International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance, Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress








Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress



Humanitarian emergencies can emerge anywhere in the world, stemming from natural disasters or
man-made conflicts. U.S. and international humanitarian assistance can have an important impact
not only on the relief operation itself but on broader foreign policy issues. In the second session th
of the 110 Congress, humanitarian assistance is likely to enjoy continued bipartisan support,
with key policy issues focused on budget priorities, levels of funding, and the types of other
support available worldwide.
The President can provide emergency humanitarian assistance through several sources whose
funding is authorized and appropriated by Congress. These are funds appropriated to the Office of
Foreign Disaster Administration (OFDA) in the Agency for International Development (USAID);
U.S. Department of Agriculture food aid programs under P.L. 480 Food for Peace and Section
416 (b) of the Agriculture Act of 1949; the State Department Emergency Refugee and Migration
Account (ERMA) a contingency account that can contain as much as $100 million for assistance
to refugees fleeing persecution; and funds appropriated to the Department of Defense, Overseas
Humanitarian and Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA).
In addition, the President has the authority to draw down defense equipment and direct military
personnel to respond to disasters and provide space-available transportation on military aircraft
and ships to private donors who wish to transport humanitarian goods and equipment in response
to a disaster. Finally, the President can request other government agencies to assist within their
capabilities. In FY2006 the United States contributed close to $3 billion to disaster relief
worldwide.
This report examines U.S. humanitarian assistance in international crises and disaster situations.
It considers the sources of U.S. government aid (including the governmental response
mechanism), budget trends in humanitarian assistance, and issues for Congress. It does not
specifically address the creation of a new Director of Foreign Assistance position at the State
Department or the broader restructuring of U.S. foreign aid programs. For background and
information on this issue, see CRS Report RL33491, Restructuring U.S. Foreign Aid: The Role of
the Director of Foreign Assistance, by Connie Veillette. See also http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/

2006/59398.htm and remarks by Secretary Rice at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/


59408.htm. Ambassador Randall L. Tobias is the first Director of Foreign Assistance and serves
concurrently as the Administrator of USAID.This report will be updated as the restructuring
initiatives evolve, or if in the meantime, the humanitarian response mechanism within the U.S.
government changes.






Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Defining Humanitarian Assistance............................................................................................1
Exemptions for Humanitarian Assistance.................................................................................2
Budget Trends: A Thirty-Year Review of U.S. Humanitarian Assistance.......................................2
Sources of U.S. Governmental Humanitarian Aid..........................................................................5
United States Agency for International Development...............................................................5
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)..................................................................5
Food for Peace (FFP)..........................................................................................................6
Office of Military Affairs (OMA).......................................................................................7
Other Funds.........................................................................................................................7
Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)..................................................................................7
Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM)....................................................7
Department of State...................................................................................................................8
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM)......................................................8
Emergency Refugee and Migration Account (ERMA).......................................................8
Department of Defense.............................................................................................................8
The Role of Congress......................................................................................................................9
Funding Sources and Oversight................................................................................................9
Roles of the U.S. Government and Private Sector in Humanitarian Aid Delivery........................10
International Humanitarian Assistance..........................................................................................10
Sources of Post-Disaster and Post-Conflict Assistance.................................................................12
Issues for Congress........................................................................................................................13
Competing Aid and Budget Priorities.....................................................................................13
Burdensharing and Donor Fatigue..........................................................................................13
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)...........................................................................14
Transparency and Efficacy......................................................................................................14
Consequences of Humanitarian Assistance.............................................................................14
Links to Broader Foreign Policy Goals...................................................................................15
Figure 1. Humanitarian Assistance Spending..................................................................................4
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................15






The United States is a major contributor to relief efforts in international crises and disaster
situations. Key relief-related policy issues likely to be of concern in the second session of the th

110 Congress include budget priorities, levels of funding, and the types and levels of support 2


available from the international community. In FY2006, the U.S. government contributed close 3
to $3 billion to disaster relief worldwide. Congress has consistently supported humanitarian
efforts as a means of responding to natural disasters (such as floods, earthquakes) and man-made 4
crises (such as war) in the short term, taking the lead and promoting a U.S. presence.
Humanitarian assistance generally receives bipartisan congressional support. Congress has given
the President broad authority in this area. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), as
amended, authorizes the United States to participate in disaster relief efforts and gives the
President great flexibility to respond to disasters with a wide range of government-funded 5
humanitarian assistance.
In 1993, President Clinton designated for the first time the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) as the Special Coordinator for International Disaster 6
Assistance. In this capacity the Administrator coordinates the U.S. government’s response to
both natural or man-made disasters. The Administrator also calls upon federal agencies to provide
assistance; contracts with and funds private voluntary agencies to provide humanitarian 7
assistance; and coordinates the U.S. response with that of other countries.
The very nature of humanitarian emergencies—the need to respond quickly in order to save lives
and provide relief—has resulted in a broad definition of humanitarian assistance, on both a policy
and operational level. While humanitarian assistance is assumed to address urgent food, shelter,
and medical needs, the agencies within the U.S. government providing this support expand or
contract the definition in response to circumstances.

1 This report draws on an earlier report on the same topic, now out of print, by Lois McHugh.
2 These key policy issues may be applied in the global context, but also in the U.S. response to specific crises of
concern to Congress.
3 Due to the unanticipated nature of many disasters, humanitarian aid budget allocations often increase throughout the
year as demands arise. Countries that have or are experiencing a crisis or natural disaster receive U.S. aid through
several key worldwide emergency humanitarian assistance accounts for disaster (International Disaster and Famine
Assistance or IDFA); food relief (P.L. 480 Title II); and refugee programs (Emergency Refugee Migration Assistance
or ERMA). These accounts are generally used to respond to emergency situations and are not integrated into long-term
development strategies.
4 U.S. private contributions and efforts are also part of the overall response but not addressed in this report.
5 Sec. 491-493 of P.L. 87-195, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
6 Sec. 493 of P.L. 87-195, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
7 Ambassador Randall L. Tobias was nominated by President Bush in January 2006 to serve concurrently as the
Administrator of USAID and the first Director of Foreign Assistance. The Senate confirmed his appointment as USAID
Administrator on March 29, 2006, and he was sworn in on March 31. As Director of Foreign Assistance, Ambassador
Tobias holds the rank of Deputy Secretary of State and also reports to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. For more
information, see http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/bios/bio_rtobias.html.





The legislation governing humanitarian or disaster assistance leaves the decision on the type of
assistance required to the President. U.S. humanitarian assistance in disasters and international
crises is broad, far reaching and covers many elements directly concerned with the provision of 8
relief and strategies for strengthening how people survive over time. Congress broadly defines
humanitarian activities in an effort to enable the U.S. response to be as flexible as possible to
adapt to humanitarian needs. Assistance can include the provision of basic needs, child survival
strategies, and assistance to refugees, but in practice the provision of humanitarian assistance is 9
typically case and time specific.
In general, humanitarian assistance is exempt from the regulations implementing various types of 10
foreign aid sanctions. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (P.L. 87-195), allows the
President to provide disaster assistance, “notwithstanding any other provision of this or any other
Act,” which would otherwise prohibit or restrict aid to selected countries, such as economic
sanctions.


The United States, consistently a large contributor to international disaster and humanitarian relief
operations, has spent unprecedented amounts on global humanitarian emergencies, particularly in
the last decade. The confluence of several natural disasters—Hurricane Mitch, which struck
Central America in late 1998; the drought in Ethiopia and elsewhere in Africa since 2002; the
Indian Ocean tsunami, which struck in December 2004, and the October 2005 earthquake in
Pakistan—plus continuing conflicts around the world—Kosovo (1999), Liberia (until 2003),
Afghanistan (2002), pre-war Iraq (2003), Haiti (2004), and Darfur (since 2003)—combined to 12
push foreign aid spending on humanitarian crises to their highest levels in three decades. The

8 A livelihood strategy considers the specific context and circumstances of the situation in designing effective programs
that work with local abilities to cope with emergencies.
9 What is less clear is when an activity might be considered humanitarian as differentiated from post-conflict transition
or reconstruction, and to what degree this distinction needs to remain flexible to adapt to changes in policy or
operations on the ground. In an operational sense, humanitarian and other assistance is often provided on parallel
tracks, and there is usually an overlap in activities in the transition from one phase to another.
10 The decision as to what is considered humanitarian versus non-humanitarian is often made on a case-by-case basis.
For example, in the India-Pakistan situation in 1998, sanctions were applied following Indias nuclear tests; under the
Pressler Amendment, all aid was cut off except for specific relief assistance programs.
11 While there is noofficial definition of what constitutes U.S. humanitarian assistance, for the purposes of a trend
analysis, this discussion is based on spending appropriated in the current Foreign Operations and Agriculture accounts
for International Disaster and Famine Assistance, Transition Initiatives, Migration and Refugee Assistance, Emergency
Migration and Refugee Assistance Fund, and title II of P.L. 480 food assistance. In addition, in selected years,
Congress created special accounts for specific relief efforts, such as the Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund
(2005) and Central America and the Caribbean Emergency Fund (1999). Figures do not include amounts funded
outside the Foreign Affairs Budget Function 150, such as the Defense Department’s Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster,
and Civic Action account provided in annual DOD appropriations, i.e., the 151 Budget Account. Data are expressed in
FY2006 dollars taking in the effects of inflation over time. This section is based on CRS Report RL33262, Foreign
Policy Budget Trends: A Thirty-Year Review,and was written by Larry Nowels.
12 Because many humanitarian emergencies continue well beyond the year in which they first arise, aid programs may
(continued...)





$3.83 billion humanitarian aid budget for FY2003 was the largest since the late 1970s, and
slightly higher than the $3.73 billion funding level for FY2005. Resources for FY2006 ($3
billion) are lower than the recent peak years, although they remain one of the largest totals over
the past 30 years.
In this 30-year review, there were only two instances where humanitarian aid funding levels come
close to recent totals. For FY1980-FY1981, large supplementals for Indochina and Soviet/East
European refugee resettlements brought amounts to around $2.8 billion. In FY1985 humanitarian
relief spending exceeded $2.75 billion, largely due to a substantial U.S. response to a major
famine in Africa. Assistance to populations affected by the Gulf War in 1991 and to victims of
conflict in Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda in 1994 represented other “surge” years for humanitarian 13
aid budgets.

(...continued)
be ongoing for several of these cases.
13 It should be noted that comparisons across disasters may be helpful in general terms, but the data cannot illustrate
fully the complexities of each situation. The disasters themselves are not equivalent: the areas in which they occur
differ dramatically in terrain, underlying economic conditions, and governmental capacity. Each U.S. agency has its
own budget, with its own criteria, accounting detail, and regional specificity. Budgets may reflect regional support, a
certain area, specific countries, or a combination thereof over time and with changing events. Authority, definitions,
and categories of services are not necessarily equivalent across events. The fact that an urgent response to humanitarian
crises is often required only compounds the problem of tracking humanitarian aid funding levels.




KEY TRENDS
Figure 1. Humanitarian Assistance Spending
• Due to the unforeseen and unpredictable nature of
events requiring humanitarian relief, spending
patterns have been highly erratic over the past 30
years.
• In general, however, resources committed for food,
disaster, and refugee support have been growing for
the past two decades. Amounts have been especially
large in several years since FY1999.
• FY2006 appropriations for humanitarian aid
programs, at $3 billion, fell below recent years—
FY1999, FY2003, and FY2005.
• For the entire 30-year period, FY2006 spending on
humanitarian relief operations is nearly 30% higher
iki/CRS-RL33769than the $2.32 billion annual average, but only
g/wslightly larger than the annual average since FY1999.
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Note: Unless otherwise stated, figures are expressed in constant FY2006 dollars.






Categories of humanitarian assistance can be broken down into several main elements including,
relief and rehabilitation, food assistance, refugee programs, and logistical and operational
support. Three central parts of the U.S. government—USAID, the State Department, and the
Department of Defense—provide humanitarian assistance and cover a mix of these activities as 14
described below. USAID is the central U.S. agency charged with coordinating U.S. government
and private sector foreign assistance.
OFDA, within USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA),
provides non-food humanitarian assistance during international crises and disasters and can
respond immediately with relief materials and personnel, many of whom are often already in the
field. OFDA was established in 1964 to coordinate what had previously been an ad hoc U.S.
response to international disasters. It facilitates the U.S. government emergency assistance.
OFDA provides some assistance through its own personnel, but the bulk of its activities are
carried out through grants to U.N. agencies, other international organizations (IOs), international
governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private or religious voluntary
organizations (PVOs). It also coordinates with the U.S. embassy or USAID mission in the
affected country, the government of the country suffering the disaster, and other governments.
Funding for USAID/OFDA is authorized and appropriated in the annual Foreign Operations
legislation.
A response to a disaster generally begins with the U.S. ambassador or Chief of Mission
responding to a request from the affected country’s government for assistance. OFDA has use of
up to $50,000 (through Disaster Assistance Authority) immediately available, which it releases to
the USAID mission or U.S. embassy, generally within 24 hours. This money is then provided to
the local Red Cross/ Red Crescent or a similar local disaster response organization, or it may be
used to buy relief supplies or hire personnel locally. The United States also begins working with
the affected government through the Ambassador to determine what, if any, additional aid may be
needed.
USAID/OFDA can respond immediately with cash, relief materials and personnel to any kind of
disaster, whether man-made or natural. The President has the authority to set the terms and
conditions of the aid provided. As a general rule, assistance provided by USAID/OFDA lasts
about 90 days, although the agency may continue monitoring and mitigation projects for a longer
period. Some USAID/OFDA personnel are located in various countries around the world and can
move quickly to a disaster area. OFDA also has Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTS),

14 In addition, although not the focus of this report, other parts of the U.S. government that support humanitarian
assistance include the USDA Forest Service, the USGS, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHSS),
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which contribute technical assistance to OFDA as needed in response
to humanitarian emergencies.





experts who can be brought together quickly to respond to different types of disasters. These
groups may be sent to the area in anticipation of a disaster, such as a tropical storm or flood that
has been predicted by the weather service. Once a DART is deployed, a Washington, DC-based
Response Management Team (RMT) is also activated.
Under the legislation governing disaster assistance, the President is authorized to borrow up to
$50 million in any fiscal year from any other section of the economic assistance part of the
foreign aid program if funding within the USAID/OFDA budget is inadequate. Generally, this
money is borrowed from programs already planned for countries within the region. These
borrowed funds may be repaid through passage by Congress of a supplemental appropriation.
USAID regional bureaus may also reprogram their projects within the disaster region in response
to local needs, or they may transfer funds to USAID/OFDA to carry out disaster related programs.
USAID/OFDA can also request the use of facilities, equipment, or personnel from other agencies
as needed. For example, U.S. weather prediction facilities and satellites may be used to track
storms, droughts, or floods. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (HHS) specialists are
relied upon for identifying and responding to outbreaks of disease.
The USAID Administrator also administers Title II of P.L. 480, the Food For Peace program 15
established in 1954. P.L. 480 is authorized and appropriated in the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) legislation and was most recently reauthorized and amended in the Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996. Title II provides food as grant aid that does
not need to be repaid. Title II is the primary disaster aid channel for U.S. food aid. A Food
Security Trust (P.L. 105-385) can be used to provide emergency humanitarian food aid if
emergency needs exceed what could be provided under regular Title II programming. The Food
Security Trust is composed of stocks of wheat, rice, corn or sorghum. Funds of the Commodity
Credit Corporation may be used to replenish the Trust.
The legislation gives the USAID Administrator wide authority to provide food aid and contains a
“notwithstanding clause” that allows food aid to be provided despite prohibitions in other
legislation. Commodities may be made available for direct distribution to the needy, or for sale,
barter, or other disposition, according to the determination of the Administrator.
The United States is by far the largest international contributor of emergency food aid in disaster
situations. In recent years, most emergency food aid has been provided to victims of complex
humanitarian emergencies, helping people displaced by warfare and unable to grow or obtain
food in their traditional way. Crisis conditions often last many years. Food aid programs generally
target the most vulnerable populations, including children, pregnant and nursing mothers, the
elderly, sick and handicapped, and those identified as malnourished. Title II grant food aid is
mostly provided for humanitarian relief but may also be used for development-oriented purposes
through governments, intergovernmental entities, PVOs, and multilateral organizations, such as
the World Food Program (WFP).

15 Authorized in Section 201-207 of P.L. 83-480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as
amended.





As with other USAID/OFDA aid, food aid may be prepositioned in regions that are vulnerable to
disaster, or diverted from a less pressing food aid program in a nearby country that would be
replenished later. Food aid that is not prepositioned or diverted from nearby countries may take
several months to reach a disaster site. At least 75% of U.S. food aid tonnage must be shipped on
U.S. flagged vessels. Section 416 (b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949 provides for the donation of
surplus U.S. agricultural commodities held by the Commodity Credit Corporation to needy
countries, including those suffering from disasters. This program is managed by the USDA.
Also placed within the DCHA, the OMA was established in October 2005 as an operational link
to improve USAID’s coordination of humanitarian assistance with the U.S. military. Senior
USAID staff are assigned to the five geographic Combatant Commands and help assess
development needs. Joint exercises with the military are planned for ongoing training in
preparation for future disasters. Training for both the military’s civil affairs officers and USAID
workers is also intended to increase knowledge and cooperation, and capacity at the operational
level. The OMA is also a contact point between NGOs and the military, and allows each to benefit
from the others operational experience while at the same time contributing to the administration 16
and delivery of humanitarian assistance.
There are three funds that can be used for disaster assistance and that are focused on specific
issues—Displaced Children and Orphans Fund (DCOF), the Leahy War Victims Fund (LWVF),
and the Victims Torture Fund (VOT). They are coordinated by DCHA through funds reserved by
Congress each year.
OTI provides post-disaster transition assistance, which includes mainly short-term peace and
democratization projects with some attention to humanitarian elements (e.g. community projects 17
such as housing, electricity, water) but not emergency relief.
CMM also provides transition assistance towards development through early intervention in the
causes and consequences of conflict.

16 For more information, see http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2007/cent_progs/central_dcha_oma.html. See also
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1104/ijpe/ijpe1104.htm.
17 Other departments within USAID may provide some form of humanitarian assistance but it is unclear how much
because humanitarian activities may be a part but not the central focus of the program, such as womens health, child
survival, trauma counseling and social welfare, and demining, activities that may be considered by some to be
humanitarian.





PRM deals with problems of refugees worldwide, conflict victims, and populations of concern to
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), often including Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs). Humanitarian assistance includes a range of services from basic needs to
community services to tolerance building and dialogue initiatives. Key issues include protection
(refugee, asylum issues, identification, returns, tracing activities) and quick impact, small
community projects.
Refugee funds are provided as cash grants to international governmental and NGO refugee
organizations. These include U.N. agencies such as UNHCR and the United Nations Children’s
Fund (UNICEF), and international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), and NGOs, such as CARE, Doctors without Borders, and Catholic Relief Services
(CRS).
ERMA is a contingency fund that remains available until spent and is replenished as needed by
Congress. P.L. 103-236 sets the maximum amount of money that can be in this account at $100 18
million although appropriations have been made that exceed this amount. Established in 1962,
ERMA gives the President wide latitude in responding to refugee emergencies. Refugees are
defined as those fleeing their homeland due to persecution on account of their religion, race,
political opinion or social or ethnic group. The law contains a “notwithstanding clause” that
waives prohibitions against providing aid contained in any other legislation. The legislation
establishing ERMA places certain requirements on the President. The President must publish a
Presidential Determination in the Federal Register and keep the appropriate Congressional
committees informed of drawdowns. Refugee emergencies lasting more than a year are
incorporated into the regular budget of the Migration and Refugee Account (MRA) through the
Bureau of Population, Migration and Refugees (PRM). Both ERMA and MRA are authorized in
the Department of State legislation and appropriated in the foreign operations legislation.
The Department of Defense (DOD) provides support to stabilize emergency situations, including
the transport and provision of food, shelter and supplies, logistical support, search and rescue,
medical evacuations, and refugee assistance. This includes the provision of 2,300 calorie low-cost
humanitarian daily rations to alleviate hunger after foreign disasters. The incremental costs for all
DOD humanitarian assistance for both natural and man-made disasters is funded through the
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Action (OHDACA) account in annual DOD
appropriations.
DOD provides assistance in humanitarian emergencies under several provisions in law. The
primary authority is Title 10, Section 2561 (formerly Section 2551), which allows the use of

18 Authorized in Sections 2 and 3 of P.L. 87-510, the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962.





appropriated funds for humanitarian assistance “for the purpose of providing transportation of 19
humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide.” The Secretary of State
determines that this provision should be used and requests DOD to respond to a disaster with
specific assistance such as helicopter transport, provision of temporary water supplies, or road
and bridge repair. DOD response time depends upon what is being requested and how long it
takes to get personnel and equipment to the site of the emergency. If possible, military personnel
join the USAID’s OFDA assessment team to help determine the type of aid that can be provided
by DOD. Under this provision, DOD generally limits its service activities to those that stabilize
the emergency situation, such as road or bridge repair, but generally does not undertake projects
that include rebuilding. The law requires an annual report to Congress on the use of funds.
Title 10 also contains a section that helps private voluntary agencies transport donated
humanitarian goods to disaster sites. Section 402, the Denton program, named after former
Member of Congress Jeremiah Denton, authorizes shipment of privately donated humanitarian
goods on U.S. military aircraft on a space-available basis. The donated goods must be certified as
appropriate for the disaster by USAID’s OFDA and can be bumped from the transport if other
U.S. government aid must be transported. Donated goods can also be shipped on commercial
vessels, using Section 2561 funds.
Section 506 (a) (1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 allows the draw down of military
equipment to a limit of $100 million in any fiscal year if the President determines that an
unforseen emergency exists that requires immediate military assistance and the requirement
cannot be met under any other provision. Before this provision can be used the President must
notify the Speaker of the House and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in writing by
issuing a Presidential Directive explaining and justifying the need for the equipment being used.
This request is handled by the Department of State and the National Security Council.

OFDA, ERMA, and P.L. 480 requests are generally approved by Congress at the requested level.
At times, however, the amount of disaster assistance provided during a Fiscal Year exceeds the
amount appropriated by Congress. Congress has provided the President with the authority to
borrow up to $50 million from economic assistance accounts in the foreign aid program. In some
cases, particularly when disasters occur during the appropriations process, Congressional
amendments reimbursing a particular agency for a specific disaster may become part of the next
year’s appropriation for that agency.
Congress is also generally supportive of supplemental appropriations that reimburse agencies for
their expenditures, either to replenish the emergency accounts or other accounts that have been
used to provide assistance. When there is difficulty in passing supplemental legislation, the debate
is generally over non-disaster items, such as long-term reconstruction aid for the devastated area,

19 Section 404 of Title 10 also authorizes DOD to provide foreign disaster assistance. It is not generally used because it
is considered to be somewhat cumbersome and requires an expansive report to Congress.





or non-germane amendments added to the legislation rather than opposition to disaster assistance
funding itself.


Most development and humanitarian assistance activities are not directly implemented by U.S.
government personnel but by private sector entities, either non-profit or commercial. Generally
speaking, government foreign service and civil servants determine the direction and priorities of
the aid program, allocate funds while keeping within congressional requirements, ensure that
appropriate projects are in place to meet aid objectives, select implementors, and monitor the
implementation of those projects for effectiveness and financial accountability. At one time,
USAID professionals played a larger role in implementing aid programs, but the affect of budget
cuts on personnel and the emergence of private sector alternatives over the past thirty years has
led to a shift in responsibilities. Private sector aid implementors, usually employed as contractors
or grantees, may be individual “personal service contractors,” consulting firms, non-profit NGOs,
universities, or charitable PVOs. These currently carry out the vast array of aid projects in all
sectors.

The complex humanitarian emergency has emerged as a category of crisis that can be defined in
different ways. It can be viewed according to the situation on the ground—scale and intensity of
population dislocation, destruction of social networks/community and infrastructure, insecurity of
civilians and noncombatants, human rights abuses; by the complexity of the response needed to
address these problems; or by the multi-causal factors that may have contributed to the escalation
of conflict in the first place.
Beginning in the 1990s, crisis operations increased in war-torn countries and regions throughout
the world along with the numbers of those providing relief, primarily humanitarian organizations
and international actors. Multinational military forces also served a greater peacekeeping role in
these internal wars. The media added a new measure of influence to the response to such crises in 21
the form of greater access and live reporting. In these situations the plight of the refugee was
one critical element of population movement; the internally displaced person (IDP) became 22
another. Conducting a humanitarian operation in areas of conflict often means that access to
populations in need and the distribution of emergency relief supplies is hampered by security
concerns, not only for those needing assistance but for humanitarian personnel as well.

20 This section appears in CRS Report 98-916, Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy,
by Curt Tarnoff and Larry Nowels.
21 Defined broadly as those seeking asylum outside their country of citizenship with protection provided under
international law.
22 A direct result of internal wars, the internally displaced are also seeking asylum but within their state’s borders. IDPs
do not have the same protection as refugees under international law. The plight of this group has gained international
recognition as a problem that needs to be addressed. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has often
been involved in providing assistance for IDPs.





The United States responds with varying amounts of relief and recovery assistance, typically in
coordination with its international partners. The sheer number of players in the field, including a
range of actors and interests, creates a complicated coordination challenge and often contributes
to duplication of efforts or competition over the same sources of money and projects. Those
involved may include, for example, numerous U.N. agencies, other international organizations
(IOs), bilateral and multilateral donors, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
International actors provide relief either through financial contributions to the government of the
affected country or aid organizations, or by directly providing relief supplies and emergency
personnel. Local, regional, and national authorities may also have a role in the provision of
assistance, law enforcement and access control. It is important to note that local aid organizations
may be critical because they often know the terrain, the available resources, and the community,
whereas the international community may bring to bear greater resources and coordinating
capacity.
While the relief operation itself is often daunting in terms of the demands of those in need—from
life saving action required to the provision of food and shelter under harsh physical conditions—
the response system has many moving parts. The United Nations works with a wide number and
variety of aid organizations and donors. Within the U.N. system, in addition to the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the World Food Program (WFP), the World
Health Organization (WHO), the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) all contribute to efforts to 23
respond to a crisis. OCHA also coordinates with IOs such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and NGOs such as
the International Rescue Committee (IRC), CARE, Mercy Corps and perhaps hundreds of others,
many of which are implementing partners and provide much of the operational support on the
ground. In addition, other internationals—governments, militaries, intergovernmental entities
such as the European Union—are often part of the response network.
A key determinant in the response to humanitarian emergencies is, not surprisingly, level of prior
planning, including the identification of responders—local, national, or international—and their
level of preparedness. Furthermore, it is widely recognized that in many crises, it is the people
who are least able to help themselves—those who are poor and those who have few, if any, 24
options to live elsewhere—who are most affected. Experts continue to emphasize the
importance of drawing on lessons learned from responses to previous crises and disasters. Some
of the ongoing challenges include communication between the government, aid agencies, and the
public; coordination among emergency responders; civil-military cooperation and division of
duties; and the planning and logistics involved in providing aid to less accessible, often more
insecure, areas.

23 As one of its functions, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) tracks worldwide
contributions to disasters. See http://www.reliefweb.int. Also, see http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/
humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/ for USAIDs OFDA webpage. Relief Web is a good source of
information, although the accuracy is not guaranteed. See http://www.reliefweb.int.
24What Can we Learn from Year of Disasters? December 29, 2005, Reuters AlertNet, http://www.alertnet.org.







After the emergency is over, reconstruction or recovery aid is provided through other channels,
such as the regular bilateral country development programs of USAID or in some cases, through
the USAID/OTI, funded as part of the disaster response account. USAID/OTI may be involved in
providing assistance to countries that are in a stage of transition from man-made crisis to
recovery. OTI focuses on areas such as demobilizing and reemploying military combatants, and
furthering democratic governance such as supporting elections and building judicial systems.
USAID/OFDA also includes disaster prevention within its budget. The Prevention, Mitigation,
Preparedness, and Planning Division has helped countries and regions minimize the damage and
loss of life in repeated natural disasters. USAID/FFP aid is also available for non-emergency
humanitarian aid. Title II contains provisions for providing non-emergency development food aid.
This program can be used in the transition period after a disaster for reconstruction purposes. 25
Titles III and Section 416 (b) of the 1949 Agriculture act support longer-term development aid.
Title 10 includes two sections that are used to provide longer-term humanitarian assistance, but
are not normally useful in fast moving emergencies. Section 401 allows the use of U.S. military
personnel to carry out humanitarian and civic activities in conjunction with military operations
(these are usually training exercises). These activities must complement, not duplicate, any other
social or economic assistance provided, and must be approved by the Secretary of State. Services
can include medical, dental, and veterinary care, construction and repair of rudimentary roads and
rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities, and well-drilling and construction of
basic sanitary facilities. There are conditions on assistance regarding land mines. This provision
requires an annual report to Congress.
Section 2557 authorizes the donation of non-lethal excess property, such as trucks. It can include
any item of excess property except weapons, ammunition, or other items designed to inflict harm.
Both of these sections are used for later stage recovery programs or transition programs aimed at
restoring a country to the development path.
Although not a focus of this report, debt relief, or at least a temporary moratorium on debt
repayment has also become part of the U.S. and international response to disasters in heavily
indebted developing countries. In 1997, industrialized countries participating in the Heavily
Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Trust Fund agreed to include special consideration for countries 26
emerging from disaster.

25 Department of Defense humanitarian assistance for use in post-emergency disaster situations includes Sections 401
and 2547 of Title 10, which have already been discussed.
26 For more information on debt relief issues, see CRS Report RS22534, The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, by
Martin A. Weiss.






Amid efforts to tackle rising budget deficits by, among other measures, slowing or reducing
discretionary spending or finding the resources to sustain U.S. aid pledges may be difficult. After
the 2004 tsunami disaster, some Members of Congress publicly expressed concern that funding
for tsunami relief and reconstruction, which depleted most worldwide disaster contingency
accounts, could jeopardize resources for subsequent international disasters or for other aid 27
priorities from which tsunami emergency aid had been transferred. These accounts were fully
restored through supplemental appropriations. At the time, others noted the substantial size of
American private donations for tsunami victims and argued that because of other budget
pressures, the United States government did not need to transfer additional aid beyond what was
already pledged. The point remains, however, that when disasters require immediate emergency
relief, the Administration may fund pledges by depleting most worldwide disaster accounts. In
order to respond to future humanitarian crises, however, these resources would need to be
replenished. If not replenished, U.S. capacity to respond to other emergencies could be curtailed.
Both Congress and the Administration also encourage other countries to provide disaster 28
assistance. It is not always evident whether figures listing donor amounts represent pledges of 29
support or more specific obligations. Pledges made by governments do not always result in
actual contributions—the earthquake of December 2003 in Bam, Iran, is but one example used by
the United Nations. Billions of dollars were pledged to help the victims of the 2004 tsunami
disaster in the Indian Ocean, but there is skepticism over whether all these pledges will ever be
honored. It also cannot be assumed that the funds committed to relief actually represent new
contributions, since the money may previously have been allocated elsewhere. It also takes time
for a more complete picture to reveal how the actual costs of a disaster will be shared among
international donors. Comparing USG and international aid is also difficult because of the often
dramatically different forms the assistance takes (in-kind contributions vs. cash, for instance).
Finding a balance between burdensharing on the one hand and donor fatigue on the other often
results in delay and can negatively impact relief operations during emergencies when immediate
funds are required for a response. Some experts are concerned about funding priorities and the
ongoing need for resources for other disaster areas.

27 Elizabeth Becker, “No New Funds Needed For Relief, Bush Aides Say,New York Times, January 4, 2005.
28 Although the United States is the world’s largest provider of overall foreign assistance (which includes humanitarian
assistance) in absolute terms, it is often one of the lowest contributors among developed countries when measured as a
percentage of its economic capacity. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the United States provided 0.16% of its Gross National Income (GNI) in 2004 for Overseas Disaster
Assistance (ODA). By comparison the average of major donors is 0.25%. The percentages for other major donors are
as follows: Japan (0.19%), the United Kingdom (0.36%), France (0.42%), and Germany (0.28%).
29 Relief Web is a good source of information, although the accuracy is not guaranteed. See http://www.reliefweb.int.
Obtaining an exact up-to-date record of all international contributions in response to an ongoing disaster is often not
possible—in part because some assistance is not reported to governments or coordinating agencies—and in part
because of the delay in their recording.





One approach to the donor fatigue problem is the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).30
As part of the United Nations’ reform process, in March 2006, the CERF was launched based on
several earlier resolutions approved by the U.N. General Assembly to strengthen the United 31
Nations’ capacity to respond to natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies. As an
international, multilateral funding mechanism, the CERF aims to focus on early intervention,
timely response, and increased capacity and support to underfunded crises. The CERF will have a
grant facility of up to $450 million and a loan facility of up to $50 million. The funds come from 32
voluntary contributions by member states and from the private sector.
The CERF is seen by proponents as a way to enable the United Nations to respond more
efficiently, effectively, and consistently to humanitarian crises worldwide. Others also believe that
U.S. support for this idea is critical to sustaining momentum for donor contributions and
continued support for the disaster relief fund.
Some Members of Congress have also raised concerns about transparency of donor contributions,
allocation of monies, and monitoring of projects by the United Nations. The United Nations is
improving its financial tracking and reporting system. In responding to international disasters,
many contributions are also made directly to IOs and NGOs, which could raise the same
questions about transparency requirements. Moreover, while earmarks and time limits may ensure
greater accountability, they can also add pressure for organizations to spend contributed funds,
sometimes leading to unnecessary spending, waste and duplicated efforts. Restrictions on use of
funds also often do not allow flexibility to adapt projects to better meet the changing needs on the 33
ground.
The provision of humanitarian assistance also raises the potential for unexpected consequences.
First, it is important to examine whether humanitarian assistance is going to those for whom it is
intended. Evaluating and tracking provision of supplies is difficult during a conflict and
impossible to completely control. Second, there is the role of the NGO, including its mission and
sources of funding, in what has become a major independent enterprise in conflict areas. There is
the potential for misuse, intended or unintended, which may require closer analysis of the
performance of providers. Third, the safety and protection of refugees, IDPs, and humanitarian
workers is another important issue. A growing number of humanitarian workers in various parts
of the world have been put at great risk or lost their lives in providing humanitarian assistance.

30 This fund should not be confused with the Commanders Emergency Response Fund, or CERP. This is a program
initiated by DOD that allows commanders in the field to provide resources immediately to support local needs and
projects.
31 Resolution A/RES/60/124 was approved by consensus at the General Assembly on December 15, 2005. See
http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?Page=2101. Also see http://cerf.un.org and United Nations General Assembly
Resolutions: A/RES/46/182 (December 19, 1991) and A/RES/56/107 (February 7, 2002).
32 See http://cerf.un.org for more detailed information on CERF.
33 Edward Clay, “Lessons for Life, The Guardian Review, January 12, 2005.





The degree to which a security force protects humanitarian relief workers and parties to the
conflict will have some bearing on who is in charge, the security measures taken and provided,
and the perception of whether the humanitarian community has taken sides in the conflict. Fourth,
there is the question raised by some experts as to whether the provision of humanitarian
assistance is helpful—particularly in cases where there is no consensus on how or when to
intervene but only on the need to demonstrate action. Some question whether humanitarian
assistance in some instances actually prolongs conflict.
Political considerations play a role in the way assistance is given and to whom. The images of
human suffering portrayed by the media only reinforce the need to do something. Humanitarian
assistance carries some weight as an instrument of “neutral” intervention in crisis and is the most
flexible policy tool that can be quickly brought to bear in a crisis. It can buy time and keep
options opens and may be an avenue to achieve minimal consensus. Sometimes the easiest
decision in terms of finding a path of least resistance, humanitarian assistance can also expand
beyond its immediate function. It may provide the means to maintain some form of contact with a
country/region, or mitigate tensions over policy towards a region within the U.S. government or
with and among its allies. Humanitarian assistance often means doing something to avert a crisis,
to provide support to allies, and to maintain a presence in the region. How it is used and whether
it becomes more of a strategic, policy tool depends upon the situation, what other governments
are doing, and the degree to which the United States has further interest in the region. In addition,
it raises questions about implications for future action. On the one hand, if the United States
decides to reduce its humanitarian support, would this diminish its standing among its allies or
affect its interests in other ways? On the other hand, since the President has a great deal of
flexibility over U.S. involvement, once commitment to a humanitarian effort is made, does this
make the long-term U.S. participation in reconstruction and political solutions more likely?
Regardless, it is clear that as crises proliferate, the level and sources of U.S. humanitarian
assistance will inevitably have an important impact not only on the relief operation itself, but on
broader foreign policy goals.
Rhoda Margesson
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy
rmargesson@crs.loc.gov, 7-0425