Israel: Background and Relations with the United States

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel declared its independence and was immediately engaged in a
war with all of its neighbors. Armed conflict has marked every decade of Israel’s existence.
Despite its unstable regional environment, Israel has developed a vibrant parliamentary
democracy, albeit with relatively fragile governments. The Kadima Party placed first in the March
28, 2006, Knesset (parliament) election and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert formed a coalition
government. Corruption charges against Olmert led to a Kadima leadership primary on
September 17, 2008. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni won and replaced Olmert as party leader, but
she was unable to form a new coalition government. Therefore, early national elections will be
held in February 2009; Olmert remains prime minister until then. Israel has an advanced
industrial, market economy with a large government role.
Israel’s foreign policy is focused largely on its region, Europe, and the United States. It views Iran
as an existential threat due to its nuclear ambitions and support for anti-Israel terrorists. Israel
concluded peace treaties with Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994, but not with Syria and Lebanon.
Israel unilaterally withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000. Hezbollah, which then took over the
south, sparked a 34-day war when it kidnaped two Israeli soldiers in July 12, 2006. Israel
negotiated a series of agreements with the Palestinians in the 1990s, but that process ended in
2000. Israel resumed talks with the Palestinian Authority (PA) in June 2007, after PA President
Mahmud Abbas dissolved an Hamas-led unity government. On November 27, 2007, the
international Annapolis Conference officially welcomed the renewed negotiations. Annapolis
anticipated a comprehensive peace agreement by the end of 2008, but talks progressed slowly and
the forthcoming Israeli elections undoubtedly will impede them.
Since 1948, the United States and Israel have developed a close friendship based on common
democratic values, religious affinities, and security interests. U.S.-Israeli bilateral relations are
multidimensional. The United States is the principal proponent of the Arab-Israeli peace process,
but U.S. and Israeli views differ on some issues, such as the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, and
settlements. The Bush Administration and Congress supported Israel’s 2006 military campaigns
against Hezbollah and Hamas as acts of self-defense. The United States and Israel concluded a
free-trade agreement in 1985. Israel is a prominent recipient of U.S. foreign aid. The two
countries also have close security relations. Other issues in U.S.-Israeli relations include Israel’s
military sales to China, inadequate Israeli protection of U.S. intellectual property, and espionage-
related cases. This report will be updated as developments warrant. See also CRS Report
RL33530, Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy, by Carol
Migdalovitz ,CRS Report RS22768, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Annapolis
Conference, by Carol Migdalovitz.

Most Recent Developments.............................................................................................................1
Domestic Politics......................................................................................................................1
Economy ................................................................................................................................... 2
Security Cooperation with the United States............................................................................2
Historical Overview of Israel..........................................................................................................2
Government and Politics.................................................................................................................3
Overvi ew ....................................................................................................................... ............ 3
Recent Political Developments.................................................................................................4
Current Government and Politics..............................................................................................5
Scandals .................................................................................................................................... 6
War and Aftermath....................................................................................................................7
Winograd Commission..............................................................................................................7
Political Repercussions.............................................................................................................8
Effects of Renewed Peace Process............................................................................................8
Other Political Developments...................................................................................................9
Election Preview.......................................................................................................................9
Economy ........................................................................................................................................ 10
Overvi ew ....................................................................................................................... .......... 10
Current Issues...........................................................................................................................11
Foreign Policy...............................................................................................................................12
Middle East.............................................................................................................................12
Ir an ........................................................................................................................... ......... 12
Palestinian Authority.........................................................................................................15
Egypt ................................................................................................................................16
Jordan ...............................................................................................................................18
Syria .......................................................................................................................... ........ 19
Lebanon ...........................................................................................................................20
Ir aq ........................................................................................................................... ......... 21
Other .......................................................................................................................... ....... 21
European Union......................................................................................................................22
Relations with the United States....................................................................................................23
Overvi ew ....................................................................................................................... .......... 23
Issues ....................................................................................................................................... 23
Peace Process....................................................................................................................23
Settlements .................................................................................................................... .... 24
Jerusale m .......................................................................................................................... 24
Syrian Talks......................................................................................................................25
Democratization Policy.....................................................................................................25
Trade and Investment........................................................................................................25
Energy Cooperation..........................................................................................................26
Aid ...................................................................................................................................26
Security Cooperation........................................................................................................27
Other Issues.............................................................................................................................29
Military Sales....................................................................................................................29
Espionage-Related Cases..................................................................................................30

Use of U.S. Arms..............................................................................................................31
Intellectual Property Protection........................................................................................32
U.S. Interest Groups................................................................................................................33
Figure 1. Map of Israel..................................................................................................................34
Table 1. Parties in the Knesset.........................................................................................................5
Table 2. Key Cabinet Officers.........................................................................................................6
Table 3. Basic Facts........................................................................................................................11
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................34

On September 17, 2008, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni won the Kadima Party leadership primary,
besting Transportation Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and former Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz
by a narrow margin of 431 votes or 43.1% to 42%—enough to ensure that a run-off would not be
needed. On September 21, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert tendered his resignation to President
Shimon Peres and, the next day, Peres designated Livni to form a new government. Olmert
remains prime minister until the Knesset (parliament) approves a new government.
Livni preferred to continue or broaden the current coalition government of the Kadima, Labor,
Shas, and Pensioners’ parties. On October 13, Kadima and Labor initialed a coalition agreement
granting Labor “senior partner” status and Barak status higher than that of any other minister ¹
“irrespective of title.” Meanwhile, the ultra-orthodox Shas demanded a large (US$261 million)
increase in child allowances and assurances that Jerusalem would never be included in
negotiations with the Palestinians. It decided not to join the coalition unless its demands were met
and the small, orthodox United Torah Judaism (UTJ) party agreed. On October 26, Livni declared
that she was “unwilling to mortgage Israel’s political and economic future” for the sake of a
coalition. Livni, who has led the Israeli team negotiating with the Palestinians, later elaborated, “I
will not promise something that will set the Middle East on fire, and I will not break into the ²
national budget at a time of economic crisis.” She informed President Peres that she had been ^th
unable to form a government and, on the 27, he called on the Knesset to dissolve itself and call
early national elections. The vote will be held on February 10, 2009.
Livni’s main opponent in the forthcoming elections will be opposition Likud Party leader
Benjamin Netanyahu. He has pledged to allow construction for “natural growth” in existing
settlements, not to negotiate over Jerusalem or the absorption of Palestinian refugees, and to ³
retain the Golan Heights and large parts of the West Bank if elected prime minister. Early polls
showed Kadima tied with or slightly ahead of Likud, with Labor trailing badly. However, they ⁴
also show continuing difficulty in forming a coalition for Livni.

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Because of the international financial crisis, it has been suggested that Israel will have a slower ⁵
rate of economic growth but will not experience negative growth.
Early elections mean that Knesset discussion of the 2009 budget will be postponed until a new
government is formed. Israel continues to operate on the basis of its 2008 budget, in monthly
installments.
In mid September, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of an
intended sale of 1,000 GBU-39 “bunker-buster” bombs to Israel for $77 million, of upgrades for
the Patriot missile defense system at a cost of up to $164 million, and of 28,000 M72A7 66-mm
light anti-armor weapons, 60,000 training rockets, and other equipment valued at up to $89
million. On September 30, DSCA notified Congress of plans to sell up 25 F-35 Joint Strike
Fighters to Israel, with an option for 50 more, at a potential total cost of $15.2 billion. Delivery
would begin in 2014. Israel seeks U.S. permission to install Israeli-made radar, fuel tanks, and
other electronic and weapons systems in the plane. DSCA said that the sales are consistent with
U.S. national interests “to assist Israel to develop and maintain a strong and ready self-defense ⁶
capability.” It also said that they “would not affect the military balance in the region.”
Also in September, the United States supplied Israel with an X-band radar system and 120 U.S.
military personnel to enable Israel’s Arrow anti-ballistic missile to engage Iran’s Shihab-3 ⁷
ballistic missile about halfway through an 11-minute flight to Israel. The radar has been
temporarily set up at the Nevatim air base in the southern Negev. Its installation is pursuant to an
agreement reached in July, when the Defense Department also agreed to increase Israel’s access ⁸
to its Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites.

The quest for a modern Jewish homeland was launched with the publication of Theodore Herzl’s
The Jewish State in 1896. The following year, Herzl described his vision at the first Zionist
Congress, which encouraged Jewish settlement in Palestine, a land that had been the Biblical
home of the Jews and was later part of the Ottoman Empire. In 1917, the British government
issued the Balfour Declaration, supporting the “establishment in Palestine (which had become a

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¹⁹⁹^6.

British mandate after World War I) of a national home for the Jewish people.” Britain also made
conflicting promises to the Arabs concerning the fate of Palestine, which had an overwhelmingly
Arab populace. Nonetheless, Jews immigrated to Palestine in ever greater numbers and, following
World War II, the plight of Jewish survivors of the Nazi holocaust gave the demand for a Jewish
home greater poignancy and urgency.
In 1947, the U.N. developed a partition plan to divide Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, with
Jerusalem under U.N. administration. The Arab states rejected the plan. On May 14, 1948, the
State of Israel proclaimed its independence and was immediately invaded by Arab armies. The
conflict ended with armistice agreements between Israel and its neighbors: Egypt, Jordan,
Lebanon, and Syria. Israel engaged in armed conflict with some or all of these countries in 1948,
1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982. Since the late 1960s, Israel also has dealt with the threat of
Palestinian terrorism. In 1979, Israel concluded a peace treaty with Egypt, thus making another
multi-front war unlikely. Israel’s current relations with its neighbors are discussed in “Foreign
Policy” below.

Israel is a parliamentary democracy in which the President is head of state and the Prime Minister
is head of government. The unicameral parliament (the Knesset) elects a president for a seven-
year term. The Prime Minister is the leader of the party with the most seats in parliament. The
political spectrum is highly fragmented, with small parties exercising disproportionate power due
to the low vote threshold for entry into parliament and the need for their numbers to form
coalition governments. In the March 2006, election, the threshold to enter parliament was raised
from 1% to 2%—an action intended to bar smaller parties from parliament but that spurred some
parties to join together simply to overcome the threshold. National elections must be held at least
every four years, but are often held earlier due to difficulties in holding coalitions together. The
average life span of an Israeli government is 22 months. The peace process, the role of religion in
the state, and scandals have caused coalitions to break apart or produced early elections.
Israel does not have a constitution. Instead, 11 Basic Laws lay down the rules of government and ¹⁰
enumerate fundamental rights; two new Basic Laws are under consideration. On February 2,
2006, the Knesset’s Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee approved a draft constitution
encompassing existing Basic Laws and a chapter of human rights and basic principles. However,
the coalition agreement for the government that took power that April promised the ultra-
orthodox Shas Party that Basic Laws would not be changed (i.e., transformed into a constitution)
without its approval. Israel has an independent judiciary, with a system of magistrates courts and
district courts topped by a Supreme Court.
There is an active civil society. Some political pressure groups are especially concerned with the
peace process, including the Council of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza (Yesha Council), which
represents local settler councils and opposes any withdrawal from occupied Arab territories, and

¹⁰^{For Ba}^sic^L^a^{ws, se}^e^http://w^ww^.^m^fa^.g^ov^.il/m^fa^/^g^ov^e^r^nm^eⁿ^t/la^w^/^b^a^sic^%^20la^w^s/.

Peace Now, which opposes settlements and the security barrier in the West Bank, and seeks
territorial compromise. Both groups have U.S. supporters.
Israel’s domestic politics have been tumultuous in recent years. Former Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon’s plan to disengage from the Gaza Strip and four small West Bank settlements split his
Likud Party. Then, in November 2005, Histadrut labor federation head Amir Peretz defeated
acting party leader Shimon Peres and former Infrastructure Minister Benjamin Ben Eliezer in a
Labor Party leadership primary. On November 20, Labor voted to withdraw from the government,
depriving Sharon of his parliamentary majority.
On November 21, Sharon said that he was no longer willing to deal with Likud rebels, resigned
from the party, and founded a new “centrist” party, Kadima (Forward). He asked the President to
dissolve parliament and schedule early elections. Some 18 Likud MKs, including several
ministers, the chairman of the Likud Central Committee, several Labor MKs, players in other
political parties, and prominent personalities joined Kadima. Former Labor leader Peres
supported Sharon. Kadima’s platform or Action Plan stated that, in order to secure a Jewish
majority in a democratic Jewish State, part of the Land of Israel (defined by some Israelis as the
area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea) would have to be ceded. It affirmed a
commitment to the Road Map, the 2003 international framework for achieving a two-state
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel would keep settlement blocs, the security barrier, ¹¹
and a united Jerusalem, while demarcating permanent borders.
Former Prime Minister and Finance Minister Benjamin Netanyahu won a primary to replace
Sharon as leader of Likud on December 19. Netanyahu called for “defensible walls” against
Hamas and borders that would include the Jordan Valley, the Golan Heights, an undivided
Jerusalem, settlement blocs, and hilltops, and moving the security barrier eastward.
On January 4, 2006, Sharon suffered an incapacitating stroke. In a peaceful transition under the
terms of Basic Law Article 16 (b), Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert became Acting Prime
Minister and, on January 16, he became acting chairman of Kadima.
The Hamas victory in the January 25, 2006, Palestinian parliamentary elections rapidly became
an Israeli election issue, even though all parties agreed that Israel should not negotiate with
Hamas. On March 8, Olmert revealed plans for further unilateral withdrawals from the West
Bank—what he termed “convergence,” or merging of settlements east of the security barrier with ¹²
large settlement blocs that west of the barrier. Netanyahu charged that the unreciprocated,
unilateral withdrawal from Gaza had rewarded terrorists and contributed to the Hamas win. He
criticized Olmert’s plan as another unilateral concession that would endanger Israel.
The March 28, 2006, Knesset election results were surprising in many respects. The voter turnout
of 63.2% was the lowest ever. The contest was widely viewed as a referendum on Kadima’s plans
to disengage from the West Bank, but it also proved to be a vote on economic policies that many
believed had harmed the disadvantaged. Kadima came in first, but by a smaller margin than polls

¹¹^{For Ka}^dⁱ^m^a^’s^Ac^tion^Plaⁿ^{, se}^e^ht^tp://k^a^d^im^a^s^ha^ron.c^o^.il^/^15-eⁿ^/^K^a^d^im^a^.^a^s^px^.
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^“^c^onv^e^r^g^e^nc^e”^a^s^the^Eng^lis^{h tr}^aⁿ^s^l^a^{tion f}^o^r^his^plaⁿ^.

had predicted. Labor, emphasizing socioeconomic issues, came in a respectable second. Kadima
drew supporters from Likud, which lost 75% of its votes from 2003. Likud’s decline also was
attributed personally to Netanyahu, whose policies as Finance Minister were blamed for social
distress and whose opposition to unilateral disengagement proved to be unpopular with an
increasingly pragmatic, non-ideological electorate.
The Shas campaign specifically aimed at restoring child allowances for the large families of its
constituents. Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel Our Home), a secular party appealing to Russian-speakers,
wants borders that exclude Israeli Arabs and their land and include settlements; it opposes
unilateral disengagements and the Road Map. The rightist National Union/National Religious
Party (NU/NRP) drew support from settlers; it opposes all withdrawals from the West Bank,
where it believes Jews have a biblical right to settle. Voters harmed by Netanyahu’s policies as
well as young protest voters supported the new Pensioners’ Party (GIL), which did not elaborate
positions on other issues. The ultra-orthodox United Torah Judaism (UTJ) also seeks increased
child allowances and military deferments for religious school students. United Arab List, Hadash,
and Balad—Israeli Arab parties—are never part of a government.
Table 1. Parties in the Knesset
^{Seats Party}^Orientation
^{29 Kadima}^Centrist,^{Pro-disengagement}
^{19 Labor}^Leftist,^Social^-democrat
^{12 Likud}^Rightist,^Anti-d^isengagement
¹²^Shas^{Sephardi Ultra-orthodox}
^{11 Yisrael}^Beiteinu^{Russian-speaker}^{s, Nationalist, Sec}^{ular, Against unilateral withdrawa}^{ls, but for}
^{(Our Home}^Israel)^excha^{nge of po}^{pulations and ter}^{ritories to create 2}^{homogenous st}^ates
⁹^{National Union (NU)/}^{Nationalist, Ashkenazi Orthodox, Seeks to anne}^{x the}^{West Bank (}^{Land of Israel)}
^{National Relig}^ious^{and trans}^{fer Palestinians to Jorda}ⁿ
^{Party (NRP)}
⁷^{Pensioners’ (GIL)}^{Single-issue: guaranteed pe}^nsions^{for all; Supports u}^{nilateral withdrawal from West}
^Bank
⁶^{United Torah Judaism}^a^{Ashkenazi Ort}^{hodox, Anti-withdrawals}
^(UTJ)
⁵^Meretz/Yahad^{Leftist, Anti-occupation, Civil l}^ibertarian
⁴^{United Arab List/Ta’al}^{Israeli-Arab, Islamist}
^{3 Hadash}^{Israeli-Arab,}^Communist
^{3 Balad}^Israeli-Arab
^a.^{UTJ includes the Lith}^uanian^ultra-^{Orthodox Degel HaTorah pa}^rty^{and the Ha}^{sidic Agudat Israel par}^ty
On May 4, 2006, the Knesset approved a four-party coalition government of the Kadima Party,
the Labor Party, the Pensioners’ Party, and the Shas Party. It controlled 67 out of 120 seats in the

Knesset, with 25 cabinet ministers, and Dalia Itzik of Kadima as the first woman Speaker of the
Knesset. The government’s guidelines called for shaping permanent borders for a democratic ¹³
state with a Jewish majority. The guidelines also promised to narrow the social gap. Shas joined
the coalition without agreeing to evacuate settlements as specified in the guidelines and would
decide on the issue when it is on the government agenda.
Table 2. Key Cabinet Officers
^{Ehud Olmert}^Prime^Minist^er^Kadima
^{Tzipi Livni}^{Vice Prime Minister;}^Kadima
^{Minister of Foreign Affairs}
^{Haim Ramon}^{Vice Prime Minister}^Kadima
^{Ehud Bara}^k^{Deputy Prime}^Minister;^Labor
^{Minister of Defen}^se
^{Roni Bar-On}^{Minister of Finance}^Kadima
^{Daniel Friedmann}^{Minister of J}^ustice^non-partisan
^{Avi Dichter}^{Public Security}^Kadima
^{Shaul Mofaz}^{Deputy Prime}^Minister;^Kadima
^{Minister of Trans}^portation^a
^{Meir Shitrit}^{Minister of I}^nterior^Kadima
^{Yuli Tamir}^{Minister of Ed}^ucation^Labor
^{Eli Yishai}^{Deputy Prime}^Minister;^Shas
^{Minister of I}^{ndustry, Trade, and L}^abor
^a.^{Also in charge of strategic dialogue with t}^{he United States.}
A series of scandals created a sense that the government was operating under a cloud. In October
2006, police recommended that President Moshe Katzav be indicted on charges of rape, sexual
harassment, and obstruction of justice. On June 30, 2007, two weeks before the expiration of his
term, Katzav resigned under the terms of a controversial plea bargain. Katzav was indicted on
February 27, 2008, but, on April 8, 2008, he backed out of the plea agreement and decided go on
trial to clear his name.
Prime Minister Olmert also is involved in several scandals. Police have opened five investigations
into his alleged corruption. On September 7, the police recommended that Olmert be indicted for
fraudulently billing the government for foreign travel paid for by organizations when he was
mayor of Jerusalem and Minister of Trade and for money Olmert received from a New York
businessman.

¹³^{For t}^h^e^eⁿ^tire^te^x^t^of^the^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt g}^u^ide^line^s^{, se}^e^h^ttp:^//www^.^m^fa^.g^ov^.il/MFA^/^G^ov^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t/
^C^u^r^r^e^nt+^G^ov^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t+^of⁺^I^s^r^a^e^l^/^B^a^s^ic^%^20G^uide^line^s^%^20of^%²⁰^th^e^%²⁰³¹^st^%^20G^ov^e^r^nm^eⁿ^t%^20of^%^20I^s^r^a^e^l^.

On January 31, 2007, former (Kadima) Justice Minister Haim Ramon, a close ally of Olmert, was
convicted of sexually harassing a female soldier. On March 29, the court upheld Ramon’s
conviction for indecent assault, but found him not guilty of moral turpitude, opening the way for
him to resume a political career and be appointed Vice Prime Minister.
Israel engaged in a two-front war against U.S.-designated terrorist groups in response to the June

25, 2006, kidnaping of an Israeli soldier by Hamas and others near Gaza and the July 12 ¹⁴

abduction of two Israeli soldiers from northern Israel by Hezbollah. The Israeli public, press,
and parliament supported the war in Lebanon as a legitimate response to an attack on sovereign
Israeli territory and a long overdue reaction to Hezbollah rocket attacks on northern Israel, but
they questioned its prosecution. Critics noted that the kidnaped soldiers were not rescued and that
Hezbollah is rearming and has been strengthened politically. The government claimed success in
forcing Hezbollah from the border, in degrading its arms, and in pressuring the Lebanese
government, aided by international forces, to assert itself in south Lebanon. The fallout from the
war included the resignation of Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz on January 17, 2007. Retired
Maj. Gen. Gabi Askenazi, Director General of the Defense Ministry and a former infantry
commander, was named to succeed Halutz and promoted to lieutenant general.
Amid post-war recriminations, Prime Minister Olmert eventually named retired Judge Eliyahu
Winograd to head a governmental commission, the “Committee for the Examination of the
Events of the Lebanon Campaign 2006,” to look into the preparation and conduct of the war and
gave it authority equal to that of an independent commission. The committee began its work in
November 2006.
On April 30, 2007, the Winograd Commission presented its interim findings, assigning personal
blame for “failings” to Prime Minister Olmert, then-Defense Minister Peretz, and then-Chief of ¹⁵
Staff Halutz. It criticized Olmert for “hastily” deciding to go to war without a comprehensive
plan, close study, or systematic consultation with others, especially outside the Israeli Defense
Forces (IDF). It accused him of declaring unclear, over-ambitious, and infeasible goals and for
failing to adapt them once their deficiencies were realized. It concluded that these accusations add
up to a “serious failure” in exercising “judgment, responsibility, and prudence.” It faulted Peretz
for making decisions without systematic consultations despite his lack of knowledge and
experience in military matters, emphasizing his lack of strategic oversight of the IDF. It
concluded, “his serving as Minister of Defense during the war impaired Israel’s ability to respond
well to its challenges.” The Committee also severely criticized Halutz, who had already resigned.
The final report of the Winograd Committee was released on January 30, 2008.¹⁶ It called the war
“a great and severe missed opportunity” and “found grave faults and failings in the decision-

¹⁴^For^a^dditi^ona^l^c^o^v^e^r^a^g^e^of^the^s^e^de^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^ts^{, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³³⁵⁶^6,^Le^ba^no^n:^T^h^e^I^s^r^a^e^l^-^H^a^m^as^-^H^e^z^bolla^h
^Conflic^t^{, by}^J^e^re^m^y^{M. Sha}^r^{p e}^t^a^l^..
¹⁵^{For te}^x^t^of^Inte^rim^Re^{port, se}^e^ht^tp://w^ww^.^m^fa^.g^ov^.il/MFA^/^G^ov^e^r^nm^eⁿ^t/Com^m^unique^s/20^07/
^Wⁱ^nog^r^a^d+^I^nquir^y⁺^C^om^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on+^s^ubm^its⁺^I^nte^rⁱ^m⁺^R^e^por^t+^30-^A^p^r^-²⁰^07.^htm^.
¹⁶^{For k}^e^y^fⁱ^nding^{s of}^the^Wⁱ^nog^ra^{d Com}^m^itte^e^,^se^e^http://w^ww^.^m^fa^.g^ov^.il/MFA^/MFAA^r^c^h^iv^e^/²⁰⁰⁰^_²⁰⁰^9/²⁰^08/
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

making process and the preparatory work both in the political and military levels and the
interaction between them.”
The political effects of the Winograd Commission’s findings on Prime Minister Olmert were
minimal. Most (26 out of 29) Kadima MKs supported him. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni called
for Olmert’s resignation, but did not work to gain the support of others in the party to achieve this
goal. Afterwards, she remained in the government, with her image somewhat tarnished by her
unsuccessful action. Shas, Yisrael Beitenu, and the Pensioners’ Party supported the Prime
Minister’s refusal to resign and the first two were said to have rejected the idea of remaining in a
Kadima-led government if it were led by Livni, who is also Vice Prime Minister, for reasons of
ideology and perhaps gender. Yisrael Beitenu viewed her as too supportive of a peace process and
Shas may not follow a female head of government. Olmert was not challenged as leader of his
Kadima Party and easily defeated three no-confidence votes against his government in the
Knesset. Most observers concluded that Olmert emerged relatively unscathed from the final
report because it did not blame him personally for what many Israelis consider a debacle. Olmert
had said prior to the report’s release that he would not resign as a result of its findings.
Afterwards, his office said, “Taking responsibility means staying on, fixing, improving, and
continuing to lead the way forward.”
Peretz was defeated in the first round of the Labor Party leadership primary on May 28, 2007. In
the second round, on June 12, former Prime Minister and former IDF Chief of Staff Ehud Barak
bested former Shin Bet (Israeli Counterintelligence and Internal Security Service) head Ami
Ayalon to become party leader. Barak then took over as Defense Minister, saying that he would
serve until an election or until someone other than Olmert forms a new government.
On February 3, 2008, Barak announced that he would not withdraw Labor from the government
because of the Winograd report. He said that it was “an opportunity to correct things that were
revealed” and that he was staying in the government because of the “challenges Israel faces -
Gaza, Hezbollah, Syria, Iran, and rehabilitating the army.” Labor Party ministers argued that
supporting the peace process is more important than the Winograd Report, but they also may have
been influenced by public opinion polls which then predicted a Likud victory in the next election.
Resumed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations roiled the domestic political waters, with the fate of
Jerusalem being the main focus of discord. In September 2007, Vice Premier Ramon, sometimes
viewed as a surrogate for Prime Minister Olmert because of their close ties, floated a peace plan
for maintaining a democratic Israel with a solid Jewish majority; one provision called for Israel to
cede control of Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem to the Palestinians and for each religion to
administer its holy sites. In October, Olmert himself questioned whether Israel needed to retain
outlying Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^Wⁱ^nog^r^a^d%^20C^om^m^itte^e^%^20s^ub^m^its%^20f^ina^l^%^20r^e^por^t%²⁰³⁰^-^J^aⁿ^-²⁰⁰^8.

Shas Party leader Eli Yishai responded that his party would leave the coalition if Jerusalem were
a subject of negotiations. Meanwhile, Yisrael Beiteinu head Lieberman asserted that while
refugee camps near Jerusalem could be handed over to Palestinian control, the Jewish holy sites
should not be discussed. Opposition leader Netanyahu declared that Jerusalem must remain
united forever under Israeli control and a majority of the Members of the Knesset
(parliament/MKs) signed a petition circulated by Likud, expressing that view. Signers included 30
MKs from coalition parties as well as opposition MKs. Netanyahu called on Yisrael Beiteinu and
Shas to leave the coalition. On January 16, 2008, Lieberman announced that Yisrael Beiteinu
Party was withdrawing from the government because negotiations with the Palestinians were
dealing with core issues. The coalition survived with a majority of 67 seats in the Knesset.
On January 22, 2008, Shas leader Yishai reportedly warned Olmert that his party would not be
part of the government from the moment it makes concessions in the peace talks on red lines like ¹⁷
Jerusalem. Olmert only promised to keep Shas fully informed about the negotiations. Shas
exacted a high price for remaining in the government and supporting Olmert against no-
confidence votes in the Knesset. Olmert approved construction of many housing units in several
settlements near Jerusalem inhabited predominantly by Shas constituents, which would appear to
contravene the 2003 Road Map’s call on Israel to end all settlement activity. In addition, Yishai
reportedly has said that his party would quit the government if child welfare payments were not ¹⁸
increased and held up government appointments until it was done.
On June 13, 2007, the Knesset elected Kadima candidate, 83-year-old Shimon Peres to be
President of Israel. On July 4, Olmert shuffled his cabinet, naming Haim Ramon Vice Premier to
replace Peres, Roni Bar-On Finance Minister, and Meir Shitrit Interior Minister, among other
appointments. Ramon and Bar-On are close associates of the Prime Minister.
On July 9, 2007, controversial Russian-born billionaire Arkadi Gaydamak announced the creation
of the Social Justice Party. French authorities seek to arrest Gaydamak for alleged arms
trafficking to Angola in the 1990s and Israeli police have questioned him about money-¹⁹
laundering. Some in Israel view him as a philanthropist. Gaydamak is a candidate in the
November 2008 Jerusalem mayoral election.
In May 2008, police questioned Prime Minister Olmert twice in connection with money he
received from New York businessman and fund raiser Morris (Moshe) Talansky. Talansky later
testified that he had transferred more than $150,000 to Olmert over 13 years. Olmert admitted
that he had taken campaign contributions from Talansky, but denied that he had ever taken a bribe ²⁰
or pocketed money for himself. He said that he would resign if indicted.

¹⁷^Gⁱ^l^Ho^ffman^,^“Ol^m^ert^P^r^o^mⁱ^s^es^Yi^sh^ay^F^u^l^l^Di^scl^o^su^{re on}^P^{eace Co}ⁿ^cessi^oⁿ^s^,^”^Jeru^s^a^l^{em P}^o^st^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^{23, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
¹⁸^M^azal^M^u^al^em^,^“S^h^a^{s T}^h^reat^en^s^t^o^Bol^t^G^o^v’t^o^v^{er Ch}ⁱ^l^d^W^e^l^f^ar^{e P}^a^ym^en^t^s^,^”^H^aar^e^t^z^{, Ma}^y^{27, 2}⁰⁰⁷^.
¹⁹^“^I^sra^e^{li Billiona}^ire^L^a^unc^he^s^P^a^r^t^y^‘^T^{o Oust Olm}^e^rt,’”^Daily^Te^le^grap^h^{, J}^u^ly^{10, 2}⁰⁰⁷^.
²⁰^Ca^m^Si^m^p^s^{on, “}^O^lm^e^r^{t D}^e^f^e^nds^T^a^kⁱ^ng^Ca^s^h^{, V}^o^w^s^{to Re}^sⁱ^gⁿ^if^Indic^t^e^d^,”^W^a^{ll Str}^e^e^t^J^ourⁿ^a^l^,^Ma^y^{9, 200}^8.

On May 28, a day after Talansky’s testimony, Labor leader Barak declared that Olmert could not
“simultaneously run the government and deal with his own personal affair.” Therefore, “for the
good of the state,” he called on Olmert to cut himself off from the daily running of the
government via “suspension, vacation, or resignation or declaring himself incapacitated.” He said
that Labor would consider working with Olmert’s replacement in Kadima. If Kadima did not act, ²¹
then Labor would provoke early elections.
On June 24, after Labor ministers decided to support a bill on calling for the dissolution of the
Knesset and thereby for early elections, Barak and Olmert cut a deal before a vote on the bill:
Labor would not support the bill and Olmert agreed to complete a Kadima primary for a new
party chairman not later than September 25. Candidates for Kadima party leader included Vice
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, Deputy Prime Minister and Transportation
Minister Shaul Mofaz, Interior Minister Meir Shitrit, and Public Security Minister Avi Dichter.
Likud and other opposition parties were outraged when the Olmert-Kadima deal short-circuited
the prospect for imminent elections.
On July 30, 2008, Olmert announced that he would resign as prime minister when Kadima picked
a new leader in September.
While campaigning for the Kadima leadership, Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tzipi
Livni said that her goal was to form a national unity government in order to advance the peace
process. Her main opponent, Shaul Mofaz, emphasized security, opposing negotiations with the
Palestinians on core issues and favoring confidence-building and measures to revive the
Palestinian economy; he criticized the cease-fire with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Likud leader
Netanyahu demanded that national elections be held when the Olmert leaves office and declared
that he would not join a Kadima-led coalition or a unity government before then.

Israel has an advanced industrial, market economy in which the government plays a substantial
role. Most people enjoy a middle class standard of living. Per capita income is on par with some
European Union member states. Despite limited natural resources, the agricultural and industrial
sectors are well developed. The engine of the economy is an advanced high-tech sector, including
aviation, communications, computer-aided design and manufactures, medical electronics, and
fiber optics. Israel greatly depends on foreign aid and loans and contributions from the Jewish
diaspora.
Under former Finance Minister Netanyahu, the government attempted to liberalize the economy
by controlling government spending, reducing taxes, and privatizing state enterprises. The
chronic budget deficit decreased, while the country’s international credit rating was raised,
enabling a drop in interest rates. However, Netanyahu’s critics suggested that cuts in social
spending widened the national income gap and increased the underclass.

²¹^Statem^en^{t b}^y^B^a^rak^,^V^o^{ice o}^f^{Israel, May}²⁸^,²⁰⁰⁸^{, BBC M}^oⁿⁱ^to^riⁿ^g^News^f^ile.

Table 3. Basic Facts
^{7.1 mil}^{lion (includes an estimated 187}^,00^{0 se}^ttl^{ers in the West Bank, 20}^,0⁰⁰
^Population^{in the Golan Heights, and fewer than 177,00}^{0 in East Jerusalem) (July 200}⁸
^est.)
^Jews^76.4%
^{non-Jews, mostly}^Arabs^23.6%
^{Gross Domestic Product}^{5.3% (2}⁰⁰^{7 est.)}
^{growth rate}
^{GDP per ca}^pita^$26,6⁰⁰⁽²⁰⁰⁷^est.)
^Unemployment^rate^{7.3% (2}⁰⁰^{7 est.)}
^{Population below}^21.6%⁽²⁰^{07 e}^st.)
^{poverty line}
^{Inflation rate}^{0.5% (2}⁰⁰^{7 est.)}
^{Military Expe}^nditures^7.3%^{GDP (200}⁶⁾
^{Public debt}^80.6%^{GDP (20}⁰⁷^est.)
^Export^s^$50.3⁷^billi^{on (200}^{7 est.)}
^Export^commodities^machinery^{and e}^quipme^{nt, softwa}^{re, cut diamonds, agricultural pro}^ducts
^Export^part^ners^{U.S. 35%, Belgium 7.5%, Hong Kong 5%}⁽²⁰⁰⁷⁾
^Imports^$55.7⁹^billi^{on (200}^{7 est.)}
^{Import commodities}^{raw materials, military equipment}^{, investment goods, rough diamonds}
^{U.S. 13.9%, Belgium 7.9%,}
^{Import partne}^rs^Germa^{ny 6.2}^{%, China 6.}^{1%, Switzerland 5.1%,}
^{UK 4.7%}
^Source:^CIA,^{The World Factbook}^{, October 2}^{3, 20}^{08, I}^{sraeli government age}^ncies.
Israel has a budget deficit target of 3% of gross domestic product, and the government is allowed
by law to raise the annual budget by only 1.7%. Olmert vowed not to increase the deficit while
lessening the social gap. The coalition agreement called for raising the minimum wage to $1,000
a month by the end of the Knesset session, canceling a 1.5% pension cut of the Netanyahu era,
guaranteeing a pension for all workers, and increasing spending on heath care, child allowances,
daycare, and other socioeconomic programs.
In a 2007 year-end speech, Olmert painted a positive picture of the economy which he attributed
to the eradication of terror from city centers, the existence of hope in the political process, and ²²
Israel’s place in the global economy. In its inflation report for 2007, the Bank of Israel (central
bank) said that the resilience of Israel’s economy is founded on a business sector that is growing,
becoming more efficient, and is profitable; fiscal policy that is keeping to a budget appropriate to

²²^“P^M^Ol^m^e^rt^{’s 1}⁰^{Dec S}^p^eech^t^o^t^h^{e Israel}^Bu^siⁿ^e^{ss Con}^f^eren^ce,^”^G^o^vern^men^t^P^r^{ess Off}ⁱ^ce,^Op^en^S^o^u^r^{ce Cen}^t^er
^Do^cu^m^eⁿ^t^G^M^P²⁰⁰⁷¹²¹¹⁷³⁸⁰⁰^9.

the state of the economy; and monetary policy that is striving for price stability and supports
financial stability. The Bank also noted that the smallness of the economy and its openness to ²³
trade and to strong and fast capital flows limits policy makers’ flexibility.
On April 13, 2008, Finance Minister Roni Bar-On claimed that Israel is poised to withstand the
crisis in the world economy and grow at a more moderate pace. Bank of Israel Governor Stanley ²⁴
Fischer predicted a 2008 growth rate of 3.2%.

Israeli officials state that Iran will pose an existential threat to Israel if it achieves nuclear
weapons capability. Ayatollah Khomeini, founder of Iran’s Islamic revolution, decreed that the
elimination of Israel is a religious duty. President Mahmud Ahmadinejad quoted Khomeini when
he called for Israel to be “wiped off the map” and has described the Holocaust as a “myth” used
as a pretext to create an “artificial Zionist regime.” He repeatedly makes virulently anti-Israel
statements. The Iranian Shahab-3 missile is capable of delivering a warhead to Israel, and the
Ashura missile will have a similar capacity. Israeli officials have called on the international
community to thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions in order to avert the need for Israel to act as it did
against Iraq’s reactor at Osirak in 1981. On June 20, 2007, the House agreed to H.Con.Res. 21,
calling on the U.N. Security Council to charge Ahmadinejad with violating the Convention on the
Prevention of Genocide because of his calls for the destruction of the State of Israel. On June 21,
it was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
In 2005, when U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney warned that Israel might act pre-emptively
against Iran, Israel’s then Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz countered, urging a pre-emptive U.S.
strike. Some consider the prospect of an Israeli counterattack to be an effective deterrent against
an Iranian attack because Israel is presumed to have nuclear weapons. However, on January 17,
2006, then Acting Prime Minister Olmert said, “Under no circumstances ... will Israel permit
anyone who harbors evil intentions against us to possess destructive weapons that can threaten
our existence.” He added, “Israel acted, and will continue to act, in cooperation and consultation ²⁵
with ... international elements.” On April 23, he stated, “it would not be correct to focus on us as
the spearhead of the global struggle as if it were our local, individual problem and not a problem
for the entire international community. The international struggle must be led and managed by—
first and foremost—the U.S., Europe, and the U.N. institutions. We are not ignoring our need to ²⁶
take ... steps in order to be prepared for any eventuality.” On November 13, Olmert told the U.S.

²³^Ba^nk^of^Is^ra^e^l^,^Iⁿ^f^l^a^ti^on^R^e^po^rt²⁰⁰⁷^,^Op^eⁿ^So^u^r^{ce C}^eⁿ^t^er^Do^c^u^men^t^G^M^P²⁰⁰⁸⁰²²³⁷³⁹⁰⁰⁵^.
²⁴^M^o^tⁱ^Bo^sso^k,^“Bar-On^:^T^h^{e Israel}ⁱ^E^c^oⁿ^o^m^y^w^{ith W}^ithsta^{nd t}^h^e^W^o^{rld Ec}^o^nom^ic^Crisis,”^H^aar^e^t^z^{, A}^p^{ril 14}^{. 2}⁰⁰⁸
²⁵^“P^M^Ol^m^e^rt^,^P^r^esi^d^eⁿ^t^Qat^{zav Di}^scu^{ss Iran}^,^P^{eace P}^r^o^{cess Du}^riⁿ^g^{News Co}ⁿ^f^eren^ce,^{” Op}^en^S^o^u^r^ce^Cen^t^er
^D^o^c^u^m^e^{nt FEA}²⁰⁰⁶⁰¹¹⁷⁰¹⁷³^85,^J^a^nua^r^y^{17, 2}⁰⁰⁶^.
²⁶^“^{23 A}^p^r^C^a^bi^ne^{t Se}^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^{; D}^a^ily^Say^s^O^l^m^e^r^t^R^e^a^d^yⁱ^ng^f^o^r^‘^S^wⁱ^f^t^’^C^onv^e^r^g^e^nc^e^,^”^J^e^r^u^s^a^lem^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt P}^r^e^s^s
^O^f^fⁱ^ce^{, O}^p^eⁿ^S^our^c^e^C^e^nte^r^D^o^c^u^m^e^{nt G}^M^P²⁰⁰⁶⁰⁴²⁴⁶²¹⁰⁰^{5, A}^p^r^{il 2}³^,²⁰^06.

“Today Show” that he would find acceptable any compromise that President Bush does to stop
Iran from acquiring nuclear capabilities.
On January 24, 2007, Olmert restated his continuing preference for a diplomatic solution and
observed that Iran is “very vulnerable” to international pressure. He added, “Israel does not face
an imminent danger of a nuclear attack” and that there is still time to frustrate Iran’s intentions to ²⁷
become a nuclear power. Israel welcomed U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747, March 24,

2007, which imposed additional sanctions in Iran due to its failure to halt uranium enrichment. It ^th

also welcomed the U.S. State Department’s October 25 decision to subject Iran’s Revolutionary
Guards, some financial entities, and individuals to economic sanctions. Other Israeli officials
have expressed concern about the ramifications of a military strike against Iran on regional
stability and about possible retaliation by Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah.
Israel and the United States appear to differ in their forecasts of when Iran will acquire nuclear
arms. U.S. Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell, at the Senate Armed Services
Committee in February 2007, estimated that Iran could develop nuclear weapons and the capacity
to deliver them by 2015. Israelis believe that they must prepare for a more imminent threat. On
February 5, 2008, the head of Mossad (the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations) Meir
Dagan told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Iran will develop a nuclear ²⁸
weapon in three years. On September 15, the head of the research division of Military
Intelligence, Brig. Gen. Yossi Baidatz told the Committee that “the most optimistic scenario as far
as the Iranians are concerned is that they will have obtained nuclear capabilities by 2010,” but, he ²⁹
said, such a scenario was “not likely.”
Israeli officials challenged some of the Key Judgements of the U.S. National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) on Iran released on December 3, 2007. The NIE concluded with “high
confidence” that Iran had halted its nuclear program in fall 2003, with “moderate confidence” that
it had not restarted the program as of mid-2007, and with moderate-to-high confidence “that ³⁰
Teheran at a minimum is keeping open its options to develop nuclear weapons.” The NIE also
observed that Iran is continuing to produce enriched uranium for civilian purposes and that the
program could provide enough material to produce a nuclear weapon by the middle of the next
decade. Defense Minister Barak responded that, although Iran had halted its military nuclear
program for a while in 2003, it is still continuing with its program. He maintained that Israel
“could not allow itself to rest just because of an intelligence report from the other side of the ³¹
globe, even if it is from our greatest friend.” The Foreign Ministry welcomed the section of the
NIE that noted the effectiveness of international pressure and sanctions.

²⁷^V^e^rb^atim^{text o}^f^sp^eech^to^t^h^{e Herzili}^yy^{a Co}ⁿ^f^er^en^ce,^rep^o^r^ted^b^y^IDF^Radⁱ^o,^{BBC M}^o^nito^riⁿ^g^Mⁱ^d^d^l^{e East,}^Janu^ary
^{25, 20}⁰⁷^.
²⁸^Re^m^a^rk^s^b^y^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t B}^u^s^h^a^t^J^o^int^P^r^e^s^s^A^v^a^ila^bility^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^{9, 200}^8,^htt^p^://w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^.
²⁹^A^m^{non Me}^r^a^nda^{, “}^I^D^F^:^Sy^rⁱ^a^Str^e^ng^theⁿ^ing^Tⁱ^e^s^w^{ith R}^a^dic^a^l^A^x^is^,”^Yⁿ^e^t^ne^w^s^{, Se}^pte^m^be^r^{15, 2}⁰⁰⁸^{, O}^p^eⁿ^S^our^c^e
^C^e^nte^r^D^o^c^u^m^e^{nt G}^M^P²⁰⁰⁸⁰⁹¹⁵⁷³⁶⁰⁰^8.
³⁰^Na^tiona^{l I}ⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^Couⁿ^c^{il, N}^a^tiona^{l I}ⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^Estim^a^t^e^,^{Iran: Nuc}^l^e^a^{r I}ⁿ^te^nt^io^{ns a}^{nd C}^a^p^abi^litie^s^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r
²⁰⁰⁷^.^Oⁿ^l^y^t^h^{e “Ke}^y^Ju^d^g^e^m^en^t^s^{” sect}ⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^NIE^w^a^{s rel}^eas^ed^uⁿ^c^l^a^ssi^fⁱ^ed^.^T^h^{e NIE}^exp^l^aiⁿ^s^t^h^at^hi^gh^coⁿ^fⁱ^d^en^ce
^indic^a^t^e^s^ju^dg^m^e^{nts ba}^se^{d on}^hig^h^q^u^a^lity^inf^o^rm^a^tion,^but^w^h^ic^{h s}^{till c}^a^rry^a^risk^o^f^be^ing^w^r^ong^{. Judg}^e^m^eⁿ^{ts of}
^m^o^d^e^rat^e^coⁿ^fⁱ^d^en^{ce are cred}ⁱ^b^l^y^so^u^r^ced^and^pl^au^si^b^l^e.
³¹^Ste^phe^{n Erla}^ng^e^r^aⁿ^{d Isa}^b^e^l^Ke^rshne^{r, “}^I^sra^e^l^{Insists T}^h^a^t^Iraⁿ^Still^Se^e^k^{s a}^Bom^b^,”^{New Yo}^{rk Times}^,^Dece^m^b^{er 5}^,
²⁰⁰^7.

On December 8, Prime Minister Olmert observed, “Iran is continuing to pursue the two vital
components needed for a nuclear weapons program—developing and advancing their rocket
arsenal and enriching uranium.” In an interview published on January 26, 2008, Defense Minister
Barak told the Washington Post, “We suspect they are probably already working on warheads for
ground-to-ground missiles... (and) that probably they have another clandestine enrichment
operation beyond the one in Natanz.” On May 11, Olmert contested the NIE’s conclusion that
Iran had not restarted his nuclear weapons program, maintaining, “Based on the information we
have, the military program continues and has never been stopped. If this program continues, at ³²
some point they will be in possession of a nuclear weapon.”.
Israel also is concerned about Iran’s support for anti-Israeli terrorist groups. Iran provides
financial, political, and/or military support to the Lebanese Hezbollah as well as to Hamas,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command—Palestinian terrorist groups seeking to obstruct the
peace process and destroy Israel.
Prime Minister Olmert has called upon moderate Sunni leaders in the region to form a coalition
against Iran, Hezbollah, and other regional extremists. Those leaders seek a settlement of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a precondition for dealings with Israel. Nonetheless, it was widely
reported, but not officially confirmed, that Olmert met Saudi National Security Advisor Prince
Bandar in September 2006, and commentators opined that Iran was on their agenda.
On January 6, 2008, President Bush reasserted, “If Iran did strike Israel... (w)e will defend our ³³
ally (Israel), no ands, ifs, or buts.” During a visit to Israel on January 9, the President noted that
the NIE “sent the signal to some that said perhaps the United States does not view an Iran with a
nuclear weapon as a serious problem..., (but) Iran was a threat, Iran is a threat, and Iran will be a
threat if the international community does not come together and prevent that nation from the
development of the know-how to build a nuclear weapon.”
On January 17, Israel successfully tested a new long-range missile, the Jericho-3, that is probably
capable of delivering nuclear warheads.
On April 16, Olmert promised the citizens of Israel, “Iran will not have nuclear capability.”³⁴ He
later told visiting Members of Congress that “the window of opportunity to prevent a nuclear Iran
will close in 2010. Iran would then provide a nuclear umbrella to the terrorist organizations and ³⁵
would make the fight against them difficult.” In a June 4 speech, Olmert claimed, “With every
day that passes, we are getting closer to stopping Iran’s nuclear program.”
On June 20, the New York Times reported that the Israeli Air Force had conducted a major
exercise about 900 miles west Israel in the Mediterranean, comparable to the distance from Israel
to Iran’s uranium enrichment plant at Natanz. The exercise was viewed as a rehearsal for an
attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities and a signal to the West of Israel’s readiness to act if diplomacy

³²^L^a^ll^y^W^e^y^m^{outh, “}^A^C^onv^e^r^s^a^ti^{on w}^{ith E}^h^u^d^O^l^m^e^r^t^,”^W^a^s^h^ing^t^onp^os^t.c^o^m^,^Ma^y^{11, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
³³^“^B^us^{h Sa}^y^s^U^S^W^{ould D}^e^f^e^{nd I}^s^r^a^e^l^if^I^r^a^{n A}^ttac^k^s^,^”^A^g^en^{ce F}^r^aⁿ^{ce P}^r^esse^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^{6, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁴^L^a^nda^{u a}ⁿ^d^Ve^r^t^e^r^,^op^{. c}^it.
³⁵^It^am^{ar E}ⁱ^chⁿ^e^r,^“P^{M t}^o^Coⁿ^g^ressmen^:^Iran^w^o^u^l^d^P^r^o^vⁱ^d^{e N}^u^cl^{ear U}^m^b^r^el^l^a^t^o^T^e^rro^ri^st^s,^”^Ye^di’^o^{t A}^har^o^not^{, Ma}^y
^20,²⁰⁰⁸^{, O}^p^eⁿ^S^our^c^e^C^e^nte^r^D^o^c^u^m^e^nt^G^M^P²⁰⁰⁸⁰⁵²⁰⁷⁴³⁰⁰^2.

fails to curtail the Iranian threat.³⁶ On July 2, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral
Mike Mullen said that “opening a third front (in addition to Iraq and Afghanistan) right now
would be extremely stressful” on the U.S. military. He added that the consequences of an attack
on Iran “are very difficult to predict.”
On July 4, commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Gen. Mohammed Ali Jafari declared that
Iran would consider military action against its nuclear facilities as the beginning of a war. On July

7, the Guards’ website carried a statement that Tel Aviv, Israel’s largest city, and the U.S. naval ³⁷

fleet in the Persian Gulf would be among the first targets of an Iranian response. On July 9, the
Guards test-fired nine missiles, including one capable of reaching Israel. A White House
spokesman stated that Iran’s development of ballistic missiles violated U.N. Security Council
resolutions and called on the Iranians to “stop the development of ballistic missiles which could
be used as a delivery vehicle for a potential nuclear weapon.”
An Israeli Defense Ministry statement reported that Defense Minister Barak had told U.S.
Secretary of Defense Gates that “a policy that consists of keeping all options on the table must be
maintained” regarding Iran. Barak also said that there was time for “accelerated sanctions” to ³⁸
persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program. On August 13, Barak told Israeli Army Radio that
the United States did not “see an action against Iran as the right thing to do.” He added, “a small, ³⁹
isolated country like Israel needs in the final analysis to rely on itself, and only itself.”
During the Oslo peace process of the 1990’s, Israelis and Palestinians negotiated a series of
agreements that resulted in the creation of a Palestinian Authority (PA) with territorial control
over parts of the West Bank and the entire Gaza Strip. After Ariel Sharon came to power and
during the intifadah or Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation, Israel refused to deal with
the late Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat. Israel’s relations with the PA and its leaders improved
somewhat after Arafat’s death in November 2004 and the election of Mahmud Abbas as President
of the PA in January 2005. Sharon and Abbas met at a summit in Sharm al Shaykh, Egypt, in
February, and promised to end violence and to take other measures. Israel made some goodwill
gestures toward the PA, and Abbas and 13 Palestinian factions agreed to an informal truce.
However, Sharon and Abbas did not meet for a long time after June 2005. Although Israeli
officials described the 2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip as unilateral, they met with
Palestinian counterparts to coordinate security for the disengagement and disposition of Israeli
assets in Gaza.
Israel has at least 242 settlements, other civilian land use sites, and 124 unauthorized settlement
outposts in the West Bank and 29 settlements in East Jerusalem—all areas that the Palestinians
view as part of their future state. Israel retains military control over the West Bank and is building
a security barrier on West Bank territory to separate Israelis and Palestinians and prevent
terrorists from entering Israel. Palestinians object to the barrier being built on their territory. The

³⁶^Mic^h^a^e^l^{R. G}^o^rd^{on a}^{nd Er}^ic^Sc^h^m^{itt, “}^U^{.S. Sa}^y^s^E^x^e^r^cⁱ^se^b^y^Isra^e^l^Se^e^m^e^d^Dire^c^t^e^d^a^t^Ira^n,”^{New Yo}^rk^Times^{, 2}⁰^,
^Juⁿ^e²⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁷^“^Ira^niaⁿ^Mil^ita^ry^W^a^rns^U^S^{, Is}^ra^e^l^A^g^aⁱ^ns^{t A}^tta^c^k^,”^CN^N^.^c^o^m^,^J^u^ly^{8, 200}^8.
³⁸^P^a^{ul R}ⁱ^c^h^te^r^,^J^u^lⁱ^aⁿ^E.^B^a^rⁿ^e^s^{, “}^S^tr^ik^e^{on I}^r^a^{n is}^{not O}^f^f^the^T^a^ble,”^L^o^{s A}ⁿ^g^e^{les T}ⁱ^mes^{, J}^u^ly^{30, 2}⁰^08.
³⁹^Quote^dⁱⁿ^He^{rb Ke}ⁱⁿ^{on a}^{nd Hila}^ry^L^e^ila^Krie^g^e^{r, “}^U^{S Cle}^a^r^l^y^Sta^t^e^s^{it Opp}^o^se^{s Milita}^ry^Ac^{tion A}^g^aⁱ^{nst Ira}^{n Now}^,
^B^a^r^a^{k S}^a^ys,^”^Jeru^s^a^l^{em P}^o^st^,^A^u^gu^st¹⁴^,²⁰⁰⁸^,^O^p^en^So^u^r^{ce C}^eⁿ^t^er^Do^cu^m^eⁿ^t^G^M^P²⁰⁰⁸⁰⁸¹²⁷³⁵⁰⁰⁶^.

barrier, which is about 60% complete, is taking the form of a future border between Israel and
Palestine and cuts Palestinians off from East Jerusalem and, in some places, from each other and
some of their land.
The Israeli government reluctantly and conditionally accepted the Road Map, the framework for a
peace process leading to a two-state solution developed by the United States, European Union, ⁴⁰
U.N., and Russia. Former Prime Minister Sharon contended that the Road Map requires that the
PA first fight terror, by which he meant disarm militants and dismantle their infrastructure, but it
also required Israel to cease settlement activity in the first phase. President Abbas initially
preferred to include terrorist groups such as Hamas in the Palestinian political system and refused
to disarm them prior to January 2006 parliamentary elections. Hamas’s victory in those elections
created policy dilemmas for Abbas, Israel, and the international community. Israel demanded that
Hamas abrogate its Covenant that calls for the destruction of Israel, recognize Israel, disarm and
disavow terrorism, and accept all prior agreements with Israel as preconditions for relations with
a Hamas-led PA.
Israel initially refused to negotiate with Hamas for the return of Cpl. Gilad Shalit, an Israeli
soldier kidnaped on June 25, 2006. After the kidnaping, Israel arrested members of the Hamas-led
PA government and legislature for participating in a terrorist group, and Israeli forces conducted
military operations against Hamas and other militant groups in the Gaza Strip as well as in the
West Bank.
On March 18, 2007, the Israeli cabinet voted to shun the new Palestinian unity government, a
coalition of Hamas, Fatah, and independents, until it met what had become international demands
to disavow violence, recognize Israel, and accept prior Israeli-Palestinian agreements. Prime
Minister Olmert said that he would continue to meet with President Abbas only to discuss
humanitarian and security issues. After Hamas took control of Gaza in June, Olmert said that he
would deal with the new PA government appointed by Abbas to replace Hamas but not cooperate
with Hamas in Gaza.
Olmert and Abbas began meeting regularly in summer 2007, and, as President Bush announced at
the Annapolis Conference on November 27, reached a “Joint Understanding” to simultaneously
begin continuous bilateral negotiations for a peace treaty and implement the Road Map. Those
negotiations continue, with teams led by Foreign Minister Livni and former Palestinian Prime
Minister Ahmed Quray.
Indirectly via Egyptian mediators, Israel and Hamas agreed to a cease-fire in June 2008 and are
continuing to negotiate a prisoner exchange to obtain Shalit’s release.

After fighting four wars in as many decades, Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty in 1979. In
1982, Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula, which it had taken in the 1967 war. Egypt and
Israel established diplomatic relations, although Egypt withdrew its ambassador during the four
years of the second intifadah (Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation), 2001-2005,
because it objected to Israel’s “excessive” use of force against the Palestinians. Some Israelis

⁴⁰^{For te}^x^t^{, se}^e^ht^tp:/^/www^.sta^te^.g^o^v^/r^/pa^/^pr^s^/^ps^/20^03/²⁰⁰⁶^2.^htm^.
⁴¹^{See also}^{, CRS Re}^p^o^r^{t RL}³³⁰⁰³^,^Egy^p^t:^Bac^k^g^r^o^un^{d a}ⁿ^d^U^.^S^.^Re^la^tions^,^by^J^e^r^e^m^y^{M. Sha}^r^p.

refer to their ties with Egypt as a “cold peace” because full normalization of relations, such as
enhanced trade, bilateral tourism, and educational exchanges, has not materialized. Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak has visited Israel only once—for the funeral of Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin. Outreach is often one way, from Israel to Egypt. Egyptians say that they are
reluctant to engage because of Israel’s continuing occupation of Arab lands. Israelis are upset by
some Egyptian media and religious figures’ anti-Israeli and occasionally anti-Semitic rhetoric.
The Egyptian government often plays a constructive role in the Arab-Israeli peace process,
hosting meetings and acting as a liaison. After the January 2006 Hamas election victory in the
Palestinian territories, Egyptian officials unsuccessfully urged the group to accept the 2002 Arab
Peace Initiative that offers Israel recognition within its 1967 borders in exchange for full
normalization of relations with Arab countries. Egypt supports President Mahmud Abbas
generally in order to ensure that there is a Palestinian partner for peace negotiations with Israel
and it is training the Palestinian Presidential Guard. After Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in June
2007, Egypt worked with Israel to close the Rafah crossing at the Gaza-Egypt border and moved
its representative to the PA to the West Bank. However, Egypt reportedly permitted about 85
Hamas members and other militants wanted by Israel to enter Gaza via Rafah in October 2007 in ⁴²
exchange for a wanted Al Qaeda militant. Egypt also has worked to revive the Fatah-Hamas
unity government. Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Sulayman mediated the June 2008 Israel-
Hamas cease fire and continues to mediate indirect talks between Israel and Hamas on a prisoner
exchange for Cpl. Gilad Shalit, whom Hamas captured in June 2006.
Egypt deployed 750 border guards to secure the Rafah crossing after Israel’s disengagement from
Gaza in 2005. Israel refused an Egyptian request to deploy military border guards, instead of
police, for greater control of smuggling along the entire border in Sinai. Israelis argued that an
increased military presence would require changes in the military annex to the 1979 peace treaty
and contend that 750 border guards plus 650 general police who also are present should suffice to
do the job, if there is the will. Israeli officials repeatedly expressed frustration with Egypt’s
failure to control arms-smuggling into Gaza. P.L. 110-161, the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2008, signed into law on December 26, 2007, would have withheld $100 million in Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) from Egypt until the Secretary of State reported that Cairo had taken
steps to detect and destroy the smuggling network and tunnels that lead from Egypt to Gaza,
among other measures. Egypt rejected the conditions and, on December 31, Foreign Minister
Ahmad Abu al Ghayt blamed the “Israel lobby” for trying to damage Egyptian interests in
Congress, and warned that Egypt would retaliate if Israel continued trying to undermine Cairo’s ⁴³
ties to Washington.
In November 2007, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers sent a team to examine the tunnels.
President Mubarak said that Egypt was following U.S. advice and obtaining advanced equipment
to detect tunnels; it was to spend $23 million of its U.S. FMF for this purpose. In March 2008,
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice confirmed that she had waived the congressional hold on
$100 million in FMF for Egypt. On June 16, the Administration disclosed that an army team had ⁴⁴
begun training Egyptian forces in using electronic equipment to detect smuggling tunnels. In

⁴²^“^H^a^m^a^s^‘H^a^nde^{d A}^l^Qa^e^d^a^Fug^itiv^e^{to Eg}^y^p^{t’ in Ex}^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^f^o^{r Borde}^r^Opeⁿⁱⁿ^g^,^”^Daily^S^t^ar⁽^B^eⁱ^r^u^t)^{, O}^c^tobe^r^2,
²⁰⁰^7.
⁴³^“^E^gy^{pt W}^a^rⁿ^s^I^s^r^a^e^l^{not to}^U^nde^r^m^ine^Tⁱ^e^s^{to U}^.^S.,”^R^e^ute^r^s^,^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^31,²⁰⁰⁷^.
⁴⁴^Unde^{r t}^h^e¹⁹⁷⁶^A^r^m^s^Ex^{port Co}^ntrol^A^c^{t, Ma}^{jor de}^f^e^nse^e^quipm^eⁿ^{t is}^de^fⁱ^ne^{d a}^s^aⁿ^y^ite^m^of^si^gⁿ^ifⁱ^c^aⁿ^{t m}^ilita^r^y
^e^quipm^eⁿ^{t o}ⁿ^t^h^e^U^.^S.^Mu^niti^ons^Lⁱ^s^t^ha^vⁱ^ng^a^nonre^c^u^rri^ng^re^s^e^a^r^c^h^a^nd^de^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t c}^o^s^t^of^m^o^re^thaⁿ^$5^{0 m}^illion
^{or a}^to^ta^{l pr}^od^uc^tio^{n c}^o^st^of^m^o^re^thaⁿ^$2^{00 m}^illio^n.

late June, U.S. military engineers installed tunnel-detection devices along the border between
Gaza and Egypt.
After Hamas blew up the border wall between the Gaza Strip and Egypt on January 23, 2008,
allowing tens of thousands of Gazans to stream into Egypt, Egyptian forces did not block their
entry. Israeli officials said that they expected Egypt to bring the situation under control. Egypt
resealed the border, but has been unable to achieve a new arrangement for border control mainly
because Hamas insists on participating and excluding Israel, and President Abbas refuses to deal
with Hamas. Israeli officials reportedly are pleased with Egypt’s decision to construct a new,
concrete border wall, complete with outlook posts and surveillance systems, to replace the one ⁴⁵
that was blown up. Egypt contributes to the blockade of Gaza by refusing to open the Rafah
crossing without Israeli approval.
In December 2004, Egypt and Israel signed a Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) Agreement under
which jointly produced goods enter the U.S. market duty free as part of the U.S.-Israeli Free
Trade Agreement (FTA). As a result of the QIZ, Israeli exports to Egypt have grown and as have
Egyptian exports to the United States. In October 2007, the agreement was amended and
expanded. On June 30, 2005, Israel signed a memorandum of understanding to buy 1.7 billion
cubic feet of Egyptian natural gas for an estimated U.S.$2.5 billion over 15 years, fulfilling a
commitment made in an addendum to the 1979 peace treaty. Gas began to flow in February 2008,
but the supply has been halted on occasion due to technical difficulties and shortages in Egypt.

Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty in October 1994 and exchanged ambassadors, although
Jordan did not have an ambassador in Israel during most of the intifadah. Relations have
developed with trade, cultural exchanges, and water-sharing agreements. Since 1997, Jordan and
Israel have collaborated in creating 13 qualified industrial zones (QIZs) to export jointly
produced goods to the United States duty-free under the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement (FTA).
Normalization of ties is not popular with the Jordanian people, over half of whom are of
Palestinian origin, although King Abdullah II has attempted to control media and organizations
opposed to normalization.
Believing that a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would contribute to regional
stability, the King supports the peace process, wants the Road Map to be implemented, and has
hosted meetings between Israeli and Palestinian leaders. In January 2007, Jordan joined Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and Palestinian President Abbas in advocating an agreement on the “end game”
before following the Road Map. The King has opposed possible unilateral Israeli steps in the
West Bank, fearing that they would strengthen Palestinian radicals who could destabilize the
region and undermine his regime. He is one of the strongest proponents of the Arab Peace
Initiative, offering Israel relations with Arab countries in exchange for its full withdrawal from
occupied territories and a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue, which the Arab League
reaffirmed in March 2007. U.S. training of a new Palestinian gendarmerie (police), considered
central to institutions for a new Palestinian state, is being conducted in Jordan.

⁴⁵^Yaako^v^Kat^z^,^“Isr^ael^I^m^p^r^essed^b^y^Cai^r^o^’^{s E}^f^f^o^rt^{s at}^{Gaza Bo}^rd^er,^”^Jeru^s^a^l^{em P}^o^st^{, Ma}^rc^h¹²^{, 20}⁰⁸^.
⁴⁶^{See also}^{CRS Rep}^o^{rt RL}³³⁵⁴⁶^,^J^o^rd^an^:^Ba^ckg^ro^un^{d an}^d^U^.^S^.^R^e^la^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^by^J^e^r^e^m^y^{M. Sha}^r^{p; a}ⁿ^d^C^R^S^R^e^por^t
^R^S²²⁰⁰^2,^Q^uali^f^yⁱ^ng^Iⁿ^dus^trⁱ^a^{l Z}^one^sⁱⁿ^J^o^r^d^an^an^{d E}^g^y^p^t^,^by^Ma^r^y^Ja^ne^B^o^lle^{, A}^l^f^r^e^d^B^.^P^r^a^d^os^{, a}^{nd J}^e^r^e^m^y^M.
^Sha^r^p.

After Hamas took over Gaza in June 2007, speculation revived concerning a possible union
between Jordan and the West Bank, which some Israelis have long suggested as the ideal solution.
On July 1, King Abdullah firmly rejected the idea, “I say clearly that the idea of confederation or
federation, or what is called administrative responsibility, is a conspiracy against the Palestinian
cause, and Jordan will not involve itself in it.... The Jordanians refuse any settlement of the ⁴⁷
Palestinian issue at their expense.” In 1988, the King’s father had disengaged Jordan from the
West Bank and accepted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole body responsible
for Palestinian areas.
Israel and Syria have fought several wars and, except for rare breaches, have maintained a
military truce along their border for many years. Yet, they failed to reach a peace agreement in
negotiations that ended in 2000. Since 1967, Israel has occupied Syria’s Golan Heights and, in
December 1981, effectively annexed it by applying Israeli law there. There are 42 Israeli
settlements and 20,000 settlers on the Golan. Syrian President Bashar al Asad called for
unconditional peace talks with Israel, while Israeli officials demanded that he first cease
supporting the Lebanese Hezbollah militia, expel Palestinian rejectionist groups (i.e., those who
reject an Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the existence of Israel), and cut ties with Iran.
After Syria was implicated in the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister
Rafiq Hariri, international pressure on the Asad regime mounted. Israeli officials said that Israel
was not interested in the fall of the regime, only in changing its policies. Some reportedly fear
that anarchy or extreme Islamist elements might follow Asad and prefer him to stay in power in a
weakened state. On December 1, 2005, former Prime Minister Sharon said that nothing should be
done to ease U.S. and French pressure on Syria, implying that Syrian-Israeli peace talks would do
that.
Syria hosts Hamas political bureau chief Khalid Mish’al and other Palestinian groups that reject
negotiations with Israel, and supplies the Lebanese Hezbollah organization with Syrian and
Iranian weapons. After the June 25, 2006, Palestinian attack on Israeli forces and kidnaping of an
Israeli soldier, Israeli officials specifically requested the United States to pressure President Asad
to expel Mish’al, whom they believed was responsible for the operation. Syria refused. When
Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers from northern Israel on July 12, sparking an Israeli-
Hezbollah war, some rightwing Israeli politicians demanded that it be expanded to include Syria.
However, the government and military did not want to open a third front against Syria in addition
to those against Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. U.S. officials demanded that Syria
exert its influence on Hezbollah to end the conflict; Syrian officials unsuccessfully sought a
broader resolution that would include a revival of a peace process to produce the return of the
Golan Heights.
In September 2006, Prime Minister Olmert, declared, “As long as I am prime minister, the Golan ⁴⁸
Heights will remain in our hands because it is an integral part of the State of Israel.” He also
indicated that he preferred not to differ with the Bush Administration’s policy of not dealing with

⁴⁷^July^{1 inte}^rv^ie^w^w^ith^{Al Gh}^ad^ne^w^s^pa^pe^r^,^c^ite^{d in H}^a^s^s^a^{n M.}^Fa^tta^{h, “}^G^r^o^wⁱ^ng^T^a^lk^of^Jordaⁿ^ia^{n Role}ⁱⁿ^P^a^le^stiniaⁿ
^Aff^a^irs,^”^N^e^{w Yor}^k^Tim^e^s^{, J}^u^ly^{10, 2}⁰⁰⁷^.
⁴⁸^“Ol^m^ert^T^e^l^l^s^Isra^elⁱ^P^a^p^e^r:^G^o^l^aⁿ^‘Aⁿ^In^t^e^gral^P^a^rt^o^f^t^h^{e S}^t^at^{e o}^f^Israel^’,^”^Ye^di’^o^{t Ah}^ar^on^ot^,^Se^pte^m^be^r^{26, 2}⁰⁰⁶^,
^c^iting^a^Mⁱ^s^hpa^ha^ne^w^s^pa^pe^r^inte^r^v^iew^,^O^p^eⁿ^So^ur^c^e^C^e^nte^r^D^o^c^u^m^e^{nt G}^M^P²⁰⁰⁶⁰⁹²⁶⁷⁴⁶⁰⁰^2.

Syria due to its support for terrorists, destabilizing of Lebanon, and failure to control the
infiltration of insurgents into Iraq. However, on April 24, 2008, President Asad revealed that
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had informed him “about Israel’s readiness for a
full withdrawal from the Golan Heights in return for a peace agreement with Israel.” In May
2008, it was disclosed that Israel and Syria had been exchanging messages via Turkish
intermediaries for more than a year and, on May 21, the two parties publicly announced
simultaneously that they had begun indirect talks in Istanbul. Olmert now acknowledges that the
price of peace would be Israeli withdrawal from the Golan.
On September 6, 2007, the Israeli Air Force carried out an air raid against a site in northeastern
Syria. The Israeli government did not comment about the strike or provide details and
considerable speculation about the likely target ensued. On September 12, the New York Times
alleged that the target may have been a nuclear weapons installation under construction with
North Korean-supplied materials, which Syrian and North Korean officials denied. Syria did not
retaliate for the air raid. H.Res. 674, introduced on September 24, would express “unequivocal
support” ... “for Israel’s right to self defense in the face of an imminent nuclear or military threat
from Syria.”

Israeli forces invaded Lebanon in 1982 to prevent Palestinian attacks on northern Israel. The
forces gradually withdrew to a self-declared nine-mile “security zone,” north of the Israeli border.
Peace talks in the 1990’s failed to produce a peace treaty, mainly because of Syria’s insistence
that it reach an accord with Israel first. Israel unilaterally withdrew from southern Lebanon on
May 25, 2000. Lebanon insists that the Israeli withdrawal is incomplete because of the continuing
presence of Israeli forces in the Shib’a Farms area where the borders of Lebanon, Syria, and
Israel meet. The U.N. determined, however, that Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon was complete
and treats the Shib’a Farms as part of Syria’s Golan Heights occupied by Israel. Syria verbally
recognizes that Shib’a is part of Lebanon, but will not demarcate the border officially as long the
Israeli occupation continues. Hezbollah took control of the former “security zone” after Israeli
forces left and attacked Israeli forces in Shib’a and northern Israeli communities. The Lebanese
government considers Hezbollah to be a legitimate resistance group and a political party
represented in parliament. Israel views it as a terrorist group.
Hezbollah’s kidnaping of two Israeli soldiers on July 12, 2006, provoked Israel to launch a war
against Hezbollah in Lebanon. On July 17, Prime Minister Olmert declared that military
operations would end with the return of the kidnaped soldiers, the end to Hezbollah rocket attacks
into northern Israel, and the deployment of the Lebanese army along the Israeli-Lebanese border
to replace Hezbollah units. Hezbollah demanded a prisoner swap, namely, that the Israeli soldiers
be exchanged for Lebanese and other Arab prisoners held in Israel. The war ended with a
cessation of hostilities on August 14. Israeli positions were assumed by the Lebanese army and an
enlarged U.N. Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The U.N. reports that Hezbollah is rearming
via smuggling across the Lebanese-Syrian border.
On May 31, 2008, Hezbollah handed over the remains of five Israeli soldiers killed in 2006 war
to Israel. At the same time, Israel released to Lebanon an Israeli of Lebanese descent who had

⁴⁹^{See also}^{CRS Rep}^o^{rt RL}³³⁵⁰⁹^,^Le^ban^on^{; an}^d^{CRS Rep}^o^{rt RL}³¹⁰⁷⁸^,^The^Shi^b^'^a^Far^m^s^Dⁱ^s^p^ute^aⁿ^d^I^t^s^I^m^p^lic^ati^ons^,
^by^A^l^f^r^e^d^B^.^Pr^a^dos^.

been convicted of spying for Hezbollah. On June 29, the Israeli cabinet approved a larger prisoner
exchange. The remains of the two Israeli soldiers captured in 2006, a report on Ron Arad, an
Israeli pilot missing in action since 1986, and the remains of Israeli soldiers killed in the 2006 war
were given to Israel. In exchange, Israel released Samir Kuntar, a Lebanese member of a
Palestinian terrorist group who killed an Israeli man and his young daughter in 1979, four
Hezbollah fighters, the bodies of eight Hezbollah members, and the bodies of other terrorists, and
supplied information on four missing Iranian diplomats to the U.N. Secretary General. Israel was
to release some Palestinian prisoners later.
In a March 12, 2007, speech, Prime Minister Olmert warned against the consequences of a
“premature” U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, arguing that a negative outcome there would harm Israel,
the Gulf States, and the stability of the Middle East as well as the ability of the United States to ⁵⁰
address threats emerging from Iran. Israel’s Ambassador to the United States has expressed hope
that withdrawal from Iraq would be done “in such a way that does not strengthen Iran and Al
Qaeda or boost organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas, so that we don’t face a new eastern ⁵¹
front from Iran to Kfar Saba.” The late Israeli commentator Ze’ev Schiff suggested that if Arabs
interpret America’s withdrawal as a sign of defeat, then Israel could look forward to a radical ⁵²
Arab shift that will strengthen extremists. Others have opined that Israel fears that a U.S.
withdrawal would be seen as a victory for Iran and could prompt Syria to consider military ⁵³
options to recover the Golan Heights. Some of these sentiments may have influenced H.Rept.
110-60, March 20, 2007, to accompany H.R. 1591, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for
FY2007, which stated, “The fight is Iraq is also critical to the future of Israel. A failure in Iraq
will further destabilize the region, posing a direct threat to Israel. We must not let that occur to
our friend and ally.”
Aside from Egypt and Jordan, Israel has diplomatic relations with the majority-Muslim countries
of Mauritania and Turkey and has had interest or trade offices in Morocco, Tunisia, Oman, and
Qatar. The latter four suspended relations with Israel during the Palestinian intifadah and the
offices have not reopened. Former Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom had predicted that relations
with Arab and Muslim countries would improve due to Israel’s disengagement from Gaza. The
first diplomatic breakthrough was his September 1, 2005, meeting in Istanbul with the Pakistani
foreign minister, although Pakistani officials asserted that they will not recognize Israel until an
independent Palestinian state is established. On September 14, Pakistan’s President Pervez
Musharraf shook Prime Minister Sharon’s hand in a “chance” meeting at the U.N. General
Assembly opening session. In October, Pakistan accepted Israeli humanitarian aid after a
devastating earthquake. In April 2007, Musharraf offered to mediate between Israel and the
Palestinians and said that he would be willing to visit Israel to help bring peace to the Middle

⁵⁰^Fo^{r tex}^t^o^f^sp^eech^{, see h}^ttp^:/^/www^.p^m^o^.g^o^v^.il/PM^O^En^g^/^Co^mm^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^/^P^M^Sp^eak^s/sp^eech^aip^ac1³⁰³⁰⁷^.h^tm^.
⁵¹^Inte^rv^ie^w^b^y^Ta^{l Sc}^hne^ide^r^,^Ma^’^a^ri^v^{, A}^p^r^{il 2}⁷^,²⁰^07,^O^p^eⁿ^So^ur^c^e^C^e^nte^r^D^o^c^u^m^e^{nt G}^M^P²⁰⁰⁷⁰⁴²⁷⁷⁵⁴⁰⁰^6.
⁵²^Ze^’^e^v^Sc^hif^f^{, “}^U^{S W}^ithdr^a^w^a^l^{in I}^r^a^{q to}^Str^e^ng^theⁿ^A^r^a^b^Ex^tr^em^ists^A^r^{ound I}^s^r^a^e^l^,”^Haa^r^etz^,^A^p^r^{il 20, 20}⁰⁷^.
⁵³^Hu^sseiⁿ^A^g^h^a^,^“T^h^e^L^a^st^T^hⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e M}ⁱ^dd^l^e^E^a^st^{’s M}^aⁱⁿ^P^l^ay^{ers W}^aⁿ^tⁱ^s^US^T^r^o^o^p^s^t^o^L^{eave Iraq}^,^”^The^G^u^ar^di^an^,
^A^p^r^{il 25,}²⁰⁰⁷^.

East. Prime Minister Olmert declined the offer, preferring to deal directly with Palestinian
President Abbas.
Shalom also met the Indonesian, Qatari, Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian foreign ministers at
the U.N. Also in September 2005, Bahrain ended its economic boycott of Israel, a move required
by the World Trade Organization and the Bahrain-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, but it has vowed
not to normalize relations.
Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali sent a personal letter to Sharon, praising his
“courageous” withdrawal from Gaza. Foreign Minister Shalom attended the World Summit on the
Information Society November 2005 and Knesset Members attended the European-Mediterranean
Parliamentary Assembly in March 2007; both events were held in Tunis.
In September 2006, Foreign Minister Livni was said to have met with 10 Arab and Muslim
foreign ministers at the U.N. On January 30, 2007, Vice Premier Shimon Peres met the Emir of
Qatar in Doha. Speaker Itzik was invited to the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting in Indonesia
in May 2007, but did not attend because of security concerns. In September 2007, Livni met the
Emir of Qatar at the U.N. and appeared with the Secretary-General of the Omani Foreign
Ministry at a public event. In April 2008, she paid a three-day visit to participate in the Doha
Forum on Democracy, Development, and Free Trade in Qatar, where she met the Emir and the
Prime Minister. She also held her first public meeting with her Omani counterpart, who refused to
reopen Israel’s trade office in Muscat until an agreement is reached on establishing a Palestinian
state.
Israel also has good relations with predominantly Muslim Azerbaijan, which supplies about one-
sixth of Israel’s oil needs and reportedly is purchasing Israeli arms as well as with Tajikistan, ⁵⁴
which seeks Israel’s technological expertise.

Israel has complex relations with the European Union (EU). Many Europeans believe that the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a root cause of terrorism and of Islamist extremism among their own
Muslim populations and want it addressed urgently. The EU has ambitions to exert greater
influence in the Middle East peace process. The EU is a member of the “Quartet,” with the
United States, U.N., and Russia, which developed the Road Map to a two-state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The EU is concerned about Israel’s ongoing settlement activity and
construction of the security barrier in the West Bank, which, according to the Europeans,
contravene the Road Map and prejudge negotiations on borders.
Israel has been cool to EU overtures because it views many Europeans as biased in favor of the
Palestinians and hears some Europeans increasingly question the legitimacy of the State of Israel.
Some Israelis contend that the basis of such views is an underlying European anti-Semitism.
Nonetheless, in November 2005, Israel agreed to allow the EU to maintain a 90-man Border

⁵⁴^{Yossi Me}^lm^aⁿ^{, “}^I^sra^e^l^a^{nd A}^z^e^r^ba^ija^{n Cl}^ose^Mul^ti-Mill^io^{n Dol}^l^a^r^A^r^m^s^D^e^a^l^,”^http://w^ww^.ha^a^r^e^t^z^.^c^o^m^,^Se^pte^m^be^r
^{26, 20}⁰⁸^.
⁵⁵^{See also}^{CRS Rep}^o^{rt RL}³¹⁹⁵⁶^,^Eur^ope^an^Vie^w^s^a^{nd P}^o^lic^ie^s^T^o^w^a^r^d^t^h^e^Mⁱ^ddle^Eas^t^,^by^Kristin^A^r^c^h^ic^k^,^a^{nd CRS}
^R^e^por^{t R}^L³³⁸⁰^8,^G^e^r^m^any^'^s^Re^l^a^tio^ns^wⁱ^t^h^I^s^r^a^e^l^:^B^a^c^k^g^r^o^un^{d a}^{nd I}^m^plic^ati^ons^for^G^e^r^m^an^Mⁱ^dd^le^Eas^t^P^o^lic^y^{, by}
^P^a^u^l^Be^lk^in.

Assistance Mission (EU-BAM) to monitor the reopened Rafah crossing between the Gaza Strip
and Egypt. The BAM was extended despite European complaints about Israeli restrictions and
frequent closures of the crossing. It suspended operations on June 13, 2007, when Hamas took
over Gaza. Negotiations to reopen the crossing, with EU monitors, are ongoing. After the war in
Lebanon, Israel urged and welcomed the strong participation of European countries in the
expanded United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
To Israel’s dismay, some EU representatives met local Hamas leaders elected in December 2004
in order to oversee EU-funded local projects. The EU also authorized its monitoring mission for
the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections to contact the full range of candidates,
including Hamas, in order to carry out its task. EU officials have said, however, that Hamas will
remain on the EU terror list until it commits to using nonviolent means to solve the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. As a member of the international Quartet, the EU officially agrees with
preconditions for relations with Hamas: disavowal of violence, recognition of Israel, and
acceptance of prior Israeli-Palestinian accords. The EU developed, at the Quartet’s request, a
temporary international mechanism to aid the Palestinian people directly while bypassing the then
Hamas-led PA government.
The EU does not include Hezbollah on its list of terrorist organizations as Israel demands. Israel
has protested meetings between European ambassadors and Hezbollah ministers in the Lebanese
cabinet. However, European countries have contributed military forces to the expanded UNIFIL,
which needs to communicate with Hezbollah, and contacts might be impeded by a terrorist
designation.
Israel participates in the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative, otherwise known as the
Barcelona Process, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), and the new Union for the
Mediterranean.

On May 14, 1948, the United States became the first country to extend de facto recognition to the
State of Israel. Over the years, the United States and Israel have developed a close friendship
based on common democratic values, religious affinities, and security interests. Relations have
evolved through legislation; memoranda of understanding; economic, scientific, military
agreements; and trade.
The United States has been the principal international proponent of the Arab-Israeli peace
process. President Jimmy Carter mediated the Israeli-Egyptian talks at Camp David which
resulted in the 1979 peace treaty. President George H.W. Bush together with Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev convened the peace conference in Madrid in 1990 that inaugurated a decade
of unprecedented negotiations between Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians.

President Clinton facilitated a series of agreements between Israel and the Palestinians as well as
the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty in 1994, hosted the Israeli-Palestinian summit at Camp David
that failed to reach a peace settlement in 2000, and sought unsuccessfully to mediate between
Israel and Syria.
In June 2002, President George W. Bush outlined his vision of a democratic Palestine to be ⁵⁶
created alongside Israel in a three-year process. U.S., European Union, Russian, and U.N.
representatives built on this vision to develop the Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution ⁵⁷
to the Israeli Palestinian Conflict.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has not named a Special Middle East Envoy, and said that
she would not get involved in direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations of issues and preferred to
have the Israelis and Palestinians work together. H.Res. 143, introduced on April 12, 2007, urges
the President to appoint a Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. S.Res. 224, introduced on June 7,
has a similar provision.
After the Administration supported Israel’s disengagement from Gaza mainly as a way to return
to the Road Map, Secretary Rice personally mediated an accord to secure the reopening of the
Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt in November 2005. Some Israelis criticized her
insistence that the January 2006 Palestinian elections proceed with Hamas participating, which
produced a Hamas-led government, despite the group’s refusal to disavow violence or recognize
Israel. The Administration later agreed with Israel’s preconditions for dealing with the Palestinian
government that emerged from the elections. In 2007, Rice tried to get the Israelis and
Palestinians to focus on what she described as a “political horizon” for the Palestinians. President
Bush convened an international meeting in Annapolis, MD on November 27 to support bilateral
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, and Secretary Rice has since traveled to the
region often to urge progress.
All recent U.S. Administrations have disapproved of Israel’s settlement activity as prejudging
final status issues and possibly preventing the emergence of a geographically contiguous
Palestinian state. On April 14, 2004, however President Bush noted the need to take into account
changed “realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers”
(i.e., settlement blocs), asserting “it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status ⁵⁸
negotiations will be full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.” He later
emphasized that it was a subject for negotiations between the parties.
Since taking East Jerusalem in the 1967 war, Israel has maintained that united Jerusalem is its
indivisible, eternal capital. Few countries agree with this position. The U.N.’s 1947 partition plan
called for the internationalization of Jerusalem, while the Declaration of Principles signed by
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in September 1993 says that it is a subject for

⁵⁶^Se^e^htt^p^://w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ne^w^s^/^r^e^l^e^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰^2/^06/²⁰⁰²⁰⁶²⁴^-3.htm^{l f}^o^{r te}^x^t^of^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^t’s^s^p^e^e^c^h^.
⁵⁷^Se^e^htt^p^://w^ww^.st^a^te^.g^ov^/^r^/pa^/^prs/ps/2⁰⁰³^/²⁰⁰^62.^htm^f^{or te}^x^t^of^R^o^a^d^Ma^p^.
⁵⁸^For^te^x^t^of^B^u^s^h^le^tte^r^t^o^S^h^a^r^on^,^s^e^e^http:/^/w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^.

permanent status negotiations. U.S. Administrations have recognized that Jerusalem’s status is
unresolved by keeping the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv. In P.L. 109-102, November 14, 2005,
Congress mandated that the embassy be moved to Jerusalem, but a series of presidential waivers
of penalties for non-compliance have delayed the move. U.S. legislation has granted Jerusalem
status as a capital in particular instances and sought to prevent U.S. official recognition of
Palestinian claims to the city. Those provisions are repeated in P.L. 110-161, the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008, signed into law on December 26, 2007.
The United States has never recognized Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights, which it views
as a violation of international law. However, the Bush Administration did not attempt to revive
Israeli-Syrian peace talks. Olmert and the Administration generally agreed on isolating Damascus
until it ended its relations with terrorists and Iran. Yet, some in the Israeli coalition, Knesset, and
press wanted their government to engage Damascus in order to distance it from an alliance with
Teheran that enhances the Iranian threat to the Jewish State and believe that peace with Syria
would be easier to achieve than one with the Palestinians. Israel and Syria began indirect
negotiations via Turkish mediators in May 2008. The United States is not a party to this process.
The State Department spokesman said, “We don’t think that any other track or any other
negotiating path ought to be a substitute or a distraction from the primary set of discussions and ⁵⁹
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.” However, Secretary Rice said, “We would
welcome any steps that might lead to a comprehensive peace in the Middle East .... We are
working very hard on the Palestinian track. It doesn’t mean that the U.S. would not support other
tracks.” White House spokeswoman Dana Perino added, “What we hope is that this is a forum to
address various concerns that we all share about Syria – the United States, Israel, and many others
– in regard to Syria’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah (and) the training and funding of terrorists ⁶⁰
that belong to these organizations .... We believe it could help us to further isolate Iran....”
Some Israeli officials have questioned possible unintended consequences of the U.S.
democratization policy in the Middle East, believing that it has aided extremist organizations to
gain power and to be legitimized. Alarmed, they cite the examples of Hezbollah in Lebanon, ⁶¹
Hamas in the Palestinian Authority, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
Israel and the United States concluded a Free Trade Agreement in 1985, and all customs duties
between the two trading partners have since been eliminated. The FTA includes provisions that
protect both countries’ more sensitive agricultural sub-sectors with non-tariff barriers, including
import bans, quotas, and fees. Israeli exports to the United States have grown since the FTA

⁵⁹^A^s^h^r^a^f^Kh^{alil, “Israel’s P}^{eace Eff}^o^{rts W}ⁱ^d^eⁿ^,^”^L^o^{s A}ⁿ^g^e^{les T}ⁱ^mes^,^J^une^21,²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶⁰^Cam^Sⁱ^m^p^soⁿ^,^{“ Israel}^,^S^y^ri^{a i}ⁿ^In^dⁱ^rect^P^{eace T}^a^l^k^s,^”^W^a^{ll Str}^e^e^t^J^ourⁿ^a^l^{, Ma}^y^22,²⁰⁰⁸^{, “}^U^{S W}^e^lc^om^es^S^y^rⁱ^aⁿ^-
^I^s^r^a^e^{li T}^a^l^k^s^{but Str}^e^s^s^e^s^P^a^le^s^tin^ia^{n T}^r^a^c^k^,”^Ya^hoo!^N^e^w^s^{, May}^{21, 2}⁰⁰⁸^{, “}^R^ic^e^:^I^s^r^a^e^li-^P^a^le^s^tiniaⁿ^T^r^a^c^k^Mos^t
^Lⁱ^kel^y^t^o^P^r^od^u^{ce Resu}^l^t^s^,^”^A^sso^ci^at^ed^P^r^ess,^M^a^y²²^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶¹^{For e}^x^a^m^ple^,^he^a^d^of^Milita^ry^Inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^Ma^{j. G}^e^{n. Am}^{os Y}^a^dlin^{, qu}^ote^dⁱⁿ^A^hⁱ^y^a^Ra^ve^{d, “}^I^nte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^Chie^f^:
^S^t^rat^e^gi^{c T}^h^reat^{s o}ⁿ^Israelⁱ^Ri^si^ng,^”^Yne^t^ne^ws^{, J}^u^ne²⁰^,²⁰^06,^O^p^eⁿ^S^our^c^e^C^e^nte^r^D^o^c^u^m^e^{nt G}^M^P²⁰⁰⁶⁰⁶²¹⁷⁴⁶⁰⁰^4.

became effective. As noted above, qualified industrial zones in Jordan and Egypt are considered
part of the U.S.-Israeli free trade area. In 2007, Israel imported $7.8 billion in goods from the ⁶²
United States and exported $18.9 billion in goods to the United States.
U.S. companies have made large investments in Israel. In July 2005, the U.S. microchip
manufacturer Intel announced that it would invest $4.6 billion in its Israeli branch; Israel
provided a grant of 15% of an investment of up to $3.5 billion or $525 million to secure the deal.
In May 2006, prominent U.S. investor Warren Buffet announced that he was buying 80% of Iscar,
a major Israeli metalworks, for $4 billion.
In the context of Israel’s relinquishing control of Egyptian oil fields and conclusion of a peace
treaty with Egypt, Israel and the United States signed a memorandum of agreement in 1979 for
the United States to provide oil to Israel in emergency circumstances. Those circumstances have
not arisen to date, and the agreement been extended until 2014.
P.L. 110-140, December 19, 2007, the Renewable Fuels, Consumer Protection, and Energy
Efficiency Act of 2007, calls for U.S.-Israeli energy cooperation and authorizes the Secretary of
Energy to make grants to businesses, academic institutions, nonprofit entities in Israel and to the
government of Israel to support research, development, and commercialization of renewable
energy or energy efficiency.

Israel was the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid after 1976 and until Iraq supplanted it after
2003. In 1998, Israeli, congressional, and Administration officials agreed to reduce U.S. $1.2
billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to zero over ten years, while increasing Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) from $1.8 billion to $2.4 billion. The process began in FY1999, with
P.L. 105-277, October 21, 1998, and concludes with FY2008. Separately from the scheduled ESF
cuts, Israeli received an extra $1.2 billion to fund implementation of the Wye agreement (part of
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process) in FY2000, $200 million in anti-terror assistance in
FY2002, and $1 billion in FMF in the supplemental appropriations bill for FY2003.
For FY2008, the Administration requested 2.4 billion in FMF and $500,000 in International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for Israel. P.L. 110-161, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, signed into law on December 26, 2007, provides $2.4
billion in FMF, of which $631.2 million may be spent in Israel, and $40 million for refugee
assistance. The amounts may be subject to a 0.81% across the board recision.
After meeting Prime Minister Olmert at the White House on June 19, 2007, President Bush said
that a new 10-year aid agreement would be signed to ensure that Israel retains a “qualitative
military edge.” The President also directed Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to expedite

⁶²^I^s^r^a^e^{li C}^e^ntr^a^{l B}^u^r^e^a^u^of^Sta^tis^tic^s^,^“^S^um^m^a^r^y^o^f^I^s^r^a^e^l^’^s^For^e^ig^{n T}^r^a^d^e^b^y^C^ountr^y²⁰⁰^7,”^pos^te^d^on^Minis^t^r^y^of
^Fina^nc^e^w^e^bs^ite^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^{20, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶³^For^m^o^r^e^de^ta^ils^{, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^p^o^r^t^R^L³³²^22,^U^.^S.^For^e^ig^{n A}ⁱ^{d t}^o^I^s^r^a^e^l^{, by}^J^e^re^m^y^{M. Sha}^r^p.

approval of IDF procurement requests in order to replenish arms and materiel used during the

2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

On August 13, U.S. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns and Israeli Foreign Ministry
Director General Aharon Abramowitz signed a memorandum of understanding to govern a new
10-year, $30 billion aid package. Aid will increase from $2.4 billion in FMF in FY2008 to $2.55
billion in FY2009, and average $3 billion a year by the conclusion of the 10-year period. Israel is
allowed to spend 26.3% of the aid in Israel; the remainder is to be spent on U.S. arms. Burns
stated that “a secure and strong Israel is in the interests of the United States” and that the aid was
an “investment in peace” because “peace will not be made without strength.” Congress must
approve the annual appropriations.
H.R. 2642, the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, was signed into law on June 30, 2008 as
P.L. 110-252. It provides not less than $170 million in FMF for Israel to be disbursed not later
than November 1. For FY2009, the Administration has requested $2.55 billion in FMF and $30
million in Migration Assistance for Israel.
Congress has legislated other special provisions regarding aid to Israel. Since the 1980s, ESF and
FMF have been provided as all grant cash transfers, not designated for particular projects, and
have been transferred as a lump sum in the first month of the fiscal year, instead of in periodic
increments. Israel is allowed to spend about one-quarter of the military aid for the procurement in
Israel of defense articles and services, including research and development, rather than in the
United States. Finally, to help Israel out of its economic slump, P.L. 108-11, April 16, 2003,
provided $9 billion in loan guarantees (for commercial loans) over three years. As of September ⁶⁴
2006, $4.5 billion of the guarantees were unexpended. P.L. 109-472, January 11, 2007, extended
the period for which the guarantees are to be provided for a second time until September 30,

2011.

Although Israel is frequently referred to as an ally of the United States, the two countries do not
have a mutual defense agreement. Even without a treaty obligation, President Bush has said ⁶⁵
several times that the United States would defend Israel militarily in the event of an attack. On ^th
May 14-14, 2008, he visited Israel to celebrate its 60 anniversary. In a speech to the Knesset, the
President stated, “The alliance between our governments is unbreakable, yet the source of our
friendship runs deeper than any treaty.” He told Israel that it “can always count on America to
stand at its side.”
On November 30, 1981, U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Israeli Minister of
Defense Ariel Sharon signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU), establishing a framework
for consultation and cooperation to enhance the national security of both countries. In November
1983, the two sides formed a Joint Political Military Group (JPMG) to implement provisions of
the MOU. Joint air and sea military exercises began in June 1984, and the United States has
constructed facilities to stockpile military equipment in Israel. In 2001, an annual interagency

⁶⁴^{See also}^{CRS Rep}^o^{rt RL}³³²²²^,^U.^S^.^F^o^reig^{n Ai}^d^{to Isra}^el^,^by^J^e^r^e^m^y^{M. Sha}^r^p.
⁶⁵^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith Re}^ute^r^{s, c}^ite^{d i}ⁿ^G^l^e^{nn Ke}^ssle^r^{, “}^B^{ush Sa}^y^s^{U.S. W}^{ould De}^f^e^{nd Isra}^e^l^Milita^rily^,”^Wa^shⁱⁿ^gt^on^Po^st^,
^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{2, 20}⁰⁶^{. Se}^e^a^l^s^o^htt^p^://^w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ne^w^s^/^r^e^l^e^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰⁶^/^05/²⁰⁰⁶⁰⁵²^3-⁹^.^htm^l^f^o^r^tr^aⁿ^s^c^rⁱ^{pt of}^jo^int
^B^u^s^h^-^O^lm^e^r^{t ne}^w^s^c^onf^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^{in Ma}^y^2006.

strategic dialogue, including representatives of diplomatic, defense, and intelligence
establishments, was created to discuss long-term issues.
In 2003, reportedly at the U.S. initiative due to bilateral tensions related to Israeli arms sales to
China, the strategic dialogue was suspended. (See Military Sales, below.) After the issue was
resolved, the talks resumed at the State Department on November 28, 2005. In January 2007,
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Transportation, and representative for the strategic
dialogue Shaul Mofaz (a former Chief of Staff and former Defense Minister) reported that the
dialogue would henceforth be held four times a year. In meetings in 2008, the delegations have
discussed Iran’s nuclear program, diplomatic and financial steps to prevent Iran from developing
nuclear capability, and concerns over Hezbollah.
Secretary of Defense Gates’ visit to Israel in April 2007 was the first by a U.S. Secretary of
Defense in eight years and was seen as a sign that strains in the relationship had truly eased. His
meetings included discussions of bilateral military-to-military relations, the peace process, Syria,
Iran, and Iraq. Gates tried to assure his Israeli interlocutors that a planned U.S. arms sale to Saudi
Arabia, reportedly to include satellite-guided munitions, was needed to counter the Iranian threat ⁶⁶
and would not threaten Israel’s military superiority.
On May 6, 1986, Israel and the United States signed an agreement (the contents of which are
secret) for Israeli participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI/”Star Wars”). Under SDI,
Israel is developing the Arrow anti-ballistic missile with a total U.S. financial contribution so far
of more than $1 billion, increasing annually. The system became operational in 2000 in Israel and
has been tested successfully. The U.S. DOD Missile Defense Agency has agreed to extend the
U.S.-Israel Arrow System Improvement Program (ASIP) and post-ASIP through 2013.
P.L. 110-116, November 13, 2007, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2008, includes
Sec. 8080 which appropriates $155,572,000 for the Arrow program, of which $37,383,000 is for
producing missile components in the United States and missile components and missiles in Israel;
$20 million is for preliminary design for an upper-tier component to Israeli Missile Defense
Architecture, and $37 million for David’s Sling. Israel reportedly decided that the Thermal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) does not meet its range and altitude requirements and seeks to
develop a new interceptor. THAAD is not mentioned in the appropriations bill. The
Administration has requested $44.9 million for David’s Sling for FY2009. Israel reportedly is
seeking $150 million to develop an advanced Arrow 3 to counter a ballistic missile threat from
Iran and Syria, and President Bush is said to have promised to work with Congress to obtain the ⁶⁷
funds.
There are unconfirmed reports that Israel is seeking to buy the F-22 Raptor stealth fighter, foreign ⁶⁸
sales of which are currently banned. On June 5, 2008, House Foreign Affairs Committee
Chairman Howard Berman told the Jerusalem Post that he would look at dropping the ban on F-

22 sales.

⁶⁶^D^a^vⁱ^{d S. C}^l^ou^{d a}ⁿ^{d J}^e^nnif^e^r^Me^dina^{, “}^G^a^t^e^s^A^s^s^u^r^e^s^I^s^r^a^e^l^{on Pla}ⁿ^to^Se^{ll A}^r^m^s^{to Sa}^udis^,^”^{New Y}^o^{rk Times}^{, A}^p^ril
^20,²⁰⁰⁷^{. F}^o^r^m^o^r^e^on^the^a^r^m^s^sa^le^{, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³⁴³²^2,^Th^e^G^u^{lf Se}^c^u^r^ity^Dⁱ^al^og^ue^an^{d Re}^l^a^te^{d Ar}^m^s^S^a^le
^Pr^opos^als^,^b^y^Ch^ri^st^o^p^h^e^{r M}^.^B^l^an^ch^ard^and^Ri^ch^ar^d^F^.^G^rⁱ^m^m^e^t^t^.
⁶⁷^Yaako^v^Kat^z^,^“O^ffⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^:^Bu^sh^P^l^ed^ged^F^u^ndⁱⁿ^{g f}^o^{r A}^rro^w³^,^”^Jeru^s^a^l^{em P}^o^st^{, Ma}^y^20,²⁰^08.
⁶⁸^Ya^a^k^ov^Ka^tz^{, “}^I^sr^a^e^l^Fe^a^r^{s US will Se}^ll^F-3⁵^t^o^Sa^u^d^is,”^J^e^r^us^ale^m^Pos^t^{, A}^p^ril^14,²⁰⁰⁸^.

Security cooperation extends to cooperation in countering terrorism. P.L. 110-53, August 3, 2007
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, recognizes Israel as a
potential research partner for the Department of Homeland Security.
In 1988, under the terms of Sec. 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, Israel
was designated a “major non-NATO ally,” affording it preferential treatment in bidding for U.S.
defense contracts and access to expanded weapons systems at lower prices. Israel participates in
NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and its Istanbul Cooperative Initiative. On October 16, 2006,
Israel signed an Individual Cooperation Program (ICP) with NATO, providing for cooperation in
counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, and disaster preparedness. On February 7, 2007, Amir
Peretz became the first Israeli defense minister to visit NATO headquarters in Brussels. In June,
as part of the ICP, Israel agreed to joint military training and exercises with NATO to enhance
interoperability, potentially leading to Israeli participation in NATO-led missions. On May 15,

2008, the House passed H.R. 5916, the Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Reform Act,

2008, by a voice vote. Among other provisions, the bill would treat Israel like NATO members
for the purposes of expediting exports of essential military equipment, requires that Israel’s
qualitative military edge be empirically assessed on an ongoing basis, and recognizes that Israel’s
national security is a priority for the United States. It was referred to the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations.
In 2006, Israel earned $4.4 billion from defense sales. India was Israel’s biggest customer, with
purchases totaling $1.5 billion.
The United States and Israel have regularly discussed Israel’s sale of sensitive security equipment
and technology to various countries, especially China. Israel reportedly is China’s second major ⁶⁹
arms supplier, after Russia. U.S. administrations believe that such sales are potentially harmful
to the security of U.S. forces in Asia. In 2000, the United States persuaded Israel to cancel the
sale of the Phalcon, an advanced, airborne early-warning system, to China. In 2003, Israel’s
agreement to upgrade Harpy Killer unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that it sold to China in 1999
angered the Pentagon. China tested the weapon over the Taiwan Strait in 2004. In reaction, the
Department of Defense suspended the joint strategic dialogue, technological cooperation with the
Israel Air Force on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft as well as several other programs,
held up shipments of some military equipment, and refused to communicate with the Israeli
Defense Ministry Director General, whom Pentagon officials believed had misled them about the
Harpy deal.
On August 17, 2005, the U.S. DOD and the Israeli Ministry of Defense issued a joint press
statement reporting that they had signed an understanding “designed to remedy problems of the
past that seriously affected the technology security relationship and to restore confidence in the
technology security area. In the coming months additional steps will be taken to restore

⁶⁹^Roⁿ^Kam^p^eas,^“Israel^-U.^S^.^Di^sp^u^t^{e on}^A^r^m^s^S^a^l^e^{s t}^o^Chⁱⁿ^{a T}^h^reat^en^{s t}^o^Sⁿ^o^w^b^a^l^l^,^”^J^e^w^is^{h Te}^le^gr^aph^ic^Ageⁿ^c^y^,
^J^une⁸^,²⁰⁰⁵^{, c}^iti^ng^a^U^.^S.-^C^hina^Ec^onom^ic^a^{nd Se}^c^u^rⁱ^ty^R^e^vⁱ^ew²⁰⁰⁴^r^e^por^t.

confidence fully.”⁷⁰ According to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Israel will continue to
voluntarily adhere to the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, without actually being a party to it. On November 4, in
Washington, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz announced that Israel would again participate
in the F-35 JSF project and that the crisis in relations was over.
In March 2006, a new Defense Ministry Director General, Jacob Toren, said that an interagency
process had begun approving marketing licenses for Israeli firms to sell selected dual-use items
and services to China, primarily for the 2008 Olympic Games, on a case-by-case basis. On July
17, 2007, the Knesset passed a Law on Control of Defense Exports to establish a new authority in
the Defense Ministry to oversee defense exports and involve the Foreign Ministry for the first
time in the process, among other provisions. As a result, the United States agreed to establish a
High Technology Forum to institutionalize a senior-level dialogue to address bilateral high
technology trade, investment, and related issues. The Israelis reportedly intend to use the Forum
to convince their U.S. interlocutors to ease restrictions on the export of dual-use products to ⁷¹
Israel.
On October 21, 2005, it was reported that Israel would freeze or cancel a deal to upgrade 22
Venezuelan Air Force F-16 fighter jets, with some U.S. parts and technology. The Israeli
government had requested U.S. permission to proceed, but it was not granted.
In November 1985, Jonathan Pollard, a civilian U.S. naval intelligence employee, and his wife
were charged with selling classified documents to Israel. Four Israeli officials also were indicted.
The Israeli government claimed that it was a rogue operation. Pollard was sentenced to life in
prison and his wife to two consecutive five-year terms. She was released in 1990, moved to
Israel, and divorced Pollard. Israelis complain that Pollard received an excessively harsh
sentence. Israel granted him citizenship in 1996 and acknowledged that Pollard had been its agent
in 1998. Israeli officials repeatedly raise the Pollard case with U.S. counterparts, but no formal ⁷²
request for clemency is pending. On June 8, 2006, the Israeli High Court of Justice refused to
intervene in efforts to obtain Pollard release. On January 10, 2008, in Israel, Shas leader Eli
Yishai gave President Bush letters from Pollard’s current wife and from Shas spiritual leader
Rabbi Ovadia Yosef pleading for Pollard’s release, but White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe ⁷³
said that there were no plans to change Pollard’s status.
On June 13, 2005, U.S. Department of Defense analyst Lawrence Franklin was indicted for the
unauthorized disclosure of classified information (about Iran) to a foreign diplomat. Press reports
named Na’or Gil’on, a political counselor at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, as the diplomat.
Gil’on was not accused of wrongdoing and returned to Israel. Then Foreign Minister Silvan
Shalom strongly denied that Israel was involved in any activity that could harm the United States,
and Israel’s Ambassador to the United States declared that “Israel does not spy on the United

⁷⁰^“^U^{.S. I}^s^r^a^e^l^A^g^r^e^e^{to C}^ons^ult^on^Futur^e^I^s^r^a^e^{li W}^e^a^pons^Sa^le^s^-^N^a^tions^A^f^fⁱ^r^m^J^o^{int C}^o^m^mⁱ^t^m^eⁿ^{t to A}^ddr^e^s^s^G^l^oba^l
^S^ecu^ri^t^y^Ch^al^l^eⁿ^g^es,^”^U.^S^.^S^t^at^{e Dep}^a^rt^men^t^P^r^{ess Rel}^ease,^A^u^gu^st¹⁷^,²⁰⁰⁵^.
⁷¹^Y^a^a^k^ov^K^a^tz^{, “}^I^s^r^a^e^l^{, U}^S^{to H}^o^l^d^Fir^s^{t D}^e^f^e^ns^e^T^e^c^hnolog^y^For^u^m^,^”^Je^r^u^s^a^lem^P^o^s^t^,^Se^pte^m^be^r^7,²⁰^08.
⁷²^Se^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^S²⁰⁰⁰^1,^J^o^nat^han^Po^llar^d^:^Bac^k^g^r^o^u^nd^an^{d C}^o^ns^ide^r^ati^ons^for^Pr^e^s^ideⁿ^tial^C^l^e^m^eⁿ^c^y^{, by}
^Rich^ard^A^.^{Best Jr. an}^d^Cly^d^{e R.}^Mark^.
⁷³^J^ona^thaⁿ^Fi^ne^r^,^“^B^us^{h T}^r^{ip R}^e^vⁱ^v^e^s^I^s^r^a^e^{li P}^u^s^h^f^o^r^P^a^r^d^oⁿ^of^S^p^y^,^”^W^a^s^h^ingt^on^Pos^t^,^J^a^nua^r^y^15,²⁰⁰^8.

States.” Franklin had been charged earlier on related counts of conspiracy to communicate and
disclose national defense information to “persons” not entitled to receive it. The information was
about Al Qaeda, U.S. policy toward Iran, and the bombing of the Khobar Towers, a U.S. housing
site in Saudi Arabia, in 1996. On August 4, 2005, two former officials of the American Israel
Political Action Committee (AIPAC), Steven J. Rosen and Keith Weissman, whom AIPAC fired
in April 2005, were identified as the “persons” and indicted for their parts in the conspiracy. Both
denied wrongdoing. On January 20, 2006, Franklin was sentenced to 12 years, 7 months in
prison.
Rosen and Weissman are the first nongovernment employees ever indicted under the 1917
Espionage Act for receiving classified information orally; they argue that they were exercising
protected free speech and that the law was designed to punish government officials. In August
2007, a judge ruled that “the rights protected by the First Amendment must at times yield to the
need for national security.” However, he required the government to establish that national
security is genuinely at risk and that those who wrongly disclosed the information knew that
disclosure could harm the nation. On November 2, the judge ruled that Secretary of State Rice
and other present and former Administration officials must testify about their conversations with
Rosen and Weissman to help the defense establish that “the meetings charged in the indictment
were examples of the government’s use of AIPAC as a diplomatic back channel.”
The trial has been delayed. On June 20, 2008, a federal appeals court let stand the district court
ruling that the prosecution had to prove that the defendants knew that the information they were
relaying was classified national defense information, that it was unlawful to disclose the
information, and that they had a bad-faith reason to believe that the disclosures could be used to
injure the United States or to aid a foreign nation. In other words, the district court ruled that the
prosecution would have to prove that Rosen and Weissman intended to harm the United States or
aid another country by disclosing the information. On October 29, 2008, the appeals court was
scheduled to hear arguments regarding a district court ruling allowing the defense to use
classified material, which the government maintains would affect national security. The case
could come in February 2009, but it might be postponed further.
On April 22, 2008, U.S. authorities arrested Ben-Ami Kadish, an 84-year-old U.S. citizen who
had worked at the U.S. Army’s Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center in
Dover, N.J. on suspicion of giving classified documents concerning nuclear weapons, F-15
fighter jets, and the Patriot missile air-defense system to Israel between 1979 and 1985. He was
charged with acting as a foreign agent and lying to the FBI. Kadish pleaded not guilty and was
released on a personal recognizance bond. He is said to have worked at the center from 1963-
1990 and to have reported to the same Israeli who had handled Jonathan Pollard. On April 23, an
Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman declared, “Since 1985, a great deal of care has gone into
following the guidelines of every prime minister in Israel, which prohibit this kind of activity in ⁷⁴
the United States.”
After the war against Hezbollah in Lebanon ended in August 2006, the State Department Office
of Defense Trade Controls began to investigate whether Israel’s use of U.S.-made cluster bombs

⁷⁴^“Yo^ssi^M^e^l^m^an^,^S^h^ah^{ar Il}^an^,^an^{d Barak Ravi}^d^,^{” E}^z^ra:^Ne^w^S^p^y^Ca^{se W}^oⁿ^’^t^Harm^U.^S^.^-Israelⁱ^Tⁱ^es,^”^H^aar^e^t^z^{, A}^p^ril
^{23, 20}⁰⁸^.

in the war had violated the Arms Export Control Act, which restricts use of the weapons to
military targets, or confidential bilateral agreements with the United States, which restrict use of
U.S. cluster munitions to certain military targets in non-civilian areas. On January 28, 2007, the
State Department informed Congress of preliminary findings that Israel may have violated
agreements by using cluster bombs against civilian populated areas. A final determination has not
been made. Israel has denied violating agreements, saying that it had acted in self-defense. The
U.N. has reported deaths and injuries in southern Lebanon from the weapons since the war ⁷⁵
ended.
P.L. 110-161, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2008, signed into law on December 26,
2007, bans the use of military assistance and the issuance of defense export licenses for cluster
munitions or cluster munitions technology unless the submunitions of the cluster munitions have
a 99% or higher tested rate and the applicable agreement specifies that the munitions will only be
used against clearly defined military targets and not where civilians are known to be present. The
Administration objects to these restrictions. The Israeli Winograd Committee, which investigated
the Israeli government’s prosecution of its 2006 war against Hezbollah, recommended a
reexamination of the rules and principles that apply to the Israeli Defense Forces’ use of cluster
bombs because the current manner of use does not conform to international law. On May 30, 111
countries adopted a draft treaty banning hte use of cluster bombs. Neither the United States nor
Israel participated in the negotiations or signed the treaty. An Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman
stated, “We don’t think such an absolute ban is justified, and a balance between military needs ⁷⁶
and taking into account humanitarian considerations needs to be found.”
The “Special 301” provisions of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, require the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) to identify countries which deny adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights (IPR). In April 2005, the USTR elevated Israel from its “Watch List”
to the “Priority Watch List” because it had an “inadequate data protection regime” and intended to
pass legislation to reduce patent term extensions. The USTR singled out for concern U.S.
biotechnology firms’ problems in Israel and persistent piracy affecting of U.S. copyrights. In
2006, the USTR retained Israel on the Priority Watch List due to continuing concern about
copyright matters and about legislation Israel had passed in December 2005 that weakened ⁷⁷
protections for U.S. pharmaceutical companies. According to Deputy Secretary of Commerce
David Sampson, the U.S. government claimed that parties in Israel were making unfair use of
information submitted when patented pharmaceuticals are registered in Israel and demanded that
the information not be transferred to powerful Israeli generic drug companies, such as Teva. It ⁷⁸
also was concerned about software, music, and DVD piracy in Israel. In April 2007, the USTR
again kept Israel on the Priority Watch List because “Israel appears to have left unchanged the
intellectual property regime that results in inadequate protection against unfair commercial use of
date generated to obtain marketing approval.” On May 2, the Israeli Ministry of Industry, Trade

⁷⁵^Davi^d^S^.^Cl^o^u^d^and^G^r^{eg M}^y^re,^“Israel^M^a^y^Ha^{ve V}ⁱ^o^l^at^ed^A^r^{ms P}^act^,^U.^S^.^Of^fⁱ^ci^al^{s S}^a^y^,^”^N^e^{w Yor}^k^Tim^e^s^,
^J^a^nua^r^y^{28, 20}⁰⁷^.
⁷⁶^Herb^Keiⁿ^on^,^“Israel^Rej^ect^{s Cl}^ust^e^{r Bo}^m^b^Ban^,^”^Jeru^s^a^l^{em P}^o^st^,^Juⁿ^e^1,²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁷⁷^Fo^{r U.}^{S. g}^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^ex^p^l^an^atioⁿ^o^f^Isr^a^e^l^{’s listing}^on^the^P^r^iority^W^a^tc^{h L}ⁱ^{st, se}^e^{Full Ve}^r^sⁱ^{on o}^f^t^h^e²⁰⁰⁶^Spe^cⁱ^al
³⁰¹^Re^p^o^r^t^,^A^p^ri^l²⁸^,²⁰⁰⁶^,^accessi^b^l^{e at}^h^t^t^p^:^/^/^www^.^u^st^r.^go^v
⁷⁸^{Ora Co}^ren^,^“U.^S^.^W^o^rri^ed^abo^u^t^Israel^{’s In}^t^e^l^l^ect^u^a^l^P^r^op^ert^y^L^a^ws,^”^Haaret^z,^F^e^b^r^u^a^ry¹^,²⁰⁰⁷^.

and Commerce responded that Israel had “complied completely in all areas that had been deemed
lacking in the past.”
In April 2008, Israel was placed on the Priority Watch list for reasons related to pharmaceuticals
similar to those in 2007. However, the USTR stated that it was encouraged by recent progress in
Israel on certain IPR issues and would conduct an out-of-cycle review to ensure further
strengthening of Israel’s intellectual property regime. Israel maintains that its regime fully
conforms with its obligations. Some Members of Congress have written letters to the USTR
urging it to remove Israel from the Priority Watch List because, they say, Israel has been more
vigilant about copyright protection than other countries with less serious listings and has passed
laws modeled after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) providing greater patent
protections to address the USTR’s concerns, although not providing the five years of protection
sought by U.S. companies.
Groups actively interested in Israel and the peace process are noted below with links to their
websites for information on their policy positions.
American Israel Public Affairs Committee: http://www.aipac.org/
American Jewish Committee: http://www.ajc.org/site/c.ijITI2PHKoG/b.685761/k.CB97/
Home.htm
American Jewish Congress: http://www.ajcongress.org/
Americans for Peace Now: http://www.peacenow.org/
Anti-Defamation League: http://www.adl.org/
Brit Tzedek v’Shalom (Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace) http://www.btvshalom.org/
Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations: http://www.conferenceofpresidents.org/
The Israel Project: http://www.theisraelproject.org/site/c.hsJPK0PIJpH/b.672581/k.CB99/
Home.htm
Israel Policy Forum: http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/
New Israel Fund: http://www.nif.org/
Zionist Organization of America: http://www.zoa.org/

Figure 1. Map of Israel
^Source:^Ma^{p Resources. Adapt}^e^d^{by CRS.}
^Car^o^{l Mig}^d^alo^v^itz
^Specialis^{t i}ⁿ^{Middle Eas}^t^ern^Aff^a^irs
^c^mⁱ^g^dal^o^vⁱ^t^z^@^c^rs^.l^oc.g^o^v^{, 7-2667}