U.S. Army and Marine Corps Equipment Requirements: Background and Issues for Congress

U.S. Army and Marine Corps Equipment
Requirements: Background and Issues
for Congress
Updated January 29, 2008
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division



U.S. Army and Marine Corps Equipment Requirements:
Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The United States Army and Marine Corps have been at war — first in
Afghanistan and then Iraq — since November 2001. The Army’s and Marine Corps’
equipment has been employed in what has been described as “the harsh operating
environments of Iraq and Afghanistan” where the heat, sand, and dust as well as
operational rates “well in excess of peacetime rates” have taken a heavy toll on the
Army’s and Marines’ equipment.
Re-equipping Reserve and National Guard units that, in many cases, were
under-equipped to start with and then required to leave their equipment in theater
also presents challenges to the Services. The Army and Marine Corps are also
undertaking efforts to re-equip their pre-positioned stocks which were drawn upon
to provide equipment for use in Afghanistan and Iraq. There are also concerns that
the Army and Marines have not always aggressively pursued the best force protection
equipment available and the Army has been questioned on its efforts to improve the
standard soldier assault rifle. Congress, in its appropriation, authorization, and
oversight roles may be faced with some of the following issues:
!What are the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) and the Service’s
plans to re-equip reserve forces so that they are sufficiently
resourced for domestic missions and to properly train for
deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan?
!What is the current state of pre-positioned stocks that have been
drawn down again to support the Iraq “surge”? What type of
equipment is being used to restock pre-positioned stocks and is this
equipment fully operational or in a lesser state of readiness?
!How Many MRAPs does DOD intend to procure?
!Have bureaucratic difficulties attributed to the Army and DOD had
an adverse impact on efforts to find a suitable replacement for the
Army’s M-16/M-4 series of assault rifles?
This report will be updated on a periodic basis.



Contents
Background ......................................................1
Historical Perspective on Equipment...............................1
Equipping the Force............................................2
Equipping Units to Their Authorized Levels.....................2
Equipping Units Above Authorized Levels......................2
Coping With Equipment Shortfalls................................4
Cross-Leveling ............................................4
Equipment in Theater.......................................4
Requirement to Replace Reserve and National Guard Equipment
Left in Theater........................................4
Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Proof (MRAP) Vehicles....................7
Body Armor..................................................8
Dragon Skin Body Armor...................................8
Replacing M-16 and M-4 Carbines?...........................9
Reset: Replacing Damaged, Destroyed, and Worn-Out Equipment......10
The Army and Reset......................................10
The Army Combines Reset and Modernization..................11
The Marines and Reset.....................................12
Potential Issues for Congress........................................12
Equipping Reserve Forces......................................12
The State of Prepositioned Stocks................................13
How Many MRAPs Does DOD Intend to Procure?..................14
A Replacement for M-16/M-4 Carbines? ..........................15
List of Tables
Table 1. Selected MEF (Forward) Equipment Density Comparison...........3



U.S. Army and Marine Corps Equipment
Requirements: Background and Issues for
Congress
Background
The United States Army and Marine Corps have been at war — first in
Afghanistan and, then Iraq — since November 2001. In a similar manner, the
Marine Corps has deployed its forces and equipment in what has been described as
“the harsh operating environments of Iraq and Afghanistan” where the heat, sand, and
dust as well as operational rates “well in excess of peacetime rates” have taken a
heavy toll on the service’s equipment, which, in some cases, was more than 20 years
old when the conflicts first began.1
Equipping Reserve and National Guard units also presents challenges to the
services. Traditionally, the Army National Guard and Reserve have been
characterized as under-equipped and often times equipped with older equipment than
their Active component counterparts. The Army has committed to both man and
equip the Army Reserves and National Guard in a similar manner to the Active
component.2 The Army and Marine Corps are also undertaking efforts to re-equip
their pre-positioned stocks which were drawn upon to provide equipment for use in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The Army and Marines are also actively pursuing the
acquisition of new equipment based on wartime experiences. The Army and Marines
have a number of equipment-related challenges to rectify which may require
significant funding and management efforts.
Historical Perspective on Equipment
Equipping Army and Marine units has been a long-standing concern of
Congress that has taken on added importance as weapons and equipment have
become exponentially more sophisticated and expensive. With few exceptions,
almost all Army and Marine Corps units have historically faced equipment shortages.
In these cases, units either “made do” with the equipment on hand or, if leadership
directed, equipment could be transferred from one unit to another — referred to as


1 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Readiness and Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives, “Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on
Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps,” GAO-06-604T,
March 30, 2006.
2 Donna Miles, “Army to Ensure Reserve Components Fully Manned, Trained, Equipped,”
American Forces Press Service, February 2, 2006.

“cross leveling” — to increase a unit’s equipment holdings at the expense of another
unit or organization. Reserve forces, which in the past constituted the nation’s
“Strategic Reserve,” usually had less equipment than their active duty counterparts
and much of this equipment tended to be older models.
Protracted conflicts — like Afghanistan and Iraq — serve the purpose of
identifying what equipment works and what equipment does not, as well as
identifying requirements for new equipment. In the later case, the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have generated requirements for new equipment such as Mine-
Resistant, Ambush-Proof (MRAP) vehicles. Protracted conflicts also dramatically
increase equipment operational usage rates, resulting in reduced useful life and
increasing repair and replacement requirements.
Equipping the Force
There are a number of dimensions to equipping Army and Marine Corps units
that are examined in the following sections. Equipping units might appear to be a
relatively straight forward exercise, but there are a variety of factors involved.
Funding is perhaps the foremost issue, as funding is often limited, requiring the
services often to make trade-offs between equipment needed to sustain operations
and equipment for reorganization or modernization efforts. Another issue is that
even if funds are readily available, the equipment might not be. Army officials
maintain that for some systems, it can take up to three years after receiving funding
before they can be fielded to units.3
Equipping Units to Their Authorized Levels. Prior to units being
deployed on operations, the Army and Marine Corps typically attempt to bring these
units up to their authorized levels of both personnel and equipment. In terms of
equipping forces, there are a number of options available. The first option is to
requisition the needed equipment through each service’s respective supply chain, but
this option may not be practical if a unit’s equipment needs are significant or if the
unit does not have a great deal of time before it deploys. Other options for equipping
units include cross-leveling and drawing equipment “in-theater” when a unit deploys.
These other two options will be discussed in greater detail in following sections.
Equipping Units Above Authorized Levels. Both the Army and Marines
are providing their units with additional equipment over and above their peacetime4
authorized levels, which is placing significant equipment demands on both services.
The Army maintains that its brigade combat teams (BCTs) are operating over a much
wider geographical area than they were designed for and therefore require additional
equipment to facilitate these dispersed operations. In addition, units such as the 10th


3 From discussions with the Army’s Material Division, G-8 Section of the Army Staff on
October 25, 2006.
4 Information in this section is taken from the Statement of General Michael W. Hagee,
Commandant of the Marine Corps before the House Armed Services Committee Hearing on
Army and Marine Corps Strategies for Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft, June 27, 2006,
and a discussion with the Army’s Material Division, G-8 Section of the Army Staff on July

12, 2006.



Mountain Division, 101st Airborne, and 82nd Airborne, the Army’s light, largely foot-
mobile infantry units, require extensive equipment augmentation — particularly
vehicles — in order to operate over the large areas assigned to them.
The Marines suggest that:
The Marine Corps is executing a number of operational missions that are
inherently ground equipment intensive. Stability and Support Operations
(SASO), Counter-Insurgency (COIN), Civil Military Operations, and Foreign
Military Training all require a greater quantity of equipment than our
programmed levels for traditional combat operations. In order to adapt to these
new mission requirements, we have revised the Equipment Density List,
increasing the quantity of equipment issued to Marine Units deploying into the5
CENTCOM ... Our forward operating bases are not in close proximity to each
other; the large distances between forward operational bases require additional
vehicles, communications capabilities, and crew-served weapons over and above
the standard unit Equipment Density List ... The increased ground equipment
requirement, when coupled with high utilization rates, results in a Corps-wide6
degradation of equipment.
The following table provides a selective comparison of a Marine Expeditionary
Force (MEF) (Forward) — an approximately 18,000 Marine force — pre-war and
revised equipment requirements.7
Table 1. Selected MEF (Forward) Equipment Density
Comparison
EquipmentPre-War EquipmentDensity ListRevised EquipmentDensity List
PRC-117 Radio78205
7-Ton Medium Tactical
Vehicle Replacement (MTVR)5401015
Armored HMMWV311981
M-2 50-Caliber Machine Gun534634


5 U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is the Unified Combatant Command responsible for
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other geographical locations within their
command jurisdiction.
6 Statement of General Michael W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps before the
House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Army and Marine Corps Strategies for
Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft, June 27, 2006, p. 5.
7 Ibid.

Coping With Equipment Shortfalls
Cross-Leveling. Cross-leveling is the practice of transferring equipment to
a unit either from another unit or from some type of equipment pool such as pre-
positioned stocks. In the case of a unit-to-unit transfer, the transferred equipment
often comes from a similar-type unit, usually in a non-deployable status. Both the
Army and Marines have made extensive use of cross-leveling, particularly early on
in the Afghan and Iraq conflicts.
Equipment in Theater.8 The Army has kept large quantities of equipment
in theater, primarily to conserve strategic transportation assets and reduce costs, but
also to ensure that units are adequately equipped when deployed. This initiative —
called Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) — began in late 2003 when Army units,
including Active, National Guard and Reserve, were directed to leave much of their
equipment in theater when they redeployed back to the United States. This
equipment is then “handed-off” to units deploying to both Operations Enduring
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). TPE consists of
a variety of equipment items including armored vehicles, individual soldier body
armor, and equipment used to counter improvised explosive devices. The Marines
have also directed that equipment needed for OEF and OIF be left in theater. As
previously noted, because mission requirements require additional equipment beyond
a unit’s peacetime equipment allowance, the Marines have developed expanded
equipment packages in theater for deploying units.
Both Services have also set aside pools of equipment to rapidly replace
equipment damaged and destroyed during operations. The Army refers to this pool
of equipment as Theater Sustainment Stocks (TSS). This includes as many as 400
different types of vehicles and equipment numbering about 174,000 pieces of
equipment including, Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, HMMWVs, and other
support vehicles. The Marines also have developed a similar pool of equipment
known as Forward In-Stores to replace major equipment damaged or destroyed.
Requirement to Replace Reserve and National Guard Equipment
Left in Theater. In late 2003, the Army directed National Guard and Reserve units
to leave selected items of equipment in theater when redeploying to the United
States.9 This equipment left behind by Guard and Reserve units is placed in both the
TPE and TSS equipment pools, along with equipment left in theater by Active Army


8 Information in this section is taken from United States Government Accountability Office
(GAO) Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Tactical Air and Land
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Defense Logistics:
Preliminary Observations on Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues for the Army and
Marine Corps, GAO-06-604T, March 30, 2006, p. 6.
9 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Readiness and Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on
Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps, GAO-06-604T,
March 30, 2006, p 16.

units. DOD Policy10 requires that the Army replace equipment transferred to it by
reserve components and if that equipment is left in theater, the Army must provide
“plans to replace equipment for units returning home to ensure training readiness.”11
National Guard leadership has reportedly stated that the Army National Guard, on
aggregate, has only 56% of its authorized equipment.12 It is not known if the Army
has developed plans to replace National Guard and Reserve equipment left in Iraq
and if efforts are underway to meet this DOD policy.
Recent Congressional Action.13 The National Defense Authorization Act
for FY2008, H.R. 4986, authorizes $6.68 billion for National Guard and Reserve
Equipment, $980 million over the President’s FY2008 Budget Request.
Equipment from Prepositioned Stocks. Another source for equipping
Army and Marine Corps units is equipment from prepositioned stocks either ashore
or afloat. Reports maintain that both the Army and Marines have drawn extensively
on prepositioned stocks to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.14 While
drawing on these stocks has facilitated operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, by
depleting these stocks, DOD has assumed near-term operational risks if another large
scale conflict breaks out. While the remnants of these prepositioned stocks provide
a degree of residual capability, there are supposedly some significant inventory and15
maintenance shortfalls.
To support operations, the Army reportedly used almost all of its prepositioned
ship stocks and its stocks ashore in Kuwait and Qatar as well as some stocks in


10 Department of Defense Directive 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve Forces, April 7, 2005.
11 Ibid., p. 3.
12 Peter Spiegel, “Guard Equipment Levels Lowest Since 9/11,” Los Angeles Times, May

10, 2007.


13 Conference Report 110-477, FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 4986,
Explanatory Statement — The Joint Explanatory Statement submitted by the Committee ofth
Conference for the conference report to accompany H.R. 1585 of the 110 Congress (Report
110-477) shall be deemed to be part of the legislative history of this Act (H.R. 4986) and
shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of this Act as it would have
had with respect to the implementation of H.R. 1585, if such bill had been enacted.
14 Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from United States
Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony Before the Subcommittee on
Readiness and Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, “Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on Equipment Reset
Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps,” GAO-06-604T, March 30, 2006,
pp. 15-16.
15 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives,
“Military Prepositioning: Observations on Army and Marine Corps Programs During
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Beyond,” GAO-04-562T, March 24, 2006, p. 11.

Europe.16 This included more than 10,000 pieces of rolling stock, 670,000 repair
parts, 3,000 containers and thousands of other items of equipment.17 According to
Marine Corps leadership, the Marines drew equipment and supplies from the Marine
Corp’s two prepositioning programs — the Maritime Prepositioning Force and the
Marine Corps Prepositioning Program (Norway) — to support operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.18
Reconstituting Prepositioned Stocks. The Army and Marines are attempting
to reconstitute their prepositioned stocks. The Army is reportedly focusing on
building two brigade-sized equipment sets in Kuwait and battalion sized sets in Qatar
and Afghanistan.19 Equipment that is being used to form these sets is coming from
a combination of equipment left in theater, equipment being transferred from U.S.
depots, and from units around the world. Much of this equipment is described as
needing “substantial repair.”20
Prepositioned Stocks Used to Support Iraq “Surge”. Reports suggest
that prepositioned stocks that were being rebuilt were drawn on heavily primarily to
support the Iraq “surge” resulting in the lowest level of prepositioned stocks in five21
years. Under normal circumstances, the Army has five full brigades’ worth of
prepositioned equipment available: two brigades’ worth in Kuwait; one brigade in
Korea, and two brigades’ worth aboard ships in Guam and at the U.S. naval base at
Diego Garcia.22 In order to provide equipment to surging forces, the Army used the
afloat stocks and are also using the Kuwaiti stocks to equip units. Only the South
Korean stocks are largely intact. According to former Chief of Staff of the Army
General (GEN) Peter Schoomaker, it will take two years to rebuild the prepositioned
stocks, a fact that worries both military officials and Congress, as these equipment
shortages severely limit the Army’s ability to respond to other military contingencies.


16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Statement of General Michael W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps before the
House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Army and Marine Corps Strategies for
Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft, June 27, 2006, p. 6.
19 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Readiness and Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives, “Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on
Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps,” GAO-06-604T,
March 30, 2006, pp. 15-16.
20 Ibid.
21 Roxana Tiron, “Panel Questions Equipment Deployment,” The Hill.com, March 14, 2007
and Kris Osborn, “U.S. Army: Prepositioned Stocks at 5-Year Low,” DefenseNews.com,
April 11, 2007.
22 Information in this section is taken from Ann Scott Tyson, “Military is Ill-Prepared for
Other Conflicts, Washington Post, March 19, 2007.

The Army estimates that it will require an additional $2.2 billion to replace
prepositioned equipment that was issued to support the “surge.”23
War-Related Equipment Needs
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have generated a variety of equipment
requirements. These requirements range from developing new equipment, providing
commercially-available equipment to service members and units, and modifying
existing equipment. The early years of the Afghan and Iraq wars revealed
deficiencies both in quantity and quality of protective equipment such as body armor
for individual troops and armor protection for wheeled vehicles. Congressional
involvement has played a significant role in focusing DOD’s attention and resources
in addressing these force protection deficiencies, which have seen significant
improvement over the past few years. Body armor remains an ongoing issue; some
are concerned that the Army’s M-16 series of weapons are not reliable; and one
relatively current force protection initiative, the Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Proof
(MRAP) vehicle, is receiving considerable attention.
Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Proof (MRAP) Vehicles24
MRAP refers to a family of vehicles produced by a variety of U.S. and
international companies that generally incorporate a “V” shaped hull and armor
plating designed to provide protection against mines and improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) which have been responsible for about 70% of U.S. casualties in Iraq.
There are three categories of MRAPs that DOD is procuring:
!Category I vehicles weighing about seven tons and capable of
carrying six passengers.
!Category II vehicles weighing about 19 tons, are capable of carrying
10 passengers and can perform a variety of missions including
ambulance transport and convoy escort.
!Category III vehicles intended to be used primarily to clear mines
and IEDs, weighing about 22.5 tons and capable of carrying up to 12
passengers.
The Army and Marines have employed two versions of MRAPs (the Buffalo and
Cougar, respectively) in limited numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003,
primarily for route clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations.


23 Congressional Transcript - House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Hearing on
Army Reset, April 18, 2007, p. 4.
24 For detailed information on this topic see CRS Report RS22707, Mine-Resistant, Ambush-
Proof (MRAP) Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress.

MRAPs have been described as providing “twice as much protection against IEDs”25
as uparmored HMMWVs. The Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, has made MRAP
procurement one of DOD’s top priorities, and Service requirements have varied
greatly. On June 28, 2007, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)26
reportedly endorsed a requirement to replace every HMMWV in with a MRAP,
potentially pushing the MRAP requirement to more than 23,000 vehicles.27 The
JROC capped overall MRAP procurement at 15,374 vehicles in September 2007 but
suggested that these numbers could change, based on the assessment of
commanders. 28
Body Armor
In June 2007, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that “the
Army and Marines are currently meeting theater ballistic requirements and the
required amount of body armor needed for personnel in theater, including amounts
needed for the surge of troops to Iraq.”29 Both the Army and Marines are involved
in efforts to improve the current Interceptor body armor systems used in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Dragon Skin Body Armor. On March 17, 2006, the Army issued a Safety
of Use Message discontinuing the use of Dragon Skin body armor — a commercially
developed product by Pinnacle Armor — that some soldiers had acquired privately
for use in Iraq and Afghanistan.30 Army officials at the time, who had been
examining Dragon Skin for potential use by the Army, stated that Dragon Skin was
“not certified against small arms threats.”31 Since the ban on Dragon Skin by the
Army, Pinnacle Armor Inc., as well as others have alleged that Dragon Skin
performed better on the Army’s tests and subsequent private tests than the Army has32
suggested. On May 21, 2007, to counter these charges, the Army held a press


25 Tom Vanden Brook, “Troops in Iraq Get Safer Vehicle, USA Today, May 10, 2007.
26 Chartered in 1984 ( 10 U.S.C. Sec 181), the JROC is tasked with examining potential joint
military requirements; identifying, evaluating, and selecting candidates for joint
developmental and acquisition programs; providing oversight of cross-service requirements
and management issues; and resolving service concerns that arise after the initiation of a
joint program.
27 Jason Sherman, “Do the Marines Really Want 246,000 MRAPs? Not Exactly,” Inside
Defense.com, August 2, 2007.
28 JenDiMascio, “JROC Boosts MRAP Requirements; Congress Struggles to Arrange
Funding,” Defense Daily, Volume 235, Issue 56, September 20, 2007.
29 United States Government Accountability Office Testimony Before the House Armed
Services “Defense Logistics: Army and Marine Corps” Body Armor Requirements,
Controls, and Other Issues,” June 6, 2007, p. 3.
30 Safety of Use Message (SOUM) 06-017, “Discontinue Use of Unauthorized Body Armor,
Dragon Skin,” issued by Program Executive Office - Soldier, March 17, 2006.
31 Ibid.
32 Adam Ciralsky and Lisa Meyers, “Are U.S. Soldiers Wearing the Best Body Armor,”
(continued...)

conference where Army officials allege that Dragon Skin had “catastrophically
failed” the Army’s tests.33 On May 21, Senators Levin and McCain wrote Secretary
of Defense Gates asking him to have the Directors of Defense Research Engineering
and Operational Test and Evaluation “conduct a comprehensive technical assessment
of the individual body armor systems currently available.”34 During a House Armed
Services Committee hearing on body armor on June 6, 2007, committee members
called for additional testing for Dragon Skin body armor and the Army reportedly
agreed to re-test Dragon Skin if its maker responded to the Army’s current request
for proposal (RFP) for new body armor.35 The Air Force Material Command has
reportedly recommended that the Air Force prohibit Pinnacle Armor, Inc., from
signing new contracts with the U.S. government due the allegation that Pinnacle
Armor had made false claims about Dragon Skin meeting government testing
standards.36
Replacing M-16 and M-4 Carbines?37 In the mid-1990s, the Army began
fielding the M-4 carbine, a lighter, more compact version of the Vietnam-era M-16
rifle which had a history of malfunctioning in combat. Both M-16 and M-4 carbines
are manufactured by Colt and are currently used by U.S. forces fighting in Iraq and
Afghanistan. While many maintain that the M-4 is a much more reliable rifle than the
M-16, it is alleged that soldiers have expressed significant concerns over the M-16’s
and M-4’s lethality and reliability during combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2004,
the Army’s Special Forces Operational Detachment — Delta (commonly referred to
as “Delta Force”) replaced their M-4 carbines with Heckler & Koch 416 carbines.
The Army’s program to replace the M-16 family of weapons — the Objective
Individual Combat Weapon (OICW) program — began in 1994 and one component
of that program, Heckler & Koch’s XM-8 assault rifle, was considered by some as
the M-16’s/M-4’s replacement. As late as 2005, the XM-8 was reportedly close to
being officially approved as the Army’s new assault rifle, but alleged acquisition and
bureaucratic conflicts within the Army and between the Army and DOD supposedly
compelled the Army to cancel the XM-8 program in October 2005. The Army
reportedly plans to continue its procurement of M-16s and M-4s for “years to come,”


32 (...continued)
MSNBC.com, May 20, 2007 and Matthew Cox, “ TV Report Questions Army Ban on
Dragon Skin,” Army Times, May 21, 2007.
33 DOD News Transcript, “DOD News Briefing with BG Brown from the Pentagon,” May

21, 2007.


34 Letter from the Senate Armed Services Committee from Senators Levin and McCain dated
May 21, 2007.
35 Jen DiMascio, “Lawmakers Support Test of Dragon Skin Body Armor,” Defense Daily,
Volume 234, Issue 47, June 7, 2007, p. 13 and Michelle Tan, “Army Agrees to Test Dragon
Skin Body Armor,” Army Times, June 7, 2007.
36 Megan Scully, “Air Force Officials Seek Disbarment of Body Armor Maker,” National
Journal’s Congress Daily PM, June 11, 2007.
37 Information in this section is taken from a series of articles by Matthew Cox, “Better than
the M-4, But You Can’t Have One,” Army Times, March 1, 2007; “Competition Sought for
New Army Rifle,” Army Times, April 27, 2007; and “Doomed Carbine the Victim of Army
Infighting,” Army Times, June 4, 2007.

and some in Congress have called for a “open competition” to choose a successor to
the M-16 and M-4 assault rifles.
Reset: Replacing Damaged, Destroyed, and Worn-Out
Equipment
Replacing damaged, destroyed, and worn-out equipment arguably constitutes
the most significant equipment issue - both in terms of cost and magnitude - facing
the Army and Marine Corps. The process of replacing this equipment is generally38
referred to as “reset” by the Army and the Marines and is further defined as follows:
!Reset is defined as “a series of actions taken to restore unit
equipment to a desired level of combat capability after returning
from contingency operations.”
!Reset includes the functions of repairing equipment and replacing
equipment that has either been lost in combat or worn to the point of
being uneconomically repairable.
!Reset also includes the function of recapitalization which is the
rebuilding or systemic upgrading of currently fielded systems to a
“zero time/zero miles” status which is intended to extend service
life, reduce operations and support costs, and improve reliability and
enhance capability — often based on lessons learned in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
The Army and Reset. Army leadership has credited funding and “around-
the-clock work” for an increase in FY2007’s reset rate.39 By the end of FY2007, the
Army predicted that it should have reset approximately 117,000 major items of
equipment, including
!557 Aircraft;
!1,700 Tracked Vehicles;
!8,115 HMMWVs;
!1,800 Trucks;


38 Statement by General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, Before the
Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, “The Army’s Reset
Strategy and Plan for Funding Reset Requirements,” June 27, 2006 and “Resetting the
Force: The Equipment Challenge,” Association of the United States Army (AUSA)
Torchbearer National Security Report, October 2005.
39 Information in this section is taken from a statement by BG Charles A. Anderson, MG
Vincent E. Boles, BG Robert M. Radin, and Mr. Thomas E. Mullins before the House
Subcommittee on Readiness and Air and Land Forces, January 31, 2007 and Gerry J.
Gilmore, “Army Equipment Reset Program Ahead of 2006 Pace,” American Forces Press
Services, February 1, 2007.

!1,200 Trailers;
!39,000 Small Arms; and
!7,400 Generators.
In FY2008, the Army hopes to reset 24 brigade combat teams (BCT), consisting
of about 4,000 soldiers and about 40,000 pieces of equipment each, returning from
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Army Combines Reset and Modernization.40 In October 2007, after
a year-long study, the Army decided to combine its reset and modernization efforts
into a single, two-year $50 billion program. The $50 billion price tag for this effort
includes $17 billion spent on rest in FY2007, the Army’s $18.4 billion supplemental
funding request for FY2008, and $14.5 billion in procurement funds spent in FY2007
and appropriated for FY2008. The Army, which plans to complete this program by
the end of FY2009, is said to be taking advantage of resources that they have today
that they might not have in the future. Under this effort, the Army plans to
!go from five Abrams tank variants to two variants by 2011;
!go from five Bradley fighting vehicles to two by 2011;
!all Patriot PAC-2 missiles to PAC-3 missiles;
!9,000 M-35 two and a half ton trucks to be replaced by the Family
of Medium Tactical Vehicles;
!unmanned systems — 3,000 on order for Iraq and Afghanistan; and
!upgraded ballistic armor protection for HMMWVs and MRAPs.
Some analysts believe that this “hurry up” approach of combining reset and
modernization could save the Army money, but there are concerns that by combining
these efforts, separating and tracking costs and expenditures — already a significant
problem — could become more difficult.


40 Information in this section is taken from Kris Osborn, “U.S. Army Plans $50B Reset and
Upgrade,” Defense News, Vol. 22, No. 46, November 26, 2007.

Recent Congressional Actions.41 The National Defense Authorization Act
for FY2008, H.R. 4986, authorizes $18.4 billion for Army reset, $4.8 billion over the
Administration’s FY2008 budget request.
The Marines and Reset. The Marines estimated that the cost to rest the
Marine Corps at the end of FY2006 was $13.7 billion, a “rolling estimate that
included two years worth of depot at the conclusion of the current hostilities and is
thus somewhat variable.”42
Recent Congressional Actions. The National Defense Authorization Act
for FY2008, H.R. 4986, authorizes $8.6 billion for Marine Corps reset, $ 6.9 billion
over the Administration’s FY2008 budget request.
Potential Issues for Congress
Equipping Reserve Forces
There are continued concerns about the availability of equipment for reserve
forces — particularly the Army National Guard — in terms of readiness to address
domestic responsibilities as well as when these units are deployed to Iraq and
Afghanistan. In January 2007, Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that:
The high use of the National Guard for federal overseas missions has reduced
equipment available for its state-led domestic missions, at the same time it faces43
an expanded array of threats at home.
On March 27, 2007, Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief of the National
Guard Bureau, told the House Subcommittee on Readiness that the Army National
Guard had only 40% of its required equipment on-hand, with an additional 11% of
that equipment either deployed with units or left in theater for other units to use.44
Lieutenant General Blum further maintained that this situation hindered the ability


41 Conference Report 110-477, FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 4986,
Explanatory Statement — The Joint Explanatory Statement submitted by the Committee ofth
Conference for the conference report to accompany H.R. 1585 of the 110 Congress (Report
110-477) shall be deemed to be part of the legislative history of this Act (H.R. 4986) and
shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of this Act as it would have
had with respect to the implementation of H.R. 1585, if such bill had been enacted.
42 Statement of Lieutenant General Emerson N. Gardner, Jr., “U.S. Marine Corps and U.S.
Navy Reset Requirements,” before the House Subcommittees on Readiness and on
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, February 13, 2007, p. 3.
43 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) “Report on Reserve Forces:
Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and
Readiness,” GAO-07-60, January 2007, p. 1.
44 Statement by Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau
before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Readiness on Readiness of
the Army and Air National Guard, March 27, 2007, p. 3.

to train units and could slow the National Guard’s domestic response to disasters or
terrorist incidents.45 Recent reports suggest that National Guard soldiers training for
deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan are not able to train with the same rifles,
HMMWVs, night vision, and other types of equipment that these soldiers will be
issued when they arrive in theater which has raised questions as to how well these
units will be able to function in combat when they are provided equipment that they
are not familiar with?46 The Army has reportedly pledged to spend $21 billion over
the next four years to re-equip the National Guard, but some are concerned that this
equipment will instead be deployed to Iraq to support the “Surge” instead of being
used to re-equip depleted National Guard units at home as they prepare to support
domestic missions and train for overseas deployments.47
Given these concerns, Congress might decide to examine DOD’s and the
Army’s plans to re-equip National Guard units. Such an examination could focus on
how units will be re-equipped to deal with domestic responsibilities and also how
these units will be provided with the same equipment that they will receive upon
deployment for home-station training in the United States. This examination might
also examine how DOD and the Army plan to bring the Reserve’s aggregate
equipment level from about the current 40% level to at least the 80% level that Guard
and Reserve leadership have called an “acceptable level” to meet both domestic and
overseas requirements.48
The State of Prepositioned Stocks49
Some in Congress have expressed alarm in both the extended duration of time
that DOD has allocated to reconstitute prepositioned stocks as well as a lack of a
comprehensive plan to reconstitute these strategic assets. In its version of the FY2008
National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1585), the House Armed Services
Committee requires DOD to submit an annual report on the status of U.S.
prepositioned stocks, including funding requirements, intended future strategic use
of these stocks, and strategic risk mitigation plan if these stocks are used before fully
replenished. There are other potential considerations related to preposition stocks
that Congress might decide to review. Will the Army and Marines reconstitute
preposition stocks with equipment such as Armored Security Vehicles (ASVs),
MRAPs, and other specialized equipment developed in response to wartime needs
or will the Services instead replenish prepositioned stocks to pre-war authorization
standards? Another consideration is the readiness status of equipment being used for


45 Ibid.
46 James Hannah, “Differences in Guard Weapons Raise Concern,” Army Times, May 31,

2007 and Matthew Dolan, “Preparing for Battle,” Baltimore Sun, May 31, 2007.


47 Sonya Crawford, “National Guard Dealing with Equipment Shortages,” ABC News,
February 24, 2007.
48 Jefferson Morris, “National Guard Needs $40 Billion to Bring Equipment Up to Snuff,
Chief Says,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, February 1, 2007.
49 Information in this section is taken from House Armed Services Committee press release,
“House Armed Services Committee Approves Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Authorization
Bill,”May 9, 2007, p. 7.

replenishment. Some reports have asserted that much of the equipment being used
in DOD’s current restocking efforts is in poor condition and requires extensive
maintenance.
How Many MRAPs Does DOD Intend to Procure?
On November 30, 2007, the Marines reduced their MRAP requirement from
3,700 to approximately 2,300 vehicles.50 The Marines cited six factors in their
decision:
!IED attacks were dramatically down over the preceding six months.
!The relatively heavy MRAP cannot operate or pursue the enemy off-
road, in confined areas, or across most bridges.
!Reduced need to put Marines on high-threat roads through the use
of persistent surveillance and airlift of supplies.
!Counterinsurgency focus requires Marines dismount and interact
closely with the local populace.
!MRAPs associated with surge forces were no longer needed.
!MRAP sustainment numbers were lower due to fewer than expected
combat losses.
The Marine’s reduction in its MRAP requirement from 3,700 to 2,300 was
anticipated to result in a potential cost savings of approximately $1.7 billion in
FY2008 and FY2009.
The Army is also expected to cut a number of MRAPs from its current 10,000-
vehicle requirement but has not yet publically committed to a specific requirement.51
The Army also cited decreasing casualties and IED attacks over the previous six
months, as well as the need to dismount and interact with the populace, as factors in
reducing its original MRAP requirement.
While decreasing MRAP requirements based on the improving tactical situation
in Iraq and in anticipation of a reduction in troop levels can be considered prudent
management by DOD, at some point DOD will need to establish a firm requirement
for the total number of MRAPs to be procured.


50 Information in this section is taken from a U.S. Marine Corps Information Paper,
“Reduction in the USMC Mrap Requirement” November 30, 2007.
51 Information in this section is from Tom Vanden Brook, “Army May Cut Armored
Vehicles,” USA Today, December 10, 2007 and Jim Garamone, “Army Looks at Long-Term
Need for Mine-Resistant Vehicles,” American Forces Press Service, December 12,2007.

A Replacement for M-16/M-4 Carbines?
Allegations that the successor of the Army’s M-16/M-4 carbine, the Heckler &
Koch’s XM-8 assault rifle, was cancelled due to bureaucratic conflicts among Army
and DOD acquisition officials might be an issue for congressional examination.
Some may question why the Army remains committed to upgrading an almost 50-
year-old weapon when other DOD organizations, such as special operations units,
have adopted other weapons that are considered more reliable and effective in
combat than the M-4 carbine. It can be argued that the Army has exhibited a
tendency to pursue incremental improvements to legacy systems, such as repeated
add-on armor upgrades to HMMWVs, instead of fully examining and rapidly
procuring commercially-available systems that prove to be more effective than
current systems.