Industrial Competitiveness and Technological Advancement: Debate Over Government Policy

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There is ongoing interest in the pace of U.S. technological advancement due to its influence on
U.S. economic growth, productivity, and international competitiveness. Because technology can
contribute to economic growth and productivity increases, congressional attention has focused on
how to augment private-sector technological development. Legislative activity over the past 25
years has created a policy for technology development, albeit an ad hoc one. Because of the lack
of consensus on the scope and direction of a national policy, Congress has taken an incremental
approach aimed at creating new mechanisms to facilitate technological advancement in particular
areas and making changes and improvements as necessary.
Congressional action has mandated specific technology development programs and obligations in
federal agencies that did not initially support such efforts. Many programs were created based
upon what individual committees judged appropriate within the agencies over which they had
authorization or appropriation responsibilities. The use of line item funding for these activities,
including the Advanced Technology Program and the Manufacturing Extension Program of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, as well as for the Undersecretary for Technology
at the Department of Commerce, was viewed by proponents as a way to ensure that the
government encourages technological advance in the private sector.
Some legislative activity, beginning in the 104^th Congress, has been directed at eliminating or
significantly curtailing many of these federal efforts. Although this approach has not been
adopted, the budgets for several programs have declined. Questions have been raised concerning
the proper role of the federal government in technology development and the competitiveness of ^th
U.S. industry. As the 110 Congress continues developing its budget priorities, how the
government encourages technological progress in the private sector again may be explored and/or
redefined.

Most Recent Developments.............................................................................................................1
Background and Analysis................................................................................................................2
Technology and Competitiveness..............................................................................................2
Federal Role..............................................................................................................................2
Legislative Initiatives and Current Programs............................................................................6
Increased R&D Spending...................................................................................................6
Industry-University Cooperative Efforts............................................................................9
Joint Industrial Research....................................................................................................11
Commercialization of the Results of Federally Funded R&D...........................................11
Different Approach?................................................................................................................15
Legislation in the 110^th Congress..................................................................................................16
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................19

Technological advancement in U.S. industry often has been supported by congressional initiatives
over the past 25 years. This approach has involved both direct measures that concern budget
outlays and the provision of services by government agencies (such as the Advanced Technology
Program (ATP) and the Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology) and indirect measures that include financial incentives and legal ^th
changes. Many of these efforts, however, have been revisited since the 104 Congress given the
then Republican majority’s statements in favor of indirect strategies such as tax policies,
intellectual property right protection, and antitrust laws to promote technological advancement;
increased government support for basic research; and decreased direct federal funding for private
sector technology initiatives. These concerns were reflected in a situation where, beginning in
FY2000, the original House-passed appropriation bills did not include funding for ATP. In
addition, the President’s FY2003 budget for the first time requested a significant reduction in
support for MEP based on the idea that all manufacturing extension centers operating more than
six years should continue without federal funding. While no program was eliminated until the
Advanced Technology Program was replaced by the Technology Innovation Program, several
have been financed at reduced levels.
P.L. 110-5, enacted in the 110^th Congress, provided FY2007 appropriations of $104.6 million for
MEP and $79 million for ATP. The President’s FY2008 budget proposed a significant decrease in
support for manufacturing extension to $46.3 million and did not include funding for ATP. The
initial appropriations legislation that passed the House, H.R. 3093, would have provided $108.8
million for MEP and $93.1 million for ATP. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 3093 would have
funded MEP at $110 million and ATP at $100 million ($30.8 million of which was to be directed
to unrelated programs in other agencies). The final FY2008 appropriations legislation, P.L. 110-
161, provides $89.6 million for MEP and replaces ATP with the Technology Innovation Program
(TIP) which is funded at $65.2 million (with an additional $5 million from FY2007 ATP
unobligated balances). P.L. 110-69, the America COMPETES Act, authorizes funding for NIST
programs through FY2010 and creates various new initiatives within the laboratory designed to
improve U.S. innovation and competitiveness.
The Administration’s original FY2009 budget request provided $4 million to close out the federal
portion of the MEP program and contained no support for TIP. On June 6, 2008, the President
submitted a series of amendments to his budget, one of which reduced the amount for the MEP
program to $2 million. The FY2009 appropriations bill ordered reported from the House
Committee on Appropriations would finance MEP at $112 million while support for TIP would
total $65.2 million. S. 3182, as reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations, provides
$110 million for manufacturing extension and $65 million for TIP.
Several of the actions detailed in the “American Competitiveness Initiative” announced by the
President in the 2006 State of the Union Address were included in bills introduced in the first ^th
session of the 110 Congress. The ACI proposed various innovation-related activities including
increased basic research funding, making permanent the research and experimentation tax credit
(which was extended through the end of 2007 by P.L. 109-432), and improved math and science
education. S. 833, the Competitiveness Through Education, Technology , and Enterprise Act of

2007, would make the research tax credit permanent, as does H.R. 2133, H.R. 2138, H.R. 2734,

H.R. 3907, H.R. 5105, H.R. 5681, and S. 2209. S. 41, the Research Competitiveness Act of 2007,

and H.R. 1712, the Research and Development Tax Credit Act of 2007, also extend the research
credit and create tax exempt facility bonds for the development of research park facilities, among
other things. H.R. 6049, as passed by the House, and S. 2552 would extend the research credit
through the end of 2008; S. 592 and S. 2884 extend it through 2012.
S. 1373 and H.R. 4250 would provide grants and loan guarantees for the development and
construction of science parks. Title VI of P.L. 100-229 establishes a program of grants to non-
profit institutions, state and local governments, cooperative extension services, or universities to
transfer energy efficient methods and technologies. S. 3078 creates a National Innovation Council
to coordinate federal innovation-related activities and promote state and local initiatives in this
area.

Interest in technology development and industrial innovation increased as concern mounted over
the economic strength of the nation and over competition from abroad. For the United States to be
competitive in the world economy, U.S. companies must be able to engage in trade, retain market
shares, and offer high quality products, processes, and services while the nation maintains
economic growth and a high standard of living. Technological advancement is important because
the commercialization of inventions provides economic benefits from the sale of new products or
services; from new ways to provide a service; or from new processes that increase productivity
and efficiency. It is widely accepted that technological progress is responsible for up to one-half
the growth of the U.S. economy, and is one principal driving force in long-term growth and
increases in living standards.
Technological advances can further economic growth because they contribute to the creation of
new goods, new services, new jobs, and new capital. The application of technology can improve
productivity and the quality of products. It can expand the range of services that can be offered as
well as extend the geographic distribution of these services. The development and use of
technology also plays a major role in determining patterns of international trade by affecting the
comparative advantages of industrial sectors. Since technological progress is not necessarily
determined by economic conditions—it also can be influenced by advances in science, the
organization and management of firms, government activity, or serendipity—it can have effects
on trade independent of shifts in macroeconomic factors. New technologies also can help
compensate for possible disadvantages in the cost of capital and labor faced by firms.
In the recent past, American companies faced increased competitive pressures in the international
marketplace from firms based in countries where governments actively promote commercial
technological development and application. In the United States, the generation of technology for
the commercial marketplace is primarily a private sector activity. The federal government
traditionally becomes involved only for certain limited purposes. Typically these are activities
which have been determined to be necessary for the “national good” but which cannot, or will
not, be supported by industry.

To date, the U.S. government has funded research and development (R&D) to meet the mission
requirements of the federal departments and agencies. It also finances efforts in areas where there
is an identified need for research, primarily basic research, not being performed in the private
sector. Federal support reflects a consensus that basic research is critical because it is the
foundation for many new innovations. However, any returns created by this activity are generally
long term, sometimes not marketable, and not always evident. Yet the rate of return to society as a
whole generated by investments in research is significantly larger than the benefits that can be ¹
captured by the firm doing the work.
Many past government activities to increase basic research were based on a “linear” model of
innovation. This theory viewed technological advancement as a series of sequential steps starting
with idea origination and moving through basic research, applied research, development,
commercialization, and diffusion into the economy. Increases in federal funds in the basic
research stage were expected to result in concomitant increases in new products and processes.
However, this linear concept is no longer considered valid. Innovations often occur that do not
require basic or applied research or development; in fact most innovations are incremental
improvements to existing products or processes. In certain areas, such as biotechnology, the
distinctions between basic research and commercialization are small and shrinking. In others, the
differentiation between basic and applied research is artificial. The critical factor is the
commercialization of the technology. Economic benefits accrue only when a technology or
technique is brought to the marketplace where it can be sold to generate income or applied to
increase productivity. Yet, while the United States has a strong basic research enterprise, foreign
firms appear equally, if not more, adept at taking the results of these scientific efforts and making
commercially viable products. Often U.S. companies are competing in the global marketplace
against goods and services developed by foreign industries from research performed in the United
States. Thus, there has been increased congressional interest in mechanisms to accelerate the
development and commercialization processes in the private sector.
The development of a governmental effort to facilitate technological advance has been
particularly difficult because of the absence of a consensus on the need for an articulated policy.
Technology demonstration and commercialization have traditionally been considered private
sector functions in the United States. While over the years there have been various programs and
policies (such as tax credits, technology transfer to industry, and patents), the approach had been
ad hoc and uncoordinated. Much of the program development was based upon what individual
committees judged appropriate for the agencies over which they have jurisdiction. Despite the
importance of technology to the economy, technology-related considerations often have not been
integrated into economic decisions.
There have been attempts to provide a central focus for governmental activity in technology
matters. P.L. 100-519 created within the Department of Commerce a Technology Administration
headed by a new Under Secretary for Technology. (This office was abolished as of the end of
FY2007.) In November 1993, former President Clinton established a National Science and
Technology Council to coordinate decisionmaking in science and technology and to insure their

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integration at all policy levels. However, technological issues and responsibilities remain shared
among many departments and agencies. This diffused focus has sometimes resulted in actions
which, if not at cross purposes, may not have accounted for the impact of policies or practices in
one area on other parts of the process. Technology issues involve components which operate both
separately and in concert. While a diffused approach can offer varied responses to varied issues,
the importance of interrelationships may be underestimated and their usefulness may suffer.
Several times, Congress has examined the idea of an industrial policy to develop a coordinated
approach on issues of economic growth and industrial competitiveness. Technological advance is
both one aspect of this and an altogether separate consideration. In looking at the development of
an identified policy for industrial competitiveness, advocates argue that such an effort could
ameliorate much of the uncertainty with which the private sector perceives future government
actions. Some commentators have argued that consideration and delineation of national objectives
could encourage industry to engage in more long-term planning with regard to R&D and to make
decisions as to the best allocation of resources. Such a technology policy could generate greater
consistency in government activities. Because technological development involves numerous
risks, efforts to minimize uncertainty regarding federal programs and policies may help alleviate
some of the disincentives perceived by industry.
The development of a technology policy, however, is a contentious issue. There is widespread
resistance to what could be and has been called national planning, due variously to doubts as to its
efficacy, to fear of adverse effects on our market system, to political beliefs about government
intervention in our economic system, and to the current emphasis on short-term returns in both
the political and economic arenas. Opponents of a national industrial policy may see this
approach as government interference in the marketplace to “pick winners and losers.” Instead, it
is argued, measures that would occasion a better investment environment for industry to expand
innovation-related efforts would be preferable to government decisionmaking in technological
advancement.
Consideration of what constitutes government policy (both in terms of the industrial policy and
technology policy) covers a broad range of ideas from laissez-faire to special government
incentives to target specific high-technology, high-growth industries. Suggestions have been
made for the creation of federal mechanisms to identify and support strategic industries and
technologies. Various federal agencies and private sector groups have developed critical
technology lists. However, others maintain that such targeting is an unwanted, and unwarranted,
interference in the private sector which will cause unnecessary dislocations in the marketplace or
a misallocation of resources. From their perspective, the government does not have the
knowledge or expertise to make business-related decisions. Instead, they argue, the appropriate
role for government is to encourage innovative activities in all industries and to keep market
related decisionmaking within the business community that has ultimate responsibility for
commercialization and where such decisions have traditionally been made.
The relationship between government and industry often is a major factor affecting innovation
and the environment within which technological development takes place. This relationship can
be adversarial, with the government acting to regulate or restrain the business community, rather
than to facilitate its positive contributions to the nation. However, this may be changing as the
benefits of industry/government cooperation become more apparent. There are an increasing
number of areas where the traditional distinctions between public and private sector functions and
responsibilities are becoming blurred. Many assumptions have been questioned, particularly in
light of the increased internationalization of the U.S. economy. The business sector is no longer

viewed in an exclusively domestic context; the economy of the United States is often tied to the
economies of other nations. The technological superiority long held by the United States in many
areas has been challenged by other industrialized countries in which economic, social, and
political policies and practices foster government-industry cooperation in technological
development.
A major divergence from the past was evident in the approach taken by the former Clinton
Administration. Articulated in two reports issued in February 1993 (A Vision of Change for
America and Technology for America’s Economic Growth, A New Direction to Build Economic ²
Strength), the proposal called for a national commitment to, and a strategy for, technological
advancement as part of a defined national economic policy. This detailed strategy offered a policy
agenda for economic growth in the United States, of which technological development and
industrial competitiveness were critical components.
In articulating a national technology policy, the approach initially recommended and subsequently
followed by the Clinton Administration provided a wide range of options while for the most part
reflecting then current trends in congressional efforts to facilitate industrial advancement. This
policy, backed by congressional legislation, increased federal coordination and augmented direct
government spending for technological development. While many past activities focused
primarily on research, the new initiatives shifted the emphasis toward development of new
products, processes, and services by the private sector for the commercial marketplace. In
addition, a significant number of the proposals aimed to increase both government and private
sector support for R&D leading to the commercialization of technology.
This approach has been questioned by recent Congresses and by the current Bush Administration.
Instead, policies appear more supportive of indirect strategies such as tax incentives, intellectual
property protection, and antitrust laws to promote technology advancement, increased
government support for basic research, and decreased direct federal funding for private sector
technology activities. In the 2006 State of the Union Address, President Bush announced the
“American Competitiveness Initiative” to facilitate innovation and provide “our nation’s children
a firm grounding in math and science.” To achieve these goals, the President has called for
doubling over the next 10 years the amount of federal funding for basic research, particularly in
the National Science Foundation, the Office of Science in the Department of Energy, and in the
core programs of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Department of Commerce.
In addition, the Initiative would increase the number of math and science teachers and make the
research and experiment tax credit permanent.
Despite the continuing debate on what is the appropriate role of government and what constitutes
a suitable government technology development policy, it remains an undisputed fact that what the
government does or does not do affects the private sector and the marketplace. The various rules,
regulations, and other activities of the government have become de facto policy as they relate to,
and affect, innovation and technological advancement.

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Legislative initiatives have reflected a trend toward expanding the government’s role beyond
traditional funding of mission-oriented R&D and basic research toward the facilitation of
technological advancement to meet other critical national needs, including the economic growth
that flows from new commercialization and use of technologies and techniques in the private
sector. An overview of recent legislation shows federal efforts aimed at (1) encouraging industry
to spend more on R&D; (2) assisting small high-technology businesses; (3) promoting joint
research activities between companies; (4) fostering cooperative work between industry and
universities; (5) facilitating the transfer of technology from the federal laboratories to the private
sector; and (6) providing incentives for quality improvements. These efforts tend toward
removing barriers to technology development in the private sector (thereby permitting market
forces to operate) and providing incentives to encourage increased private sector R&D activities.
While most focus primarily on research, some also involve policies and programs associated with
technology development and commercialization.
To foster increased company spending on research, the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act (P.L.
97-34) mandated a temporary incremental tax credit for qualified research expenditures. The law
provided a 25% tax credit for the increase in a firm’s qualified research costs above the average
expenditures for the previous three tax years. Qualified costs included in-house expenditures such
as wages for researchers, material costs, and payments for use of equipment; 65% of corporate
grants towards basic research at universities and other relevant institutions; and 65% of payments
for contract research. The credit applied to research expenditures through 1985.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514) extended the research and experimentation (R&E) tax
credit for another three years. However, the credit was lowered to 20% and made applicable to
only 75% of a company’s liability. The 1988 Tax Corrections Act (P.L. 100-647) approved a one-
year extension of the research tax credit. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (P.L. 101-239)
extended the credit through September 30, 1990 and made small start-up firms eligible for the
credit. The FY1991 Budget Act (P.L. 101-508) again continued the tax credit provisions through

1992. The law expired in June 1992 when former President Bush vetoed H.R. 11 that year.

However, P.L. 103-66, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, reinstated the credit
through July 1995 and made it retroactive to the former expiration date. The tax credit again was
allowed to expire until P.L. 104-188, the Small Business Job Protection Act, restored it from July
1, 1996 through May 31, 1997. P.L. 105-34, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, extended the credit
for 13 months from June 1, 1997 through June 30, 1998. Although it expired once again at the
end of June, the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 105-277, reinstated the tax credit ^th
through June 30, 1999. During the 105 Congress, various bills were introduced to make the tax
credit permanent; other bills would have allowed the credit to be applied to certain collaborative
research consortia. On August 5, 1999, both the House and Senate agreed to the conference report
for H.R. 2488, the Financial Freedom Act, which would have extended the credit for five years
through June 30, 2004. This bill also would have increased the credit rate applicable under the
alternative incremental research credit by one percentage point per step. While the President
vetoed the overall appropriations bill on September 23, 1999, the same provisions were included
in Title V of P.L. 106-170 signed into law on December 17, 1999. P.L. 108-311 extended the

research tax credit through December 31, 2005 while P.L. 109-432 extends the credit through the ³
end of 2007.
The Small Business Development Act (P.L. 97-219), as extended (P.L. 99-443), established a
program to facilitate increased R&D within the small-business, high-technology community.
Each federal agency with a research budget was required to set aside 1.25% of its R&D funding
for grants to small firms for research in areas of interest to that agency. P.L. 102-564, which
reauthorized the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, increased the set-aside
over a five-year period to 2.5% by 1997. Funding is, in part, dependent on companies obtaining
private sector support for the commercialization of the resulting products or processes. The
authorization for the program was set to terminate October 1, 2000. However, the SBIR activity
was reauthorized through September 30, 2008 by P.L. 106-554, signed into law on December 21,

2000. P.L. 102-564 also created a pilot effort, the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR)

program, to encourage firms to work with universities or federal laboratories to commercialize
the results of research. This program initially was funded by a 0.15% (phased in) set-aside. Set to
expire in FY1997, the STTR originally was extended for one year until P.L. 105-135 reauthorized
this activity through FY2001. Subsequently, P.L. 107-50 extended the program through FY2009
and expanded the set-aside to 0.3% beginning in FY2004. Also in FY2004, the amount of
individual Phase II grants increased to $750,000. (See CRS Report 96-402, Small Business
Innovation Research Program, by Wendy H. Schacht and CRS Report RS22865, The Small
Business Innovation Research Program: Reauthorization Efforts, by Wendy H. Schacht.)
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-418) created the Advanced
Technology Program (ATP) at the Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST). ATP provided seed funding, matched by private sector investment, for
companies or consortia of universities, industries, and/or government laboratories to accelerate
development of generic technologies with broad application across industries. The first awards
were made in 1991. As of the end of 2007, 824 projects had been funded representing
approximately $2.4 billion in federal dollars matched by $2.2 billion in private sector financing.
About 68% of the awardees are small businesses or cooperative efforts led by such firms. (For
more information, see CRS Report 95-36, The Advanced Technology Program, by Wendy H.
Schacht.)
Appropriations for the ATP included $35.9 million in FY1991, $47.9 million in FY1992, and
$67.9 million in FY1993. FY1994 appropriations increased significantly to $199.5 million and
even further in FY1995 to $431 million. However, P.L. 104-6, rescinded $90 million from this
amount. The original FY1996 appropriations bill, H.R. 2076, which passed the Congress, was
vetoed by President Clinton, in part, because it provided no support for ATP. The appropriations
legislation finally enacted, P.L. 104-134, did fund the Advanced Technology Program at $221
million. For FY1997, the President’s budget request was $345 million. However, P.L. 104-208,
the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, provided $225 million for ATP, later reduced by
$7 million to $218 million by P.L. 105-18. The Administration’s FY1998 budget requested $276
million in funding; P.L. 105-119 appropriated $192.5 million for ATP, again at a level less than
the previous year. The President’s FY1999 budget proposal included $259.9 million for this
program, a 35% increase. While not providing such a large increase, P.L. 105-277 did fund ATP at
$197.5 million, 3% above the previous year. This figure reflected a $6 million rescission

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contained in the same law that accounted for “deobligated” funds resulting from early termination
of certain projects.
In FY2000, the Clinton Administration proposed $238.7 million for ATP, an increase of 21% over
the previous year. H.R. 2670, as passed by the House, provided no funding for the activity. The
report to accompany the House bill stated that there was insufficient evidence “to overcome those
fundamental questions about whether the program should exist in the first place.” S. 1217, as
passed by the Senate, would have appropriated $226.5 million for ATP. P.L. 106-113 eventually
did finance the program at $142.6 million, 28% below prior year funding. The following year, the
President’s FY2001 budget included $175.5 million for ATP, an increase of 23% over the earlier
fiscal year. Once again, the original version of the appropriations bill that passed the House did
not contain any financial support for the activity. However, P.L. 106-553 provided $145.7 million
in FY2001 support for ATP, 2% above the previous funding level.
For FY2002, President Bush’s budget proposed suspending all funding for new ATP awards
pending an evaluation of the program. In the interim, $13 million would have been provided to
meet the financial commitments for ongoing projects. H.R. 2500, as initially passed by the House,
also did not fund new ATP grants but offered $13 million for prior commitments. The version of
H.R. 2500 that originally passed the Senate provided $204.2 million for the ATP effort. P.L. 107-

77 funded the program at $184.5 million, an increase of almost 27% over the previous fiscal year.

The Bush Administration’s FY2003 budget request would have funded ATP at $108 million; 35%
below the FY2002 appropriation level. While no relevant appropriations legislation was passed ^th^th
by the 107 Congress, a series of Continuing Resolutions funded the program until the 108
Congress enacted P.L. 108-7 which financed ATP at $178.8 million for FY2003 (after a mandated

0.65% across the board recision).

In its FY2004 budget, the Administration proposed to provide $17 million to cover ongoing
commitments to ATP; however no new projects would be funded. H.R. 2799, the FY2004
appropriations bill initially passed by the House, included no support for ATP. Subsequently
incorporated into H.R. 2673, which became P.L. 108-199, the legislation funded ATP at $179.2
million (prior to a mandated 0.59% across the board rescission). As reported to the Senate from
the Committee on Appropriations, S. 1585 would have financed the program at $259.6 million.
The President’s FY2005 budget, as well as H.R. 4754, the Commerce, Justice, State
Appropriations bill originally passed by the House, did not include any funding for ATP. As
reported to the Senate from the Committee on Appropriations, S. 2809 would have provided $203
million for the program, 19% above the previous fiscal year. P.L. 108-447, the FY2005 Omnibus
Appropriations Act, funded ATP at $136.5 million (after several rescissions mandated in the
legislation), 20% below FY2004.
For FY2006, the Administration’s budget and H.R. 2862, as originally passed by the House, again
did not include funding for the Advanced Technology Program. The version of H.R. 2862 initially
passed by the Senate would have provided ATP with $140 million. The final FY2006
appropriation legislation, P.L. 109-108, finances the program at $79 million (after mandated
rescissions), 42% less than the last fiscal year.
The President’s FY2007 budget did not include funding for ATP, nor did H.R. 5672, the FY2007
Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, as passed by the
House on June 29, 2006 and as reported from the Senate Committee on Appropriations. While no

final FY2007 appropriations legislation was enacted during the 109^th Congress, ATP was funded ^th
through February 15, 2007 by a series of continuing resolutions. Passed in the 110 Congress,
P.L. 110-5 provided FY2007 appropriations of $79 million for the program.
The Administration’s FY2008 budget proposal did not include support for the Advanced
Technology Program. The initial FY2008 appropriations bill passed by the House, H.R. 3093,
would have funded the program at $93.1 million. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 3093 would
have provided $100 million for ATP ($30.8 million of which was to be directed to unrelated
programs in the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Marshals Service). The final
appropriations legislation, P.L. 110-161, the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, replaces
ATP with the Technology Innovation Program (TIP) and funds it at $65.2 million (with an
additional $5 million from FY2007 ATP unobligated balances).
The President’s FY2009 budget request does not contain funding for TIP. The bill ordered
reported from the House Committee on Appropriations would provide $65.2 million for TIP while
S. 3182, as reported from the Senate Committee on Appropriations, would finance the program at
$65 million.
P.L. 110-69, the America COMPETES Act, created the Technology Innovation Program. While
similar to ATP in the intent to promote high-risk R&D that would be of broad-based economic
benefit to the nation, there are several differences in the operation of the new activity. Funding
under TIP is limited to small and medium-sized businesses whereas grants under ATP were
available to companies regardless of size. In addition, in the Advanced Technology Program, joint
ventures were required to include two separately owned for-profit firms and could include
universities, government laboratories, and other research establishments as participants in the
project but not as recipients of the grant. In the TIP initiative, a joint venture may involve two
separately owned for-profit companies but may also be comprised of one small or medium-sized
firm and a university (or other non-profit research organization). A single company could receive
up to $2 million for up to three years under ATP; under TIP, the participating company (which
must be a small or medium-sized business) may receive up to $3 million for up to three years. In
ATP, small and medium-sized companies were not required to cost share (large firms provided

60% of the total cost of the project), while in TIP there is a 50% cost sharing requirement which,

again, only applies to the small and medium-sized businesses that are eligible. There were no
funding limits for the five-year funding available for joint ventures under ATP; the TIP limits
joint venture funding to $9 million for up to five years. The Advisory Board that was created to
assist in the Advanced Technology Program included industry representatives as well as federal
government personnel and representatives from other research organizations. The Advisory Board
for the Technology Innovation Program is to be comprised of only private sector members.
The promotion of cooperative efforts among academia and industry is aimed at increasing the
potential for the commercialization of technology. (For more information, see CRS Report
RL33526, Cooperative R&D: Federal Efforts to Promote Industrial Competitiveness, by Wendy
H. Schacht.) Traditionally, basic research has been performed in universities or in the federal
laboratory system while the business community focuses on the manufacture or provision of
products, processes, or services. Universities are especially suited to undertake basic research.
Their mission is to educate and basic research is an integral part of the educational process.
Universities generally are able to undertake these activities because they do not have to produce

goods for the marketplace and therefore can do research not necessarily tied to the development
of a commercial product or process.
Subsequent to World War II, the federal government supplanted industry as the primary source of
funding for basic research in universities. It also became the principal determinant of the type and
direction of the research performed in academia. This resulted in a disconnect between the
university and industrial communities. The separation and isolation of the parties involved in the
innovation process is thought by many observers to be a barrier to technological progress. The
difficulties in moving an idea from the concept stage to a commercial product or process may be
compounded when several entities are involved. Legislation to stimulate cooperative efforts
among those involved in technology development has been viewed as one way to promote
innovation and facilitate the international competitiveness of U.S. industry.
Several laws have attempted to encourage industry-university cooperation. Title II of the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-34) provided, in part, a 25% tax credit for 65% of
all company payments to universities for the performance of basic research. Firms were also
permitted a larger tax deduction for charitable contributions of equipment used in scientific
research at academic institutions. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514) kept this latter
provision, but reduced the credit for university basic research to 20% of all corporate
expenditures for this over the sum of a fixed research floor plus any decrease in non-research
giving.
The 1981 act also provided an increased charitable deduction for donations of new equipment by
a manufacturer to an institution of higher education. This equipment must be used for research or
research training for physical or biological sciences within the United States. The tax deduction is
equal to the manufacturer’s cost plus one-half the difference between the manufacturer’s cost and
the market value, as long as it does not exceed twice the cost basis. These provisions were
extended through July 1995 by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, but then expired
until restored by the passage of P.L. 104-188, P.L. 105-277, and P.L. 106-170 as noted above. ^th
H.R. 6111, passed by both the House and Senate during the 109 Congress and awaiting the
President’s signature, extended the research credit through the end of 2007.
Amendments to the patent and trademark laws contained in P.L. 96-517 (commonly called the
“Bayh-Dole Act”) also were designed to foster interaction between academia and the business
community. This law provides, in part, for title to inventions made by contractors receiving
federal R&D funds to be vested in the contractor if they are small businesses, universities, or not-
for-profit institutions. Certain rights to the patent are reserved for the government and these
organizations are required to commercialize within a predetermined and agreed upon time frame.
Providing universities with patent title is expected to encourage licensing to industry where the
technology can be manufactured or used thereby creating a financial return to the academic
institution. University patent applications and licensing have increased significantly since this law
was enacted. (See CRS Report RL32076, The Bayh-Dole Act: Selected Issues in Patent Policy
and the Commercialization of Technology, and CRS Report RL30320, Patent Ownership and
Federal Research and Development (R&D): A Discussion on the Bayh-Dole Act and the
Stevenson-Wydler Act, both by Wendy H. Schacht.)
The CREATE Act, P.L. 108-453, makes changes in the patent laws to promote cooperative
research and development among universities, government, and the private sector. The bill
amends section 103(c) of title 25, United States Code, such that certain actions between
researchers under a joint research agreement will not preclude patentability. (For more detail see

CRS Report RS21882, Collaborative R&D and the Cooperative Research and Technology
Enhancement (CREATE) Act.)
Private sector investments in basic research are often costly, long term, and risky. Although not all
advances in technology are the result of research, it is often the foundation of important new
innovations. To encourage increased industrial involvement in research, legislation was enacted to
allow for joint ventures in this arena. It is argued that cooperative research reduces risks and costs
and allows for work to be performed that crosses traditional boundaries or expertise and
experience. Such collaborative efforts make use of existing and support the development of new
resources, facilities, knowledge, and skills.
The National Cooperative Research Act (P.L. 98-462) encourages companies to undertake joint
research. The legislation clarifies the antitrust laws and requires that a “rule of reason” standard
be applied in determinations of violations of these laws; cooperative research ventures are not to
be judged illegal “per se.” It eliminates treble damage awards for those research ventures found in
violation of the antitrust laws if prior disclosure (as defined in the law) has been made. P.L. 98-
462 also makes changes in the way attorney fees are awarded. Defendants can collect attorney
fees in specified circumstances, including when the claim is judged frivolous, unreasonable,
without foundation, or made in bad faith. However, the attorney fee award to the prevailing party
may be offset if the court decides that the prevailing party conducted a portion of the litigation in
a manner which was frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith. These
provisions were included to discourage frivolous litigation against joint research ventures without
simultaneously discouraging suits of plaintiffs with valid claims. Between 1985 (when the law
went into effect) and 2003, 913 joint research ventures have filed with the Department of Justice.
P.L. 103-42, the National Cooperative Production Amendments Act of 1993, amends the National
Cooperative Research Act by, among other things, extending the original law’s provisions to joint
manufacturing ventures. These provisions are only applicable, however, to cooperative
production when (1) the principal manufacturing facilities are “located in the United States or its
territories, and (2) each person who controls any party to such venture ... is a United States
person, or a foreign person from a country whose law accords antitrust treatment no less
favorable to United States persons than to such country’s domestic persons with respect to
participation in joint ventures for production.”
Another approach to encouraging the commercialization of technology involves the transfer of
technology from federal laboratories and contractors to the private sector where
commercialization can proceed. Because the federal laboratory system has extensive science and
technology resources and expertise developed in pursuit of mission responsibilities, it is a
potential source of new ideas and knowledge which may be used in the business community. (See
CRS Report RL33527, Technology Transfer: Use of Federally Funded Research and
Development, by Wendy H. Schacht for more details.)
Despite the potential offered by the resources of the federal laboratory system, however, the
commercialization level of the results of federally funded R&D remained low. Studies indicated
that only approximately 10% of federally owned patents were ever utilized. There are many

reasons for this low level of usage, one of which is the fact that some technologies and/or patents
have no market application. However, industry unfamiliarity with these technologies, the “not-
invented-here” syndrome, and perhaps more significantly, the ambiguities associated with
obtaining title to or exclusive license to federally owned patents also contribute to the low level of
commercialization.
Over the years, several governmental efforts have been undertaken to augment industry’s
awareness of federal R&D resources. The Federal Laboratory Consortium for Technology
Transfer was created in 1972 (from a Department of Defense program) to assist in transferring
technology from the federal government to state and local governments and the private sector. To
expand on the work of the Federal Laboratory Consortium, and to provide added emphasis on the
commercialization of government technology, Congress passed P.L. 96-480, the Stevenson-
Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980. Prior to this law, technology transfer was not an
explicit mandate of the federal departments and agencies with the exception of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. To provide “legitimacy” to the numerous technology
activities of the government, Congress, with strong bipartisan support, enacted P.L. 96-480 which
explicitly states that the federal government has the responsibility, “to ensure the full use of the
results of the nation’s federal investment in research and development.” Section 11 of the law
created a system within the federal government to identify and disseminate information and
expertise on what technologies or techniques are available for transfer. Offices of Research and
Technology Applications were established in each federal laboratory to distinguish technologies
and ideas with potential applications in other settings.
Several amendments to the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act have been enacted to
provide additional incentives for the commercialization of technology. P.L. 99-502, the Federal
Technology Transfer Act, authorizes activities designed to encourage industry, universities, and
federal laboratories to work cooperatively. It also establishes incentives for federal laboratory
employees to promote the commercialization of the results of federally funded research and
development. The law amends P.L. 96-480 to allow government-owned, government-operated
laboratories to enter into cooperative R&D agreements (CRADAs) with universities and the
private sector. This authority is extended to government-owned, contractor-operated laboratories
by the Department of Defense FY1990 Authorization Act, P.L. 101-189. (See CRS Report 95-

150, Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), by Wendy H. Schacht.)

Companies, regardless of size, are allowed to retain title to inventions resulting from research
performed under cooperative agreements. The federal government retains a royalty-free license to
use these patents. The Technology Transfer Improvements and Advancement Act (P.L. 104-113),
clarifies the dispensation of intellectual property rights under CRADAs to facilitate the
implementation of these cooperative efforts. The Federal Laboratory Consortium is given a
legislative mandate to assist in the coordination of technology transfer. To further promote the use
of the results of federal R&D, certain agencies are mandated to create a cash awards program and
a royalty sharing activity for federal scientists, engineers, and technicians in recognition of efforts
toward commercialization of this federally developed technology. These efforts are facilitated by
a provision of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1991 (P.L. 101-510), which amends
the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act to allow government agencies and laboratories
to develop partnership intermediary programs to augment the transfer of laboratory technology to
the small business sector.
Amendments to the Patent and Trademark law contained in Title V of P.L. 98-620 made changes
which are designed to improve the transfer of technology from the federal laboratories—
especially those operated by contractors—to the private sector and increase the chances of

successful commercialization of these technologies. This law permits the contractor at
government-owned, contractor-operated laboratories (GOCOs) to make decisions at the
laboratory level as to the granting of licenses for subject inventions. This has the potential of
effecting greater interaction between laboratories and industry in the transfer of technology.
Royalties on these inventions are also permitted to go back to the laboratory contractor to be used
for additional R&D, awards to individual laboratory inventors, or education. While there is a cap
on the amount of the royalty returning directly to the lab in order not to disrupt the agency’s
mission requirements and congressionally mandated R&D agenda, the establishment of
discretionary funds gives contractor-operated laboratories added incentive to encourage
technology transfer.
Under P.L. 98-620, private companies, regardless of size, are allowed to obtain exclusive licenses
for the life of the patent. Prior restrictions allowed large firms use of exclusive license for only 5
of the 17 years (now 20 years) of the life of the patent. This was expected to encourage improved
technology transfer from the federal laboratories or the universities (in the case of university
operated GOCOs) to large corporations which often have the resources necessary for
development and commercialization activities. In addition, the law permits GOCOs (those
operated by universities or nonprofit institutions) to retain title to inventions made in the
laboratory within certain defined limitations. Those laboratories operated by large companies are
not included in this provision.
P.L. 106-404, the Technology Transfer Commercialization Act, altered practices concerning
patents held by the government to make it easier for federal agencies to license such inventions.
The law amends the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act and the Bayh-Dole Act to
decrease the time delays associated with obtaining an exclusive or partially exclusive license.
Previously, agencies were required to publicize the availability of technologies for three months
using the Federal Register and then provide an additional 60 day notice of intent to license by an
interested company. Under this legislation, the time period was shortened to 15 days in
recognition of the ability of the internet to offer widespread notification and the necessity of time
constraints faced by industry in commercialization activities. Certain rights are retained by the
government. The bill also allows licenses for existing government-owned inventions to be
included in CRADAs.
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (P.L. 100-418) mandated the creation of a program
of regional centers to assist small manufacturing companies to use knowledge and technology
developed under the auspices of the National Institute of Standards and Technology and other
federal agencies. Federal funding for the centers is matched by non-federal sources including
state and local governments and industry. Originally, seven Regional Centers for the Transfer of
Manufacturing Technology were selected. The initial program was expanded in 1994 to create the
Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) to meet new and growing needs of the community.
In a more varied approach, the Partnership involves both large centers and smaller, more
dispersed organizations sometimes affiliated with larger centers as well as the NIST State
Technology Extension Program which provides states with grants to develop the infrastructure
necessary to transfer technology from the federal government to the private sector (an effort
which was also mandated by P.L. 100-418) and a program which electronically ties the disparate
parties together along with other federal, state, local, and academic technology transfer
organizations. There are now centers in all 50 states and Puerto Rico. Since the manufacturing
extension activity was created in 1989, awards made by NIST have resulted in the creation of
approximately 350 regional offices. [It should be noted that the Department of Defense also
funded 36 centers through its Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) in FY1994 and FY1995.

When the TRP was terminated, NIST took over support for 20 of these programs in FY1996 and
funded the remaining efforts during FY1997.]
Funding for this program was $11.9 million in FY1991, $15.1 million in FY1992, and $16.9
million in FY1993. In FY1994 support for the expanded Manufacturing Technology Partnerships
was $30.3 million. The following fiscal year, P.L. 103-317 appropriated $90.6 million for this
effort, although P.L. 104-19 rescinded $16.3 million from this amount. While the original FY1996
appropriations bill, H.R. 2076, was vetoed by the President, the $80 million funding for MEP was
retained in the final legislation, P.L. 104-134. The President’s FY1997 budget request was $105
million; P.L. 104-208 appropriated $95 million for manufacturing extension while temporarily
lifting the six-year limit on federal support for individual centers. For FY1998, the Administration
requested funding of $123 million. The FY1998 appropriations bill, P.L. 105-119, financed the
MEP program at $113.5 million. This law also permitted government funding, at one-third the
centers total annual cost, to continue for additional periods of one year over the original six-year
limit, if a positive evaluation is received. The President’s FY1999 budget included $106.8 million
for the MEP, a 6% decrease from current funding. The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations
Act, P.L. 105-277, appropriated the $106.8 million. The decrease in funding reflected a reduced
federal financial commitment as the centers mature, not a decrease in program support. In
addition, the Technology Administration Act of 1998, P.L. 105-309, permits the federal
government to fund centers at one-third the cost after the six years if a positive, independent
evaluation is made every two years.
For FY2000, the Clinton Administration requested $99.8 million in support for MEP. Again, the
lower federal share indicated a smaller statutory portion required of the government. S. 1217, as
passed by the Senate, would have appropriated $109.8 million for the Manufacturing Extension
Partnership, an increase of 3% over FY1999. H.R. 2670, as passed initially by the House, would
have appropriated $99.8 million for this activity. The version of the H.R. 2670 passed by both
House and Senate provided FY2000 appropriations of $104.8 million. While the President vetoed
that bill, the legislation that was ultimately enacted, P.L. 106-113, appropriated $104.2 million
after a mandated rescission. The President’s FY2001 budget requested $114.1 million for the
Partnership, an increase of almost 9% over the earlier fiscal year. P.L. 106-553 appropriated
$105.1 million.
The FY2002 Bush Administration budget proposed providing $106.3 million for MEP. H.R.
2500, as originally passed by the House, would have funded MEP at $106.5 million. The initial
version of H.R. 2500 passed by the Senate would have provided $105.1 million for the program.
The final legislation, P.L. 107-77 funded the Partnership at $106.5 million.
For FY2003, the Administration’s budget included an 89% decrease in support for MEP.
According to the budget document, “consistent with the program’s original design, the President’s
budget recommends that all centers with more than six years experience operate without federal
contribution.” A number of Continuing Resolutions supported the Partnership at FY2002 levels ^th
until the 108 Congress enacted P.L. 108-7 which appropriated $105.9 million for MEP in
FY2003 (after a mandated recision).
The President’s FY2004 budget requested $12.6 million for MEP to finance only those centers
that have not reached six years of federal support. H.R. 2799, as initially passed by the House,
would have appropriated $39.6 million for the Partnership. This bill was subsequently
incorporated into H.R. 2673, which became P.L. 108-199, the FY2004 Consolidated
Appropriations Act. This legislation financed MEP at $38.7 million after a mandated rescission.

S. 1585, reported to the Senate by the Committee on Appropriations, would have funded the
program at $106.6 million.
The Administration proposed funding MEP at $39.2 million in FY2005. H.R. 4754, as originally
passed by the House, would have appropriated $106 million for this program. As reported by the
Senate Committee on Appropriations, S. 2809 would have provided $112 million for MEP to
“fully fund” existing centers and provide assistance to small and rural states. P.L. 108-447,
supported manufacturing extension at $107.5 million (after several mandated rescissions included
in the legislation).
For FY2006, the President’s budget requested $46.8 million for the Manufacturing Extension
Partnership, 56% below funding for the current fiscal year. H.R. 2862, as originally passed by
both the House and the Senate, would have provided $106 million for the program. The final
appropriation included in P.L. 109-108 was $104.6 million (after mandated rescissions, but not
including a rescission from unobligated balances).
The Administration’s FY2007 budget included $46.3 million for MEP. The FY2007
appropriations bill passed by the House, H.R. 5672, funded the program at $92 million. The
version of H.R. 5672 reported from the Senate Committee on Appropriations provided $106 ^th
million for MEP. No final FY2007 appropriations legislation was enacted during the 109
Congress; however, the Partnership program was funded through February 15, 2007 by a series of
continuing resolutions. Passed by the current Congress, P.L. 110-5 financed MEP at $104.6
million in FY2007.
The President’s FY2008 budget proposal included $46.3 million for manufacturing extension, a
significant decrease from the current fiscal year. H.R. 3093, the initial appropriations bill passed
by the House, would have funded MEP at $108.8 million, while the version of H.R. 3093 passed
by the Senate would have provided $110 million. The final FY2008 appropriations legislation,
P.L. 110-161, finances MEP at $89.6 million.
The Administration’s original FY2009 budget request provides $4 million to close out the
federally funded portion of the Manufacturing Extension Partnership program; amendments
offered in June reduced this amount to $2 million. The bill ordered reported from the House
Committee on Appropriations would provide $122 million for MEP while S. 3182, as reported
from the Senate Committee on Appropriations, would finance the program at $110 million.
P.L. 110-69 authorizes a new program of partnerships between industry and other educational or
research institutions to develop new manufacturing processes, techniques, or materials. In
addition, a manufacturing fellowship program would be created with stipends available for post-
doctoral work at NIST. These activities differ from the established MEP effort where no new
manufacturing research is conducted as existing manufacturing technology is applied to the needs
of small and medium-sized firms. (For additional information see CRS Report 97-104,
Manufacturing Extension Partnership Program: An Overview, by Wendy H. Schacht.)
As indicated above, the laws affecting the R&D environment have included both direct and
indirect measures to facilitate technological innovation. In general, direct measures are those
which involve budget outlays and the provision of services by government agencies. Indirect
measures include financial incentives and legal changes (e.g., liability or regulatory reform; new

antitrust arrangements). Supporters of indirect approaches argue that the market is superior to
government in deciding which technologies are worthy of investment. Mechanisms that enhance
the market’s opportunities and abilities to make such choices are preferred. Advocates further
state that dependency on agency discretion to assist one technology in preference to another will
inevitably be subjected to political pressures from entrenched interests. Proponents of direct
government assistance maintain, conversely, that indirect methods can be wasteful and ineffective
and that they can compromise other goals of public policy in the hope of stimulating innovative
performance. Advocates of direct approaches argue that it is important to put the country’s scarce
resources to work on those technologies that have the greatest promise as determined by industry
and supported by its willingness to match federal funding.
In the past, while Republicans tended to prefer reliance on free market investment, competition,
and indirect support by government, participants in the debates generally did not make definite
(or exclusionary) choices between the two approaches, nor consistently favor one over the other.
For example, some proponents of a stronger direct role for the government in innovation are also
supporters of enhanced tax preferences for R&D spending, an indirect mechanism. Opponents of
direct federal support for specific projects (e.g., SEMATECH, flat panel displays) may
nevertheless back similar activities focused on more general areas such as manufacturing or ^th
information technology. However, beginning with the 104 Congress, legislators directed many
of their efforts toward eliminating or curtailing some of the programs that previously had enjoyed
bipartisan support. Initiatives to terminate the Advanced Technology Program, funding for flat
panel displays, and agricultural extension reflected concern about the role of government in
developing commercial technologies. The then Republican leadership stated that the government
should directly support basic science while leaving technology development to the private sector.
Instead of federal funding, changes to the tax laws, proponents argue, will provide the capital
resources and incentives necessary for industry to further invest in R&D. Many of the same issues
were considered in subsequent Congresses. While funding for several programs decreased,
support for most ongoing activities continued. How the debate over federal funding evolves in the ^th
110 Congress may serve to redefine thinking about the government’s efforts in promoting
technological advancement in the private sector.

P.L. 110-69 (H.R. 2272)
America COMPETES Act. Title III authorizes funding for the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) through 2010 and creates several new manufacturing R&D programs in that
organization. Funding for the Scientific and Technical Research and Services account within
NIST is authorized at $502.1 million for FY2008, $541.9 million for FY2009, and $584.8 for
FY2010. Support for construction and maintenance would be authorized at $150.9 million for
FY2008, $86.4 million for FY2009, and $49.7 million for FY2010. Authorization of
appropriations for Industrial Technology Services programs within NIST would include $210
million ($100 million for the Technology Innovation Program (TIP) and $110 million for MEP)
for FY2008, $253.5 million ($131.5 million for TIP and $122 million for MEP) for FY2009, and
$272.3 million ($140.5 million for TIP and $131.8 million for MEP) for FY2010. Among the new
programs established within NIST would be a Technology Innovation Program (to replace the
Advanced Technology Program), collaborative manufacturing research pilot grants, a
manufacturing fellowship program, and a manufacturing research database. Introduced on May

10, 2007; referred to the House Committee on Science and Technology. Passed House on May 21,

2007 and received in the Senate on May 22, 2007. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under
General Orders. Senate struck out all after the Enacting Clause and substituted the language of S.
761. Passed Senate, with the amendment, on July 19, 2007. Conference held and conference
report agreed to on July 31, 2007. House and Senate agreed to conference report on August 2,

2007. Signed into law by the President on August 9, 2007.

P.L. 110-161 (H.R. 2764)
Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2008. Appropriates $89.6 million for the Manufacturing
Extension Partnership and $65.2 million for the Technology Innovation Program which replaces
the Advanced Technology Program (with an additional $5 million from FY2007 ATP unobligated
balances), among other things. Introduced June 18, 2007; referred to the House Committee on
Appropriations. Passed House on June 22, 2007; received in Senate the same day and referred to
the Senate Committee on Appropriations. Reported from the Senate Committee on
Appropriations, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, on June 28, 2007. Passed Senate,
amended, on September 6, 2007. Signed into law by the President on December 26, 2007.
P.L. 110-229 (S. 2739)
Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008. Title VI creates a program of grants to non-profit
institutions, state and local governments, cooperative extension services, or universities to
transfer energy efficient methods and technologies. Introduced in the Senate on March 10, 2008.
Passed the Senate without amendment on April 10, 2008. Passed the House on April 29, 2008.
Signed into law by the President on May 8, 2008.
H.R. 1712 (Johnson, E. B.)
The Research and Development Tax Credit Act of 2007. Makes the research tax credit permanent
and allows for the issuance of tax exempt facility bonds for research park facilities used for
research and experimentation, among other things. Introduced March 27, 2007; referred to the
House Committee on Ways and Means.
H.R. 2133 (Allen)
Small Business Investment and Promotion Act of 2007. Makes the research tax credit permanent,
among other things. Introduced May 8, 2007; referred to the House Committee on Ways and
Means.
H.R. 2138 (Levin)
Investment in America Act of 2007. Makes the research tax credit permanent, among other things.
Introduced May 3, 2007; referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means.
H.R. 2734 (Walberg)
Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2007. Makes the research tax credit permanent, among other
things. Introduced June 14, 2007; referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means.

H.R. 3907 (Murphy, C.)
Small Business Tax Relief Act of 2007. Makes the research tax credit permanent, among other
things. Introduced October 18, 2007; referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means.
H.R. 5105 (Dreier)
Fair and Simple Tax Act of 2008. Makes the research tax credit permanent, among other things.
Introduced January 23, 2008; referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means.
H.R. 5681(McNerney)
Innovation Tax Credit Act of 2008. Revises the tax credit for increased research activities and
makes it permanent, among other things. Introduced April 2, 2008; referred to the House
Committee on Ways and Means.
H.R. 6049 (Rangel)
Renewable Energy and Job Creation Act of 2008. Extends the research tax credit through the end
of 2008, among other things. Introduced May 14, 2008; referred to the House Committee on
Ways and Means. Reported, amended, from the House Committee on Ways and Means on May

20, 2008. Passed the House on May 21, 2008.

S. 41 (Baucus)
Research Competitiveness Act of 2007. Amends the Internal Revenue Code to make the research
and experimentation tax credit permanent. Among other things, this bill would allow the issuance
of tax exempt facility bonds for research park facilities used for research and experimentation.
Introduced January 4, 2007; referred to the Senate Committee on Finance.
S. 592 (Collins)
GoMe Act. Extends the research tax credit through 2012, among other things. Introduced
February 14, 2007; referred to the Senate Committee on Finance.
S. 833 (Coleman)
COMPETE Act of 2007. Makes the research and experimentation tax credit permanent, among
other things. Introduced March 9, 2007; referred to the Senate Committee on Finance.
S. 1373 (Pryor)/H.R. 4250
Building a Stronger America Act. Provides for grants and loan guarantees for the development
and construction of science parks, among other things. Introduced May 11, 2007; referred to the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Hearings held by the
Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Innovation on October 18, 2007.H.R. 4250
introduced November 15, 2007; referred to the House Committee on Science and Technology.

S. 2209 (Hatch)
Research Credit Improvement Act of 2007. Simplifies the research tax credit and makes it
permanent, among other things. Introduced October 19, 2007; referred to the Senate Committee
on Finance.
S. 2552 (Snowe)
Small Business Stimulus Act of 2008. Extends the research tax credit through the end of 2008.
Introduced January 24, 2008; referred to the Senate Committee on Finance.
S. 2884 (Collins)
Research and Development Tax Credit Improvement Act of 2008. Revises the tax credit for
increased research activities and extends the credit through 2012, among other things. Introduced
April 17, 2008; referred to the Senate Committee on Finance.
S. 3078 (Collins)
National Innovation and Job Creation Act of 2008. Establishes a National Innovation Council to
coordinate federal innovation policy and provide support for state and local initiatives in this area.
Provides funding for cluster development activities and information dissemination, among other
things. Introduced June 3, 2008; referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation.
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