁱⁿ^Re^no^tha^t^{it w}^ould^“ⁿ^e^ithe^r
^accep^tⁿ^o^r^rej^ect^t^h^{e G}^o^vern^m^eⁿ^t^{’s su}^b^mⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^t^h^at^t^h^{e F}ⁱ^rst^Am^en^d^m^en^t^d^o^e^{s no}^t^f^o^rbⁱ^d^{a b}^l^aⁿ^ket^pro^hⁱ^bⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^oⁿ^al^l
^‘iⁿ^d^ecen^t^’^and^‘^p^at^en^t^l^y^o^f^f^eⁿ^sⁱ^v^e^’^m^e^ssa^{ges co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^cat^ed^t^o^{a 17-year-o}^l^d^—n^o^m^a^t^t^e^{r h}^o^w^m^u^ch^val^u^{e t}^h^{e m}^e^s^s^ag^e
^m^a^y^ha^v^e^a^{nd r}^e^g^a^r^d^le^s^s^of^pa^r^e^nta^l^a^ppr^ov^a^l^{. I}^t^is^a^t^le^a^s^{t c}^l^e^a^r^tha^t^the^s^t^r^e^ng^th^of^the^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt’^s^inte^r^e^s^tⁱⁿ
^pr^ote^c^ting^mⁱ^nor^s^is^not^e^qua^lly^s^t^r^ong^thr^oug^h^o^u^t^the^c^o^v^e^r^a^g^e^of^t^h^is^br^oa^{d s}^t^a^t^ute^.^”
⁴⁸^In^o^t^h^e^{r w}^o^rd^s,ⁱ^t^app^{ears t}^h^at^,ⁱ^f^t^h^{e p}^r^o^p^o^s^al^ap^p^lⁱ^e^d^t^o^sexu^al^m^a^t^e^ri^al^wⁱ^t^h^seri^o^u^s^val^u^e,^t^h^enⁱ^t^mi^gh^t^b^e^st^r^u^ck
^dow^{n u}^nde^r^eⁱ^t^h^e^r^pr^ong^of^the^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^s^c^r^u^tiny^te^s^t^.
⁴⁹^Eⁿ^t^e^rt^aiⁿ^m^en^t^S^o^f^t^w^a^re^A^sso^ci^atⁱ^oⁿ^v.^B^l^ago^j^evi^c^h^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^not^e^{23. A}^s^note^d^{, t}^h^e^Se^v^e^{nth C}ⁱ^r^c^u^{it in}^this^c^a^s^e^a^l^s^o
^f^{ound t}^h^a^t^t^h^e^s^t^a^t^uteⁱⁿ^que^s^tioⁿ^did^no^{t c}^o^ns^titute^the^le^a^s^{t re}^s^t^ric^t^iv^e^m^e^aⁿ^s^b^ecau^{se “t}^h^e^S^t^at^{e co}^u^l^d^h^a^{ve si}^m^p^l^y
^pa^s^s^e^{d le}^gⁱ^s^l^a^{tion i}ⁿ^c^r^e^a^s^ing^a^w^a^r^eⁿ^e^s^s^am^ong^pa^r^e^nts^of^the^v^o^l^unt^a^r^y^ESR^B^r^a^ting^s^s^y^s^t^em^.”
⁵⁰^Sc^ha^{d v}^.^M^o^uⁿ^t^Ep^hr^aⁱ^m^,^{452 U}^.^{S. 6}¹^,⁶⁶⁽¹⁹⁸¹⁾^.

or the particular sexual content—then the substantial overbreadth doctrine would seem likely to
render unconstitutional a prohibition on the sale or rental to minors of “M”-rated video games,
given the current criteria for an “M” rating.
Video games with “AO” ratings, as noted, “may include prolonged scenes of intense violence
and/or graphic sexual content and nudity.” Applying the same reasoning just applied to video
games with “M” ratings, if it would be unconstitutional to prohibit the sale or rental to minors of
video games simply because they contained prolonged scenes of intense violence, without regard
to their literary value or the possibility of harm, then the substantial overbreadth doctrine would
seem likely to render unconstitutional a prohibition on the sale or rental to minors of “AO”-rated
video games, given the current criteria for an “AO” rating.
In conclusion, it appears that, for a prohibition of the sale or rental to minors of video games with
violent content to be upheld, the government would have to present empirical evidence that these
games harm minors or cause them to become violent. The prohibition of the sale or rental to
minors of video games containing sexual content, however, would seem more likely to be upheld
without empirical evidence that such games harm minors.
Nevertheless, the apparent vagueness and potential overbreadth of the current criteria for “M” and
“AO” ratings might cause a statutory prohibition on the sale or rental to minors of video games
that incorporates those ratings to be found unconstitutional on its face, even if the sale or rental to
minors of some of the video games to which the “M” or “AO” rating apply could constitutionally
be prohibited by more narrowly tailored legislation.

^H^e^nr^y^Co^heⁿ
^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e A}^t^torn^e^y
^h^c^oh^eⁿ^@^c^r^s^.l^oc.g^ov^{, 7-}⁷⁸⁹²