Civil Commitment of Sexually Dangerous Persons







Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress



The 109th Congress passed legislation (P.L. 109-248) that allows the federal government to civilly
commit “sexually dangerous persons.” Civil commitment, as it relates to sex offenders, is when a
state retains custody of an individual, found by a judge or jury to be a “sexually dangerous
person,” by involuntarily committing the person to a secure mental health facility after the
offender’s prison sentence is done. In 1990, the state of Washington passed the first civil
commitment law for sexually dangerous persons. Currently, 18 other states and the federal
government have similar laws. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas
v. Crane, ruled that current civil commitment laws are constitutional.
The civil commitment of sex offenders centers on the belief that sex offenders are more likely
than other offenders to re-offend. However, data on sex offender recidivism is varied. Data show
that the recidivism risk for sex offenders may be lower than it is typically thought to be; in fact,
some studies show that sex offenders recidivate at a lower rate than many other criminals. Other
studies show that, given time, almost all sex offenders will commit a new sex crime. Most
discussions about recidivism examine ways to decrease recidivism; for example, by providing sex
offenders with treatment. Research on the efficacy of sex offender treatment is promising, but it
cannot prove that treatment reduces recidivism. Cognitive-behavioral techniques appear to be the
most promising type of treatment for sex offenders, although some research indicates that
offenders who receive a diagnosis of psychopathy may be less amenable to treatment.
For civil commitment to be effective, practitioners must be able to identify sex offenders who
pose a high risk of re-offending. Although the ability of practitioners to identify offenders has
improved, there is still the possibility that an offender who would not re-offend might be
committed. Moreover, determining when it is safe to release a sex offender from custody is still
difficult for practitioners. Such concerns have raised questions about alternatives to civil
commitment. One potential alternative is the use of less restrictive measures, such as intensive
community supervision. Another alternative is the use of indeterminate sentences for sex
offenders. The cost of civil commitment programs has fueled debate about other viable means for
managing dangerous sex offenders. Data show that civil commitment programs are expensive
when compared with traditional incarceration or community supervision. The cost of civil
commitment programs is expected to grow as more offenders are committed.
An issue for Congress is whether civil commitment is a sustainable policy for dealing with
sexually dangerous persons, or whether there is a different way to manage this population
effectively. The issue of civil commitment raises a series of concomitant questions: How much do
civil commitment programs cost? How dangerous are sex offenders? Is sex offender treatment
effective? Can sexually dangerous persons be defined and identified? Are there less restrictive
alternatives for managing sex offenders?
This report will be updated as warranted.






Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background on Civil Commitment.................................................................................................2
History of Civil Commitment Laws..........................................................................................2
Supreme Court Rulings on Civil Commitment.........................................................................5
Kansas v. Hendricks............................................................................................................5
Kansas v. Crane..................................................................................................................7 th
Civil Commitment Legislation in the 109 Congress...............................................................7
Sex Offender Recidivism................................................................................................................9
Limitations of Studies on Sex Offender Recidivism.................................................................9
Sex Offender Recidivism Data..................................................................................................9
Sex Offender Treatment................................................................................................................13
Can Sex Offenders Be Treated?..............................................................................................13
Sex Offender Treatment Research Issues................................................................................18
Select Issues..................................................................................................................................18
Who Should Be Civilly Committed?......................................................................................19
Do Sex Offenders Specialize in Sex Crimes?...................................................................19
Are Some Sex Offenders More Dangerous Than Others?................................................22
Future Dangerousness.......................................................................................................23
Safe to Release..................................................................................................................25
Less-Restrictive Alternatives...................................................................................................25
Indeterminate Sentences for Sex Offenders............................................................................27
Cost of Civil Commitment......................................................................................................28
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 29
Table 1. Rate of Recidivism of State Offenders Released in 1994, by Most Serious
Offense for Which Released........................................................................................................11
Table 2. Relative Likelihood of Rearrest for Same Offense as Release Offense, Among
State Prisoners Released in 1994................................................................................................20
Table 3. Percentage of Sex Offenders Rearrested or Reconvicted for a Sex Crime or Any
Crime Within Three Years of Release........................................................................................21
Table 4. Criminal History of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994, by Type of
Sex Offender..............................................................................................................................22
Appendix. Civil Commitment Statutes, by State...........................................................................31





Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................36






In 1990, the state of Washington passed a law that allows for the civil commitment of sex
offenders. Civil commitment, as it relates to sex offenders, is when a state retains custody of an
individual, found by a judge or jury to be a “sexually dangerous person,” by involuntarily
committing the person to a secure mental health facility after the offender’s prison sentence is
done. The state of Washington law requires the state to prove that such offenders suffer from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder that would make them likely to engage in predatory 2
acts of sexual violence unless they are confined. The law allows for civil commitment after an
offender completes a prison sentence for his or her crime(s). Since 1990, 19 states have passed 3
similar legislation, and in 2006, Congress passed legislation (P.L. 109-248) that allows the
Attorney General to civilly commit federal inmates who are found to be sexually dangerous
persons.
Every state has “civil commitment” laws that allow for the involuntarily hospitalization of people 4
with serious mental illness. Generally speaking, people can be civilly committed when they are a
danger to others. When a person’s symptoms begin to remit, the individual is discharged and
typically referred to aftercare services. Hospital stays for individuals under a civil commitment
order for mental illness rarely exceed 30 days. However, in this report, “civil commitment” refers
to civil commitment laws targeted at the hospitalization or commitment to a secure institution of
“sexually violent persons” after they are released from prison.
With respect to sex offenders, civil commitment laws allow states, and now the federal
government, to civilly commit sexually dangerous persons. For the most part, discussions about
sexually dangerous persons treat sex offenders as a homogenous group, sometimes making a
distinction between “rapists” and “child molesters.” However, sex offenders are a heterogeneous
group of offenders; under many state statutes, sex offenses range from rape to child molestation
to exhibitionism.
An issue for Congress is whether civil commitment is a sustainable policy for dealing with
sexually dangerous persons, or whether there is a different way to manage this population
effectively. The issue of civil commitment raises a series of concomitant questions: How much do
civil commitment programs cost? How dangerous are sex offenders? Is sex offender treatment
effective? Can sexually dangerous persons be defined and identified? Are there less restrictive
alternatives for managing sex offenders?
This report begins with an outline of the history of civil commitment laws, followed by a review
of two cases, Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane, in which the Supreme Court addressed
constitutional issues involving civil commitment. This review is followed by a summary of the
recently enacted legislation governing the federal civil commitment program. The report then

1 Michael Nance, a CRS intern, assisted with the research and development of this report.
2 See the Appendix.
3 Monica Davey and Abby Goodnough, “Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison,” New York Times,
March 4, 2007, p. 1, hereinafter referred to asNew York Times Civil Commitment Article.”
4 W. Lawrence Fitch, “Sexual Offender Commitment in the United States, Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences, vol. 989 (2003), p. 489, hereinafter referred to asW.L. Fitch.”





discusses research on sex offender recidivism and treatment. It concludes with an evaluation of
some of the issues surrounding civil commitment.

This section describes the history of civil commitment laws in the United States, two Supreme
Court rulings on the constitutionality of civil commitment programs, and a description of the
federal civil commitment program.
With respect to sexually dangerous persons, current civil commitment laws are a reincarnation of 5
what are generally referred to as “sexual psychopath” laws. Beginning in the 1930s, states started
to enact sexual psychopath laws, which grew out of the rehabilitative ideal that characterized the 6
American criminal justice system at the time. By the mid-1960s, more than half of the states in 7
the country had enacted some form of sexual psychopath laws. Sexual psychopath laws reflected 8
the growing belief that sexual psychopaths could be identified and treated. The influence of
psychiatry on sexual psychopath laws can be seen in the four presumptions on which the laws
were based: (1) sexual psychopaths are distinguishable from generic sex offenders, (2)
individuals commit sex offenses because of mental disease, (3) mental diseases are treatable and
curable, and (4) mental health professional can successfully predict who will commit sex crimes 9
in the future. Sexual psychopath laws were designed to offer alternatives to prison for sex
offenders and to prevent further harm to other members of society by incapacitating the 10
offender. After a court found an offender to be a sexual psychopath, the offender was sent to a 11
mental health facility for control and treatment in lieu of imprisonment and punishment. Sexual
psychopath laws targeted offenders who were not seriously mentally ill (thus, not making them
candidates for traditional civil commitment) but who were believed to have a “psychopathic 12
personality” that caused their criminal behavior.
Starting in the 1970s, many of the sexual psychopath laws were repealed, modified, or 13
abandoned. Many states eventually abolished sexual psychopath laws because of criticism from

5 Sexual psychopaths were offenders who did not suffer from a serious mental illness but who were believed to have a
psychopathic personality that caused their criminal behavior. W.L. Fitch, p. 490.
6 Ibid.
7 Grant H. Morris, “The Evil that Men Do: Perverting Justice to Punish Perverts,” University of Illinois Law Review,
vol. 2000 (2000), p. 1200, hereinafter referred to asG.H. Morris.
8 Jill S. Levenson, “Policy Interventions Designed to Combat Sexual Violence: Community Notification and Civil
Commitment, Journal of Child Sexual Abuse, vol. 12, no. 3/4 (2003), p. 31; John Q. LaFond, “The Future of
Involuntary Civil Commitment in the U.S.A. after Kansas v. Hendricks,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law, vol. 18
(2000), p. 157-158, hereinafter referred to asJ.Q. LaFond (2000).
9 Laura Barnickol, “Missouri’s Sexually Violent Predator Law: Treatment or Punishment,” Washington University
Journal of Law and Policy, vol. 4 (2000), p. 324.
10 Ibid.
11 J.Q. LaFond (2000), p. 157.
12 W.L. Fitch, p. 490.
13 Eric S. Janus,Sexual Predator Commitment Laws: Lessons for Law and Behavioral Sciences,” Behavioral Sciences
and the Law, vol. 18 (2000), p. 7, hereinafter referred to asE.S. Janus.”





the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP) and the American Bar Association’s 14
(ABA’s) Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards. Such criticism contended that labeling
offenders as sexual psychopaths lacked scientific merit, the treatment of sex offenders was 15
ineffective, and the prediction of future offending was suspect. In 1977, GAP stated that
First and foremost, sexual psychopath and sexual offender statutes can best be described as
approaches that have failed. The discrepancy between the promises in sex statutes and
performances have rarely been resolved.... The notion is naive and confusing that a hybrid
amalgam of law and psychiatry can validly label a person a “sex psychopath” or sex
offender” and then treat him in a manner consistent with a guarantee of community safety.
The mere assumption that such a heterogeneous legal classification could define treatability 16
and make people amenable to treatment is not fallacious; it is startling.
There was growing intolerance for the idea of treating sex offenders after a series of treated and 17
released sex offenders committed additional sex crimes. Beginning in the 1970s, states started to
adopt a more traditional criminal justice model for managing dangerous sex offenders, such as
incarcerating sex offenders instead of placing them under the supervision of mental health 18
institutions.
Starting in the 1990s, some states passed legislation reminiscent of the old sexual psychopath
laws. In 1990, Washington became the first state to pass a new sexual predator civil commitment 19
law. Other states passed similar legislation since that time. As of June 2007, 19 states have
sexual predator civil commitment laws. Each state had its own impetus for passing its civil
commitment law, but generally speaking, the reasons for enacting such laws are similar. In many 20
states, the laws were passed in response to a particularly heinous sex crime. The change in the 21
1970s and 1980s in most states from an indeterminate to a determinate sentencing structure
allowed some sex offenders to be released from prison after a relatively short period of 22
incarceration. There was also a growing change in societal attitudes and behavior towards 23
violence against women. In addition, general civil commitment laws were considered 24
inadequate to confine sex offenders who were considered dangerous. General civil commitment
laws required proof of serious mental disorder (such as schizophrenia) and recent behavior

14 Rudolph Alexander, Jr. “The United States Supreme Court and the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders,” The Prison
Journal, vol. 83, no. 3 (September 2004), p. 363, hereinafter referred to asR. Alexander.”
15 Ibid.
16 As cited in American Psychiatric Association (APA), Dangerous Sex Offenders: A Task Force Report of the
American Psychiatric Association (Washington, DC: APA, 1999), p. 14, hereinafter referred to asAPA task force
report.”
17 Jill S. Levenson, “Policy Interventions Designed to Combat Sexual Violence: Community Notification and Civil
Commitment, Journal of Child Sexual Abuse, vol. 12, no. 3/4 (2003), p. 31.
18 Ibid.
19 John Q. LaFond, “The Costs of Enacting a Sexual Predator Law,Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, vol. 4 (1998),
p. 474, hereinafter referred to asJ.Q. LaFond (1998).”
20 W.L. Fitch, p. 491.
21 Determinate sentencing requires a convicted offender to serve a specified amount of prison time. The length of the
offenders sentence is usually determined by the offenders criminal history and the crime for which the offender is
sentenced.
22 E.S. Janus, p. 8; J.Q. LaFond (2000), p. 160; Howard Zonana,The Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, Science,
vol. 278, no. 5341 (November 14, 1997).
23 E.S. Janus, p. 8.
24 J.Q. LaFond (2000), p. 160.





indicating that the individual was dangerous. Many states could not commit sex offenders under
general civil commitment laws because the state could not demonstrate that such offenders (1)
had a medically recognized mental disorder and (2) had engaged in recent behavior that proved
that they were dangerous (the population in question was usually incarcerated, which limited
offenders from engaging in sexually dangerous behavior).
Generally, civil commitment laws that target sexually dangerous persons have a similar structure.
They require (1) proof of a past course of sexually harmful conduct, (2) a current mental disorder
or “abnormality,” (3) a finding of risk of future sexually harmful conduct and, (4) some 25
connection between the mental abnormality and the danger. Although similarities exist between
the old sexual psychopath laws and civil commitment laws, they vary in some key aspects. Rather
than providing an alternative to imprisonment, civil commitment laws require sex offenders to be 26
committed after they complete their terms of incarceration. Also, civil commitment laws do not
require an allegation or proof of recent criminal, dangerous, or inappropriate behavior or 27
deteriorating mental state before the state can seek commitment.
Civil commitment laws have been both politically and legally contentious because they allow sex
offenders to be confined after their criminal sentence is completed. Moreover, some members of
the psychiatric community have challenged the validity of the legislatively created definition of
“mental abnormality.” For example, the Washington State Psychiatric Association (WSPA)
testified before the Washington State Legislature when it was considering civil commitment
legislation. One psychiatrist who testified on behalf of the WSPA noted that a psychiatrist’s
definition of “mental disorder” includes the loss of contact with reality, confusion, loss of reason, 28
and hallucinations. Some sex offenders, however, do not demonstrate any of these behaviors. 29
According to the WSPA, the issue is not “mental disorders,” but rather “abnormal behavior.”
Persons who have committed more than one sex offense are assumed to be depraved or sick, or to
have some type of mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes them likely to re-30
offend.
Several offenders have attempted to challenge their civil commitment in court. Civilly committed
offenders argue that civil commitment laws are unconstitutional because they allow offenders to
be committed after they have completed their sentences, even if they do not suffer from a
medically recognized mental disorder. Two legal challenges to civil commitment laws have made
it to the United States Supreme Court, Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane.

25 E.S. Janus, p. 9.
26 W.L. Fitch, p. 491.
27 Ibid.
28 James D. Reardon, “Sexual Predators: Mental Illness or Abnormality? A Psychiatrists Perspective, University of
Puget Sound Law Review, vol. 15 (1991-1992), p. 849, hereinafter referred to asJ.D. Reardon”; Robert M. Wettstein,
“A Psychiatric Perspective on Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Statute,University of Puget Sound Law
Review, vol. 15 (1991-1992), p. 597, hereinafter referred to asR.M. Wettstein.”
29 J.D. Reardon.
30 Ibid.






In Kansas v. Hendricks,32 the Supreme Court considered constitutional challenges to the Kansas 33
Sexually Violent Predator Act, which was enacted to address the issue of repeat sexual
offenders. Although Kansas law already contained a provision for the confinement of the
“mentally ill,” the Kansas legislature found that this statute was inadequate in its application to
sex offenders. According to the Act’s preamble:
[A] small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist who do not have
a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for involuntary treatment pursuant to
the [general involuntary civil commitment statute].... In contrast to persons appropriate for
civil commitment under the [general involuntary civil commitment statute], sexually violent
predators generally have anti-social personality features which are unamenable to existing
mental illness treatment modalities and those features render them likely to engage in
sexually violent behavior. The legislature further finds that sexually violent predators
likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high. The existing
involuntary commitment procedure ... is inadequate to address the risk these sexually violent
predators pose to society. The legislature further finds that the prognosis for rehabilitating
sexually violent predators in a prison setting is poor, the treatment needs of this population
are very long term and the treatment modalities for this population are very different than the
traditional treatment modalities for people appropriate for commitment under the [general
involuntary civil commitment statute].
As traditional methods of civil confinement were found to be inappropriate, Kansas created a
civil commitment procedure specifically for sexual predators. Under this Act, “sexually violent
predators” were defined as “any person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually
violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes 34
the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence.” This definition was
intended to be applied regardless of whether a person had been previously convicted of a sexual
offense.
In Hendricks, the state sought to commit a defendant who had been convicted of taking “indecent
liberties” with two 13-year-old boys, and who had served nearly 10 years in prison for that crime.
Shortly before his scheduled release, Kansas filed a petition seeking to confine the defendant as a
sexually violent predator. After a trial that considered the defendant’s long history of pedophilia,
the defendant was civilly committed.
The Court first considered whether the Act violated the defendant’s substantive due process rights
to freedom from physical restraint. In general, states may civilly commit people who are unable

31 For a discussion of the Hendricks case, see G.H. Morris; R. Alexander; J.Q. LaFond (2000); Eli M. Rollman,
“‘Mental Illness’: A Sexually Violent Predator is Punished Twice for One Crime,Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology, vol. 88 (1997-1998), p. 985, hereinafter referred to as E.M. Rollman; Franklin T. Wilson, “Out of
Sight, Out of Mind: An Analysis of Kansas v. Crane and the Fine Line Between Civil and Criminal Sanctions,” The
Prison Journal, vol. 84, no. 3 (2004), p. 379, hereinafter referred to asF.T. Wilson.”
32 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
33 K.S.A. § 59-29a03 (1994).
34 K.S.A. § 59-29a02(a)(1994).





to control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public’s health and safety.35 Thus,
the question in the Hendricks case was whether the Act met that standard.
The Court noted that the statute required more than proof of predisposition to violence, in that it
also required evidence of past sexually violent behavior and a present mental condition that
created a likelihood of such conduct in the future. Because the Act specifically required a finding
of dangerousness either to oneself or to others before a person is civilly committed, it was found 36
to be consistent with the requirements of due process.
The Court also considered two other arguments. First, it considered whether the application of the
Act was intended to punish Hendricks for behavior that he had engaged in before passage of the
law, as this would run afoul of the prohibition on the passage of ex post facto laws. Second, the
Court considered whether the Act was being used to punish Hendricks for behavior that he had 37
previously been convicted and punished for, in violation of the prohibitions on double jeopardy.
The Court noted that the resolution of both ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges turns on
whether the challenged statute is found to be punitive or regulatory in nature.
The Supreme Court has long held that the Ex Post Facto Clause limits Congress from passing 38
criminal or penal laws that have a retrospective effect. However, when the statute in question is
not clearly criminal in nature, a question may arise as to whether the challenged law is actually 39
imposing a penalty for past conduct. For instance, when convicted sex offenders were subject to
the retroactive application of an Alaskan statute requiring convicted sex offenders to register
(with much of the resulting information being made public), the statute was upheld as a 40
nonpunitive regulatory scheme.
Determining what is punitive is a multistep process, sometimes referred to as the “intent/effects”
test. First, a court must ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish “civil” or
“criminal” proceedings. To do so, a court will examine a statute’s text and structure to determine 41
the legislative objective. If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends 42
the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and
nonpunitive, a court must then determine whether the statutory scheme is “so punitive either in 43
purpose or effect as to negate [the government’s] intention to deem it civil.” Only the “clearest
proof” will allow a court to override legislative intent and find that a civil remedy is in fact 44
punitive.

35 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (in order to continue confinement after a finding of not guilty by reason of
mental illness, the government must show that the defendant is a danger to society).
36 521 U.S. at 357-358.
37 U.S. Const. Amendment 5 (as incorporated through the 14th Amendment).
38 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 397 (1789); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1867).
39 Thus, for instance, when a post-Civil War statute required attorneys to swear they had not participated in a rebellion
against the Union before they could practice law in federal court, the Court found the law punitive, because the oath
had no relationship to the professional duties of attorneys. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 316 (1867).
40 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
41 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
42 538 U.S. at 92.
43 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249 (1980).
44 Id. at 249.





In Hendricks, the Court found that Kansas intended for the Act to be civil in nature, describing it
as “civil commitment procedure” and placing it within the Kansas probate code, instead of the
criminal code. Second, the Court held the Act did not implicate either of the two primary
objectives of criminal punishment: retribution or deterrence. The Court found that prior criminal
conduct was considered under the Act, not as a means to punish for prior conduct but as evidence
for the regulatory purpose of determining dangerousness. Further, the Court noted that offenders
could be committed even if they had been acquitted for prior criminal conduct. Finally, the Court
noted that, unlike traditional punishment, the confinement is indefinite in scope and is reviewed
on an annual basis.
Similarly, the Court found that for purposes of double jeopardy, the application of the Act had
none of the attributes of punishment. Because the Act is civil in nature, instituting commitment
proceedings after a criminal case for the same crime has been concluded does not constitute a 45
second prosecution. Consequently, the Court concluded that neither the ex post facto clause or 46
double jeopardy was implicated by the application of the Act.

The Kansas Act was again in question in Kansas v. Crane,48 in which the Court refined its holding
in Hendricks. In Crane, the defendant in question was a previously convicted sexual offender
who apparently suffered from both exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder. In Crane,
the Court considered the issue of whether a civil commitment statute, beyond showing the
likelihood of dangerousness, must also show that a defendant cannot control his or her dangerous
behavior. While rejecting the argument that the individual be completely unable to control their
behavior, the Court did reaffirm language from the Hendricks case, noting that the Kansas Act
required that it be “difficult, if not impossible” for the dangerous person to control his dangerous
behavior. While recognizing the difficulty of setting a precise standard for the degree of volition
required, the Court did indicate that a state would have to show that a defendant had “serious 49
difficulty” in controlling his or her impulses.

Title III of The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-248) established a
federal civil commitment program. The program allows the Attorney General (AG), or any
individual authorized by the AG, or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to certify as
sexually dangerous a person who is in BOP’s custody, under the custody of the AG under current 50
law, or whose criminal charges have been dismissed solely for reasons relating to the mental
condition of the person. If an individual is deemed sexually dangerous, a court in the district
where the individual is being held conducts a hearing to determine whether the individual is
indeed a sexually dangerous person. Under the law, the court may order a psychological or

45 See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 77 L. Ed. 2d 694, 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1984) (permitting involuntary civil
commitment after verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity).
46 521 U.S. at 369-71.
47 For a discussion of the Crane case, see R. Alexander and F.T. Wilson.
48 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
49 534 U.S. at 413.
50 18 U.S.C. §§4241 and 4247.





psychiatric examination before the proceedings begin, and those findings are filed with the court.
The individual cannot be released until the proceedings conclude. If the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the person is a sexually dangerous person, the individual is committed
to the custody of the AG.
After the individual is committed to the custody of the AG, the AG releases the individual to the
appropriate official of the state in which the person was confined or tried, if the state will assume
responsibility for the offender’s custody, care, and treatment. If the state will not assume
responsibility for the offender, the AG places the offender in a suitable treatment facility until
either the state assumes responsibility for the offender or the offender is no longer considered a
sexually dangerous person and would not be a threat to others if released under a prescribed
regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care, whichever is earlier.
After the individual is committed to custody, the director of the facility in which the offender is
placed may petition the court to release the individual if the director determines that the offender
is no longer a sexually dangerous person and would not be a threat to others. The court may order
the discharge of the individual or, on the motion of the government’s attorney, hold a hearing to
determine whether the individual should be released. If the court finds by a preponderance of
evidence that the individual’s condition is such that he or she would not be sexually dangerous to
others if released unconditionally, the court orders the person discharged. If he or she is found not
to be sexually dangerous to others if released under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric,
or psychological care, the court orders the individual conditionally discharged under a prescribed
regimen that has been certified to the court as appropriate. The director of the facility is
responsible for notifying the AG and the court of any failure to comply with the regimen. If the
court receives notice that the individual is not complying with the treatment regime, or upon other
probable cause to believe that the discharged individual is not complying with the regimen, the
individual is arrested and brought before the court. The court then determines whether the
individual should be remanded to a suitable facility on the grounds that he or she is a sexually
dangerous person and is not complying with the imposed regimen.
The law also states that if the director of a facility in which an individual is hospitalized or placed
certifies to the AG that the individual, against whom all charges have been dismissed for reasons
not related to the mental condition of the person, is a sexually dangerous person, the AG will
release the person to the appropriate official of the state in which the person is confined or was
tried for the purpose of instituting state proceedings for civil commitment. If the state will not
assume responsibility for the individual, the AG releases the person, but not later than 10 days
after certification by the director of the facility.
Title III of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 also created a grant program
that allows the AG to award grants to jurisdictions for the purpose of establishing, enhancing, or
operating civil commitment programs for sexually dangerous persons. The civil commitment
programs must be consistent with guidelines issued by the AG. The law also requires states to
notify the state official responsible for conducting civil commitment proceedings upon the
impending release of an inmate that (1) has been convicted of a sexually violent offense or (2) has
been deemed by the state to be a high risk for recommitting a sexual offense against a minor.






The common perception of sex offenders is that they are more dangerous than other criminals. 51
For some, it is not a matter of if sex offenders will re-offend, but when they will re-offend. The
civil commitment of sex offenders hinges on the belief that sex offenders are more likely to 52
recidivate. This section evaluates the threat that sex offenders pose to the public by reviewing
four studies of sex offender recidivism.
Although an increasing number of studies have attempted to capture the recidivism rate of sex
offenders, each study suffers from inherent limitations. First, sexual offenses are usually
underreported, which means that many of the traditional measures of recidivism, such as rearrest 53
or reconviction, underestimate the true amount of recidivism amongst sex offenders. Moreover,
debate exists about what type of outcome measure should be used to measure recidivism. The
broader the outcome measure (e.g., rearrest compared with reconviction), the greater the reported
recidivism rate. Second, many studies tend to report recidivism rates for sex offenders as a whole,
rather than for more homogenous groups of sex offenders (e.g., rapists, intrafamiliar child
molesters, extrafamiliar child molesters, and exhibitionists), which can affect the rate because 54
evidence shows that different groups of sex offenders have different recidivism rates. For
example, if a study measured the recidivism rate for a group of released sex offenders composed
primarily of convicted rapists, it might have a higher recidivism rate than a group of released sex
offenders composed primarily of intrafamiliar child molesters. Third, many studies include only
incarcerated sex offenders, not sex offenders who are placed on probation, which means the 55
sample might not reflect the true population of sex offenders. Finally, the length of the follow-
up period can affect the reported recidivism rate. The longer the follow-up period, the greater the
recidivism rate. Although a five year follow-up period is common for many studies of sex
offender recidivism, research has shown that some sex offenders may commit new crimes 10, 15, 56
or 20 years after being released from incarceration or community supervision.
This section reviews two studies from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). One study reported
the recidivism rate of sex offenders released from prison in 1994; the other study reported the
recidivism rate of all types of offenders released from prison in 1994. The recidivism rates for sex
offenders and violent offenders are compared to evaluate whether sex offenders are at a higher
risk to recidivate than other violent offenders. To evaluate whether the sex offender recidivism

51 Lisa L. Sample and Timothy M. Bray, “Are Sex Offenders Dangerous,” Criminology and Public Policy, vol. 3, no. 1
(2003), p. 60.
52 In general, recidivism refers to when a convicted offender commits another crime after the offender is released from
prison.
53 APA task force report, p. 129. A 1992-2000 National Crime Victimization Survey showed that only 36% of rapes
were reported to police.
54 Ibid., pp. 129-130.
55 Ibid., p. 130.
56 Ibid., pp. 133-134.





rates reported by BJS are consistent with other research, this section also reviews two additional
studies that reported the recidivism rates for other groups of sex offenders. Later in the report,
recidivism data from the BJS studies are analyzed to evaluate whether sex offenders specialize in
sex crimes, or whether they commit sex crimes as a part of a general pattern of violent behavior.
BJS collected data on 272,111 prisoners released in 15 states57 in 1994. In 2003, BJS released a 58
report that presented recidivism data for 9,691 male sex offenders who were a part of the 59

272,111 released prisoners. The 9,691 released men represent two-thirds of all male sex 60


offenders released from prison in 1994. BJS collected data on the released sex offenders for
three years and reported the following:
• 5.3% of all released sex offenders were rearrested for a new sex crime within
three years of being released, and 3.5% of all released sex offenders were
reconvicted for a new sex crime within three years of being released;
• 5.0% of released rapists were rearrested within three years for a new sex crime,
and 3.2% of released rapists were reconvicted within three years for a new sex
crime;
• 5.5% of sexual assaulters were rearrested for a new sex crime within three years,
and 3.7% of sexual assaulters were reconvicted for a new sex crime within three
years;
• 5.1% of child molesters were rearrested for a new sex crime within three years,
and 3.5% of child molesters were reconvicted for a new sex crime within three
years;
• 5.0% of statutory rapists61 were rearrested for a new sex crime within three years,
and 3.6% of statutory rapists were reconvicted for a new sex crime within three 62
years.
BJS also reported that released sex offenders were four times more likely than non-sex offenders 63
to be rearrested for a sex crime. BJS found that 5.3% of released sex offenders were rearrested
for a sex crime within three years of being released (517 of the 9,961 released sex offenders were 64
rearrested for a sex crime). In comparison, BJS found that 1.3% of the released non-sex
offenders were rearrested for a sex crime within three years of being released (3,328 of the 65

262,420 released non-sex offenders were rearrested for a sex crime).



57 The sex offenders included in the BJS report were released from prisons in Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida,
Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia.
58 All released sex offenders were convicted for violent sex offenses.
59 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994, report NCJ 198281,
November 2003, available online at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf, accessed November 29, 2006,
hereinafter referred to asBJS 1994 sex offender recidivism report.
60 Ibid., p. 1.
61Statutory rapist refers to an offender who had consensual sexual intercourse with someone under the age of consent
in the state in which the offense occurred. Statutory rape included incest offenses.
62 Ibid., p.1 and p. 24.
63 BJS 1994 sex offender recidivism report, p. 1.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.





A 2002 BJS report discussed data from all the 272,111 offenders released in 1994.66 Like the
2003 report on released sex offenders, data were collected for three years after the prisoners were
released. Table 1 presents data from the 2002 BJS report showing the number of released violent
offenders that were rearrested, reconvicted, and returned to prison. Data show that released rapists
and other sexual assaulters were less likely than other released violent offenders, other than
released murders, to be rearrested and reconvicted within three years of being released. This data
suggest that rapists and other sexual assaulters, in terms of recidivism for any type of crime, may
not be a greater threat to recidivate than other released violent offenders.
Table 1. Rate of Recidivism of State Offenders Released in 1994, by Most Serious
Offense for Which Released
Percentage of Released Prisoners Who, Within
Three Years, Were—
Returned to
Most Serious Returned to Prison with or
Offense for Which Prison with a without a New
Released Rearrested Reconvicted New Sentenceh Sentencei
Homicidea 40.7% 20.5% 10.8% 31.4%
Kidnappingb 59.4% 37.8% 25.1% 29.5%
Rapec 46.0% 27.4% 12.6% 43.5%
Other sexual assaultd 41.4% 22.3% 10.5% 36.0%
Robberye 70.2% 46.5% 25.0% 54.7%
Assaultf 65.1% 44.2% 21.0% 51.2%
Other violentg 51.7% 29.8% 12.7% 40.9%
Source: CRS presentation of Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, NCJ 193427,
June 2002. Extracted from Table 9. This table focuses on the recidivism rates of sex offenders compared to
other violent offenders; hence, it does not include information on the recidivism rates for offenders convicted of
property offenses (burglary, larceny/theft, motor vehicle theft, arson, fraud, stolen property, or other property),
drug offenses (possession, trafficking, or other/unspecified), or public-order offenses (weapons, driving under the
influence, or other public-order offenses).
a. “Homicide” is defined as (1) intentionally causing the death of another person without extremeprovocation
or legal justification or (2) causing the death of another while committing or attempting to commit another
crime.
b. “Kidnapping” is defined as the unlawful seizure, transportation, or detention of a person against his or her
will, or of a minor without the consent of his or her guardian. Includes forcible detainment, false
imprisonment, abduction, or unlawful restraint. Does not require that ransom or extortion be the purpose
of the act.
c. “Rape” is defined as forcible intercourse (vaginal, anal, or oral) with a female or male. It includes forcible
sodomy or penetration with a foreign object; it excludes statutory rape or any other nonforcible sexual acts
with some unable to give legal or factual consent because of mental or physical defect or intoxication.
d. “Other sexual assault” is defined as (1) forcible or violent sexual acts not involving intercourse with an adult
or minor, (2) non-forcible sexual acts with a minor (such as statutory rape or incest with a minor), or (3)

66 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Offenders Released in 1994, report NCJ 193427, June 2002, available
online at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf, accessed November 29, 2006, hereinafter referred to as “BJS
1994 offender recidivism report.”





non-forcible sexual acts with someone unable to give consent because of mental or physical defect or
intoxication.
e. “Robbery” is defined as the unlawful taking of property that is in the immediate possession of another, by
force or the threat of force. Includes forcible purse snatching, but excludes nonforcible purse snatching.
f. “Assault” is defined as (1) intentionally and without legal justification causing serious bodily injury, with or
without a deadly weapon or (2) using a deadly or dangerous weapon to threaten, attempt, or cause bodily
injury, regardless of the degree of injury, if any. Includes attempted murder, aggravated battery, felonious
assault, and assault with a deadly weapon.
g. Includes offenses such as intimidation, illegal abortion, extortion, cruelty towards a child or wife, hit-and-run
driving with bodily injury, and miscellaneous crimes against the person.
h. Includes new sentences to state or federal prisons but does not include sentences to local jails. Prisoners
released in Ohio and Virginia were not included in the calculations because of missing data.
i. Includes both prisoners with new sentences to state or federal prisons and prisoners returned for technical
violations. Prisoners released in Arizona, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and Virginia were not
included in the calculations because of missing data.
Two studies found recidivism rates for sex offenders that were higher than the rates reported in 6768
the BJS report. A 1998 study combined the data from 61 sex offender recidivism studies. The
61 studies include data from 28,972 sex offenders. Recidivism was defined as either rearrest or
reconviction. The average follow-up period was four to five years. The study found that, on
average, sex offenders had a 13.4% recidivism rate for sex crimes, rapists had a 18.9% recidivism 69
rate, and child molesters had a 12.7 recidivism rate. When recidivism was defined as any re-
offense, the recidivism rate increased to 36.3% for all sex offenders, 36.9% for child molesters, 70
and 46.2% for rapists. The study also found that non-sexual violent offense recidivism rate for 71
sex offenders was 12.2%, 9.9% for child molesters, and 22.1% for rapists. The averages should
be considered cautiously because the studies included in the meta-analysis used diverse methods 72
and follow-up periods.
A 2003 study calculated recidivism rates for sex offenders up to 20 years after they were released 73
from prison. The analysis included data from 10 individual samples of sex offenders. The 10
studies included data from 4,724 sex offenders. In five of the samples, recidivism was defined as
a new charge for a sex crime; in the other five samples, recidivism was defined as a new

67 R. Karl Hanson and Monique T. Bussiere,Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism
Studies, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, vol. 66, no. 2 (1998), p. 348.
68 Meta-analysis pools together the treatment effectiveness estimates and thus provides a reliable and valid method of
assessing the consistency of results across studies.” Meta-analysis allows researchers to test the relationships between
treatment effectiveness and substantive and methodological issues such as treatment length and type, offender type, and
the degree that offenders drop out of the sample. Meta-analysis gives researchers “the opportunity [to draw] definitive
quantitative conclusions by combining the results of many studies, none of which alone would be decisive.” Catherine
A. Gallagher, David B. Wilson, Paul Hirschfield, Mark B. Coggeshall, and Doris L. MacKenzie,A Quantitative
Review of the Effects of Sex Offender Treatment on Sexual Reoffending,” Corrections Management Quarterly, vol. 3,
no. 4 (1999), p. 20; Vernon L. Quinsey, Grant T. Harris, Marine E. Rice, and Martin L. Lalumiere, “Assessing
Treatment Efficacy in Outcome Studies of Sex Offenders,” Journal of Interpersonal Violence, vol. 8 (1993), p. 521.
69 Ibid., p. 351.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 R Karl Hanson, Kelley E. Morton, and Andrew J.R. Harris,Sex Offender Recidivism Risk: What We Know and
What We Need to Know,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, vol. 989 (2003), p. 154, hereinafter referred to
asR.K. Hanson et al. (2003).”





conviction for a sex crime. The average follow-up period was seven years, with approximately

16% of sex offenders being followed for more than 15 years. The study estimated that the five-74


year recidivism rate for sex offenders was 14% (95% Confidence Interval [CI] of 13%-15%);
the 10-year recidivism rate was 20% (95% CI of 19%-21%); the 15-year recidivism rate was 24% 75
(95% CI of 22%-26%); and the 20-year recidivism rate was 27% (95% CI of 24%-30%).
As previously mentioned, there are several factors that may account for why the three studies
discussed above found different recidivism rates for sex offenders. First, the studies had different 76
follow-up periods. Second, the samples in the studies were composed of different types of sex
offenders (i.e., rapists, child molesters, sexual assaulters, and statutory rapists), which could have 77
affected the recidivism rate. Third, the sex offender samples in the two non-BJS studies were
from multiple countries, and the studies were conducted in different years.
The data on sex offender recidivism are varied and, as discussed above, studies have inherent
limitations. However, the data indicate that sex offenders, when compared with other violent
offenders, may not be the high-risk offenders that they are perceived to be. Some argue that any
risk of recidivism, given the impact sex crimes have on their victims, is too great for the
community. Others argue, however, that given the fact that sex offenders pose a similar risk to the
community as other violent offenders, the need for special measures to monitor and control sex
offenders, such as civil commitment, are unwarranted.
Any discussion about recidivism almost inevitably includes a discussion about ways to decrease
recidivism. Sex offender treatment is viewed as one way to decrease sex offender recidivism. As
discussed above, civil commitment is meant to provide treatment to sexually dangerous persons.
Civilly committed offenders are confined until treatment renders them no longer dangerous to
others. The literature on sex offender treatment is reviewed in the next section.

One of the key tenets of civil commitment is the belief that sex offenders can be treated; for if
they cannot, it is likely that there will be a burgeoning population of civilly committed sex
offenders that will never be released. However, questions linger about the efficacy of sex offender
treatment. Recent research provides evidence that sex offender treatments might reduce
recidivism, but the degree to which the treatments are effective is uncertain.
A 1989 study that analyzed the breadth of treatment literature and recidivism among sex 78
offenders found that recidivism rates for treated offenders ranged from 0% to 40%. The

74 A confidence interval shows the range within which the true value of a calculated statistic is likely to fall a certain
percentage of the time. In this case, the study estimated that there is a 95% chance that the five-year recidivism rate for
sex offenders was in the range of 13% to 15%. There was a 5% chance that it was either higher or lower than that
range.
75 Ibid., p. 155.
76 APA task force report, p. 133.
77 Ibid., p. 134.
78 Lita Furby, Mark R. Weinrott, and Lyn Blackshaw, “Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, Psychological Bulletin,
(continued...)





researchers noted that the results of the studies varied, including some that found that treated 79
offenders had higher recidivism rates than untreated offenders. The researchers concluded that
there was no compelling evidence that sex offender treatment reduced recidivism. However, they 80
also could not conclude that sex offender treatment was a failure. They noted that a variety of
methodological shortcomings were present in most every study they reviewed, which made the 81
results from any single study hard to interpret. The methodological shortcomings in most
studies prevented the researchers from using meta-analytic techniques, which would have allowed 82
them to draw more definitive conclusions about the effectiveness of sex offender treatment. The
researchers also noted that sex offender treatment has continued to evolve, and many of the 83
treatment programs evaluated in the studies would now be considered obsolete.
A 1996 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the effectiveness of sex offender 84
treatment found that the research was inconclusive. The research included in the GAO’s analysis
was generally more recent than the research included in the analysis discussed above. The GAO 85
included 22 studies in its analysis, which were published between 1977 and 1996. Ten studies
were published after 1990, and one was unpublished at the time of the analysis. The GAO 86
reported that some of the research indicated that cognitive-behavioral treatment was promising,
but methodological limitations in the studies prevented it from drawing any firm conclusions 87
about effectiveness. The GAO reported that conclusions about the effectiveness of sex offender
treatment were limited by three general weaknesses in the research: (1) limitations in the 88
methodological designs of the study, which included a lack of a comparison group and
inconsistent and inadequate follow-up periods; (2) limitations in the recidivism measures used; 89
and (3) limitations in how the studies were reported.

(...continued)
vol. 105 (1989), p. 24, hereinafterFurby et. al.”
79 Ibid., p. 25.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid., p. 27
82 Furby et. al, p. 27.
83 Ibid., p. 25.
84 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Sex Offender Treatment: Research Results Inconclusive About What Works
to Reduce Recidivism, GAO/GGD-96-137, June 1996, hereinafter referred to as “GAO report.
85 Ibid., p. 15.
86 Cognitive-behavioral therapy focuses on patterns of thinking that are maladaptive and the beliefs that underlie such
thinking. Cognitive-behavioral therapy encourages individuals in treatment to view such beliefs as hypotheses rather
than facts and to test such beliefs by running experiments. Individuals are encouraged to monitor and log thoughts in
order to enable them to determine what patterns of biases in thinking may exist and to develop more adaptive
alternatives to their thoughts. National Alliance on Mental Illness, About Treatment and Supports: Cognitive-
Behavioral Therapy, available at http://www.nami.org/
Te mp late.cfm?Section=About_Treat ments_ and_Supports&templat e=/Conten tMan agemen t/
ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=7952, accessed March 7, 2007.
87 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
88 A comparison group is a group of offenders that either do not receive treatment, or receive a different treatment than
the offenders in the treatment group. Offenders assigned to the comparison group are followed, along with members of
the treatment group, to track their recidivism.
89 GAO report, p. 8.





A relatively recent study conducted in 2002 found that the sex offense recidivism rate for treated 90
offenders (12.3%) was lower than that of untreated offenders (16.8%). The study reviewed the
effectiveness of any type of psychological treatment for sex offenders. Other research has
evaluated the effectiveness of two specific forms of sex offender treatment: antiandrogen
(hormonal) treatment and cognitive-behavioral treatment.
Antiandrogens reduce the level of a sex offender’s circulating testosterone.91 Studies have shown
that decreased testosterone levels have resulted in reductions in self-reported deviant sexual 92
fantasies and paraphilic symptoms in sex offenders. Research suggests that antiandrogen 93
treatment may reduce sex offender recidivism in many cases. Antiandrogens do have side 94
effects, which might explain the high drop-out rate for offenders who use them. Antiandrogen 95
treatment requires a high level of medical supervision, which can be costly. Also, doctors do not 96
know what the long-term effects of the treatment are.
Another meta-analysis study found that, overall, cognitive-behavioral treatment appears to be a 97
promising way to reduce recidivism in sex offenders. Research also shows that cognitive-98
behavioral treatment combined with other treatments, such as relapse prevention, group therapy, 99100
or social skills training, can help prevent recidivism. Cognitive-behavioral treatments are 101
some of the most common forms of therapy for sex offenders. Cognitive-behavioral treatments
seek to change a sex offender’s belief system, eliminate inappropriate behavior, and increase

90 The recidivism rates were based on an average 46-month follow-up period using the recidivism criteria reported in
the original studies. The study also found the same to be true for recidivism involving any type of offense, not just sex
offenses (27.9% for treated offenders versus 39.2% for untreated offenders). R. Karl Hanson, Arthur Gordon, Andrew
J.R. Harris, Janice K. Marques, William Murphy, Vernon L. Quinsey, and Michael Seto, “First Report of the
Collaborative Outcome Data Project on the Effectiveness of Psychological Treatment for Sex Offenders,Sexual
Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment, vol. 14, no. 2 (2002), p. 181, hereinafter referred to as R.K. Hanson et
al. (2002).”
91 Linda S. Grossman, Brian Martis and Christopher G. Fichtner, “Are Sex Offenders Treatable? A Research
Overview, Psychiatric Services, vol. 50 (1999), p. 351, hereinafter referred to asGrossman et al.”
92 Ibid. Fabian M. Saleh and Laurie L. Guidry, “Psychosocial and Biological Treatment Considerations for the
Paraphilic and Nonparaphilic Sex Offender,” Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, vol. 31
(2003), p. 489.
93 Grossman et al., p. 352; Gordon C. Nagayama Hall, “Sexual Offender Recidivism Revisited: A Meta-Analysis of
Recent Treatment Studies,Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, vol. 63 (1995), pp. 806-808, hereinafter
referred to asG.C.N. Hall.”
94 Grossman et al., p. 353.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 G.C.N. Hall, pp. 806-808; Gallagher et al., p. 27; Danielle M. Polizzi, Doris Layon MacKenzie, and Laura J.
Hickman, “What Works in Adult Sex Offender Treatment? A Review of Prison- and Non-Prison-Based Treatment
Programs,” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, vol. 43 (1999), p. 371,
hereinafter referred to as “Polizzi et al.
98 Relapse prevention involves teaching sex offenders maintenance strategies to anticipate and resist deviant sexual
urges. It also teaches sex offenders to recognize high-risk situations and that one’s decisions could lead to recidivism.
Offenders are taught how to prevent recidivism by dealing with high-risk situations. Grossman et al.
99 Social skills training helps offenders develop the skills necessary to have successful interactions in social and non-
deviant sexual situations. Some programs focus on social anxiety, conflict resolution, and anger management. Other
programs include assertiveness training. Ibid.
100 Gallagher et al., p. 24.
101 John Q. LaFond, Preventing Sexual Violence: How Society Should Cope With Sex Offenders (Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association, 2005), p. 65, hereinafter referred to as “J.Q. LaFond (2005).





appropriate behavior by ensuring the inappropriate behavior is not reinforced.102 Some cognitive-
behavioral treatments are aimed at reducing deviant arousal. These treatments include aversion 103104105
treatment, covert sensitization, imaginal desensitization, and masturbatory 106
reconditioning. Other cognitive-behavioral treatments focus on cognitive restructuring, which 107
attempts to correct distorted cognitions used to justify sexual offending. These treatments 108
include social skills training, victim empathy training, lifestyle management, sex education,
and relapse prevention.
Because violent sex offenders (i.e., rapists and child molesters) are the most likely candidates for
civil commitment, there are concerns about whether treatment can decrease recidivism. Research
indicates that treatment for incarcerated sex offenders (who are more likely to be violent sex
offenders) is promising, but the findings are somewhat mixed. One study found that offenders
who were treated in prison had a 9.4% recidivism rate, compared with a 17.6% recidivism rate for 109
untreated offenders. Another study indicated that cognitive-behavioral treatment for
incarcerated sex offenders can decrease recidivism, but the effect of treatment is smaller than the 110
effect of treatment for non-incarcerated sex offenders. Other research found that although
cognitive-behavioral treatment for incarcerated sex offenders looks promising, the evidence is not 111
sufficient to draw a conclusion about the effectiveness of treatment for incarcerated offenders.
Studies that evaluate the effectiveness of sex offender treatment can only determine whether the
treatment was effective as long as the researchers are following the treated offenders to see if they
recidivate. It is possible that treated offenders might recidivate after the follow-up period ends,
which raises questions about how long a treatment should be shown to decrease recidivism in
order to be considered “effective.” If a form of treatment is shown to decrease recidivism for five
years, is it “effective?” One researcher found that the longer a sex offender can remain offense-112
free, the greater the likelihood that the offender will not recidivate. Therefore, any treatment

102 Ibid., p. 354.
103 Aversion therapy pairs deviant sexual fantasies with punishment (such as an electric shock or a noxious odor). The
therapy links the deviant fantasy with the punishment, thereby decreasing the desire to act on the deviant fantasy. Ibid.
104 Covert sensitization pairs deviant sexual fantasies with mental images of adverse consequences, such as being
arrested for sexual offending. Sometimes offenders are required to subject themselves to a noxious odor to augment the
imagined adverse consequences. Like aversion therapy, covert sensitization links the deviant fantasy with the
punishment, thereby decreasing the desire to act upon the deviant fantasy. Ibid.
105 Imaginal desensitization teaches the offender deep muscle relaxation techniques, which are paired with fantasies of
a chain of events that lead to a sexual offense. The therapy is meant to teach offenders to tolerate the feelings associated
with sexual offending without acting on them. Ibid.
106 In mastubatory reconditioning, offenders use masturbation to reinforce non-deviant fantasies. Mastubatory
reconditioning can also be used to decrease deviant fantasies by requiring offenders to masturbate after orgasm while
thinking of deviant fantasies, thereby associating the deviant fantasies with pain or boredom. Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Victim awareness or empathy training attempts to increase sex offenders understanding of the impact of their
crimes on their victims. Victim awareness or empathy training attempts to help sex offenders understand their cognitive
distortions that allow them to believe that their victims were not harmed or even enjoyed being victimized. Ibid.
109 Margaret A. Alexander,Sexual Offender Treatment Efficacy Revisited,” Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and
Treatment, vol. 11, no. 2 (1999), pp. 106-107, hereinafter referred to asM.A. Alexander.
110 G.C.N. Hall, pp. 806-808.
111 Polizzi et al., p. 371.
112 R.K. Hanson et al. (2003), p. 155.





that decreases the risk that a sex offender will commit new offenses in the short-term may
increase the likelihood that an offender will not recidivate in the long-term.
Certain characteristics of offenders who may be likely candidates for civil commitment may
make them less likely to benefit from treatment. Potential candidates for civil commitment, 113
especially rapists, might be diagnosed with psychopathy or anti-social personality disorder 114
(ASPD). Offenders diagnosed with ASPD or psychopathy may not be as amenable to treatment 115
as offenders diagnosed with paraphilias. Candidates for civil commitment are also, by
definition, repeat offenders. According to one researcher, repeat offenders are more likely not to 116
complete treatment than first-time offenders. Moreover, candidates for civil commitment are
likely to have served long prison sentences before being committed. If an offender did not receive 117
treatment in prison before being committed, it may make treatment more difficult. Delays in
treatment could allow offenders to deny their sexual offending, externalize responsibility, or
claim amnesia for their offenses. Such distortions make it harder for offenders to accept 118
responsibility for their offenses, thus making it harder to treat them.
Questions also exist regarding whether involuntary treatment can reduce sex offender recidivism.
Most of the recent literature on treatment involves sex offenders who wanted to receive 119
treatment. This is noteworthy because civil commitment laws require treatment for offenders
who, at least initially, chose not to participate in treatment.
Many experts believe that there is sound evidence that sex offender treatment can reduce 120
recidivism. However, other researchers warn that more research needs to be done because, 121
currently, it cannot be proven that treatment is effective. Results are less than definitive because
there is not a large body of highly rigorous treatment research. In conclusion, the research

113 Psychopathy is traditionally defined by a collection of interpersonal, affective, and lifestyle characteristics. On the
interpersonal level, psychopaths are grandiose, arrogant, callous, dominant, superficial, and manipulative. Affectively,
psychopaths are short-tempered, unable to form strong emotional bonds with others, and lack guilt or anxiety. The
interpersonal and affective characteristics of psychopaths are associated with a socially deviant lifestyle that includes
irresponsible and impulsive behavior and a tendency to ignore or violate social conventions and mores. Robert D. Hare,
Psychopathy as a Risk Factor for Violence, Psychiatric Quarterly, vol. 70, no. 3 (Fall 1999), pp. 183, hereinafter
referred to as R.D. Hare.”
114 R.D. Hare, p. 189; Stephen Porter, David Fairweather, Jeff Dregge, Hugues Herve, Angela Birt, Douglas P Boer,
Profiles of Psychopathy in Incarcerated Sexual Offenders,” Criminal Justice and Behavior, vol. 27, no. 2 (2000), p.
224; Howard Zonana, “The Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders,” Science, vol. 278, Academic Search Premier via
EBSCO Host, herafter referred to asH. Zonana.”
115 The essential features of paraphilia are recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors
generally involving (1) non-human objects, (2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or ones partner, (3) children or
other non-consenting persons that occur over a period of at least six months. The behavior, sexual urges, or fantasies
cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV),
pp. 522-523, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association (1995). H. Zonna, R.D. Hare, pp. 191-193.
116 Andrew J. Harris, Civil Commitment of Sexual Predators: A Study in Policy Implementation (New York: LFB
Scholarly Publishing, 2005), p. 62, hereinafter referred to asA.J Harris.
117 R.M. Wettstein, p. 617.
118 Ibid.
119 J.Q. LaFond (2005), p. 82.
120 Ibid., p. 82.
121 M.A. Alexander, p. 112; R.K Hanson et al. (2002), p. 186; Polizzi et al., p. 372; Gallagher et al., pp. 27-28; J.Q.
LaFond (2005).





indicates that there is not enough evidence to definitively prove that treatment for sex offender
works.
More recent research has addressed many of the methodological problems of past research, but 122
issues still remain. As mentioned before, faults in the methodology used in some research can
limit the generalizability of the findings. The issues include the following:
• In some cases, treatment groups are limited to sex offenders who meet stringent
criteria, thereby treating only sex offenders who are the most likely to respond to 123
treatment.
• Some studies provided treatment for sex offenders that was questionably 124
implemented.
• Some studies did not use a comparison group, and in other studies that did,
offenders were not randomly assigned to either the treatment or comparison 125
group.
• Some studies did not count offenders who refused treatment or those who
dropped out of treatment when calculating the recidivism rate of treated and
untreated offenders. Therefore, the lower recidivism rates for treated offenders in
these studies could be the result of the fact that treatment groups consisted of 126
offenders who were more open to treatment.
• In some studies, recidivism is narrowly defined (studies only count new sex
offenses when calculating recidivism) or studies rely only on one data source to 127
determine whether or not a treated offender recidivated.
• The length of the follow-up period in some studies might be too short to 128
effectively determine recidivism. Research has shown that the longer the 129
follow-up period, the greater the rate of recidivism.

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s rulings that addressed constitutional issues, there are issues
that could influence the long-term viability of civil commitment laws. These issues include (1)
the ability of the government to determine which offenders should be civilly committed, (2) the

122 Polizzi et al., p. 372.
123 L.M.J Simon (2000), p. 297.
124 Ibid.
125 L.M.J Simon (2000), p. 297; GAO report, p. 4; Polizzi et al., p. 372.
126 L.M.J Simon (2000), p. 297.
127 Ibid; GAO report, p 10.
128 Ibid; GAO report, p. 4.
129 Furby et al., p.27.





use of less restrictive alternatives to civil commitment, (3) the use of indeterminate sentences to
punish sex offenders, and (4) the cost of civil commitment programs.
Special laws governing the control and management of sex offenders have been passed in many
states out of concern that sex offenders are not only dangerous, but they are more likely to
commit new sex crimes. Some research indicates that sex offenders do not specialize in sex
crimes; hence, it might be difficult to label an offender simply as a “rapist” or a “child 130
molester.” One researcher reported that convicted rapists self-report sexual contact with 131
children and convicted child molesters have admitted to raping adult females. Most sex crimes
are committed by offenders with extensive criminal histories that involve other violent and 132
property crimes. In many cases, sex crimes are committed by individuals as part of a pattern of
violent and non-violent offending.
This section presents data from both the 2002 BJS report on the recidivism rates of 272,111
prisoners released in 1994 and the 2003 BJS report on the recidivism rates of 9,961 sex offenders
released in 1994 to analyze whether sex offenders specialize in sex crimes. This section reviews
data on the relative likelihood that violent offenders were rearrested for the same crime for which
they were incarcerated. Next, this section reviews data on how many rapists, sexual assaulters,
child molesters, and statutory rapists were rearrested and reconvicted for any type of crime within
three years of being released. Finally, this section also reviews data on the criminal histories of
released rapist, sexual assaulters, child molesters, and statutory rapists. Data indicate that sex
offenders do specialize in sex crimes to some degree, but they also commit other crimes.
Table 2 shows the likelihood that released violent offenders were rearrested for the same crime.
The odds of a rapist being rearrested for rape was 4.2 times the odds of a non-rapist being 133
rearrested for rape. The odds of a sexual assaulter being rearrested for another sexual assault
was 5.9 times the odds of a non-sexual assaulter being rearrested for a sexual assault. The odds
ratios for rapist and sexual assaulter relative to the odds ratios for murderers, robbers, and
assaulters suggest that rapists and sexual assaulters are more likely than other violent offenders to
be rearrested for the same crime. In all cases, the odds ratios for rapists and sexual assaulters is at
least double that of the odds ratios of other violent offenders.

130 Leonore M.J. Simon, “An Examination of the Assumption of Specialization, Mental Disorder, and Dangerousness in
Sex Offenders,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law, vol. 18 (2000), p. 275, hereinafter referred to asL.M.J Simon
(2000)”; Leonore M.J. Simon, “Do Criminal Offenders Specialize in Crime Types,Applied and Preventive
Psychology, vol. 6 (1997), p. 35; Leonore M.J. Simon, “The Myth of Sex Offender Specialization: An Empirical
Analysis, New England Journal on Criminal and Civil Confinement, vol. 23 (1997), p. 387, hereinafter referred to as
L.M.J Simon (1997).”
131 L.M.J Simon (1997), p. 391.
132 L.M.J. Simon (2000), p. 283.
133 Ibid.





Table 2. Relative Likelihood of Rearrest for Same Offense as Release Offense,
Among State Prisoners Released in 1994
All Other
Violent Sexual
Offenses Homicidea Rapeb Assaultc Robberyd Assaulte
Relative
likelihood
of rearrest 1.3 1.4 4.2 5.9 2.7 1.9
Source: CRS presentation of Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, NCJ 193427,
June 2002. Extracted from Table 11. This table focuses on how the likelihood of sex offenders being rearrested
for another sex crime compares to the likelihood of other violent offenders being rearrested for the same crime
for which they were incarcerated; hence, this table does not include the odds-ratios for offenders convicted of
property crimes (burglary, larceny/theft, motor vehicle theft, fraud, or stolen property), drug offenses, or public-
order offenses.
Notes: The likelihood of rearrest in Table 2 is presented as an odds ratio. In the context of this study, an odds
ratio is calculated by calculating the ratio of the odds that a group of offenders released after being incarcerated
for a particular crime will be rearrested for that same crime to the odds of all other offenders being rearrested
for that particular crime. For example, 78 out of 3,138 released rapists were rearrested for rape, meaning the
odds of a released rapist being rearrested for another rape was 0.025 or ((78/3,138)/((3,138-78)/3,138)). Out of
266,814 released non-rapists, 1,639 were rearrested for rape, meaning the odds of a prisoner released non-
rapist being rearrested for rape was 0.006 or ((1,639/266,814)/((268,631-1,639)/266,814)). The resulting odds
ratio is 4.2 or (0.025/0.006).
a. “Homicide” is defined as (1) intentionally causing the death of another person without extreme provocation
or legal justification or (2) causing the death of another while committing or attempting to commit another
crime.
b. “Rape” is defined as forcible intercourse (vaginal, anal, or oral) with a female or male. It includes forcible
sodomy or penetration with a foreign object; it excludes statutory rape or any other nonforcible sexual acts
with some unable to give legal or factual consent because of mental or physical defect or intoxication.
c. “Other sexual assault” is defined as (1) forcible or violent sexual acts not involving intercourse with an adult
or minor, (2) non-forcible sexual acts with a minor (such as statutory rape or incest with a minor), or (3)
non-forcible sexual acts with someone unable to give consent because of mental or physical defect or
intoxication.
d. “Robbery” is defined as the unlawful taking of property that is in the immediate possession of another, by
force or the threat of force. Includes forcible purse snatching, but excludes nonforcible purse snatching.
e. “Assault” is defined as (1) intentionally and without legal justification causing serious bodily injury, with or
without a deadly weapon or (2) using a deadly or dangerous weapon to threaten, attempt, or cause bodily
injury, regardless of the degree of injury, if any. Includes attempted murder, aggravated battery, felonious
assault, and assault with a deadly weapon.
Data in Table 3 show that at least 40% of rapists, sexual assaulters, and statutory rapists were
rearrested for any type of crime (i.e., violent crimes, property crimes, drug offenses, or public-
order offenses) within three years of release, and more than 20% of rapists, sexual assaulters,
child molesters, and statutory rapists were reconvicted for any type of crime. Moreover, all types
of sex offenders were more likely to be rearrested or reconvicted for any type of crime than for a
sex crime.





Table 3. Percentage of Sex Offenders Rearrested or Reconvicted for a Sex Crime or
Any Crime Within Three Years of Release
All Sex aSexual bChild cStatutory d
Offenders Rapist Assaulter Molester Rapist
Percentage rearrested or reconvicted for a sex crime
Rearrested 5.3% 5.0% 5.5% 5.1% 5.0%
Reconvicted 3.5% 3.2% 3.7% 3.5% 3.6%
Percentage rearrested or reconvicted for any crime
Rearrested 43.0% 46.0% 41.5% 39.4% 49.9%
Reconvicted 24.0% 27.3% 22.4% 20.4% 32.7%
Total Released 9,691 3,115 6,576 4,295 443
Source: CRS presentation of Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994,
report NCJ 198281, November 2003. Extracted from Table 7, Table 8, Table 21, and Table 22. This table only
focuses on two measures of recidivism: rearrest and reconviction. This table does not include data on two
additional recidivism measures: returned to prison with a new sentence for any type of crime and returned to
prison with or without a new sentence because BJS only provided this data for rearrests or reconvictions for any
crime and not for rearrests or reconvictions for sex crimes.
Note: The sum total of the number of released offenders in the four sex offender categories (rapist, sexual
assaulter, child molester, and statutory rapist) does not equal 9,691 because some sex offenders are counted in
more than one category (though “rapist” and “sexual assaulter” are exclusive). For example, an offender counted
as a “rapist” or a “sexual assaulter” could also be counted as a “child molester” if the offender’s crime was
committed against a child. All “statutory rapists” would be counted as “child molesters” because their crime
involved consensual sexual intercourse with a child.
a. “Rapist” refers to a released sex offender whose imprisonment offense was defined by state law as forcible
intercourse with a female or male.
b. “Sexual assaulter” refers to a released sex offender whose imprisonment offense was defined as (1) forcible
sexual acts not amounting to intercourse with a victim of any age, (2) nonforcible sexual acts with a minor,
or (3) nonforcible sexual acts with someone unable to give consent because of mental or physical reasons.
c. “Child molester” refers to a released sex offender whose imprisonment offense involved (1) forcible
intercourse with a child, (2) statutory rape, or (3) any other type of sexual contact with a child, with or
without the use of force.
d. “Statutory rapist” refers to an offender who had consensual sexual intercourse with someone under the age
of consent in the state in which the offense occurred. Statutory rape includes incest offenses.
Data in Table 4 show that a large percentage of sex offenders had at least one prior arrest for any
type of crime (i.e., violent crimes, property crimes, drug offenses, or public-order offenses). More
than half of sex offenders had a past conviction for any type of crime. However, BJS reported that
sex offenders were more likely than non-sex offenders to have a past arrest (6.5% of non-sex 134
offenders) or conviction (0.2% of non-sex offenders) for a sex offense.

134 BJS 1994 sex offender recidivism report, p. 12.





Table 4. Criminal History of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994, by Type of
Sex Offender
Sexual bChild cStatutory d
All Rapista Assaulter Molester Rapist
Percentage with at least one prior arrest for
Any crime 78.5% 83.1% 76.3% 76.8% 80.6%
Any sex offense 28.5% 28.7% 28.4% 29.0% 38.4%
Sex offense against a child 10.3% 5.7% 12.5% 18.3% 19.6%
Percentage with at least one prior conviction for
Any crime 58.4% 62.9% 56.2% 54.6% 64.6%
Any sex offense 13.9% 14.6% 13.5% 11.9% 21.2%
Sex offense against a child 4.6% 3.4% 5.2% 7.3% 11.5%
Total Released 9,691 3,115 6,576 4,295 443
Source: CRS presentation of Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994,
report NCJ 198281, November 2003. Extracted from Table 5 and Table 6. This table focuses on whether sex
offenders have a history of any other crimes other than sex crimes; hence, this table does not include
information on the mean and median number of arrests and convictions for any crimes, or the percentage of sex
offenders with a prior prison sentence for any crime.
Note: The sum total of the number of released offenders in the four sex offender categories (rapist, sexual
assaulter, child molester, and statutory rapist) does not equal 9,691 because some sex offenders are counted in
more than one category (though “rapist” and “sexual assaulter” are exclusive). For example, an offender counted
as a “rapist” or a “sexual assaulter” could also be counted as a “child molester” if the offender’s crime was
committed against a child. All “statutory rapists” would be counted as “child molesters” because their crime
involved consensual sexual intercourse with a child.
a. “Rapist” refers to a released sex offender whose imprisonment offense was defined by state law as forcible
intercourse with a female or male.
b. “Sexual assaulter” refers to a released sex offender whose imprisonment offense was defined as (1) forcible
sexual acts not amounting to intercourse with a victim of any age, (2) nonforcible sexual acts with a minor,
or (3) nonforcible sexual acts with someone unable to give consent because of mental or physical reasons.
c. “Child molester” refers to a released sex offender whose imprisonment offense involved (1) forcible
intercourse with a child, (2) statutory rape, or (3) any other type of sexual contact with a child, with or
without the use of force.
d. “Statutory rapist” refers to an offender who had consensual sexual intercourse with someone under the age
of consent in the state in which the offense occurred. Statutory rape includes incest offenses.
Data indicate that sex offenders are more likely than non-sex offenders to be rearrested for a sex
crime. Sex offenders are also more likely than non-sex offenders to have a past arrest or
conviction for a sex crime. However, the data indicate that sex offenders do not specialize solely
in sex crimes. Sex offenders are also rearrested and reconvicted for committing offenses other
than sex offenses. At the same time, it appears that sex offenders may be at a greater risk than
non-sex offenders to commit another sex crime after they are released from prison.
Some researchers believe that there is a small group of sex offenders—ones diagnosed with both
paraphilia and psychopathy—who are at a high risk for re-offending. One researcher concluded
that “the rate at which this highest risk subgroup actually reoffends with another sexual offense





could be conservatively estimated at 50% and could reasonably be estimated at 70% to 80%.”135
Other research indicates that sex offenders diagnosed with psychopathy, especially sex offenders
diagnosed with both psychopathy and paraphilia, are more likely to recidivate than other sex 136
offenders. One study found that more than 80% of sex offenders released from a maximum
security psychiatric facility who were diagnosed with psychopathy were rearrested or returned to 137
custody for a violent offense within six years. In comparison, about 20% of non-psychopathic 138
offenders were rearrested or returned to custody for a violent offense within six years.
However, it should be noted that recidivism in this case was measured as arrest or return to
custody for a violent offense, not just sex offenses. Other research found that a high Psychopathy 139140
Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) score was a good predictor of violent recidivism in general.
However, it also found that sexual recidivism was predicted by a combination of a high PCL-R 141
score and deviant sexual arousal.
Before a sex offender is civilly committed, the offender is evaluated to determine the likelihood
of recidivism. There are two general methods for predicting dangerousness: clinical and 142
actuarial. The clinical method involves a clinician examining the offender and the offender’s
history, including the offender’s criminal record, psychosexual history, and other biographical 143
information. The clinician weighs all he knows about the individual and then, based on
knowledge of risk factors, makes a judgement about the likelihood the offender will re-offend if 144
the offender was released to live in the community without supervision. The clinician has the 145
ability to decide how much weight, if any, to give each risk factor. Supporters of the clinical
method argue that trained clinicians can shape their assessment based on cues that actuarial 146
methods cannot pick up, especially if the clinician interviews the offender.

135 R. Karl Hanson, “What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk Assessment,” Psychology, Public Policy and Law,
vol. 4, no. 50 (1998), pp. 67-68.
136 R.D. Hare, pp. 189-191; Philip H. Witt, Joseph DelRusso, Jessica Oppenheim, and Glen Ferguson, Sex Offender
Risk Assessment and the Law,The Journal of Psychiatry and Law, vol. 24 (1997), p. 357, hereinafter referred to as
P.H. Witt et. al.”
137 Vernon L. Quinsey, Marine E. Rice and Grant T. Harris,Actuarial Prediction of Sexual Recidivism, Journal of
Interpersonal Violence, vol. 10, no. 1 (1995), p. 99.
138 Ibid.
139 The PCL-R was developed by Robert Hare and is the tool most commonly used to diagnose psychopathy.
140 R.D. Hare, p. 190.
141 Ibid.
142 J.Q. LaFond (2005), pp. 51-55.
143 Gregory DeClue,Avoiding Garbage 2: Assessment of Risk for Sexual Violence After Long-term Treatment, The
Journal of Psychiatry and Law, vol. 33 (Summer 2005), p. 183, hereinafter referred to asG. DeClue.”
144 J.Q. LaFond (2005), p. 51.
145 G. DeClue, p. 183.
146 Ibid.





The actuarial method involves the use of actuarial instruments147 by trained individuals to predict
the risk of re-offense. Actuarial instruments are developed by studying large numbers of repeat 148
sex offenders and collecting data on their common characteristics. Researchers also collect data
on the rate of re-offending by a group of sex offenders with a set of common characteristics.
Actuarial tools predict the likelihood that offenders will re-offend based on how their
characteristics match the characteristics of a group of offenders with a known re-offense rate.
Supporters of actuarial instruments argue that the instruments are developed using proven
statistical methods for calculating risk and that a large number of repeat sex offenders have been 149
studied to provide them with reliable predictive accuracy. Supporters also maintain that the
instrument prevents evaluators from introducing errors or bias, thereby making them more
objective.
Both methods have their flaws; some are particular to the method, others are inherent to the
nature of predicting risk. Studies indicate that clinical judgements about sex offender 150
dangerousness are quite poor. One researcher reported that a number of studies that have
evaluated the predictive accuracy of clinical judgements of sex offender dangerousness found that 151
the average correlation between a prediction of re-offending and actual offending was 0.10.
There is also the possibility that clinicians could introduce bias into the risk assessment, such as
giving more weight to some risk factors and less to others.
Actuarial instruments can only identify a range of risk for a group of sex offenders; they cannot 152
identify the specific risk for any individual within the group. A given individual in the group
might have a risk of re-offending that is either higher or lower than the group’s risk. Actuarial
instruments rely heavily on static factors (i.e., factors that do not change with time, such as age at 153
first offense, number of victims, and gender of victim) when determining risk. This means that
when offenders are placed in a risk group based on their history, they will most likely stay in that
risk group because their history cannot change.
There is also the possibility of type I errors.154 One inherent problem in risk assessments for sex
offenders is that sex offenders do not commit new sex crimes at high rates, which means that 155156
there is a low recidivism base-rate upon which to predict risk. However, as discussed above,

147 Several actuarial instruments have been developed to predict the risk sex offenders pose. They include the Violence
Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG), the Sex Offender Risk Appraisal Guide (SORAG), the Rapid Risk Assessment of Sexual
Offense Recidivism (RRASOR), the Static-99, and the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool (revised) (Mn-SOST-R).
Grant T. Harris and Marnie E. Rice, “Actuarial Assessment of Risk among Sex Offenders,” Annals of the New York
Academy of Sciences, vol. 989 (2003), p. 199.
148 J.Q. LaFond (2005), p. 208.
149 Ibid, p. 53.
150 Ibid.
151 In general terms, the 0.10 correlation coefficient means that experts were correct in only about 10% of the cases in
which they predicted that the sex offender would re-offend. Ibid., p. 52.
152 J.Q. LaFond (2005), p. 209.
153 Ibid, p. 55.
154 Type I errors are sometimes referred to asfalse-positives.” In statistical terms, a type I error results when the null
hypothesis is true, but it is rejected. In the context of civil commitment, the null hypothesis for someone assessing a sex
offenders risk to recidivate would be that the sex offender is not at risk to recidivate. A type I error would result when
an offender that is not at risk to recidivate is assessed as being a risk to recidivate. A.H. Studenmund, Using
Econometrics: A Practical Guide, (Boston: Addison Wesley, 2001). p. 116.
155 A recidivism base rate is the proportion of a group of sex offenders who will re-offend after a given period of time.
R.K. Hanson et al. (2003).





certain groups of offenders may recidivate at higher rates, which can make risk assessment more
accurate. Yet, even the highest risk groups do not recidivate 100% of the time, which means that
there is still the possibility of error.
After the offender is committed, it must be determined when it is safe to release the offender into
society. Although researchers have made advancements in determining whether an offender is at-
risk to re-offend, not as much progress has been made in developing methods to determine when 157
it is safe to release sex offenders from custody. Predictions of dangerousness are based on static 158159
risk factors, but predictions of safety are based on dynamic risk factors. Researchers have yet
to accurately determine which dynamic risk factors are associated with decreased risk of sex 160
offenders recidivating. This is problematic because sex offender treatment attempts to decrease
the risk of re-offending by changing dynamic risk factors. Some have argued that it is difficult to
assess risk in an institutional setting because the offender does not have the opportunity to re-161
offend. Offenders do not face the same stimulations and opportunities in a institutional setting
that they will face in the community, hence it is difficult to tell whether they can apply what they 162
have learned in treatment.
The difficulty in accurately predicting whether committed offenders are safe to release from
confinement raises questions about whether less restrictive alternatives should be used to manage
sexually dangerous persons. Some have argued that judges or juries should be allowed to, in
certain situations, civilly commit an offender to outpatient treatment, or if the offender is placed
in an institution, the offender should be released to community supervision after he shows 163
improvement. Maricopa County in Arizona was the first jurisdiction in the country to 164
implement lifetime supervision for sex offenders.

(...continued)
156 P.H. Witt et. al, p. 352.
157 J.Q. LaFond (2005), p. 211.
158 Such as criminal history, age at first offense, or the sex of past victims. Ibid., p. 212.
159 Dynamic risk factors are risk factors that can change. Dynamic risk factors are the factors that therapy usually
addresses. Examples of dynamic risk factors include developing empathy for victims, attitudes towards women, and
mastering techniques to prevent relapse. Ibid.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid, p. 212; R.M. Wettstein, p. 621.
162 J.Q. LaFond (2005), p. 212.
163 J.Q. LaFond (2005), pp. 158, 217.
164 In 1990, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed a 1988 Court of Appeals decision (Arizona v. Wagstaff) that ruled that
lifetime parole was invalid due to a violation of the Separation of Powers clause in the state constitution. Also in 1990,
the Arizona Supreme Court ruled (Arizona v. Lyons) that lifetime probation was constitutional because it did not violate
a separation of judicial and executive power. The Arizona Court of Appeals ruled in 1991 that a court could not impose
lifetime probation and a prison sentence on the same offense. This is why prosecutors try to get sex offenders to plead
to one crime where they are required to be placed on lifetime supervision. Center for Sex Offender Management,
Lifetime Supervision of Sex Offenders: Emerging Practices and Implications, unpublished brief, April 2001, p. 1.





The lifetime supervision program in Maricopa County involves specialized units that focus solely 165
on the supervision of sex offenders. Some offenders under the supervision of these units are
placed in an intensive probation supervision program. Offenders in this program are assigned to a
probation officer (PO) with a limited caseload that gives the PO more time to monitor the 166
offenders. Each PO has a maximum caseload of 25 probationers. POs are supported by
surveillance officers who make random field visits to offenders on their caseload. POs also have a
“maintenance” caseload that is composed of offenders who have been on probation for several 167
years and are considered low-risk. All offenders begin probation on a specialized caseload and 168
are designated as high-risk until they have undergone an evaluation. Periodic reassessment is
conducted to determine the risk the offender poses, thereby determining the degree of supervision
he will receive. Offenders also receive a set of conditions for their supervision, which can include
requirements to attend sex offender treatment, register as a sex offender, and restrictions on where 169
the offender can live and with whom he can have contact. Violations of the terms of 170
supervision result in increased supervision and surveillance. The offender’s probation can be
revoked if the graduated sanctions fail to ensure compliance. Offenders are also subject to 171
polygraph examinations to ensure that they are following the terms of their supervision.
The program appears to help prevent recidivism. Agency data showed that 39.5% of offenders
supervised by the specialized units over a seven-year period (May 1993 to August 2000) returned
to court at least once for a violation of the terms of supervision. Less than 7% of the supervised 172
offenders committed a new criminal offense, and less than 2% committed a new sex offense.
Data also showed that 31.9% had a violation for not complying with treatment, 29.6% had a
violation for using or abusing alcohol or drugs, and 26.9% had a violation for having contact with 173
children. However, it is not clear what proportion of the offenders on lifetime supervision were
sentenced for violent or non-violent sex crimes, hence it is difficult to tell whether the program
was successful at reducing recidivism for violent sex offenders.
A successful outpatient civil commitment program could have many of the same elements as
Maricopa County’s lifetime probation program: the use of polygraph examinations, reduced
caseloads for POs, a set of conditions for supervision that includes a requirement for treatment,
and intensive supervision. However, additional elements could be incorporated into an outpatient
civil commitment program. The program could use electronic monitoring to ensure that sex
offenders avoid prohibited areas. Colorado has a sex offender management program similar to the
Maricopa County’s lifetime probation program, but it also includes some elements not found in
Maricopa County’s program. Colorado’s program uses containment plans tailored to offenders 174
based on their offense patterns. The plan places boundaries on what offenders can do, where

165 Ibid., p. 9.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid., p. 10.
169 Ibid., p. 9-10.
170 Ibid., p. 11.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
173 It should be noted that some offenders might have had multiple violations. Ibid.
174 J.Q. LaFond (2005), p. 220.





they can go, their access to erotic material, and other activities that are a part of their offense 175
patterns.
Allowing offenders to be placed in the community under intense supervision could assist in the 176
treatment of offenders while they are committed. The program could motivate offenders to
participate in treatment because they would know that there is a possibility of being released. The
outpatient treatment program would allow psychologists to evaluate offenders outside of a
institutional setting to see whether they are applying what they are learning in treatment.
However, there is always a risk associated with placing an offender on parole. Even with
intensive supervision, a PO cannot monitor a sex offender all the time, hence there is a possibility
that an offender can commit a new crime while on parole. There is also the possibility that an
offender could abscond while on parole.
Starting in the 1980s, many states adopted determinate sentencing laws. In general, these laws
allowed judges to impose a fixed sentence. To help structure determinate sentences, many states
adopted sentencing guidelines that suggested how long an offender’s sentence should be based on
the crime the offender was convicted for and the individual’s criminal history, among other
factors. In most instances, determinate sentence laws eliminated parole, so even though offenders
had to serve most or all of their sentence, they were released unsupervised after serving their
sentence. Although many states implemented determinate sentencing laws, some maintained
indeterminate sentencing. Under an indeterminate sentencing approach, statutes provide a range
of possible sentences, offenders are released on parole as determined by a parole board, and
rehabilitation of prisoners is the main objective.
One researcher has proposed that states implement what he refers to as “a sexually dangerous 177
offender sentence.” The proposal would allow for a sentence that is both determinate and
indeterminate. Offenders would be sentenced to an indeterminate term in addition to whatever
punishment they would receive under the existing determinate sentencing structure. Offenders
would be eligible to receive a sexually dangerous offender sentence after they commit a second
serious sex crime. A special hearing would be held where the prosecutor would present evidence
that the defendant is a “sexually dangerous offender” with an enduring propensity for committing
sex crimes. The hearing would focus solely on the offender’s current sexual dangerousness.
Sexually dangerous offender laws would ensure that the offender serves at least the minimum
sentence required by law, but if there is reason to believe that the offender is still dangerous and
would commit a new crime if released, the state would not be required to release him from prison,
much like if the offender had received an indeterminate sentence. Also, when released, the
offender would be released on parole instead of being released unsupervised. Sexually dangerous 178
offender laws would have the benefit of avoiding the costs associated with civil commitment.
They would also send a message to sex offenders that if they continue to commit sex crimes and 179
are found to be dangerous, they can be punished indefinitely.

175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
177 J.Q. LaFond (2005), p. 161-163.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.





This system could be implemented at the federal level, but it would require Congress to
reestablish parole for convicted offenders. Such a proposal would also have to provide the
appropriate procedural due process to the offender, such as the right to contest evidence and the
right to present evidence with the assistance of counsel and the offender’s expert, and a jury 180
would have to make a finding of sexual dangerousness.
The annual cost of a civil commitment program can run into the millions of dollars. Different
sources have attempted to estimate states’ costs for implementing and running a civil commitment 181
program. One researcher stated that it costs about $100,000 per person per year to civilly 182
commit an offender. Projected annual costs could continue to increase as more offenders are 183
civilly committed. As of fall 2006, 2,694 offenders in 18 states have been civilly committed. Of 184
the 2,694 offenders, 252 have been discharged (9.4%). Of the 252 discharged offenders, 81
(32.1%) were released by the state of Arizona, and 59 (23.4%) were released by the state of 185186
California. Five states (Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Texas) have 187
not released any civilly committed offenders. The population of offenders will likely continue
to grow because very few offenders are being released after being committed. As more offenders
are committed, states will likely have to build new facilities or renovate old facilities to house the
increasing population. It is likely that there will be an increased demand for new facilities because 188
the facilities used to house committed offenders will have to be therapeutic and secure. Also,
states might face costs associated with increased medical care as the civilly committed population 189
ages. As of fall 2006, 229 (8.5%) of all civilly committed offenders were over the age of 60. An
elderly civil commitment population could be a growing problem if the trend of releasing
relatively few civilly committed offenders continues.
Civil commitment includes other costs in addition to housing and treating committed offenders.
States have to pay the cost of the legal proceedings required under civil commitment laws. The
state of Washington estimates that court and litigation costs are, on average, $35,000 per patient 190
per year. The state of Minnesota estimates that a single civil commitment trial costs about

180 Ibid, p. 162.
181 For example see W.L. Fitch, p. 493, J.Q. LaFond (1998), pp. 476-486; A.J Harris, pp. 17-18; Washington State
Institute for Public Policy, Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators: Comparing State Laws, March
2005, available online at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/05-03-1101.pdf, accessed December 18, 2006.
182 J.Q. LaFond (2005), p. 150.
183 Currently, 19 states have civil commitment laws, but only 18 states have actually civilly committed offenders. New
Hampshire recently passed a civil commitment law and is in the process of beginning to civilly commit sex offenders.
As of fall 2006, New Hampshire had not civilly committed any sex offenders. Monica Davey and Abby Goodnough,
Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison,” New York Times, March 4, 2007 p. 1, hereinafter referred to
asNew York Times Civil Commitment Article.”
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid.
186 This only includes offenders that have been civilly committed since July 2006. Ibid.
187 Ibid.
188 J.Q. LaFond (2005), p. 151.
189 New York Times Civil Commitment Article.
190 Ibid, p. 150.





$100,000, which includes attorneys and expert fees and not other court costs.191 Moreover, states
will likely have to establish and maintain community placement programs for released offenders.
Other costs could include construction and operation of transitional facilities, as well as any
medications offenders are required to take.

The public outrage towards sex crimes, especially sex crimes against children, has resulted in
demands for harsher penalties for sex offenders and better methods for managing them in the
community. Recent media coverage of high-profile sex crimes may have increased the public’s
fear that all sex offenders are dangerous. Elected officials in 19 states and the federal government
have turned to civil commitment as a means of trying to ensure the public’s safety from sex
offenders. Yet, there is a growing controversy about whether civil commitment is the best policy
for protecting the public from sex offenders.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s rulings on civil commitment, issues remain that continue to
fuel the debate over civil commitment. Some of these issues include the following:
• Are sex offenders the threat most people believe them to be? There is some
evidence that they may not be, but evidence also shows that a select group of sex
offenders are at a high risk to re-offend. Data on sex offender recidivism is not
conclusive. The rate of recidivism among sex offenders varies depending on the
study, which, along with the limitations of recidivism data, makes it difficult to
conclude that sex offenders are not the threat many think they are.
• Can sex offenders be treated? Studies show that there are promising methods for
treating sex offenders, but certain traits found in some sex offenders, especially
those who are candidates for civil commitment, may make them more resistant to
treatment. A review of the literature on the efficacy of sex offender treatment
indicates that no consensus exists regarding whether treatment can reduce
recidivism among sex offenders.
• Questions persist regarding whether “dangerousness” can be accurately
predicted. This can make civil commitment a problematic endeavor because for it
to be effective, only the most dangerous offenders should be committed, and they
should be released when it is safe to do so.
• The potentially high cost of establishing and maintaining a civil commitment
program continues to be a concern. If, however, few civilly committed offenders
are released, costs will likely continue to grow as the population of committed
offenders increases.
These issues raise questions central to the debate on civil commitment. If sex offenders are not at
a greater threat to recidivate than other violent offenders, should they be subject to civil
commitment? If sex offenders cannot be treated, is civil commitment a viable method for
managing sex offenders? Would it be better for sex offenders to be managed by the criminal
justice system rather than requiring mental health professionals to work with offenders that are

191 Ibid.





not responsive to treatment? Are there more cost-effective measures for managing sex offenders
that also protect communities from repeat sex crimes?





This appendix provides an overview of the state laws governing the civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons. It does not review state laws
governing civil commitment of individuals with serious mental illness.
Proceeding
Burden of Following
State Commitment Eligibility Proof Trial Duration Commitment
Arizona Guilty except insane, guilty or incompetent to Beyond a Court or Jury Until the mental disorder has Release to less
stand trial for a sexually violent offense and 18 reasonable (Ariz. Rev. Stat. changed and no longer a danger to restrictive alternative or
years of age with a mental disorder that makes the doubt (Ariz. § 36-3706). others (Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 36-3707, discharge (Ariz. Rev.
person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence Rev. Stat. § 36-3709, and 3714). Stat. §§ 36-3707, 3709
(Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 36-3701 and 3702). 3707). and 3714).
Convicted, not guilty by reason of insanity, Beyond a Court or jury Mental disorder has so changed that Unconditional discharge California
adjudicated delinquent of a sexually violent offense reasonable (Cal. W & I § person is no longer a danger and is and release (Cal. W & I
and suffering from a mental disorder that makes doubt (Cal. W 6603 & 6604). not likely to engage in sexually § 6605).
iki/CRS-RL34068the person likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior (Cal. W & I §§ 6600, 6601). & I § 6604). violent criminal behavior (Cal. W & I § 6605).
g/w
s.orIncompetent to stand trial for a sexual offense and a danger to others (Cal. Pen. Code § 1370). Clear and convincing Court (Cal. Pen. Code § 1370). After three year commitment or the maximum term of imprisonment for Return to committing court (Cal. Pen. Code
leakevidence the offense whichever is shorter or §§ 1370 and 1372).
://wiki(Cal. Pen. Code § 1370). until mentally competent (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 1370 and 1372).
httpFlorida Guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, or Clear and Court or Until mental abnormality or Release (Fla. Stat. Ann.
adjudicated delinquent of a sexually violent offense convincing unanimous jury personality disorder has so changed § 394.918 and 394.919).
and suffering from a mental abnormality or evidence (Fla. (Fla. Stat. Ann. that it is safe for the person to be at
personality disorder that makes the person likely Stat. Ann. § §§ 394.916). large and the person will not engage
to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined 394.917). in acts of sexual violence (Fla. Stat.
(Fla. Stat. Ann. § 394.912). Ann. §§ 394.917 and 394.918).
Illinois Convicted, adjudicated delinquent, or found not Beyond a Court or No longer a sexually violent person Discharge and parole or
guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually violent reasonable unanimous jury (725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 207/65). mandatory supervised
offense and suffering from a mental disorder that doubt (725 Ill. (725 Ill. Comp. release resume (725 Ill.
creates a substantial probability that the person will Comp. Stat. Stat. Ann. Comp. Stat. Ann.
engage in acts of sexual violence (725 Ill. Comp. Ann. 207/35). 207/15 and 207/15 and 207/65).


Stat. Ann. 207/15). 207/25).


Proceeding
Burden of Following
State Commitment Eligibility Proof Trial Duration Commitment
Iowa Convicted of, charged with, acquitted of, or found Beyond a Judge or jury Mental abnormality has so changed Discharge (Iowa Code §
incompetent to stand trial for a sexually violent reasonable (Iowa Code § that person is not likely to engage in 229A.10).
offense and suffering from a mental abnormality doubt (Iowa 229A.7). sexually violent offenses (Iowa Code
that makes the person likely to engage in predatory Code § 229A.7). § 229A.10).
acts of sexual violence, if not confined (Iowa Code
§§ 229A.3 and 229A.4).
Kansas Convicted of or charged with a sexually violent Beyond a Judge or Until mental abnormality or Place in transitional
offense and suffering from a mental abnormality or reasonable unanimous jury personality disorder has so changed release (Kan. Stat. Ann.
personality disorder which makes the person likely doubt (Kan. (Kan. Stat. Ann. that the person is safe to be placed § 59-29a8).
to engage in repeat acts os sexual violence (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-§§ 59-29a06 and in transitional release (Kan. Stat. Incompetent: period of
Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02). 29a07). 59-29a07). Ann. § 59-29a8). limitation for the
prosecution shall
continue to run (Kan.
Stat. Ann. §§ 59-29a07
and 22-3305).
iki/CRS-RL34068Massachusetts Convicted of or adjudicated as a delinquent of, Beyond a Court or No longer sexually dangerous (Mass. Discharge (Mass. Gen.
g/wcharged with, or found incompetent to stand trial reasonable unanimous jury Gen. Laws ch. 123A, § 9). Laws ch. 123A, § 9).
s.orfor a sexual offense and suffering from a mental doubt (Mass. (Mass. Gen.
leakdisorder that makes such person likely to engage in Gen. Laws ch. Laws ch. 123A, §
sexual offenses (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123A, § 1). 123A, § 14). 14).
://wikiMinnesota Mentally ill, a danger to others and sexually Clear and Judge (Minn. Until capable of making an acceptable Discharge or
httpdangerous or having a sexual psychopathic convincing Stat. § adjustment to open society, no provisional discharge
personality (Minn. Stat. § 253B.185). evidence (Minn. 253B.185). longer a danger, and no longer in (Minn. Stat. § 253B.18).
Stat. § need of inpatient treatment and
253B.185). supervision (Minn. Stat. § 253B.18).
Missouri Guilty or not guilty by reason of mental Clear and Court or Mental abnormality has changed so Conditional Release
disease/defect of a sexually violent offense or convincing Unanimous jury that person is not likely to commit (Mo. Rev. Stat. §§
committed as a criminal sexual psychopath and evidence (Mo. (Mo. Rev. Stat. § sexual violence. (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.498 and 632.505).


suffering from a mental abnormality which makes Rev. Stat. § 632.492). 632.501).
the person more likely to engage in predatory acts 632.495).
of sexual violence if not confined (Mo. Rev. Stat. §
632.480).


Proceeding
Burden of Following
State Commitment Eligibility Proof Trial Duration Commitment
Nebraska A dangerous sexual offender suffering from a Clear and Mental Health Mental illness or personality disorder Discharged or new
mental illness or personality disorder which makes convincing Board (Neb. has been successfully treated or treatment order
the person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual evidence (Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. managed to the extent that the entered (Neb. Rev. Stat.
violence, who has been convicted of one or more Rev. Stat. Ann. § §§ 71-1205 and subject no longer poses a threat to Ann. § 71-1219).
sex offenses, and who is substantially unable to 71-1209) 71-1209). the public or a less restrictive
control his or her criminal behavior. treatment alternative exists which
(Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 83-174.01) and neither does not increase the risk that the
voluntary hospitalization nor other less restrictive subject will commit another sexual
treatment alternatives are available or would offense (Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 71-
suffice to prevent harm (Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 71-1219).
1209).
New Guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity or Clear and Court or Jury Until mental abnormality or Release from
Hampshire incompetent to stand trial on a charge of a sexually convincing (N.H. Rev. Stat. personality disorder has changed and commitment and return
violent offense and suffering from a mental evidence (N.H. Ann. § 135-E:9). person is no longer a danger to to department of
abnormality or personality disorder that makes a Rev. Stat. Ann. § Effective others. Commitment order valid for corrections (N.H. Rev.
iki/CRS-RL34068person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if 135-E:11). 1/1/2007. up to five years (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Stat. Ann. § 135-E:20).
g/wnot confined (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 135-E:2). Effective § 135-E:11). Effective 1/1/2007. Effective 1/1/2007.
s.orEffective 1/1/2007. 1/1/2007.
leakNew Jersey Convicted, adjudicated delinquent, not guilty by Clear and Court (N.J. Stat. No longer a sexually violent Return to appropriate
reason of insanity or incompetent to stand trial on convincing Ann. §§ 30:4-predator (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-authority, release or
://wikia charge of a sexually violent offense and suffering evidence (N.J. 27.32 and 30:4-27.36). conditional release (N.J.
httpfrom a mental abnormality that makes him likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if no confined (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-27.32). 27.33). Stat. Ann. §§ 30:4-27.32 and 30:4-27.36).
Stat. Ann. § 30:4-27.26).
North Dakota An individual has engaged in sexually predatory Clear and Court (N.D. No longer sexually dangerous (N.D. Discharge (N.D. Cent.
conduct and has a congenital or acquired condition convincing Cent. Code § Cent. Code §§ 25-03.3.17 and 25-Code §§ 25-03.3.17 and
that is manifested by sexual, personality or other evidence (N.D. 25-03.3.13). 03.3.18). 25-03.3.18).


mental disorder that makes the individual likely to Cent. Code §
engage in further sexual acts (N.D. Cent. Code § 25-03.3.13).
25-03.3.01).


Proceeding
Burden of Following
State Commitment Eligibility Proof Trial Duration Commitment
Pennsylvania Adjudicated delinquent for an act of sexual Clear and Court (42 Pa. Commitment expires after one-year Discharged if person no
violence, committed to an institution as a convincing Cons. Stat. Ann. unless court determines by clear and longer has serious
delinquent child (§ 6352) and remains upon evidence (42 Pa. § 6403). convincing evidence the person is difficulty in controlling
attaining 20 years of age, and is in need of Cons. Stat. Ann. likely to engage in an act of sexual sexually violent
involuntary treatment due to a mental abnormality § 6403). violence, then the court shall order behavior (42 Pa. Cons.
or personality disorder which results in serious an additional period of involuntary Stat. Ann. § 6404).
difficulty in controlling sexually violent behavior treatment of one year (42 Pa. Cons.
that makes the person likely to engage in an act of Stat. Ann. § 6404).
sexual violence (42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6403).
South The individual is convicted, or found guilty but Beyond a Court or Mental abnormality or personality Release (S.C. Code
Carolina mentally ill, not guilty by reason of insanity, reasonable unanimous jury disorder has so changed that the Ann. §§ 44-48-110).
adjudicated delinquent, or found incompetent to doubt (S.C. Code Ann. person is no longer a danger and not
stand trial for a sexually violent offense and (S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-100). likely to commit acts of sexual
suffering from a mental abnormality or personality § 44-48-100). violence (S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-
disorder that makes the person likely to engage in 110).
iki/CRS-RL34068acts of sexual violence if not confined (S.C. Code
g/wAnn. § 44-48-30).
s.orTexas Convicted of, charged with, not guilty by reason of Beyond a Court or Behavioral abnormality has changed Release (Tex. Health &
leakinsanity of, or adjudicated delinquent of a sexually reasonable unanimous jury and no longer likely to engage in Safety Code Ann. §
violent offense and is a repeat sexually violent doubt (Tex. (Tex. Health & predatory acts of sexual violence 841.121).
://wikioffender and suffering from behavioral abnormality Health & Safety Safety Code (Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §
httpthat makes him likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence (Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § Code Ann. § 841.062). Ann. §§ 841.061and 841.121).
841.003). 841.062).
Virginia Charged and unrestorably incompetent to stand Clear and Unanimous jury No longer a sexually violent Release or conditional
trial or convicted of a sexually violent offense and convincing or court (Va. predator (Va. Code Ann. §§ release (Va. Code Ann.
because of a mental abnormality or personality evidence (Va. Code Ann. §§ 37.2.910). §§ 37.2.910).


disorder, finds it difficult to control predatory Code Ann. §§ 37.2.908).
behavior, which makes him likely to engage in 37.2.908).
sexually violent acts (Va. Code Ann. §§ 37.2.900).


Proceeding
Burden of Following
State Commitment Eligibility Proof Trial Duration Commitment
Washington Convicted of or charged with a sexual violent Beyond a Court or Acquitted by reason of insanity: Conditional release or
offense and suffering from a mental abnormality or reasonable unanimous jury commitment cannot exceed the unconditional discharge
personality disorder which makes the person likely doubt (Wash. (Wash. Rev. maximum possible penal sentence (Wash. Rev. Code §
to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not Rev. Code § Code § for the offense charged (Wash. Rev. 71.09.090).
confined (Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.020). Charged 71.09.060). 71.09.060). Code § 10.77.025). No longer a
with a sexually violent offense and found sexual predator or conditions can be
incompetent to stand trial (Wash. Rev. Code § imposed that adequately protect the
71.09.060). community (Wash. Rev. Code §
71.09.090).
Wisconsin Convicted, adjudicated delinquent, not guilty of or Beyond a Court or jury No longer a sexually violent person Supervised release
not responsible by reason of insanity or mental reasonable (Wis. Stat. § (Wis. Stat. § 980.06). (Wis. Stat. § 980.08).
disease/defect/illness of a sexually violent offense doubt (Wis. 980.05). Discharge (Wis. Stat. §
and dangerous because of a mental disorder that Stat. § 980.05). 980.09).


makes the person likely to engage in one or more
acts of sexual violence (Wis. Stat. § 980.01).
iki/CRS-RL34068
g/w
s.or
leak
://wiki
http



Nathan James Cassandra L. Foley
Analyst in Crime Policy Law Librarian
njames@crs.loc.gov, 7-0264 cfoley@crs.loc.gov, 7-4179
Kenneth R. Thomas
Legislative Attorney
kthomas@crs.loc.gov, 7-5006