Options to Address Social Security Solvency and Their Impact on Beneficiaries: Results from the Dynasim Microsimulation Model--Detailed Distributional Tables

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

This report presents detailed tables showing the distributional effects of 12 Social Security
solvency options on Social Security beneficiaries in 2035 compared with current law.
The 12 options presented fall into 6 categories of reform proposals. For some reform options, we
present two or more variations on how they could be approached. They include the most
commonly discussed or introduced proposals to improve cash flow and achieve Social Security
solvency:
• reducing the annual cost of living adjustment (COLA)
• increasing the number of computation years in the benefit formula
• increasing the full retirement age (FRA)
• longevity indexing initial Social Security benefits
• progressive price indexing initial Social Security benefits
• increasing earnings subject to Social Security payroll taxes by raising or
eliminating the taxable earnings base.
These tables provide the modeling results used to produce the full analysis of these options
contained in a companion report, CRS Report RL33840, Options to Address Social Security
Solvency and Their Impact on Beneficiaries: Results from the Dynasim Microsimulation Model.
That report presents the distributional effects of these reform options in terms of Social Security
beneficiaries’ median payroll tax increase or benefit reduction and shows the varied effect of
these reforms on beneficiaries along certain socio-economic lines (i.e., age, type of benefit
received, and income quintile). Those readers interested in a complete explanation of these results
are encouraged to read that report.
The tables contained in this report provide some additional detail not included in the previously
mentioned report. The first table for each option summarizes the effect of the policy change on
beneficiaries in 2035 across socio-economic groups (i.e., by gender, ethnicity, educational
attainment, age, marital status, benefit type, and income quintile). These tables show the number
in the population, the mean percent change in benefits or taxes between current law and the
policy option, and the median percent change in benefits or taxes between current law and the
policy option. Subsequent tables show the varied effects of these reforms on beneficiaries in 2035
overall and then within each socio-economic group (i.e., gender, ethnicity, educational attainment,
age, marital status, benefit type, and income quintile).
CRS analysts used the Dynasim microsimulation model to project the effects of these reforms on
Social Security beneficiaries in 2035, assuming the reforms first take effect in 2013.
This report will not be updated.

Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Interpreting the Results...................................................................................................................2
Why These Options?...........................................................................................................2
When Would the Options Begin?........................................................................................3
How Far Into the Future Does This Analysis Look?...........................................................3
What Do the Tables Show?.................................................................................................4
How to Read the Tables......................................................................................................6
Why Do Some of the Results Seem Counterintuitive?.......................................................7
Who Is Included in the Analysis?.......................................................................................7
How Does Dynasim Estimate Future Benefits?..................................................................8
Where Can Readers Find Out More?..................................................................................8
Option 1: Reducing the Annual Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) by Half a Percentage
Point .......................................................................................................................... ................... 9
Option 2: Reducing the Annual COLA by One Percentage Point.................................................14
Option 3: Increasing the Number of Computation Years in the Benefit Formula From 35
to 38 for All Beneficiaries..........................................................................................................19
Option 4: Increasing the Number of Computation Years in the Benefit Formula From 35
to 38 For All But Disability Beneficiaries..................................................................................24
Option 5: Increasing the Number of Computation Years in the Benefit Formula From 35
to 40 for All Beneficiaries..........................................................................................................30
Option 6: Increasing the Number of Computation Years in the Benefit Formula From 35
to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries...................................................................................35
Option 7: Increasing the Full Retirement Age (FRA) by Accelerating the Increase From
Age 66 to Age 67 Scheduled Under Current Law and Further Increasing the FRA From
Age 67 to Age 70........................................................................................................................41
Option 8: Longevity Indexing Initial Social Security Benefits by Reducing the Primary
Insurance Amount (PIA) Formula Factors.................................................................................46
Option 9: Longevity Indexing Initial Social Security Benefits by Reducing the PIA Value
and Holding Disability Beneficiaries Harmless Until They Reach the FRA.............................52
Option 10: Progressive Price Indexing Initial Social Security Benefits........................................57
Option 11: Increasing Earnings Subject to Social Security Payroll Taxes by Raising the
Dollar Amount of the Taxable Earnings Base to 100% of Aggregate Covered Earnings
in the U.S. (Eliminating the Taxable Earnings Base).................................................................62
Option 12: Increasing Earnings Subject to Social Security Payroll Taxes by Raising the
Dollar Amount of the Taxable Earnings Base to 90% of Aggregate Covered Earnings in
the U.S........................................................................................................................................77
Table 1. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Summary of Mean and Median
Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035........................................................................................9

Table 2. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Impact in 2035............10
Table 3. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Gender in 2035............10
Table 4. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035..........11
Table 5. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Education Level
in 2035.........................................................................................................................................11
Table 6. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Age in 2035.................12
Table 7. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Marital Status in
2035 ............................................................................................................................................ 12
Table 8. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Benefit Type in
2035 ............................................................................................................................................ 13
Table 9. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Income Quintile
in 2035........................................................................................................................................13
Table 10. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Summary of Mean and Median
Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035......................................................................................14
Table 11. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Impact in 2035..............15
Table 12. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Gender in 2035.............15
Table 13. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035..........16
Table 14. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Education Level in
2035 ............................................................................................................................................ 16
Table 15. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Age in 2035..................17
Table 16. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Marital Status in
2035 ............................................................................................................................................ 17
Table 17. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Benefit Type in
2035 ............................................................................................................................................ 18
Table 18. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Income Quintile in
2035 ............................................................................................................................................ 18
Table 19. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries:
Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035...................................19
Table 20. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Impact in 2035..................................................................................................20
Table 21. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Gender in 2035..................................................................................................21
Table 22. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035...............................................................................................21
Table 23. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Education Level in 2035...................................................................................21
Table 24. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Age in 2035.......................................................................................................22
Table 25. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Marital Status in 2035.......................................................................................22

Table 26. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035.........................................................................................23
Table 27. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035...................................................................................23
Table 28. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035............24
Table 29. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Impact in 2035...........................................................................25
Table 30. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Gender in 2035...........................................................................26
Table 31. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035........................................................................26
Table 32. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Education Level in 2035............................................................27
Table 33. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Age in 2035................................................................................27
Table 34. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035................................................................28
Table 35. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035..................................................................28
Table 36. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035............................................................29
Table 37. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries:
Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035...................................30
Table 38. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Impact in 2035..................................................................................................31
Table 39. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Gender in 2035..................................................................................................32
Table 40. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035...............................................................................................32
Table 41. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Education Level in 2035...................................................................................32
Table 42. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Age in 2035.......................................................................................................33
Table 43. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Marital Status in 2035.......................................................................................33
Table 44. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035.........................................................................................34
Table 45. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035...................................................................................34
Table 46. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035............35

Table 47. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Impact in 2035...........................................................................36
Table 48. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Gender in 2035...........................................................................37
Table 49. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035........................................................................37
Table 50. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Education Level in 2035............................................................38
Table 51. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Age in 2035................................................................................38
Table 52. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035................................................................39
Table 53. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035..................................................................39
Table 54. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035............................................................40
Table 55. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Summary of Mean Percentage Change in
Benefits in 2035.........................................................................................................................41
Table 56. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Impact in 2035...............................42
Table 57. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Gender in 2035..............................42
Table 58. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035...........................43
Table 59. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Education Level in 2035................43
Table 60. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Age in 2035....................................44
Table 61. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035....................44
Table 62. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035.....................44
Table 63. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035................45
Table 64. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Summary of Mean and Median
Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035......................................................................................46
Table 65. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Impact in 2035...........47
Table 66. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Gender in 2035...........48
Table 67. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035........48
Table 68. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Education Level
in 2035........................................................................................................................................49
Table 69. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Age in 2035................49
Table 70. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Marital Status in
2035 ............................................................................................................................................ 50
Table 71. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Benefit Type in
2035 ............................................................................................................................................ 50
Table 72. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Income Quintile
in 2035........................................................................................................................................51

Table 73. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage
Change in Benefits in 2035........................................................................................................52
Table 74. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Impact in 2035.............................53
Table 75. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Gender in 2035............................53
Table 76. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035.........................54
Table 77. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Education Level in 2035.............54
Table 78. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Age in 2035.................................55
Table 79. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035.................55
Table 80. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035...................56
Table 81. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035..............56
Table 82. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth:
Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035...................................57
Table 83. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth:
Distribution by Impact in 2035..................................................................................................58
Table 84. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth:
Distribution by Gender in 2035..................................................................................................58
Table 85. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth:
Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035...............................................................................................59
Table 86. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth:
Distribution by Education Level in 2035...................................................................................59
Table 87. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth:
Distribution by Age in 2035.......................................................................................................60
Table 88. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth:
Distribution by Marital Status in 2035.......................................................................................60
Table 89. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth:
Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035.........................................................................................61
Table 90. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth:
Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035...................................................................................61
Table 91. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary of
Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Individuals Who Pay No
Additional Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035...........................................................................62
Table 92. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary of
Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Individuals Who Pay Additional
Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035.............................................................................................63
Table 93. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary of
Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population in 2035................65
Table 94. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution
of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Impact in 2035..........................66
Table 95. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution
of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Gender in 2035.........................66
Table 96. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution
of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Ethnicity in 2035......................67

Table 97. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings of the Total
Population: Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by
Education Level in 2035............................................................................................................67
Table 98. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution
of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Age in 2035..............................68
Table 99. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution
of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Marital Status in 2035..............68
Table 100. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution
of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Benefit Type in 2035................69
Table 101. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution
of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Income Quintile in 2035...........69
Table 102. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary of
Mean and Median Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for Individuals Who Pay No
Additional Taxes Over their Lifetime in 2035............................................................................70
Table 103. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary of
Mean and Median Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for Individuals Who Pay
Additional Taxes Over their Lifetime in 2035............................................................................71
Table 104. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution
of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population in 2035.......................................72
Table 105. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution
of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Gender in 2035.....................73
Table 106. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution
of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Ethnicity in 2035..................73
Table 107. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution
of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Education Level in
2035 ............................................................................................................................................ 74
Table 108. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution
of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Age in 2035..........................74
Table 109. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution
of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population Marital Status in 2035...............75
Table 110. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earning: Distribution
of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Benefit Type in 2035............75
Table 111. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution
of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Income Quintile in
2035 ............................................................................................................................................ 76
Table 112. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Individuals Who Pay
No Additional Taxes Over their Lifetime in 2035.......................................................................77
Table 113. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Individuals Who Pay
Additional Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035...........................................................................78
Table 114. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Total Population in

2035............................................................................................................................................80

Table 115. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Impact in 2035.........81
Table 116. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Gender in 2035.........81
Table 117. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Ethnicity in
2035 ............................................................................................................................................ 82
Table 118. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Education
Level in 2035..............................................................................................................................82
Table 119. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Age in 2035..............83
Table 120. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Marital Status
in 2035........................................................................................................................................83
Table 121. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Benefit Type in
2035 ............................................................................................................................................ 84
Table 122. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Income Quintile
in 2035........................................................................................................................................84
Table 123. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for Individuals Who
Pay No Additional Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035...............................................................85
Table 124. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for Individuals Who
Pay Additional Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035....................................................................86
Table 125. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Impact in
2035 ............................................................................................................................................ 87
Table 126. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Gender in
2035 ............................................................................................................................................ 88
Table 127. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Ethnicity in
2035 ............................................................................................................................................ 88
Table 128. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Education
Level in 2035..............................................................................................................................88
Table 129. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Age in 2035..........89
Table 130. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Marital
Status in 2035.............................................................................................................................90

Table 131. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Benefit Type
in 2035........................................................................................................................................90
Table 132. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Income
Quintile in 2035..........................................................................................................................90
Table C-1. Retirement Earnings Test Application Rules...............................................................96
Appendix A. Computation of the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) Under Current Law............92
Appendix B. Interaction of Spouse and Aged Survivor Benefit Rules with Policy Options.........94
Appendix C. Interaction of the Retirement Earnings Test with Policy Options............................96
Appendix D. Technical Description of the Progressive Price Indexing Option............................99
Appendix E. Background on the Urban Institute’s Dynasim Microsimulation Model...............101
Appendix F. Glossary..................................................................................................................105
Author Contact Information.........................................................................................................110

This report presents detailed tables showing the distributional effects of 12 Social Security ¹
solvency options on Social Security beneficiaries in 2035 compared with current law. The
options presented are
1. Reducing the annual cost of living adjustment (COLA) by half a percentage point
2. Reducing the annual COLA by one percentage point
3. Increasing the number of computation years in the benefit formula from 35 to 38 for all
beneficiaries
4. Increasing the number of computation years in the benefit formula from 35 to 38 for all but
disability beneficiaries
5. Increasing the number of computation years in the benefit formula from 35 to 40 for all
beneficiaries
6. Increasing the number of computation years in the benefit formula from 35 to 40 for all but
disability beneficiaries
7. Increasing the full retirement age (FRA) by accelerating the increase from age 66 to age 67
scheduled under current law and further increasing the FRA from age 67 to age 70
8. Longevity indexing initial Social Security benefits by reducing the Primary Insurance Amount
(PIA) formula factors
9. Longevity indexing initial Social Security benefits by reducing the PIA value and holding
disability beneficiaries harmless until they reach the FRA
10. Progressive price indexing initial Social Security benefits
11. Increasing earnings subject to Social Security payroll taxes by raising the dollar amount of the
taxable earnings base to 100% of aggregate covered earnings in the U.S. (eliminating the
taxable earnings base)
12. Increasing earnings subject to Social Security payroll taxes by raising the dollar amount of the
taxable earnings base to 90% of aggregate covered earnings in the U.S.
These tables provide the modeling results used to produce the full analysis of these options
contained in a companion report, CRS Report RL33840, Options to Address Social Security
Solvency and Their Impact on Beneficiaries: Results from the Dynasim Microsimulation Model.

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That report presents the distributional effects of these reform options in terms of Social Security
beneficiaries’ median payroll tax increase or benefit reduction and shows the varied effect of
these reforms on beneficiaries along certain socio-economic lines (i.e., age, type of benefit
received, and income quintile). Those readers interested in a complete explanation of these results
are encouraged to read that report.
The tables contained in this report provide some additional detail not included in the previously
mentioned report. The first table for each option summarizes the effect of the policy change on
beneficiaries in 2035 across socio-economic groups (i.e., by gender, ethnicity, educational
attainment, age, marital status, benefit type, and income quintile). These tables show the number
of people in the population, the mean percent change in benefits or taxes between current law and
the policy option, and the median percent change in benefits or taxes between current law and the
policy option. Subsequent tables show the varied effects of these reforms on beneficiaries in 2035
overall and then within each socio-economic group (i.e., gender, ethnicity, educational attainment,
age, marital status, benefit type, and income quintile).
The options presented below include the most commonly discussed or introduced proposals to
improve cash flow and achieve Social Security solvency. CRS takes no position for or against any ²
of the options presented in this report. The presentation of options in the report moves from least
complex to most complex. The ordering of the 12 options, and the assumptions used in their
analysis, reflect no policy recommendations or preferences on the part of CRS. For some reform
options, we present two or more variations on how they could be approached. Each option would
affect beneficiaries differently. This report assumes that all of the options take effect in 2013 and
shows the distributional impact of each option in 2035 using results from the Dynasim ³
microsimulation model. The Dynasim model is not an actuarial model and so cannot produce
solvency estimates for these options.

The primary rationale for all of the options in this report is to improve the solvency of the Social
Security system. All of the options would enhance long-range solvency by either cutting benefits
or increasing payroll taxes. There are also secondary rationales behind most of the options—for
example, some would reward longer working careers or account for increases in longevity.
The options in this report include the most commonly discussed or introduced proposals to
improve cash flow and achieve Social Security solvency. Each option in this report is analyzed in
isolation, but it is important to note that the options are typically proposed in combination with
one another and/or with other Social Security reform features (such as individual accounts or

²^S^o^m^e^so^l^v^en^c^y^o^p^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^su^{ch as i}ⁿ^creasiⁿ^{g t}^h^{e S}^o^ci^al^S^ecu^ri^t^y^co^v^e^{rage o}^f^st^at^{e an}^d^l^o^cal^go^vern^m^eⁿ^t^w^o^rkers,
^a^lte^ring^the^ta^x^a^tion^of^Socⁱ^a^l^Se^c^u^rity^be^ne^f^{its, or inv}^e^sting^a^p^o^rti^on^of^the^So^cⁱ^a^l^Se^c^u^rity^{surplus i}ⁿ^e^q^u^itie^{s, c}^aⁿⁿ^o^t
^c^u^r^r^e^ntly^be^m^ode^le^{d in t}^h^is^v^e^r^s^ion^of^Dy^na^sⁱ^m^.^T^h^e^r^ef^or^e^,^the^s^e^opti^ons^a^r^e^not^inc^l^u^d^e^d^a^m^ong^th^e^opti^ons^aⁿ^a^l^y^z^e^d
^{in t}^h^{is re}^p^o^rt.
³^For^a^dditi^ona^l^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion o}ⁿ^t^h^e^D^y^na^sⁱ^m^mⁱ^c^r^osⁱ^m^ula^{tion m}^ode^l^,^ple^a^s^e^s^e^e^A^p^pe^ndi^x^E^.

benefit enhancements for low earners).⁴ The options analyzed in this report can be viewed as a set
of building blocks for comprehensive Social Security reform.
All of the options in this report are assumed to be implemented starting in 2013. The year 2013
was chosen since many policymakers have indicated a desire to leave the benefits of individuals
who are currently age 55 or older unchanged, since they would have little time to alter their
savings, work, or retirement plans. With the exception of the option to increase the full retirement
age, none of the options presented in this report are phased in gradually over time. Any of the
options could be implemented before or after 2013, or could be phased in gradually.
This analysis aims to compare all of the reform options using consistent assumptions and under
identical circumstances. However, for some options, all beneficiaries would be affected starting
in 2013, including those who became eligible for benefits before 2013 (e.g., reducing the COLA).
For other options, only new beneficiaries—those who become eligible for benefits in 2013 or
later—would be affected (e.g., progressive price indexing initial Social Security benefits). These
differences are dictated by the nature of the reform options themselves and the particular Social
Security program rules affected by these reform options.
This report focuses on the effects of policy changes on beneficiaries in 2035. The tables presented
are essentially a snapshot of the projected beneficiary population in this single year. Focusing on
a different year would lead to different results.
The year 2035 was selected for this analysis because it balances two competing goals. The first
goal is to allow a sufficient amount of time to pass for the differing effects of the policy options to
become clear once the new policies are implemented. Since all of the options are assumed to
begin in 2013, by 2035 most beneficiaries would be affected. An earlier date may not capture the
disparate effects of the options, particularly for those options with relatively small annual
changes. The second goal is to provide the most reliable information possible. Since it is
impossible to accurately predict the future, all projection models contain some level of
uncertainty. The further into the future one projects, the greater the estimates may ultimately
deviate from reality. The most accurate data are the actual observations that exist when the
projection period began. The youngest individuals eligible to receive retirement benefits in 2035
would have been born in the early 1970s, and so actual data would be included in the model’s
projection of their retirement benefits. Extending the analysis to periods much later than 2035
would rely more heavily on the model’s assumptions about future trends.
Under some of the options, not all beneficiaries in 2035 would be affected. This is because some
of the options apply only to beneficiaries who become eligible for benefits in 2013 or later (e.g.,
progressive price indexing). For these options, the analysis in 2035 will show a sizable group of
beneficiaries who are not subject to the change since they became eligible for benefits before
2013. Because the proportion of beneficiaries who become eligible for benefits before 2013

⁴^C^o^m^b^ining^aⁿ^y^of^the^opt^io^ns^w^{ith o}ⁿ^e^aⁿ^othe^r^or^w^{ith o}^t^he^r^f^e^a^t^ur^e^s^c^{ould s}ⁱ^gⁿⁱ^fⁱ^c^aⁿ^tl^y^a^lte^r^theⁱ^r^dis^t^rⁱ^b^u^ti^ona^l
^im^pa^c^t^s^.^T^hus^{, it is}^no^{t p}^o^s^sⁱ^ble^t^o^s^u^m^the^r^e^s^u^lts^of^aⁿ^y^c^o^m^b^ina^tion^of^opti^ons^s^how^{n i}ⁿ^th^is^r^e^por^{t s}ⁱ^nc^e^the^opti^ons
^co^u^l^{d i}ⁿ^t^e^ractⁱⁿ^un^exp^ect^ed^w^a^ys^.

varies significantly by socio-economic characteristics, the date of implementation drives many of
the results in 2035, particularly the results by age.
Results shown for 2035 also do not reflect the full impact of the options over time. The effect of
some options increases over time (e.g., longevity indexing). Under these options, each successive
cohort of beneficiaries would be affected more than the last, so that a beneficiary who becomes
eligible 50 years after implementation would be affected much more than a beneficiary who
becomes eligible in the first year, all other things being equal. For other options, the magnitude of
the benefit change does not increase over time (e.g., increasing the number of computation years).
Under these options, each successive cohort of beneficiaries would be subject to the same rules,
so that a beneficiary who becomes eligible 50 years after implementation would experience the
same magnitude of change as a beneficiary who becomes eligible in the first year, all other things
being equal. Since the tables in this report focus on a single year, these distinctions are not shown.
The first table for each option breaks down the effect of the policy change on beneficiaries in
2035 by gender, ethnicity, educational attainment, age, marital status, benefit type, and income
quintile. (For more information on income quintiles, please see the subsection below called ⁵
“Breakdowns by Income Quintile.”). These tables show the number of people in the population,
the mean percent change, and the median percent change in benefits between current law and the ⁶
policy option. Since Dynasim projects a representative sub-sample of the population, the number
of observations in the model must be weighted (in this case multiplied by a constant) so that the
numbers total the entire population. Population numbers in the tables are presented in thousands.
The mean, or average, is determined by adding all the values in a data set and dividing the sum by
the number of values in the data set. The median is the midpoint in a group of values, such that
half the values are above the median and half are below. Unlike a mean, a median will not be
skewed by a small number of extremely large or extremely small values. For example, consider
five beneficiaries affected by a policy option. One loses her entire benefit under the option
(meaning she has a change of -100%). The other four beneficiaries have benefit changes of -3%,
-2%, -2%, and -1%, compared with current law. The median percentage change for this group
would be -2% because -2% is the third value of the five values arranged from least to greatest.
The mean percentage change would be -22% because it is the sum of all five values divided by
five. Since policy changes sometimes result in very large benefit changes (such as beneficiaries
gaining or losing a benefit) for a few beneficiaries, the median is a good measure of how a policy
would affect a typical beneficiary. For both the mean and median percent change in benefits,
numbers have been rounded to the nearest full percentage point.
The results for each option include tables that show the overall distribution of the estimated
benefit change for all beneficiaries as well as for beneficiaries broken down by gender, ethnicity,
educational attainment, age, marital status, benefit type, and income quintile. For example, the

⁵^In^t^hⁱ^s^versi^oⁿ^o^f^D^yⁿ^a^si^m^,^each^o^b^s^ervatⁱ^oⁿ^h^a^d^{a w}^eⁱ^g^h^t^o^f²^,⁵¹^7.³⁸¹¹^.^T^h^u^s^,¹⁰^raw^o^b^s^ervatⁱ^oⁿ^s^w^o^u^l^d^b^e^sho^wⁿ
^a^s^a^bout²⁵^,0⁰⁰ⁱⁿ^divⁱ^dua^lsⁱⁿ^t^h^e^ta^ble^s^pr^e^s^eⁿ^te^d.^A^{ll pr}^oje^c^t^e^d^p^opu^la^tio^{n n}^u^m^b^e^r^s^a^r^e^r^oun^de^{d t}^o^the^ne^a^r^e^s^t
^tho^u^s^a^nd.
⁶^T^h^{e rep}^o^r^t^co^m^p^{ares b}^eⁿ^e^fⁱ^t^s^uⁿ^d^e^{r each}^o^p^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^sch^e^du^l^e^d^b^eⁿ^e^fⁱ^t^s^unde^r^c^u^r^r^e^nt^la^w^.^Som^e^othe^r^aⁿ^a^l^y^s^e^s
^c^o^m^p^a^r^e^be^nef^its^unde^r^pol^ic^y^options^to^pa^y^a^ble^be^ne^f^its^{, or}^the^le^v^e^{l of}^be^ne^f^its^tha^t^c^ould^be^f^uⁿ^d^e^{d w}^{ith c}^u^r^r^e^nt
^f^unding^le^v^e^ls^{. H}^o^w^e^v^e^{r, the}²⁰⁰^{5 T}^r^us^te^e^s^Re^{port (}^{on w}^h^ic^{h t}^h^is^aⁿ^a^l^y^s^is^is^ba^s^e^{d) proje}^c^t^s^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^trus^{t f}^uⁿ^d^s^w^ill
^re^m^a^{in solv}^eⁿ^{t u}ⁿ^til²⁰⁴¹^{. Si}^nc^e^t^h^e^aⁿ^a^l^y^s^{is in this re}^p^o^rt^f^o^c^u^se^{s on}²⁰^35,^sc^he^du^le^d^be^ne^f^{its a}^{nd p}^a^y^a^ble^be^ne^f^its
^w^{ould be}^t^h^e^s^a^m^e^am^ount.

tables show what proportion of beneficiaries in each of the five income quintiles have benefit
reductions of up to -10%, reductions from -10% to -19%, etc.
Every attempt has been made to be consistent in the presentation of the results of the analysis.
The same benefit reduction categories have been used in all tables across the various reform
options so as not to skew the results. Furthermore, the tables for all of the options include the
entire Dynasim population, with one exception. For the options to raise or eliminate the taxable
earnings base, the report contains additional separate tables describing the mean and median
impact for only those beneficiaries who would be affected by the option and for only those
beneficiaries who would pay no additional taxes. These additional breakdowns are presented
since a relatively small share of beneficiaries would be affected by the options to raise or
eliminate the taxable earnings base. Tables that include the entire Dynasim population for these
options show that the median beneficiary in each subgroup is not affected.
All of the options include tables in the report that break down the beneficiary population by the
type of Social Security benefits they receive. Four types of Social Security beneficiaries are
presented in this report: retired worker beneficiaries who receive a Social Security benefit based
on their own earnings; disabled worker beneficiaries who receive a Social Security disability
benefit based on their own earnings; spouse beneficiaries who receive a Social Security
retirement benefit based on their working spouse’s earnings; and, survivor beneficiaries who
receive Social Security survivor benefits based on their deceased spouse’s earnings. Some
individuals may qualify for more than one type of benefit.
In the tables that follow, the retired worker only category and the disability only category are
made up of beneficiaries who receive solely a retired or disabled worker benefit, not a spouse or
survivor benefit. The survivor category and the spouse category include both beneficiaries who
receive solely spouse or survivor benefits as well as those who receive both a spouse or survivor
benefit and a retired or disabled worker benefit (i.e., dually entitled beneficiaries). The disability
benefit only category includes both beneficiaries receiving disability benefits in 2035 and those
who originally received disability benefits but automatically converted to retirement benefits at
the full retirement age (as required by law).
All of the policy options include tables in the report that break down the beneficiary population
by age group. These categories reflect beneficiaries’ ages as of 2035. It is important to note that
beneficiaries in the age 61 and younger category are primarily disability beneficiaries but also
include some aged survivor beneficiaries who began to receive benefits at age 60 or 61. (Other
Social Security beneficiaries who are eligible to receive benefits before age 60—such as children
of retired, disabled, or deceased workers—are not included in the analysis in this report.) For
retirement beneficiaries, the earliest age of eligibility is age 62. Thus, no retirement beneficiaries
are included in the age 61 and younger category.
All of the policy options include tables in the report that break down the beneficiary population
by income quintile. In other words, they separate the Dynasim population into five equal parts—

the one-fifth with the highest incomes, the one-fifth with the second-highest incomes, etc., down
to the one-fifth with the lowest income. For the purposes of this analysis, income includes Social
Security benefits, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, pension payments, earnings, and
the annuitized value of financial assets. Income is calculated on a per capita basis, which means
that for married couples the income of both spouses is averaged together.
It is important to note the distinction between income levels and Social Security benefit amounts.
Some beneficiaries with relatively low Social Security benefit amounts may be included in one of
the higher income quintiles and vice versa. For example, a beneficiary married to a person with a
high income may be in one of the higher income quintiles despite receiving a small Social
Security benefit. Similarly, a beneficiary with a relatively large Social Security benefit but with
no other income may be in one of the lower income quintiles.
There are three types of tables presented in this report: The first shows the mean and median
changes under the policy option across socio-economic groups; the second shows the overall
distribution of benefit or tax changes in the population; and the third shows the distribution of
benefit or tax changes within each socio-economic group.
The first table for each option summarizes the effect of the policy change on beneficiaries in 2035
across socio-economic groups (i.e., by gender, ethnicity, educational attainment, age, marital
status, benefit type, and income quintile). These tables show the number in the population, the
mean percent change in benefits or taxes between current law and the policy option, and the
median percent change in benefits or taxes between current law and the policy option.
For example, if a reader is interested in the average benefit reduction caused by reducing the
COLA by half a percentage point, he or she should turn to Table 1. The first row (labeled “All”)
shows the total number in the population in thousands (e.g., the total population for Table 1 is
80,362,000). The first row also shows the mean change in benefits overall (-6%) and median
change in benefits overall (-6%). In other words, it shows that among the 80 million beneficiaries
in the Dynasim population, reducing the COLA by half a percentage point would result in a mean
benefit reduction of 6% and also a median benefit reduction of 6%. (The mean and the median
may vary for other options.)
Table 1 also shows the mean and median change in benefits for each socio-economic group (i.e.,
by gender, ethnicity, educational attainment, age, marital status, benefit type, and income
quintile). For example, the second and third rows of Table 1 show a breakdown by gender.
Females make up the majority of the population (i.e., there are 43,566,000 females wompared
with 36,766,000 males). Females and males have the same mean benefit reduction (6%). Males
have a smaller median benefit reduction (5%) than do females (6%).
The second table for each option show how the effects of each reform vary among the overall
population. This table shows the number and percent of the population, broken down by the
magnitude of the change in benefits. For example, the table shows the number and percent of

beneficiaries whose benefits would be reduced by 20% or more, then the number and percent of
beneficiaries whose benefits would be reduced by 10% to 19%, and so forth.
For example, if a reader is interested in knowing whether the cuts caused by reducing the COLA
by half a percentage point are spread equally across the entire sample, he or she should turn to
Table 2. Table 2 shows that a small number of beneficiaries (103,000 people, or less than 0.5%)
would have benefit reductions of 20% or more. A larger number (14,973,000 people, or about
19%) have benefit reductions of 10% to 19%. Most beneficiaries (63,232,000 people, or about
79%) would have benefit reductions of up to 10%. The last two columns in Table 2 show the
cumulative number and percent of beneficiaries.
The subsequent tables for each option show the varied effects of these reforms on beneficiaries in

2035 within each socio-economic group (i.e., gender, ethnicity, educational attainment, age,

marital status, benefit type, and income quintile).
For example, if a reader is interested in knowing how the cuts caused by reducing the COLA by
half a percentage point are distributed by gender, he or she should turn to Table 3. There, the
reader could see that the majority of both females and males would have a benefit cut of up to
10% (i.e., 75% of females and 83% of males). The reader could also see that females are more
likely than males to receive a cut that is greater than 10% (i.e., 23% of females and 14% of
males). The percentages in each horizontal row add up to 100%.
Sometimes the results shown in this report may be unexpected. For example, an option to cut
Social Security benefits could result in a small number of beneficiaries receiving an increase in
their benefits. Such counterintuitive results are not errors, but interactions between the option and
the current law Social Security rules. For example, the interaction between the current law
retirement earnings test (RET) and certain options to reduce benefits leads to benefit increases for
some beneficiaries who were subject to the RET before reaching the full retirement age, but are
currently older than the full retirement age. (For a full explanation of how this interaction works,
please see Appendix C.)
One of the advantages of a microsimulation model such as Dynasim is that it brings unexpected
interactions between policy options and program rules to light. Social Security is a complex
program, and changes to its structure could result in unintended consequences.
The results presented in this report focus on individuals who are projected to receive Social
Security retired worker, spouse, aged survivor and/or disability benefits in 2035. However, the
Dynasim population does not include individuals who are projected to receive other types of
Social Security benefits, including the children of retired, disabled, or deceased workers,
surviving spouses under age 60 with a child in care, and the aged parents of deceased workers.

The Dynasim model estimates future Social Security benefits by using a mix of historical data
and projections. The historical data—which include actual beneficiaries’ earnings, marital
histories, Social Security benefits, and more—come from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), the Current Population Survey (CPS), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), and other sources. Using the historical data as a base, Dynasim projects future economic
and demographic patterns by using the 2005 Social Security Trustees’ official assumptions about
future trends as well as statistical methods that take into account individual beneficiaries’
characteristics. When interpreting the results of Dynasim or any other model, it is important to
note that projections are inherently imprecise; the further into the future one looks, the wider the
range of possible outcomes. (For a full explanation, please see Appendix E.)
A full written analysis of all 12 policy options is available in CRS Report RL33840, Options to
Address Social Security Solvency and Their Impact on Beneficiaries: Results from the Dynasim
Microsimulation Model. For each reform option, that report explains current Social Security
policy, reasons why some policymakers propose this particular type of reform, how the reform
proposal works, the distributional effects of the reform proposal on various types of Social
Security beneficiaries, and legislation related to the reform being analyzed. That report presents
the distributional effects of these reform options in terms of Social Security beneficiaries’ median
payroll tax increase or benefit reduction and shows the varied effect of these reforms on
beneficiaries along certain socio-economic lines (i.e., age, type of benefit received, and income
quintile). That report, however, does not contain detailed analysis of the effects of these reforms
on Social Security beneficiaries by gender, ethnicity, educational attainment, or marital status.
When interpreting the distributional results of these reform options, it is important for the reader
to have a solid understanding of Social Security program rules, technical details, and terminology.
Detailed explanations of certain Social Security program rules and their potential interactions
with policy options, along with an explanation of how the Dynasim model works and a glossary
of Social Security and technical terms may be found in the following appendices of the report:
• Appendix A, “Computation of the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) Under
Current Law”
• Appendix B, “Interaction of Spouse and Aged Survivor Benefit Rules with
Policy Options”
• Appendix C, “Interaction of the Retirement Earnings Test with Policy Options”
Appendix D, “Technical Description of the Progressive Price Indexing Option”
• Appendix E, “Background on the Urban Institute’s Dynasim Model”
• Appendix F, “Glossary.”

Table 1. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Summary of Mean and
Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035
^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^All^80,3^{62 -6}^-6
^Gender
^Female^43,5⁹⁶^-6^-6
^Male^36,7⁶⁶^-6^-5
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-Hispa^nic^54,2¹⁷^-6^-6
^Black^non-Hispanic^8,49⁴^-6^-5
^Native^American⁴¹³^-6^-5
^Asian^5,35⁴^-6^-5
^Hispanic^11,8⁸⁵^-5^-5
^{Education Level (highes}^{t level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool^9,53¹^-6^-6
^{High school graduate}^27,2⁵³^-6^-6
^Some^college^18,5²⁵^-6^-6
^College^graduate^25,0⁵³^-6^-6
^Age
^{61 or you}^nger^5,63⁹^-4^-3
^62—6⁶^13,8⁸⁸^-3^-1
^67—7⁰^14,5⁵⁸^-4^-3
^71—7⁵^16,8⁴⁴^-6^-5
^76—8⁰^13,9⁷⁹^-8^-8
^81—8⁵^9,17¹^-10^-10
^{86 or older}^6,28³^-10^-11
^{Marital Status}
^Married^41,0²³^-5^-5
^Widowed^17,8⁰⁸^-8^-9
^Divorced^11,7⁸⁹^-6^-6
^Never^ma^rried^9,74²^-5^-5
^{Benefit Type - Cu}^rrent^Law
^{Retired worker only}^46,2⁷⁴^-5^-5
^Spouse^6,84²^-6^-6

^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^{Survivor 12,1}³⁹^-9^-10
^Disability^only^15,1⁰⁷^-6^-6
^{Income Q}^uintile
^Lowest^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-6^-6
^Second^quintile^16,0⁷³^-6^-6
^Third^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-6^-6
^Fourth^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-6^-5
^Highest^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-6^-5
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
Table 2. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Impact in
2035
^Percentage^Number^Percent^Cumulative^Number^Cumulative
^{Change Catego}^ry^(000s)^(000s)^Percent
^{-20% or more}¹⁰³⁰¹⁰³⁰
^{-10% to -1}^9%^14,9⁷³¹⁹^15,0⁷⁷¹⁹
^{Up to -10%}^63,2³²⁷⁹^78,3⁰⁸⁹⁷
^{No change}^1,91¹²^80,2¹⁹¹⁰⁰
^{Up to 10}^%¹⁴³⁰^80,3⁶²¹⁰⁰
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 3. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Gender in
2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^Percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Female 0}²³⁷⁵²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Male 0}¹⁴⁸³³¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}^{103 14,9}⁷³^63,2³²^1,91¹¹⁴³^80,3⁶²
^(000s)
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.

^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 4. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Ethnicity in
2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^Total
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%^percent
^{White non-}
^{Hispanic 0}²⁰⁷⁸²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Black non-Hispanic}⁰¹⁹⁷⁷⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Native American}⁰¹⁵⁸²²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Asian 0}¹⁶⁸¹³¹⁰⁰
^{Hispanic 0}¹⁴⁸³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}^{103 14,9}⁷³^63,2³²^1,91¹¹⁴³^80,3⁶²
^(000s)
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 5. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Education
Level in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^Percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Did not graduate high}
^{school 0}²⁰⁷⁷³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{High school graduate}⁰²⁰⁷⁷³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Some college}⁰¹⁹⁷⁹²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{College graduate or}
^{higher 0}¹⁷⁸¹²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)¹⁰³^14,9⁷³^63,2³²^1,91¹¹⁴³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 6. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Age in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{61 or you}^nger⁰¹²⁷⁸⁹⁰¹⁰⁰
^62—6^{6 1}⁴⁸⁵¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^67—7^{0 0}⁹⁶⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^71—7^{5 0}⁷⁹³¹⁰⁰
^76—8^{0 0}¹³⁸⁷⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^81—8^{5 0}⁴⁵⁵⁵¹⁰⁰
^{86 or older}⁰⁹⁶⁴⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}^{103 14,9}⁷³^63,2³²^1,91¹¹⁴³^80,3⁶²
^(000s)
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 7. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Marital Status
in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Married 0}¹⁰⁸⁶³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Widowed 0}⁴⁰⁵⁹¹¹⁰⁰
^{Divorced 0}¹⁷⁸⁰²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Never ma}^rried⁰¹⁵⁸¹³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}^{103 14,9}⁷³^63,2³²^1,91¹¹⁴³^80,3⁶²
^(000s)
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 8. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Benefit Type
in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Retired worker}
^{only 0}⁹⁸⁸³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Spouse 0}¹¹⁸⁶¹¹¹⁰⁰
^{Survivor 0}⁵⁰⁵⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Disability only}⁰²⁵⁷¹⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}^{103 14,9}⁷³^63,2³²^1,91¹¹⁴³^80,3⁶²
^(000s)
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 9. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Income
Quintile in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Lowest quintile}⁰²⁴⁷⁴²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Second quintile}⁰²⁰⁷⁸²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Third quintile}⁰¹⁸⁸⁰²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Fourth q}^uintile⁰¹⁶⁸¹³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Highest q}^uintile⁰¹⁶⁸²²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}^{103 14,9}⁷³^63,2³²^1,91¹¹⁴³^80,3⁶²
^(000s)
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 10. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Summary of Mean and
Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035
^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^All^80,3^{62 -11}^-11
^Gender
^Female^43,5⁹⁶^-12^-12
^Male^36,7⁶⁶^-11^-10
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-Hispa^nic^54,2¹⁷^-12^-12
^Black^non-Hispanic^8,49⁴^-11^-10
^Native^American⁴¹³^-11^-10
^Asian^5,35⁴^-11^-10
^Hispanic^11,8⁸⁵^-10^-9
^{Education Level (highes}^{t level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool^9,53¹^-11^-11
^{High school graduate}^27,2⁵³^-12^-11
^Some^college^18,5²⁵^-12^-12
^{College graduate or higher}^25,0⁵³^-11^-11
^Age
^{61 or you}^nger^5,63⁹^-8^-6
^62—6⁶^13,8⁸⁸^-5^-3
^67—7⁰^14,5⁵⁸^-7^-7
^71—7⁵^16,8⁴⁴^-11^-10
^76—8⁰^13,9⁷⁹^-15^-14
^81—8⁵^9,17¹^-18^-19
^{86 or older}^6,28³^-20^-20
^{Marital Status}
^Married^41,0²³^-10^-9
^Widowed^17,8⁰⁸^-15^-17
^Divorced^11,7⁸⁹^-11^-11
^Never^ma^rried^9,74²^-10^-9
^{Benefit Type - Cu}^rrent^Law
^{Retired worker only}^46,2⁷⁴^-10^-9
^Spouse^6,84²^-11^-11

^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^{Survivor 12,1}³⁹^-16^-19
^Disability^only^15,1⁰⁷^-11^-11
^{Income Q}^uintile
^Lowest^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-12^-12
^Second^quintile^16,0⁷³^-11^-11
^Third^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-11^-11
^Fourth^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-11^-10
^Highest^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-12^-11
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
Table 11. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Impact in
2035
^Percentage^Number^Percent^Cumulative^Number^Cumulative
^{Change Catego}^ry^(000s)^(000s)^Percent
^{-20% or more}^12,9⁶⁷¹⁶^12,9⁶⁷¹⁶
^{-10% to -1}^9%^32,5²⁷⁴⁰^45,4⁹⁴⁵⁷
^{Up to -10%}^32,8²²⁴¹^78,3¹⁶⁹⁷
^{No change}^1,90⁶²^80,2²¹¹⁰⁰
^{Up to 10}^%¹⁴¹⁰^80,3⁶²¹⁰⁰
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 12. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Gender in
2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Female 20}⁴¹³⁷²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Male 12}⁴⁰⁴⁵³¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 12,9}⁶⁷^32,5²⁷^32,8²²^1,90⁶¹⁴¹^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.

^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 13. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Ethnicity in
2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{White non-}
^{Hispanic 17}⁴²³⁹²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Black non-Hispanic}¹⁷³⁶⁴³⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Native American}¹⁴³⁹⁴⁵²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Asian 14}³⁹⁴³³¹⁰⁰
^{Hispanic 12}³⁷⁴⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 12,9}⁶⁷^32,5²⁷^32,8²²^1,90⁶¹⁴¹^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 14. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Education
Level in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Did not graduate high}
^{school 18}³⁷⁴²³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{High school graduate}¹⁸⁴⁰³⁹³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Some college}¹⁶⁴³³⁹²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{College graduate or}
^{higher 14}⁴⁰⁴³²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)^12,9⁶⁷^32,5²⁷^32,8²²^1,90⁶¹⁴¹^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 15. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Age in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{61 or you}^nger¹¹²⁴⁵⁵⁹⁰¹⁰⁰
^62—6^{6 4}¹⁰⁷⁶¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^67—7^{0 3}¹¹⁸⁵⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^71—7^{5 6}⁵⁶³⁷¹⁰⁰
^76—8^{0 10}⁸⁷²⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^81—8^{5 31}⁶⁷¹¹⁰⁰
^{86 or older}⁹⁴⁵¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}^12,9^{67 32,5}²⁷^32,8²²^1,90⁶¹⁴¹^80,3⁶²
^(000s)
^Source:^Congr^{essional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 16. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Marital Status
in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Married 9}⁴⁰⁴⁹³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Widowed 35}⁴⁵¹⁹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Divorced 15}⁴²⁴⁰²¹⁰⁰
^{Never ma}^rried¹⁴³⁴⁴⁸³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}^12,9^{67 32,5}²⁷^32,8²²^1,90⁶¹⁴¹^80,3⁶²
^(000s)
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 17. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Benefit Type
in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Retired worker}
^only^{8 42 48}³⁰¹⁰⁰
^Spouse^{8 47 44}¹¹¹⁰⁰
^Survivor^{44 43 12}⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Disability only}²³³³⁴⁰⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}^12,9^{67 32,5}^{27 32,8}²²^1,90⁶¹⁴¹^80,3⁶²
^(000s)
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 18. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Income
Quintile in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Lowest quintile}²¹⁴⁰³⁶²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Second quintile}¹⁷⁴¹³⁹²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Third quintile}¹⁵⁴²⁴¹²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Fourth q}^uintile¹⁴⁴⁰⁴⁴³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Highest q}^uintile¹⁴⁴⁰⁴⁴²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}^12,9^{67 32,5}²⁷^32,8²²^1,90⁶¹⁴¹^80,3⁶²
^(000s)
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 19. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries:
Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035
^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^All^80,3^{62 -3}^-2
^Gender
^Female^43,5⁹⁶^-3^-2
^Male^36,7⁶⁶^-3^-3
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-Hispa^nic^54,2¹⁷^-3^-2
^Black^non-Hispanic^8,49⁴^-3^-3
^Native^American⁴¹³^-2^-2
^Asian^5,35⁴^-4^-3
^Hispanic^11,8⁸⁵^-4^-3
^{Education Level (highes}^{t level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool^9,53¹^-3^-3
^{High school graduate}^27,2⁵³^-3^-3
^Some^college^18,5²⁵^-3^-2
^{College graduate or higher}^25,0⁵³^-3^-2
^Age
^{61 or you}^nger^5,63⁹^-3^-3
^62—6⁶^13,8⁸⁸^-5^-3
^67—7⁰^14,5⁵⁸^-3^-3
^71—7⁵^16,8⁴⁴^-3^-3
^76—8⁰^13,9⁷⁹^-3^-2
^81—8⁵^9,17¹^-2^-2
^{86 or older}^6,28³⁰⁰
^{Marital Status}
^Married^41,0²³^-3^-3
^Widowed^17,8⁰⁸^-2^-2
^Divorced^11,7⁸⁹^-3^-3
^Never^ma^rried^9,74²^-3^-3

^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^{Benefit Type - Cu}^rrent^Law
^{Retired worker only}^46,2⁷⁴^-3^-3
^Spouse^6,84²^-3^-2
^Survivor^12,1³⁹^-2^-1
^Disability^only^15,1⁰⁷^-3^-3
^{Income Q}^uintile
^Lowest^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-3^-3
^Second^quintile^16,0⁷³^-3^-3
^Third^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-3^-3
^Fourth^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-3^-2
^Highest^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-2^-2
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
Table 20. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Impact in 2035
^Cumulative^Cumulative
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Number^(000s)^Percent^Number^Percent
^(000s)
^{-20% or more}²⁷²⁰²⁷²⁰
^{-10% to -1}^9%²⁵⁴⁰⁵²⁶¹
^{Up to -10%}^65,8³⁰⁸²^66,3⁵⁶⁸³
^{No change}^13,9⁶⁴¹⁷^80,3²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Up to 10}^%⁴³⁰^80,3⁶²¹⁰⁰
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 21. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Gender in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Female 0}⁰⁷⁸²¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Male 0}⁸⁶¹³¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}^{272 254}^65,8³⁰^13,9⁶⁴⁴³^80,3⁶²
^(000s)
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 22. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^{-20% or more}^{-19% to -10%}^{Up to -10%}^{No chan}^ge^{Up to 10%}^percent
^{White non-Hispa}^nic⁰⁰⁸¹¹⁹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Black non-Hispanic}⁰⁰⁸¹¹⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Native American}⁰¹⁸⁴¹⁵⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Asian 1}⁰⁸⁴¹⁵¹⁰⁰
^{Hispanic 0}⁸⁶¹³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)²⁷²²⁵⁴^65,8³⁰^13,9⁶⁴⁴³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 23. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Education Level in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool⁰⁰⁸¹¹⁹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{High school graduate}⁰⁰⁸¹¹⁹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Some college}⁰⁰⁸²¹⁸⁰¹⁰⁰

^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{College graduate}⁰⁰⁸⁴¹⁵⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)²⁷²²⁵⁴^65,8³⁰^13,9⁶⁴⁴³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 24. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Age in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{61 or you}^nger⁰⁰⁸⁸¹²⁰¹⁰⁰
^62—6^{6 2}²⁹³³¹⁰⁰
^67—7^{0 0}⁰⁹⁵⁵⁰¹⁰⁰
^71—7^{5 0}⁹²⁸¹⁰⁰
^76—8^{0 0}⁰⁸⁸¹²⁰¹⁰⁰
^81—8^{5 0}⁶⁶³³¹⁰⁰
^{86 or older}⁰⁰⁵⁹⁵⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)²⁷²²⁵⁴^65,8³⁰^13,9⁶⁴⁴³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 25. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Marital Status in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Married 0}⁰⁸⁹¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Widowed 0}⁶²³⁷¹⁰⁰
^{Divorced 0}⁰⁸³¹⁶⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Never ma}^rried⁰⁰⁸⁵¹⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}^{272 254}^65,8³⁰^13,9⁶⁴⁴³^80,3⁶²
^(000s)
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.

^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 26. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Retired worker}
^{only 1}¹⁹¹⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Spouse 0}⁰⁸⁹¹¹¹⁰⁰
^{Survivor 0}⁵³⁴⁷⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Disability only}⁰⁰⁷⁶²⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^(000s)^{272 254}^65,8³⁰^13,9⁶⁴⁴³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 27. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Lowest quintile}⁰⁰⁷⁸²²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Second quintile}⁰⁰⁸²¹⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Third quintile}⁰⁰⁸⁴¹⁶⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Fourth q}^uintile¹¹⁸⁴¹⁵⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Highest q}^uintile¹¹⁸³¹⁶⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 272}²⁵⁴^65,8³⁰^13,9⁶⁴⁴³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 28. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035
^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^All^80,3^{62 -2}^-2
^Gender
^Female^43,5⁹⁶^-2^-2
^Male^36,7⁶⁶^-2^-2
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-Hispa^nic^54,2¹⁷^-2^-2
^Black^non-Hispanic^8,49⁴^-2^-2
^Native^American⁴¹³^-2^-1
^Asian^5,35⁴^-3^-3
^Hispanic^11,8⁸⁵^-3^-2
^{Education Level (highes}^{t level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool^9,53¹^-2^-2
^{High school graduate}^27,2⁵³^-2^-2
^Some^college^18,5²⁵^-2^-2
^{College graduate or higher}^25,0⁵³^-2^-2
^Age
^{61 or you}^nger^5,63⁹⁰⁰
^62—6⁶^13,8⁸⁸^-4^-3
^67—7⁰^14,5⁵⁸^-2^-2
^71—7⁵^16,8⁴⁴^-2^-2
^76—8⁰^13,9⁷⁹^-2^-2
^81—8⁵^9,17¹^-2^-1
^{86 or older}^6,28³⁰⁰
^{Marital Status}
^Married^41,0²³^-3^-2
^Widowed^17,8⁰⁸^-2^-1
^Divorced^11,7⁸⁹^-2^-2
^Never^ma^rried^9,74²^-2^-1

^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^{Benefit Type - Cu}^rrent^Law
^{Retired worker only}^46,2⁷⁴^-3^-3
^Spouse^6,84²^-2^-2
^Survivor^12,1³⁹^-1⁰
^Disability^only^15,1⁰⁷⁰⁰
^{Income q}^{uintile - CL}
^Lowest^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-2^-2
^Second^quintile^16,0⁷³^-2^-2
^Third^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-2^-2
^Fourth^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-2^-2
^Highest^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-2^-1
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
Table 29. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Impact in 2035
^Cumulative^Cumulative
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Number^(000s)^Percent^Number^Percent
^(000s)
^{-20% or more}²⁷⁴⁰²⁷⁴⁰
^{-10% to -1}^9%²⁷⁴⁰⁵⁴⁹¹
^{Up to -10%}^53,5²⁷⁶⁷^54,0⁷⁶⁶⁷
^{No change}^26,1²⁸³³^80,2⁰⁴¹⁰⁰
^{Up to 10}^%¹⁵⁹⁰^80,3⁶²¹⁰⁰
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 30. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Gender in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Female 0}⁰⁶⁵³⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Male 0}⁶⁹³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 274}²⁷⁴^53,5²⁷^26,1²⁸¹⁵⁹^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 31. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{White non-Hispa}^nic⁰⁰⁶⁸³¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Black non-Hispanic}⁰⁰⁵⁹⁴⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Native American}⁰¹⁶⁷³²¹¹⁰⁰
^{Asian 1}⁰⁶⁹²⁹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Hispanic 0}¹⁶⁵³⁴¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 274}²⁷⁴^53,5²⁷^26,1²⁸¹⁵⁹^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 32. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Education Level in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Did not graduate high}
^{school 0}⁰⁵⁵⁴⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{High school graduate}⁰⁰⁶³³⁶⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Some college}⁰⁰⁷⁰²⁹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{College graduate or}
^{higher 0}⁰⁷²²⁷⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)²⁷⁴²⁷⁴^53,5²⁷^26,1²⁸¹⁵⁹^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 33. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Age in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{61 or you}^nger⁰⁰³⁹⁷⁰¹⁰⁰
^62—6^{6 2}²⁷³²³¹⁰⁰
^67—7^{0 0}⁰⁸³¹⁷⁰¹⁰⁰
^71—7^{5 0}⁸¹¹⁸¹⁰⁰
^76—8^{0 0}⁰⁸²¹⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^81—8^{5 0}⁶⁴³⁶¹⁰⁰
^{86 or older}⁰⁰⁴⁹⁶⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 274}²⁷⁴^53,5²⁷^26,1²⁸¹⁵⁹^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 34. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Married 0}⁰⁷⁵²⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Widowed 0}⁵⁴⁴⁶¹⁰⁰
^{Divorced 0}⁰⁶⁶³³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Never ma}^rried⁰⁰⁵⁵⁴⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 274}²⁷⁴^53,5²⁷^26,1²⁸¹⁵⁹^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 35. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^Total
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Retired worker}
^{only 1}¹⁹¹⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Spouse 0}⁰⁸⁶¹³¹¹⁰⁰
^{Survivor 0}⁴⁵⁵⁵⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Disability only}⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 274}²⁷⁴^53,5²⁷^26,1²⁸¹⁵⁹^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 36. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Lowest quintile}⁰⁰⁵⁹⁴¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Second quintile}⁰⁰⁶¹³⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Third quintile}⁰⁰⁶⁷³³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Fourth q}^uintile¹¹⁷¹²⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Highest q}^uintile¹¹⁷⁵²³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 274}²⁷⁴^53,5²⁷^26,1²⁸¹⁵⁹^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 37. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries:
Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035
^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^All^80,3^{62 -5}^-4
^Gender
^Female^43,5⁹⁶^-5^-4
^Male^36,7⁶⁶^-5^-4
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-Hispa^nic^54,2¹⁷^-4^-4
^Black^non-Hispanic^8,49⁴^-5^-5
^Native^American⁴¹³^-4^-4
^Asian^5,35⁴^-6^-6
^Hispanic^11,8⁸⁵^-6^-5
^{Education Levels (highe}^{st level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool^9,53¹^-6^-5
^{High school graduate}^27,2⁵³^-5^-4
^Some^college^18,5²⁵^-5^-4
^{College graduate or higher}^25,0⁵³^-4^-4
^Age
^{61 or you}^nger^5,63⁹^-5^-5
^62—6⁶^13,8⁸⁸^-8^-6
^67—7⁰^14,5⁵⁸^-5^-5
^71—7⁵^16,8⁴⁴^-5^-4
^76—8⁰^13,9⁷⁹^-4^-4
^81—8⁵^9,17¹^-3^-3
^{86 or older}^6,28³⁰⁰
^{Marital Status}
^Married^41,0²³^-5^-5
^Widowed^17,8⁰⁸^-3^-3
^Divorced^11,7⁸⁹^-5^-4
^Never^ma^rried^9,74²^-5^-5

^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^{Benefit Type - Cu}^rrent^Law
^{Retired worker only}^46,2⁷⁴^-5^-5
^Spouse^6,84²^-4^-4
^Survivor^12,1³⁹^-3^-2
^Disability^only^15,1⁰⁷^-4^-5
^{Income Q}^{uintile - CL}
^Lowest^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-5^-5
^Second^quintile^16,0⁷³^-5^-5
^Third^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-5^-4
^Fourth^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-5^-4
^Highest^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-4^-3
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
Table 38. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Impact in 2035
^Cumulative^Cumulative
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Number^(000s)^Percent^Number^Percent
^(000s)
^{-20% or more}⁴³⁰¹⁴³⁰¹
^{-10% to -1}^9%^2,88²⁴^3,31³⁴
^{Up to -10%}^63,8⁴³⁷⁹^67,1⁵⁶⁸⁴
^{No change}^13,1⁷¹¹⁶^80,3²⁷¹⁰⁰
^{Up to 10}^%³⁵⁰^80,3⁶²¹⁰⁰
^Source:^{Congressional R}^esearc^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 39. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Gender in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Female 1}⁴⁷⁵²⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Male 1}³⁸⁵¹²¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 430}^2,88²^63,8⁴³^13,1⁷¹³⁵^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 40. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{White non-Hispa}^nic⁰²⁸⁰¹⁷⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Black non-Hispanic}¹⁵⁷⁷¹⁷⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Native American}⁰⁴⁸³¹³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Asian 1}⁶⁷⁹¹⁴¹⁰⁰
^{Hispanic 1}⁸⁷⁹¹²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 430}^2,88²^63,8⁴³^13,1⁷¹³⁵^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 41. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Education Level in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Did not graduate high}
^school⁰^{11 71 18}⁰¹⁰⁰
^{High school graduate}¹⁴⁷⁸¹⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^Some^college⁰^{3 80 17}⁰¹⁰⁰

^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{College graduate or}
^higher¹^{2 84 14}⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)⁴³⁰^2,88²^63,8⁴³^13,1⁷¹³⁵^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 42. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Age in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{61 or you}^nger⁰⁵⁸⁴¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^62—6^{6 3}⁸⁸⁶³¹⁰⁰
^67—7^{0 0}³⁹³⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^71—7^{5 0}⁹⁰⁷¹⁰⁰
^76—8^{0 0}³⁸⁶¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^81—8^{5 0}²⁶⁶³²¹⁰⁰
^{86 or older}⁰⁰⁵⁹⁵⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 430}^2,88²^63,8⁴³^13,1⁷¹³⁵^80,3⁶²
^Source:^Congress^{ional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 43. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Marital Status in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Married 1}⁴⁸⁷⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Widowed 0}²⁶¹³⁷¹⁰⁰
^{Divorced 1}⁴⁸⁰¹⁵⁰¹⁰⁰

^{Never ma}^rried⁰⁵⁸⁰¹⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 430}^2,88²^63,8⁴³^13,1⁷¹³⁵^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 44. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Retired worker}
^{only 1}⁴⁸⁷⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Spouse 0}³⁹⁰⁷¹⁰⁰
^{Survivor 0}¹⁵²⁴⁷⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Disability only}⁰⁴⁷³²⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 430}^2,88²^63,8⁴³^13,1⁷¹³⁵^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 45. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries:
Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Lowest quintile}⁰¹¹⁶⁷²²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Second quintile}⁰²⁸⁰¹⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Third quintile}⁰¹⁸³¹⁵⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Fourth q}^uintile¹²⁸³¹⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Highest q}^uintile¹²⁸⁴¹⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 430}^2,88²^63,8⁴³^13,1⁷¹³⁵^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 46. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035
^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^All^80,3^{62 -4}^-3
^Gender
^Female^43,5⁹⁶^-4^-3
^Male^36,7⁶⁶^-4^-3
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-Hispa^nic^54,2¹⁷^-3^-3
^Black^non-Hispanic^8,49⁴^-4^-3
^Native^American⁴¹³^-3^-2
^Asian^5,35⁴^-5^-5
^Hispanic^11,8⁸⁵^-4^-4
^{Education Level (highes}^{t level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool^9,53¹^-4^-3
^{High school graduate}^27,2⁵³^-4^-3
^Some^college^18,5²⁵^-4^-3
^{College graduate or higher}^25,0⁵³^-4^-3
^Age
^{61 or you}^nger^5,63⁹⁰⁰
^62—6⁶^13,8⁸⁸^-6^-5
^67—7⁰^14,5⁵⁸^-4^-4
^71—7⁵^16,8⁴⁴^-4^-4
^76—8⁰^13,9⁷⁹^-4^-4
^81—8⁵^9,17¹^-3^-2
^{86 or older}^6,28³⁰⁰
^{Marital Status}
^Married^41,0²³^-4^-4
^Widowed^17,8⁰⁸^-3^-2
^Divorced^11,7⁸⁹^-4^-3
^Never^ma^rried^9,74²^-3^-3

^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^{Benefit Type - Cu}^rrent^Law
^{Retired worker only}^46,2⁷⁴^-5^-5
^Spouse^6,84²^-4^-3
^Survivor^12,1³⁹^-2⁰
^Disability^only^15,1⁰⁷⁰⁰
^{Income Q}^uintile
^Lowest^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-4^-4
^Second^quintile^16,0⁷³^-4^-4
^Third^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-4^-3
^Fourth^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-4^-3
^Highest^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-4^-3
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
Table 47. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Impact in 2035
^Cumulative^Cumulative
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Number^(000s)^Percent^Number^Percent
^(000s)
^{-20% or more}⁴²⁸¹⁴²⁸¹
^{-10% to -1}^9%^2,27⁸³^2,70⁶³
^{Up to -10%}^51,4⁷⁸⁶⁴^54,1⁸⁴⁶⁷
^{No change}^26,0⁴⁵³²^80,2²⁹¹⁰⁰
^{Up to 10}^%¹³³⁰^80,3⁶²¹⁰⁰
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 48. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Gender in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Female 0}³⁶²³⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Male 1}⁶⁷³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 428}^2,27⁸^51,4⁷⁸^26,0⁴⁵¹³³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 49. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{White non-Hispa}^nic⁰²⁶⁷³¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Black non-Hispanic}¹⁴⁵⁵⁴⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Native American}⁰²⁶⁶³²¹¹⁰⁰
^{Asian 1}⁶⁶⁴²⁹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Hispanic 1}⁵⁹³⁴¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 428}^2,27⁸^51,4⁷⁸^26,0⁴⁵¹³³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 50. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Education Level in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Did not graduate high}
^school⁰^{8 48 44}⁰¹⁰⁰
^{High school graduate}¹³⁶⁰³⁶⁰¹⁰⁰
^Some^college⁰^{2 68 29}⁰¹⁰⁰
^College^graduate¹^{1 71 27}⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)⁴²⁸^2,27⁸^51,4⁷⁸^26,0⁴⁵¹³³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 51. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Age in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^Total^percent
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{61 or you}^nger⁰⁰³⁹⁷⁰¹⁰⁰
^62—6^{6 3}⁷⁶⁷²³¹⁰⁰
^67—7^{0 0}³⁸⁰¹⁷⁰¹⁰⁰
^71—7^{5 0}⁷⁹¹⁸¹⁰⁰
^76—8^{0 0}²⁸⁰¹⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^81—8^{5 0}⁶²³⁶¹⁰⁰
^{86 or older}⁰⁰⁴⁹⁶⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 428}^2,27⁸^51,4⁷⁸^26,0⁴⁵¹³³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 52. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Married 1}³⁷²²⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Widowed 0}²⁵²⁴⁵¹⁰⁰
^{Divorced 1}³⁶⁴³²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Never ma}^rried⁰³⁵²⁴⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 428}^2,27⁸^51,4⁷⁸^26,0⁴⁵¹³³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 53. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Retired worker}
^{only 1}⁴⁸⁷⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Spouse 0}²⁸⁴¹²¹¹⁰⁰
^{Survivor 0}¹⁴⁴⁵⁵⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Disability only}⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 428}^2,27⁸^51,4⁷⁸^26,0⁴⁵¹³³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 54. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability
Beneficiaries: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Lowest Quintile}⁰⁸⁵⁰⁴¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Second Quintile}⁰¹⁶⁰³⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Third Quintile}⁰¹⁶⁶³³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Fourth Q}^uintile¹²⁶⁹²⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Highest Q}^uintile¹¹⁷⁴²³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 428}^2,27⁸^51,4⁷⁸^26,0⁴⁵¹³³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 55. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Summary of Mean Percentage Change in
Benefits in 2035
^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^All^80,3^{62 -2}^-2
^Gender
^Female^43,5⁹⁶^-2^-1
^Male^36,7⁶⁶^-2^-2
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-Hispa^nic^54,2¹⁷^-2^-2
^Black^non-Hispanic^8,49⁴^-2^-1
^Native^American⁴¹³^-2^-1
^Asian^5,35⁴^-2^-2
^Hispanic^11,8⁸⁵^-2^-2
^{Education Status (hig}^{hest level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool^9,53¹^-2^-1
^{High school graduate}^27,2⁵³^-2^-1
^Some^college^18,5²⁵^-2^-2
^{College graduate or higher}^25,0⁵³^-2^-2
^Age
^{61 or you}^nger^5,63⁹⁰⁰
^62—6⁶^13,8⁸⁸^-5^-4
^67—7⁰^14,5⁵⁸^-2^-3
^71—7⁵^16,8⁴⁴^-1^-2
^76—8⁰^13,9⁷⁹^-2^-2
^81—8⁵^9,17¹^-2^-1
^{86 or older}^6,28³⁰⁰
^{Marital Status}
^Married^41,0²³^-3^-2
^Widowed^17,8⁰⁸^-1⁰
^Divorced^11,7⁸⁹^-2^-2
^Never^ma^rried^9,74²^-2^-1

^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^{Benefit Type - Cu}^rrent^Law
^{Retired worker only}^46,2⁷⁴^-3^-3
^Spouse^6,84²^-2^-2
^Survivor^12,1³⁹⁰⁰
^Disability^only^15,1⁰⁷⁰⁰
^{Income Q}^uintile
^Lowest^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-2^-1
^Second^quintile^16,0⁷³^-2^-1
^Third^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-2^-2
^Fourth^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-2^-2
^Highest^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-3^-2
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
Table 56. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Impact in 2035
^Cumulative^Cumulative
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Number^(000s)^Percent^Number^Percent
^(000s)
^{-20% or more}³⁶⁰⁰³⁶⁰⁰
^{-10% to -1}^9%⁴⁶¹¹⁸²¹¹
^{Up to -10%}^48,7⁴⁴⁶¹^49,5⁶⁵⁶²
^{No change}^28,7⁸⁴³⁶^78,3⁴⁸⁹⁷
^{Up to 10}^%^2,01⁴³^80,3⁶²¹⁰⁰
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 57. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Gender in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Female 0}⁰⁵⁹³⁸²¹⁰⁰
^{Male 1}¹⁶³³³³¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 360}⁴⁶¹^48,7⁴⁴^28,7⁸⁴^2,01⁴^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.

^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 58. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^-^{19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{White non-Hispa}^nic⁰¹⁶¹³⁵³¹⁰⁰
^{Black non-Hispanic}¹¹⁵⁵⁴²²¹⁰⁰
^{Native American}⁰¹⁵⁷⁴⁰²¹⁰⁰
^{Asian 1}⁶⁴³²³¹⁰⁰
^{Hispanic 0}¹⁶⁰³⁷²¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 360}⁴⁶¹^48,7⁴⁴^28,7⁸⁴^2,01⁴^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 59. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Education Level in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Did not graduate high}
^{school 0}⁰⁵¹⁴⁶¹¹⁰⁰
^{High school graduate}⁰¹⁵⁸⁴⁰²¹⁰⁰
^{Some college}⁰¹⁶⁴³²³¹⁰⁰
^{College graduate or}
^{higher 1}¹⁶⁵³⁰⁴¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)³⁶⁰⁴⁶¹^48,7⁴⁴^28,7⁸⁴^2,01⁴^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 60. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Age in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{61 or you}^nger⁰⁰¹⁹⁹⁰¹⁰⁰
^62—6^{6 3}³⁷¹²³¹⁰⁰
^67—7^{0 0}⁰⁸²¹⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^71—7^{5 0}⁷⁶²³¹⁰⁰
^76—8^{0 0}⁰⁶²²⁴¹⁴¹⁰⁰
^81—8^{5 0}⁵⁸⁴²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{86 or older}⁰⁰¹⁹⁹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 360}⁴⁶¹^48,7⁴⁴^28,7⁸⁴^2,01⁴^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 61. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Married 1}¹⁷⁰²⁶³¹⁰⁰
^{Widowed 0}⁰⁴³⁵⁴²¹⁰⁰
^{Divorced 1}¹⁶¹³⁵¹⁰⁰
^{Never ma}^rried⁰¹⁵²⁴⁵²¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 360}⁴⁶¹^48,7⁴⁴^28,7⁸⁴^2,01⁴^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 62. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Retired worker}
^{only 1}¹⁸⁵⁹⁴¹⁰⁰
^{Spouse 0}⁰⁸¹¹⁷²¹⁰⁰

^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Survivor 0}⁰³⁰⁶⁸¹¹⁰⁰
^{Disability only}⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 360}⁴⁶¹^48,7⁴⁴^28,7⁸⁴^2,01⁴^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 63. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Lowest quintile}⁰⁰⁵⁶⁴³¹¹⁰⁰
^{Second quintile}⁰⁰⁵⁷⁴¹²¹⁰⁰
^{Third quintile}⁰⁰⁶⁰³⁷²¹⁰⁰
^{Fourth q}^uintile¹¹⁶³³¹³¹⁰⁰
^{Highest q}^uintile¹¹⁶⁶²⁷⁴¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 360}⁴⁶¹^48,7⁴⁴^28,7⁸⁴^2,01⁴^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 64. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Summary of Mean and
Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035
^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^All^80,3^{62 -6}^-5
^Gender
^Female^43,5⁹⁶^-5^-5
^Male^36,7⁶⁶^-6^-6
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-Hispa^nic^54,2¹⁷^-5^-5
^Black^non-Hispanic^8,49⁴^-6^-5
^Native^American⁴¹³^-5^-6
^Asian^5,35⁴^-6^-6
^Hispanic^11,8⁸⁵^-6^-6
^{Education Level (highes}^{t level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool^9,53¹^-5^-5
^{High school graduate}^27,2⁵³^-5^-5
^Some^college^18,5²⁵^-5^-5
^{College graduate or higher}^25,0⁵³^-6^-5
^Age
^{61 or you}^nger^5,63⁹^-7^-8
^62—6⁶^13,8⁸⁸^-12^-10
^67—7⁰^14,5⁵⁸^-7^-8
^71—7⁵^16,8⁴⁴^-5^-5
^76—8⁰^13,9⁷⁹^-3^-3
^81—8⁵^9,17¹^-1^-1
^{86 or older}^6,28³⁰⁰
^{Marital Status}
^Married^41,0²³^-6^-6
^Widowed^17,8⁰⁸^-3^-2
^Divorced^11,7⁸⁹^-6^-5
^Never^ma^rried^9,74²^-6^-6

^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^{Benefit Type - Cu}^rrent^Law
^{Retired worker only}^46,2⁷⁴^-7^-6
^Spouse^6,84²^-5^-5
^Survivor^12,1³⁹^-2^-1
^Disability^only^15,1⁰⁷^-5^-5
^{Income Q}^uintile
^Lowest^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-5^-4
^Second^quintile^16,0⁷³^-5^-5
^Third^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-5^-5
^Fourth^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-6^-5
^Highest^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-7^-6
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
Table 65. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Impact in
2035
^Cumulative^Cumulative
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Number^(000s)^Percent^Number^Percent
^(000s)
^{-20% or more}⁹⁸²¹⁹⁸²¹
^{-10% to -1}^9%^5,21¹⁷^6,19³⁸
^{Up to -10%}^60,9⁶³⁷⁶^67,1⁵⁶⁸⁴
^{No change}^13,1⁷⁶¹⁶^80,3³²¹⁰⁰
^{Up to 10}^%³⁰⁰^80,3⁶²¹⁰⁰
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 66. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Gender in
2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Female 1}⁶⁷³²⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Male 2}⁸⁷⁹¹²¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 982}^5,21¹^60,9⁶³^13,1⁷⁶³⁰^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 67. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Ethnicity in
2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{White non-Hispa}^nic¹⁶⁷⁶¹⁷⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Black non-Hispanic}²⁹⁷³¹⁷⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Native American}¹⁵⁸¹¹³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Asian 2}⁶⁷⁸¹⁴¹⁰⁰
^{Hispanic 1}⁹⁷⁸¹²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 982}^5,21¹^60,9⁶³^13,1⁷⁶³⁰^80,3⁶⁷
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 68. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Education
Level in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Did not graduate high}
^school¹^{8 74 18}⁰¹⁰⁰
^{High school graduate}¹⁷⁷⁵¹⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^Some^college¹^{6 77 17}⁰¹⁰⁰
^{College graduate or}
^higher²^{7 78 14}⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)⁹⁸²^5,21¹^60,9⁶³^13,1⁷⁶³⁰^80,3⁶⁷
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 69. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Age in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{61 or you}^nger⁰¹⁹⁷⁰¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^62—6^{6 7}²⁸⁶²³¹⁰⁰
^67—7^{0 0}¹⁹⁶⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^71—7^{5 0}⁰⁹³⁷¹⁰⁰
^76—8^{0 0}⁸⁹¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^81—8^{5 0}⁰⁶⁷³³¹⁰⁰
^{86 or older}⁰⁰⁵⁹⁵⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 982}^5,21¹^60,9⁶³^13,1⁷⁶³⁰^80,3⁶⁷
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 70. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Marital
Status in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Married 2}⁸⁸²⁹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Widowed 0}²⁶¹³⁶¹⁰⁰
^{Divorced 1}⁶⁷⁷¹⁵⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Never ma}^rried¹⁹⁷⁶¹⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 982}^5,21¹^60,9⁶³^13,1⁷⁶³⁰^80,3⁶⁷
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 71. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Benefit Type
in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Retired worker}
^{only 2}⁷⁸³⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Spouse 0}⁶⁸⁶¹⁰⁰
^{Survivor 0}¹⁵²⁴⁶⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Disability only}⁰⁹⁶⁸²⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 982}^5,21¹^60,9⁶³^13,1⁷⁶³⁰^80,3⁶⁷
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 72. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Income
Quintile in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Lowest quintile}⁰⁵⁷³²²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Second quintile}⁰⁶⁷⁶¹⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Third quintile}¹⁷⁷⁷¹⁵⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Fourth q}^uintile²⁸⁷⁶¹⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Highest q}^uintile³⁶⁷⁸¹³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 982}^5,21¹^60,9⁶³^13,1⁷⁶³⁰^80,3⁶⁷
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 73. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Summary of Mean and Median
Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035
^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^All^80,3^{62 -3}^-2
^Gender
^Female^43,5⁹⁶^-3^-2
^Male^36,7⁶⁶^-3^-3
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-Hispa^nic^54,2¹⁷^-3^-2
^Black^non-Hispanic^8,49⁴^-3^-2
^Native^American⁴¹³^-3^-3
^Asian^5,35⁴^-3^-3
^Hispanic^11,8⁸⁵^-3^-3
^{Education Level (highes}^{t level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool^9,53¹^-3^-2
^{High school graduate}^27,2⁵³^-3^-2
^Some^college^18,5²⁵^-3^-2
^{College graduate or higher}^25,0⁵³^-3^-3
^Age
^{61 or you}^nger^5,63⁹⁰⁰
^62—6⁶^13,8⁸⁸^-7^-6
^67—7⁰^14,5⁵⁸^-4^-5
^71—7⁵^16,8⁴⁴^-3^-3
^76—8⁰^13,9⁷⁹^-2^-2
^81—8⁵^9,17¹^-1^-1
^{86 or older}^6,28³⁰⁰
^{Marital Status}
^Married^41,0²³^-4^-3
^Widowed^17,8⁰⁸^-2^-1
^Divorced^11,7⁸⁹^-3^-2
^Never^ma^rried^9,74²^-3^-2

^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^{Benefit Type - Cu}^rrent^Law
^{Retired worker only}^46,2⁷⁴^-4^-4
^Spouse^6,84²^-3^-3
^Survivor^12,1³⁹^-1⁰
^Disability^only^15,1⁰⁷^-1⁰
^{Income Q}^uintile
^Lowest^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-2^-2
^Second^quintile^16,0⁷³^-2^-2
^Third^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-3^-2
^Fourth^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-3^-3
^Highest^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-4^-3
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
Table 74. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Impact in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Number^{Percent Cumulative}^Cumulative
^(000s)^Number^Percent
^(000s)
^{-20% or more}⁵⁴⁹¹⁵⁴⁹¹
^{-10% to -1}^9%⁷¹⁷¹^1,26⁶²
^{Up to -10%}^55,9²⁹⁷⁰^57,1⁹⁵⁷¹
^{No change}^23,0⁶⁷²⁹^80,2⁶²¹⁰⁰
^{Up to 10}^%¹⁰¹⁰^80,3⁶²¹⁰⁰
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 75. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Gender in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Female 1}¹⁶⁸³¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Male 1}⁷²²⁶¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 549}⁷¹⁷^55,9²⁹^23,0⁶⁷¹⁰¹^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.

^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 76. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{White non-Hispa}^nic¹¹⁷¹²⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Black non-Hispanic}¹¹⁶³³⁵⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Native American}⁰¹⁷²²⁷⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Asian 1}⁷²²⁶¹⁰⁰
^{Hispanic 1}¹⁶⁹³⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 549}⁷¹⁷⁵⁵⁹²⁹²³⁰⁶⁷¹⁰¹⁸⁰³⁶⁷
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 77. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Education Level in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Did not graduate high}
^{school 0}¹⁶¹³⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{High school graduate}¹¹⁶⁷³²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Some college}¹¹⁷³²⁶⁰¹⁰⁰
^{College graduate or}
^{higher 1}¹⁷⁴²⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)⁵⁴⁹⁷¹⁷^55,9²⁹^23,0⁶⁷¹⁰¹^80,3⁶⁷
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 78. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Age in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{61 or you}^nger⁰⁰³⁹⁷⁰¹⁰⁰
^62—6^{6 4}⁵⁶⁸²³¹⁰⁰
^67—7^{0 0}⁰⁸⁹¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^71—7^{5 0}⁸⁸¹²¹⁰⁰
^76—8^{0 0}⁰⁸⁶¹³⁰¹⁰⁰
^81—8^{5 0}⁶⁷³³¹⁰⁰
^{86 or older}⁰⁰⁵⁹⁵⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 549}⁷¹⁷^55,9²⁹^23,0⁶⁷¹⁰¹^80,3⁶⁷
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 79. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Married 1}¹⁷⁷²¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Widowed 0}⁰⁵⁸⁴¹¹⁰⁰
^{Divorced 1}¹⁷⁰²⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Never ma}^rried¹¹⁵⁸⁴⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 549}⁷¹⁷^55,9²⁹^23,0⁶⁷¹⁰¹^80,3⁶⁷
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 80. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Retired worker}
^{only 1}¹⁹⁰⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Spouse 0}⁰⁸⁸¹¹¹⁰⁰
^{Survivor 0}⁵⁰⁴⁹¹¹⁰⁰
^{Disability only}⁰⁰¹⁵⁸⁵⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 549}⁷¹⁷^55,9²⁹^23,0⁶⁷¹⁰¹^80,3⁶⁷
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 81. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Lowest quintile}⁰⁰⁶³³⁷⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Second quintile}⁰⁰⁶⁶³³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Third quintile}⁰¹⁷¹²⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Fourth q}^uintile¹²⁷³²⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Highest q}^uintile²²⁷⁶²⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 549}⁷¹⁷^55,9²⁹^23,0⁶⁷¹⁰¹^80,3⁶⁷
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 82. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth:
Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035
^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^All^80,3^{62 -6}^-4
^Gender
^Female^43,5⁹⁶^-5^-3
^Male^36,7⁶⁶^-7^-5
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-Hispa^nic^54,2¹⁷^-6^-5
^Black^non-Hispanic^8,49⁴^-5^-3
^Native^American⁴¹³^-6^-5
^Asian^5,35⁴^-6^-4
^Hispanic^11,8⁸⁵^-5^-2
^{Education Level (highes}^{t level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool^9,53¹^-3⁰
^{High school graduate}^27,2⁵³^-5^-3
^Some^college^18,5²⁵^-6^-4
^{College graduate or higher}^25,0⁵³^-8^-7
^Age
^{61 or you}^nger^5,63⁹^-5^-2
^62—6⁶^13,8⁸⁸^-12^-8
^67—7⁰^14,5⁵⁸^-8^-9
^71—7⁵^16,8⁴⁴^-6^-7
^76—8⁰^13,9⁷⁹^-4^-4
^81—8⁵^9,17¹^-2^-1
^{86 or older}^6,28³⁰⁰
^{Marital Status}
^Married^41,0²³^-7^-6
^Widowed^17,8⁰⁸^-4^-1
^Divorced^11,7⁸⁹^-6^-4
^Never^ma^rried^9,74²^-5^-3
^{Benefit Type - Cu}^rrent^Law
^{Retired worker only}^46,2⁷⁴^-7^-6
^Spouse^6,84²^-7^-6

^Number^{Mean Median}
^(000s)
^{Survivor 12,1}³⁹^-3⁰
^Disability^only^15,1⁰⁷^-4^-1
^{Income Q}^{uintile - CL}
^Lowest^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-1⁰
^Second^quintile^16,0⁷³^-4^-3
^Third^quintile^16,0⁷¹^-6^-5
^Fourth^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-8^-7
^Highest^q^uintile^16,0⁷³^-10^-9
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
Table 83. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth:
Distribution by Impact in 2035
^Cumulative^Cumulative
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Number^(000s)^Percent^Number^Percent
^(000s)
^{-20% or more}^1,62⁴²^1,62⁴²
^{-10% to -1}^9%^16,5⁵²²¹^18,1⁷⁵²³
^{Up to -10%}^37,1⁷⁹⁴⁶^55,3⁵⁵⁶⁹
^{No change}^24,9⁸²³¹^80,3³⁷¹⁰⁰
^{Up to 10}^%²⁵⁰^80,3⁶²¹⁰⁰
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 84. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth:
Distribution by Gender in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Female 1}¹⁷⁴⁶³⁶⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Male 3}²⁵⁴⁷²⁶¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 1,62}⁴^16,5⁵²^37,1⁷⁹^24,9⁸³²⁵^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.

^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 85. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth:
Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{White non-Hispa}^nic²²²⁴⁸²⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Black non-Hispanic}²¹⁶⁴⁵³⁷⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Native American}¹²⁶⁴⁷²⁷⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Asian 2}²³⁴³³³¹⁰⁰
^{Hispanic 2}¹⁶⁴²³⁹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^(000s)^1,62^{4 16,5}⁵²^37,1⁷⁹^24,9⁸³²⁵^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 86. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth:
Distribution by Education Level in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Did not graduate high}
^{school 1}¹⁰³⁶⁵³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{High school graduate}¹¹⁵⁴⁸³⁶⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Some college}²¹⁹⁵¹²⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{College graduate or}
^{higher 3}³¹⁴⁵²⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)^1,62⁴^16,5⁵²^37,1⁷⁹^24,9⁸³²⁵^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 87. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth:
Distribution by Age in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{61 or you}^nger¹²³³⁸³⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^62—6^{6 10}³⁴³¹²⁵¹⁰⁰
^67—7^{0 0}⁴³³⁷¹⁹⁰¹⁰⁰
^71—7^{5 0}²³⁵⁶²⁰¹⁰⁰
^76—8^{0 0}²⁷⁴²⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^81—8^{5 0}¹⁵⁷⁴²¹⁰⁰
^{86 or older}⁰⁰³⁹⁶⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^(000s)^1,62^{4 16,5}⁵²^37,1⁷⁹^24,9⁸³²⁵^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 88. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth:
Distribution by Marital Status in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Married 3}²⁵⁴⁸²⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Widowed 1}¹²⁴³⁴⁴¹⁰⁰
^{Divorced 2}²⁰⁴⁷³¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Never ma}^rried²¹⁸⁴³³⁷⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 1,62}⁴^16,5⁵²^37,1⁷⁹^24,9⁸³²⁵^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 89. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth:
Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Retired worker}
^{only 3}²⁴⁵⁰²³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Spouse 2}²⁷⁵¹¹⁹¹⁰⁰
^Survivor¹⁹³⁹⁵¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Disability only}⁰¹⁶³⁹⁴⁵⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 1,62}⁴^16,5⁵²^37,1⁷⁹^24,9⁸³²⁵^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 90. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth:
Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035
^{Percentage Change Catego}^r^y^Total
^percent
^{-20% or}^{-19% to}^{Up to}^No^{Up to}
^more^-10%^-10%^chan^ge^10%
^{Lowest quintile}⁰³³¹⁶⁶⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Second quintile}⁰¹³⁵⁶³¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Third quintile}¹²¹⁵⁴²³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Fourth q}^uintile⁴²⁸⁵⁰¹⁹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Highest q}^uintile⁵³⁸⁴¹¹⁶⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 1,62}⁴^16,5⁵²^37,1⁷⁹^24,9⁸³²⁵^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 91. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary
of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Individuals Who Pay No
Additional Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035
^{Individuals who}^pay^Number^{Median percent}^{Mean percent}
^{no ad}^{ditional taxes}^(000s)^chan^{ge in benefits}^chan^{ge in benefits}
^All^62,4^{06 0}⁰
^Gender
^Female^36,2⁸³⁰⁰
^Male^26,1²³⁰⁰
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-Hispa^nic^40,7¹¹⁰⁰
^Black^non-Hispanic^7,49⁹⁰⁰
^Native^American³⁴⁵⁰⁰
^Asian^3,79⁶⁰⁰
^Hispanic^10,0⁵⁴⁰⁰
^{Education Level (highes}^{t level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool^8,99⁰⁰⁰
^{High school graduate}^24,5⁷⁰⁰⁰
^Some^college^15,0²⁹⁰⁰
^{College graduate or higher}^13,8¹⁸⁰¹
^Age
^{61 or You}^nger^4,74³⁰⁰
^62-6⁶^10,0⁸⁷⁰¹
^67-7⁰^10,1⁰²⁰⁰
^71-7⁵^12,4⁷⁶⁰⁰
^76-8⁰^11,0⁰⁹⁰⁰
^81-8⁵^7,90⁰⁰⁰
⁸⁶⁺^6,09⁰⁰⁰

^{Individuals who}^pay^Number^{Median percent}^{Mean percent}
^{no ad}^{ditional taxes}^(000s)^chan^{ge in benefits}^chan^{ge in benefits}
^{Marital Status}
^Married^30,3⁸²⁰⁰
^Widowed^15,0⁰⁴⁰⁰
^Divorced^9,21¹⁰¹
^Never^ma^rried^7,80⁹⁰⁰
^{Benefit Type - Cu}^rrent^Law
^{Retired worker only}^31,1⁹³⁰⁰
^Spouse^6,77⁹⁰²
^Survivor^11,4⁶⁴⁰⁰
^{Disability only}^12,9⁷⁰⁰⁰
^{Income Q}^uintile
^Lowest^quintile^15,6¹⁰⁰⁰
^Second^quintile^14,3⁹⁴⁰⁰
^Third^quintile^13,0⁵⁸⁰⁰
^Fourth^q^uintile^11,2⁶³⁰¹
^Highest^q^uintile^8,08¹⁰¹
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
Table 92. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary
of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Individuals Who Pay Additional
Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035
^{Individuals who}^pay^Number^{Median percent}^{Mean percent}
^{additional taxes}^(000s)^chan^{ge in benefits}^chan^{ge in benefits}
^All^17,9^{56 2 5}
^Gender
^Female^7,31^{3 1 5}
^Male^10,6^{43 2 6}
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-^Hispa^nic^13,5^{06 2 5}
^Black^non-Hispanic^{994 1 6}
^Native^American^{a a a}
^Asian^1,55^{8 2 4}
^Hispanic^1,83^{0 1 8}

^{Individuals who}^pay^Number^{Median percent}^{Mean percent}
^{additional taxes}^(000s)^chan^{ge in benefits}^chan^{ge in benefits}
^{Education Level (highes}^{t level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool⁵⁴¹²⁵
^{High school graduate}^2,68⁴¹⁴
^Some^college^3,49^{7 1 3}
^{College graduate or higher}^11,2³⁵²⁶
^Age
^{61 or You}^nger⁸⁹⁶²⁵
^62-6⁶^3,80¹²¹²
^67-7⁰^4,45^{6 2 4}
^71-7⁵^4,36^{8 1 3}
^76-8⁰^2,97^{1 1 3}
^81-8⁵^1,27^{1 1 2}
⁸⁶⁺^{194 1 2}
^{Marital Status}
^Married^10,6^{41 2 5}
^Widowed^2,80^{4 1 6}
^Divorced^2,57^{8 2 5}
^Never^ma^rried^1,93^{3 2 4}
^{Benefit Type - Cu}^rrent^Law
^{Retired worker only}^15,0⁸²²⁶
^Spouse^{a a a}
^Survivor^{675 0 2}
^{Disability only}^2,13⁷¹⁵
^{Income Q}^uintile
^Lowest^quintile^{461 1 2}
^Second^quintile^1,67^{9 1 2}
^Third^quintile^3,01^{3 1 2}
^Fourth^q^uintile^4,81^{1 1 5}
^Highest^q^uintile^7,99^{3 2 8}
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
^a.^Num^ber^{not pres}^{ented due}^{to insufficient sam}^{ple size.}

Table 93. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary
of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population in 2035
^{Total population}^Number^(000s)^{Median percent}^chan^{ge in benefits}^{Mean percent}^chan^{ge in benefits}
^All^80,3^{62 0 1}
^Gender
^Female^43,5^{96 0 1}
^Male^36,7^{66 0 2}
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-Hispa^nic^54,2^{17 0 2}
^Black^non-Hispanic^{164 0 1}
^Native^American^{413 0 1}
^Asian^5,35^{4 0 1}
^Hispanic^11,8^{85 0 1}
^{Education Level (highes}^{t level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool^9,53¹⁰⁰
^{High school graduate}^27,2⁵³⁰¹
^Some^college^18,5^{25 0 1}
^College^graduate^25,0^{53 0 3}
^Age
^{61 or You}^nger^5,63⁹⁰¹
^62-6⁶^13,8^{88 0 4}
^67-7⁰^14,5^{58 0 2}
^71-7⁵^16,8^{44 0 1}
^76-8⁰^13,9^{79 0 1}
^81-8⁵^9,17^{1 0 0}
⁸⁶⁺^6,28^{3 0 0}
^{Marital Status}
^Married^41,0^{23 0 2}
^Widowed^17,8^{08 0 1}
^Divorced^11,7^{89 0 2}
^Never^ma^rried^9,74^{2 0 1}
^{Simple Benefit Type - Cur}^rent^La^w
^{Retired worker only}^46,2⁷⁴⁰²
^Spouse^6,84^{2 0 2}
^Survivor^12,1^{39 0 0}
^{Disability only}^15,1⁰⁷⁰¹

^{Total population}^Number^(000s)^{Median percent}^chan^{ge in benefits}^{Mean percent}^chan^{ge in benefits}
^{Income Q}^{uintile - Curre}^{nt Law}
^Lowest^quintile^16,0^{71 0 0}
^Second^quintile^16,0^{73 0 0}
^Third^quintile^16,0^{71 0 1}
^Fourth^q^uintile^16,0^{73 0 2}
^Highest^q^uintile^16,0^{73 0 4}
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
Table 94. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Impact in
2035
^Cumulative^Cumulative
^{Percentage Change in Benefits Category}^Number^(000s)^Percent^Number^Percent
^(000s)
^{Up to -10%}⁸⁰⁸⁰
^{No change}^62,3⁰³⁷⁸^62,3¹⁰⁷⁸
^{Up to 10}^%^16,0⁴⁶²⁰^78,3⁵⁶⁹⁸
^{10% to}¹⁹^%^1,23⁴²^79,5⁹⁰⁹⁹
^{20% to}¹⁰^0%⁶⁹⁷¹^80,2⁸⁷¹⁰⁰
^{More tha}^{n 1}⁰⁰^%⁷⁶⁰^80,3⁶²¹⁰⁰
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 95. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Gender in
2035
^{Percentage Change in Benefits Category}^Total
^percent
^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^{10% to}^{20% to}^{More than}
^-10%^chan^ge^10%^19%^100%^100%
^{Female 0}⁸⁰¹⁸¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Male 0}⁷⁵²²²¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 8}^62,3⁰³^16,0⁴⁶^1,23⁴⁶⁹⁷⁷⁶^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.

^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 96. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Ethnicity
in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Benefits Category}^Total
^percent
^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^{10% to}^{20% to}^{More than}
^-10%^chan^ge^10%^19%^100%^100%
^{White non-}
^{Hispanic 0}⁷⁵²²²¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Black non-}
^{Hispanic 0}⁸⁹¹⁰⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Native American}⁰⁸²¹⁴²²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Asian 0}⁷²²⁵³¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Hispanic 0}⁸⁴¹⁴¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 8}^62,3⁰³^16,0⁴⁶^1,23⁴⁶⁹⁷⁷⁶^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the “What}^{Do the Tables Sho}^{w?” in the}
^{report I}^ntroduction.
Table 97. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings of the Total
Population: Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population
by Education Level in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Benefits Category}^Total
^percent
^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^{10% to}^{20% to}^{More than}
^-10%^chan^ge^10%^19%^100%^100%
^{Did not graduate}
^{high school}⁰⁹²⁷⁰¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{High school}
^{graduate 0}⁸⁹¹⁰¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Some college}⁰⁸²¹⁶¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{College graduate or}
^{higher 0}⁵⁷³⁸³²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)⁸^62,3⁰³^16,0⁴⁶^1,23⁴⁶⁹⁷⁷⁶^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 98. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Age in
2035
^{Percentage Change in Benefits Category}^Total
^percent
^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^{10% to}^{20% to}^{More than}
^-10%^chan^ge^10%^19%^100%^100%
^{61 or You}^nger⁰⁸⁶¹²¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^62-6^{6 0}⁷²²³³²⁰¹⁰⁰
^67-7^{0 0}⁷⁰²⁷²¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^71-7^{5 0}⁷³²⁴²¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^76-8^{0 0}⁷⁸²⁰¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^81-8^{5 0}⁸⁶¹³⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{86+ 0}⁹⁷³⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 8}^62,3⁰³^16,0⁴⁶^1,23⁴⁶⁹⁷⁷⁶^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 99. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Marital
Status in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Benefits Category}
^Total
^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^{10% to}^{20% to}^{More than}^percent
^-10%^chan^ge^10%^19%^100%^100%
^{Married 0}⁷⁴²³²¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Widowed 0}⁸²¹⁶¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Divorced 0}⁷⁹¹⁹¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Never ma}^rried⁰⁸⁴¹⁵¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 8}^62,3⁰³^16,0⁴⁶^1,23⁴⁶⁹⁷⁷⁶^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 100. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Benefit
Type in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Benefits Category}
^Total
^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^{10% to}^{20% to}^{More than}^percent
^-10%^chan^ge^10%^19%^100%^100%
^{Retired worker}
^{only 0}⁷³²⁴²¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Spouse 0}⁶⁵³⁰³¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Survivor 0}⁸⁸¹¹¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Disability only}⁰⁸⁹¹⁰¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 8}^62,3⁰³^16,0⁴⁶^1,23⁴⁶⁹⁷⁷⁶^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 101. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Income
Quintile in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Benefits Category}^Total
^percent
^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^{10% to}^{20% to}^{More than}
^-10%^chan^ge^10%^19%^100%^100%
^{Lowest Quintile}⁰⁹⁷³⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Second Quintile}⁰⁹⁰¹⁰¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Third Quintile}⁰⁸¹¹⁸¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^Fourth^Q^{uintile 0}⁷⁰²⁷^{2 1}⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Highest Q}^uintile⁰⁵⁰⁴²⁵³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 8}^62,3⁰³^16,0⁴⁶^1,23⁴⁶⁹⁷⁷⁶^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 102. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary
of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for Individuals Who Pay No
Additional Taxes Over their Lifetime in 2035
^{Individuals who}^{pay n}^o^ad^diti^{onal taxes}^Number^{Median percent}^{Mean percent}
^(000s)^chan^{ge in taxes}^chan^{ge in taxes}
^All^60,9^{03 0}⁰
^Gender
^Female^35,3⁴⁴⁰⁰
^Male^25,5⁵⁹⁰⁰
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-Hispa^nic^39,6²¹⁰⁰
^Black^non-Hispanic^7,34³⁰⁰
^Native^American³⁴⁰⁰⁰
^Asian^3,72⁶⁰⁰
^Hispanic^9,87³⁰⁰
^{Education Level (highes}^{t level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool^8,90⁹⁰⁰
^{High school graduate}^24,2⁹⁰⁰⁰
^Some^college^14,7⁰⁷⁰⁰
^{College graduate or higher}^12,9⁹⁷⁰⁰
^{Birth Year}
^<⁼¹⁹³⁰^{a a}^a
¹⁹³^1-1⁹⁴¹⁷⁵⁵⁰⁰
¹⁹⁴^2-1⁹⁴⁵^1,52⁸⁰⁰
¹⁹⁴^6-1⁹⁵⁵^12,8³¹⁰⁰
¹⁹⁵^6-1⁹⁶⁴^21,0⁰⁰⁰⁰
¹⁹⁶^5-1⁹⁷⁰^14,5⁹⁶⁰⁰
¹⁹⁷¹⁺^10,1⁶⁰⁰⁰
^{Marital Status}
^Married^29,6⁰²⁰⁰
^Widowed^14,4⁶²⁰⁰
^Divorced^9,03⁰⁰⁰
^Never^ma^rried^7,80⁹⁰⁰
^{Benefit Type - Cu}^rrent^Law
^{Retired worker only}^31,1⁹³⁰⁰
^Spouse^5,91⁶⁰⁰
^Survivor^10,8²⁵⁰⁰
^{Disability only}^12,9⁷⁰⁰⁰

^{Individuals who}^{pay n}^o^ad^diti^{onal taxes}^Number^{Median percent}^{Mean percent}
^(000s)^chan^{ge in taxes}^chan^{ge in taxes}
^{Income Q}^uintile
^Lowest^quintile^15,4³²⁰⁰
^Second^quintile^14,1³⁵⁰⁰
^Third^quintile^12,7⁷⁶⁰⁰
^Fourth^q^uintile^10,9²³⁰⁰
^Highest^q^uintile^7,63⁸⁰⁰
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
^a.^Num^ber^{not pres}^{ented due}^{to insufficient sam}^{ple size.}
Table 103. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary
of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for Individuals Who Pay
Additional Taxes Over their Lifetime in 2035
^{Individuals who}^{pay ad}^{ditional taxes}^Number^{Median percent}^{Mean percent}
^(000s)^chan^{ge in taxes}^chan^{ge in taxes}
^All^17,9^{56 3}⁸
^Gender
^Female^7,31³³⁸
^Male^10,6⁴³³⁸
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-^Hispa^{nic 13,5}⁰⁶³⁸
^Black^non-Hispanic⁹⁹⁴²⁷
^Native^American^{a a}^a
^Asian^1,55⁸⁴⁷
^Hispanic^1,83⁰³⁷
^{Education Level (highes}^{t level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool⁵⁴¹³¹²
^{High school graduate}^2,68⁴²⁷
^Some^college^3,49⁷²⁵
^{College graduate or higher}^11,2³⁵⁴⁹
^{Birth Year}
¹⁹³^1-1⁹⁴¹^{a a}^a
¹⁹⁴^2-1⁹⁴⁵^{a a}^a
¹⁹⁴^6-1⁹⁵⁵^1,92¹²⁵
¹⁹⁵^6-1⁹⁶⁴^6,86²³⁷

^{Individuals who}^{pay ad}^{ditional taxes}^Number^{Median percent}^{Mean percent}
^(000s)^chan^{ge in taxes}^chan^{ge in taxes}
¹⁹⁶^5-1⁹⁷^{0 6,34}⁶⁴⁹
¹⁹⁷¹⁺^2,80⁷⁴¹¹
^{Marital Status}
^Married^10,6⁴¹³⁸
^Widowed^2,80⁴³⁷
^Divorced^2,57⁸³⁹
^Never^ma^rried^1,93³³⁹
^{Simple Benefit Type - Cur}^rent^La^w
^{Retired worker only}^15,0⁸²³⁸
^Spouse^{a a}^a
^Survivor⁶⁷⁵²⁵
^{Disability only}^2,13⁷³¹⁰
^{Income Q}^{uintile - Curre}^{nt Law}
^Lowest^quintile⁴⁶¹²⁵
^Second^quintile^1,67⁹²⁵
^Third^quintile^3,01³²⁵
^Fourth^q^uintile^4,81¹³⁷
^Highest^q^uintile^7,99³⁴¹¹
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
^a.^Num^ber^{not pres}^{ented due}^{to insufficient sam}^{ple size.}
Table 104. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population in 2035
^Cumulative^Cumulative
^{Percentage Change in Taxes}^Category^Number^(000s)^Percent^Number^Percent
^(000s)
^{No change}^62,6⁴⁵⁷⁹^62,6⁴⁵⁷⁹
^{Up to 10}^%^12,8²⁴¹⁶^75,4⁶⁹⁹⁶
^{10% to}¹⁹^%^1,99¹³^77,4⁶⁰⁹⁸
^{20% to}¹⁰^0%^1,24⁶²^78,7⁰⁶¹⁰⁰
^{More tha}^{n 1}⁰⁰^%¹⁵⁴⁰^78,8⁵⁹¹⁰⁰
^Num^ber^{Missing (00}^{0s) =}¹⁵⁰³
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Individuals without earnings a}^{re not incl}^u^{ded (missing)}
^{from table. Please see the s}^{ection on “What Do the Tables Show?}^{” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 105. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Gender
in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Taxes}^Category
^{Total percent}
^{Up to -10%}^{No chan}^ge^{Up to 10%}^{10% to 19%}^{20% to 10}^0%
^{Female 85}¹³¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Male 73}²⁰⁴²¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)^62,6⁴⁵^12,8²⁴^1,99¹^1,24⁶¹⁵⁴^78,8⁶⁰
^Num^ber^{Missing (00}^{0s) =}¹⁵⁰³
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Individuals without earnings a}^{re not incl}^u^{ded (missing)}
^{from table. Please see the s}^{ection on “What Do the Tables Show?}^{” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 106. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Ethnicity
in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Taxes}^Category
^{Total percent}
^{Up to -10%}^{No chan}^ge^{Up to 10%}^{10% to 19%}^{20% to 10}^0%
^{White non-Hispa}^nic⁷⁷¹⁸³²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Black non-Hispanic}⁹⁰⁹¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Native American}⁸⁵¹⁰²³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Asian 73}²⁰⁴¹⁰⁰
^{Hispanic 86}¹²¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)^62,6⁴⁵^12,8²⁴^1,99¹^1,24⁶¹⁵⁴^78,8⁶⁰
^Num^ber^{Missing (00}^{0s) =}¹⁵⁰³
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Individuals without earnings a}^{re not incl}^u^{ded (missing)}
^{from table. Please see the s}^{ection on “What Do the Tables Show?}^{” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 107. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by
Education Level in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Taxes}^Category^Total
^percent
^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^{10% to}^{20% to}
^-10%^chan^ge^10%^19%^100%
^{Did not graduate high}
^{school 95}⁴⁰¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{High school graduate}⁹²⁷⁰¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Some college}⁸⁴¹⁵¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{College graduate or}
^{higher 57}³²⁷⁴⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)^62,6⁴⁵^12,8²⁴^1,99¹^1,24⁶¹⁵⁴^78,8⁶⁰
^Num^ber^{Missing (00}^{0s) =}¹⁵⁰³
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Individuals without earnings a}^{re not incl}^u^{ded (missing)}
^{from table. Please see the s}^{ection on “What Do the Tables Show?}^{” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 108. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Age in
2035
^{Percentage Change in Taxes}^Category^{Total percent}
^{Up to -10%}^{No chan}^ge^{Up to 10%}^{10% to 19%}^{20% to 10}^0%
^{61 or You}^nger⁸⁵¹¹²¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^62-6^{6 75}¹⁹³²¹⁰⁰
^67-7^{0 72}²¹⁴³⁰¹⁰⁰
^71-7^{5 76}¹⁹³²¹⁰⁰
^76-8^{0 80}¹⁷²¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^81-8^{5 88}¹¹¹¹⁰⁰
^{86+ 97}³⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)^62,6⁴⁵^12,8²⁴^1,99¹^1,24⁶¹⁵⁴^78,8⁶⁰
^Num^ber^{Missing (00}^{0s) =}¹⁵⁰³
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Individuals without earnings a}^{re not incl}^u^{ded (missing)}
^{from table. Please see the s}^{ection on “What Do the Tables Show?}^{” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 109. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population Marital
Status in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Taxes}^Category^{Total percent}
^{Up to -10%}^{No chan}^ge^{Up to 10%}^{10% to 19%}^{20% to 10}^0%
^{Married 76}¹⁹³²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Widowed 85}¹²¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Divorced 80}¹⁶³¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Never ma}^rried⁸²¹⁵²¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)^62,6⁴⁵^12,8²⁴^1,99¹^1,24⁶¹⁵⁴^78,8⁶⁰
^Num^ber^{Missing (00}^{0s) =}^1,50³
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Individuals without earnings a}^{re not incl}^u^{ded (missing)}
^{from table. Please see the s}^{ection on “What Do the Tables Show?}^{” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 110. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earning:
Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Benefit
Type in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Taxes}^Category^{Total percent}
^{Up to -10%}^{No chan}^ge^{Up to 10%}^{10% to 19%}^{20% to 10}^0%
^{Retired worker only}⁷¹²³⁴²⁰¹⁰⁰
^Spouse⁹⁹⁰⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^Survivor⁹⁵⁴⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Disability only}⁸⁷¹⁰²¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)^62,6^{45 12,8}²⁴^1,99¹^1,24⁶¹⁵⁴^78,8⁶⁰
^Num^ber^{Missing (00}^{0s) =}^1,50³
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Individuals without earnings a}^{re not incl}^u^{ded (missing)}
^{from table. Please see the s}^{ection on “What Do the Tables Show?}^{” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 111. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Income
Quintile in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Taxes}^Category
^{Total percent}
^{Up to -10%}^{No chan}^ge^{Up to 10%}^{10% to 19%}^{20% to 10}^0%
^{Lowest quintile}⁹⁸²⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Second quintile}⁹¹⁸¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Third quintile}⁸³¹⁵²¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Fourth q}^uintile⁷³²³³²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Highest q}^uintile⁵³³⁵⁷⁵¹¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)^62,6⁴⁵^12,8²⁴^1,99¹^1,24⁶¹⁵⁴^78,8⁶⁰
^Num^ber^{Missing (00}^{0s) =}^1,50³
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Individuals without earnings a}^{re not incl}^u^{ded (missing)}
^{from table. Please see the s}^{ection on “What Do the Tables Show?}^{” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 112. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Individuals Who
Pay No Additional Taxes Over their Lifetime in 2035
^{Individuals who}^{pay n}^o^ad^diti^{onal taxes}^Number^{Median percent}^{Mean percent}
^(000s)^chan^{ge in benefits}^chan^{ge in benefits}
^All^62,4^{06 0 0}
^Gender
^Female^36,2^{83 0 0}
^Male^26,1^{23 0 0}
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-Hispa^nic^40,7^{11 0 0}
^Black^non-Hispanic^7,49^{9 0 0}
^Native^American^{345 0 0}
^Asian^3,79^{6 0 0}
^Hispanic^10,0^{54 0 0}
^{Education Level (highes}^{t level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool^8,99⁰⁰⁰
^{High school graduate}^24,5⁷⁰⁰⁰
^Some^college^15,0^{29 0 0}
^{College graduate or higher}^13,8¹⁸⁰¹
^Age
^{61 or You}^nger^4,74³⁰⁰
^62-6⁶^10,0^{87 0 0}
^67-7⁰^10,1^{02 0 0}
^71-7⁵^12,4^{76 0 0}
^76-8⁰^11,0^{09 0 0}
^81-8⁵^7,90^{0 0 0}
⁸⁶⁺^6,09^{0 0 0}
^{Marital Status}
^Married^30,3^{82 0 0}
^Widowed^15,0^{04 0 0}

^Individu^{als who}^{pay n}^o^ad^diti^{onal taxes}^Number^{Median percent}^{Mean percent}
^(000s)^chan^{ge in benefits}^chan^{ge in benefits}
^Divorced^9,21^{1 0 0}
^Never^ma^rried^7,80^{9 0 0}
^{Benefit Type - Cu}^rrent^Law
^{Retired worker only}^31,1⁹³⁰⁰
^Spouse^6,77^{9 0 1}
^Survivor^11,4^{64 0 0}
^{Disability only}^12,9⁷⁰⁰⁰
^{Income Q}^uintile
^Lowest^quintile^15,6^{10 0 0}
^Second^quintile^14,3^{94 0 0}
^Third^quintile^13,0^{58 0 0}
^Fourth^q^uintile^11,2^{63 0 0}
^Highest^q^uintile^8,08^{1 0 1}
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
Table 113. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Individuals Who
Pay Additional Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035
^{Individuals who}^{pay ad}^{ditional taxes}^Number^{Median percent}^{Mean percent}
^(000s)^chan^{ge in benefits}^chan^{ge in benefits}
^All^17,9^{56 2}⁴
^Gender
^Female^7,31³¹³
^Male^10,6⁴³²⁵
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-^Hispa^{nic 13,5}⁰⁶²⁴
^Black^non-Hispanic⁹⁹⁴¹⁴
^Native^American^{a a}^a
^Asian^1,55⁸²³
^Hispanic^1,83⁰¹⁶
^{Education Level (highes}^{t level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool⁵⁴¹²⁴
^{High school graduate}^2,68⁴¹²
^Some^college^3,49⁷¹²
^{College graduate or higher}^11,2³⁵²⁵

^{Individuals who}^{pay ad}^{ditional taxes}^Number^{Median percent}^{Mean percent}
^(000s)^chan^{ge in benefits}^chan^{ge in benefits}
^Age
^{61 or you}^nger⁸⁹⁶²⁴
^62-6⁶^3,80¹²⁹
^67-7⁰^4,45⁶²³
^71-7⁵^4,36⁸¹³
^76-8⁰^2,97¹¹²
^81-8⁵^1,27¹¹²
⁸⁶⁺¹⁹⁴¹¹
^{Marital Status}
^Married^10,6⁴¹²⁴
^Widowed^2,80⁴¹⁴
^{Divorced 2,57}⁸
^Never^ma^rried^1,93³²³
^{Benefit Type - Cu}^rrent^Law
^{Retired worker only}^15,0⁸²²⁴
^Spouse^{a a}^a
^Survivor⁶⁷⁵⁰²
^{Disability only}^2,13⁷¹³
^{Income Q}^uintile
^Lowest^quintile⁴⁶¹¹²
^Second^quintile^1,67⁹¹²
^Third^quintile^3,01³¹²
^Fourth^q^uintile^4,81¹¹⁴
^Highest^q^uintile^7,99³²⁶
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
^a.^Num^ber^{not pres}^{ented due}^{to insufficient sam}^{ple size.}

Table 114. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Total Population in
2035
^{Total population}^Number^{Median percent}^{Mean percent}
^(000s)^chan^{ge in benefits}^chan^{ge in benefits}
^All^80,3^{62 0 1}
^Gender
^Female^43,5^{96 0 1}
^Male^36,7^{66 0 1}
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-Hispa^nic^54,2^{17 0 1}
^Black^non-Hispanic^8,49^{4 0 1}
^Native^American^{413 0 1}
^Asian^5,35^{4 0 1}
^Hispanic^11,8^{85 0 1}
^{Education Level (highes}^{t level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool^9,53¹⁰⁰
^{High school graduate}^27,2⁵³⁰⁰
^Some^college^18,5^{25 0 1}
^{College graduate or higher}^25,0⁵³⁰³
^Age
^{61 or you}^nger^5,63⁹⁰¹
^62-6⁶^13,8^{88 0 3}
^67-7⁰^14,5^{58 0 1}
^71-7⁵^16,8^{44 0 1}
^76-8⁰^13,9^{79 0 1}
^81-8⁵^9,17^{1 0 0}
⁸⁶⁺^6,28^{3 0 0}
^{Marital Status}
^Married^41,0^{23 0 1}
^Widowed^17,8^{08 0 1}
^Divorced^11,7^{89 0 1}
^Never^ma^rried^9,74^{2 0 1}
^{Simple Benefit Type - Cur}^rent^La^w
^{Retired worker only}^46,2⁷⁴⁰¹
^Spouse^6,84^{2 0 1}
^Survivor^12,1^{39 0 0}
^Disability^only^15,1^{07 0 0}

^{Total population}^Number^{Median percent}^{Mean percent}
^(000s)^chan^{ge in benefits}^chan^{ge in benefits}
^{Income Q}^{uintile - Curre}^{nt Law}
^Lowest^quintile^16,0^{71 0 0}
^Second^quintile^16,0^{73 0 0}
^Third^quintile^16,0^{71 0 1}
^Fourth^q^uintile^16,0^{73 0 1}
^Highest^q^uintile^16,0^{73 0 3}
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
Table 115. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Impact in
2035
^Cumulative^Cumulative
^{Percentage Change in Benefits Category}^Number^(000s)^Percent^number^percent
^(000s)
^{Up to -10%}⁸⁰⁸⁰
^{No change}^62,3²³⁷⁸^62,3³⁰⁷⁸
^{Up to 10}^%^16,5⁹²²¹^78,9²²⁹⁸
^{10% to}¹⁹^%^1,05⁷¹^79,9⁸⁰¹⁰⁰
^{20% to}¹⁰^0%³⁵⁰⁰^80,3³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{More tha}^{n 1}⁰⁰^%³³⁰^80,3⁶²¹⁰⁰
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 116. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Gender in
2035
^{Percentage Change in Benefits Category}^Total
^percent
^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^{10% to}^{20% to}^{More than}
^-10%^chan^ge^10%^19%^100%^100%
^{Female 0}⁸⁰¹⁹¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Male 0}⁷⁵²³²¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 8}^62,3²³^16,5⁹²^1,05⁷³⁵⁰³³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.

^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 117. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Ethnicity in
2035
^{Percentage Change in Benefits Category}^Total
^percent
^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^{10% to}^{20% to}^{More than}
^-10%^chan^ge^10%^19%^100%^100%
^{White non-}
^{Hispanic 0}⁷⁵²³¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Black non-}
^{Hispanic 0}⁸⁹¹⁰⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Native American}⁰⁸²¹⁵³⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Asian 0}⁷²²⁶²⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Hispanic 0}⁸⁴¹⁵¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 8}^62,3²³^16,5⁹²^1,05⁷³⁵⁰³³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 118. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Education
Level in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Benefits Category}^Total
^percent
^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^{10% to}^{20% to}^{More than}
^-10%^chan^ge^10%^19%^100%^100%
^{Did not graduate}
^{high school}⁰⁹²⁷¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{High school}
^{graduate 0}⁸⁹¹¹¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Some college}⁰⁸²¹⁷¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{College graduate or}
^{higher 0}⁵⁷³⁹³¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)⁸^62,3²³^16,5⁹²^1,05⁷³⁵⁰³³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 119. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Age in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Benefits Category}^Total
^percent
^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^{10% to}^{20% to}^{More than}
^-10%^chan^ge^10%^19%^100%^100%
^{61 or you}^nger⁰⁸⁶¹²¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^62-6^{6 0}⁷²²⁴³¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^67-7^{0 0}⁷⁰²⁸²¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^71-7^{5 0}⁷³²⁵¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^76-8^{0 0}⁷⁸²¹¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^81-8^{5 0}⁸⁶¹³⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{86+ 0}⁹⁷³⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^(000s)^{8 62,3}²³^16,5⁹²^1,05⁷³⁵⁰³³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 120. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Marital
Status in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Benefits Category}^Total
^percent
^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^{10% to}^{20% to}^{More than}
^-10%^chan^ge^10%^19%^100%^100%
^{Married 0}⁷⁴²⁴²⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Widowed 0}⁸²¹⁷¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Divorced 0}⁷⁹¹⁹¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Never ma}^rried⁰⁸⁴¹⁵¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 8}^62,3²³^16,5⁹²^1,05⁷³⁵⁰³³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 121. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Benefit Type
in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Benefits Category}^Total
^percent
^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^{10% to}^{20% to}^{More than}
^-10%^chan^ge^10%^19%^100%^100%
^{Retired worker}
^{only 0}⁷³²⁵²¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Spouse 0}⁶⁵³²²¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Survivor 0}⁸⁸¹²⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Disability only}⁰⁸⁹¹⁰¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 8}^62,3²³^16,5⁹²^1,05⁷³⁵⁰³³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 122. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Income
Quintile in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Benefits Category}^Total
^percent
^{Up to}^No^{Up to}^{10% to}^{20% to}^{More than}
^-10%^chan^ge^10%^19%^100%^100%
^{Lowest quintile}⁰⁹⁷³⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Second quintile}⁰⁹⁰¹⁰⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Third quintile}⁰⁸¹¹⁸⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Fourth q}^uintile⁰⁷⁰²⁸¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Highest q}^uintile⁰⁵⁰⁴⁴⁴²⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number}
^{(000s) 8}^62,3²³^16,5⁹²^1,05⁷³⁵⁰³³^80,3⁶²
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Please see the section on}^{“What Do the}^Tables
^{Show?” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 123. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for Individuals Who
Pay No Additional Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035
^{Individuals who}^{pay n}^o^ad^diti^{onal taxes}^Number^{Median percent}^{Mean percent}
^(000s)^chan^{ge in taxes}^chan^{ge in taxes}
^All^60,9^{03 0}⁰
^Gender
^Female^35,3⁴⁴⁰⁰
^Male^25,5⁵⁹⁰⁰
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-Hispa^nic^39,6²¹⁰⁰
^Black^non-Hispanic^7,34³⁰⁰
^Native^American³⁴⁰⁰⁰
^Asian^3,72⁶⁰⁰
^Hispanic^9,87³⁰⁰
^{Education Level (highes}^{t level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool^8,90⁹⁰⁰
^{High school graduate}^24,2⁹⁰⁰⁰
^Some^college^14,7⁰⁷⁰⁰
^{College graduate or higher}^12,9⁹⁷⁰⁰
^{Birth Year}
^<⁼¹⁹³⁰^{a a}^a
¹⁹³^1-1⁹⁴¹⁷⁵⁵⁰⁰
¹⁹⁴^2-1⁹⁴⁵^1,52⁸⁰⁰
¹⁹⁴^6-1⁹⁵⁵^12,8³¹⁰⁰
¹⁹⁵^6-1⁹⁶⁴^21,0⁰⁰⁰⁰
¹⁹⁶^5-1⁹⁷⁰^14,5⁹⁶⁰⁰
¹⁹⁷¹⁺^10,1⁶⁰⁰⁰
^{Marital Status}
^Married^29,6⁰²⁰⁰
^Widowed^14,4⁶²⁰⁰
^Divorced^9,03⁰⁰⁰
^Never^ma^rried^7,80⁹⁰⁰
^{Benefit Type - Cu}^rrent^Law
^{Retired worker only}^31,1⁹³⁰⁰
^Spouse^5,91⁶⁰⁰
^Survivor^10,8²⁵⁰⁰
^{Disability only}^12,9⁷⁰⁰⁰

^Ind^{ividuals who}^{pay n}^o^ad^diti^{onal taxes}^Number^{Median percent}^{Mean percent}
^(000s)^chan^{ge in taxes}^chan^{ge in taxes}
^{Income Q}^uintile
^Lowest^quintile^15,4³²⁰⁰
^Second^quintile^14,1³⁵⁰⁰
^Third^quintile^12,7⁷⁶⁰⁰
^Fourth^q^uintile^10,9²³⁰⁰
^Highest^q^uintile^7,63⁸⁰⁰
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
^a.^Num^ber^{not pres}^{ented due}^{to insufficient sam}^{ple size.}
Table 124. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for Individuals Who
Pay Additional Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035
^{Individuals who}^{pay ad}^{ditional taxes}^Number^{Median percent}^{Mean percent}
^(000s)^chan^{ge in taxes}^chan^{ge in taxes}
^All^17,9^{56 3}⁶
^Gender
^Female^7,31³³⁶
^Male^10,6⁴³³⁶
^Eth^nicity
^White^non-Hispa^nic^13,5⁰⁶³⁶
^{Black non-Hispanic}⁹⁹⁴²⁵
^Native^American^{a a}^a
^Asian^1,55⁸⁴⁶
^Hispanic^1,83⁰³⁶
^{Education Level (highes}^{t level completed)}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool⁵⁴¹³⁸
^{High school graduate}^2,68⁴²⁵
^Some^college^3,49⁷²⁴
^{College graduate or higher}^11,2³⁵⁴⁷
^{Birth Year}
¹⁹³^1-1⁹⁴¹^{a a}^a
¹⁹⁴^2-1⁹⁴⁵^{a a}^a
¹⁹⁴^6-1⁹⁵⁵^1,92¹²⁴
¹⁹⁵^6-1⁹⁶⁴^6,86²³⁵

^{Individuals who}^{pay ad}^{ditional taxes}^Number^{Median percent}^{Mean percent}
^(000s)^chan^{ge in taxes}^chan^{ge in taxes}
¹⁹⁶^5-1⁹⁷^{0 6,34}⁶⁴⁷
¹⁹⁷¹⁺^2,80⁷⁴⁷
^{Marital Status}
^Married^4,22⁷³⁶
^Widowed^1,11⁴³⁵
^Divorced^1,02⁴³⁶
^Never^ma^rried⁷⁶⁸³⁶
^{Simple Benefit Type - Cur}^rent^La^w
^{Retired worker only}^15,0⁸²³⁶
^Spouse^{a a}^a
^Survivor⁶⁷⁵²⁴
^{Disability only}^2,13⁷³⁷
^{Income Q}^{uintile - Curre}^{nt Law}
^Lowest^quintile⁴⁶¹²⁵
^Second^quintile^1,67⁹²⁴
^Third^quintile^3,01³²⁴
^Fourth^q^uintile^4,81¹³⁵
^Highest^q^uintile^7,99³⁴⁷
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^P^{lease see the section on}^{“What Do the Tables Show?” in}^{the re}^{port Int}^roduction.
^a.^Num^ber^{not pres}^{ented due}^{to insufficient sam}^{ple size.}
Table 125. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Impact in
2035
^Cumulative^Cumulative
^Number^(000s)^Percent^number^percent
^(000s)
^{No change}^62,6⁴⁵⁷⁹^62,6⁴⁵⁷⁹
^{Up to 10}^%^13,1⁶⁸¹⁷^75,8¹³⁹⁶
^{10% to}²⁰^%^2,04²³^77,8⁵⁵⁹⁹
^{20% or}^more^1,00⁴¹^78,8⁵⁹¹⁰⁰
^Num^ber^{Missing (00}^{0s) =}^1,50³
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Individuals without earnings a}^{re not incl}^u^{ded (missing)}
^{from table. Please see the s}^{ection on “What Do the Tables Show?}^{” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 126. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Gender in
2035
^{Percentage Change in Taxes}^Category^{Total percent}
^{No chan}^ge^{Up to 10%}^{10% to 20%}^{20% or more}
^{Female 85}¹³²¹¹⁰⁰
^{Male 73}²¹⁴²¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)^62,6⁴⁵^13,1⁶⁸^2,04²^1,00⁴^78,8⁶⁰
^Num^ber^{Missing (00}^{0s) =}^1,50³
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Individuals without earnings a}^{re not incl}^u^{ded (missing)}
^{from table. Please see the s}^{ection on “What Do the Tables Show?}^{” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 127. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Ethnicity in
2035
^{Percentage Change in Taxes}^Category^{Total percent}
^{No chan}^ge^{Up to 10%}^{10% to 20%}^{20% or more}
^{White non-Hispa}^nic⁷⁷¹⁹³¹¹⁰⁰
^{Black non-Hispanic}⁹⁰⁹¹¹¹⁰⁰
^{Native American}⁸⁵¹⁰²²¹⁰⁰
^{Asian 73}²¹⁴¹⁰⁰
^{Hispanic 86}¹²¹¹¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)^62,6⁴⁵^13,1⁶⁸^2,04²^1,00⁴^78,8⁶⁰
^Num^ber^{Missing (00}^{0s) =}^1,50³
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Individuals without earnings a}^{re not incl}^u^{ded (missing)}
^{from table. Please see the s}^{ection on “What Do the Tables Show?}^{” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 128. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Education
Level in 2035
^Pe^{rcentage Change in Taxes}^Category^{Total percent}
^{No chan}^ge^{Up to 10%}^{10% to 20%}^{20% or more}
^{Did not graduate high sc}^hool⁹⁵⁴⁰¹¹⁰⁰
^{High school graduate}⁹²⁷⁰¹¹⁰⁰
^{Some college}⁸⁴¹⁵¹¹¹⁰⁰

^Pe^{rcentage Change in Taxes}^Category^{Total percent}
^{No chan}^ge^{Up to 10%}^{10% to 20%}^{20% or more}
^{College graduate or higher}⁵⁷³⁴⁷³¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)^62,6⁴⁵^13,1⁶⁸^2,04²^1,00⁴^78,8⁶⁰
^Num^ber^{Missing (00}^{0s) =}^1,50³
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Individuals without earnings a}^{re not incl}^u^{ded (missing)}
^{from table. Please see the s}^{ection on “What Do the Tables Show?}^{” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 129. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Age in
2035
^{Percentage Change in Taxes}^Category
^{Total percent}
^{No chan}^ge^{Up to 10%}^{10% to 20%}^{20% or more}
^{61 or you}^nger⁸⁵¹¹²¹¹⁰⁰
^62-6^{6 75}¹⁹⁴²¹⁰⁰
^67-7^{0 72}²²¹⁰⁰
^71-7^{5 76}²⁰³¹¹⁰⁰
^76-8^{0 80}¹⁷²¹⁰⁰
^81-8^{5 88}¹¹¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{86+ 97}³⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)^62,6⁴⁵^13,1⁶⁸^2,04²^1,00⁴^78,8⁶⁰
^Num^ber^{Missing (00}^{0s) =}^1,50³
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Individuals without earnings a}^{re not incl}^u^{ded (missing)}
^{from table. Please see the s}^{ection on “What Do the Tables Show?}^{” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

Table 130. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Marital
Status in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Taxes}^Category
^{Total percent}
^{No chan}^ge^{Up to 10%}^{10% to 20%}^{20% or more}
^{Married 76}¹⁹³²¹⁰⁰
^{Widowed 85}¹²¹¹¹⁰⁰
^{Divorced 80}¹⁶³¹⁰⁰
^{Never ma}^rried⁸²¹⁵¹¹¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)^62,6⁴⁵^13,1⁶⁸^2,04²^1,00⁴^78,8⁶⁰
^Num^ber^{Missing (00}^{0s) =}^1,50³
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Individuals without earnings a}^{re not incl}^u^{ded (missing)}
^{from table. Please see the s}^{ection on “What Do the Tables Show?}^{” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 131. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Benefit
Type in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Taxes}^Category
^{Total percent}
^{No chan}^ge^{Up to 10%}^{10% to 20%}^{20% or more}
^{Retired worker only}⁷¹²⁴⁴²¹⁰⁰
^Spouse⁹⁹¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^Survivor⁹⁵⁵⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Disability only}⁸⁷¹⁰²¹¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)^62,6⁴⁵^13,1⁶⁸^2,04²^1,00⁴^78,8⁶⁰
^Num^ber^{Missing (00}^{0s) =}^1,50³
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Individuals without earnings a}^{re not incl}^u^{ded (missing)}
^{from table. Please see the s}^{ection on “What Do the Tables Show?}^{” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.
Table 132. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings:
Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Income
Quintile in 2035
^{Percentage Change in Taxes}^Category
^{Total percent}
^{No chan}^ge^{Up to 10%}^{10% to 20%}^{20% or more}
^{Lowest quintile}⁹⁸²⁰⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Second quintile}⁹¹⁸¹⁰¹⁰⁰
^{Third quintile}⁸³¹⁵²¹¹⁰⁰

^{Percentage Change in Taxes}^Category
^{Total percent}
^{No chan}^ge^{Up to 10%}^{10% to 20%}^{20% or more}
^{Fourth q}^uintile⁷³²³³¹¹⁰⁰
^{Highest q}^uintile⁵³³⁶⁷⁴¹⁰⁰
^{Total number (0}⁰⁰^s)^62,6⁴⁵^13,1⁶⁸^2,04²^1,00⁴^78,8⁶⁰
^Num^ber^{Missing (00}^{0s) =}^1,50³
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^{Service (CRS) calculati}^{ons using}^{the Urba}^{n I}^{nstitute’s Dyna}^{sim microsimulation}
^model.
^Note:^{Categories may not add t}^o¹⁰⁰^{% due to rou}^{nding. Individuals without earnings a}^{re not incl}^u^{ded (missing)}
^{from table. Please see the s}^{ection on “What Do the Tables Show?}^{” in the re}^{port I}^ntroduction.

The Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) is the basic Social Security monthly benefit amount
payable to an individual upon entitlement to retirement benefits at the normal retirement age (i.e.,
the PIA does not reflect any adjustments for early or delayed retirement) or disability benefits. In
addition, the PIA is the base amount used to determine monthly benefits payable to family
members on the worker’s record (such as a spouse or surviving spouse).
Under current law, the PIA is determined by applying a benefit formula to the worker’s average
lifetime covered earnings. In the first step of the benefit computation, the worker’s nominal
earnings (up to 2 calendar years prior to the year of eligibility—for example, earnings prior to age
60 in the case of a retirement benefit) are indexed to wage growth to reflect the change in average
wages over time. (Earnings in subsequent years are counted at nominal value.) For purposes of
computing a basic retirement benefit, the 35 highest years of indexed earnings are then averaged
and a monthly amount is computed to determine the worker’s Average Indexed Monthly Earnings
(AIME). (If a worker has fewer than 35 years of covered earnings, years of “zero” earnings are ⁷
counted in the computation of the AIME.) The benefit formula is then applied to the worker’s
AIME. The benefit formula that applies to individuals who first become eligible for retirement or
disability benefits in 2006, or who die in 2006 before becoming eligible for benefits, is as
follows:
• 90% of the first $656 of AIME, plus
• 32% of AIME over $656 through $3,955, plus
• 15% of AIME over $3,955
For example, the PIA for a worker who reaches age 62 in 2006, based on an AIME of $4,500,
would be $1,727.80. The PIA would be computed as follows:
• 90% x $656 = $590.40, plus
• 32%x$3,299 = $1,055.68, plus
• 15% x $545 = $81.75
PIA = $1,727.80 (rounded to the next lower 10 cents)
The worker’s PIA is based on the benefit formula that applies in the year the worker first becomes
eligible for benefits (age 62 for retired-worker benefits, the year of disability for disabled-worker
benefits, or the year of the worker’s death for survivor benefits ), rather than the first year of

⁷^T^h^e^num^be^r^of^c^o^m^puta^{tion y}^e^a^r^s^us^e^d^to^de^te^r^m^ine^the^A^I^{ME v}^a^rⁱ^e^s^{, de}^peⁿ^d^ing^oⁿ^t^h^e^ty^pe^of^be^ne^f^{it (}^r^e^tir^em^eⁿ^t,
^surv^iv^{or or}^disa^bility^{). T}^h^e^num^be^{r of}^c^o^m^puta^{tion y}^e^a^r^{s is ba}^se^{d on t}^h^eⁿ^u^m^b^e^r^of^“^e^l^a^p^se^d^y^e^a^r^s^”^(i.e^{., t}^h^e^num^be^{r of}
^c^a^l^e^nda^r^y^e^a^r^s^af^te^r¹⁹⁵⁰^or^,^if^la^te^r^,^a^tta^inm^e^{nt of}^a^g^e²¹⁾^{up t}^o^t^h^e^y^e^a^r^the^w^o^r^k^e^r^a^tta^ins^a^g^e^{62 (}^f^or^r^e^tir^e^m^eⁿ^t
^be^ne^f^{its); the}^y^e^a^r^o^f^de^a^t^{h or,}^if^e^a^r^lie^{r, a}^tta^inm^e^{nt of}^a^g^e^{62 (f}^{or surv}^iv^{or be}^ne^f^{its); or t}^h^e^y^e^a^r^of^di^sa^bility⁽^f^or
^dis^a^bility^be^ne^f^its^{) m}ⁱ^nus^aⁿ^y^“^d^ropo^{ut y}^e^a^r^s^.^”^T^h^e^num^be^r^of^{dropout y}^e^a^r^s^a^l^s^o^v^a^rie^s^{, de}^pe^nding^oⁿ^the^ty^pe^of
^be^ne^f^{it. For}^pur^pose^s^of^re^tire^m^eⁿ^{t a}^{nd s}^u^rv^iv^{or be}^ne^f^its,^u^p^t^o⁵^dr^opo^{ut y}^e^a^r^{s a}^pply^.^{For pur}^pose^s^o^f^disa^bility
^be^ne^f^its^f^o^r^w^o^r^k^e^r^s^dis^a^ble^d^be^f^o^r^e^a^g^e^47,^{1 t}^o⁴^dr^op^{out y}^e^a^r^s^apply^,^de^peⁿ^d^ing^oⁿ^t^h^e^w^o^r^k^e^r^’^s^a^g^e^a^{nd the}ⁿ^u^m^b^e^r
^of^drop^out^y^e^a^r^{s. How}^e^v^e^{r, no f}^e^w^e^{r tha}ⁿ^{2 c}^o^m^puta^tio^{n y}^e^a^r^s^m^a^y^be^use^d^f^o^{r disa}^bility^be^ne^f^{it c}^a^l^c^u^la^tions.

benefit receipt. Beginning with the first year of eligibility, the PIA is increased by the annual
Social Security cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) for any intervening years between eligibility
and benefit receipt. For example, if an individual who first becomes eligible for retired-worker
benefits at age 62 in 2006 elects to receive benefits at the normal retirement age (age 66 in 2010),
the PIA effective at the normal retirement age would be the PIA calculated using the benefit
formula for 2006 (shown above) adjusted annually according to the COLA effective in December

2006, December 2007, December 2008 and December 2009.

The dollar amounts that separate the three brackets of AIME in the benefit formula ($656 and
$3,955) are referred to as bend points. Under current law, the bend points are indexed to wage
growth on an annual basis to provide stable replacement rates over time for workers with similar
earnings patterns. (The replacement rate is based on Social Security benefits in the first year of
retirement divided by final earnings.) For example, under current law, the benefit formula is
designed to provide a replacement rate of approximately 40% for average-wage earners
regardless of the year of retirement.
The percentages that apply to each of the three brackets of AIME in the benefit formula (90%,

32% and 15%) are referred to as formula factors (or replacement factors). The formula factors,

which are fixed under current law, are structured such that Social Security benefits replace a
greater share of pre-retirement earnings for lower-wage workers wompared with higher-wage
workers.

The current-law Social Security rules regarding spouses and survivors can increase the benefits of
some married, widowed, and divorced beneficiaries. When these spouse and survivor rules
interact with policy options that reduce Social Security benefits, they can mitigate the effect of
benefit reductions, causing smaller reductions than would have been expected under the policy
option.
The Social Security rules regarding spouses and aged survivors allow some individuals to receive
a benefit when they otherwise would have received none, and allow other individuals to receive a
higher benefit than they otherwise would have received.
Individuals who do not qualify for a Social Security benefit based on their own work records may
qualify for a benefit based on their current or former spouses’ work records. Social Security
spouse benefits are payable to the spouse or divorced spouse of a retired or disabled worker, ⁸
based on the worker’s earnings record. The primary insurance amount (PIA) for a spouse
beneficiary is generally 50% of his or her spouse’s PIA. Social Security survivor benefits are
payable to the survivors of a deceased worker, based on the worker’s earnings record. The PIA for ⁹
an aged widow or widower is 100% of his or her deceased spouse’s final benefit amount.
Individuals who do qualify for Social Security benefits based on their own work records may
receive a partial spouse or survivor benefit in addition to their own worker benefit, if the amount
of their spouse or survivor benefit would be greater than their worker benefit. These so-called
dually entitled beneficiaries receive a total Social Security benefit that is the higher of the worker
benefit and the spouse or survivor benefit to which they are entitled, not the sum of the two
benefits.
Some individuals marry more than once throughout the course of their lives, either because they
were divorced or widowed. Some of these individuals may qualify for spouse and/or survivor ¹⁰
benefits based on the work records of more than one spouse. In such a case, an individual would
receive the highest benefit to which he or she is entitled.
When Social Security’s spouse and survivor rules interact with policy options that would reduce
benefits, they can mitigate the effect of benefit reductions, causing smaller reductions than would
have been expected under the policy option. There are two mechanisms that could mitigate the

⁸^Dⁱ^v^o^r^c^e^d^s^p^o^u^s^e^s^m^u^s^t^ha^v^e^be^{en m}^a^r^rⁱ^e^d^{to the}^w^o^r^k^e^r^f^o^r^a^t^le^a^s^{t 10}^y^e^a^r^s^{to q}^u^a^lif^y^f^o^r^s^pous^e^or^s^u^r^v^iv^or^be^ne^f^its^.
⁹^O^t^he^r^ty^pe^s^of^s^u^r^v^iv^or^be^ne^f^its—^t^hos^e^f^o^r^c^h^il^dr^eⁿ^{, m}^o^the^r^s^or^f^a^the^r^s^w^{ith a}^c^h^{ild i}ⁿ^c^a^r^e^,^aⁿ^{d de}^pe^ndeⁿ^t^pa^r^e^nts^of
^S^o^ci^al^S^ecu^ri^t^y^b^eⁿ^e^fⁱ^ci^ari^e^s—ar^{e n}^o^t^aⁿ^al^y^z^edⁱⁿ^t^hⁱ^s^repo^rt^.
¹⁰^Iⁿ^s^o^m^e^c^a^s^e^s^{, be}^ne^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^r^ie^s^{do n}^o^{t q}^u^a^lif^y^f^o^r^be^ne^f^its^ba^s^e^{d on a}^f^o^r^m^e^r^s^pous^e^’^s^w^o^r^k^r^e^c^o^r^d^if^they^r^e^m^a^r^r^y^.

effect of the policy option for a beneficiary: (1) if his or her benefit type changes under the
option, or (2) if the spouse on whose work record his or her the benefit is based changes under the
option.
Some individuals could change benefit types under a policy option because of the spouse and
survivor rules, thus mitigating the effect of the option’s benefit reduction. For example, consider a
couple in which the wife receives a $600 retired worker benefit and the husband receives a
$1,100 retired worker benefit under current law. The woman would not qualify for a spouse
benefit under current law, since her worker benefit ($600) is greater than 50% of her husband’s
primary insurance amount (assuming he is not subject to any reductions or credits, this amount
would be $550). If the wife is younger than the husband, she would be subject to a greater benefit
reduction in 2035 under most of the policy options analyzed in this report. Continuing the
example above, let’s assume under a policy option that the wife’s benefit were reduced by $100
(making her retired worker benefit $500) and the husband’s benefit is reduced by $50 (making his
retired worker benefit $1,050). As a result, the wife would become dually entitled to receive a
partial spouse benefit in addition to her full worker benefit. Her total benefit amount under the
option would be equal to 50% of her husband’s PIA, or $525 in this case (i.e., $500 in worker
benefits and $25 in spouse benefits). Thus, the dual entitlement rule leads the wife to receive a
$75 benefit reduction rather than a $100 reduction.
Some individuals could receive a spouse or survivor benefit based on a different marriage than
under current law as a result of a policy change, thus mitigating the effect of a benefit reduction
that would otherwise result from the policy option. For example, consider a woman who divorced
after 15 years of marriage, then remarried. Under current law, she receives a spouse benefit of
$600. Her spouse benefit is based on her current husband’s PIA of $1,200; her former husband’s
PIA is $1,180. Under the policy option, her current husband’s PIA is reduced by $100 (to $1,100),
and her former husband’s PIA remains at $1,180 since he retired before the policy option was
implemented. Under the policy option, she would receive a divorced spouse benefit based on her
former husband’s work record—rather than her current husband’s work record—since the benefit
she would receive based on her former husband’s record ($590) would be greater than the benefit
she would receive based on her current husband’s record ($550). Thus, the rule that allows
beneficiaries to receive the highest spouse or survivor benefit to which they are entitled means
that the wife in this example receives a $10 benefit reduction rather than a $50 benefit reduction.
It is important to note that in either scenario—changing benefit type or changing the spouse on
which the benefit is based—the affected beneficiary would receive a higher-than-expected benefit
under the option due to Social Security’s spouse and survivor rules. The reason for this effect is
that the Social Security rules always allow beneficiaries to receive a total benefit that is equal to
the highest of the various benefits to which they may be entitled.

The current-law Retirement Earnings Test (RET) can affect benefits received before and after the
full retirement age (FRA). When the RET provision interacts with policy options that reduce
Social Security benefits, it can magnify the size of the benefit reduction received before the FRA
and reduce the size of the benefit reduction received after the FRA relative to what is expected
under the policy option, or even lead to apparent benefit increases relative to current law.
The RET is a current-law provision that reduces the Social Security benefits paid to some
individuals who work before their full retirement age (FRA). Specifically, the RET applies to
non-DI beneficiaries below the FRA who have earnings from employment in excess of certain ¹¹
thresholds. Generally, for workers who fall under the full retirement age for the entire year, the
threshold is $12,480 in 2006. For every two dollars in earnings over this threshold, the worker’s
Social Security benefit is reduced by one dollar. In the year that the worker attains the full
retirement age, a higher threshold of $33,240 applies in 2006 for those months worked prior to
the full retirement age. For every three dollars in earnings over this threshold, the worker’s Social
Security benefit is reduced by one dollar. These thresholds rise annually with increases in the
national average wage. Monthly benefits are eliminated or reduced until all excess earnings have
been offset. The RET does not apply to workers after they attain the full retirement age.
Table C-1. Retirement Earnings Test Application Rules
^{Age of}^{Social Security Beneficiary}^{Threshold in 2006}^{Benefit Reduction}
^{Under FRA Entire Year}^$12,4⁸⁰^{$1 for e}^very^{$2 of e}^xcess^earning^s
^{In Year of Attaining FRA, for Mo}^{nths Prior to the}^FRA^$33,2⁴⁰^{$1 for e}^very^{$3 of e}^xcess^earning^s
^{Over th}^{e FRA}^{No thres}^hold^{No reduction}
For example, Joe is 62 and will not reach the full retirement age this year. Thus, Joe could earn up
to $12,480 in 2006 without penalty. Joe earns $30,000 this year, so his Social Security benefit
would be reduced under the RET. For every two dollars of earnings over the $12,480 threshold,
his benefit would be reduced by one dollar. Joe has ‘excess’ earnings of $17,520 in 2006 ($30,000
- $12,480). Thus, the reduction to his Social Security benefit is $8,760 ($17,520 x 0.5) in 2006.
Joe’s current-law Social Security benefit is $1,500 per month ($18,000 per year) before the RET
is applied. Therefore, Joe would lose his Social Security benefit payments for 5 full months and ^th
would lose a portion of his benefit for a 6 month ($8,760/$1,500) because of his excess earnings
under the RET. After application of the RET, Joe’s annual Social Security benefit would be
$9,240 ($18,000 - $8,760).

¹¹^T^h^{e RET}^d^o^e^{s n}^o^t^ap^p^l^y^to^dⁱ^sab^l^ed^w^o^rk^{ers rec}^e^ivⁱⁿ^g^Di^sab^ility^Iⁿ^su^ran^{ce (DI) b}^eⁿ^e^f^{its b}^ecau^{se th}^{ese in}^dⁱ^vⁱ^d^u^a^ls
^a^r^e^s^ubje^c^t^to^theⁱ^r^ow^{n e}^a^r^ning^s^t^e^s^t^{, the}^S^ubs^ta^nt^ia^{l G}^a^inf^u^{l Ac}^tivⁱ^t^y^(S^GA^{) te}^{st. Se}^e^{CRS Re}^port⁹⁸^-78⁹^,^Soc^ia^l
^Se^c^u^r^ity^:^Pr^o^pos^e^d^C^h^a^nge^s^t^o^t^h^e^Earⁿⁱ^ngs^Te^s^t^,^by^De^bra^{B. W}^h^itm^aⁿ^f^o^{r a}^dditi^ona^l^inf^o^rm^a^{tion o}ⁿ^the^R^E^T^.

Those individuals who face benefit reductions due to the RET have their benefits increased at the
full retirement age. Under current law, workers are only subject to the RET if they have excess
earnings, receive non-DI benefits and have not yet reached the full retirement age. When
individuals receive non-DI benefits prior to the full retirement age, they are subject to an actuarial
benefit reduction, the size of which is dependent on the number of months of benefits the
individual is projected to receive benefits before the full retirement age. The greater the number
of months of benefit receipt prior to the full retirement age, the greater the actuarial reduction.
Those retiring at the earliest eligibility age (60 for survivors benefits, 62 for retirement benefits)
face the largest reduction. For every month that an individual’s early retirement or early survivor
benefit is eliminated as a result of the RET, the actuarial reduction that he or she is subject to goes
down as compensation for these lost benefits. When the individual reaches the full retirement age,
the actuarial reduction is lowered and the retirement or survivor benefit is adjusted upward to
account for the lost months of benefits under the RET.
Following on the previous example, if Joe takes Social Security benefits at the earliest eligibility ¹²
age, 62, his benefits will be 25% lower than if he retired at his FRA of 66. If Joe’s full
retirement benefit (PIA) was $2,000 per month, his monthly benefit after the early retirement
reduction would be $1,500 ($2,000 x 0.75). However, if Joe continues working, as described in
the previous example, he would lose benefits for over five months out of the year due to the RET.
If Joe worked intermittently between age 62 and 66 and the RET ultimately eliminated Joe’s
benefit for a total of 12 months over this period, essentially, Joe delayed taking up Social Security
benefits for an additional year. Therefore, his actuarial reduction for early retirement should be
adjusted to reflect his receipt of Social Security benefits for only 36 months prior to his full
retirement age instead of 48. Joe’s actuarial reduction would be reduced from -25% to -20% at the
full retirement age of 66. Thus, at age 66 the RET would increase Joe’s monthly benefit from
$1,500 to $1,600 ($2,000 x .80) under current-law, about a 7% increase. On an annual basis, the
RET would increase Joe’s benefit from $18,000 per year to $19,200 per year.
The RET can magnify the effect of policy options that reduce benefits relative to current law.
Those affected by the RET appear to receive larger benefit reductions than what could be
attributed to the policy change alone. The RET calculation is based on a worker’s excess
earnings. Since earnings are not affected by the policy option, the RET reduction is the same
dollar amount under both current law and the policy option. If a policy option reduces Social
Security benefits, this smaller Social Security benefit is being reduced by the same dollar amount
under the RET as under current law. Therefore, the RET creates a larger percent reduction in
benefits than is expected under the policy change.

¹²^T^h^e^be^ne^f^{it r}^e^duc^tio^{n of}²⁵^%^is^c^a^l^c^u^la^te^{d ba}^s^e^d^{on t}^h^eⁿ^u^m^b^e^r^of^m^onths^J^o^e^r^e^tir^e^s^be^f^o^r^e^his^f^u^ll^r^e^tir^em^eⁿ^{t a}^g^e^.
^B^y^re^tiring^a^t^a^g^e^{62, Joe}^w^{ill c}^o^ll^e^c^t^Socⁱ^a^l^Se^c^u^rity^be^ne^f^{its f}^o^{r 48 m}^{onths be}^f^o^re^{his f}^u^{ll re}^tire^m^eⁿ^{t a}^g^e^of^{66. For}
^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion on}^how^the^a^c^t^ua^rⁱ^a^l^r^e^duc^tio^{n is}^de^te^r^m^ine^d^{, s}^e^e^T^a^bl^e^2.A^17.1ⁱⁿ^the^S^o^cⁱ^a^l^Se^c^u^r^ity^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tion’^s
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Continuing the current-law example, assume that a policy option reduces Joe’s initial benefit by
10% (prior to the application of the RET). Thus, his annual benefit prior to the RET is $18,000
and the policy option reduces his benefit by 10% ($1,800) to $16,200. Since Joe’s earnings don’t
change, and he still has excess earnings of $17,520 in 2006, the RET still reduces his annual
Social Security benefit by $8,760. So, Joe’s final annual benefit (after the policy option and the
RET) is $7,440 ($16,200 - $8,760), which is approximately a 20% decrease ($7,440/$9,240) from
the current law annual benefit of $9,240 (after the RET). Thus, the interaction of the policy option
with the RET program rules is responsible for the larger than expected reduction in Joe’s benefit.
Some policy options might reduce the Social Security benefit to a size where the fixed dollar
amount of the RET fully eliminates the Social Security benefit for a greater number of months
than under current law. Because of the interaction of the policy option with the RET and the
actuarial benefit reduction, the ultimate consequence of this benefit elimination is a later increase
in benefits relative to current law. When a policy option reduces the size of the Social Security
benefit, the unchanging dollar amount of the RET requires more months of benefits to be
eliminated than under current law. Thus, at the full retirement age, when the benefits are adjusted
upward for this loss, they are increased relative to current law, making some individuals receive
benefit increases that would seem to be counterintuitive under a policy change that reduces
benefits.
For example, if Joe’s benefit were reduced relative to current law, let’s say that the RET would
eliminate his now smaller Social Security benefit for 16 months instead of 12 months during the
period he worked between age 62 and 66. Joe’s actuarial reduction would be adjusted to reflect
his receipt of Social Security benefits for only 32 months prior to his full retirement age instead
of 36 months under current law (after the RET). Joe’s actuarial reduction would be reduced from
-20% to approximately -16.7%. Thus, under the policy option, at age 66 Joe’s benefit increases
from $1,600 (PIA of $2,000 x 0.80) under current law to $1,666 ( PIA of $2,000 x .83) under the
policy option, a benefit increase of 4%.
In summary, the RET can either magnify the size of a benefit reduction under a policy change or
appear to create a benefit increase relative to current law, depending on whether an individual is
below or above the full retirement age.

The progressive price indexing policy option would constrain the growth of initial benefits for
future retirees by using a combination of wage indexing and price indexing in the benefit formula
to apply differing degrees of benefit reduction based on the worker’s career-average level of
earnings. The following section explains the mechanics of the progressive price indexing option ¹³
examined in this report. The basic steps used to calculate initial benefits for future retirees under
the progressive price indexing option include:
The benefits of low-wage workers would be preserved by establishing a new bend point in the
PIA formula, below which initial benefits would continue to be fully wage-indexed. For the ^th
option analyzed in this report, the new bend point would be established at the 30 percentile of
earnings. This means that workers with career-average earnings in the lowest 30% of the earnings
distribution would experience no change in benefits relative to current law.
The new bend point would fall between the first and second bend points under current law. The
replacement factors for the now four brackets of Average Indexed Monthly Earnings in the
benefit formula would be set initially at 90%, 32%, 32% and 15%. The new bend point would
increase each year after 2013 by the rate of growth of the national average wage, just as the two
current bend points are wage-indexed. All workers with career-average earnings below this new
bend point would continue to have their initial benefits fully wage-indexed. Workers with career-
average earnings above the new bend point would have their initial benefits reduced because the
third and fourth replacement factors (32% and 15%) would be adjusted downward each year
(described in Step 3 below).
For those who become eligible for retired-worker benefits in 2013 and each year thereafter,
calculate a hypothetical fully price-indexed PIA for a worker who had maximum earnings over
his/her career and the percentage reduction in benefits between this hypothetical PIA and the
current law PIA. SSA would compute the percentage benefit reduction that would apply for a ¹⁴
career high-wage earner if all three of the current-law PIA factors (90%, 32%, and 15%) were
fully price-indexed.
For example, if the benefit for a career high-wage earner retiring at the full retirement age in a
future year were determined to be, say, $2,800 per month and the percentage changes in prices

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¹⁴^A^car^{eer h}ⁱ^gh^-w^a^g^{e earn}^e^{r i}^s^so^meoⁿ^e^w^h^o^earn^e^d^at^o^r^ab^o^v^{e t}^h^{e t}^a^xab^l^e^w^a^g^e^b^a^{se f}^o^{r at}^l^east³⁵^y^ear^{s i}ⁿ^t^h^ei^r
^en^tⁱ^r^{e career.}

and wages since 2011 were 2.8% and 3.9%, respectively, the benefit for a high-wage earner
would be recalculated with each of the three PIA factors multiplied by the ratio 1.028/1.039 or ¹⁵
.989. Thus, in this example, the benefit of a high-wage earner under full price indexing would
be reduced by 1.1% in 2013, the first year that price indexing would be in effect. After ten
years—assuming that prices and wages continued to grow annually by 2.8% and 3.9%—the PIA ¹⁰¹⁰
factors would be multiplied by 1.028/1.039 = .899, representing a benefit reduction of 10.1%.
The third step of the process would be to calculate the percentage reduction only to the PIA
factors above the new bend point (32% and 15%) that would result in the same benefit reduction
for career-long maximum-wage earners (those always at or above the annual maximum taxable
wage) as would have applied to these earners if price indexing had been applied to all workers.
This would reduce benefits for career-long maximum-wage earners by the same percentage as
they would have been reduced if the benefit formula were fully price-indexed for workers at all
earnings levels. Benefits would be reduced by a smaller percentage for workers with career-long
average wages and not at all for workers with average wages that fall in the lowest 30% of the
earnings distribution.

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ⁱ^s^{a t}^w^o^-^y^{ear l}^a^{g t}ⁱ^m^e^asso^ci^at^ed^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e rel}^{ease o}^f^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^w^a^{ge d}^a^t^a^f^o^{r a gi}^v^eⁿ^year.^T^h^u^s^,ⁱ^f^t^h^{e fi}^rst^y^e^{ar t}^h^{e p}^o^lⁱ^c^y
^a^pplie^s^is²⁰^13,^{it w}^oul^{d be}^ne^c^e^s^s^a^r^y^{to obta}ⁱ^{n t}^h^e^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^w^a^g^e^data^f^r^o^m²⁰¹^1.

The Urban Institute’s Dynamic Simulation of Income Model (Dynasim) is a computer model that
uses survey data to project demographic changes, retirement income, and Social Security
benefits. It was created by the Urban Institute and was purchased by the Congressional Research
Service. Dynasim can be used to analyze the consequences of retirement and aging policy issues
on individual and family income and benefits. One of the major advantages of using the Dynasim
model is the ability to analyze the distributional effects of Social Security proposals. For example,
Dynasim can be used: 1) to analyze the difference in benefit levels between a particular Social
Security reform proposal and current law; 2) to model the combined effects of multiple and
complex policy changes on individual and family benefits and total income; 3) to model the effect
of a change in Social Security policy on an individual’s eligibility for other means-tested federal
programs (e.g. SSI). The effect on individuals and families can be broken down along multiple
demographic and economic lines, such as gender, educational attainment, marital status, race, and
wealth.
Through statistical adjustments of the data sources listed below, Dynasim projects the major
pillars of retirement income. Starting with a representative sample of individuals and nuclear
families, the model “ages” the data year by year from 1993 to 2050. Characteristics such as an
individual’s year of birth, educational attainment, marital status, and race are used to predict
future values of variables such as earnings, marital changes, and wealth. For each year, Dynasim
simulates such demographic events as births, deaths, marriages and divorces, and such economic
events as labor force participation, earnings, hours of work, disability onset, and retirement.
The large amount of demographic and income information makes Dynasim particularly suitable
to analyze the distributional effects of various Social Security reform proposals and other issues
relating to the aged population. For example, retired worker Social Security benefits are based on
35 years of a worker’s earning history. Having a tool, such as Dynasim, that contains an
individual’s earning history as well as the individual’s traits over his/her entire career is essential
to modeling Social Security reforms. One such policy option that requires 40 years of a worker’s
earning history is to increase the number of computation years from 35 to 40. In addition to
modeling provisions that require long work histories, we can analyze how benefits change due to
changes in life events (such as a marital status change or the death of a spouse) over the span of
the individual’s lifetime. At the end of the simulation process, we have detailed information on
the lifetimes of multiple individuals, with all of the information needed to calculate Social
Security benefits and total incomes. In addition to workers’ earning histories, the Dynasim model
includes additional retirement income projections useful for analyzing policy options. These
projections include but are not limited to: Social Security coverage, eligibility and benefit levels,
pension coverage and participation, income from assets, and Supplemental Security Income
(SSI).

The Dynasim model was created using a complex combination of various data resources. The
base population is comprised of households from the 1990 through 1993 panels of the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP). This sample consists of over 100,000 people and

44,000 families and is limited to individuals who answered questions regarding assets and ¹⁶

pensions. Annual earnings are created from a mixture of historical and projected data. Earnings
histories are calculated for SIPP respondents by matching individuals from the SIPP to
individuals interviewed in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and to individuals
interviewed in the 1972 Current Population Survey (CPS). The 1972 Current Population Survey
is a unique dataset because it is matched to Social Security Administrative records. The 1972 CPS
is matched to the Social Security Administration’s Summary of Earnings Records and is used to
provide SIPP respondents with earnings between the years 1951 and 1967. The PSID also collects
annual earnings information and provides SIPP respondents with earnings between the years 1968
and 1992.
Once earnings are imputed for the years 1968 through 1992, earnings are then projected for the
years 1993 through 2050. Dynasim uses information from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to project individual earnings from 1993 through

2050 using a series of statistical regression equations. The earnings are projected in 5 steps. First,

hourly wages are estimated using a random-effects model. Second, results from the hourly wage
model are used to calculate predicted wages for all individuals in the PSID. Third, the number of
annual hours worked is predicted using a tobit model that includes the predicted wage results
from the previous regression. In the fourth step, labor force participation is estimated using a
random-effect probit model. Finally, the labor force participation rates are adjusted to reflect
projected employment rates from the OASDI Trustees’ Report by age and gender.
The model utilizes survey data to estimate population growth, family formation, education and
health, earnings, employee benefits, asset accumulation, pension and Social Security benefits, and
payroll taxes. Some of the survey data used to estimate these processes include the Survey of
Income and Program Participation, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the Current Population
Survey, the Health and Retirement Survey, the National Longitudinal Mortality Study, the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, estimates from the Social Security Administration’s
Office of the Chief Actuary, Vital Statistics, the Pension Simulation Model from the Policy
Simulation Group, and the Pension Insurance Modeling System from the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation. All of these data sources are used to validate and readjust the underlying
data for the Dynasim model as necessary.
Despite the many advantages of using a microsimulation model, such as Dynasim, one must keep
in mind the caveats that are common to the use of microsimulation models, in general. Such
caveats include, but are not limited to:

1. Microsimulation models require the use of a large number of assumptions. For example,

Dynasim utilizes assumptions from the Social Security Administration’s Office of the Chief
Actuary (OCACT) to determine future fertility and mortality patterns and to project

¹⁶^T^h^e^que^s^tio^ns^r^e^g^a^r^d^ing^a^s^s^e^ts^a^nd^pe^ns^io^ns^c^aⁿ^be^f^oun^{d i}ⁿ^the^S^I^{PP lo}^ng^a^s^s^e^t/peⁿ^sⁱ^oⁿ^t^opic^a^l^m^odule^w^a^v^e^.

employment rates and wage growth. Individuals who believe that OCACT’s fertility and
mortality assumptions are too optimistic or pessimistic will also have the same views of
Dynasim’s fertility and mortality assumptions. In addition, Dynasim models mortality using an
individual’s age, race/ethnicity, marital status, education, disability status and work history.
There may be other variables that affect mortality that are not used in this model.
2. Like all projections, historical information is used to calculate future information for
individuals such as future earnings, future marital status changes, future pensions, etc. There
may be historical information, however, that will not provide good estimates of future values.
For example, 40 years ago, it could not have been foreseen how technological advancements
would have altered mortality and earnings. Similarly, future technology and medical
advancements will have an effect on the population that can not currently be predicted. A
model, such as Dynasim, would not be able to factor in these kinds of advancements unless
they are already, somehow, accounted for in historical information. Put another way, the model
assumes that the future will resemble the past. The model often uses a variety of techniques
(e.g., cohort effects) to place heavier weight on more recent experience than on less recent
experience. The model projects social and economic change mainly through change in the
composition of the population.
3. Microsimulation models require many assumptions and utilize many specific mathematical
equations. Therefore, care should be taken when interpreting results. For example, because of
their detailed assumptions, microsimulation models better represent relative changes in
benefits rather than exact benefit levels. All microsimulation models are estimates of what a
given population will look like in the future. Because they are estimates, all microsimulation
models contain some level of error. By analyzing relative differences, rather than point
estimates such as average benefits, some of the error is controlled for because the underlying
error will be the same under both options. Thus, microsimulation models will be more accurate
in stating that “Plan A is estimated to result in a 23% increase in benefits over current law”
than stating that “Individuals, under Plan A, receive a monthly benefit of $900” because the
error found in microsimulation models is difficult to quantify, but can be mitigated by
comparing plans across the same population and, in essence, holding the error constant.
In addition to the caveats associated with microsimulation models, there are caveats that are
specific to the Dynasim model. For example:

1. Dynasim does not model the “old law” Social Security benefit rules in place prior to 1979.

Therefore, the benefits for the oldest individuals may not precisely reflect the level of benefits
that they actually received.
2. Dynasim does not include behavioral changes resulting from the modification of the Social
Security benefit and tax structures. Thus, changes to Social Security’s tax or benefit structure
will not automatically alter an individual’s work patterns or retirement decision.
3. Dynasim does not include macroeconomic feedbacks. A change in the Social Security program
can affect other segments of the economy. For example, a benefit cut could have effects on the
labor force participation and the savings rate. These kinds of macroeconomic effects cannot
automatically be modeled using the Dynasim model. Thus, second order microeconomic
effects such as the effect of the savings rate on the interest rate earned by individual accounts
cannot be modeled.

4. This version of Dynasim does not currently include an income tax module. Because Social
Security benefits may be subject to income taxation, reform options that alter the level of
Social Security benefits can also alter the amount of income tax paid by individuals. Although
income taxes cannot be modeled, the amount of Social security payroll taxes paid can easily be
calculated from an individual’s earnings.
5. Dynasim is not a Social Security actuarial model and thus cannot estimate the solvency effect
of a proposed policy change. The Dynasim model does not contain all of the information
required to produce solvency estimates. For example, Dynasim does not calculate children’s
benefits and so a complete account of benefit payments cannot be calculated. In addition,
Dynasim simulates the population between the years 1993 and 2050. The benefits received by
individuals outside of this yearly range would not be included in the calculations. For these
same reasons, long-term cost estimates cannot be calculated.
6. Dynasim incorporates differences in processes on the basis of race/ethnicity where the data
suggest that such differences are significant. The literature is not always definitive on the
magnitude of differences by race, and measurement issues can complicate estimation of such
effects. We thus suggest conservative interpretation of differences by race and Hispanicity.
Despite the caveats related to microeconomic models and specifically to Dynasim, the Urban
Institute’s Dynamic Simulation Model is an extremely useful tool for analyzing the effects of
Social Security reform proposals and other topics related to the aged. The wealth of demographic
and economic information found in the Dynasim model enables CRS to provide members of
Congress with in-depth analysis regarding the distributional effects of reform proposals that
would not be possible without the use of a microsimulation model.

^{Actuarially Fair}^{In the}^conte^{xt of Social Security,}^{holding constant the}^{value of lifetime Socia}^{l Security}
^benefits^{for a pe}^{rson of ave}^rage^li^{fe expectancy}^{, regardless of whe}ⁿ^{he or sh}^{e takes}^up
^{benefits. For exam}^{ple, the}^{early retirement reduction}^and^{delayed retir}^{ement credit}^were
^{intended to make lifetime Social}^{Security be}^{nefits eq}^{ual in actua}^{rial terms regardless of}
^when^bene^{ficiaries began to collect bene}^fits.
^Adequa^cy^{In the}^conte^{xt of Social Security,}^{the goal of providing some basic level of income to}
^{beneficiaries. Meas}^{ures of}^bene^{fit adequacy in}^{clude poverty}^{rates a}^{nd replaceme}^{nt rate}^s.
^{Average Indexed}^{The average mont}^{hly amou}^{nt of}^{a worker’s}^{taxable earnings}^{, which is}^{wage indexed}^(or
^{Monthly Earnings}^{adjusted to reflect increasing wag}^{es) and used to determine}^the^{primary insurance amount}
^(AIME)^(PIA)^whe^{n a worker}^ap^{plies for Social Security benefits. In t}^{he ave}^{rage indexed mont}^hly
^{earnings (AI}^{ME) calculation for a}^{retired worker, the}^highest^{35 ye}^{ars of taxa}^{ble earnings}
^{are wage indexed, averaged, and}^{divided by 12. Fewer years}^{of ear}^{nings may}^be^{used to}
^{calculate the AI}^{MEs of worke}^rs^{who die or become}^disabled^.
^{Average Wa}^{ge Index}^{The average amou}^{nt of total nati}^{onal wages for each}^{year afte}^{r 1}⁹^{50, as meas}^ured^by
^(AWI)^{annual wage data ta}^{bulated b}^y^th^{e Social Security Administration (}^SSA).^{The Average}
^{Wage Index (AWI) includes ea}^rni^{ngs that a}^re^not^covered^and/or^taxable^{by Social}
^{Security. The AWI is used for}^{wage indexing}^{values in the Social Security p}^rogram.
^Baseline^{In the}^conte^{xt of this re}^{port, cu}^r^{rent law Social Security benefits a}^{nd payroll taxes,}
^{against which Social Security be}ⁿ^{efits and pay}^{roll taxes under}^vari^{ous alternative policies}
^{are compared. Also see}^{payable baseline}^and^{scheduled baseline}^.
^{Basic Benefit Amount}^{See primary insurance amount (PIA)}^.
^{Basic Benefit Formula}^{See primary insurance amount (PIA) formula}^.
^{Bend Points}^{The dollar amounts that define}^th^{e brackets}^{in the}^{primary insuranc}^{e amount (PIA)}^formula
^{used to calculate basic Social Security be}^{nefits. The be}^{nd points a}^r^e^{wage indexed}^{, or}
^{adjusted annually to reflect inc}^rea^{sing wages. In}²⁰^{06, th}^{e be}^{nd points were}^$6^{56 a}^nd
^$3,95^{5. The}^{use of be}^{nd points in}^{the Social Security bene}^{fit formu}^{la creates a}^progressive
^{benefit st}^ruct^{ure, whe}^{re lower e}^arners^{receive p}^{roportionately higher}^{benefits, relative}
^to^{covered earnings}^{, than do higher earne}^rs.
^Coho^rt^{A group of individuals sharing}^{a p}^{articular chara}^{cteristic and st}^{udied over time. For}
^{example, a birt}^{h cohort is a gro}^u^p^{of individuals born in t}^{he same}^{year or pe}^{riod of time.}
^{Computation Years}^{The years of ea}^rnings^{used to cal}^{culate a worker’s}^{average indexed monthly earnings}
^{(AIME) in t}^{he Social Security ben}^{efit formula. For retirement}^bene^{fits, the highest}³⁵
^{years of ear}^{nings are}^{used. For disability and survivor be}^{nefits, the}^num^{ber of}
^{computation years}^depe^{nds on th}^{e age whe}^{n the}^{wage ear}^ner^beca^me^disabled^{or died;}
^{the n}^umbe^{r of comp}^{utation years}^{varies from}^{2 to 35.}
^{Consumer P}^rice^{An official measure of inflation (i.e., the change ove}^{r time in p}^rices^{) calculated by the U.S.}
^{Index (CPI)}^Department^{of Labor. The Social Security program}^uses^{the Cons}^u^{mer Price Inde}^{x for}
^{Urban Wage}^Ear^{ners a}^{nd Clerical Workers (CPI-W) to calculate annual}^c^ost-^of-living
^adjustments^{(COLA) to be}^nefits.
^{Cost-of-Living}^{The ann}^{ual increase}^{in Social Sec}^{urity be}^{nefits re}^{flecting the in}^cre^{ase in the cost of living}
^{Adjustment (COLA)}^(i.e^.,^inf^lation^{), as measured by t}^h^e^{Consumer Price Index}^{(CPI-W). T}^{he cost-of-living}
^{adjustment (COLA) is effe}^{ctive in}^{December of ea}^{ch y}^{ear and is ca}^{lculated as the cha}^nge
^{in the CPI-W from t}^{he third cale}^{ndar q}^uarter^{of the}^{prior year to}^{the third calendar}
^quarte^{r of the}^cu^rrent^{year. If}^the^{CPI-W increases duri}^{ng this}^{period, S}^ocial^Security
^benefits^{for the}^next^{year inc}^reas^{e proportionately. If the}^{CPI-W decreases, Social}
^{Security be}^{nefits stay t}^{he same.}
^{Contribution a}^nd^See^{taxable earni}^{ngs base}^.

^{Benefit Bas}^e

^{Covered Ear}^nings^Earnings^{from a job w}^{hich re}^quir^{es contrib}^{utions to the Social Security progra}^{m. (See}
^{covered worker}^{for more information.) All covered earnings below the taxa}^{ble wage}
^{base—that is,}^{taxable earnings}^{—are su}^{bject to Social Security}^payr^{oll taxes.}^Covered
^{earnings a}^{bove the ta}^{xable wage}^{base are e}^xem^{pt from t}^{he Social Security payroll tax.}
^{Covered Wo}^rker^{A worker who is em}^{ployed in a job at which}^{he or s}^{he cont}^ribute^{s a portion of ear}^nings
^{to Socia}^{l Security, or a worker who is self-employed. Workers not covered by Social}
^{Security are eithe}^{r covered}^{by a}^{similar elig}^{ible contributory syste}^{m offered by}^their
^{employers outside of Social Security, do not have high e}^nough^ear^{nings for ma}^ndatory
^{participation, or have anot}^{her s}^p^{ecial exemption. (About 9}^{6% of a}^{ll workers are covered}
^{by Social Security.)}
^Credits^{To be}^insured^{for retired}^{worker b}^enefits^{, an individual must accum}^u^{late at least 40 c}^redits
^{in the Social Security system, whi}^{ch is eq}^{uivalent to at least 1}⁰^yea^{rs of covered}
^{employment. In}²⁰^{06, a worke}^{r r}^{eceived one credit (up to a total}^{of four pe}^{r year)}^for
^{each $}⁹⁷⁰ⁱⁿ^c^{overed earnings}^{. Fe}^{wer credits may}^{be re}^{quired in}^s^{ome survivor and}
^{disability cases; in these cases, be}^{nefits may}^{be gra}^{nted with as}^few^{as six credits. The}
^{amount of ear}^{nings r}^e^q^{uired for}^{a credit is}^{wage indexed}^.
^{Delayed Ret}^irement^{An increase}^{to the}^{primary insurance amount (PIA)}^{if a}^ben^{eficiary delays claiming Socia}^l
^{Credit (DRC)}^{Security be}^{nefits be}^{yond his or h}^er^{full retirement age (FRA)}^{. The amount of t}^{he increas}^e
^{varies depending on}^the^bene^{ficiary’s date of birth a}^{nd how long a}^{beneficiary delays}
^{benefit take-}^up^{beyond his or}^her^{FRA. However, the increase sto}^{ps whe}^{n a}^person
^{reaches age}⁷^{0, even if}^{he or s}^he^{continues to delay taking u}^p^bene^fits.
^Disabled^{For Socia}^{l Security pur}^{poses, a p}^{erson who is u}^{nable to work}^bec^{ause of a}^{physical or}
^{mental impairment t}^{hat ca}^{n b}^e^e^{xpected to re}^{sult in death}^{or to last for a contin}^uous
^{period of at least one year. Disab}^{led indivi}^{duals under t}^{he age of}⁶²^may^{qualify for Social}
^{Security disability benefits (after}^{which th}^{ey q}^{ualify for retireme}^nt^bene^{fits). No benefits}
^{are paya}^{ble for short-ter}^{m disability or partial disability}^.
^{Distributional}^{A method of analyzing how the}^c^{osts and be}^{nefits of a p}^{rogram or}^{a policy option are}
^Analysis^{distributed among differe}^{nt su}^bgr^{oups (e.g., birth}^cohort^{or income}^level).
^{Dually Entitl}^ed^{Workers who q}^{ualify for Social S}^{ecurity be}^nefits^{based on t}^{heir own work records (i.e.,}
^{Beneficiaries}^{worker benefits}^{) as well as benefits based on t}^{heir spou}^{ses’ work re}^{cords (i.e.}^,^spouse
^benefits^or^{survivor benefits}^{). Dual}^l^y^{entitled beneficiaries receive a}^t^{otal Soc}^{ial Security}
^{benefit t}^{hat is the}^higher^{of the w}^{orker be}^{nefit and t}^{he spo}^use/su^r^{vivor benefit to whic}^h
^{they are e}^{ntitled, not the su}^{m of}^{the two be}^nefits.
^{Early Retirement Age}^{The age at whic}^{h individuals qualify for red}^{uced Social Security retired worker be}^{nefits if}
^{they c}^{hoose to collect benefits b}^{efore the}^{full retirement age (FRA)}^{. The early retireme}^nt
^{age is 62. I}^{ndividuals who begin t}^o^{receive retired worker}^bene^{fits early will be subject to}
^the^{early retirement reduction}^{. (A}^ls^{o called the early eligibi}^{lity age.)}
^{Early Retirement}^{The amount w}^{hich a}^perso^{n’s monthly Social Security benefit is}^pe^rmane^{ntly reduced for}
^Reduction^{taking up}^retireme^{nt be}^{nefits b}^e^f^{ore the}^{full retirement age (FRA)}^{. The amou}^{nt of the}
^{reduction varies depe}^{nding on t}^h^e^bene^{ficiary’s date of birth a}^{nd h}^{ow long before his or}
^{her FRA that}^{he or s}^{he takes}^up^{benefits. The ma}^{ximum a}^mount^{of the redu}^{ction ranges}
^{from 20}^{% to 3}^{0%, depe}^{nding on t}^{he year in}^which^{the worke}^{r was}^{born (be}^{cause of t}^he
^{increase in t}^{he FRA). The early r}^{etirement red}^{uction is intended t}^o^be^{actuarially fa}^ir^.
^Earnin^gs^{Wages or self-employment inco}^{me. Also see}^{covered earnings}^and^{taxable earnings}^.
^Eligibilit^y^{To be eligible for Soci}^{al Security benefits, a worker}^{(or his or he}^r^{family members) m}^ust
^be^insured^{and mu}^{st meet age, disability status, family relationship, and/or other criteria}
^{established by law.}
^Entitlemen^t^{Any federal p}^{rogram—including}^Social^{Security—that legally requi}^{res paym}^{ents to a}^ny
^{individual who meets the}^eligibility^{criteria established by}^{law. (To be entitled to Socia}^l
^{Security be}^{nefits, an individual must meet eligibility criteria and fil}^{e an ap}^{plication for}
^{benefits.) Ge}^{nerally, entitlement}^{programs ar}^{e not s}^{ubject to the}^{annual a}^ppro^priations
^process.

^{FICA (Federal}^See^{payroll taxes}^.
^Insuran^ce
^{Contributions Act)}
^Taxes
^{Full Retirem}^{ent Age}^{The age at whic}^{h an individual ma}^{y first become}^{entitled to unred}^u^{ced Social}^Security
^(FRA)^retirement^bene^{fits. The full retir}^{ement age (FRA) was age 6}⁵^for^{most of Social}
^{Security’s history, and is now gra}^{dually increasing to age 6}^{7. In}²⁰^{06, the FRA was}⁶⁵
^{years and}^{6 mont}^{hs. (Also called}^{the normal retire}^{ment age.)}
^{Hold Harmless}^{In the}^conte^{xt of Social Security,}^{a group of}^bene^{ficiaries is held harmless if be}^{nefit cuts}
^{and/or tax incr}^{eases are}^{not ap}^{plied to that group.}
^Income^{In the}^conte^{xt of this re}^{port, Dy}^{nasim projections of total income in the yea}^{r 2}⁰³^5,
^{including Social Security benefits, defined-benefit pe}^{nsion be}^{nefits, income from}
^{retirement ac}^{counts, ear}^{nings, SSI, and the a}ⁿⁿ^{uitized value of financial assets. Individuals}
^{are the}^{unit of obse}^{rvation, but i}^{ncome estimates include income}^{of the spo}^{use, if the}
^{individual is married.}
^{Inflation (Prices)}^{A rate of increase}^{in the}^gene^{ral price level of all goods and services. The official measure}
^{of inflation in the United States is the}^Consum^{er Price Index}^.
^Insolvency^{In the}^conte^{xt of Social Security,}^{the inability of the tr}^{ust f}^unds^{to pay all curre}^nt
^expe^{nses out of}^cur^{rent ta}^{x inco}^{me and acc}^{umulated tr}^{ust f}^{und as}^{sets. Insolvency would}
^{mean that}^{Social Security’s trust f}^{unds wer}^{e u}^{nable to pay}^{full be}ⁿ^{efits on time.}
^{(Insolvency would not mea}^{n that}^Social^{Security would be complet}^{ely broke and}^una^ble
^{to pay any}^ben^efits.)
^Insured^{In the}^conte^{xt of Social Security,}^{having eno}^ugh^credits^{to meet}^{eligibility requirements}^for
^{retired or}^disabled^{worker be}^nefi^{ts, or to permit the worke}^{r’s spo}^{use and c}^{hildren or}
^{survivors to esta}^{blish eligibil}^{ity for be}^{nefits in th}^{e even}^{t of the wor}^{ker’s retirement,}
^disability^{, or death.}
^Intermediate^{The Social Security Administratio}^{n actua}^{ries’ “best estimate” of f}^u^t^{ure demograp}^{hic and}
^Assumptions^{economic trends. The act}^{uaries a}^{lso produce high cost (}^{pessimistic) assum}^{ptions and low}
^{cost (optimistic) assumptions. These assum}^{ptions are}^pu^{blished an}^{nually in the Social}
^{Security Trustees}^{Report. This re}^{port uses}^{the Tr}^{ustees’ inter}^{mediate assum}^ptions.
^{Life Expectancy}^{An estimate of the}^average^{remaining n}^umbe^{r of year}^{s ex}^pected^p^{rior to death for a}
^{given cohort. In t}^{he conte}^{xt of S}^{ocial Security, l}^{ife expecta}^{ncy at a}^{ge 65 is most}
^{commonly used.}
^{Long Ra}^nge^{In the}^conte^{xt of Social Security,}^{the ne}^{xt 7}⁵^yea^{rs. Long-range}^act^{uarial estimates are}
^{made for this pe}^{riod because it is}^appro^{ximately the ma}^{ximum r}^e^{maining lifetime of}
^{workers cu}^rre^{ntly covered by So}^{cial Security. The annual Social Security Trust}^{ees Report}
^{includes long-range p}^{rojections of Social Security’s financial status. (See also}^{short range}^.)
^Mean^{The mean is t}^{he average}^{value in}^{a data set. It is determined by}^{adding all the values and}
^divid^{ing the su}^{m by}^the^num^{ber o}^f^{values in t}^{he data set. I}ⁿ^{this re}^p^{ort, the}^median^is
^{generally used instead of t}^{he mea}^n.
^Median^{The middle numbe}^{r in a se}^{ries of num}^{bers a}^rra^{nged from least to}^{greatest. Half the data}
^{values are a}^{bove the m}^{edian, and half are}^{below. The value of a m}^{edian is not affected b}^y
^{a few ext}^{remely high or}^extre^{mely low values, as a}^mean^{would be.}
^{Microsimulation}^{In the}^conte^{xt of policy analysis, a computer}^{model that simulates}^{how a governme}^nt
^Model^{program would operate}^unde^{r p}^{olicy changes and}^{how participant}^{s would be affected.}
^{For more information on the Dy}^{nasim microsimulation model used in this report,}^please
^see^Appen^{dix E}^.
^{Nominal Dollars}^{The face value of a}ⁿ^amou^{nt of m}^{oney during a give}^{n year,}^{using th}^{e prices}^prevailing
^{during that}^{year. Nominal dollars are not adjusted for}^inflation^.
^{Normal Retirement}^See^{full reti}^{rement age (FRA)}^.

^{Age (NRA)}

^{Payable Basel}^ine^{In the}^conte^{xt of Social Security,}^a^baseline^{that includes}^bene^{fits p}^{ayable with cu}^rre^{nt tax}
^{income and accu}^{mulated tru}^{st f}^u^{nd assets, even}^{if those}^{benefits a}^{re less tha}^{n those}
^{which would be}^{paid according to the formula set}^{forth in}^{the law}^{. Payable benefits would}
^{be less tha}^{n sc}^{heduled be}^{nefits in}^{the case of Social Security}^insolve^ncy^{. (See also}^scheduled
^benefits^.)
^{Payroll Tax}^{In the}^conte^{xt of Social Security,}^{a tax levied on all}^{covered earnings}^{, up to the}^contribution
^{wage base}^{in a given yea}^{r. The Social Security payroll tax is paid in equal pa}^{rts b}^y
^{employers and em}^{ployees. Curre}^{ntly the Social Security payroll tax rate is}^12.4%^(of
^{which 6.2}^{% is paid by}^each^{employee and em}^{ployer). Payroll taxes are also known as}
^{FICA (Federal Insura}^{nce Contrib}^{utions Act) or SECA (Self-Employment Contrib}^utions
^{Act) taxes. FICA and SECA ta}^xes^{include both t}^{he Social Security tax and a}^Medicare
^{Hospital Insu}^{rance ta}^{x of}^{2.9% of}^{all covered earnings (of which}^1.^{45% is}^{paid by eac}^h
^{employee and em}^ployer).
^{Price Indexing}^{In the}^conte^{xt of Social Security,}^{a proposed alternative met}^{hod of calculating bene}^fits.
^{The most commonly discussed fo}^{rm of price inde}^{xing would incre}^{ase individuals’ benefit}
^{levels at the rate of}^{price growth}^(i.e^.,^inf^lation^{) rather tha}^{n at th}^{e r}^{ate of wage growth (as}
^{under c}^u^r^{rent law). Under t}^{his form of price inde}^{xing, the}^{primary insurance amount (PIA)}
^factors^{would be multiplied each y}^{ear by t}^{he ratio of the}^Con^sumer^{Price Index (CPI)}^{to the}
^{Average Wage Index (AWI)}^{for t}^h^e^{second prior year. U}^{nder a sys}^te^{m of price indexi}^ng,
^{beneficiaries’ Social Security bene}^{fits would be lower than}^unde^{r c}^urre^{nt law. (Other}
^{parts of t}^{he Social Security benefi}^{t formula which}^{are wage inde}^xe^{d under c}^urr^{ent law,}
^{such a}^s^{bend points}^{, could also be}^{price indexed, b}^{ut t}^{he term “}^pri^{ce indexing” is typically}
^{used in ref}^eren^{ce to reducing}^the^{PIA factors.)}
^{Primary Insur}^ance^{The monthly Social Security bene}^{fit amount pa}^{yable to a retired w}^{orker who begin}^{s to}
^Amou^{nt (PIA)}^{receive be}^{nefits at th}^e^{full retirement age}^(FRA)^{or, generally, to a}^disabled^{worker. This}
^{amount, which is}^{based on t}^{he w}^orker’s^{average indexed monthly earnings (AIME)}^{, is a}^lso
^{used to calculate be}^{nefits paya}^ble^{on the worke}^{r’s earnings}^record^{—for exam}^ple,
^benefits^{paid to his or her}^spouse^{or survivors. Also refer}^{red to as a basic be}^nefit
^{amount. For more information o}ⁿ^{the PIA}^{calculation, please refer}^to^{Appendix A}^.
^{Primary Insur}^ance^{The factors}^{by whic}^{h the}^{dollar a}^{mounts in t}^he^{primary insurance amount (PIA) formula}^are
^Amou^{nt (PIA)}^{multiplied. The PIA factors are 9}^{0%, 3}^{2% and}¹⁵^{%; each}^{is applied to a worker’s}^average
^Factors^{indexed monthly earnings}^(AIME)^amounts^between^the^{bend p}^oints^{in the PIA}^formula.
^{Primary Insur}^ance^{The formula to calculate the}^prim^{ary insura}^{nce amount (PIA)}^{for wor}^{kers who attain age}
^Amou^{nt (PIA)}^{62, become}^di^sabled^{, or die after 197}^{8. The PIA is e}^{qual to 9}^{0% of}^{a worker’s}^average
^Formula^{indexed monthly earnings}^(AIME)^{up to the first}^{bend point}^{, plus}^32%^{of AIME}^betwee^{n th}^e
^{first and second}^bend^{points, plus}^15%^{of AIM}^{E above t}^{he se}^cond^{bend point.}
^Progressive^{A system in w}^{hich lower ear}^ners^{receive pro}^{portionately higher}^b^{enefits (or pay}
^{proportionately lower taxes) tha}^{n do higher ea}^rner^{s. The Social S}^{ecurity be}^{nefit form}^ula
^{is progressive.}
^Purchasin^{g Po}^wer^{The amount of goods and se}^rvice^{s that a given}^amount^{of money c}^{an b}^{uy. In t}^{he cont}^ext
^{of Social}^{Security, beneficiaries re}^{ceive an an}^nual^c^ost-^{of-living adjustment (COLA)}^{in which}
^{benefits a}^{re adjusted according t}^o^{the growth in}^{prices (i.e.,}^infla^ti^on^{) as a way to maintain}
^{the p}^urc^hasing^{power of be}^nefits^{over the cou}^{rse of a}^bene^{ficiaries lifetime.}
^{Quarters o}^f^Covera^ge^See^credits^.
^Quintile^{One of five seg}^{ments of a}^{distribution that}^{has bee}^{n divided into fifths. For exam}^{ple, an}
^{individual in the second-from-the}^{-bottom quintile of an income dis}^{tribution is one whose}^th^th
^{income falls between t}^he²⁰^and⁴⁰^pe^{rcentile of the in}^{come of}^{the pop}^{ulation. In this}
^report,^income^q^{uintiles are used}^{to il}^{lustrate the e}^ffects^{of policy changes on}^individuals
^{of different income levels.}
^{Real Dollars}^{The value of an}^{amount of}^mone^{y measur}^{ed in terms}^{of p}^urc^hasin^{g power in a given}^year.
^{Real do}^{llars are adjusted for}^inflat^ion^{. In this re}^{port, real values a}^re^{in 20}^{05 dollars.}
^Regressive^{A system in w}^{hich lower ear}^ners^{pay p}^{roportionately higher}^taxes^{(or receive}
^{proportionately lower bene}^{fits) than do highe}^{r ear}^{ners. The Social Security pay}^{roll tax is}
^{regressive, since t}^{he tax}^{rate is fl}^{at and the a}^{mount of ta}^{xable ear}^{nings is cap}^ped.

^{Replacement Rate}^{In the}^conte^{xt of Social Security,}^{the p}^{roportion of taxable ea}^rning^{s before}^retirement
^{that are}^{replaced by}^be^{nefits. A Social Security replacement rat}^{e is calculated by dividing a}
^{worker’s initial S}^ocial^{Security be}^{nefit by}^{his or he}^r^{average indexed monthly earnings}
^(AIME)^{. Replacement rates a}^{re on}^{e way of measu}^{ring t}^he^adequacy^{of a person’s}^bene^fits.
^{Retirement Earnings}^{A provision of the law whic}^{h red}^{uces Social Security bene}^{fits on a}^{ccount of ear}^nings^from
^{Test (RET)}^{work before t}^he^{full retirement age (FRA)}^{. In 2}⁰⁰^{6, the R}^{ET applied}^{to beneficiaries ear}^ning
^{more than}^$1^2,48⁰^{before t}^{he ye}^{ar in which}^they^reach^{the FRA, a}^{nd to bene}^ficiaries
^{earning more t}^han^$3^3,24^{0 du}^rin^{g the year}^{in whic}^{h they}^reac^{h th}^{e FRA (i.e}^{., during the}
^months^{before t}^{heir birt}^{hdays). For more information on the}^{RET, please see}^Appendix
^C^.
^{Scheduled Baseline}^{In the}^conte^{xt of Social Security,}^a^baseline^{that includes}^bene^{fits a}^{ccording to the form}^ula
^{set forth in t}^{he law, regardless of}^whethe^{r those}^bene^{fits would b}^e^{payable with}^cur^rent
^{tax income and ac}^cum^{ulated trus}^{t fund as}^{sets. Scheduled be}^nefits^{would be greater t}^han
^{payable be}^{nefits in t}^{he case}^{of Social Security insolvency. (See also}^{payable baseline}^.)
^{Short Ran}^ge^{In the}^conte^{xt of Social Security,}^{the ne}^{xt 1}⁰^yea^{rs. The an}^{nual Social Security Trustees}
^{Report includes short-ra}^nge^{projections of Social Security’s financial status. (See also}^long
^range^.)
^S^{ocial Insura}^nce^{A system t}^{hat insu}^{res worker}^{s an}^{d their families against economic insecurity ca}^{used b}^y
^{the loss of earnings}^{or health}^car^{e due to some event}^{(e.g., retirement, un}^employment,
^disability^{, or death). Benefit amounts are}^{based on worke}^{rs’ and e}^{mployers’ contributions}
^{to the social insurance}^{system. S}^{ocial Security is a system of social insurance.}
^Solvency^{In the}^conte^{xt of Social Security,}^{the ability to pay sc}^{heduled be}^nef^{its when due}^{out of}
^curre^{nt ta}^{x income and ac}^cum^{ulated trust f}^{und as}^{sets. Social Security is considered}
^{solvent as long as the Social Security trust}^fu^{nds maintain a}^{positive balance.}
^{Spouse Benefits}^Social^{Security bene}^{fits paya}^{ble to the spouse}^{or divorced spouse}^{of a retired or}^disabled
^{worker, based on t}^{he worker’s e}^{arnings r}^{ecord. The}^{primary insur}^{ance amount (PIA)}^{for a}
^spouse^bene^{ficiary is generally 5}⁰^%^{of his or he}^{r s}^{pouse’s PIA. For more information on}
^{how spouse}^be^{nefits are calc}^{ulated, please see}^Appen^{dix B}^.
^{Survivor Benefits}^Social^{Security bene}^{fits paya}^{ble to the sur}^{vivors of a deceased wo}^{rker, based on t}^he
^{worker’s earnings}^{record. Potential survivor bene}^{ficiaries include widow(er)s, former}
^{spouses, children, and}^pare^{nts of}^{the deceased worker. The}^{primary insurance amount (PIA)}
^{for an aged widow or widower is}¹⁰^{0% of}^{his or her}^{deceased spo}^{use’s actual b}^enefit
^{amount (i.e., the deceased spous}^{e’s PIA after ap}^{plying the}^{early reti}^{rement reduction}^or
^{delayed retirement credit (DRC)}^{, if}^{applicable). Other ty}^{pes of s}^urviv^{or benefits—c}^hild’s,
^{mother’s, father’s, and}^parent’s^b^{enefits—are}^{not analyzed in this}^{report. For more}
^{information on how su}^{rvivor be}ⁿ^{efits are calculated, please see}^A^{ppendix B}^.
^{Taxable Earnings}^{In the}^conte^{xt of Social Security,}^{wages and/or self-employment in}^{come earned in}^c^overed
^employm^ent^{that is less t}^{han t}^he^t^{axable earnings base}^{. (About 85%}^{of covered earnings}
^{were taxa}^{ble in 2}⁰⁰^5.)
^{Taxable Earnings}^{The maximum}^an^{nual amou}^{nt of}^{covered earnings}^{that are s}^{ubject t}^o^Socia^{l Security}
^Base^{payroll taxes and c}^{redited toward Socia}^{l Security bene}^{fits. Covered earnings a}^{bove this}
^{amount are}^neither^taxable^{nor c}^{reditable for bene}^{fit computation}^pur^{poses. The amou}^nt
^{of the taxa}^{ble earning}^{s base}^is^{wage indexed}^(i.e.^{, rises each year wi}^{th overall wage}
^{growth). In 2}⁰⁰^{6, the amo}^{unt of t}^{he taxa}^{ble earning}^{s base}^{was $}⁹⁴^{,200. (Also called the}
^{contribution and}^ben^{efit base, tax}^{able wage base, or t}^{he taxa}^{ble m}^aximum.)
^{Taxable Maximum}^See^tax^{able earni}^{ngs base}^.
^{Wage Indexation}^{In the}^conte^{xt of Social Security,}^{a method by w}^{hich dollar values}^{are adjusted to account}
^{for the a}ⁿⁿ^{ual growth in}^{national wages. The}^{Average Wage Index (}^AWI)^{is used to}
^{increase values}^{in the Social Secu}^{rity program, including t}^he^{average indexed monthly}
^earnings^(AIME)^{formula, the}^{taxable wage base}^{, the}^{bend points}^{in t}^he^{primary insurance}
^{amount (PIA) formula}^{, and the}^{retirement earnings test (RET)}^e^{xempt amounts.}
^{Worker Benefits}^Social^{Security bene}^{fits paya}^{ble to a retired or}^disabled^{worker, ba}^{sed on his or he}^{r own}
^{earnings record.}

^L^a^u^r^{a Haltzel} ^Da^wⁿ^N^u^sc^h^l^er
^Specialis^{t i}ⁿ^In^co^m^e^Secu^rit^y^Specialis^{t i}ⁿ^In^co^m^e^Secu^rit^y
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^An^al^y^s^{t i}ⁿ^Di^sab^ilit^y^P^o^lic^y^A^pplⁱ^catⁱ^ons^D^e^v^e^l^{oper, C}^lⁱ^e^nt^-^S^er^v^e^{r an}^{d WEB}
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