Statutory Qualifications for Executive Branch Positions

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, some Members of Congress and others questioned the
competence of leadership at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). After
investigating the federal response to the hurricane, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs concluded that the agency’s leader had “lacked the leadership skills
that were needed for his critical position.” In response, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1394) stipulated that the FEMA Administrator,
among other top agency leaders, must meet certain qualifications. President George W. Bush’s
signing statement for this act seemingly challenged the constitutionality of these requirements,
and it stated that the “executive branch shall construe [the applicable provision] in a manner
consistent with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.” Three Members of Congress then
urged the President to “reconsider [his] position and join [them] in calling for strong standards
and the highest professional qualifications for the leadership of FEMA and for open dialogue
between the executive and legislative branches on issues of such significant importance to out
nation’s safety and security.”
These events reflect broader interbranch differences over congressional authority to establish
statutory qualifications. The preponderance of evidence and historical practice suggests that
Congress generally has the constitutional authority to set such qualifications. The boundaries of
this authority have not been conclusively drawn, however, and the executive branch, in recent
years, has asserted that congressional authority in this area is more limited than congressional
practice would suggest. Statutory qualification requirements might continue to be an area of
conflict between Congress and the President. Inasmuch as these provisions are not self-enforcing,
their success as a means of assuring competent leadership of the federal government will depend
upon the two branches’ adherence to them during the selection and confirmation processes.
In practice, it has not been unusual for Congress to mandate that appointees to certain positions
meet specified requirements. Some statutory qualification provisions, like those for the FEMA
Administrator, require that appointees have certain experience, skills, or educational backgrounds
that are associated with competence. Other qualification provisions address a variety of
characteristics, such as citizenship status, residency, or, for the purpose of maintaining political
balance on regulatory boards, political party affiliation. Congress has used such statutory
provisions selectively; most executive branch positions do not have them. This report provides
background on the constitutional appointments framework, discusses Congress’s constitutional
authority to set qualifications, discusses congressional practices in this area, and provides related
analysis and options. The report includes two tables with examples of existing positions with
qualification requirements.
This report will be updated in response to policy developments related to statutory qualifications.

Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
The Constitutional Appointments Framework................................................................................2
Congressional Authority to Establish Qualifications for Leadership Positions...............................3
Executive Branch Views...........................................................................................................4
Signing Statements..............................................................................................................4
Department of Justice Opinions..........................................................................................5
Statutory Qualifications in Practice.................................................................................................7
Qualification Modifications......................................................................................................9
Qualification Waivers..............................................................................................................10
Qualifications for Members of Collegial Bodies.....................................................................11
Statutory Qualifications: Analysis and Options.............................................................................12
Advantages and Disadvantages of Statutory Qualifications...................................................13
Options for Congressional Consideration...............................................................................15
Incremental Establishment of Qualifications....................................................................15
Agency-wide Qualifications.............................................................................................16
Government-wide Standards.............................................................................................16
Senate Standards...............................................................................................................17
Concluding Observations..............................................................................................................18
Table A-1. Examples of Department and Agency Leadership Positions with Statutory
Qualification Requirements........................................................................................................20
Table A-2. Examples of Positions on Independent Collegial Bodies with Statutory
Qualification Requirements........................................................................................................24
Appendix. Examples of Statutory Qualification Requirements....................................................20
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................29

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, some Members of Congress and others questioned the
competence of leadership at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). After
investigating the federal response to the hurricane, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs concluded, among other findings, that the agency’s leader had “lacked ¹
the leadership skills that were needed for his critical position.” The committee went on to
recommend that future leaders of national emergency management efforts “have significant
experience in crisis management, in addition to substantial management and leadership ²
experience, whether in the public, private or nonprofit sector.”
At the time of Hurricane Katrina, appointees to the top FEMA leadership position were not ³
required, in statute, to meet any qualifications. This was changed by the Post-Katrina Emergency ⁴
Management Reform Act of 2006, under which the FEMA Administrator, among other top
agency leaders, is required to meet certain qualifications. The act provides the following:
^T^h^{e A}^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rat^o^{r sh}^al^l^be^appoiⁿ^t^{ed f}^r^o^m^a^m^ongⁱ^ndi^vⁱ^du^al^s^w^h^o^h^a^v^e^—⁽^A⁾^a
^d^e^m^oⁿ^s^tr^ated^ab^ilit^yⁱⁿ^aⁿ^d^kⁿ^o^w^l^ed^g^e^o^f^e^m^er^g^eⁿ^c^y^m^aⁿ^a^g^e^m^eⁿ^t^an^d^h^o^m^e^laⁿ^d^sec^u^rⁱ^t^y^;
^an^{d (B}⁾ⁿ^o^{t les}^s^th^aⁿ^{5 y}^ears^of^ex^ecu^tⁱ^v^e^leaders^h^{ip an}^{d m}^aⁿ^a^g^e^m^eⁿ^t^ex^perien^{ce i}ⁿ^th^e⁵
^pu^blⁱ^c^{or pri}^v^at^{e s}^ect^or.
The Bush Administration seemingly challenged the legitimacy of this provision in the President’s
signing statement for the act. It reads, in part, as follows:
^S^ectⁱ^oⁿ^503(c)^of^t^h^{e H}^o^m^e^l^a^{nd S}^ecu^ri^t^y^A^c^t^of^{2002, as}^am^eⁿ^{ded by}^s^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{611 of}^t^h^{e A}^c^t^,
^provⁱ^d^es^f^o^{r t}^h^{e appoi}ⁿ^t^m^e^nt^an^{d cert}^aⁱⁿ^dutⁱ^e^s^o^f^t^h^e^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rat^o^{r of}^t^h^{e F}^e^deral
^E^m^erg^eⁿ^c^y^Man^a^g^e^m^eⁿ^t^A^g^eⁿ^c^y^.^S^ectⁱ^{on 503(c)(}²^{) v}^e^s^t^sⁱⁿ^t^h^{e Pres}ⁱ^d^en^t^a^u^t^h^ori^t^y^t^o
^appoiⁿ^t^t^h^{e A}^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rat^o^{r, b}^y^an^d^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e adv}ⁱ^{ce an}^{d con}^s^eⁿ^t^of^t^h^{e S}^eⁿ^a^t^e^{, bu}^t^pu^rport^s^t^o
^lⁱ^mⁱ^t^t^h^{e q}^u^alⁱ^fⁱ^catⁱ^ons^o^f^t^h^e^pool^of^pers^ons^f^r^o^m^w^h^o^m^t^h^e^Presⁱ^d^en^t^m^a^y^s^e^l^ect^t^h^e
^appoiⁿ^t^{ee i}ⁿ^{a m}^aⁿⁿ^{er t}^h^at^ru^l^e^s^ou^t^{a l}^a^rg^{e port}ⁱ^oⁿ^of^t^hos^{e pers}^on^s^bes^t^qu^alⁱ^fⁱ^e^{d b}^y
^ex^p^e^rⁱ^en^{ce an}^d^kⁿ^o^w^l^ed^g^e^to^f^{ill t}^h^{e o}^f^fⁱ^{ce. T}^h^{e ex}^ec^u^tⁱ^v^e^b^r^an^ch^s^h^{all co}ⁿ^s^tr^u^e^sectioⁿ⁶
^503(c)^{(2) i}ⁿ^{a m}^aⁿⁿ^{er con}^sⁱ^s^t^eⁿ^t^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^e^A^ppoiⁿ^t^m^eⁿ^t^s^C^l^a^u^s^e^of^t^h^{e C}^oⁿ^s^tⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^on^.
The President appears to take issue with the extent to which the qualifications might limit the
pool of potential nominees to the position. The statement does not make clear whether the
Administration sees Section 503(c)(2) as being in conflict with the Appointments Clause and, if
so, in what way. The final sentence in the excerpt suggests that, to the degree that Section

503(c)(2) is seen to be in conflict with the Administration’s reading of the Appointments Clause,

the President might elect not to abide by the provision. In response to the signing statement, three

¹^{U.S. C}^ong^re^{ss, Se}^na^te^Com^m^itte^e^{on H}^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^rity^a^{nd G}^ove^rnm^e^nta^l^Aff^a^irs,^H^u^r^rⁱ^c^ane^K^a^t^r^ina:^A^N^a^ti^on
^{Still U}^npre^p^are^d^{, 10}⁹^th^Cong^.,²^nd^s^e^s^s^.⁽^W^a^s^hing^{ton: G}^P^O^,²⁰⁰⁶⁾^,^unpa^gⁱ^na^te^d^c^h^a^p^te^r^,^“^C^onc^l^u^sⁱ^on^s^a^{nd Fi}^nd^ing^s^.”
²^I^b^id^.,^{p. R}^e^c^o^m^m^e^nda^tions^-^4.
³^T^h^e^he^a^d^of^FEMA^a^t^tha^t^tim^e^w^a^s^the^U^nde^r^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^f^o^r^Em^e^r^g^e^ncy^P^r^e^p^a^r^e^dne^s^s^aⁿ^d^R^e^s^p^oⁿ^s^e^{. A}^ppointm^e^nts^to
^this^p^o^s^iti^{on w}^e^r^e^{to be}^m^a^de^by^the^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^t^,^by^a^{nd w}^{ith t}^h^e^a^d^vⁱ^c^e^a^{nd c}^ons^eⁿ^t^of^the^Se^na^te⁽^P^.L^{. 10}^7-²⁹⁶^,^§
¹⁰³^(a)).
⁴^P^.^L.¹⁰⁹^-²⁹^5,¹²^{0 S}^t^at^{. 13}⁹⁴^.
⁵^I^b^id^.,^{§ 6}¹¹⁽¹⁰⁾^{, a}^s^{it a}^m^e^nds^§⁵⁰³⁽^c⁾^of^the^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^A^c^{t of}²⁰⁰^2;¹²^{0 Sta}^t^{. 1}³⁹⁷^.
⁶^U^.^S.^P^r^e^sⁱ^d^eⁿ^{t (}^G^.W^{. B}^u^s^h⁾^,^“^S^ta^te^m^e^{nt on}^Sigⁿ^ing^t^h^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^A^ppr^oprⁱ^a^tions^A^c^{t, 20}⁰⁷^,”
^Weekl^{y Co}^mpⁱ^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^of^P^r^esi^d^en^tⁱ^a^l^Do^cu^ment^s^{, v}^o^l.⁴²^{, O}^c^to^be^r⁴^,²⁰^06,^p^p^.¹⁷^42-¹⁷^43.

Members of Congress urged the President to “reconsider [his] position and join [them] in calling
for strong standards and the highest professional qualifications for the leadership of FEMA and
for open dialogue between the executive and legislative branches on issues of such significant ⁷
importance to out nation’s safety and security.”
Both Congress and the President have an interest in assuring that the federal government is led by
appointees who have the necessary qualifications to successfully and faithfully implement the
law. As discussed later in this report, the preponderance of evidence and historical practices
suggest that Congress has the constitutional authority to set such qualifications—as long as those
qualifications do not amount to a de facto legislative designation. In many instances, Congress
has mandated that appointees to leadership positions meet specified requirements. Some statutory
qualification provisions, like those for the FEMA Administrator, require that appointees have
certain experience, skills, or educational backgrounds that are associated with competence. Other
qualification provisions address a variety of characteristics, such as citizenship status, residency,
or, for the purpose of maintaining political balance on regulatory boards, political party
affiliation. Congress has, however, used qualification provisions selectively; most executive
branch positions do not have statutory qualifications. This report provides background on the
constitutional appointments framework, discusses Congress’s constitutional authority to set
qualifications, discusses congressional practices in this area, and discusses related options for
congressional consideration. Examples of positions with statutory requirements or restrictions are
provided in two tables in the Appendix.

The Constitution charges Congress with the responsibility of determining how most leaders of the
federal government will be appointed. The framework for this process is based in Article II:
^[T^h^e^P^r^es^iden^{t] s}^h^allⁿ^o^mⁱⁿ^a^te^{, an}^{d by}^aⁿ^d^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^e^A^d^vⁱ^{ce a}ⁿ^{d C}^oⁿ^s^eⁿ^{t o}^f^th^{e Se}ⁿ^a^{te, s}^h^all
^appoiⁿ^t^A^m^ba^s^s^a^dors^,^ot^h^e^{r pu}^blⁱ^c^Miⁿⁱ^s^t^ers^aⁿ^{d C}^oⁿ^s^u^l^s^,^Ju^dg^es^of^t^h^e^s^u^p^r^em^e^C^o^u^r^t^,^aⁿ^d
^al^l^ot^h^e^{r O}^f^fⁱ^cers^of^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^{ed S}^t^at^es^,^w^h^os^e^A^ppoiⁿ^t^m^eⁿ^t^s^{are n}^o^t^h^e^reiⁿ^ot^h^e^r^wⁱ^s^e
^provⁱ^d^{ed f}^o^{r, an}^d^w^hⁱ^c^h^s^h^al^l^{be es}^t^a^blⁱ^s^h^e^{d b}^y^L^a^w^:^bu^t^t^h^e^C^ong^res^s^m^a^y^b^y^L^a^w^v^e^s^t^t^h^e
^A^ppoiⁿ^t^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^su^c^hⁱⁿ^f^e^ri^{or O}^f^fⁱ^cers^,^a^s^t^h^e^y^t^hⁱⁿ^{k proper,}ⁱⁿ^t^h^e^Presⁱ^d^en^t^al^oⁿ^{e, i}ⁿ^t^h^e⁸
^C^o^u^r^ts^o^f^L^a^w^,^{or in}^t^h^{e Head}^s^of^Depart^m^eⁿ^t^s^.
This clause sets presidential appointment by and with the advice and consent of the Senate ⁹
(hereafter referred to as PAS positions) as the default process for filling such positions. But only
certain officers of the United States must be appointed by that method. At the discretion of
Congress, “inferior” officers may be appointed either under the default process or by the
President alone, the courts, or agency heads. The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase
“Officers of the United States” to mean “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant ¹⁰
to the laws of the United States.” The Supreme Court has provided guidance that could assist

⁷^{U.S. C}^ong^re^{ss, le}^tte^{r f}^r^om^Se^na^t^o^{rs Ma}^ry^L^.^L^a^ndrie^u,^S^u^sa^{n M.}^Collins^,^aⁿ^d^Jose^p^h^{I. L}ⁱ^e^b^e^r^m^a^{n to}^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^t
^G^e^or^ge^W^.^B^u^s^h^{, O}^c^tobe^r^12,²⁰^06.⁽^L^e^tte^r^obtaⁱ^ne^d^f^r^om^C^Q^T^{op D}^o^c^s^a^t^C^Q^.c^om^.)
⁸^A^r^{t. II, Se}^c^.^{2, c}^l^{. 2}^.
⁹^Iⁿ^a¹⁹⁷⁶^opiⁿⁱ^on,^the^C^o^m^p^tr^oll^e^r^G^e^ne^r^a^{l r}^e^a^s^one^{d tha}^t^this^pr^ov^is^ionⁱⁿ^dic^a^t^e^s^tha^t^a^ll^of^fⁱ^ce^r^s^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s
^a^r^e^{to be}^P^A^{S p}^o^sitio^ns^unle^{ss Co}^ng^re^{ss a}^f^fⁱ^r^m^a^tive^l^y^de^le^g^a^t^e^{s tha}^t^a^u^th^ority^(Com^{p. G}^e^{n. De}^c^.^{No. B-18}³⁰^12,⁵⁶
^C^o^m^p^{. G}^e^{n. 137)}^.
¹⁰^B^u^ckl^ey^v^{. Vale}^o^,⁴^{24 U}^.^S.^1,¹²^{6 (}¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.

Congress in identifying which officers may be appointed through one of the non-PAS processes. ¹¹
In Edmond v. United States, the court reasoned that
^[g^]en^e^rall^y^s^p^eakⁱⁿ^g^,^t^h^{e ter}^m^“ⁱ^nf^{erior of}^fⁱ^{cer” conn}^otes^{a r}^e^lation^s^hⁱ^p^wⁱ^t^h^s^o^m^e^hⁱ^gh^er
^ran^kⁱ^ng^of^{ficer or of}^fⁱ^cers^below^t^h^{e P}^r^es^iden^t:^W^h^eth^e^{r on}^{e i}^s^an^“ⁱ^nf^{erior of}^fⁱ^{cer” depen}^d^s
^on^w^h^et^h^e^r^h^e^h^a^s^{a su}^peri^{or. It}ⁱ^sⁿ^o^t^eⁿ^ough^t^h^at^ot^h^e^{r o}^f^fⁱ^cers^m^a^y^{be i}^d^en^tⁱ^fⁱ^ed^w^ho
^f^o^r^m^all^y^m^aⁱⁿ^taiⁿ^a^hⁱ^g^h^e^r^r^aⁿ^k^{, o}^r^p^o^{ssess r}^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ilit^{ies o}^f^a^g^r^eater^m^a^gⁿ^it^u^d^{e. I}^f^t^h^at
^w^e^r^e^th^{e i}ⁿ^ten^tioⁿ^,^th^{e Co}ⁿ^s^tⁱ^t^u^tioⁿ^mⁱ^g^h^t^h^a^v^e^u^s^ed^th^{e p}^h^r^a^{se “}^l^e^sser^o^f^fⁱ^cer^{.” Rath}^er^{, in}
^th^{e co}ⁿ^t^ex^{t o}^f^a^Clau^{se d}^e^sⁱ^gⁿ^e^d^to^p^r^eserv^e^p^o^{litical acco}^uⁿ^tab^ilit^y^relati^v^e^toⁱ^m^p^o^r^taⁿ^t
^G^o^ve^rⁿ^meⁿ^t^a^s^sⁱ^gⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^s^,^w^e^t^hⁱⁿ^{k i}^t^e^vⁱ^d^eⁿ^t^t^h^a^t^“iⁿ^f^e^rⁱ^o^r^of^fⁱ^cers^”^are^of^fⁱ^cer^s^w^h^os^{e w}^o^rk
ⁱ^s^di^rect^{ed an}^{d su}^pervⁱ^s^{ed at}^s^o^m^e^l^e^v^e^l^b^y^ot^h^e^rs^w^ho^w^e^{re appoi}ⁿ^t^{ed by}^Presⁱ^d^en^tⁱ^a^l¹²
ⁿ^o^mⁱⁿ^a^tioⁿ^wⁱ^t^h^th^{e advice and con}^s^en^{t of}^t^h^{e Se}ⁿ^a^te.
This suggests that, aside from officers in positions that the Constitution specifically identifies,
such as ambassadors and “Judges of the supreme Court,” the Constitution requires only one layer
of advice and consent positions in the hierarchy of each agency. It indicates that appointees with
PAS-appointed supervisors are inferior officers, and that Congress may, therefore, provide for ¹³
appointment by one of the other specified authorities.
In the case of executive branch departments and agencies outside the White House, Congress
usually elects either to use the PAS process or to delegate authority to the agency head. This
enables the Senate to play a role in appointments to the leadership positions where it is most
interested in maintaining influence over programs and policies. In some cases, Senators may
influence nominee selection. They also may obtain commitments to carry out implementation of
laws in certain ways during confirmation hearings, and they are likely to exact promises to testify
before committees for oversight purposes.

The power of Congress to specify qualifications for a particular office is generally understood to
be incident to its constitutional authority to establish the office. Historically, it has established
qualifications many times; Justice Louis Brandeis, in a dissenting opinion in Myers v. United
States, documented the longstanding nature of this practice. He observed that “a multitude of laws
have been enacted which limit the President’s power to make nominations,” and added that
“[s]uch restriction upon the power to nominate has been exercised by Congress continuously ¹⁴
since the foundation of the Government.” Justice Brandeis noted that
^Coⁿ^g^r^e^ss^h^a^s,^f^r^o^m^ti^m^e^to^tⁱ^m^{e, r}^e^strⁱ^cted^th^e^P^r^esid^en^t^’^s^s^e^lectioⁿ^b^y^t^h^{e r}^e^q^u^ir^e^m^eⁿ^{t o}^f
^citizen^sh^ip^{. I}^t^h^a^{s l}ⁱ^m^ited^th^{e p}^o^w^e^r^o^fⁿ^o^mⁱⁿ^a^tioⁿ^b^y^p^r^o^v^idⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{at t}^h^{e o}^f^fⁱ^ce^m^a^y^b^e^h^e^ld
^on^l^y^b^y^{a res}ⁱ^den^t^o^f^t^h^{e Uni}^t^{ed States}^{; of a}^{State; o}^f^{a particu}^l^{ar State; o}^f^{a particu}^l^ar
^dⁱ^strⁱ^{ct; o}^f^{a p}^a^r^tic^u^l^ar^ter^r^ito^r^y^{; o}^f^t^h^{e Dis}^t^rⁱ^{ct o}^f^Co^lu^m^b^{ia; o}^f^{a p}^a^r^ticu^l^ar^f^o^r^e^igⁿ^co^uⁿ^tr^y^.

¹¹^Edmo^nd^v^{. U}ⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^,⁵²^{0 U.S}^.⁶⁵^{1 (}¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^.
¹²^I^b^id^.,^pp.⁶^62-⁶⁶^3.
¹³^A^lthoug^{h t}^h^e^Se^na^te^pla^y^s^aⁿⁱ^m^por^taⁿ^t^a^d^vⁱ^c^e^a^{nd c}^o^ns^eⁿ^{t r}^o^le^f^o^r^m^aⁿ^y^pr^e^s^ideⁿ^tia^{l a}^ppo^intm^eⁿ^ts^{, it is}^note^w^or^thy
^tha^t^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^s^o^f^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^m^a^y^{not be}^a^p^poi^nte^d^by^Mem^b^e^r^s^of^C^ong^r^e^s^s^.
¹⁴^Myers^v.^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^,²⁷^{2 U}^.^S.^52,²⁶^{5 (}¹⁹²⁶⁾⁽^d^is^s^e^ntiⁿ^g^o^pⁱⁿⁱ^oⁿ⁾^.

^{It h}^a^s^li^m^{ited th}^{e po}^w^e^{r of n}^o^mⁱⁿ^a^tion^f^u^rt^h^e^{r b}^y^pres^cribin^g^s^p^eci^fⁱ^{c prof}^es^sⁱ^oⁿ^al
^attainm^eⁿ^t^s^,^o^f^occu^pation^a^l^ex^perien^{ce. It h}^a^s^,ⁱⁿ^oth^e^r^cas^es^{, pres}^{cribed th}^{e tes}^t^of
^ex^a^mⁱⁿ^at^ion^s^{. It}^h^a^sⁱ^m^pos^ed^th^{e requ}^ire^m^eⁿ^{t of ag}^e;^of^s^e^{x; of}^{race; o}^f^property^;^aⁿ^{d of}
^h^a^b^itu^{al te}^m^p^er^an^{ce i}ⁿ^th^{e u}^s^{e o}^fⁱⁿ^to^xⁱ^catin^g^liq^u^o^r^s^{. Co}ⁿ^g^r^es^s^h^a^s^im^p^o^s^e^d^lⁱ^k^e^r^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^s
^oⁿ^t^h^{e p}^o^w^e^r^o^fⁿ^o^mⁱⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^b^y^r^e^q^u^irⁱⁿ^g^p^o^{litical r}^e^p^r^eseⁿ^t^a^tioⁿ^;^o^r^t^h^{at t}^h^e^selectioⁿ^b^e
^m^a^{de on a}ⁿ^oⁿ^p^artⁱ^s^aⁿ^basⁱ^s^.^It^h^a^s^requi^{red i}ⁿ^s^o^m^e^ca^ses^,^t^h^at^t^h^{e repres}^eⁿ^t^a^tⁱ^{on be}
ⁱⁿ^d^u^s^tr^ial;ⁱⁿ^o^t^h^e^r^s^,^t^h^{at it}^b^e^g^e^o^g^r^a^p^h^{ic. I}^t^h^a^s^at^ti^m^e^s^r^e^q^u^ir^ed^th^a^t^t^h^{e P}^r^esid^en^t^’^s
^no^mⁱ^ne^e^s^b^e^t^a^ke^{n fr}^o^m^,^o^rⁱⁿ^c^l^ud^e^r^e^p^r^e^s^eⁿ^t^a^tⁱ^v^e^s^fr^o^m^,^p^a^r^tⁱ^c^ul^a^r^bran^ch^e^s^or^dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^s
^o^f^th^{e Go}^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^{. B}^y^{still o}^t^h^e^r^statu^t^{es, Co}ⁿ^g^r^e^{ss h}^a^{s co}ⁿ^fⁱⁿ^ed^th^{e P}^r^e^sⁱ^d^eⁿ^t^’^s^s^e^l^e^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^o¹⁵
^{a sm}^al^l^num^{ber of}^pers^ons^t^o^{be n}^a^m^e^{d b}^y^ot^h^e^rs^.
When specifying qualifications, Congress has, at times, come close to specifying the individual
who must be appointed. In 1916, for example, Congress enacted a law providing that
^of^t^h^{e v}^acaⁿ^c^ie^s^{created i}ⁿ^t^h^e^J^u^dg^e^A^d^v^o^cate^’^s^Depart^m^eⁿ^t^by^this^act,^on^e^s^u^c^h^v^acaⁿ^c^y^,
ⁿ^o^{t belo}^w^t^h^{e rank}^o^f^Maj^o^{r, s}^h^{all be}^f^{illed b}^y^t^h^{e appoin}^t^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^{a pers}^{on f}^r^o^m^ci^v^{il l}ⁱ^f^e^,
^no^t^l^e^s^s^t^h^aⁿ^fo^r^t^y-^fi^ve^no^r^m^o^r^e^t^h^aⁿ^fⁱ^ft^y^ye^a^r^{s o}^f^a^g^e^,^w^h^o^sha^l^l^ha^ve^b^e^eⁿ^fo^r^t^eⁿ^ye^a^r^{s a}
^J^u^d^g^{e o}^f^th^e^S^u^p^r^e^m^e^Co^u^r^{t o}^f^t^h^{e P}^hⁱ^lip^pⁱⁿ^e^I^s^laⁿ^d^s,^sh^a^ll^h^a^v^e^ser^v^ed^f^o^r^t^w^o^y^ear^{s a}^s^a
^Ca^p^t^aⁱ^{n i}ⁿ^t^h^e^r^e^g^u^l^a^r^o^r^vo^l^unt^e^e^r^a^r^my^,^aⁿ^d^sha^l^l^b^e^p^r^o^fⁱ^cⁱ^e^ntⁱⁿ^t^h^e^Sp^aⁿⁱ^s^{h l}^a^ng^ua^ge^an^d¹⁶
^la^w^s^.
These requirements would likely have limited the President’s potential choices to one or two
people, a limitation on the President’s appointment power that might not withstand judicial
scrutiny. Although Congress enjoys broad discretion in establishing qualifications, its
constitutional power is probably not without limits. In its majority opinion in Myers, the Court
noted that “the legislative power” comprehends the authority “to prescribe qualifications for
office, or reasonable classification for promotion, ... provided of course that these qualifications
do not so limit selection and so trench upon executive choice as to be in effect legislative ¹⁷
designation.”
Although the preponderance of evidence and historical practice supports the understanding that
Congress has broad authority in this area, this view is not universally held. Executive branch
views, as articulated through presidential signing statements and opinions of the Department of
Justice, have ranged from the assertion that Congress has no such authority to an
acknowledgment of some such authority that lacks clear boundaries.
The view that Congress may have authority to establish only limited qualifications was evident in
President George W. Bush’s signing statement for the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act of 2006, discussed in the introduction to this report, as well as other presidential
signing statements. President Bush’s 2006 signing statement for the Postal Accountability and
Enhancement Act, for example, raised similar issues.

¹⁵^Myers^v.^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^,²⁶^5-2⁷⁴^.^Fo^otn^o^te^{s om}^itte^d.
¹⁶^{39 Sta}^t^{. 16}^9.
¹⁷^Myers^v.^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^,¹²^{8 (}^O^pi^nioⁿ^of^the^C^our^t)^.

^T^h^{e ex}^ecu^ti^v^e^bran^ch^s^h^{all cons}^tru^e^s^u^bs^ectioⁿ^s^{202(a) an}^{d 5}^02(a)^of^{title 39, as}^en^{acted by}
^s^u^bs^ectⁱ^oⁿ^s^{501(a) an}^{d 6}^01(a⁾^of^t^h^e^A^c^t^,^w^hⁱ^c^h^pu^rport^t^o^lⁱ^mⁱ^t^t^h^e^q^u^a^lⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^o^f^t^h^e^pool
^of^pers^on^s^f^r^o^m^w^h^o^m^t^h^{e Presi}^d^en^t^m^a^y^s^e^l^ect^appoiⁿ^t^eesⁱⁿ^a^m^aⁿⁿ^{er t}^h^at^ru^l^e^s^ou^t^{a l}^a^r^g^e
^p^o^r^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^o^s^e^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^s^b^e^s^t^q^u^a^lⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^b^y^e^x^p^e^rⁱ^eⁿ^c^e^aⁿ^d^kⁿ^o^w^l^e^d^g^e^t^o^f^ill^th^e^p^o^s^itioⁿ^s^,ⁱⁿ^a¹⁸
^m^aⁿⁿ^{er con}^s^is^teⁿ^t^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^e^A^ppoin^t^m^eⁿ^t^s^C^l^a^u^s^e^of^t^h^{e C}^oⁿ^s^titu^tioⁿ^.
Previous Presidents, in other signing statements, also raised constitutional objections to
qualification provisions. In a 1992 signing statement for legislation establishing the Morris K.
Udall Scholarship and Excellence in National Environmental Policy Foundation, for example,
President George H.W. Bush stated that the bill he was signing into law “purport[ed] to set
qualifications, including requirements as to political party affiliation, for the trustees who will
administer the foundation created by the bill.” In his estimation, under the appointments clause of
the Constitution, “congressional participation in such appointments may be exercised only
through the Senate’s advice and consent with respect to Presidential nominees.” He stated that he ¹⁹
would, therefore, “treat these provisions as precatory.”
A signing statement by President William J. Clinton raised specific, rather than blanket,
objections to a qualifications provision, while agreeing to abide by its requirements:
^[S^]ectⁱ^oⁿ^{21(b) of}^t^h^e^A^c^t^w^o^u^l^d^f^o^rbi^d^t^h^{e appoi}ⁿ^t^m^e^nt^as^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^e^s^T^r^ad^e
^R^e^pres^en^tatⁱ^v^e^{or Depu}^t^y^Uⁿ^{ited States}^T^r^ade^R^e^pres^en^tatⁱ^v^e^{, of}^any^oⁿ^e^w^h^{o h}^a^{d ev}^er
^‘‘^directl^y^represen^{ted, aided, o}^r^advⁱ^{sed a f}^o^reigⁿ^[g^ov^ernm^eⁿ^{t or political pa}^rty^]^{... in}^any
^tr^ad^{e n}^e^g^o^tiatioⁿ^,^o^r^tr^ad^e^dⁱ^sp^u^t^e^wⁱ^t^h^th^{e U}ⁿ^{ited States}^.^’^’^Th^e^C^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^m^a^yⁿ^o^t^,^o^f^c^o^u^r^s^e^,
ⁱ^m^p^o^s^{e b}^r^o^a^d^r^e^strⁱ^ctioⁿ^s^oⁿ^th^{e P}^r^esid^en^t’^s^coⁿ^s^t^itu^tioⁿ^a^{l p}^r^e^r^o^g^ativ^{e to}ⁿ^o^mⁱⁿ^a^{te p}^e^r^s^oⁿ^s
^o^f^hⁱ^{s c}^h^o^o^sⁱⁿ^g^to^th^{e h}ⁱ^g^h^{est e}^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^e^b^r^an^c^h^p^o^s^itioⁿ^s^{, an}^d^th^{is i}^s^esp^eciall^y^soⁱⁿ^th^{e ar}^e^a
^of^f^o^reign^relatioⁿ^s^{. Ho}^w^e^v^e^r,^becau^s^e^as^a^polic^y^m^a^{tter I a}^g^ree^wⁱ^t^h^th^e^g^o^al^{of ens}^u^ri^ng
^th^{e u}ⁿ^dⁱ^vⁱ^d^e^d^lo^y^a^lt^y^o^f^o^u^r^r^e^p^r^esen^tati^v^e^{s i}ⁿ^tr^ad^{e n}^e^g^o^tia^tioⁿ^s^{, I}ⁱⁿ^teⁿ^d^{, as a}^m^a^tter^o^f²⁰
^{practice, to act in}^accordan^ce^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^is^provⁱ^s^ion^.
Historically, opinions of Attorneys General recognized a constitutional authority for Congress to
set qualifications. In 1871, for example, Attorney General Amos T. Akerman offered the
following opinion:
^T^h^{e arg}^u^m^eⁿ^t^h^a^s^been^m^a^de^th^at^t^h^e^uⁿ^q^u^e^s^tioⁿ^e^{d righ}^t^of^C^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^{to create off}ⁱ^ce^s
ⁱ^m^p^{lies a r}ⁱ^g^h^{t to}^p^r^escr^ib^{e q}^u^ali^f^icatioⁿ^s^f^o^r^th^e^m^{. T}^h^{is i}^s^ad^m^itted^.^B^u^{t th}^{is r}ⁱ^g^h^{t to}
^p^r^e^s^c^rⁱ^b^e^q^u^a^lⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^sⁱ^s^lⁱ^mⁱ^t^e^d^b^y^t^h^eⁿ^e^c^e^s^sⁱ^t^y^o^f^l^e^a^vⁱⁿ^g^s^c^o^p^e^f^o^r^th^e^j^u^d^g^m^eⁿ^t^an^d^w^ill
^of^t^h^{e pers}^on^{or bo}^dyⁱⁿ^w^h^o^m^t^h^{e C}^ons^tⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^v^e^s^t^s^t^h^{e po}^w^e^{r of}^app^oⁱⁿ^t^m^eⁿ^t^.^T^h^e^p^a^r^t^s^o^f
^th^{e Co}ⁿ^s^ti^tu^tioⁿ^w^h^ich^coⁿ^f^er^th^{is p}^o^w^e^r^ar^{e as v}^a^lid^{as t}^h^o^s^{e p}^a^r^t^{s f}^r^o^m^w^h^ich^Coⁿ^g^r^e^ss
^deriv^e^s^th^{e po}^w^e^{r to create of}^fⁱ^ces^{, an}^{d on}^{e part s}^h^ou^{ld n}^o^{t be s}^acrif^{iced to th}^{e oth}^e^{r. A}ⁿ

¹⁸^U.^S^.^P^r^esi^d^en^t^(G^.^W^.^Bu^sh^),^“S^t^a^t^e^men^t^oⁿ^Sⁱ^gnⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^e^P^o^st^al^A^c^c^o^uⁿ^t^a^bⁱ^lⁱ^t^y^an^d^Eⁿ^h^aⁿ^cemen^t^A^c^t^,^”^Weekl^y
^Compil^atio^{n of}^Pre^s^ideⁿ^tial^Doc^u^me^nts^,^vo^l^.⁴²^,^Dece^m^b^er²⁰^,²⁰⁰⁶^,^p.²¹⁹⁶^.
¹⁹^U^.^S.^P^r^e^sⁱ^d^eⁿ^{t (G}^.H^.W^{. Bus}^h^{), “}^S^ta^te^m^e^{nt on}^Sigⁿⁱⁿ^g^the^M^o^rris^{K. Uda}^{ll Sc}^h^o^la^rshi^{p a}ⁿ^{d Ex}^c^e^lle^nc^e^{in Na}^tio^na^l
^Envⁱ^ronm^eⁿ^ta^{l a}^{nd Na}^tiv^e^Am^e^rⁱ^c^aⁿ^Pub^lic^Polic^y^A^c^t,”^W^eekl^{y C}^o^mpⁱ^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^P^r^esi^d^entⁱ^a^l^Do^cu^m^eⁿ^t^s^{, v}^o^l.²⁸^,
^Ma^r^c^{h 19}^{, 1}⁹⁹²^,^p.⁵⁰^7.^Se^na^te^Ma^jor^ity^L^e^a^d^e^r^G^e^or^g^e^J^.^Mitc^h^e^{ll la}^te^r^r^e^butte^d,^{on t}^h^e^Se^na^te^f^l^oor^,^the^sⁱ^gⁿⁱⁿ^g
^sta^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t’s re}^a^s^oning^(Seⁿ^{. G}^e^org^e^{J. Mitc}^he^{ll, “}^T^he^Uda^{ll F}^o^uⁿ^d^a^{tion A}^c^t,”^re^m^a^rk^{s in the}^Se^na^te^,^Co^ng^ressioⁿ^a^l
^R^eco^rd^{, v}^o^l.¹^38,^A^p^r^{il 9,}¹⁹⁹²^{, p}^p^{. 8}⁶⁸⁹^-⁸⁶⁹¹⁾^.
²⁰^U^.^S.^P^r^e^sⁱ^d^eⁿ^{t (}^C^lⁱ^nt^on)^,^“^S^ta^te^m^e^{nt o}ⁿ^Sigⁿⁱⁿ^g^the^L^o^b^b^yⁱ^ng^Dⁱ^s^c^los^u^r^e^A^c^{t of}¹⁹⁹^5,”^Weekl^{y Co}^mpⁱ^l^a^tⁱ^on^of
^P^r^esi^d^en^tⁱ^a^l^Do^cu^men^t^s^,^v^o^l.³¹^,^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^{19, 1}⁹⁹⁵^,^pp.²²⁰⁵^-²²^{06. A}^s^no^te^{d la}^te^rⁱⁿ^t^h^is^r^e^p^o^r^t^{, C}^ong^r^e^s^s^w^aⁱ^v^e^d^the
^r^e^quir^e^m^e^{nt in q}^u^e^s^tio^{n f}^o^r^C^lin^t^on’^s^a^p^poi^ntm^e^{nt of}^C^h^a^r^le^ne^B^a^r^s^he^v^s^ky^{to the}^pos^iti^on^.

^o^f^fⁱ^{ce ca}ⁿⁿ^o^t^b^e^created^ex^ce^p^t^uⁿ^d^{er t}^h^{e co}ⁿ^d^itioⁿ^t^h^{at it}^s^h^{all b}^e^f^illed^acco^rdⁱⁿ^g^to^th^e
^con^s^tⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^ru^l^e^{.... T}^h^ou^gh^t^h^{e appoi}ⁿ^tⁱⁿ^g^po^w^e^{r al}^on^{e ca}^{n des}ⁱ^gn^at^{e an i}ⁿ^di^vⁱ^du^al^f^o^{r an}
^of^fⁱ^{ce, ei}^th^er^C^ong^res^s^,^b^y^{direct leg}ⁱ^s^l^ation^,^{or t}^h^{e P}^r^es^iden^{t, b}^y^a^u^t^h^orit^y^deriv^e^d^f^r^o^m
^C^ong^res^s^,^can^pres^cribe^qu^alifi^cation^s^,^an^d^requ^ire^t^h^a^t^th^e^d^e^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^h^a^l^l^b^e^m^a^d^e^o^u^t^o^f^a
^c^l^a^s^s^o^f^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^s^a^s^c^e^r^t^aⁱⁿ^e^d^b^y^p^r^o^p^e^{r t}^e^s^t^s^t^o^ha^ve^t^h^o^s^e^q^u^a^lⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^;^...^It^h^a^s^been^arg^u^e^d
^th^{at a r}ⁱ^g^h^{t i}ⁿ^Coⁿ^g^r^e^{ss to}^lⁱ^mⁱ^tⁱⁿ^t^h^{e lea}^s^{t t}^h^e^fⁱ^eld^o^f^selecti^oⁿ^,ⁱ^m^p^lie^{s a r}ⁱ^g^h^t^to^car^r^y^oⁿ
^th^{e co}ⁿ^t^r^actiⁿ^g^p^r^o^{cess to}^th^{e d}^e^sigⁿ^atioⁿ^o^f^{a p}^a^r^ticu^l^arⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vⁱ^d^u^{al. B}^u^{t I}^d^oⁿ^o^{t th}ⁱⁿ^k^th^{is a}
^f^a^ir^coⁿ^c^l^u^sioⁿ^{. Co}ⁿ^g^r^e^{ss co}^u^l^d^r^e^q^u^ir^{e th}^{at o}^f^fⁱ^cer^s^sh^al^{l b}^e^o^f^Am^er^icaⁿ^citizeⁿ^s^h^ip^o^r^o^f^a
^cert^aⁱⁿ^ag^{e, t}^h^at^j^u^dg^e^s^sh^ou^l^d^be^of^t^h^{e l}^e^g^a^l^prof^essⁱ^on^aⁿ^{d of}^{a cert}^aⁱⁿ^s^t^an^di^ngⁱⁿ^t^h^e
^prof^es^sⁱ^on^{, an}^{d s}^tⁱ^l^l^l^eav^{e room}^t^o^t^h^{e appoi}ⁿ^tⁱⁿ^g^po^w^e^{r f}^o^{r t}^h^{e ex}^erci^s^e^ofⁱ^t^s^o^wⁿ^j^u^d^g^m^en^t
^an^d^w^{ill; a}ⁿ^d^I^a^mⁿ^o^{t p}^r^ep^ar^ed^to^af^fⁱ^r^m^th^{at to}^g^o^f^u^r^t^h^e^r^,^an^d^r^e^q^u^ir^{e th}^{at t}^h^{e select}^ioⁿ
^s^h^al^l^be^m^a^{de f}^r^o^m^pers^ons^f^o^uⁿ^d^b^y^aⁿ^e^x^a^mⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^b^o^a^r^d^to^b^e^q^u^alif^iedⁱⁿ^s^u^ch^p^a^r^ticu^l^ar^s
^as^dilig^eⁿ^{ce, s}^c^h^o^lars^hⁱ^{p, in}^te^grit^y^,^g^{ood m}^aⁿⁿ^ers^,^aⁿ^d^a^t^t^a^c^h^m^eⁿ^t^t^o^t^h^e^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^,^w^o^u^l^d
ⁱ^m^pos^{e a}ⁿ^un^cons^tit^u^tioⁿ^a^{l li}^m^itatioⁿ^{on th}^e^appoin^ting^p^o^w^{er. It}^w^o^u^l^d^s^till^h^a^v^e^a
^reas^on^{able s}^c^{ope f}^o^{r it}^s^o^wⁿ^j^udgm^eⁿ^{t a}ⁿ^d^w^{ill. B}^u^{t it}^m^a^y^be^as^k^e^{d, at}^w^h^at^poin^t^m^u^s^t^t^h^e
^coⁿ^t^r^actin^g^p^r^o^{cess sto}^p^?^I^coⁿ^f^e^ss^m^yⁱⁿ^ab^ilit^y^to^an^s^w^er^{. B}^u^{t th}^{e d}ⁱ^f^f^ic^u^l^t^y^o^f^d^r^a^wⁱⁿ^g^a
^lin^{e bet}^w^eeⁿ^s^u^ch^li^m^itations^as^{are, an}^{d s}^u^c^h^as^areⁿ^o^{t, allow}^e^{d b}^y^t^h^e^C^oⁿ^s^t^itution^,ⁱ^sⁿ^o²¹
^proof^t^h^at^bot^h^cl^as^s^e^s^{do n}^o^t^exⁱ^s^t^.
A 1979 opinion of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) was seemingly
consistent with the earlier view, stating that
^C^ong^res^s^h^a^s^po^w^e^{r t}^o^pres^crⁱ^b^{e qu}^alⁱ^fⁱ^catⁱ^ons^f^o^{r off}ⁱ^ce;^b^u^t^t^h^e^po^w^e^{r o}^f^appoiⁿ^t^m^eⁿ^t
^belon^g^s^{to th}^{e P}^r^es^iden^{t, an}^{d i}^t^canⁿ^o^{t be u}^s^u^r^{ped or ab}^ridg^{ed by}^C^ong^res^s^{.... T}^h^{ere is}ⁿ^o
^settled^coⁿ^s^ti^tu^tⁱ^oⁿ^{al r}^u^{le th}^at^d^e^ter^mⁱⁿ^e^s^h^o^w^t^h^{ese t}^w^o^p^o^w^e^r^s^—th^e^p^o^w^e^r^o^f^Coⁿ^g^r^es^{s to}
^pres^{cribe qu}^alif^icat^ion^s^an^{d t}^h^{e po}^w^e^{r of th}^e^P^r^esid^en^{t to}^ap^p^oⁱⁿ^t—ar^{e to}^b^e^r^ecoⁿ^c^iled^,^b^u^t
^{it s}^e^e^m^s^{clear t}^h^{at t}^h^ere^m^u^s^t^b^e^s^o^m^e^coⁿ^s^t^itution^a^ll^y^pres^cri^b^{ed balan}^{ce. T}^h^{e balan}^ce^m^a^y
^s^hⁱ^f^t^depen^dⁱⁿ^g^on^t^h^{e n}^a^t^u^{re of}^t^h^{e off}ⁱ^{ce i}ⁿ^qu^e^s^tⁱ^oⁿ^.^F^o^{r exa}^m^pl^{e, C}^ong^res^s^h^a^s^requⁱ^r^ed
^t^h^at^t^h^{e Pres}ⁱ^d^en^t^appoiⁿ^t^m^e^m^b^ers^o^f^bot^h^partⁱ^e^s^t^o^cert^aⁱⁿ^kⁱⁿ^d^s^of^boards^and
^co^m^mⁱ^ssioⁿ^s;^th^er^{e i}^s^serⁱ^o^u^s^q^u^estioⁿ^w^h^e^t^h^e^r^Coⁿ^g^r^e^{ss co}^u^l^d^coⁿ^s^titu^tioⁿ^a^ll^y^r^e^q^u^ir^{e t}^h^e²²
^P^r^esid^en^{t to}^f^o^llo^w^t^h^{e sa}^m^e^p^r^actice^wⁱ^t^h^r^e^sp^{ect to}^hⁱ^{s Cab}ⁱⁿ^e^t.
In 1989, however, the Department of Justice articulated a different point of view. The Office of
Legal Counsel issued a memorandum entitled “Common Legislative Encroachments on
Executive Branch Constitutional Authority,” which stated, in part, the following:
^C^ong^res^s^{... i}^m^pos^esⁱ^m^per^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^{ble qu}^ali^f^icatioⁿ^s^requ^ire^m^en^ts^on^prin^{cipal off}ⁱ^cer^s^.^For
ⁱⁿ^staⁿ^{ce, Co}ⁿ^g^r^es^s^w^{ill r}^e^q^u^ir^{e th}^{at a f}ⁱ^x^e^dⁿ^u^m^b^e^r^o^f^m^e^m^b^er^{s o}^f^cer^tain^co^m^mⁱ^ssioⁿ^{s b}^e
^fr^o^m^a^p^a^r^tic^ula^r^p^o^litic^a^l^p^a^r^t^y.^T^h^e^s^e^r^e^q^u^ir^e^m^eⁿ^ts^...^vⁱ^ol^a^t^e^t^h^e^A^ppoiⁿ^t^m^eⁿ^t^s^C^l^a^u^s^e^.^T^h^e
^on^l^y^cong^ress^ion^a^{l c}^h^eck^t^h^at^th^{e C}^oⁿ^s^tit^u^tioⁿ^places^on^t^h^{e P}^r^es^iden^t’^s^po^w^e^{r to appoin}^t²³
^“^p^rin^c^{ipal off}ⁱ^cer^s^”^is^t^h^{e adv}ⁱ^{ce an}^{d con}^s^{ent of}^th^e^Sen^a^te.
In 1996, the Department of Justice, citing Myers v. United States, the 1871 opinion of the
Attorney General, and the 1979 OLC opinion, acknowledged that Congress has the constitutional
authority to set certain qualifications. Nonetheless, it asserted that the requirements for the U.S.
Trade Representative overstepped this authority because of the foreign policy responsibilities of
the position and the position’s close proximity to the President:

²¹^{13 O}^p^{. A}^.^G^.^516,⁵^20-⁵²^1,⁵²^4-⁵^{25 (}¹⁸⁷¹⁾^.
²²³^Op.^O.^L.^C^.³⁸^8,³⁸^{9 (}¹⁹⁷⁹⁾^.
²³^{13 O}^p^{. O}^.^L^.^C^.²⁴^8,²⁵^{0 (}¹⁹⁸⁹⁾^.⁽^T^his^m^e^m^o^r^a^ndum^w^a^s^s^upe^r^c^e^d^{ed by}^a¹⁹⁹^{6 O}^L^C^m^e^m^o^r^a^ndum^,^w^h^ic^{h did}^no^t
^a^ddr^e^s^s^the^is^s^u^e^of^qua^lif^ic^a^tions⁽²⁰^O^p^{. O}^.^L^.^C^.¹²⁰⁾^.)

^Wh^atev^{er t}^h^{e pos}^sⁱ^{ble role of}^C^ong^res^sⁱⁿ^s^e^tt^ing^reas^on^able^qu^alif^icat^ion^s^f^o^{r of}^{fice, ... a}
^res^t^ri^ctⁱ^oⁿ^rulⁱⁿ^g^o^u^t^{a l}^a^rg^e^portⁱ^oⁿ^of^t^h^os^{e pers}^oⁿ^s^bes^t^qu^alⁱ^fⁱ^e^{d b}^y^e^x^peri^en^{ce a}ⁿ^d
^kⁿ^o^w^l^ed^g^e^to^f^{ill a}^p^a^r^ticu^l^ar^o^f^fⁱ^ceⁱⁿ^v^a^d^e^{s t}^h^{e co}ⁿ^s^ti^tu^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^{l p}^o^w^e^r^o^f^th^e^P^r^esid^en^{t a}ⁿ^d
^Sen^a^{te to}ⁱⁿ^{stall t}^h^{e p}^rⁱⁿ^cip^a^{l o}^f^fⁱ^cer^{s o}^f^t^h^{e Un}^ited^States.^An^y^p^o^w^e^rⁱⁿ^t^h^{e Co}ⁿ^g^r^e^{ss to}^set
^q^u^alificatioⁿ^s^“ⁱ^s^li^m^ited^b^y^th^{e n}^eces^sit^y^o^f^leavⁱⁿ^g^sco^p^e^f^o^{r th}^{e j}^u^d^g^m^eⁿ^{t a}ⁿ^d^w^{ill o}^f^t^h^e
^pers^on^{or b}^odyⁱⁿ^w^h^o^m^t^h^e^C^oⁿ^s^titution^v^e^s^t^s^th^{e po}^w^e^r^of^appoin^t^m^eⁿ^t^{.” [Ak}^e^r^m^aⁿ^]
^Coⁿ^g^r^e^ss^m^a^yⁿ^o^{t d}ⁱ^{ctate q}^u^alif^icatioⁿ^s^“^uⁿ^a^ttaiⁿ^ab^{le b}^y^{a su}^f^f^icⁱ^eⁿ^tⁿ^u^m^b^e^r^t^o^a^f^f^o^r^d^a^m^p^l^e
^r^o^o^m^f^o^r^ch^oⁱ^{ce.” [}^A^k^e^r^m^an^]^Ev^enⁱ^f^“^t^h^e^r^e^isⁿ^o^settled^coⁿ^s^tit^u^tioⁿ^a^{l r}^u^{le th}^{at d}^e^ter^mⁱⁿ^e^s
^h^o^w^{... th}^{e po}^w^e^{r of}^th^e^C^ong^r^e^s^s^{to pres}^{cribe qu}^alif^icatioⁿ^s^an^{d th}^{e po}^w^e^{r of}^t^h^{e P}^r^es^iden^t
^{to app}^oⁱⁿ^{t ... are t}^o^be^recon^c^{iled,” w}^e^h^a^v^e^opiⁿ^e^{d th}^at^“^t^h^e^{re m}^u^s^t^{be s}^o^m^e^con^s^t^itutioⁿ^a^l^l^y
^pres^{cribed balan}^{ce” an}^{d th}^at^this^“^b^alan^ce^m^a^y^s^hⁱ^f^{t depen}^dⁱⁿ^g^on^t^h^eⁿ^a^t^u^{re of}^t^h^{e o}^f^fⁱ^ceⁱⁿ
^qu^es^tion^.^{” [1979 OL}^{C opin}ⁱ^oⁿ^{] Here, th}^{e restric}^tionⁱ^s^parti^c^u^l^arl^y^e^g^re^gⁱ^ou^{s becau}^s^e^t^h^e
^o^f^fⁱ^{ce i}ⁿ^q^u^e^s^tioⁿⁱⁿ^v^o^l^v^{es r}^e^p^r^esen^tatioⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e U}ⁿ^ited^State^s^to^f^o^r^e^igⁿ^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^s^—^aⁿ
^{area con}^s^titu^tⁱ^on^all^y^co^mm^itte^{d to th}^{e Presiden}^{t.... Fu}^rth^e^r^m^{ore, th}^{e position}ⁱⁿ^qu^estionⁱ^s
^es^peciall^y^clos^{e to th}^{e P}^r^es^iden^{t. T}^h^{e Of}^fⁱ^{ce of}^Uⁿ^{ited St}^ates^T^r^a^d^{e R}^e^pres^en^tativ^{e is}
^“^e^s^t^ablis^h^e^d^wⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^th^{e Ex}^ec^u^t^iv^{e Off}ⁱ^{ce of}^th^{e P}^r^es^iden^{t.” ... C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^s^h^a^s^als^o^ex^pres^s^e^d
^[in^s^t^at^u^t^{e] its}^s^eⁿ^s^{e th}^a^t^th^{e U}ⁿ^{ited States}^T^r^ade^R^e^pres^en^tative^“^b^e^t^h^e^s^eⁿⁱ^o^r^r^e^p^r^e^s^eⁿ^t^a^tⁱ^v^e
^on^any^bod^y^th^{at t}^h^{e P}^r^es^iden^t^m^a^y^es^tabli^s^h^f^o^{r th}^{e pu}^rpos^{e of}^prov^idin^g^{to th}^{e P}^r^es^iden^t
^advⁱ^{ce on ov}^{erall eco}ⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^policiesⁱⁿ^w^h^ic^hⁱⁿ^terⁿ^ation^a^l^t^r^ade^m^a^tters^predomⁱⁿ^{ate.” ...}
^W^e^b^e^liev^e^th^at,^w^h^er^{e an}^o^f^fⁱ^{ce th}^u^s^en^tail^{s b}^r^o^a^d^r^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ilit^y^f^o^r^ad^vⁱ^siⁿ^g^t^h^{e P}^r^esid^en^t²⁴
^an^{d f}^o^r^m^a^kⁱ^ng^polic^y^,^t^h^{e P}^r^es^iden^t^m^u^s^t^h^a^v^e^e^x^pan^s^iv^{e a}^u^th^orit^y^{to ch}^oos^e^hⁱ^s^aides^.
Although executive branch views, as expressed in these signing statements and opinions from the
Department of Justice, are seemingly inconclusive about the precise range of Congress’s
constitutional authority in this area, they clearly do not endorse the view that this authority is
broad.

Congress has established hundreds of executive branch positions in statute, but only a relatively
small portion of the provisions creating these positions specify minimum qualifications that must
be met by appointees. Table A-1, in the Appendix to this report, provides examples of
department and agency leadership positions with statutory qualification requirements. For each
example, the table identifies the position, its compensation level, the text of the qualification
provision, the location of the provision in the U.S. Code, and the type of provision. Table A-2,
also located in the Appendix, provides similar examples for independent collegial bodies, such as
regulatory boards and commissions.
As suggested by Justice Brandeis’s previously mentioned dissenting opinion in the Myers case,
Congress has developed a number of different kinds of qualifications for executive branch
leadership positions. These include the following:
• requirements of political party balance on collegial bodies;
• restrictions on the basis of active duty or retired military status;
• restrictions on the basis of concurrent federal government employment;
• restrictions on the basis of criminal record;

²⁴^{20 O}^p^{. O}^.^L^.^C^.²⁷^9,²⁸^0-²⁸¹⁽¹⁹⁹⁶⁾^.

• restrictions on the basis of prior employment;
• requirements of specified expertise, knowledge, or education;
• requirements that the individual be an authority in a specified field related to the
position;
• requirements of demonstrated ability, or experience related to the position;
• requirements of fitness between the individual and the office;
• requirements of specified character trait (e.g., integrity);
• requirements of U.S. citizenship;
• requirements that the individual be selected without regard to political affiliation;
and
• requirement of specified affiliations (e.g., membership in the Public Health
Service for the Surgeon General).
For some positions, the qualifications are specific. The director of the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight, for example, is to be appointed “from among individuals who are citizens
of the United States, have a demonstrated understanding of financial management or oversight,
and have a demonstrated understanding of mortgage security markets and housing finance.” The
law further provides a very specific disqualifying provision: “An individual may not be appointed
as Director if the individual has served as an executive officer or director of an enterprise at any
time during the 3-year period ending upon the nomination of such individual for appointment as ²⁵
Director.” Similarly, the position of controller at the Office of Federal Financial Management in
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) must be filled “from among individuals who
possess—(1) demonstrated ability and practical experience in accounting, financial management,
and financial systems; and (2) extensive practical experience in financial management in large ²⁶
governmental or business entities.” These provisions seemingly provide objective criteria, such
as demonstrated understanding of specific topics and ability and experience in certain fields, that
must be used in the selection, by the President, and consideration, by the Senate, of nominees to
these two positions.
For other positions, qualification requirements are more general. The position of director of
operational test and evaluation at the Department of Defense, for example, is to be filled “without
regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of fitness to perform the duties of the office ²⁷
of Director.” Similarly, appointments to the position of archivist of the United States are to be
made “without regard to political affiliations and solely on the basis of the professional ²⁸
qualifications required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the office of Archivist.”
These provisions supply guidance to the President, in his selection, and to the Senate, in its
consideration of a nominee. Compared with the language of more specific requirements, the
phrases used in these provisions—regard for political affiliation, fitness to perform the duties, and
professional qualifications required to perform the duties and responsibilities—would arguably be
subject to a greater variety of subjective interpretations.

²⁵^{12 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁴⁵¹²⁽^a⁾^.
²⁶^{31 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁵⁰⁴⁽^b)^.
²⁷^{10 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹³⁹⁽^a⁾⁽¹⁾^.
²⁸^{44 U}^.^S.C^.^§²¹⁰³⁽^a⁾^.

In some cases, Congress has established requirements that appointees be drawn from particular
parts of the population. For example, at least seven of the 25 members of the Architectural and ²⁹
Transportation Barriers Compliance Board must be individuals with disabilities. In other cases,
Congress has specified that special experience or sensitivity to a population is required. In
selecting appointees for the Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely
Disabled, the President is to select several non-governmental appointees, one of whom is
“conversant with the problems incident to the employment of the blind,” another of whom is
“conversant with the problems incident to the employment of other severely handicapped
individuals,” a third of whom “represent[s] blind individuals employed in qualified nonprofit
agencies for the blind,” and a fourth of whom “represent[s] severely handicapped individuals
(other than blind individuals) employed in qualified nonprofit agencies for other severely ³⁰
handicapped individuals.” Although many individuals would meet these qualifications, the
requirements significantly reduce the size of the pool of individuals from which the President can
select.
In some cases, Congress has applied a qualification to a broad category of positions for specific
policy reasons. For example, many defense-related leadership positions are required to be filled
by civilians, which reinforces the tradition of civilian supremacy in the United States ³¹
government. Only a civilian may be appointed as Secretary of Defense. In addition, an
individual “may not be appointed [to the position] within 10 years after relief from active duty as ³²
a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force.” Military service restrictions
of one kind or another apply to many other leaders of the Department of Defense, as well, ³³³⁴³⁵
including the Deputy Secretary, Under Secretaries, and Assistant Secretaries. Other executive
branch leadership positions with military service restrictions include the Director and Principal ³⁶
Deputy Director of National Intelligence, the Administrator and Deputy Administrator of the ³⁷
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Administrator and Deputy Administrator of the ³⁸
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
Congress has sometimes modified qualifications it had established earlier. For example, an
appointee to the position of Under Secretary for Health at the Department of Veterans Affairs was
formerly required to be
^{a docto}^{r of}^m^e^diciⁿ^e^{... app}^oⁱⁿ^t^ed^w^ith^o^u^{t re}^g^a^{rd to politi}^{cal af}^fⁱ^liation^{or activ}^it^y^aⁿ^d
^so^lel^y^—(^A⁾^oⁿ^t^h^{e b}^a^{sis o}^f^d^e^m^oⁿ^s^tr^ated^ab^ilit^yⁱⁿ^th^e^m^e^dⁱ^{cal p}^r^o^f^essioⁿ^{, i}ⁿ^h^ealt^h^-^car^e

²⁹^{29 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁷⁹²⁽^a⁾⁽¹⁾⁽^A⁾^.
³⁰^{41 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁴⁶⁽^a⁾⁽²⁾^.
³¹^For^m^o^r^e^on^the^his^t^or^y^of^this^d^e^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t, s}^e^e^Sa^m^u^e^l^P^.^H^u^ntiⁿ^g^t^on,^T^h^e^S^o^l^dⁱ^e^{r an}^{d t}^h^e^S^t^at^e:^T^h^{e T}^h^eo^{ry a}ⁿ^d
^Politic^s^{of Civ}^il-M^ilit^ary^Re^lati^on^s⁽^C^am^br^idg^e^{, MA}^{: H}^a^r^v^a^r^{d U}ⁿ^ive^r^sⁱ^t^y^{, 195}⁷⁾^.
³²^{10 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹¹³⁽^a⁾^.
³³^{10 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹³²⁽^a⁾^.
³⁴¹⁰^U^.^S^.^C^.^§§¹³^3,¹³^4,¹³^5,¹³^{6, an}^d¹³⁷^.
³⁵^{10 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹³^8.
³⁶^{50 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁴⁰^3-^3a^.
³⁷^{49 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁰^6.
³⁸^{42 U}^.^S.C^.^§²⁴⁷²^.

^a^d^miⁿⁱ^st^r^a^tⁱ^o^{n a}ⁿ^d^p^o^lⁱ^c^y^fo^r^m^ul^a^tⁱ^o^n,^aⁿ^dⁱⁿ^he^a^l^t^h^-c^a^r^e^fi^sc^a^l^m^a^na^ge^meⁿ^t^;^aⁿ^d^(B)^on^t^h^e
^basⁱ^s^of^su^bs^t^a^ntⁱ^a^l^e^x^peri^en^c^eⁱⁿ^conn^ectⁱ^oⁿ^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e progra}^m^s^o^f^t^h^{e V}^e^t^e^rans^H^eal^t^h
^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ratⁱ^oⁿ^{or prog}^ram^s^o^f^sⁱ^mⁱ^l^a^{r con}^t^en^t^aⁿ^{d s}^c^ope.
This provision was amended by the Veterans Health Programs Improvement Act of 2004.³⁹ Under
the qualifications specified in the revised section, the appointee is no longer required to be a
doctor of medicine, and must have “demonstrated ability in the medical profession, in health-care
administration and policy formulation, or in health-care fiscal management,” rather than all three ⁴⁰
areas. This amendment emerged from the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs with the
following explanation:
^C^u^{rrent la}^w^requ^ire^s^th^{e Un}^der^Secretary^f^o^{r Hea}^lth^to^b^e^{a “}^d^o^c^to^r^o^f^m^e^dⁱ^cin^e^{,” r}^e^strⁱ^c^tⁱⁿ^g
^t^h^{e pool}^{of can}^di^dat^e^{s t}^h^at^m^a^y^{be cons}ⁱ^d^{ered b}^y^t^h^e^Presⁱ^d^en^t^f^o^rⁿ^o^mⁱⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^t^h^e
^p^o^s^itioⁿ^.^Senⁱ^o^r^ex^ec^u^tⁱ^v^{es in}^t^h^{e h}^ealt^h^car^{e in}^d^u^s^t^r^y^w^h^o^m^a^y^h^a^v^e^ex^cep^ti^oⁿ^a^l^c^r^e^d^eⁿ^tⁱ^a^ls
^an^{d ex}^peri^en^{ce, bu}^t^w^{ho are not}^doct^o^rs^of^m^e^diciⁿ^e^{, are ex}^clu^d^{ed f}^r^o^m^cons^ideration^.
^T^h^{e Co}^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee b}^ill^w^o^u^l^d^r^e^p^{eal th}^{e r}^e^q^u^ir^e^m^eⁿ^{t f}^o^r^V^A^’^s^Uⁿ^d^e^r^Secr^etar^y^f^o^r^Hea^l^t^h^t^o^b^e
^a^m^e^dⁱ^{cal d}^o^c^to^r^an^d^allo^w^th^{e Secr}^etar^y^f^l^e^x^ib^ilit^y^toⁿ^o^mⁱⁿ^a^{te ca}ⁿ^d^id^ates^wⁱ^t^h⁴¹
^d^e^m^oⁿ^s^tr^ated^ab^ilitie^{s to}^f^{ill t}^h^{is k}^e^y^p^o^s^itioⁿ^f^r^o^m^t^h^e^wⁱ^d^e^s^t^sp^ectr^u^m^o^f^taleⁿ^t^s.
Qualification provisions are created by law; they may also be waived by law, and Congress has
occasionally done so on a case-by-case basis. Congress passed legislation waiving civilian status
requirements for the appointments of General George C. Marshall as Secretary of Defense ⁴²
(1950), retired Admiral James B. Busey and retired General Thomas C. Richards to FAA ⁴³
Administrator (1989 and 1992), and Rear Admiral Richard H. Truly as NASA Administrator ⁴⁴
(1989). In 2002, the civilian status limitation on the NASA Deputy Administrator was waived
for the candidate of the President’s choosing for the duration of that fiscal year, rather than for a ⁴⁵
particular individual. The President nominated an active duty Marine Corps officer to the
position, then withdrew the nomination in the face of opposition, among key Senators, to setting ⁴⁶
such a precedent. He subsequently nominated a civilian, who was confirmed.
In addition to these cases involving military officers, Congress has waived qualifications in other
instances. In 1997, for example, Congress waived a conflict of interest restriction for the U.S.
trade representative. The section provides that

³⁹^P^.^L.¹⁰⁸^-⁴²^2;¹¹^{8 S}^t^at^.²³⁷⁹^.
⁴⁰^{38 U}^.^S.C^.^§³⁰⁵⁽^a⁾^{. Em}^pha^sⁱ^s^a^d^de^d.
⁴¹^{U.S. C}^ong^re^{ss, House}^Com^m^itte^e^on^V^e^te^ra^{ns’ A}^f^f^a^irs,^De^partmeⁿ^{t o}^f^Ve^te^rans^Affa^{irs Nu}^{rse Recru}^itmen^t^aⁿ^d
^Re^te^ntioⁿ^Ac^{t of 20}⁰⁴^,^rep^o^r^t^t^o^acco^m^p^an^y^H.^R.⁴²³¹^,¹⁰⁸^th^Cong^{., 2}^nd^s^e^s^s^{., H}^.^R^e^pt.¹⁰^8-⁵³⁸⁽^W^a^s^hing^to^{n: G}^P^O^,
²⁰⁰⁴⁾^,^p.¹⁰^.
⁴²^P^.^L^.^81-⁷⁸^8,⁶⁴^Sta^t^.⁸^53.
⁴³^P^.^L^.¹⁰^1-⁴⁷^,¹⁰^{3 S}^t^a^t^.¹³^{4; a}ⁿ^d^P.L^.^102-³⁰^8,¹⁰^{6 S}^t^a^t^{. 2}⁷³^.
⁴⁴^P^.^L^.¹⁰^1-⁴⁸^{, 10}³^S^t^a^t^{. 13}^6.
⁴⁵^P^.^L^.¹⁰^7-¹¹⁷^,^§³^07,¹¹⁵^Sta^t^.²³^01.
⁴⁶^{Bill G}^e^rtz^a^{nd Row}^a^{n Sc}^a^r^bor^ou^g^h^{, “}^I^nside^t^h^e^Ring^,”^Wa^shiⁿ^g^t^on^Tⁱ^mes^{, Ma}^r^c^h²²^,²⁰^02,^p.^9.

^{[a] pers}^on^w^h^o^h^a^s^directl^y^re^pres^en^{ted, aided, or adv}ⁱ^s^e^{d a}^f^o^reign^eⁿ^tit^y^{... i}ⁿ^aⁿ^y^trade
ⁿ^e^g^o^tⁱ^a^tⁱ^on^{, or t}^r^{ade di}^s^p^u^t^{e, w}ⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^e^s^m^a^yⁿ^o^t^{be appoi}ⁿ^t^{ed as}^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^e^s⁴⁷
^T^r^a^d^{e R}^e^pres^en^tativ^{e or as}^a^Depu^t^y^Uⁿ^{ited State}^s^T^r^{ade R}^e^pres^en^tati^v^e^.
This provision was waived to allow Charlene Barshefsky to be appointed as U.S. Trade
Representative. As an attorney for a Washington law firm, she had “advised the Canadian
government on trade matters and also represented the government of Quebec in a case involving ⁴⁸
lumber imports.” Among the arguments presented in favor of the waiver was the fact that
Barshefsky was already serving as deputy U.S. trade representative in 1995 when the restriction ⁴⁹
was enacted.
Statutory qualification requirements are more common for members of collegial boards and
commissions than they are for other executive branch leadership positions. (For examples of
requirements for collegial bodies, see Table A-2 in the Appendix of this report.) Arguably, such
provisions serve to enhance both the independence and neutral competence of these entities.
Collegial boards and commissions are generally structured so that they have more independence
from the President than do other executive branch agencies. As one congressional study stated
with regard to regulatory bodies,
^[^h^]ⁱ^sto^r^ic^a^l^l^y^,^Co^ngr^e^ssioⁿ^a^lⁱⁿ^te^r^e^stⁱⁿ^t^h^e^r^e^g^u^l^a^t^or^y^a^g^en^cⁱ^esⁱ^s^{rooted in t}^h^eⁿ^o^{tion th}^a^t
^th^es^e^co^m^mⁱ^s^s^ions^w^e^{re crea}^{ted by}^C^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^,^v^e^s^t^ed^wⁱ^t^h^C^ong^res^sⁱ^oⁿ^{al a}^u^t^h^orit^y^to
^reg^u^l^{ate i}ⁿ^ters^{tate co}^m^m^e^rce^an^{d, th}^eref^{ore, h}^a^{d a s}^p^ecial^relation^s^hⁱ^{p to th}^{e leg}ⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e
^bran^ch^{. T}^h^{e com}^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^f^o^r^m^{, as}^{it h}^a^s^beeⁿ^{created an}^{d dev}^e^{loped by}^C^ong^res^s^ov^{er t}^h^e
^p^a^{st n}ⁱⁿ^e^t^y^y^ear^{s, is a}^d^e^ter^mⁱⁿ^ed^atte^m^p^t^{to is}^olate^th^{e a}^g^en^cies^bot^h^f^r^o^m^precipitou^s
^ch^ang^e^aⁿ^d^f^r^o^m^coⁿ^t^{rol b}^y^{the Ex}^ec^u^tⁱ^v^{e B}^r^an^c^h^{. It}^w^a^s^f^o^{r th}^os^{e rea}^s^on^s^t^h^at^C^ong^res^s
^estab^lis^h^e^d^bⁱ^p^a^r^tisan^co^m^mⁱ^s^s^ioⁿ^s^co^m^p^o^s^ed^o^f^m^u^lt^i-^m^e^m^b^er^{s, ser}^vⁱⁿ^g^{set te}^r^m^s^e^x^pⁱ^rⁱⁿ^g
^{at s}^t^agg^e^{red in}^terv^al^s^,^w^h^{o cou}^l^{d be rem}^o^v^e^{d b}^y^th^{e P}^r^es^iden^{t on}^l^y^u^pon^{a s}^h^o^wⁱⁿ^g^o^f⁵⁰
^su^f^f^icieⁿ^t^cau^se.
Qualification requirements for members of a collegial body can also serve to enhance the
agency’s independence by emphasizing the importance of neutral competence, relative to political
considerations, during the selection and confirmation processes.
In the post-World War II era, the quality of the membership and functioning of regulatory bodies
was a matter of concern for government scholars and observers. In 1949, the first Hoover
Commission observed that “[a]ppointments to membership on [independent regulatory]
commissions are sometimes below desirable standards because of the inadequate salaries offered, ⁵¹
or the failure of the Executive to appreciate the importance of the positions.” A 1960 report to
President-elect John F. Kennedy was also critical of the quality of regulatory agency leaders:

⁴⁷^{19 U}^.^S.C^.^§²¹⁷¹⁽^b)⁽³⁾^.
⁴⁸^P^a^{ul Bl}^uste^in,^“^C^lint^oⁿ^Se^e^k^{s Wa}^iv^e^r^f^o^{r Ba}^rshe^f^s^ky^,”^Wa^shⁱⁿ^gt^on^P^o^st^{, J}^a^nua^ry^{9, 1}⁹⁹⁷^,^p.^E3.
⁴⁹^Re^{p. Billy}^T^a^uz^{in, re}^m^a^rk^{s in the}^House^,^C^o^ng^ressioⁿ^a^{l Reco}^rd^,^d^a^ily^e^d^ition^,^v^o^l.¹⁴^3,^Ma^rc^{h 1}¹^,¹⁹⁹⁷^{, p}^.^H8²²^.
⁵⁰^{U.S. C}^ong^re^{ss, Se}^na^te^Com^m^itte^e^{on G}^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt Ope}^r^a^tions,^S^t^u^d^y^on^Fe^de^r^a^l^Re^gu^lati^ons^:^Vol^.¹^,^The^Re^gul^ator^y
^App^o^intmeⁿ^{ts Proc}^e^s^s^{, S.}^D^o^c^.⁹⁵^-^25,⁹⁵^th^Cong^.,¹^st^s^e^s^s^.⁽^W^a^s^hin^g^t^{on: G}^P^O^,¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^,^p.^16.
⁵¹^U^.^{S. C}^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on on O}^r^g^a^niz^a^tio^{n of}^the^Ex^e^c^u^tiv^e^B^r^aⁿ^c^h^of^the^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt,^The^I^nde^pe^ndeⁿ^t^Re^gul^ator^y
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

^I^t^{is g}^eⁿ^e^r^a^ll^y^ad^m^itted^b^y^m^o^{st o}^b^s^er^v^e^r^s^th^a^t^siⁿ^{ce W}^o^r^l^d^W^a^r^I^I^a^d^e^terⁱ^o^r^atioⁿⁱⁿ^th^e
^qu^alit^y^o^f^ou^{r ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rati^v^e^pers^onⁿ^e^l^h^a^s^ta^k^eⁿ^{place, both}^{at th}^{e top lev}^e^{l an}^{d th}^rough^out
^t^h^{e s}^t^a^f^f^{.... C}^a^ref^u^l^s^c^r^u^tⁱ^ny^o^f^ag^en^c^y^m^e^m^b^ers^f^r^o^m^t^h^{e s}^t^a^ndpoiⁿ^t^of^t^h^eⁱ^r^q^u^a^lⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^a^s
^w^e^{ll a}^s^th^eir^p^r^ej^u^d^{ices in}^b^e^h^a^lf^o^f^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^erⁱⁿ^g^th^{e le}^gⁱ^sla^tⁱ^v^{e g}^o^{als to}^w^h^ic^h^th^e^y^w^e^r^e^t^o
^b^e^co^m^m^itted^,^w^a^{s d}^u^rin^g^th^e^s^{e y}^{ears to}^o^o^f^ten^rep^l^aced^b^y^{a co}ⁿ^s^id^eratioⁿ^o^f^w^h^a^t^p^o^litica^l
^oblig^ation^s^cou^l^{d be repaid t}^h^rou^g^h^appoin^t^m^eⁿ^t^s^{.... T}^h^es^{e attit}^u^d^es^h^a^v^e^h^a^{d a}^s^e^rio^u^s
ⁱ^m^p^act^u^p^oⁿ^th^e^r^e^g^u^lato^r^y^a^g^en^cies.^A^t^th^e^to^p^lev^e^{l i}ⁿ^itia^{l e}^x^p^e^r^tise^w^o^u^l^d^b^e^lackⁱⁿ^g^aⁿ^d
^th^e^w^aⁿ^t^o^f^d^e^v^o^tioⁿ^to^th^{e p}^u^b^{lic ser}^v^ice^m^ilitated^ag^aiⁿ^s^{t it}^s^a^c^q^uⁱ^s^itioⁿ^th^rough^con^tⁱⁿ^uⁱ^ng
^t^e^nur^e^.^T^o^p^a^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^r^a^tⁱ^ve^p^o^sⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^a^p^p^e^a^r^t^o^ha^ve^b^e^eⁿ^s^o^ug^ht^fr^e^q^ue^nt^l^y^a^s^st^e^p^pⁱⁿ^g
^stoⁿ^{es to}^f^u^r^t^h^e^r^p^o^{litical p}^r^ef^er^en^{ce o}^r^to^p^o^s^itioⁿ^s^o^fⁱ^m^p^o^r^tan^ce^wⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^th^{e i}ⁿ^d^u^s^tr^ies
^s^u^bj^{ect to reg}^u^l^atioⁿ^.^A^{too comm}^oⁿ^co^m^p^laiⁿ^{t at}^th^{e bar is}^t^h^{at t}^h^{e s}^t^a^f^f^s^h^a^v^e^capt^u^{red th}^e
^com^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^aⁿ^{d t}^h^atⁱⁿ^dependen^t^an^{d bol}^{d t}^hⁱⁿ^kⁱⁿ^g^oⁿ^t^h^e^part^of^t^h^e^m^e^m^b^ers^of^t^h^es^e⁵²
^ag^en^cie^s^is^abs^eⁿ^t^.
In the late 1970s, a Senate committee investigation found that the “pre-eminent problem with the
regulatory appointments process, as it has operated in the past, is that it has not consistently ⁵³
resulted in the selection of people best equipped to handle regulatory responsibilities.” The
committee recommended that the organic acts for each collegial regulatory board and commission
include the following language:
^T^h^{e P}^r^esid^en^{t sh}^allⁿ^o^mⁱⁿ^a^te^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^{s f}^o^r^t^h^{e Co}^m^mⁱ^ss^ioⁿ^/^B^o^ar^d^toⁱⁿ^su^r^e^co^m^mⁱ^s^s^ioⁿ
^m^e^m^b^ershⁱ^p^sh^al^l^{be bal}^aⁿ^ced,^wⁱ^t^h^broad^repres^en^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^of^v^a^ri^ou^s^t^a^l^eⁿ^t^s^,^backg^r^oun^ds^,
^o^ccu^p^a^tioⁿ^s^{, an}^d^ex^p^e^rⁱ^eⁿ^ce^ap^p^r^o^p^rⁱ^{ate to}^th^{e f}^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^an^d^r^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ilit^{ies o}^f^t^h^e
^C^o^m^mⁱ^ssⁱ^on/^{Board. . . . T}^h^e^C^o^m^mⁱ^ssⁱ^on/^{Board s}^h^al^l^{be c}^o^m^pos^{ed o}^f^m^e^m^b^ers^w^h^{o b}^y
^reas^on^{of training}^{, edu}^c^a^tion^{or ex}^perien^{ce ar}^{e q}^u^ali^f^ied^to^car^r^y^o^u^t^th^e^f^uⁿ^c^tioⁿ^s^o^f^t^h^e⁵⁴
^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^s^ion/B^o^{ard u}ⁿ^d^{er th}^is^ch^apter.
Although this specific language has not been included in the organic acts of all boards and
commissions, many collegial bodies now have statutory provisions imposing similar
requirements. (See Table A-2.)

Should issues concerning the competence of executive branch officials become a high priority for
Congress, it might consider adding qualification requirements to existing or new statutory
executive branch positions. The use of statutory qualifications entails certain potential benefits
and costs for Congress, the President, and the federal bureaucracy. These advantages and
disadvantages are discussed in the next section. This section is followed by a discussion of
several options.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^Co^mmi^ssi^oⁿ^s^{: A}^R^e^p^o^r^t^t^o^t^h^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^{ess b}^y^t^h^{e C}^o^mmi^ssi^on^on^Orgaⁿⁱ^zatⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e E}^xecu^tⁱ^{ve B}^r^aⁿ^c^{h o}^f^t^h^e
^Go^vern^m^en^t⁽^W^a^s^hing^{ton: G}^P^O^,¹⁹⁴⁹⁾^,^p.^3.
⁵²^{U.S. C}^ong^re^{ss, Se}^na^te^Com^m^itte^e^{on t}^h^e^Ju^dicⁱ^a^r^y^,^Subc^om^m^itte^e^{on A}^d^mⁱ^nistra^tiv^e^P^r^a^c^tic^e^a^nd^Pr^oc^e^dure^,^Re^por^t
^oⁿ^R^e^g^u^l^a^t^o^r^{y A}^g^en^ci^{es t}^o^t^h^{e P}^r^esi^d^en^t^-^el^ect^{, c}^o^m^m^itte^e^pr^{int pr}^e^p^a^r^e^d^by^J^a^m^e^s^{M. L}^a^ndis^,⁸⁶^th^Cong^.,²^nd^sess.
⁽^W^a^s^hing^{ton: G}^P^O^,¹⁹⁶⁰⁾^{, p}^p^.¹¹^-^12.
⁵³^{U.S. C}^ong^re^{ss, Se}^na^te^Com^m^itte^e^{on G}^o^v^e^rnm^e^nta^l^Aff^a^irs,^Pr^incⁱ^pal^Re^c^o^m^m^e^nd^atio^ns^aⁿ^d^Fin^dⁱ^ngs^{of t}^h^e^St^udy
^{on Fe}^de^r^a^{l Re}^g^u^l^a^tio^n,^Vol^u^m^e^s^I^-^V^I^{, c}^o^m^m^itte^e^print,⁹⁶^th^Co^ng^.,¹^st^s^e^s^s^.⁽^W^a^s^hing^to^{n: G}^P^O^,¹⁹⁷⁹⁾^,^p.¹³^.
⁵⁴^Ibid^{., p. 4.}

Although some statutory qualification requirements address characteristics that are not explicitly
related to competence (notably those setting civilian and citizenship status requirements), most
appear intended to ensure that competent and qualified individuals are appointed to leadership
positions. One student of the administrative process observed, “[t]he prime key to the
improvement of the administrative process is the selection of qualified personnel. Good men can ⁵⁵
make poor laws workable; poor men will wreak havoc with good laws.” Both Congress and the
President have an interest in ensuring that the federal government is led by competent leaders
who have the ability to implement the law successfully and faithfully. At the same time, inasmuch
as the President is seen to be responsible for coordinating the management of the executive
branch, it could be argued that he must be given the freedom to appoint leaders who will be
accountable and, to some degree, politically loyal to him. These interests—competence,
accountability, and loyalty—are not mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, they can be in tension. For
example, recent research suggests that executive branch programs headed by mid-level managers,
who are appointed at the agency level, may be better managed than those run by top executive ⁵⁶
branch leaders in presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed positions.
It could be argued that establishing minimum qualifications for a program’s or agency’s
leadership position is likely to lead to improved performance by that program or agency. This
argument assumes that the President would select, and the Senate would consider, a nominee on
the basis of these qualifications. It also assumes that the Senate would more easily reject, on this
basis, poorly suited candidates. Finally, it assumes that an appointee with these qualifications
would do a better job of leading the program or agency than would an appointee without these
qualifications. Although these assumptions might hold true in many cases where qualifications
are stipulated, they are not guaranteed to hold in all situations.
The difficulties that may arise during the implementation of qualification provisions are
illustrated by the nomination and appointment of Julie Myers to be Assistant Secretary of
Homeland Security for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. This position, originally
established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 as the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of
Border Security, is to be filled by an individual who has “a minimum of 5 years professional ⁵⁷
experience in law enforcement, and a minimum of 5 years of management experience.” The
President nominated Myers to the position on June 29, 2005. Questions about whether or not
Myers met the specified qualifications were raised and addressed during her confirmation hearing ⁵⁸
before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. In the months

⁵⁵^{U.S. C}^ong^re^{ss, Se}^na^te^Com^m^itte^e^{on t}^h^e^Ju^dicⁱ^a^r^y^,^Subc^om^m^itte^e^{on A}^d^mⁱ^nistra^tiv^e^P^r^a^c^tic^e^a^nd^Pr^oc^e^dure^,^Re^por^t
^oⁿ^R^e^g^u^l^a^t^o^r^{y A}^g^en^ci^{es t}^o^t^h^{e P}^r^esi^d^en^t^-^el^ect^{, p.}⁶⁶^.
⁵⁶^J^o^hⁿ^{B. G}^ilm^{our a}^{nd D}^a^vⁱ^{d E}^.^L^e^wⁱ^s^,^“^P^olitic^a^l^A^ppoi^nte^e^s^aⁿ^d^th^e^Com^p^e^t^eⁿ^c^e^of^Fe^de^ra^{l P}^r^og^ra^m^Ma^na^gem^e^nt,”
^Ame^r^ic^{an Pol}^itic^{s Re}^se^arc^h^{, v}^o^l^.^{34, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁶^{, p}^.²²^{. T}^h^e^r^e^s^e^a^r^c^h^e^r^s^c^onc^lude^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^y^“^h^a^v^e^s^how^{n tha}^t
^prog^ra^m^s^a^d^mⁱ^nis^t^e^r^e^d^by^politic^a^l^a^ppoi^nte^e^s^g^e^{t s}^y^s^t^em^a^tica^l^l^y^low^e^r^m^a^nag^e^m^e^{nt g}^r^a^d^e^s^thaⁿ^pr^og^ram^s
^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^ered^b^y^senⁱ^o^r^execu^tⁱ^v^e^s^{” (p}^.⁴²^).^T^h^ei^{r sam}^p^l^e^o^f^senⁱ^o^r^e^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^{es i}ⁿ^cl^u^d^e^{s b}^o^t^h^{career emp}^l^o^y^{ees an}^d
^p^o^lⁱ^tⁱ^cal^ap^poⁱⁿ^t^ees,^h^o^w^ever.
⁵⁷^{6 U}^.^S^.^C.^{§ 2}^52(a⁾⁽²^{)(B). T}^h^is^po^s^ition^ha^s^a^uⁿ^iq^ue^s^t^a^t^ut^ory^c^onte^x^{t. O}^r^ig^ina^lly^{, the}^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^curity^A^c^{t of}²⁰⁰²
^e^s^ta^blis^he^{d t}^h^e^p^o^s^itioⁿ^of^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^{ant Se}^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^o^f^the^Bur^e^a^u^of^Borde^r^Se^c^u^rity^w^{ithout s}^p^e^cⁱ^fy^ing^the^m^e^aⁿ^s^of
^a^ppoi^ntm^e^{nt (}^P^.L^{. 1}^07-²⁹^{6 §}⁴⁴²⁽^a⁾⁽²⁾⁾^.^A^s^pa^r^t^of^a^m^odifⁱ^ca^tion^of^a^pr^e^s^ideⁿ^tia^{l r}^e^or^g^a^niz^a^tioⁿ^pl^aⁿ^tha^t^r^e^a^r^r^a^ng^e^d
^bor^de^r^s^e^c^u^r^ity^f^unc^tions^,^the^posⁱ^tion^w^a^s^r^e^nam^e^{d the}^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^{t Se}^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^f^o^r^the^B^u^r^e^a^u^of^I^m^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion a}ⁿ^{d C}^u^s^t^om^s
^Enf^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^{t a}^{nd i}^d^eⁿ^tif^ie^{d a}^s^a^p^r^e^s^ideⁿ^tia^lly^a^ppoin^t^e^d^Se^na^te^-^c^oⁿ^fⁱ^r^m^e^d^pos^iti^on.⁽^S^e^e^“^B^or^de^r^R^e^or^g^a^niz^a^{tion Fa}^c^t
^She^e^t^,”^a^t^ht^tp://w^w^w^.dhs^.g^ov^/x^ne^w^s^/re^l^e^a^s^e^s^/^p^re^s^s^_^re^le^a^s^e^_007^3.^s^h^tm^{, v}ⁱ^s^ite^{d J}^a^nua^ry^{15, 20}⁰⁸^.)
⁵⁸^{U.S. C}^ong^re^{ss, Se}^na^te^Com^m^itte^e^{on H}^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^rity^a^{nd G}^ove^rnm^e^nta^l^Aff^a^irs,^N^o^mⁱ^nati^ons^o^f^Ste^w^ar^{t A.}
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

after the hearing, some Senators were satisfied that Myers was qualified for the position, while ⁵⁹
others stated that her experience was insufficient and opposed the nomination on that basis. The
nomination was reported out of the committee and placed on the Senate Executive Calendar, but ^th⁶⁰
it was not considered by the full Senate during the 109 Congress. Although reservations about
Myers’s qualifications may have prevented the nomination from coming to the floor at that time, ⁶¹
the nomination may also have been held up because of other concerns. On January 4, 2006, the ⁶²
President gave Myers a recess appointment to the position. He again nominated her to the ^th
position on January 9, 2007, at the beginning of the 110 Congress. On December 19, 2007, after
Myers had served in the position for nearly two years, and less than a month before her recess
appointment would have expired, the Senate confirmed her nomination.
Although many qualified individuals are nominated to, and confirmed for, positions with
statutory qualifications, appointments to such positions can sometimes lead to a tug of war
between the President and Congress. In such a case, (1) Congress establishes minimum
experience requirements; (2) the President nominates the individual of his choice, who some
argue has insufficient experience to meet these requirements; (3) the Senate does not confirm the
nomination after some Senators oppose it because of this perceived shortcoming; (4) the
President gives the nominee a recess appointment that lasts up to two years; and (5) the Senate
confirms the individual, despite concerns about his or her qualifications, or, if the appointee is not
confirmed, he or she must leave office when the recess appointment expires.
It could be argued that this interbranch conflict is a healthy exercise of constitutional checks and
balances. But this dynamic seemingly imposes a potentially heavy cost on the federal
bureaucracy. An individual whose leadership and management qualifications are publicly cast
into doubt in the Senate can still serve in a major federal government leadership position if the
President elects to circumvent the confirmation process through a recess appointment. Although
the President can install his chosen nominee in this way, the process might diminish the
appointee’s stature and, potentially, his or her effectiveness.
The prospect of an interbranch tug of war over qualifications might raise concerns, from an
institutional perspective and on a practical level, about the worth of establishing such
qualifications in the first place. Institutionally, this tug of war might sometimes damage Congress,
particularly the Senate. To the extent that the President circumvents the Senate when a nominee’s
qualifications are in question, congressional prerogatives—the authority of Congress to specify
the characteristics of an office and the role of the Senate in the appointment process—are
undercut and, seemingly, these institutions are injured. As a practical matter, it could be argued
that a qualification requirement is of little use if it is not sufficient to prevent an individual whose
satisfaction of that requirement is in doubt in the Senate from holding the office.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^B^a^{ker a}ⁿ^d^Ju^lⁱ^e^L^.^Myers^,^h^eariⁿ^g,¹⁰⁹^th^Cong^.,¹^st^s^e^s^s^{., Se}^pte^m^be^r^15,²⁰⁰⁵^,^pp.¹⁶^-²^1.
⁵⁹^Ch^ri^{s S}^t^r^o^h^m^,^“New^I^mmi^gratⁱ^oⁿ^Eⁿ^f^o^rcem^en^t^Chⁱ^e^f^G^e^t^s^Mⁱ^xed^Recep^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^”^Go^vE^xec.^co^{m Da}ⁱ^l^y^B^rⁱ^e^fⁱⁿ^g^,^J^a^nua^r^y
^{5, 2}⁰⁰⁶^{, a}^t^htt^p^://w^ww^.g^ove^x^e^c^.^c^o^m^/^da^ily^f^e^d/010^6/⁰¹⁰⁵⁰^6c^1.^htm^,^vⁱ^site^{d Ja}^nua^ry^{15, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶⁰^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion obta}ⁱ^ne^{d f}^r^om^the^no^mⁱ^na^tions^da^ta^ba^s^e^of^the^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^ativ^e^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion Sy}^s^t^em⁽^L^I^S⁾^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^to
^Cong^re^{ss a}^t^http^://w^ww^.^c^ong^re^ss.g^o^v^/^nom^{is/, v}ⁱ^site^{d Ja}^nua^ry^{15, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶¹^Eileen^S^u^lliv^an^{, “Recess DHS Ap}^p^oⁱⁿ^tm^en^{ts M}^a^y^Bac^k^fⁱ^{re, Ex}^p^e^r^t^Say^s^,”^C^Q^H^o^m^e^{land Se}^c^u^r^ity^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^{6, 20}^06,
^a^t^http^://h^om^e^l^a^nd.c^q^.c^om^/hs^/^dis^p^lay^.^do?^doc^k^e^y⁼^/c^qonliⁿ^e^/^pro^d^/^d^a^t^a^/^doc^s^/^htm^l^/^h^sⁿ^e^w^s^/^109/^hs^ne^w^s¹⁰⁹^-
⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰²⁰²⁶⁸⁹^3.^htm^l^@^a^llne^w^s^&^m^e^ta^pub=^H^S^N^E^W^S^&^s^e^q^N^u^m⁼^8&s^e^a^r^c^h^I^nde^x⁼^{0, v}ⁱ^s^ite^{d J}^a^nua^r^y^{15, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶²^U^.^S.^P^r^e^sⁱ^d^eⁿ^{t (G}^.W^{. Bus}^h^{), “}^P^e^r^s^onne^{l A}ⁿⁿ^o^uⁿ^c^e^m^eⁿ^t,”^J^a^nua^r^y^{4, 2}⁰⁰⁶^{, a}^t^htt^p^://w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ne^w^s^/
^r^e^le^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰^6/^01/²⁰⁰⁶⁰¹^04-^3.h^t^m^l^{, v}ⁱ^s^ite^{d J}^a^nua^r^y^15,²⁰⁰⁸^.

It is worth noting, however, that statutory qualifications do not typically lead to such open
conflicts between Congress and the President. Because these conflicts can impose political and
institutional costs on the President as well, he has an incentive, in general, to abide by the
requirements established by Congress. When Congress contemplates establishing qualifications,
the possibility of such a conflict—a disadvantage—might be weighed against the potential
benefits of the proposed requirements.
Conflicts concerning statutory qualifications have typically been resolved through the political
process. Whether statutory qualifications legally bind the appointment process actions of the
President or the Senate remains an open question. It is not clear what, if any, legal consequences
might follow if either actor were to ignore such provisions.
Establishing specific qualifications for an advice and consent position entails other potential
disadvantages. First, it narrows the field of individuals from whom the President may select, and
otherwise worthy candidates might be eliminated prematurely from consideration. Second, the
inclusion of certain qualifications in law could lead the President and the Senate to overlook or
undervalue other potentially important qualities when evaluating candidates. Third, the
qualifications that are necessary, or most important, for carrying out the responsibilities of a
position might change over time. Finally, should the President and the Senate determine that it
would be preferable, in a given situation, to appoint, to a given position, an individual who does
not technically meet its qualifications, legislation might be necessary to waive the statutory
requirements.
With regard to statutory qualifications, several approaches are available to Congress. Most
existing statutory qualifications will remain in force absent congressional action. Congress could
reduce the number of positions with these kinds of requirements, either through a comprehensive
review of such provisions or through incremental legislative changes, during a reauthorization
process, for example. Congress could increase the use of statutory qualifications. Options include
the continued incremental adoption of qualification provisions, the development of agency-wide
minimum qualification thresholds, and the enactment of a government-wide standard for all
government leadership positions. The Senate could also elect to establish threshold standards for
confirmation of all or some presidential nominees.
Congress could continue recent legislative practices and establish statutory qualifications on a
case-by-case basis. Under this option, the number of positions with these requirements would
slowly increase. These provisions could be added where neutral competence is perceived to be of
particular importance, or where other attributes, such as U.S. citizenship or civilian status, are
deemed necessary. This approach would be consistent with the view that the need for program or
agency leaders with particular characteristics should be weighed, on a case-by-case basis, against
the President’s need for flexibility in selecting his preferred leadership team. It assumes that the
balance between these two interests will vary according to the responsibilities of the position and
its proximity to the President. Whereas Congress might require members of an independent
regulatory entity that deals with complex technical questions to have a certain educational
background, for example, it might not stipulate any requirements for an assistant secretary whose
responsibilities are assigned by the secretary.

Congress could establish, for one or more agencies, organization-wide threshold requirements. In
effect, Congress has instituted such a threshold requirement—civilian status—for most top
leadership positions at the Department of Defense. Such thresholds have also been established for
the membership of many collegial bodies, especially regulatory boards and commissions, as
discussed above. These entities differ from departments and other executive branch entities,
however, because they each have only a few uniform leadership positions.
In a variation of this approach, Congress could establish agency-wide requirements that vary ^th
according to each leadership position’s level in an agency’s hierarchy. During the 109 Congress,
Senator Daniel K. Akaka introduced legislation that used this model. The bill would have
established minimum leadership, management, and subject matter experience requirements for
most top leaders at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It would also have required that
appointees to top leadership positions in the department possess “a demonstrated ability to ⁶³
manage a substantial staff and budget.” Appointees to positions compensated at Levels II and III
of the Executive Schedule, such as the Administrator of FEMA and DHS Under Secretaries,
would have been required to meet the most rigorous standards proposed by the bill. Appointees to
Level IV positions, such as most Assistant Secretaries, would have been subject to similar, but
slightly less stringent, standards. The bill would have excepted the DHS Secretary and Deputy
Secretary, as well as the Commandant of the Coast Guard, from these requirements.
The agency-wide qualifications approach might be particularly useful to Congress where broad
agreement exists, particularly on the congressional committees of jurisdiction, regarding
threshold standards for a particular agency. Agency-wide qualifications might be more difficult to
establish where broad agreement on minimum standards does not exist or where the leadership
positions for a given agency require a broad range of talents or experience.
Another approach that Congress could consider would be to establish government-wide
requirements that would be applied to all or most top leadership positions. Congress has
established government-wide requirements regarding citizenship through a recurring provision of
the funding bill for the Department of the Treasury and other agencies. The provision’s
requirements are quite specific:
^Un^les^s^oth^e^r^wⁱ^s^{e s}^p^eci^fⁱ^{ed d}^u^ring^t^h^{e c}^u^rren^t^fⁱ^s^cal^y^ear,ⁿ^o^{part of}^any^{appropriation}
^con^t^aiⁿ^e^{d i}ⁿ^t^hⁱ^s^{or any}^ot^h^e^r^A^c^t^s^h^a^l^l^{be u}^s^{ed t}^o^pa^y^t^h^{e c}^o^m^p^eⁿ^s^a^tⁱ^on^of^aⁿ^y^o^f^fⁱ^{cer or}
^e^m^plo^y^{ee of}^t^h^{e Go}^v^e^rnm^e^{nt of}^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^{ed States}⁽ⁱⁿ^c^l^u^ding^aⁿ^y^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^t^h^e^m^a^j^o^rity^o^f^th^e
^s^t^ock^of^w^hⁱ^c^hⁱ^s^o^wⁿ^e^{d b}^y^t^h^{e G}^o^v^e^rnm^e^nt^of^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^{d St}^at^es⁾^w^h^os^{e pos}^t^o^f^du^t^yⁱ^sⁱⁿ
^th^{e co}ⁿ^tⁱⁿ^eⁿ^{tal U}ⁿ^ited^States^uⁿ^les^s^s^u^c^h^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^{: (}¹⁾^{is a ci}^tiz^en^o^f^t^h^{e U}ⁿ^ited^States;⁽²⁾^{is a}
^p^e^r^s^oⁿⁱⁿ^th^{e ser}^v^{ice o}^f^th^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^ed^{States o}ⁿ^th^{e d}^a^{te o}^f^th^{e en}^a^c^t^m^eⁿ^{t o}^f^thⁱ^s^A^c^t^w^h^o^,^b^eⁱⁿ^g
^elig^ib^le^f^o^r^citizen^s^h^ip^{, h}^a^{s f}^ile^d^{a d}^eclar^atioⁿ^o^fⁱⁿ^ten^tioⁿ^to^b^eco^m^e^{a ci}^tizen^o^f^th^{e U}ⁿ^ited
^States^{prior to s}^u^ch^{date an}^{d is}^actu^a^ll^y^resⁱ^dingⁱⁿ^th^{e U}ⁿ^it^{ed States}^{; (3) is}^{a pers}^on^w^h^o
^o^w^{es alle}^gⁱ^aⁿ^{ce to}^th^{e U}ⁿ^ited^{States; (}⁴⁾^{is an}^alieⁿ^f^r^o^m^C^u^b^a^{, P}^o^lan^d^{, So}^u^t^h^Vietn^a^m^,^th^e
^co^uⁿ^t^rⁱ^{es o}^f^th^{e f}^o^r^m^er^So^vⁱ^et^Un^ioⁿ^,^o^r^th^{e B}^a^{ltic co}^uⁿ^t^rⁱ^{es l}^a^w^f^u^l^l^y^ad^m^itted^to^th^{e Un}^ite^d
^S^t^at^es^f^o^{r perm}^aⁿ^en^t^resi^den^c^e^;^{(5) i}^s^{a S}^o^u^t^h^Vⁱ^etⁿ^a^m^e^s^e^{, Ca}^m^bodi^an^{, or L}^a^otⁱ^aⁿ^refug^ee
^parol^e^{d i}ⁿ^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^es^af^t^e^{r Jan}^u^a^r^y^{1, 1975;}^or⁽⁶⁾ⁱ^s^{a n}^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^of^t^h^{e Peopl}^e’^s

⁶³¹⁰⁹^th^C^ong^{., S. 20}^40,^{§ 3.}

^R^e^pu^{blic of C}^hⁱⁿ^a^w^h^o^qu^ali^fⁱ^e^s^f^o^{r adj}^u^s^t^m^eⁿ^t^of^s^t^at^u^s^p^u^r^s^u^aⁿ^t^{to t}^h^e^C^hⁱⁿ^e^s^{e St}^u^d^en^t
^Prot^ectⁱ^oⁿ^A^c^t^o^f^{1992 (P.L}^{. 102-}^404):^Pr^ovide^d^,^T^h^{at f}^o^r^th^{e p}^u^r^p^o^s^{e o}^f^th^is^sectioⁿ^,^aⁿ
^af^fi^davⁱ^t^sⁱ^gⁿ^e^{d b}^y^aⁿ^y^su^{ch pers}^on^sh^al^l^be^coⁿ^s^idered^prim^a^f^a^cⁱ^{e eviden}^{ce t}^h^at^th^e
^r^e^q^u^ir^e^m^en^{ts o}^f^t^hⁱ^s^sectioⁿ^wⁱ^t^h^r^e^sp^{ect to}^hi^{s o}^r^he^r^st^a^t^us^ha^ve^b^e^eⁿ^c^o^m^p^lⁱ^e^d^wⁱ^t^h^:
^Pro^v^id^ed^fu^rth^e^r^,^T^h^{at any}^pers^on^m^a^kⁱⁿ^g^{a f}^a^l^s^{e aff}ⁱ^{davit s}^h^{all be g}^u^ilt^y^o^f^{a f}^e^lony^{, an}^d,
^u^pon^convⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^sh^al^l^be^fⁱⁿ^e^dⁿ^o^m^o^{re t}^h^an^{$4,000 or i}^m^pri^s^on^{ed f}^o^{r n}^o^t^m^o^{re t}^h^aⁿ¹^y^ear,
^o^r^b^o^th^:^Pro^v^id^ed^fu^rth^e^r^,^T^h^{at th}^{e ab}^o^v^{e p}^eⁿ^a^{l clau}^{se sh}^al^{l b}^eⁱⁿ^ad^d^itioⁿ^to^{, an}^dⁿ^o^{t in}
^s^u^bs^tⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^on^f^o^{r, any}^ot^h^e^{r pro}^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^of^e^xⁱ^s^tⁱ^ng^l^a^w^:^Pr^ovi^d^{ed f}^u^r^t^her^,^T^h^{at any}^pa^y^m^eⁿ^t
^m^a^{de t}^o^aⁿ^y^offⁱ^{cer or e}^m^p^l^oy^ee^con^t^rar^y^t^o^t^h^{e prov}ⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^o^f^t^hⁱ^s^s^ectⁱ^oⁿ^s^h^a^l^l^be
^r^eco^v^e^r^a^b^l^{e in}^actioⁿ^b^y^th^{e Fe}^d^e^r^a^{l Go}^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^{. T}^h^{is sectio}ⁿ^s^h^{all n}^o^{t ap}^p^l^y^to^citizen^{s o}^f
^I^r^e^lan^d^{, I}^s^r^{ael, o}^r^th^e^Rep^u^b^lⁱ^c^o^f^t^h^{e P}^h^ilip^pⁱⁿ^e^s,^o^r^toⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^{ls o}^f^t^h^o^s^{e co}^uⁿ^tr^{ies al}^lied
^wⁱ^t^h^th^e^Uⁿ^ited^Sta^t^{es i}ⁿ^a^cu^r^r^en^{t d}^e^f^eⁿ^s^{e e}^f^f^o^r^t^{, o}^r^toⁱⁿ^terⁿ^a^tioⁿ^a^{l b}^r^o^a^d^caster^s^e^m^p^l^o^y^ed
^by^t^h^{e Broadcas}^tⁱⁿ^g^{Board of}^G^o^v^e^rn^ors^,^{or t}^o^t^e^m^porary^e^m^p^l^o^y^m^e^nt^{of t}^r^ans^l^at^ors^,^{or t}^o
^te^m^porary^e^m^plo^y^m^eⁿ^tⁱⁿ^t^h^{e field s}^e^rv^{ice (}ⁿ^{ot to ex}^c^{eed 60 day}^s^{) as}^{a res}^u^{lt o}^f⁶⁴
^e^m^e^r^ge^ncⁱ^e^s.
Most full-time leaders are paid from appropriated funds. In effect, therefore, the provision
restricts appointments, government-wide, to many top leadership positions.
If Congress found it necessary, such an approach could be used to put in place qualifications such
as minimum experience or demonstrated ability. Qualifications that set discrete, objective
standards might be more easily enforced than those that set more subjective requirements.
Arguably, it is easier to measure whether or not a nominee has specific educational credentials
than whether he or she meets the threshold of “related educational background.”
Notably, the appropriations provision above includes a number of exceptions. If Congress were to
determine that no non-U.S. citizen should be appointed to a particular position, it would need to
enact a separate, more restrictive, provision for that post. This example demonstrates the
difficulty of establishing a government-wide standard that could cover all situations.
Consequently, if Congress were to establish government-wide minimum standards, it might be
necessary to create individual exceptions for certain positions.
Several of the options discussed above would set qualifications in statute. The Senate, of course,
could establish confirmation standards that would, in effect, set qualifications for some or all
nominations. This approach was recommended, for regulatory agency appointees, by the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs as a result of its previously discussed late-1970s study. The
committee recommended that
^[^t^]^h^e^Se^na^t^e^s^h^o^u^l^d^e^s^t^a^b^lⁱ^s^{h t}^h^e^fo^l^l^o^wⁱⁿ^g^ge^ne^r^a^l^st^aⁿ^d^a^rds^t^o^be^a^pplⁱ^e^dⁱⁿ^con^fⁱ^r^m^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^of
^reg^u^l^at^or^y^a^g^en^c^y^appoiⁿ^t^ees^:^(a)^T^h^at^by^reas^on^of^backg^r^oun^{d, t}^r^aiⁿⁱ^ng^{or ex}^peri^en^{ce, t}^h^e
ⁿ^o^mⁱⁿ^{ee is}^a^f^fⁱ^r^m^ati^v^el^y^q^u^ali^f^{ied f}^o^{r th}^{e of}^fⁱ^{ce to}^w^h^ic^h^h^e^{or s}^h^{e is}ⁿ^o^mⁱⁿ^a^{ted. (b)}^Th^a^t^,ⁱⁿ
^con^sⁱ^d^eriⁿ^g^{a regu}^l^a^t^o^r^y^appoiⁿ^t^m^eⁿ^t^{, t}^h^{e S}^eⁿ^a^t^e^sh^al^l^consⁱ^d^{er t}^h^{e ch}^aract^{er an}^{d n}^a^t^u^{re of}
^th^{e o}^f^{fice, a}ⁿ^{d th}^eⁿ^eeds^o^f^t^h^{e ag}^eⁿ^c^y^to^w^h^ic^h^t^h^eⁿ^o^mⁱⁿ^{ee h}^a^s^{been n}^a^m^e^{d. (c) T}^h^{at, i}ⁿ
^con^sⁱ^d^eriⁿ^g^{a regu}^l^a^t^o^r^y^appoiⁿ^t^m^eⁿ^t^t^o^{a col}^l^e^gⁱ^al^body^,^t^h^{e S}^eⁿ^a^t^e^s^h^a^l^l^consⁱ^d^{er t}^h^e
^ex^istⁱⁿ^g^co^m^p^o^s^itioⁿ^o^f^t^h^{at b}^o^d^y^an^d^w^h^et^h^e^r^o^rⁿ^o^t^m^e^m^b^er^{s o}^f^a^siⁿ^g^{le secto}^r^o^r^g^r^o^u^pⁱⁿ
^s^o^ciet^y^{are too h}^eav^il^y^repres^eⁿ^{ted. (d)}^T^h^{at th}^{e n}^o^mⁱⁿ^{ee is}^com^mⁱ^{tted to en}^f^o^r^c^em^en^t^o^f^t^h^e

⁶⁴^P^.^L.¹¹⁰^-¹⁶^1,^Di^vi^si^on^D,^§⁷⁰^5.

^reg^u^l^ator^y^f^r^a^m^e^w^{ork as}^es^tab^lis^h^e^{d b}^y^C^ong^res^s^{in t}^h^{e s}^t^atutes^{. (e) T}^h^{at th}^eⁿ^o^mⁱⁿ^ee^m^eet⁶⁵
^th^{e stat}^u^t^o^r^y^q^u^a^lⁱ^f^icatioⁿ^s^to^h^o^ld^th^{e o}^f^fⁱ^{ce to}^w^h^ic^h^h^e^o^r^sh^e^w^a^{s n}^o^mⁱⁿ^a^ted^.
Such confirmation standards might be established in the Standing Rules of the Senate, or by
standing order, either of which would be accomplished by Senate resolution. Alternatively, such
standards could be adopted by individual committees for nominations within their jurisdictions.
These rules, at either the committee or full Senate level, could establish either mandatory or
optional consideration of standards during the confirmation process, and they could require either
that the standards be considered or that they be followed, and/or include waiver and enforcement
provisions.
A constitutional objection might be raised with regard to the establishment of Senate confirmation
standards. Unlike statutory qualifications, which, as discussed above, can be seen to be an
exercise of Congress’s constitutional authority to create offices, Senate confirmation standards
would be established by the Senate alone, rather than the full Congress. On the other hand, it
could be argued that such standards would be a legitimate exercise of the Senate’s constitutional
authority to set its own rules. The rules would not directly limit the President’s authority to select
a nominee, they would merely guide the Senate’s advice and consent process.

The preponderance of evidence and historical practice suggests that Congress generally has the
constitutional authority to establish statutory qualifications for federal government positions.
Although Congress enjoys broad discretion in this area, there appears to be consensus that it may
not set qualifications that limit the President’s selection to the extent that the appointment is a de
facto legislative designation. Neither case law nor statute has established a bright line that clearly
defines the boundaries of this authority. Within this somewhat ambiguous environment, Congress,
at times, has enacted standards that limit the President’s selection pool to a greater extent than the
executive branch sees as legitimate. In response, the President has issued signing statements, and
the Justice Department has issued opinions, that challenge the constitutionality of such
provisions. In practice, this difference of opinion has occasionally led to conflict between the two
branches in the appointment process arena. Whereas Senators may sometimes block confirmation
of a nominee who is perceived to lack sufficient qualifications, the President may use his recess
appointment power to sidestep the Senate and install his preferred nominee. Although this
dynamic might be suboptimal for the smooth functioning of the federal bureaucracy, for
Congress, and for the President, it is part of a larger pattern of give and take between the
President and Congress in areas of shared constitutional power. For the moment, interbranch
conflicts concerning statutory qualifications are likely to be resolved in the political realm.
If establishing such standards became a legislative priority, Congress would have a number of
options for asserting its prerogatives in this area. These options include a continuation of present
ad hoc practices, establishment of agency-wide or government-wide standards, and the
establishment, in the Senate, of confirmation standards. The success of statutory qualifications
and confirmation standards as a means of ensuring competent leadership of the federal

⁶⁵^{U.S. C}^ong^re^{ss, Se}^na^te^Com^m^itte^e^{on G}^o^v^e^rnm^e^nta^l^Aff^a^irs,^Pr^incⁱ^pal^Re^c^o^m^m^e^nd^atio^ns^aⁿ^d^Fin^dⁱ^ngs^{of t}^h^e^St^udy
^{on Fe}^de^r^a^{l Re}^g^u^l^a^tio^n,^Vol^u^m^e^s^I^-^V^I^{, p.}¹⁰^.

bureaucracy would depend on adherence to them during the selection and confirmation processes,
and successful political resolution of interbranch conflicts as they arise.

Table A-1. Examples of Department and Agency Leadership Positions with Statutory Qualification Requirements
^Position^a^Provision(s)^General^{Requirement or}
^{(Executive Schedule Lev}^el)^Restriction
^{Secretary of Defe}^{nse, Departme}^{nt of}^{... appointed from civilian l}^ife..^{.. A}^person^{may not}^{be ap}^{pointed as}^{Secretary of Defe}^{nse within}¹⁰^y^ears^{• Military restriction}
^{Defense (I)}^{after relief from active d}^{uty as a}^c^{ommissioned officer of a regular}^{component of a}ⁿ^armed^{force. [1}⁰
^U.S.C^{. § 113(a)]}
^{Director of National Intelligence, Office of}^{... shall have extensive national se}^{curity ex}^{pertise. [5}^{0 U.S.C. § 403]}^{• E}^xpertise
^{the Director of National Intelligence (I)}^{Not more tha}^{n one of [t}^{he Direc}^{tor of National Intelligence and t}^{he Principal Dep}^{uty Director of}^{• Military restriction}
^{National Intelligence] may be a}^c^{ommissioned officer of the Arme}^{d Forces in active status. ... It is the}
^{sense of Congre}^{ss that,}^{under or}^{dinary circumsta}^{nces, it is desirab}^{le that one of the}^{individuals serving}
^{[as the Director of National I}^{ntelligence and the Princi}^{pal Deputy}^{Director of National Intelligence] ... be}
^{a commissioned officer of the Ar}^{med Forces, in active status; or ... have, by t}^{raining or e}^xperie^nce,^an
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33886}^appre^{ciation of military intell}^{igence activities and req}^{uirements. [}⁵⁰^U.S.C.^{§ 403-3a]}
^g/w^{Under Secretary}^{for Acq}^uisition,^{... shall be appointed from among}^persons^{who ha}^{ve an e}^xte^nsive^management^backg^{round in t}^he^p^rivate^{• Related}
^s^.or^{Technology, and Logistics}^{sector. [10 U.S.C. § 133(a)]}^backgrou^nd
^le^ak^Department^{of Defense}^(II)
^://wiki^{Administrator, Federal Aviati}^on^{Administration, Department of}^{... the President shall consider th}^{e fitness of t}^{he individual to carry}^{out efficiently the d}^{uties and}^powers^{of the office.... The administrator must—(1) b}^e^{a citizen of the U}^{nited States; (2) be a civilian; and (3}⁾^{• Fitness}^{• U.S. citi}^zenship
^h^ttp^{Transportation (II)}^{have ex}^perien^{ce in a field directly related to aviation. [49 U.S.C}^{. §}¹⁰⁶⁽^{b) and (c)]}^{• Military restriction}
^{• Related experie}^nce
^{Principal Deputy Director of}^Nat^ional^...shal^{l have exte}^{nsive national se}^{curity ex}^perien^{ce and ma}^nageme^{nt ex}^{pertise ... [and] shall not, wh}^{ile so}^{• Related experie}^nce
^{Intelligence, Office of the Directo}^{r of}^{serving, serve in}^{any ca}^{pacity in a}^{ny other}^{element of t}^{he intelligence community.... Not more than}^one^{• E}^xpertise
^{National Intelligence (II)}^{of [the Director and Principal De}^{puty Director of}^{National Intelligence] may}^{be a commissioned off}^icer^{• Concu}^rrent
^{of the Armed Forces i}ⁿ^{active sta}^{tus. ... It is the sense of Cong}^ress^{that, unde}^{r ordinary circ}^umstan^c^{es, it}^employment
^{is desirable that one of t}^{he individuals serving [as t}^{he Director of}^{National Intelligence and the P}^rin^cipal^restriction
^{Deputy Director of}^{National Inte}^{lligence] ..}^{. be a commissioned officer of the Arm}^{ed Forces, in active}^{• Military restriction}
^{status; or ... have, by training or}^e^xperien^{ce, an a}^ppre^{ciation of mili}^{tary intelligence activities and}
^requirem^{ents. [5}^{0 U.S.C. § 403-3}^a]
^{Director, Office of Federal Housing}^{... shall be appointed ... from amo}^{ng individuals who are citizens of}^{the United States, have a}^{• U.S. citi}^zenship
^Enter^{prise O}^{versight, Depart}^men^{t of}^{demonstrated u}^{nderstanding of}^{financial manageme}^{nt or oversight,}^{and have a}^demonstrated^{• Related knowledge}
^{Housing and Ur}^ban^Development^(II)^understa^{nding of mortgage sec}^uri^{ty markets a}^{nd housing}^finan^{ce. An individual may not be a}^ppoint^{ed as}^{• Prior employment}
^{Director if the individual has serv}^{ed as an e}^{xecutive officer}^{or director of an en}^terp^{rise at any}^time^restriction

^{during the}^3-year^{period ending u}^{pon the}^{nomination of su}^{ch individual for appointme}^{nt as Director}^{. [12}
^U.S.C^{. § 4512(a)]}

^Position^a^Provision(s)^General^{Requirement or}
^{(Executive Schedule Lev}^el)^Restriction
^{Director, Institute of Edu}^{cation Sciences,}^{... shall be selected from individua}^{ls who are highly}^{qualified authorities in the fields of scientifically valid}^{• Aut}^{hority in}
^Department^{of Education (I}^I)^researc^{h, statistics, or evaluation in education, as well as managem}^{ent within s}^uch^{areas, and}^{have a}^{specified fields}
^{demonstrated capacity}^{for sustai}^{ned productivity a}^{nd leaders}^{hip i}ⁿ^these^{areas. [2}^{0 U.S.C. § 9514(}^d)]^{• Related}
^{demonstrated ability}
^{Administrator, Federal Emergenc}^y^{... shall be appointed from among}^{individuals who have ... a demonstrated ability in and knowledge of}^{• Related}
^Manageme^{nt Agen}^{cy, Departme}ⁿ^t^of^emergency^manage^{ment a}^{nd hom}^{eland security; and ... not less tha}^{n 5 y}^{ears of e}^{xecutive leaders}^hip^and^{demonstrated ability}
^{Homeland Security (II)}^management^ex^perience^{in the}^p^{ublic or private se}^{ctor. [6 U.S.C.}^{§ 313(c)(2)]}^{• Related knowledge}
^{• Related experie}^nce
^{Controller, Office of Federal Fina}^ncial^{... shall be appointed from among}^{individuals who possess—(1) demonstrated ability and pra}^ctical^{• Related}
^Manageme^{nt, Office of}^Managem^{ent and}^experie^{nce in acco}^{unting, fina}^{ncial management, and}^{financial syste}^{ms; and (2) ext}^ensive^practical^{demonstrated ability}
^{Budget, Exec}^{utive Office of t}^{he P}^resident^experie^{nce in fina}^{ncial manageme}^{nt in large gover}^{nmental or}^busin^{ess entities. [31 U.S.C. § 504(b)]}^{• Related experie}^nce
^(III)
^{Archivist of the U}^{nited States, National}^{... shall be appointed without reg}^{ard to political affi}^liat^{ions and solely on the ba}^{sis of the}^profession^al^{• Apolitical}
^{Archives and Records Administra}^{tion (III)}^{qualifications required to}^perfor^{m the duties a}^{nd res}^{ponsibilities of the office of Arc}^{hivist. [44 U.S.C. §}^appointment
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33886}²¹⁰^3(a)]^{• Related}
^g/w^{qualifications}
^s^.or^{Deputy Director for Dema}^{nd Re}^duction,^{... the President shall take into consideration the scientific, educati}^{onal or professional backgrou}^nd^{of the}^{• Related}
^le^ak^{Office of National Drug Cont}^{rol Pol}^icy,^individual^{, and whethe}^{r the indivi}^{dual has ex}^perienc^{e in th}^{e fields of substa}^{nce a}^buse^pre^vention,^backgrou^nd
^Exec^{utive Office of t}^{he President}^(III)^{education, or treatment. [2}^{1 U.S.C. § 1703(a)(1)]}^{• Related experie}^nce
^://wiki^{Under Secretary}^{for Health, Dep}^{artment of}^{... shall be appointed without reg}^{ard to political affi}^liat^{ion or activi}^{ty and solely—(A) on the basis of}^{• Apolitical}
^h^ttp^{Veterans Affairs}^(III)^{demonstrated ability in the medic}^{al profession, in health-care admi}^{nistration and policy formulation, or in}^appointment
^{health-care fiscal ma}^{nagement; a}ⁿ^d^{(B) on the basis of s}^ubsta^{ntial experien}^{ce in con}^{nection with t}^h^e^{• Related}
^{programs of t}^{he Vetera}^{ns Health}^{Administration or programs of si}^{milar content and sco}^{pe. [38}^U.S.^{C. §}^{demonstrated ability}
^305(a)(2)]^{• Related experie}^nce
^{Under Secretary}^{for Bene}^{fits, Departme}^{nt of}^{... shall be appointed without reg}^{ard to political affi}^liat^{ion or activi}^{ty and solely on the}^{basis of}^{• Apolitical}
^{Veterans Affairs}^(III)^{demonstrated ability in—(1) fiscal management; a}^{nd (2) the}^{administration of programs}^{within the}^appointment
^{Veterans Bene}^{fits Administration or programs of}^{similar content a}^{nd scope. [3}^{8 U.S.C. § 306(a)]}^{• Related}
^{demonstrated ability}
^{Under Secretary}^{for Science, De}^partme^{nt of}^{... shall be appointed from among}^persons^{who—(A) have e}^xten^{sive backgrou}^{nd in scientific or}^{• Related}
^Energ^{y (III)}^engineering^{fields; and (B) are well qualified to manage the civilian researc}^{h and developme}^{nt p}^rograms^backgrou^nd
^{of the Depart}^{ment. [4}^{2 U.S.C. §}⁷¹³^2(b)(3)]^{• Related}
^{qualifications}

^Position^a^Provision(s)^General^{Requirement or}
^{(Executive Schedule Lev}^el)^Restriction
^{Under Secretary}^{for N}^uclear^{... shall be appointed from among}^persons^{who—(A) have e}^xten^{sive backgrou}^{nd in national sec}^urity,^{• Related}
^{Security/Administrator, National Nuclear}^{organizational management, and a}^pprop^{riate tech}^{nical fields; and (B}^{) are well qualified to manage the}^backgrou^nd
^{Security Administration, Depart}^{ment of}^{nuclear wea}^{pons, non}^{proliferation, and materials disposition programs of the}^{National Nuclear Sec}^urity^{• Related}
^Energ^{y (III)}^{Administration in a manne}^{r that}^{advances and}^{protects t}^he^{national security of the}^{United States. [42}^{qualifications}
^U.S.C^{. § 7132(c)(2)]}
^{Director, Office of Thrift Supe}^rvision,^{... shall be appointed ... from amo}^{ng individuals who are citizens of}^{the United States. [12}^U.S.C.^{• U.S. citi}^zenship
^Department^{of the Trea}^sury^(III)¹⁴⁶^2a(c)(1)]
^{Commissioner of Inter}^{nal Reven}^ue,^{... appointment shall be made f}^{rom individuals who, among other qualifications, have a demonstrat}^ed^{• Related}
^Department^{of the Trea}^sury^(III)^{ability in management. [2}^{6 U.S.C.}^{§ 780}^3(a)(1)(A)]^{demonstrated ability}
^{Deputy Administrator, Federal Aviation}^{... must be a citizen of the U}^{nited States and have}^ex^{perience in}^{a f}^{ield d}^{irectly related to aviati}^{on. An}^{• U.S. citi}^zenship
^{Administration, Department of}^{officer on active duty in}^{an ar}^me^{d force may b}^e^ap^{pointed as Dep}^{uty Administrator. However, if th}^e^{• Related experie}^nce
^{Transportation (IV)}^{Administrator is a former reg}^ular^{officer of an ar}^{med force, the D}^{eputy Administrator}^{may not}^be^an^{• Military restriction}
^{officer on active duty in}^{an ar}^me^{d force, a retired regular officer}^{of an armed forc}^{e, or a former}^r^egular
^{officer of an arm}^{ed force. [4}^{9 U.S.C. § 106(d)(1)]}
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33886}^{Commissioner for Education Stat}^istics,^{... shall}^..^{. have su}^{bstantial knowledge of programs assisted}^{by th}^e^{National Center for}^Education^{• Related knowledge}
^g/w^{National Center for}^{Education St}^atistics,^{Statistics. [20 U.S.C}^{. § 9517(b)]}
^s^.or^Department^{of Education (IV)}
^le^ak
^{Assistant Secretary}^{for Immigrati}^{on and}^{... shall have a minimum of 5 yea}^r^s^{professional ex}^perience^{in law}^enforceme^{nt, and a minimu}^{m of}^{5 years}^{• Related experie}^nce
^://wiki^{Customs E}^nforceme^{nt Depa}^rtme^{nt of}^{Homeland Security (IV)}^{of management}^ex^{perience. [}⁶^U.S.C.^{§ 252(a)(2)(B)]}
^h^ttp
^{Director of Operational Test and}^Evaluation,^{... [shall be] appointed from civilia}^{n life[,] ... w}^{ithout regard to politi}^{cal affiliati}^{on and solely on the ba}^{sis of}^{• Apolitical}
^Department^{of Defense}^(IV)^{fitness to pe}^{rform t}^{he duties of t}^{he office of Director. [10 U.S.C. § 139(a)(1)]}^appointment
^{• Fitness}
^{Administrator, Economic Regulatory}^{... shall be, by demonstrated ability, background, training, or e}^xpe^{rience, an individual who is specially}^{• Related}
^{Administration, Department of E}^{nergy (IV)}^{qualified to assess fairly the}^need^{s and concer}^{ns of all interests}^aff^{ected by Federal ene}^rgy^{policy. [}⁴²^{demonstrated ability}
^U.S.C^{. § 7136(a)]}^{• Related}
^backgrou^nd
^{Principal Deputy Administrator,}^National^{... shall be appointed from among}^persons^{who ha}^{ve exte}^nsive^bac^{kground in orga}^{nizational management}^{• Related}
^{Nuclear Sec}^{urity Administration,}^{and are well qualified to manage t}^{he n}^{uclear wea}^{pons, non}^{proliferation, and materials dispositi}^on^backgrou^nd
^Department^{of E}^{nergy (IV)}^{programs of t}^{he Administration in a man}^ner^{that adva}^{nces a}^{nd pr}^{otects the national sec}^{urity of th}^e^{• Related}
^{United States. [50 U.S.C. § 2403(a)(2)]}^{qualifications}
^{Chief Medical Officer, Departm}^e^{nt of}^{... shall possess a demonstrated ability in and knowledge of medici}^{ne and}^pu^{blic health. [6 U.S.C. §}^{• Related}
^{Homeland Security (IV)}³²¹^e(b)^{demonstrated ability}
^{• Related knowledge}

^Position^a^Provision(s)^General^{Requirement or}
^{(Executive Schedule Lev}^el)^Restriction
^{Chief Financial Officers (IV)}^{... shall}^..^{. be appointed or designa}^{ted, as applicable, from among in}^{dividuals who possess demonstra}^ted^{• Related}
^{ability in general manageme}^{nt of,}^{and knowledge of and exte}^nsive^{practical exp}^{erience in}^financial^{demonstrated ability}
^management^pra^{ctices in large go}^vernme^{ntal or b}^{usiness e}^{ntities. [31 U.S.C. § 901(a)(3)]}^{• Related knowledge}
^{• Related experie}^nce
^Inspe^{ctors Ge}^{neral (IV)}^{... shall be appointed ... without regard to political affi}^liat^{ion and solely on the basis of integrity}^a^nd^{• Apolitical}
^{demonstrated ability in accountin}^{g, auditing, financial analysis, law}^{, management}^{analysis, pu}^blic^appointment
^{administration, or investigations.}^{[5 U.S.C. App. § 3(a)]}^{• Specified characte}^r
^trait
^{• Related}
^{demonstrated ability}
^Membe^{rs, National Indian Ga}^min^g^{No individual shall be eligible for}^{any ap}^{pointment to, or to contin}^{ue service on, t}^{he Commission, who ...}^{• Felony conviction}
^{Commission, Department of the}^Interior^{has bee}^{n convicted of a}^{felony or}^{gaming offense.... [25 U.S.C. §2704(b)(5)]}^restriction
^{(Rate equal to V - Chair is rate e}^{qual to IV)}
^{Director, United States Fish and Wild}^life^{No individual may be appointed a}^s^{the Director u}^nless^{he is, by re}^{ason of scientific education and}^{• Related education}
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33886}^{Service, Department of t}^{he I}^nteri^{or (V)}^experie^{nce, knowledgeable in the}^{principles of fis}^{heries and wildlife manageme}^{nt. [16}^U.S.C.^{§ 742}^b(b)]^{• Related experie}^nce
^g/w^{• Related knowledge}
^s^.or^{Chief Scientist, National Oceanic and}^{... shall be an individual who is, by reason of scientific edu}^{cation an}^{d experien}^{ce, knowledgeable in t}^he^{• Related education}
^le^ak^{Atmospheric Administration, Departme}^{nt of}^{principles of oceanic, atmosp}^heri^{c, or other scientific disciplines important to t}^{he work of t}^he^{• Related experie}^nce
^{Commerce (V)}^{Administration. [Reorganizat}^{ion Plan No. 4 of 19}^{70, § 2(d); 1}⁵^{U.S.C. § 1511}^note]^{• Related knowledge}
^://wiki^{Surgeon Ge}^{neral, Public Health S}^ervice,^{... shall be appointed from individ}^{uals who (1) are}^membe^{rs of th}^e^{Regular Corps, and (2)}^have^{• Corps me}^mber^ship
^h^ttp^Department^{of Health a}^{nd Hu}^ma^{n Services}^b^{specialized training or significant experie}^{nce in}^pu^{blic health p}^rogr^{ams. [42 U.S.C. § 205]}^{• Related training}
^{• Related experie}^nce
^{United States Marshals}^c^{Each ma}^{rshal s}^{hall reside within the district for which}^suc^{h ma}^rsha^{l is appointed, except t}^{hat—(1) t}^he^{• Residency}
^{marshal for t}^{he District of Columbia, for the Su}^{perior Court of t}^{he District of Columbia, and for t}^he^requirem^ent
^{Southern District of Ne}^{w York}^{may reside within 2}⁰^{miles of the}^{district for which t}^{he mars}^{hal is}^{• Related experie}^nce
^{appointed; and (2) a}^{ny mars}^{hal ap}^{pointed for the}^Northe^rn^Marian^{a Islands who at t}^{he same time is}^{• Related education}

^{serving as ma}^{rshal in a}^{nother dist}^{rict may reside in s}^{uch ot}^{her dist}^{rict. [28 U.S.C. § 561(e)]}
^{Each ma}^{rshal ... should have—(1)}^{a minimum of}^{4 years}^{of comma}^{nd-level law enforcement ma}^nage^ment
^{duties, including person}^{nel, budg}^{et, and accounta}^{ble prope}^{rty issu}^{es, in a police department, s}^heriff^’s
^{office or Federal law enforcemen}^{t agency; (2) e}^xpe^{rience in coord}^{inating with other law e}^nforceme^nt
^{agencies, particularly at t}^{he State}^{and local level; (3) co}^llege-^{level a}^{cademic experie}^{nce; and (4)}
^experie^{nce in or with}^{county, Sta}^{te, and Federal court system}^{s or}^experie^{nce with}^{protection of co}^urt
^person^{nel, jurors, and witnesses.}^{[28 U.S.C. § 561(i)]}

^Position^a^Provision(s)^General^{Requirement or}
^{(Executive Schedule Lev}^el)^Restriction
^{United States Attorneys and As}^sistant^d^{Each U}^{nited States attorney s}^{hall reside in the district for w}^{hich h}^e^{is appointed, exce}^{pt that t}^hese^{• Residency}
^Attorneys^{officers of the District of Columb}^{ia, the Southern District of N}^ew^{York, and the Easte}^{rn District of}^New^requirem^ent
^{York may reside within 2}⁰^miles^{thereof. Eac}^{h assistant U}^{nited States attorney s}^{hall reside in the district}
^{for which}^{he or s}^{he is ap}^{pointed or within 25}^{miles thereof. The}^p^{rovisions of this subse}^{ction shall not}
^{apply to any U}^{nited States attorn}^{ey or assistant U}^{nited States attorney a}^{ppointed for t}^{he Nort}^herⁿ
^{Mariana Islands w}^{ho at th}^{e same}^{time is serving in th}^{e same ca}^paci^{ty in anothe}^{r district. Pursua}^{nt to an}
^{order from the Attor}^ney^Gene^ra^{l or his designee, a United States attorney or an}^{assistant U}^{nited States}
^{attorney may}^{be assigned d}^{ual or additi}^{onal responsibilities that ex}^{empt s}^{uch office}^{r from t}^{he reside}^ncy
^requirem^{ent in t}^{his su}^{bsection fo}^{r a specific}^{period as established}^{by the}^{order and s}^{ubject to re}^ne^wal.
^{[28 U.S.C. 545(a)]}
^Source:^{Developed by Cong}^ress^{ional Research Service from infor}^{mation obtained from the}^{United States}^Code^.
^a.^Positi^{ons are arra}^{nged by}^Ex^ecuti^{ve Schedule Level.}
^b.^{The Surgeon}^Gene^{ral is compens}^{ated as a commissioned officer at Level O-9. (See 37 U.S.C. 201.)}
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33886}^c.^{“The majority of USMs [U.S. Marshals] enter}^{at the}^GS-15^{level. USMs in the}^Gene^{ral Schedule (Gr}^{ade 15) start}^{with a ba}^{se rate}⁽ⁱⁿ²⁰⁰^{6) of $}^91,5^{07, to whic}^{h is}
^g/w^{automatically added the appropri}^{ate amount of locality pay. USMs}^{may go to the Step}^{10 a}^{fter six}^m^{onths in t}^{he position. The GS}^-15^{Step 10}^{rate is $}¹¹^8,95^{7 (in}
^s^.or²⁰⁰^{6), to which is also added loc}^{ality pay. There are}^{32 locality pa}^{y areas nationwide that adjust}^{salaries from 1}^2.52^{% to 2}^8.6^{8%. Th}^{ere are c}^urre^{ntly 2}⁷^{Senior Level}^Marshal^{positions at some of the}^{larger, more complex USMS District Offices arou}^{nd the}^{nation. The salary of t}^hese^{27 USMs}^begiⁿ^s^{at $1}^09,8⁰⁸^{(in 20}^{06), to whic}^h^is
^le^ak^{added their locality pay. Advancement th}^rough^{the Senior Le}^{vel pa}^{y range to a ma}^ximum^$1^43,0^00,^{including locality pay, is base}^{d on success}^{ful pe}^rforman^{ce as USM}
^://wiki^{for one year. The De}^{puty Attor}ⁿ^{ey Gen}^{eral is authorized to app}^r^{ove this pay inc}^{rease.” (U.S. Marshals Service, Office of Congre}^ssio^{nal Affairs, document}^providing^{nomination process, q}^{ualification,}^{and job description information,}^{obtained December}^28,²⁰^06.)
^h^ttp^d.^{“Subject to sections 5}³¹⁵^th^roug^{h 5}³¹⁷^{of title 5, the Attor}^{ney G}^{eneral shall fix t}^{he an}^{nual salaries}^{of United States attorney}^{s, assist}^{ant United States attorney}^{s, and}
^{attorneys ap}^{pointed u}^{nder section 5}^{43 of t}^{his title at rates of com}^pensation^{not in exces}^{s of the}^rat^{e of basic compe}^{nsation p}^r^ovided^{for Ex}^{ecutive Le}^{vel IV of the}
^Exec^{utive Schedule set}^{forth in}^s^{ection 53}^{15 of title 5, United States Code” (28 U.S.C. § 548).}
Table A-2. Examples of Positions on Independent Collegial Bodies with Statutory Qualification Requirements
^Agency^a^(Executive^{General Requirement or}
^{Schedule Level of}^Provision(s)^Restriction
^Members)
^{Commodity Futures Trading}^{... [T]he President shall (i) select}^{persons w}^{ho shall each}^{have dem}^{onstrated knowledge in fut}^ures^{• Demonstrated k}^{nowledge in}
^{Commission (IV - Chair is III)}^{trading or its regulation, or the p}^{roduction, merchandising, proces}^{sing or distribution of one or mo}^{re of}^{related areas, balanced among}
^{the commodities or other goods and articles, services, rights, and interests}^{covered by}^{this Act; a}^{nd (ii)}^members
^{seek to ens}^{ure t}^{hat the de}^monst^{rated knowledge of the Commiss}^{ioners is balanced with r}^espect^t^o^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel

^{such a}^{reas. Not more t}^{han t}^hree^{of the mem}^{bers of t}^{he Commission shall be mem}^{bers of}^{the sa}^me
^politica^{l party. [7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(}^A)]

^Agency^a^(Executive^{General Requirement or}
^{Schedule Level of}^Provision(s)^Restriction
^Members)
^{Consumer Product}^Safety^{In making s}^u^c^h^ap^{pointments, t}^h^e^{President shall consider individuals who, by reason of t}^heir^{• Related backgrou}^{nd and ex}^perti^se
^{Commission (IV - Chair is III)}^backgrou^{nd and e}^{xpertise in}^area^{s related to consumer}^product^{s a}^{nd protection of th}^{e p}^{ublic from}^risks
^{to safety, are q}^{ualified to serve as member}^{s of the}^{Commission. [15 U.S.C.}^{§ 205}^3(a)]
^{Not more tha}^{n th}^{ree of the}^{Commissioners shall be affiliated with the same}^{political party. [15 U.S.}^{C. §}^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
²⁰⁵^3(c)]
^{Defense N}^{uclear Facilities}^{The Board shall be composed of}^{five member}^{s ap}^{pointed from civilian life .}^{.. from among United States}^{• Military restriction}
^{Safety Board (III)}^{citizens who are res}^{pected e}^xper^{ts in the}^{field of nuclear safet}^{y with a demonstrated}^compete^{nce a}^nd^{• U.S. citi}^zenship
^{knowledge relevant to the inde}^pe^{ndent investigative and over}^sight^{functions of t}^{he Board. Not mor}^e^{• Related demonstrated compete}^nce
^{than t}^{hree m}^embe^{rs of the}^{Board shall be of the sa}^{me political party. [42 U.S.C. § 2286(}^b)(1)]^{and knowledge}
^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^{Election Assistance}^{Each m}^embe^{r of the}^{Commission shall have ex}^perien^{ce with or e}^x^{pertise in election administration}^or^{• Related experie}^{nce or e}^xpertis^e
^{Commission (IV)}^{the study of}^{elections. [42 U.S.C.}^{§ 153}^23(a)(3)]
^{As designated by t}^{he President at}^{the time of nomination, of the}^m^embers^{first ap}^{pointed—(A) two of}^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33886}^{the mem}^{bers (}^{not more tha}^{n on}^{e of whom may}^{be affiliated with the same}^{political party) shall be}^{appointed for a te}^{rm of 2}^years;^{and (B) two of the membe}^{rs (not}^{more than}^{one of w}^{hom may b}^e
^g/w^{affiliated with the same political party) shall be ap}^{pointed for a te}^r^m^{of 4 yea}^{rs.... A vacancy on the}
^s^.or^{Commission shall be filled in the manne}^{r in whic}^{h the}^{original app}^{ointment was made a}^{nd shall be}
^le^ak^{subject to an}^{y conditions which a}^{pplied with respe}^{ct to the origina}^{l appointment. [4}^{2 U.S.C. § 1532}^3(b)]
^://wiki^{Equal Employment}^Opport^{unity Commission (IV}^{... [T]he Equal Em}^{ployment O}^ppo^{rtunity Commission ... shall be composed of five mem}^{bers, not mo}^re^{than t}^{hree of w}^{hom shall be}^me^{mbers of t}^{he same}^{political party. [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-}^4(a)]^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^h^ttp^{- Chair is III)}
^Export-I^{mport Ban}^{k Board}^{Of the}^{five mem}^{bers of t}^{he Boar}^{d, not more than t}^hree^{shall be}^members^{of any o}^{ne political party. [12}^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^{of Directors (IV - Chair is III)}^U.S.C^{. § 635a(c)(2)]}
^{Farm Credit Administration}^{The Board shall consist of three}^{members, w}^{ho shall be citizens o}^f^{the U}^{nited States and broadly}^{• U.S. citi}^zenship
^{(IV- Chair is III)}^represe^{ntative of th}^{e p}^{ublic inter}^est...^{. Not more than two me}^mb^{ers of the Board s}^{hall be mem}^ber^{s of}^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^{the same}^{political party. [12 U.S.}^{C. § 2242(a)]}
^{The President shall ap}^{point mem}^{bers of t}^{he Board who—(1) are}^experie^{nced or knowledgeable in}^{• Related knowledge, experience,}^or
^{agricultural economics and fina}^nc^{ial reporting and disclosure; (2) a}^{re ex}^{perienced or k}^{nowledgeable in}^backgrou^nd
^{the reg}^{ulation of financial entities; or (3) have a st}^{rong fina}^{ncial, le}^{gal, or regulatory backgrou}^{nd. [1}²
^U.S.C^{. § 2242(e)]}
^{Federal Communications}^{Each m}^embe^{r of the}^{Commission shall be a citizen of the U}^{nited States...}^{. The maximum}^num^{ber of}^{• U.S. citi}^zenship
^{Commission (IV - Chair is III)}^{commissioners who may}^{be mem}^{bers of t}^{he same}^{political party shall be a n}^umbe^{r eq}^{ual to the lea}^st^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel

^num^{ber of commissioners}^which^{constitute a majority of the f}^{ull members}^{hip of t}^{he Commission. [47}
^U.S.C^{. § 154(b)]}

^Agency^a^(Executive^{General Requirement or}
^{Schedule Level of}^Provision(s)^Restriction
^Members)
^{Federal Deposit Insura}^nce^{The manageme}^{nt of t}^{he Corpora}^{tion shall be vested in a Board of}^{Directors consisting of 5 mem}^be^rs—^{• U.S. citi}^zenship
^{Corporation Board of}^{(A) 1 of whom shall be t}^{he Com}^{ptroller of the Cu}^rren^{cy; (B) 1 of}^{whom shall be t}^{he Director of t}^he^{• Related experie}^{nce for at least}^one
^{Directors (IV - Chair is III)}^{Office of Thrift Su}^{pervision; and (}^{C) 3 of whom s}^{hall be ap}^{pointed ... from among individuals who are}^director
^{citizens of the United States, 1 of}^{whom shall have State}^bank^su^pe^{rvisory exp}^{erience.... [N]ot more}
^than^{3 of the}^mem^{bers of t}^{he Board of Directors may be}^membe^r^s^{of the same}^{political party. [12}^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^U.S.C^{. § 1812(a)]}
^{Federal Election Commission}^{No more tha}^{n 3}^membe^{rs of th}^e^{Commission appointed under}^thi^{s paragra}^ph^{may b}^e^{affiliated with the}^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^(IV)^{same political party. [2 U.S.C.}^{§ 437c(a)(1)]}
^Membe^{rs shall be}^chosen^{on the}^{basis of their e}^xpe^{rience, integrit}^{y, impartiality, and goo}^{d judgment and}^{• E}^xperie^nce
^{... shall be indivi}^{duals who, at the time appointed to the Commission, are not elected or ap}^pointed^{• Specified characte}^{r traits}
^{officers or employees in t}^{he e}^xec^{utive, legislat}^{ive, or judicia}^{l branc}^{h of the Federal}^Governm^{ent. [2}^{• Not pa}^{rt of the}^federal
^U.S.C^{. § 437c(a)(3)]}^government
^{Federal Energy Reg}^ulatory^{Not more tha}^{n th}^{ree mem}^{bers o}^f^{the Commission shall be m}^emb^{ers of the}^{same political party. [4}²^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^{Commission (IV - Chair is III)}^U.S.C^{. § 7171(b)(1)]}^{• Demonstrated a}^{bility, background,}
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33886}^{The Chairman a}^{nd mem}^{bers of}^t^{he Commission shall be individuals who, by demonst}^{rated ability,}^{training, or expe}^rience
^g/w^backgrou^{nd, training, or expe}^rien^{ce, are specially qualified to assess fairly the}^{needs and con}^cern^{s of}^all
^s^.or^{interests aff}^{ected by}^{Federal ener}^{gy policy. [42 U.S.C. § 7134]}
^le^ak
^{Federal Housing Finance}^{The directors appointed ... shall be from among}^persons^{with ext}^e^{nsive ex}^perience^{or training in}^{• Related extensive e}^xpe^rience,
^://wiki^{Board (IV - Chair is III)}^{housing fina}^{nce or with a}^{commitment to p}^{roviding specialized ho}^{using credit.... Not more than 3}^{directors shall be mem}^{bers of t}^h^e^{same political party. Not more}^than^{1 ap}^{pointed director shall b}^e^{training, or commitment}^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^h^ttp^{from any single district of th}^{e Federal Home Loan Bank Syste}^m....^{At least 1 director shall be c}^hoseⁿ^{• Geogra}^{phic rest}^riction
^{from an orga}^{nization with more than a}^2-year^{history of re}^prese^{nting cons}^{umer or comm}^{unity inte}^r^ests^{• Specified affiliation for at least 1}
^{on banking}^{services, credit needs,}^{housing, or fina}^{ncial consumer}^p^{rotections. [12 U.S.C. § 1422a(b)}^]^director
^{Federal Labor Relations}^{The Federal Labor Relations Aut}^{hority is composed of three}^mem^{bers, not more t}^han^{2 of w}^hom^may^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^{Authority (V - Chair is IV)}^{be adhere}^{nts of t}^{he same}^politica^{l party. [5 U.S.C. § 7104(a)]}
^{Federal Maritime}^{Not more tha}^{n 3 Commissioners}^{may be a}^{ppointed f}^{rom the sa}^me^{political party. [46 U.S.C. § 301(b)]}^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^{Commission (IV - Chair is III)}
^{Federal Mine Safety and}^{The Commission shall consist of five member}^{s, appointed ... from among perso}^{ns who}^{by reaso}^{n of}^{• Related training, education, or}
^{Health Review Commission}^{training, education, or expe}^rienc^{e are q}^{ualified to carry out the}^fu^{nctions of the Commission.... [30}^experie^nce
^{(IV - Chair is III)}^U.S.C^{. § 823(a)]}
^{Federal Reserve System}^{In selecting t}^{he mem}^{bers of}^the^{Board, not more than one of w}^h^{om shall be selected from a}^{ny on}^e^{• Geogra}^{phic rest}^riction
^{Board of Governors (III}^-^{Federal Reserve district, the Pres}^{ident shall have due}^{regard to a f}^{air represe}^{ntation of the}^finan^cial,^{• Represe}^{ntation of sp}^ecified
^{Chair is II)}^{agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests, and geograp}^{hical divisi}^{ons of the cou}^{ntry. [1}^{2 U.S.C. §}^interests

²⁴¹^]

^Agency^a^(Executive^{General Requirement or}
^{Schedule Level of}^Provision(s)^Restriction
^Members)
^{Federal Trade Commission}^{Not more tha}^{n th}^{ree of the}^com^{missioners shall}^{be mem}^bers^{of t}^{he same}^{political party. [15 U.S.C}^{. §}^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^{(IV - Chair is III)}^41]
^{Merit System Protection}^{The Merit Systems P}^{rotection Board is composed of 3 mem}^bers^...^{, not more than}^{2 of w}^{hom may}^be^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^{Board (IV - Chair is III)}^adherents^{of the sa}^{me political party. The mem}^{bers of t}^{he Board s}^{hall be individuals who, by}^{• Related demonstrated ability,}
^{demonstrated ability, background}^{, training, or experien}^{ce are e}^spe^{cially qualified to carry out the}^backgrou^{nd, training, or expe}^rien^ce
^{functions of t}^{he Board. No mem}^{ber of t}^{he Board may hold anoth}^{er office or position in the}^{• Not pa}^{rt of the}^federal
^Governme^{nt of t}^{he United States}^{, except as ot}^{herwise p}^{rovided by law or at the direction of the}^government
^{President. [5 U.S.C.}^{§ 120}^1]
^{National Credit Union}^{The Board shall consist of three}^{members, w}^{ho are b}^{roadly repre}^{sentative of the}^pu^{blic interest....}^Not^{• Represe}^{ntative of p}^{ublic intere}^s^t
^{Administration (IV - Chair is}^{more than}^{two membe}^{rs of th}^e^{Board shall be membe}^{rs of the}^sa^{me political party...}^{. [T]he Presid}^ent^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^III)^{shall give consideration to indivi}^d^{uals who, by virt}^{ue of their ed}^uca^{tion, training, or experience}^relating^{• Consideration of related}
^{to a broad range of}^{financial servi}^{ces, financial services reg}^{ulation, or financial policy, are especially}^{education, training, or expe}^rienc^e
^{qualified to serve on the}^Board...^.^{Not more tha}^{n one me}^mbe^{r of t}^{he Board may be}^ap^{pointed to th}^e^{• Prior affiliation restriction for all}
^{Board from among individuals who, at the time of the a}^ppointment^{, are, or have rece}^{ntly bee}^{n, involved}^{but 1}^mem^ber
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33886}^{with any ins}^{ured c}^{redit union as}^{a committee member, director, officer, employee, or other institut}^ion-^{affiliated party. [12 U.S.C. § 1752}^a(b)]
^g/w
^s^.or^{National Mediation Board (IV}^{There is he}^{reby e}^{stablished ... the “National Mediation Board”, to}^{be composed of t}^{hree me}^mbe^rs^...^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^le^ak^{- Chair is III)}^{not more tha}^{n two of whom s}^{hall be of the sa}^{me political party. [4}^{5 U.S.C.}^{§ 154]}
^{National Transportation}^{Not more tha}^{n 3}^membe^{rs may}^{be ap}^{pointed from the}^same^polit^{ical party. At least 3 mem}^bers^sh^{all be}^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^://wiki^{Safety Board (IV - Chair is III)}^{appointed on th}^{e basis of tec}^hnic^{al qualification, professional standing, and demonstrated knowledge in}^{• Related technical q}^{ualifications,}
^h^ttp^{accident reconstr}^{uction, safety e}^{ngineering, h}^uman^{factors, tra}^nsp^{ortation safety, or trans}^portation^regulation.^{professional standing, and}^{demonstrated knowledge for at least}
^{[49 U.S.C. § 1111(b)]}^{3 mem}^bers
^{Nuclear Regulatory}^{There is established ... the N}^{uclear Regulatory Commission which}^{shall be composed of five me}^mb^ers,^{• U.S. citi}^zenship
^{Commission (III - Chair is II)}^{each of whom}^{shall be a citizen o}^f^{the U}^{nited States. [42 U.S.C. §}⁵⁸⁴^1(a)(1)]
^Appointment^{s of mem}^{bers ... shall be made in su}^{ch a}^man^{ner t}^hat^{not more tha}^{n th}^{ree mem}^{bers of}^the^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^{Commission shall be member}^{s of}^{the same}^{political party. [42 U.S.C. § 5841(}^b)(2)]
^Occu^{pational Safety and}^{The Commission shall be compo}^{sed of three m}^embe^{rs who s}^{hall be ap}^{pointed ... from among pers}^ons^{• Related training, education, or}
^{Health Review Commission}^{who by r}^{eason of training, edu}^cat^{ion, or experience a}^{re q}^{ualified to carry out t}^{he f}^{unctions of t}^he^experie^nce

^{(IV - Chair is III)}^{Commission under this Act. [}²⁹^U.S.C^{. § 661(a)]}

^Agency^a^(Executive^{General Requirement or}
^{Schedule Level of}^Provision(s)^Restriction
^Members)
^{Postal Regulatory}^{The Postal Regulatory Commissi}^{on is composed of 5 Commissioners.... [They] shall be chosen sole}^{ly on}^{• Related technical q}^{ualifications,}
^{Commission (IV - Chair is III)}^{the basis of t}^{heir tec}^{hnical q}^ualifi^{cations, professional standing, an}^{d demonstrated ex}^{pertise in}^{professional standing, and}
^{economics, accounting, law, or public administration...}^{. Each individual appointed to the Commission}^{demonstrated ex}^pertise
^{shall have the}^q^{ualifications and expertise}^necessa^{ry to car}^{ry out t}^{he en}^hanc^{ed respo}^{nsibilities acco}^rded^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^{Commissioners under t}^{he Postal Accountability and E}^nha^nceme^nt^{Act. Not more than}^{3 of t}^he
^{Commissioners may be adh}^erent^{s of the same}^{political party. [39}^U.S.C^{. 502(a)]}
^{Privacy and Civil Liberties}^{... shall be selected sole}^{ly on the}^{basis of their}^{professional qualific}^{ations, achievements, p}^{ublic statu}^re,^{• Related qualifications}
^{Oversight Board (IV: daily}^{expertise in}^{civil liberties and priv}^{acy, and relevant e}^xpe^{rience, and}^{without regard to political affiliat}^ion,^{• Related experie}^{nce and}
^{equivalent - Chair is I}^II)^{but in}^{no event}^{shall more tha}ⁿ³^member^{s of the}^{Board be mem}^b^{ers of the}^{same political party. [P.L.}^achievement
^110-^{53, § 8}^{01(a); 1}^{21 Stat. 3}^55]^{• Related knowledge}
^{• Apolitical appointment}
^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^Railroa^{d Retirement Board}^{One mem}^ber^{shall be a}^{ppointed f}^{rom recommendations made}^by^represe^{ntatives of t}^{he em}^{ployees and}^{• Two member}^{s from}
^{(IV - Chair is III)}^{one membe}^{r shall be a}^{ppointed f}^{rom recommendations made}^by^represe^{ntatives of em}^{ployers ..., i}ⁿ^{recommendations of sp}^ecified
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33886}^{both cases a}^s^{the P}^{resident shall}^{direct, so as to provide represe}ⁿ^{tation on the Board satisfactory t}^o^the^{largest num}^{ber, res}^{pectively, of e}^{mployees and em}^{ployers concer}ⁿ^{ed. One memb}^{er, who shall be}^{constituent g}^roups^{• Third memb}^{er ca}^{nnot b}^e^from
^g/w^{chairman of t}^{he Board, shall be a}^{ppointed without re}^{commendation by eithe}^{r employers or}^employees^{specified constituent g}^roup^s
^s^.or^{and shall not be in}^{the e}^mployme^{nt of or be}^pec^{uniarily or otherw}^{ise interested in any}^{employer or}
^le^ak^{organization of employees. [45 U}^.S.C^{. § 231f(a)]}
^://wiki^{Securities and E}^xcha^nge^{Commission (IV - Chair is III)}^{Not more tha}^{n th}^{ree ... commissi}^{oners shall be}^membe^{rs of t}^{he sa}^{me political party, and in making}^appointment^{s mem}^{bers of diffe}^re^{nt political parties shall be ap}^{pointed alternately as nea}^{rly as may}^b^e^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^{nel throu}^gh^{alternating ap}^pointments
^h^ttp^{practicable. [1}^{5 U.S.C. § 78d(a)]}
^{Surface Tra}^nsportation^{Not more tha}^{n 2}^membe^{rs may}^{be ap}^{pointed from the}^same^polit^{ical party.... At any given time, at least}^{• Politica}^{l balance on pa}^nel
^{Board (IV - Chair is III)}^{2 mem}^{bers of t}^{he Board shall be}^{individuals with professional stan}^{ding and demonstrated k}^{nowledge in}^{• Related professional standing an}^d
^{the fields of trans}^{portation or tra}^{nsportation reg}^{ulation, and at least one mem}^{ber s}^{hall be an individual}^{demonstrated knowledge for at least}
^{with professional or b}^usiness^ex^p^{erience (including agricultu}^{re) in}^{the p}^{rivate sector. [4}^{9 U.S.C. §}^{two board member}^s
⁷⁰¹⁽^b)]^{• Private sector e}^xpe^{rience for at}
^{least one membe}^r
^Source:^{Developed by Cong}^ress^{ional Research Service from infor}^{mation obtained from the}^{United States}^Code^.
^a.^{Agencies are ar}^{ranged alp}^habetic^ally.

^Hen^r^y^B^.^Ho^g^u^e
^An^al^y^s^{t i}ⁿ^Am^erican^Natⁱ^on^al^Gov^e^rnm^e^nt
^h^h^o^g^u^e^@^c^rs^.l^oc.g^o^v^{, 7-}⁰⁶⁴²