Unauthorized Employment in the United States: Issues and Options

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

As Congress considers immigration reform and ways to address the unauthorized alien
population, the issue of unauthorized employment is the focus of much discussion. The
unauthorized alien working population, like the unauthorized alien population generally, has been
growing steadily. There were an estimated 7.2 million unauthorized workers in the U.S. civilian
labor force in March 2005. It is widely accepted that most unauthorized aliens enter and remain in
the United States in order to work. Thus, eliminating employment opportunities for these aliens
has been seen as an approach to curtailing unauthorized immigration.
Provisions enacted by the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, which are
sometimes referred to as employer sanctions, made it unlawful for an employer to knowingly
hire, recruit or refer for a fee, or continue to employ an alien who is not authorized to work. It
also established a paper-based employment eligibility verification system, known as the I-9
system, which requires that employers examine documents presented by new hires to verify
identity and work eligibility, and complete and retain I-9 verification forms. There is general
agreement that the I-9 process has been undermined by fraud. Employers violating prohibitions
on unauthorized employment in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) may be subject to
civil or criminal penalties. The Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (DHS/ICE) is responsible for enforcing the INA prohibitions on unauthorized
employment.
Building on the employment verification system established by IRCA, the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) directed the Attorney General to
conduct three pilot programs for employment eligibility confirmation that were to be largely
voluntary. Under the Basic Pilot program, the only one of the three pilots still in operation,
participating employers verify new hires’ employment eligibility by accessing Social Security
Administration (SSA) and, if applicable, DHS databases.
A variety of options has been put forth to curtail unauthorized employment and related practices,
a selection of which is discussed in this report. Some of these options would build on the current
employment eligibility verification system; these include making electronic verification
mandatory, increasing existing penalties, or increasing resources for worksite enforcement.
Others represent new approaches to address unauthorized employment, such as shifting
responsibility for employment eligibility verification from employers to the federal government.
This report will be updated if developments warrant.

Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Estimates of Unauthorized Workers................................................................................................1
Prohibitions on Unauthorized Employment....................................................................................2
Basic Pilot Program.........................................................................................................................4
Worksite Enforcement.....................................................................................................................5
Options for Addressing Unauthorized Employment.......................................................................6
Mandatory Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification.....................................................6
Increased Penalties....................................................................................................................7
Unauthorized Employment.................................................................................................7
Unfair Immigration-Related Employment Practice............................................................7
New Penalty for Unauthorized Employees.........................................................................7
Increased Worksite Enforcement-Related Resources................................................................8
Data Sharing..............................................................................................................................8
Changes to Issuance and Acceptance of Documents.................................................................8
Government Responsibility for Employment Eligibility Verification.....................................10
Shift Focus to Enforcement of Workplace Protections...........................................................10
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 11
Table 1. Estimates of Unauthorized Employment in Selected Industries, 2005..............................2
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................12

In the past several years, as increasing public and congressional attention has been focused on the
unauthorized alien population in the United States, the issue of unauthorized employment has
come to the fore. Unauthorized employment, as used in this report, refers to the employment of
aliens who lack authorization to be employed in the United States. The term includes both those
who are in the country in violation of the law, as well as those in the country legally who ¹
nevertheless are not authorized to work. Despite the prohibitions against unauthorized
employment in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an estimated 7.2 million unauthorized
workers were in the U.S. civilian labor force in March 2005, representing about 5% of the labor ²
force.
For many years, it has been widely accepted that most unauthorized aliens enter and remain in the
United States in order to work. Thus, eliminating employment opportunities for these aliens has ^th
been seen as a key to curtailing unauthorized immigration. In the 109 Congress, both the House
and Senate passed major immigration bills that included significant provisions aimed at
preventing unauthorized employment. Legislation on unauthorized employment may be ^th
considered in the 110 Congress.

Based on data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and other sources, the Pew Hispanic
Center has estimated that the unauthorized resident alien population totaled 11.5 to 12 million in
March 2006, and that since 2000, this population has grown at an average annual rate of more ³
than 500,000 per year. Estimates by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) of the
unauthorized alien population and its growth are somewhat lower. Based on data from the 2004
American Community Survey and other sources, DHS has estimated that there were 10.5 million
unauthorized aliens residing in the United States in January 2005 and that the unauthorized ⁴
resident population grew at an average annual rate of 408,000 during the 2000-2004 period.
Unauthorized workers are a subpopulation of the total unauthorized alien population. According
to the Pew Hispanic Center, there were an estimated 7.2 million unauthorized workers in the U.S. ⁵
civilian labor force in March 2005. These workers represented about 5% of the labor force. In

¹^For^e^x^a^m^ple^,^a^num^be^r^of^c^a^t^eg^or^ie^s^of^tem^por^a^r^y^vⁱ^s^itor^s^{to t}^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, k}^now^{n a}^s^no^nim^m^ig^r^a^nts^,^a^r^e^no^t
^a^u^thor^iz^e^d^to^w^o^r^k^{. Se}^e^C^R^S^R^e^p^o^r^t^R^L³¹³⁸^1,^U^.^{S. I}^m^mⁱ^gr^ati^on^P^o^lic^y^on^Te^m^p^or^ar^y^Admⁱ^s^sⁱ^ons^,^by^Cha^d^{C. H}^a^dda^l
^a^{nd Ru}^th^Elle^{n W}^a^se^m^.
²^Jeff^re^{y S}^.^P^a^ssel,^Siz^e^an^{d C}^har^a^c^te^rⁱ^s^tic^s^{of the}^Uⁿ^aut^hor^iz^e^d^Mⁱ^gr^ant^Po^pu^lati^onⁱⁿ^the^U^.^S.;^Es^tⁱ^m^ate^s^Bas^e^d^on
^the^M^a^r^c^{h 2}⁰⁰⁵^C^u^r^r^e^{nt P}^o^p^u^lati^on^Sur^v^e^y^,^P^e^w^Hispaⁿ^ic^Ce^nte^r^,^Ma^rc^{h 7,}²⁰⁰⁶^{, a}^t^http^://pe^w^hispaⁿ^ic^.org^/^r^e^ports/
^r^e^por^t.^ph^p?^R^e^por^tI^D⁼⁶¹⁽^h^e^r^e^a^f^t^e^r^c^ite^{d a}^s^P^a^s^s^e^l,^Siz^e^a^{nd C}^har^a^c^te^rⁱ^s^tic^s^{of the}^Uⁿ^aut^hor^iz^e^d^Mⁱ^gr^ant^Po^pu^lati^onⁱⁿ
^the^U.S.^,^Ma^r^c^{h 7, 20}⁰⁶⁾^.
³^Jeff^re^{y S}^.^P^a^ssel,^Es^tim^ate^s^of^th^e^Siz^e^an^{d C}^har^ac^te^rⁱ^s^tic^s^o^f^the^U^ndoc^um^eⁿ^te^{d P}^o^p^u^l^a^tioⁿ^,^P^e^w^Hⁱ^s^p^aⁿ^ic^Ce^nte^r^,
^Ma^r^c^{h 21}^{, 2}⁰⁰⁵^;^P^a^s^s^e^l,^Siz^e^aⁿ^d^C^har^ac^te^rⁱ^s^tic^s^of^the^Uⁿ^a^u^th^oriz^e^d^Mⁱ^gran^{t P}^o^p^u^latⁱ^onⁱⁿ^the^U.^S.^,^M^a^r^c^h^7,²⁰⁰⁶^.
^T^h^e^s^e^re^{ports a}^r^e^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://pe^w^hispaⁿ^ic^.org^/^t^opi^c^s^/ⁱ^nde^x^.^p^hp?^T^opic^I^D=¹⁶^{. A}^l^{so se}^e^{CRS Re}^{port RL}³³⁸⁷^4,
^U^naut^hor^iz^e^d^Alie^ns^Re^sⁱ^di^{ng i}ⁿ^t^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^:^Es^tim^ate^s^Sinc^e¹⁹⁸⁶^,^by^Ruth^Elle^{n W}^a^se^m^.
⁴^{U.S. De}^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}^Hom^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^rity^{, O}^f^fⁱ^c^e^o^f^I^m^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion St}^a^tistic^s,^Estimate^s^of^the^Uⁿ^a^u^th^o^r^ize^d^Immigran^t
^Pop^u^latⁱ^oⁿ^Re^sⁱ^di^ngⁱⁿ^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^:^J^a^nu^ar^y²⁰⁰⁵^{, by}^Mic^h^a^e^l^H^o^e^f^e^r^{, N}^a^ncy^R^y^tina^,^a^{nd C}^h^rⁱ^s^t^op^he^r^C^a^m^pbe^ll,
^A^u^g^u^{st 200}^{6, a}^t^http^://w^ww^.dhs.gov^/x^libra^ry^/^a^sse^ts/^s^ta^tistic^s/pub^lic^a^tions/^I^LL^_P^E^_²⁰⁰⁵^.^pdf^.
⁵^P^a^ssel,^Siz^e^a^{nd C}^har^ac^te^rⁱ^s^tic^s^{of t}^h^e^Uⁿ^a^u^t^hor^iz^e^d^Mⁱ^gr^ant^Po^p^u^lati^onⁱⁿ^the^U^.^S.^,^Ma^r^c^{h 7, 20}⁰⁶^.

some occupations and industries, however, their share of the labor force was considerably higher.
Table 1 presents data from the Pew Hispanic Center on industries with high concentrations of
unauthorized workers. Unauthorized aliens accounted for about one in five workers in private
households and between 10% and 15% in the other industries shown.
Table 1. Estimates of Unauthorized Employment in Selected Industries, 2005
^{Industry Gr}^oup^Unautho^{rized Wo}^rkers^{(in Industry)}
^{Private Households} ^21%
^{Food Manufactu}^ring^14%
^Agriculture^13%
^Furnitur^{e Ma}^nufa^cturing^13%
^Construction^12%
^{Textile, Apparel, and Leather}^Ma^nufact^uring^12%
^{Food Services}^12%
^{Administrative and Support}^Services^11%
^{Accommodation 10%}
^Source:^Jef^{frey S. Passel,}^{Size an}^{d Characte}^{ristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S.}^{, Pew Hispanic}
^{Center, Marc}^h^{7, 20}^06.

Prior to 1986, it was not against the law for an employer to employ an individual who was not
authorized to work. This changed with the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act ⁶
of 1986 (IRCA), which amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to add a new §274A. The
§274A provisions are sometimes referred to collectively as employer sanctions. Under INA ⁷
§274A, it is unlawful for an employer to knowingly hire, recruit or refer for a fee, or continue to
employ an alien who is not authorized to be so employed. Employers are required to participate in
a paper-based employment eligibility verification system, commonly known as the I-9 system, in
which they examine documents presented by new hires to verify identity and work eligibility, and
complete and retain I-9 verification forms.
With respect to the document examination requirement, INA §274A states that an employer is in ⁸
compliance “if the document reasonably appears on its face to be genuine.” There is general
agreement that the I-9 process has been undermined by fraud—both document fraud, in which
employees present counterfeit or invalid documents, and identity fraud, in which employees ⁹
present valid documents issued to other individuals.

⁶^P^.^L^.^99-⁶⁰^3,^§1⁰¹⁽^a⁾^,^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{6, 1}⁹⁸⁶^.
⁷^“^E^m^p^lo^y^e^r^”^is^us^e^d^a^s^a^s^hor^thaⁿ^{d in}^this^s^e^c^{tion f}^o^r^“^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^or^eⁿ^t^ity^,”^the^phr^a^s^e^us^e^dⁱⁿ^I^N^A^§§2⁷⁴^A^a^{nd 2}^74B^.
⁸^I^N^A^§274A⁽^b⁾⁽¹⁾⁽^A⁾^.
⁹^Se^e^,^f^o^{r e}^x^am^ple^,^U^.^{S. G}^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt A}^c^c^ounta^b^ility^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^,^I^m^mⁱ^g^r^atio^{n E}ⁿ^for^c^e^m^eⁿ^t:^W^e^ak^ne^s^s^e^s^Hⁱ^nde^r
^Employ^me^{nt Ve}^rific^ati^{on an}^d^W^o^rk^site^Enforc^e^m^eⁿ^{t Eff}^o^rts^{, G}^A^O^-^05-⁸¹^{3, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁵^,^pp.¹⁵^-¹^6,^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.g^a^o^.g^ov^/ⁿ^e^w^.item^s^/^d⁰⁵⁸¹^3.^pdf^.

Employers violating INA prohibitions on unauthorized employment may be subject to civil and/or
criminal penalties. INA §274A establishes separate and escalating ranges of penalties for the
following: failure to comply with the I-9 requirements ($110 - $1,100 per employee); violations
of prohibitions on knowingly hiring, recruiting, referring, or continuing to employ unauthorized
aliens ($275 - $11,000 per alien); and a pattern or practice of violations of knowingly hiring,
recruiting, referring, or continuing to employ unauthorized aliens (up to $3,000 per alien or up to ¹⁰
six months imprisonment or both). As discussed below, DHS’s Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for enforcing the INA prohibitions on unauthorized
employment.
During the congressional debates preceding the passage of IRCA, major concerns were expressed
that the verification and penalty provisions would result in employment discrimination based on
national origin as employers opted not to hire eligible workers who looked or sounded “foreign,”
out of fear that they lacked work authorization. To directly address these concerns, IRCA added a
new §274B to the INA, which makes it an unfair immigration-related employment practice for
employers with four or more employees to discriminate against U.S. citizens or work-authorized
aliens in hiring, recruiting or referring for a fee, or firing based on national origin or on
citizenship or lawful immigration status. INA §274B also provided for the establishment of the
Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices (OSC) in the ¹¹
U.S. Department of Justice to enforce these provisions. Under INA §274B, employers found to
have engaged in an unfair immigration-related employment practice shall be required to cease
and desist from such practice and may be subject to other requirements, including civil penalties.
IRCA also required the then-General Accounting Office (GAO) to issue three annual reports on
the implementation and enforcement of the INA §274A provisions. In each of the reports, GAO
was directed to make a determination as to whether the implementation of INA §274A “has
resulted in a pattern of discrimination in employment (against other than unauthorized aliens) on ¹²
the basis of national origin.” GAO’s third report included the following summary of its findings:
^{GAO f}^o^uⁿ^d^t^h^{at th}^{e la}^w^h^a^{s ap}^p^a^ren^t^l^y^red^u^ced^ille^g^a^lⁱ^m^mⁱ^g^r^at^ioⁿ^an^dⁱ^sⁿ^o^{t an}
^uⁿⁿ^eces^s^a^r^y^b^u^rden^on^e^m^ploy^ers^,^h^a^s^g^eⁿ^e^rall^y^been^carrie^d^ou^{t s}^a^tis^f^actoril^y^b^y^{INS [t}^h^e
^f^o^r^m^er^I^m^mⁱ^g^r^atioⁿ^aⁿ^d^Natu^r^a^lizatioⁿ^Ser^vⁱ^{ce] a}ⁿ^{d L}^a^{bor, an}^{d h}^a^sⁿ^o^{t been}^u^s^{ed as}^a
^v^e^hⁱ^c^l^{e to lau}ⁿ^c^h^f^rⁱ^v^olou^s^co^m^p^laints^ag^ai^ns^{t e}^m^plo^y^er^s^.^GA^{O al}^s^o^f^oun^{d th}^{at th}^ere^w^a^s
^wⁱ^des^p^{read dis}^c^ri^mⁱⁿ^a^tioⁿ^.^B^u^t^w^a^s^t^h^{ere dis}^c^ri^mⁱⁿ^a^tioⁿ^as^{a res}^u^lt^o^f^I^R^C^A^?^Th^a^tⁱ^s^t^h^e^k^e^y¹³
^qu^es^tion^C^ong^res^s^{directed G}^A^{O to a}ⁿ^s^w^{er. G}^A^O^’^{S a}ⁿ^s^w^er^is^y^e^s^.

¹⁰^T^h^e^s^e^pe^na^lty^lev^e^ls^ref^l^e^c^t^a^{1999 i}ⁿ^c^r^e^a^s^e^of^the^cⁱ^v^{il pe}^na^ltie^sⁱⁿ^IN^A^§27^4A^{, a}^s^eⁿ^a^c^t^e^d^{, in}^accord^an^{ce w}ⁱ^t^h^t^h^e
^Fe^de^ra^{l Civ}^il^P^e^na^ltie^s^Iⁿ^f^l^a^tion^A^d^jus^t^m^e^{nt A}^c^{t of}^{1990, a}^s^a^m^e^nde^{d (}^P^.L^{. 10}^1-4^10,^O^c^tobe^r^5,¹⁹^90;²⁸^U^.^S.C.²⁴⁶¹
^note⁾^.^For^f^u^r^t^he^r^br^e^a^k^dow^ns^of^the^pe^na^lty^r^a^ng^e^s^{, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^S²²¹^80,^Uⁿ^a^u^t^hor^iz^e^d^Em^pl^oy^m^e^nt^{of Alie}^ns^:
^Basⁱ^c^s^of^Em^ploy^e^r^S^anc^ti^ons^{, by}^A^{lison M.}^Sm^ith.
¹¹^For^f^u^r^t^he^r^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion a}^b^o^u^{t I}^N^A^§274B^,^s^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^t^R^S²²¹^80,^Uⁿ^a^u^th^or^iz^e^d^Em^ploy^m^e^nt^of^Alie^ns^:^Basⁱ^c^s^of
^Em^ploy^e^r^S^anc^ti^ons^,^by^A^{lison M. Sm}^ith.
¹²^I^R^C^A^§101(^a⁾^.
¹³^U^.^{S. G}^e^ne^r^a^{l A}^c^c^ountiⁿ^g^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^,^I^m^mⁱ^gr^ati^on^Re^for^m^:^Em^p^l^oy^e^r^Sanc^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^a^{nd t}^h^e^Q^u^e^s^ti^on^{of D}ⁱ^s^c^rⁱ^mⁱ^natioⁿ^,
^GAO/^GG^D-90-62,^Ma^rc^h¹⁹^90,^p^.^{3, a}^t^htt^p^://a^rc^hⁱ^v^e^.g^a^o^.g^ov^/d24t^8/¹⁴⁰⁹⁷^4.p^d^f^.

Building on the employment verification system established by IRCA, the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) directed the Attorney General to
conduct three pilot programs for employment eligibility confirmation that were to be largely
voluntary—the Basic Pilot program, the Machine-Readable Document Pilot program, and the ¹⁴
Citizen Attestation Pilot.
Under the Basic Pilot program, the only one of the three pilots still in operation, participating
employers verify new hires’ employment eligibility by accessing Social Security Administration ¹⁵
(SSA) and, if applicable, DHS databases. The program is administered by DHS’s U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The Basic Pilot program began in 1997 in the ¹⁶
five states with the largest unauthorized alien populations. Initially scheduled to terminate in ¹⁷
2001, it has been extended twice, most recently by P.L. 108-156. It is currently scheduled to
terminate in 2008.
In addition to extending the life of the Basic Pilot program, P.L. 108-156 directed the Secretary of
DHS to expand the operation of the program to all 50 states not later than December 1, 2004. In
connection with this expansion, it further directed the Secretary to submit a report to Congress
assessing whether the problems identified in earlier pilot program evaluations had been resolved
and describing actions that the Secretary would take prior to the nationwide expansion to resolve
any outstanding problems.
In the resulting June 2004 report, USCIS described its efforts to resolve the three main problems
identified in the pilot program evaluations. The chief problem, which the report described as “the
most serious pilot deficiency noted by the evaluation,” was that work-authorized employees,
especially foreign-born work-authorized employees, too frequently received tentative
nonconfirmations, or initial responses by the system that employment eligibility could not be
immediately confirmed. The report described this erroneous tentative nonconfirmation rate as “a
source of unintentional discrimination against foreign-born employees,” and detailed efforts to
address it by improving the accuracy of the verification databases and reducing data entry errors
by employers and immigration status verifiers. The other problems identified in the pilot program
evaluations were employer noncompliance with pilot program requirements and low levels of ¹⁸
employer interest in participating in a pilot program. In December 2004, USCIS announced the ¹⁹
expansion of the Basic Pilot program to all 50 states and the District of Columbia.

¹⁴^IIRIRA^{is Div}ⁱ^{sion C of}^P^.^L^.¹⁰⁴^-²⁰^{8. T}^h^e^pil^o^t^prog^ra^m^s^w^e^re^e^s^ta^blishe^d^un^de^{r T}^itle^IV^,^S^ubtit^le^A^.^Inde^pe^ndeⁿ^t
^e^v^a^l^ua^tions^of^the^t^h^r^e^e^pil^o^t^pr^og^r^a^m^s^w^e^r^e^c^onduc^te^{d by}^the^Iⁿ^s^t^it^ute^f^o^r^Sur^v^e^y^R^e^se^a^r^c^h^a^t^T^e^m^p^l^e^Uⁿ^iv^e^r^sⁱ^t^y^a^nd
^W^e^st^at^f^o^{r INS}^/^US^CIS^.^T^h^{ese ev}^al^u^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^are:^I^N^{S B}^a^sⁱ^c^Pil^o^t^Su^m^m^a^r^y^Re^por^t⁽^J^aⁿ^ua^r^y^{29, 2}⁰⁰²⁾^;^Fⁱ^ndⁱⁿ^g^s^of^th^e
^Basⁱ^c^Pil^o^{t Pr}^ogr^am^Ev^alu^a^ti^on⁽^J^uⁿ^e²⁰⁰²⁾^;^Fⁱⁿ^dⁱⁿ^{gs of}^the^Ci^tizeⁿ^Atte^sta^tio^{n Ve}^rific^a^tio^{n Pil}^o^{t (}^C^{AVP) Pro}^g^ram
^Ev^alu^a^tioⁿ⁽^A^pr^il²⁰⁰³⁾^,^aⁿ^d^Fin^dⁱⁿ^{gs of}^the^M^a^c^h^ine^-^Re^a^d^a^b^le^D^o^c^u^me^{nt Pi}^lot⁽^M^{RDP) Program}^Ev^alu^a^tioⁿ^(May
²⁰⁰³⁾^.
¹⁵^For^a^br^ie^f^de^s^c^rⁱ^ptio^{n of}^the^B^a^sⁱ^c^Pilot^v^e^rⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^{tion pr}^oc^e^s^s^,^s^e^e^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^l^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{, U}^.^S.
^Ci^tⁱ^zen^shⁱ^p^an^{d Imm}ⁱ^gr^atⁱ^oⁿ^S^e^rvi^ces,^Re^{port t}^o^Co^ngre^{ss o}ⁿ^t^h^e^B^a^sic^Pilo^{t Pro}^g^ram^{, J}^une²⁰^04,^p^p^{. 2}^-^{3 (}^h^e^r^e^a^f^te^r
^c^ite^{d a}^t^Re^por^t^to^C^o^ngr^e^s^s^on^th^e^Basⁱ^c^Pil^o^{t Pr}^o^g^r^a^m^,^J^une²⁰⁰⁴⁾^.
¹⁶^T^h^{e st}^at^es^w^e^{re Cal}ⁱ^f^o^rnⁱ^a^,^F^l^o^rⁱ^d^a,^Il^lⁱⁿ^oⁱ^s,^New^Yo^rk,^an^d^T^e^xas^.
¹⁷^P^.^L^.¹⁰^7-¹²⁸^,^J^a^nua^r^y^16,²⁰⁰²^;^P.L^.¹⁰^8-¹^56,^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^{3, 2}⁰⁰³^.
¹⁸^Re^{port to}^C^oⁿ^g^re^ss^{on the}^B^a^sic^{Pilot Progr}^am^{, J}^u^ne²⁰⁰⁴^.
¹⁹^U.^S^.^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^Ho^m^e^l^aⁿ^d^S^ecu^ri^t^y^,^U.^S^.^Ci^tⁱ^zen^shⁱ^p^an^{d Imm}ⁱ^gratⁱ^oⁿ^S^e^rvi^ces,^“E^xp^an^si^oⁿ^of^t^h^{e Basi}^{c P}ⁱ^l^o^t
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

The Basic Pilot program, which remains largely voluntary, has been growing in recent years. On
January 31, 2006, there were 5,272 employers registered for the program, representing 22,710
hiring sites. As of March 28, 2007, 15,663 employers were registered, representing 78,163 hiring ²⁰
sites.
In July 2006 testimony before a House Government Reform subcommittee on the Basic Pilot
program, a USCIS official discussed some of the program’s limitations. As stated in her written
testimony: “The current Basic Pilot is not fraud-proof and was not designed to detect identity ²¹
fraud.” Worksite enforcement actions by ICE in late 2006 and early 2007 focused national
attention on these limitations. Among these actions, in December 2006, ICE raided six
meatpacking plants operated by Swift & Company as part of an identity theft investigation and ²²
arrested more than 1,200 workers; Swift participates in the Basic Pilot program.

Since March 2003, ICE has had responsibility for enforcing the INA prohibitions against
unauthorized employment (known as worksite enforcement) as part of its larger responsibility to ²³
enforce federal immigration laws within the United States. The ICE worksite enforcement
strategy gives top priority to investigations at worksites related to critical infrastructure and
national security, such as nuclear power plants, defense facilities, and airports. Its strategy also
involves “targeting unscrupulous employers of illegal aliens [and] seeking to initiate criminal
prosecutions and cause asset forfeitures.” According to ICE, its worksite investigations “often
uncover egregious criminal violations [such as, money laundering, alien smuggling, or document ²⁴
fraud] and widespread abuses [such as, worker exploitation].”
In July 2006, ICE announced another part of its worksite enforcement strategy—a new initiative
called the ICE Mutual Agreement between Government and Employers (IMAGE) program.
IMAGE is a voluntary program, which ICE describes, as follows:
^[T]t^h^e^prog^ra^mⁱ^s^de^sⁱ^gn^{ed t}^o^buⁱ^l^d^cooperatⁱ^v^{e rel}^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^hⁱ^ps^bet^w^eeⁿ^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^aⁿ^d
^b^u^siⁿ^e^sse^{s to}^str^eⁿ^g^t^h^eⁿ^hⁱ^rⁱⁿ^g^p^r^{actices an}^d^r^e^d^u^{ce th}^e^uⁿ^l^a^w^f^u^{l e}^m^p^l^o^y^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^ille^g^a^l

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^P^r^og^r^a^m^{to A}^{ll 50 Sta}^t^e^s^aⁿ^d^the^Dⁱ^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^of^C^o^lum^b^ia^;^P^r^ovⁱ^d^ing^W^e^b-^B^a^s^e^d^A^c^ce^s^s^,^”⁶⁹^Fe^de^{ral Re}^giste^r⁷⁵⁹⁹^7-
⁷⁵⁹⁹⁹^,^Decem^b^e^{r 2}⁰^,²⁰⁰⁴^.
²⁰^Da^ta^prov^ide^d^by^{USCIS, Sy}^ste^m^a^tic^A^lie^{n V}^e^rifⁱ^c^a^{tion f}^o^{r E}ⁿ^tit^le^m^e^{nts (SA}^V^{E) prog}^ra^m^.
²¹^S^t^at^em^en^t^o^f^Janⁱ^{s S}^p^o^s^at^o^,^A^sso^ci^at^{e Di}^rect^o^r^,^US^CIS^Natⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^ecu^ri^t^y^an^d^Reco^rd^{s V}^e^ri^fⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^Di^rect^o^r^at^e,^at
^{U.S. Co}^ng^re^{ss, House}^Com^m^itte^e^on^the^G^o^v^e^rnm^e^nt^Re^f^o^r^m^{, Sub}^c^om^m^itte^e^{on Re}^g^u^la^tory^Affa^irs,^{Is the}^Fe^de^ra^l^th^nd
^G^o^v^e^r^nm^eⁿ^{t D}^oⁱⁿ^{g A}^{ll I}^t^C^aⁿ^To^Ste^m^the^Tⁱ^de^o^f^I^lle^g^a^{l I}^m^mⁱ^gr^ati^on?^,^h^earⁱⁿ^g,¹⁰⁹^Cong^.,²^s^e^s^s^{., J}^u^ly^25,²⁰^06.
²²^U.^S^.^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^Ho^m^e^l^aⁿ^d^S^ecu^ri^t^y^,^U.^S^.^Immⁱ^gratⁱ^oⁿ^an^d^C^u^st^o^m^{s E}ⁿ^f^o^rce^m^en^t^,^“U.^S^.^Un^co^v^e^{rs L}^a^r^g^e-S^cal^e
^Ideⁿ^tity^T^h^e^f^{t Sc}^he^m^e^Use^d^B^y^Ille^g^a^l^A^lie^{ns to G}^a^{in Em}^ploy^m^e^{nt a}^t^Na^tionw^ide^Me^a^t^P^r^oc^e^ssor,”^ne^w^s^re^le^a^s^e^,
^De^c^e^m^b^e^r^{13, 2}⁰⁰⁶^{, a}^t^htt^p^://w^ww^.ic^e^.^g^o^v^/^pi/ne^w^s/^ne^w^s^re^le^a^s^e^s^/^a^rtic^le^s/061²¹^3dc^.^h^tm^.
²³^Im^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion e}ⁿ^f^o^rc^e^m^eⁿ^{t re}^spon^sibility^f^o^r^m^e^r^l^y^r^e^ste^d^w^{ith the}^Im^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion a}^{nd Na}^tura^liz^a^tⁱ^on^Se^rv^ic^e^{(INS). T}^h^e
^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^A^c^{t of}^{2002 (}^P^.L^{. 10}^7-²^96,^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{25, 2}⁰⁰²⁾^a^b^o^lis^he^d^I^N^{S a}ⁿ^{d tr}^aⁿ^s^f^e^r^r^e^{d m}^o^s^t^of^its
^f^unc^tions^t^o^D^H^S^a^s^of^Ma^r^c^h^1,²⁰⁰^3.
²⁴^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{, U}^.^{S. I}^m^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion a}^{nd C}^u^s^t^om^s^Enf^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^{t, “}^W^or^k^s^ite^Enf^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^t,”^f^a^c^t
^s^h^e^e^t^{, Fe}^br^ua^r^y^22,²⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^t^h^ttp:^/^/^w^w^w^.ice^.g^ov^/^p^i/^ne^w^s^/^f^a^c^t^s^h^e^e^t^s^/^w^o^r^k^s^ite⁰⁷⁰²²^2.h^t^m^.

^alien^s^{. T}^h^{e in}^itiatⁱ^v^e^also^see^k^s^to^acco^m^p^lis^h^g^r^{eater in}^d^u^s^try^c^o^m^p^lⁱ^aⁿ^c^e^aⁿ^d^c^o^r^p^o^r^a^t^e^d^u^e²⁵
^dilig^en^{ce t}^h^rough^enh^aⁿ^ced^f^e^{deral train}ⁱ^ng^an^{d edu}^catioⁿ^{of e}^m^plo^y^ers^.
To enroll in IMAGE, an employer must agree to submit to an I-9 audit by ICE and to verify the
Social Security numbers of its current employees through an SSA database. IMAGE participants
also are required to adhere to a set of “best hiring practices.” These practices include participating
in the Basic Pilot program, arranging for annual I-9 audits, and establishing a process for ²⁶
reporting any violations to ICE.

A variety of options has been put forth to curtail unauthorized employment and related practices,
a selection of which is discussed below. Some of these options would build on the current
employment eligibility verification system, while others represent new approaches to address
unauthorized employment. The options presented here are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and
some could be pursued in concert.
One set of options would make the Basic Pilot program or a similar electronic employment
eligibility verification system mandatory for all employers in the United States. Under this
general approach, all employers would be required to query the system to verify the identity and
employment eligibility of all new hires. Related questions concern what other, if any, required
uses of the system there would be. For example, one key question would likely be whether
employers would be required to verify the identity and employment eligibility of previously hired ²⁷
workers in addition to new hires.
The Bush Administration has endorsed making the Basic Pilot program mandatory for all
employers. Although President Bush did not mention the Basic Pilot program by name during his
2007 State of the Union address, the White House’s online 2007 State of the Union Policy
Initiatives states the following: “We will also work with Congress to expand ‘Basic Pilot’—an
electronic employment eligibility verification system—and mandate that all employers use this

²⁵^U.^S^.^Dep^a^rtm^eⁿ^t^o^f^Ho^m^e^lan^d^S^ecu^rity^,^“DHS^High^ligh^t^s^Be^{st P}^r^a^c^tic^e^s^{For Ma}^intaⁱⁿ^ing^L^e^g^a^{l Work}^f^o^rc^e^s^,”^pre^ss
^re^le^a^s^e^,^J^u^l^y^26,²⁰^06,^a^t^htt^p^://w^w^w^.dhs^.g^ov^/x^new^s^/^r^e^l^e^a^s^e^s^/^p^re^s^s^_^re^le^a^s^e^_096^6.s^h^tm^.
²⁶^S^{ee U.}^S^.^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^Ho^m^e^l^aⁿ^d^S^ecu^ri^t^y^,^U.^S^.^Immⁱ^gr^atⁱ^oⁿ^and^Cu^st^o^m^{s E}ⁿ^f^o^rce^m^en^t^,^“^P^artⁿ^er^s;^IM^AG^E^,^{” at}
^http:^//w^w^w^.ic^e^.^g^o^v^/^pa^r^t^ne^r^s^/^opa^im^a^g^e^/^inde^x^.^htm^.
²⁷^T^h^{is que}^stio^{n a}^r^oseⁱⁿ^t^h^e^m^a^{jor im}^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion bills}^pa^sse^{d by}^the^House^(H.R.⁴⁴³⁷⁾^aⁿ^d^Se^na^te^(S.²⁶¹¹^{) in}^the¹⁰⁹^th
^Cong^re^{ss. W}^h^ile^bot^h^{bills w}^oul^d^ha^v^e^re^quire^{d e}^m^ploy^e^r^{s to v}^e^ri^fy^the^ideⁿ^tity^a^{nd e}^m^plo^y^m^e^{nt e}^lig^ibility^of^a^{ll ne}^w
^hⁱ^res,^t^h^ey^dⁱ^f^f^ered^wⁱ^t^h^resp^ect^t^o^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c veri}^fⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^requⁱ^r^emen^t^s^f^o^{r p}^r^evi^o^u^s^l^y^hⁱ^red^w^o^rkers.^Un^d^e^{r H.}^R.⁴⁴³⁷^,
^e^m^ploy^e^r^s^w^{ould ha}^v^e^be^eⁿ^re^q^uⁱ^r^e^d^to^que^ry^the^sy^st^e^m^{to v}^e^rify^the^ideⁿ^t^ity^a^{nd e}^m^ploy^m^e^{nt e}^ligⁱ^b^ility^of^pre^v^iously
^hir^e^{d w}^o^r^k^e^r^s^by^sⁱ^x^y^e^a^r^s^af^te^r^ena^c^t^m^e^{nt. U}^nde^r^S.²⁶^11,^D^H^S^c^oul^{d ha}^v^e^r^e^quir^e^{d c}^e^r^ta^{in e}^m^plo^y^e^r^s^or^c^l^a^s^s^e^s^of
^em^ploy^e^r^s^{to c}^onduc^t^v^e^rⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^{tion of}^pr^e^v^ious^ly^hir^e^{d w}^o^r^k^e^r^s^,^{but t}^h^is^v^e^rⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^{tion w}^ould^not^ha^v^e^be^eⁿ^aⁿ^a^c^r^os^s^-^the^-
^boa^{rd re}^quire^m^e^{nt. For}^f^u^rthe^{r d}ⁱ^sc^ussion^of^the^e^m^ploy^m^e^nt^e^lig^ibility^ve^rifⁱ^c^a^{tion pr}^ov^isions^{in H.R}^.⁴⁴³⁷^aⁿ^d^S.^th
²⁶¹^{1, a}^s^w^e^{ll a}^sⁱⁿ^othe^r^billsⁱⁿ^tr^oduc^e^dⁱⁿ^the¹⁰⁹^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^s^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³³¹²⁵^,^I^m^mⁱ^gr^ati^{on Le}^gis^l^a^tioⁿ^aⁿ^d^th
^Issue^s^{in the}¹⁰⁹^C^o^ng^ress^{, c}^oor^dina^te^d^by^A^ndor^r^a^B^r^un^o.

system.”²⁸ In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee in February 2007, DHS Secretary ²⁹
Michael Chertoff similarly called for mandatory electronic employment verification.
While there is considerable support for making electronic employment eligibility verification
mandatory, concerns have been expressed about discrimination and employer noncompliance
based on the experience of the Basic Pilot program, as discussed above. The inability of the Basic
Pilot program to detect identity fraud has also been raised. In addition, there have been questions
about implementation, such as whether a Basic Pilot-like system could handle the large volume of
inquiries that would be generated under a mandatory program.
Another set of options would increase existing monetary or other penalties under the INA for
prohibited behavior or establish new penalties. Although there seems to be broad support for
enhancing penalties, proposals differ with regard to which penalties to increase or establish and
by how much.
One option would be to increase some or all existing penalties on employers who violate INA
§274A prohibitions on unauthorized employment, as discussed above. Along these lines, DHS
Secretary Chertoff, in his February 2007 testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, urged
Congress:
^toⁱⁿ^cr^{ease p}^eⁿ^a^lties^f^o^r^r^e^p^{eat o}^f^f^eⁿ^d^er^{s a}ⁿ^d^estab^lⁱ^s^h^s^u^b^s^tan^{tial cr}ⁱ^mⁱⁿ^{al p}^eⁿ^a^ltie^{s an}^d
ⁱⁿ^j^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^on^procedu^r^es^t^h^at^puⁿⁱ^s^h^e^m^p^l^o^y^ers^w^h^{o e}ⁿ^g^a^g^eⁱⁿ^a^pat^t^e^rn^of^kⁿ^o^wⁱⁿ^g^vⁱ^ol^atⁱ^ons³⁰
^of^th^{e la}^w^s^an^{d eff}^ecti^v^el^y^proh^{ibit th}^{e e}^m^plo^y^m^eⁿ^t^of^uⁿ^a^u^t^h^o^{rized alien}^s^.
Another option would be to increase fines under INA §274B for engaging in unfair immigration-
related employment practices, as discussed above.
Current penalties for unauthorized employment, as discussed above, apply to employers that hire,
recruit or refer for a fee, or employ individuals. Another penalty-related option would be to ³¹
establish a new penalty on unauthorized employees. For example, one proposal of this type

²⁸^A^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^s^t^a^t^e^o^f^t^he^unioⁿ^/²⁰⁰^7/^init^ia^tiv^e^s^/ⁱⁿ^d^e^x^.htm^l.
²⁹^S^{ee S}^t^at^em^en^t^o^f^DHS^S^ecret^ar^y^Mⁱ^ch^ael^Ch^ert^o^f^f^,^at^U.^S^.^Con^g^ress,^S^eⁿ^a^t^e^Co^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee o}ⁿ^t^h^{e J}^u^dⁱ^ci^ar^y^,
^C^o^m^p^r^e^he^ns^iv^e^I^m^mⁱ^gr^at^io^{n Re}^fo^r^m^,^h^earⁱⁿ^g,¹¹⁰^th^Co^ng^{., 1}^st^s^e^s^s^.^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^28,²⁰^07,^a^t^ht^tp:/^/ju^dicⁱ^a^r^y^.^s^e^na^te^.g^ov^/
^te^stim^on^y^.^c^f^m^?^id=²⁵⁵^5&^w^it_id=^{66 (}^h^e^r^e^a^f^te^{r c}^ite^{d a}^s^Che^r^toff^Te^stim^on^y⁾^.
³⁰^Ibid^.
³¹^W^h^ile^not^s^u^b^j^e^c^t^{to a}^pe^na^lty^un^de^r^I^N^A^§274A^{, u}ⁿ^a^u^t^hor^iz^e^d^w^o^r^k^e^r^s^,^lik^e^una^uth^o^rⁱ^z^e^d^a^lie^ns^g^e^ne^r^a^lly^{, a}^r^e
^s^ubje^c^t^to^beⁱⁿ^g^r^e^m^ove^{d f}^r^o^m^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^un^de^r^the^I^N^A^.

would make an individual who falsely represents on the I-9 or comparable verification form that ³²
he or she is authorized to work in the United States, subject to a fine and/or imprisonment.
Another set of options would make additional resources available to ICE for worksite
enforcement. These resources could be in the form of additional personnel to work on worksite
enforcement cases or additional funding. Historically, interior enforcement resources devoted to ³³
worksite enforcement have been limited. Related questions concern how any additional
worksite enforcement resources would best be used. For example, should ICE’s current strategy
of focusing primarily on criminal employer cases continue, or should any changes be made to that
strategy?
A related resource option would make additional resources available to ICE to investigate cases ³⁴
of document and identity fraud.
Data sharing among SSA, DHS, and employers represents another possible approach to reduce
unauthorized employment and related identity fraud. There have been various proposals to
increase the sharing of information for these purposes. Among these are proposals to require SSA ³⁵
to inform DHS of cases in which a single social security number is used with multiple names.
DHS Secretary Chertoff expressed his support for this type of data sharing at the February 2007
Senate Judiciary Committee hearing:
^[^W^]^eⁿ^eed^leg^a^{l au}^th^o^r^it^y^to^as^su^r^e^th^{at t}^h^{e So}^{cial Secu}^ri^t^y^Admⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ration^caⁿ^s^h^a^r^e^wⁱ^th^u^s
^an^d^wⁱ^t^h^e^m^p^l^o^y^er^{s d}^a^{ta co}ⁿ^cerⁿⁱⁿ^g^sto^l^en^id^en^t^{ities b}^eⁱⁿ^g^mⁱ^s^u^sed^to^o^b^t^ain^w^o^r^k³⁶
^illeg^a^ll^y^.
Such data sharing would likely raise privacy concerns and would require SSA to assume an
additional role.
Another set of possible options to address unauthorized employment and related identity fraud
revolves around the issuance and acceptance of documents establishing identity and employment
eligibility. INA §274A establishes categories of acceptable documents. Implementing regulations
list more than 20 documents that employees can present to establish their identity and/or

³²^S.²⁶^11,^a^s^pa^s^s^e^{d by}^the^Se^na^te^{in t}^h^e¹⁰⁹^th^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^inc^l^ude^d^s^u^c^h^a^pe^na^lty^pr^ov^is^io^n.
³³^Se^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³³³⁵¹^,^I^m^mⁱ^gr^ati^{on Enf}^o^r^c^e^m^eⁿ^t^W^ithin^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^{, c}^oor^dina^te^d^by^A^lⁱ^s^{on Sis}^kⁱⁿ^.
³⁴^S^ee,^f^o^{r exa}^m^p^l^e,^S^t^at^e^m^en^t^o^f^Carl^W^.^Ha^m^p^e,^at^U.^S^.^Con^g^ress,^Ho^u^s^{e Co}^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee o}ⁿ^t^h^{e J}^u^dⁱ^ci^ar^y^,^S^u^b^c^o^m^mⁱ^t^t^ee
^{on I}^m^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion, B}^o^r^d^e^r^Se^c^u^r^ity^{, a}^{nd C}^l^aⁱ^m^s^,^Lac^k^{of W}^o^r^k^s^ite^Eⁿ^f^o^r^c^e^m^eⁿ^{t an}^{d Em}^p^l^oy^e^r^S^anc^ti^on^s^,^h^earⁱⁿ^g,¹⁰⁹^th^st
^C^ong^{., 1}^s^e^s^s^{., J}^une^21,²⁰⁰⁵^.^Fo^r^a^dis^c^us^sⁱ^oⁿ^of^im^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion f}^r^a^u^{d, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^p^o^r^t^R^L³³³⁵^1,^I^m^mⁱ^gr^ati^on
^Eⁿ^f^o^rcemen^t^Wi^t^hⁱⁿ^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^ed^St^a^t^es^{, c}^oor^di^na^te^{d by}^A^lis^{on Sis}^k^in.
³⁵^S^{ee S}^.⁶⁹^{9 (}¹¹⁰^th^Con^g^ress).
³⁶^C^h^e^r^tof^f^Te^s^tⁱ^m^ony^{. C}^u^r^r^e^{nt la}^w⁽^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^l^R^e^v^e^nue^C^ode^§6¹⁰^{3; 2}⁶^U^.^S.C^.^§⁶¹⁰³⁾^r^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^s^SSA^f^r^om^s^h^a^r^ing
^cert^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^atⁱ^t^recei^ve^{s f}^r^o^m^t^h^{e In}^t^e^rn^al^Reven^u^e^S^e^rvi^ce.

employment eligibility for I-9 purposes.³⁷ Reducing the number of acceptable documents has long
been under discussion as an option for making the I-9 verification process more secure and less ³⁸
confusing for employers.
Other options in this category would combine a reduction in the number of acceptable documents
with requirements to improve the security of documents, particularly the widely counterfeited
Social Security card. For example, there have been proposals to require Social Security cards to
include an encrypted machine-readable electronic identification strip unique to the bearer and a ³⁹
digitized photograph. Under some such proposals, new hires would be required to show a card
of this type to the employer, who would then use it to verify the worker’s identity and work ⁴⁰
authorization. Biometrics could also be incorporated into new Social Security cards or other
documents. As discussed in the next section, a verification system based on more secure
documents could replace the existing requirement under the I-9 process that employers examine
employee-provided documents.
In his February 2007 testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Commerce Secretary
Carlos Gutierrez called for the issuance of secure documents to assist businesses in verifying the
legal status of their employees, but he limited his recommendation to foreign workers. According
to Secretary Gutierrez: “Tamper-proof biometric identity cards should be established for foreign ⁴¹
workers so that employers have no excuse for violating the law.”
Reducing the number of documents for evidencing identity and employment eligibility could
raise concerns that some work-authorized individuals might not be able to meet the requirements ⁴²
easily. Proposals to require all new hires to show one particular document containing various
pieces of information about the bearer have been further criticized by some as undermining ⁴³
privacy, facilitating identity theft, and creating a de facto national identification card. The costs ⁴⁴
of issuing more secure Social Security cards or other documents would likely be another issue.

³⁷^{8 C}^.^F^.^R^.^§2^74a^.²⁽^b⁾⁽¹⁾⁽^v⁾^.^B^o^t^h^Se^na^te^-^p^a^s^s^e^{d S.}²⁶^{11 a}^{nd H}^ous^e^-^pa^s^s^e^{d H}^.^R^.⁴⁴³⁷ⁱⁿ^t^h^e¹⁰⁹^th^C^o^ng^r^e^s^s^w^ould
^h^a^ve^m^a^d^e^ch^an^{ges t}^o^t^h^{e INA}^p^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^oⁿ^accep^t^a^b^l^e^d^o^c^u^m^en^t^s^.
³⁸^Se^e^,^f^o^{r e}^x^am^ple^,^U^.^{S. G}^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt A}^c^c^ounta^b^ility^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^,^Ille^gal^Alie^{ns: Si}^gn^ific^aⁿ^{t Obst}^ac^le^{s to}^R^e^ducⁱⁿ^g
^U^naut^hor^iz^e^d^Em^pl^oy^m^e^{nt Ex}^is^t^,^GAO/^GG^D-9⁹^-³³^,^A^p^{ril 1}⁹⁹⁹^,^p^p^{. 1}³^-1⁵^,^at^h^ttp^://w^ww^.^g^ao^.g^o^v^/^a^rchⁱ^v^e^/1⁹⁹⁹^/
^g^g⁹⁹⁰³³^.p^df^.
³⁹^S^{ee H.}^R^.⁹⁸⁽¹⁰⁹^th^{, 11}⁰^th^Coⁿ^g^resses).
⁴⁰^Bi^o^m^et^ri^{cs are p}^h^y^si^cal^o^r^b^e^h^a^vi^o^r^al^ch^aract^eri^s^tⁱ^c^{s o}^f^{a p}^e^rsoⁿ^t^h^at^can^b^e^m^easu^r^ed^an^d^u^s^ed^f^o^{r i}^d^en^tⁱ^fⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^.^F^o^r
^f^u^r^t^h^e^r^dⁱ^scu^ssi^on^,^{see C}^R^S^R^e^por^t^R^S²¹⁹¹⁶^,^Bⁱ^o^m^et^ri^{c Id}^en^tⁱ^fⁱ^e^{rs a}ⁿ^d^B^o^r^d^{er S}^ecu^ri^t^y^:⁹^/¹¹^Co^mmi^ssi^oⁿ
^Re^c^o^m^m^e^ndati^ons^an^{d Re}^l^a^te^{d I}^s^s^u^e^s^{, by}^Da^nie^l^Morg^aⁿ^aⁿ^d^W^illia^m^{J. Krouse}^.
⁴¹^S^{ee S}^t^at^em^en^t^o^f^Co^mm^er^{ce S}^e^c^r^et^ar^y^Carl^o^s^M^.^G^u^tⁱ^e^rrez,^at^U.^S^.^Coⁿ^g^ress,^S^eⁿ^a^t^e^C^o^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee o}ⁿ^t^h^{e Ju}^di^ci^ary^,
^C^o^m^p^r^e^he^ns^iv^e^I^m^mⁱ^gr^at^io^{n Re}^fo^r^m^,^h^earⁱⁿ^g,¹¹⁰^th^Co^ng^{., 1}^st^s^e^s^s^.^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^28,²⁰^07,^a^t^ht^tp:/^/ju^dicⁱ^a^r^y^.^s^e^na^te^.g^ov^/
^te^stim^on^y^.^c^f^m^?^id=²⁵⁵^5&^w^it_id=⁵⁵³^{1. Se}^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^G^u^tie^rre^z^di^d^not^dis^c^us^s^d^o^c^u^m^e^{nt r}^e^quir^e^m^e^nts^f^o^r^c^itiz^eⁿ^s^or^f^o^r
^le^g^a^{l pe}^r^m^aⁿ^eⁿ^{t r}^e^sⁱ^de^nts^or^ot^he^r^a^lie^ns^.
⁴²^In^t^h^{e su}^pp^l^e^m^eⁿ^t^ar^yⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^acco^m^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g^{a 1}⁹⁹⁸^p^r^o^p^o^s^{ed ru}^l^e^t^o^redu^{ce t}^h^{e nu}^m^b^{er o}^f^acce^p^t^ab^l^e^do^cu^m^eⁿ^t^s
^f^o^{r I-9}^pu^rpo^s^es,^t^h^{e f}^o^rm^{er INS}^s^t^at^ed^t^h^{e f}^o^l^l^o^wⁱⁿ^g^:^“W^h^eⁿ^[^I^RC^A^]^w^a^{s n}^e^w^,^{a co}ⁿ^s^en^su^{s emerge}^d^t^h^at^{a l}^oⁿ^g^,
^inc^l^usiv^e^{list of}^d^o^c^u^m^e^{nts w}^ould^eⁿ^sure^tha^t^a^{ll pe}^rsoⁿ^{s w}^h^o^{are el}ⁱ^gⁱ^b^l^e^t^o^w^o^{rk co}^u^l^d^easi^l^y^m^e^et^t^h^{e req}^uⁱ^rem^eⁿ^t^s.^”
^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^J^u^s^tic^e^,^I^m^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion a}ⁿ^d^N^a^tur^a^liz^a^tio^{n Se}^r^v^ic^e^,⁶³^Fe^de^{ral Re}^giste^r⁵²⁸⁹^{, Fe}^br^ua^r^y^{2, 199}^8.
⁴³^F^o^{r a}^dⁱ^scu^ssi^on^o^f^t^h^{ese t}^y^p^e^{s o}^f^coⁿ^cern^s^,^{see S}^t^at^em^en^t^o^f^M^a^{rc Ro}^t^eⁿ^b^e^rg,^E^l^ect^r^oⁿⁱ^c^P^rⁱ^v^ac^y^In^fo^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ
^C^e^nte^r^{, a}^t^U^.^S.^C^o^ng^r^e^s^s^,^H^ous^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on the}^J^u^dicⁱ^a^r^y^,^Subc^om^m^itte^e^{on I}^m^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion, B}^o^r^d^e^r^Se^c^u^r^ity^{, a}^nd^th^st
^Claims,^I^lle^{gal I}^m^mⁱ^gr^ati^oⁿ^Enf^o^r^c^e^m^eⁿ^{t and}^Socⁱ^a^l^Se^c^u^r^ity^Pr^ot^e^c^{tion Ac}^t^of²⁰⁰⁵^,^h^eariⁿ^g,¹⁰⁹^Cong^.,¹^sess.^,
^Ma^y^{12, 20}^05.
⁴⁴^F^o^{r a}^dⁱ^scu^ssi^on^o^f^co^st^estⁱ^m^at^e^s^f^o^{r i}^ssuⁱⁿ^{g m}^o^{re secu}^{re S}^o^ci^al^S^ecu^ri^t^y^c^a^rd^s,^{see S}^t^at^e^m^en^t^o^f^S^S^A^Co^mmⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^e^r
^Jo^Aⁿⁿ^e^B.^Barnh^a^rt,^{at U.}^S^.^Congress,^Ho^u^s^{e Co}^mm^{ittee o}ⁿ^W^a^ys^an^d^M^ean^s,^Impa^ct^s^o^f^B^o^rd^{er S}^ecu^ri^t^y^aⁿ^d^th^nd
^I^m^mⁱ^gr^atio^{n on}^W^a^y^s^an^d^M^e^ans^Pr^ogr^am^s^,^h^eariⁿ^g,¹⁰⁹^Cong^.,²^s^e^s^s^{., J}^u^ly^{26, 20}⁰⁶^.

In addition, SSA has long cautioned that the Social Security card is not a personal identification
document, maintaining that its primary purpose is to provide a record of the number that has been
assigned to an individual so the individual’s employer can properly report earnings in covered
jobs.
All of the options discussed, thus far, would build on the existing employer-based employment
eligibility verification system. An alternative system could make the government responsible for
verifying employment eligibility. In a November 2005 paper, Marc R. Rosenblum offered one ⁴⁵
such alternative, which he termed a centralized screening system. He described the centralized
screening system, as follows:
^Un^d^e^r^{a cen}^tr^alized^s^y^ste^m^{, t}^h^{e r}^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ilit^y^f^o^r^v^e^rⁱ^f^yⁱⁿ^g^wo^r^k^elig^ib^il^it^y^w^o^u^l^d^r^e^s^t^wⁱ^t^h
^p^r^o^f^essioⁿ^{al scr}^e^eⁿ^er^{s at th}^{e p}^oⁱⁿ^t^o^f^d^o^c^u^m^eⁿ^{t iss}^u^aⁿ^{ce, an}^d^p^r^o^o^f^o^f^elig^ib^ilit^y^w^o^u^l^d^b^e
^e^m^bodi^{ed i}ⁿ^a^w^o^r^k^er’^sⁱ^d^en^tⁱ^t^y^{card i}^t^s^e^l^f^.^E^m^pl^o^y^er^s^cou^l^{d t}^h^us^a^s^sum^e^cardh^ol^ders^are
^w^o^r^k^-^a^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^{, an}^d^em^p^l^o^y^e^r^r^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ilit^y^w^o^u^l^d^b^e^r^e^d^u^ced^to^k^eepⁱⁿ^g^{a r}^eco^r^d^o^fⁿ^e^w
^hi^r^e^s.
As outlined by Rosenblum, employers would be responsible for registering new hires in a new
job holder database; he envisions that eventually this would be done by swiping a machine-
readable card. Under such a system, employers would only be subject to penalties for failing to
fulfill the registration requirements.
The effectiveness of such a system at preventing unauthorized employment would rely largely on
the security of the underlying documents. According to Rosenblum:
^En^f^o^r^c^e^m^en^t^ag^eⁿ^t^s^w^o^u^l^d^b^e^r^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^l^e^f^o^rⁱⁿ^s^u^rⁱⁿ^g^th^eⁱⁿ^teg^r^it^y^o^f^w^o^r^k^a^u^th^o^r^izatioⁿ
^docum^ents^{, an}^d^f^o^{r an}^al^y^z^ing^e^m^plo^y^{er records}^{to s}^earch^f^o^{r ev}^iden^{ce t}^h^{at e}^m^plo^y^ees^are
^u^sⁱⁿ^g^borrow^e^{d or s}^t^ol^en^docum^ent^s^.
If such a system were to receive serious consideration, there would likely be questions about
whether enforcement agents could perform these functions. In addition, to the extent that it relied
on one or a small number of verification documents, such a system would likely raise concerns
about privacy, identity theft, and the establishment of a national identification card, as discussed
in the prior section.
Another option would be to shift the focus of enforcement from ICE worksite enforcement to
enforcement of minimum wage and health and safety laws by the Department of Labor (DOL).
This option is premised on an assumption that increased DOL enforcement would be more
effective than ICE enforcement at protecting the jobs, wages, and working conditions of U.S.

⁴⁵^{Marc R. Ro}^sen^b^lu^m^,^Immigrati^o^{n En}^forc^e^m^eⁿ^{t at}^the^W^o^rk^site^{: M}^a^kⁱ^ng^{it W}^o^rk^{, Mig}^r^a^{tion Pol}ⁱ^c^y^Iⁿ^stitute^,^P^o^lic^y
^Brie^f^,^{no. 6}^,^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r²⁰⁰^{5, a}^t^h^ttp://w^w^w^.^mⁱ^g^ra^tionpo^lic^y^.^org^/^IT^FIA^F^/T^F6_Ros^e^nbl^um^.pdf^.

workers, and that employers who employ unauthorized aliens are likely the same employers who
violate wage, hour, and safety laws.
Another version of this option, which represents a complete departure from the current
employment eligibility verification system, would couple increased DOL enforcement with the
repeal of the current INA prohibitions on unauthorized employment. Jennifer Gordon, a law
professor, advocated a version of this option at a hearing of the House Immigration subcommittee
in June 2005. In her testimony, Gordon contended that the current system had “contributed
significantly to undermining [the working conditions of U.S. citizens and legal immigrants] and
that “effective enforcement of basic workplace rights for all employees is the lynchpin in any
strategy to protect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers.” She recommended
replacing the current system with a two-pronged approach. The first prong would be a statement
from Congress that workplace protections apply equally to all workers regardless of their
immigration status. The second part, as she characterized it, would be “a new commitment to
intensive and strategically targeted government enforcement of minimum wage and health and
safety laws in industries and geographic areas with high concentrations of undocumented ⁴⁶
workers.”
This option is highly controversial. While Gordon argued at the hearing that it held greater
promise for protecting workers than the current system, others soundly reject the idea of repealing
employer sanctions. Among the opponents is Carl W. Hampe, a partner in a law firm and a former
Justice Department official and congressional staffer, who also testified at the June 2005 House
hearing. According to Hampe’s testimony:
^I^b^e^lⁱ^e^ve^[^r^e^p^e^a^lⁱ^{ng e}^m^p^l^o^y^e^r^sa^nc^tⁱ^o^ns]^w^o^ul^d^b^e^ve^r^y^uⁿ^wⁱ^s^e^,^a^sⁱ^t^w^o^ul^d^se^nd^a^m^e^ssa^ge
^to^th^e^w^o^r^l^d^’^{s p}^o^t^en^tial^uⁿ^au^th^o^r^izedⁱ^m^mⁱ^g^r^an^t^s^th^{at t}^h^e^Un^ited^State^sⁿ^o^loⁿ^g^er^w^ill
^discou^rag^e^ille^g^a^{l i}^m^mⁱ^g^r^atioⁿ^{... Ho}^w^e^v^e^r^larg^e^th^e^uⁿ^a^u^t^{horized i}^m^mⁱ^g^r^atioⁿ^proble^m^is
ⁿ^o^w^,^repeal^of^e^m^pl^o^y^er^s^a^nctⁱ^oⁿ^s^a^t^t^hⁱ^s^poiⁿ^t^w^o^u^l^{d ce}^rt^aiⁿ^l^y^m^a^k^e^t^h^{e probl}^e^m^f^a^r⁴⁷
^wo^r^s^e^.

Significant legislation on employment eligibility verification and worksite enforcement was
enacted in 1986 and 1996, and many seem to believe the time may be ripe once again to address
these issues. As Congress decides if, and or, to reform the current system, it may consider the
options presented in this report. Members of Congress may decide on one or more options that
build on the existing employer-based system of employment eligibility verification and the
existing ICE worksite enforcement program, or may consider a different approach in one or both
of these areas. While presumably options would be assessed, in large part, on their potential for
reducing unauthorized employment, this report has also attempted to identify accompanying
concerns, such as discrimination, privacy, and identify theft, which Congress may also want to
weigh as part of the policymaking process.

⁴⁶^Sta^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^J^e^nnif^e^r^G^o^{rdon, a}^t^U^.^{S. Co}^ng^re^s^s^,^H^ous^e^Com^m^{ittee on}^the^J^u^dicⁱ^a^r^y^,^Subc^om^m^itte^e^{on Im}^mⁱ^g^r^a^tion,
^Bo^rd^{er S}^ecu^ri^t^y^,^an^d^Cl^ai^m^s^,^Lac^k^{of W}^o^r^k^s^ite^Enf^o^r^c^e^m^eⁿ^{t an}^{d E}^m^ploy^e^r^Sa^nc^tio^ns^,^h^earⁱⁿ^g,¹⁰⁹^th^Cong^.,¹^st^sess.^,
^J^une²¹^,²⁰^05.
⁴⁷^Sta^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^C^a^r^l^W^.^H^a^m^p^e^,^a^t^U^.^{S. C}^o^ng^r^e^s^s^,^H^ous^e^C^o^m^m^{ittee on}^the^J^u^dicⁱ^a^r^y^,^Subc^om^m^itte^e^{on I}^m^mⁱ^g^r^a^tion,
^Bo^rd^{er S}^ecu^ri^t^y^,^an^d^Cl^ai^m^s^,^Lac^k^{of W}^o^r^k^s^ite^Enf^o^r^c^e^m^eⁿ^{t an}^{d E}^m^ploy^e^r^Sa^nc^tio^ns^,^h^earⁱⁿ^g,¹⁰⁹^th^Cong^.,¹^st^sess.^,
^J^une²¹^,²⁰^05.

^An^{dorra Bru}ⁿ^o
^Sp^{ecialist i}ⁿ^I^m^mⁱ^g^r^atioⁿ^P^o^lic^y
^abruⁿ^o^@^c^rs^.l^oc.^g^ov^{, 7-}⁷⁸⁶⁵