Congress's Contempt Power: Law, History, Practice, and Procedure

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

Congress’s contempt power is the means by which Congress responds to certain acts that in its
view obstruct the legislative process. Contempt may be used either to coerce compliance
(inherent contempt), punish the contemnor (criminal contempt), and/or to remove the obstruction
(civil contempt). Although arguably any action that directly obstructs the effort of Congress to
exercise its constitutional powers may constitute a contempt, in the last seventy years the
contempt power (primarily through the criminal contempt process) has generally been employed
only in instances of refusals of witnesses to appear before committees, to respond to questions, or
to produce documents.
This report examines the source of the contempt power, reviews the historical development of the
early case law, outlines the statutory and common law basis for Congress’s contempt power, and
analyzes the procedures associated with each of the three different types of contempt proceedings.
In addition, the report discusses limitations both nonconstitutional and constitutionally based on
the power. Finally, the report discusses the recent investigation by the House Judiciary Committee
that has resulted in votes for criminal contempt of Congress and the filing of a civil lawsuit to
enforce congressional subpoenas.

Introduc tion ............................................................................................................................... 1
Congress’s Power to Investigate...............................................................................................1
Early History of Congressional Contempt................................................................................4
Inherent Contempt...................................................................................................................10
Inherent Contempt Proceedings By Committees of Congress................................................13
Statutory Criminal Contempt..................................................................................................17
The Position of the Department of Justice on the Use of Inherent and/or Criminal
Contempt of Congress Against the Executive Branch.........................................................22
Civil Contempt........................................................................................................................28
Civil Contempt in the Senate............................................................................................28
Civil Contempt in the House of Representatives..............................................................31
Non-Constitutional Limitations..............................................................................................38
Authorization and Jurisdiction..........................................................................................38
Legislative Purpose...........................................................................................................40
Pertinency ......................................................................................................................... 42
Wi ll fulnes s ........................................................................................................................ 43
Other Procedural Requirements........................................................................................44
Attorney-Client Privilege..................................................................................................44
Work Product Immunity and Other Common Law Testimonial Privileges......................47
Constitutional Limitations.......................................................................................................48
First Amendment...............................................................................................................48
Fourth Amendment...........................................................................................................50
Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination...................................................52
Fifth Amendment Due Process Rights..............................................................................54
Recent Developments..............................................................................................................54
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................56

Congress’s contempt power is the means by which Congress responds to certain acts that in its
view obstruct the legislative process. Contempt may be used either to coerce compliance, punish ¹
the contemnor, and/or to remove the obstruction. Although arguably any action that directly ²
obstructs the effort of Congress to exercise its constitutional powers may constitute a contempt,
in the last seventy years the contempt power has generally been employed only in instances of
refusals of witnesses to appear before committees, to respond to questions, or to produce ³
documents.
This report examines the source of the contempt power, reviews the historical development of the
early case law, outlines the statutory, common law, and constitutional limitations on the contempt
power, and analyzes the procedures associated with each of the three different types of contempt ⁴
proceedings (inherent contempt, statutory criminal contempt, and statutory civil contempt).
The power of Congress to punish for contempt is inextricably related to the power of Congress to ⁵
investigate. Generally speaking, Congress’s authority to investigate and obtain information,
including but not limited to confidential information, is extremely broad. While there is no
express provision of the Constitution or specific statute authorizing the conduct of congressional
oversight or investigations, the Supreme Court has firmly established that such power is essential
to the legislative function as to be implied from the general vesting of legislative powers in ⁶
Congress. The broad legislative authority to seek and enforce informational demands was
unequivocally established in two Supreme Court rulings arising out of the 1920’s Teapot Dome
scandal.

¹^Se^e^ge^ne^r^a^lly^,^R^ONAL^D^L.^G^OL^DF^A^R^B^,^T^HE^C^ONT^E^M^P^T^P^OWE^R⁽²^d^e^d^{., A}ⁿ^c^hor^B^o^ok^s¹⁹⁷¹⁾^.
²^Co^mpa^r^{e Ju}^rn^{ey v.}^Ma^cCra^cken^,²⁹^{4 U}^.^S^.¹²⁵⁽^d^e^s^tr^uc^ti^on^of^doc^um^eⁿ^ta^r^y^ev^ideⁿ^c^e^w^h^ic^{h ha}^{d be}^eⁿ^s^u^bp^oe^na^e^d^by
^a^c^o^m^m^itte^e^of^Cong^re^{ss c}^aⁿ^c^onstitute^c^o^nte^m^pt)^{with M}^a^rsh^{all v}^.^Gordoⁿ^,²⁴^{3 U}^.^S^.⁵²¹⁽¹⁹¹⁷⁾⁽^p^u^b^lic^a^tio^{n by}^U^.^S.
^A^t^t^o^rn^e^y^o^f^l^e^t^t^e^{r cri}^tⁱ^cal^o^f^Coⁿ^g^{ress co}^u^l^dⁿ^o^t^coⁿ^s^tⁱ^t^u^t^e^con^t^em^p^t^b^ecau^{se i}^t^di^dⁿ^o^t^dⁱ^rect^l^y^o^b^s^t^r^uct^t^h^{e l}^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^v^e
^p^r^o^cess).^T^h^e^Ju^rn^ey^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^on^a^l^s^o^u^phe^l^d^t^h^e^us^e^of^theⁱ^nhe^r^e^nt^c^onte^m^{pt pow}^e^r^to^pu^nis^h^a^pa^s^t^c^onte^m^{pt, e}^v^eⁿ
^w^h^e^r^e^r^e^m^o^v^a^{l of}^the^obs^tr^uc^ti^on^{to t}^h^e^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e^pr^oc^e^s^s^w^a^s^{no l}^ong^e^r^pos^sⁱ^ble^.^S^{ee Ju}^rn^ey^{, 2}^{94 U}^.^{S. a}^t¹⁴^7-⁴⁸^,¹⁵^0.
³^H^o^w^e^ve^r^,^{in tw}^{o c}^a^s^e^s^{, de}^f^e^nda^nts^eⁿ^te^r^e^{d ple}^a^s^ofⁿ^o^lo^c^onte^nde^r^e^{to t}^h^e^s^t^a^t^utor^y^of^f^e^ns^e^of^c^onte^m^{pt, a}
^mⁱ^sde^m^e^a^{nor, ra}^the^r^thaⁿ^staⁿ^{d tr}^ia^{l f}^o^{r pe}^rjury^,^a^f^e^lon^y^.^Unite^{d S}^t^ate^s^v^.^He^lms^{, Cr. N}^o^{. 7}⁷^-6⁵⁰^(D^.^D^{.C. 1}⁹⁷⁷^);
^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^v^.^K^l^eⁱ^nd^ie^ns^t^{, Cr.}^N^o^{. 7}⁴^-2⁵⁶^(D^.D^.C.¹⁹^74);^{see a}^l^so^P^r^os^e^c^u^ti^on^of^C^oⁿ^t^e^m^{pt of}^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^H^e^a^r^ing
^be^f^o^r^e^the^Su^bc^om^m^itte^e^{on A}^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e^L^a^w^a^{nd G}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{ntal R}^e^la^tions^of^the^H^o^us^e^J^udicⁱ^a^r^y^C^o^m^m^itte^e^on^th^st
^H.^R^.²⁶⁸⁴^an^{d H.}^R^.³⁴⁵⁶^,⁹⁸^Cong^.,¹^Se^s^s^{., 2}⁹⁽¹⁹⁸³⁾⁽^p^r^e^pa^r^e^{d s}^t^a^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^Staⁿ^ley^B^r^a^{nd, f}^o^r^m^e^r^C^ouns^e^l^t^o^t^h^e
^Cl^{erk o}^f^t^h^{e Ho}^u^s^e).
⁴^T^h^{e t}^h^{ree t}^y^p^e^{s o}^f^coⁿ^t^e^m^p^t^,^an^{d t}^h^{e p}^r^o^ced^u^r^{es asso}^ci^at^ed^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^e^m^,^{are d}ⁱ^scu^ssedⁱⁿ^m^o^{re d}^e^t^aⁱ^l^bel^o^w^.^Se^e^infra^at
^{12 (}ⁱ^nhe^r^eⁿ^t^c^oⁿ^t^e^m^pt)^,^{20 (}^c^rⁱ^mⁱ^na^{l c}^onte^m^pt)^,^&³³⁽^c^iv^{il c}^o^nte^m^pt)^.^I^t^isⁿ^o^te^d^tha^t^a^w^itne^s^s^w^{ho r}^e^f^u^s^e^s^{to te}^s^tif^y
^b^e^f^o^{re a co}^mmi^t^t^ee,^o^r^w^h^o^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^{es a co}^mmⁱ^t^t^ee^wⁱ^t^h^f^a^l^s^{e o}^r^mⁱ^s^l^eadⁱⁿ^{g t}^e^stⁱ^m^oⁿ^y^,^can^p^o^t^en^tⁱ^a^l^l^y^b^e^p^r^o^s^ecu^t^e^d
^unde^r^ot^he^r^c^r^im^ina^l^pr^ov^is^io^ns^{, i}ⁿ^c^l^ud^ing¹⁸^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 1}⁰⁰¹⁽^f^a^l^s^e^s^t^a^t^em^eⁿ^ts⁾^,^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^{§ 1}⁶²¹⁽^p^e^r^jur^y⁾^,^a^{nd 1}⁸
^U.^S^.^C.^§¹⁵⁰⁵⁽^o^b^s^t^r^u^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^commi^t^t^{ee p}^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^gs).^A^d^e^t^aⁱ^l^e^d^dⁱ^scu^ssi^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^o^s^{e o}^f^f^eⁿ^s^e^s^,^h^o^w^ever,ⁱ^s^b^e^y^{ond t}^h^e
^s^c^ope^of^this^r^e^p^o^r^t^.^Se^e^ge^ne^r^a^lly^{, J}^AM^E^S^H^A^M^I^LTO^N^,^T^HE^P^OWE^R^T^O^P^ROB^E^:^A^S^T^{UDY O}^F^C^ONGR^E^S^S^I^ONAL
^I^NVE^S^T^I^G^A^T^I^ONS^{, 78 (}¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.
⁵^Se^e^ge^ne^r^a^lly^,^A^lle^{n B. M}^o^re^laⁿ^d^,^C^o^ngr^e^s^sⁱ^o^nal^Iⁿ^v^e^s^tig^ati^ons^a^{nd Pr}^iv^ate^Pe^r^s^ons^{, 40}^S^O^.^C^AL^.^L.^R^EV^{. 189}
⁽¹⁹⁶⁷⁾^.
⁶^Se^e^,^e^.^g.^{, N}ⁱ^x^o^{n v}^.^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tor^{of G}^e^ne^r^a^l^Se^r^v^ic^e^s^{, 433}^U^.^S.⁴³⁵⁽¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^;^E^a^st^l^aⁿ^d^v.^Unⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^{es S}^e^rvi^cemen^’s
^Fun^d^,⁴²^{1 U}^.^S^.⁴⁹¹⁽¹⁹⁷⁵⁾^;^B^a^rⁿ^blatt^v^.^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^State^s^,³⁶^{0 U}^.^S^.¹^{09 (}¹⁹⁵⁹⁾^;^W^a^tk^{ins v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^at^e^s^{, 35}^{4 U}^.^S.¹⁷⁸
⁽¹⁹⁵⁷⁾^;^M^c^G^r^ain^v^.^D^a^ug^he^r^t^y^{, 2}^{73 U}^.^S.¹³^{5 (}¹⁹²⁷⁾^.

In McGrain v. Daugherty,⁷ which arose out of the exercise of the Senate’s inherent contempt
power, the Supreme Court described the power of inquiry, with the accompanying process to
enforce it, as “an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.” The Court
explained:
^A^l^e^gⁱ^sl^atⁱ^v^{e body}^caⁿⁿ^o^t^l^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^t^e^wⁱ^s^e^l^y^{or eff}^ectⁱ^v^el^yⁱⁿ^t^h^{e abs}^eⁿ^{ce of}ⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ
^r^e^sp^ectin^g^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^d^itioⁿ^s^w^h^ic^h^th^{e le}^gⁱ^slat^ioⁿ^{is i}ⁿ^ten^d^ed^to^af^f^e^c^t^o^r^ch^an^g^e^;^an^d^w^h^e^r^e^t^h^e
^l^e^gⁱ^sl^atⁱ^v^{e body}^doesⁿ^o^tⁱ^t^s^e^l^f^pos^s^e^s^s^t^h^{e requ}ⁱ^sⁱ^t^eⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^–^w^hⁱ^c^hⁿ^o^tⁱⁿ^f^r^equ^eⁿ^t^l^yⁱ^s
^t^r^u^e^–recou^r^s^e^m^u^s^t^{be h}^a^{d t}^o^ot^h^e^rs^w^h^{o pos}^s^e^ssⁱ^t^.^Ex^peri^en^c^e^h^a^s^t^a^ug^ht^t^h^a^t^m^e^r^e^r^e^q^u^e^s^t^s
^f^o^r^su^c^hⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^o^f^teⁿ^ar^{e u}ⁿ^a^v^a^iliⁿ^g^{, an}^d^also^th^{at i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^w^h^ic^h^{is v}^o^l^uⁿ^t^eer^ed^is
ⁿ^o^{t al}^w^a^y^s^accu^{rate or co}^m^p^le^{te; s}^o^s^o^m^e^m^e^aⁿ^s^of^co^m^p^u^l^sⁱ^on^{are es}^s^e^{ntial to obtain}^t^h^at
^w^hⁱ^c^{h i}^s^ne^e^d^e^d^.^A^l^l^t^hⁱ^s^w^a^{s t}^r^ue^b^e^fo^r^e^aⁿ^d^w^h^eⁿ^t^h^e^Co^ns^tⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^w^a^s^f^r^a^m^ed^an^d^adopt^ed.
^In^t^h^at^peri^{od t}^h^{e pow}^{er of}ⁱⁿ^q^uⁱ^r^y^–^wⁱ^t^h^enf^o^rciⁿ^g^proces^s^–^w^a^s^reg^a^{rded an}^{d em}^pl^o^y^e^d^a^s^a
ⁿ^eces^s^a^r^y^an^{d appropriate attri}^b^u^t^{e of}^th^{e po}^w^e^r^{to leg}ⁱ^s^l^ate–iⁿ^deed,^w^a^s^{treated as}^inh^e^riⁿ^g
ⁱⁿ^{it. T}^h^u^s^t^h^er^{e is a}^m^p^l^e^w^a^r^r^an^{t f}^o^r^thⁱⁿ^kⁱⁿ^g^,^as^w^e^d^o^,^th^a^t^th^{e co}ⁿ^s^t^itu^tioⁿ^a^{l p}^r^o^v^is^ioⁿ^s
^w^h^ic^h^co^m^m^{it th}^{e le}^gⁱ^s^l^ati^v^{e fu}ⁿ^c^tⁱ^on^{to th}^{e t}^w^{o h}^ous^es^{are in}^ten^d^{ed to in}^cl^u^d^e^t^hⁱ^s^a^t^t^rⁱ^b^u^t^e⁸
^{to th}^{e en}^{d th}^{at t}^h^e^f^uⁿ^c^tioⁿ^m^a^y^{be ef}^f^e^c^tiv^e^l^y^e^x^ercis^e^d.
In Sinclair v. United States,⁹ a different witness at the congressional hearings refused to provide
answers, and was prosecuted for contempt of Congress. The witness had noted that a lawsuit had
been commenced between the government and the Mammoth Oil Company, and declared, “I shall
reserve any evidence I may be able to give for those courts ... and shall respectfully decline to ¹⁰
answer any questions propounded by your committee.” The Supreme Court upheld the witness’s
conviction for contempt of Congress. The Court considered and rejected in unequivocal terms the
witness’s contention that the pendency of lawsuits provided an excuse for withholding
information. Neither the laws directing that such lawsuits be instituted, nor the lawsuits
themselves, “operated to divest the Senate, or the committee, of power further to investigate the ¹¹
actual administration of the land laws.” The Court further explained that
^[ⁱ^]^t^m^a^y^b^e^coⁿ^ced^ed^th^{at Co}ⁿ^g^r^e^{ss is}^wⁱ^t^h^o^u^{t au}^th^o^r^it^y^to^co^m^p^e^l^dⁱ^sclo^su^r^e^f^o^r^t^h^e^p^u^r^p^o^s^e
^of^ai^di^ng^t^h^{e pros}^ecutⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^peⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^s^uⁱ^t^s^;^b^u^t^t^h^{e a}^u^t^h^ori^t^y^o^f^t^h^at^bod^y^,^di^rect^l^y^{or t}^h^rough
^{its co}^m^m^{ittees to}^r^e^q^u^ir^{e p}^e^r^tin^en^{t d}ⁱ^sclo^su^r^e^{s i}ⁿ^aid^o^f^{its o}^wⁿ^coⁿ^s^ti^tu^tⁱ^oⁿ^{al p}^o^w^e^r^{is n}^o^t¹²
^abridg^{ed becau}^s^e^th^{e inf}^o^r^m^a^t^ion^s^oug^{ht to be elicited}^m^a^y^a^l^s^o^{be of}^u^s^{e i}ⁿ^s^u^ch^s^u^it^s^.
Subsequent Supreme Court rulings have consistently reiterated and reinforced the breadth of
Congress’s investigative authority. For example, in Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund,
the Court explained that “[t]he scope of [Congress’s] power of inquiry ... is as penetrating and far-¹³
reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.” In addition, the
Court in Watkins v. United States, described the breadth of the power of inquiry. According to the
Court, Congress’s power “to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That
power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as

⁷²⁷^{3 U}^.^S^.¹³⁵^,¹^74-⁷⁵⁽¹⁹²⁷⁾^.
⁸^Id^.
⁹²⁷^{9 U}^.^S^.²⁶³⁽¹⁹²⁹⁾^.
¹⁰^Id^.^a^t²⁹^0.
¹¹^Id^.^a^t²⁹^5.
¹²^Id^.
¹³⁴²¹^U.^S.⁴⁹^1,⁵⁰^4,^n.¹⁵⁽¹⁹⁷⁵⁾⁽^q^u^o^tⁱⁿ^g^B^a^r^e^nbl^{att v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^at^e^s^,³⁶^{0 U}^.^S.¹^09,¹^{11 (}¹⁹⁶⁰⁾⁾^.

proposed or possibly needed statutes.”¹⁴ The Court did not limit the power of congressional
inquiry to cases of “wrongdoing.” It emphasized, however, that Congress’s investigative power is
at its peak when the subject is alleged waste, fraud, abuse, or maladministration within a
government department. The investigative power, the Court stated, “comprehends probes into ¹⁵
departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste.” “[T]he
first Congresses,” held “inquiries dealing with suspected corruption or mismanagement by ¹⁶
government officials” and subsequently, in a series of decisions, “[t]he Court recognized the
danger to effective and honest conduct of the Government if the legislative power to probe ¹⁷
corruption in the Executive Branch were unduly hampered.” Accordingly, the Court now clearly
recognizes “the power of the Congress to inquire into and publicize corruption, ¹⁸
maladministration, or inefficiencies in the agencies of Government.”
The inherent contempt power is not specified in a statute or constitutional provision, but has been
deemed implicit in the Constitution’s grant to Congress of all legislative powers. In an inherent
contempt proceeding, the offender is tried at the bar of the House or Senate and can be held in
custody until such time as the contemnor provides the testimony or documents sought, or until the
end of the session. Inherent contempt was most often used as a means of coercion, not
punishment. A statutory criminal contempt provision was first enacted by Congress in 1857, in
part because of the inadequacies of proceedings under the inherent power. In cases of criminal
contempt, the offender is cited by the subcommittee, the committee, and the full House or Senate,
with subsequent indictment by a grand jury and prosecution by the U.S. Attorney. Criminal
contempt, unlike inherent contempt, is intended as a means of punishing the contemnor for non-
compliance rather than to obtain the information sought. A statutory civil contempt procedure,
applicable only to the Senate, was enacted in 1978. Under that procedure, a witness, who refuses
to testify before a Senate committee or provide documents sought by the committee can, after
being served with a court order, be held in contempt of court and incarcerated until he agrees to
testify. Moreover, the House and Senate have authorized standing or special committees to seek ¹⁹
civil enforcement of subpoenas.

¹⁴³⁵⁴^U.^S.¹⁷^8,¹⁸^{7 (}¹⁹⁵⁷⁾^.
¹⁵^Id^.
¹⁶^Id^.^a^t¹⁸^2.
¹⁷^Id^.^a^t¹⁹^4-⁹⁵
¹⁸^Id^.^a^t²⁰^{0 n. 33;}^{see a}^l^so^Mo^rrison^v.^Olson^,⁴⁸^{7 U}^.^S^.⁶⁵⁴^,⁶⁹⁴⁽¹⁹⁸⁸⁾⁽^not^ing^t^h^a^t^C^o^ng^r^e^s^s^’^s^r^o^le^u^nde^r^t^h^e
^I^nde^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^t^C^o^uns^e^l^A^c^{t “}^o^f^r^e^c^e^iv^ing^r^e^por^ts^or^ot^he^rⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^tion^a^nd^ov^e^r^sⁱ^g^h^{t of}^theⁱⁿ^de^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^t^c^ouns^e^l^’^s
^{activities ...}^[^a^re]^f^uⁿ^c^ti^oⁿ^s^w^e^h^a^{ve reco}^gn^ized^{as b}^eⁱⁿ^{g in}^cid^eⁿ^t^al^to^t^h^{e legislative}^f^uⁿ^c^tioⁿ^o^f^C^{ongress”) (citin}^g
^M^c^G^r^{ain v}^.^D^a^u^ghe^r^t^y^{, 27}³^U^.^S^.¹³⁵⁽¹⁹²⁷⁾⁾^.
¹⁹^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^S.R^e^s^.⁶⁰^&^S.R^e^s^.¹⁹⁴^,⁹³^{d C}^ong^{., (}¹⁹⁷³⁾⁽^S^eⁿ^a^t^e^Se^le^c^t^C^o^m^m^itte^e^s^{on W}^a^te^r^g^a^t^e⁾^{; H}^.^R^e^s^.^60,⁹⁷^th
^C^ong^{., (}¹⁹⁸¹⁾⁽^A^B^S^C^A^M)^{; H}^.^R^e^s^.¹²^{, 1}⁰⁰^th^C^o^ng^{. (}¹⁹⁸⁷⁾⁽^H^o^u^s^e^I^r^a^n–C^oⁿ^tr^a⁾^{; S}^.^R^e^s^.²³^,¹⁰⁰^th^C^ong^{. (}¹⁹⁸⁷⁾⁽^S^eⁿ^a^t^e^th
^I^r^a^n–C^oⁿ^tr^a⁾^;^H^.^R^e^s^.⁴⁶^{3, 10}⁵^Coⁿ^g^.^,⁽¹⁹⁹⁸⁾^(S^el^ect^Co^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee o}ⁿ^Natⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^ecu^ri^t^y^Co^mm^er^ci^al^Coⁿ^cern^s^);^see^th
^als^o^H^.^R^e^s^.¹⁴²⁰^{, 9}⁴^C^ong^.^2d^S^e^s^s^.⁽¹⁹⁷⁶⁾⁽^a^ut^ho^rⁱ^zⁱ^ng^the^C^h^aⁱ^r^m^aⁿ^of^the^H^ous^e^Iⁿ^te^r^s^ta^te^a^nd^F^o^r^e^ig^{n C}^o^m^m^e^r^c^e
^Subc^om^m^itte^e^{on Ov}^e^r^sig^h^{t a}^{nd I}ⁿ^v^e^stig^a^{tions to i}ⁿ^te^rv^eⁿ^eⁱⁿ^Uⁿ^it^e^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Am^e^r^ic^an^Te^le^ph^one^&^Te^le^gr^aph^{, 41}⁹
^{F. S}^u^p^p^.⁴⁵^{4 (}^D^.D^.C^.¹⁹⁷⁶⁾⁾^;^H^.^R^e^s^.⁸⁹^9,¹²¹^C^ONG^.^R^EC^.⁹¹^8-¹⁹⁽¹⁹⁷⁵⁾⁽^a^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^zⁱ^ng^t^h^e^C^h^aⁱ^r^m^aⁿ^of^the^H^ous^e
^Iⁿ^te^r^s^ta^te^a^{nd F}^o^r^e^ig^{n C}^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^Su^bc^om^m^itte^e^on^Ov^e^r^sig^h^{t a}^nd^Inv^e^stig^a^{tions to}^inte^rv^eⁿ^eⁱⁿ^As^h^l^an^{d O}^{il I}ⁿ^c^{., v}^.
^FTC^{, 4}⁰⁹^F.^Su^pp.²^97,³^{07 (D}^.D^{.C. 1}⁹⁷⁶^)).

While the contempt power was exercised both by the English Parliament²⁰ and by the American ²¹
colonial assemblies, Congress’s first assertion of its contempt authority occurred in 1795,
shortly after the ratification of the Constitution. At the time, three Members of the House of
Representatives reported that they had been offered what they interpreted to be a bribe by men ²²
named Robert Randall and Charles Whitney. The House of Representatives interpreted these
allegations as sufficient evidence of an attempt to corrupt its proceedings and reported a
resolution ordering their arrest and detention by the Sergeant-at-Arms, pending further action by ²³
the House. The matter was then referred to a special Committee on Privileges which reported
out a resolution recommending that formal proceedings be instituted against Messrs. Randall and ²⁴
Whitney at the bar of the House. In addition, the resolution provided that the accused be
questioned by written interrogatories submitted by the Speaker of the House with both the ²⁵
questions and the answers entered into the House minutes. The resolution also provided that ²⁶
individual Members could submit written questions to the accused.
Upon adopting the resolution and after considerable debate, the House determined that the
following procedures be adhered to: First, the complaining Members were to submit a written
signed information to the accused and for publication in the House Journal. In addition, the
accused were to be provided counsel, the right to call witnesses on their behalf, the right to cross-
examination of the complaining Members through written questions submitted to the Speaker, ²⁷
and adequate time to prepare a defense. A proceeding was held at the bar of the House, and on
January 4, 1796, the House, by a vote of 78-17, adopted a resolution finding Mr. Randall guilty of
“a contempt to, and a breach of the privileges of, this House by attempting to corrupt the integrity ²⁸
of its Members in the manner laid to his charge.” The House ordered Mr. Randall to be brought
to the bar, reprimanded by the Speaker, and held in custody until further resolution of the ²⁹
House. Mr. Randall was detained until January 13, 1796, when he was discharged by House
resolution. Mr. Whitney, on the other hand, was absolved of any wrongdoing as the House
determined that his actions were against a “member-elect,” and had taken place “away from the ³⁰
seat of government.”

²⁰^M^AY^’^S^T^RE^AT^I^S^E^{ON T}^H^E^L^AW^,^P^RI^VI^L^E^G^E^S^,^P^ROCE^E^D^I^N^G^S^A^ND^U^S^A^GE^OF^P^AR^L^I^AM^E^N^T^{, 141-}^{42 (}¹⁷^th^e^d^.¹⁹^64).
²¹^M^AR^Y^P^AT^T^E^R^S^O^N^C^LA^R^K^E^{, P}^AR^L^I^AM^E^N^T^A^R^Y^P^R^I^V^I^LEG^E^IN^T^H^E^A^ME^RI^C^A^N^C^O^L^ONI^E^S⁽¹⁹⁷¹⁾^;^{see a}^l^so^C^AR^L^B^EC^K^,
^C^ONT^E^M^P^T^O^F^C^ONGRE^S^S^:^A^S^TU^D^Y^O^F^T^H^E^P^ROS^E^CUTI^ONS^I^N^I^TIA^TED^B^Y^TH^E^C^OM^M^I^T^T^E^E^ON^U^N^-A^M^E^RI^CAN^A^C^T^IV^IT^IE^S^,
¹⁹⁴^5-¹⁹^{57 (}¹⁹⁵⁹⁾^[^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^B^e^c^k^]^.
²²^{2 A}^SH^E^R^C.^H^IN^D^S^{, P}^RE^CE^DE^NTS^O^F^THE^H^OUS^E^O^F^R^EP^RE^SE^N^T^A^T^I^V^E^S^,^§¹⁵⁹⁹⁽¹⁹⁰⁷⁾^[^h^ereiⁿ^a^f^t^{er Hi}ⁿ^d^s^’^P^r^eced^en^t^s^]^.
^A^c^c^o^r^d^ing^to^the^r^e^c^o^r^d^s^,^Me^s^s^r^s^.^R^a^nda^{ll a}ⁿ^{d W}^h^it^ne^y^a^lleg^e^dl^y^of^f^e^r^e^{d thr}^e^e^Me^m^b^e^r^s^em^olum^eⁿ^ts^a^{nd m}^one^yⁱⁿ
^e^x^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^f^o^{r the}^pa^ssa^g^e^of^a^la^{w g}^r^aⁿ^ting^Ra^nda^{ll a}^nd^{his a}^ssocⁱ^a^t^e^s^som^e^18-2⁰^m^{illion a}^c^r^e^s^of^la^nd^bor^de^ring^L^a^k^e
^Erie^.^S^{ee i}^d^.
²³^Id^.
²⁴^Id^.^a^t^{§ 16}^00.
²⁵^Id^.
²⁶^Id^.
²⁷^Id^.^at^§^§¹⁶⁰¹^-16⁰²^.^T^h^{e p}^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^{gs ap}^p^{ear t}^o^h^a^{ve b}^een^d^e^l^a^y^e^d^f^r^o^m^Dec^e^m^b^e^{r 3}⁰^,¹⁷⁹⁵^t^o^Janu^ary⁴^,¹⁷⁹⁶^,^at
^the^r^e^que^s^t^of^R^a^nda^{ll a}ⁿ^{d h}ⁱ^s^c^o^uⁿ^s^e^l.^Id^.
²⁸^Id^.^a^t^{§ 16}^03.
²⁹^Id^.
³⁰^Id^.

Of additional significance is the fact that the records indicate that almost no question was raised
with respect to the power of Congress to punish a non-Member for contempt. According to one
commentator, who noted that many of the Members of the early Congress were also members of
the Constitutional Convention and, thus, fully aware of the legislative practices of the time, it was
“substantially agreed that the grant of the legislative power to Congress carried with it by ³¹
implication the power to punish for contempt.”
Four years later, the Senate exercised its contempt power against William Duane, who, as editor
of the Aurora newspaper, was charged with the publication of a libelous article concerning the
Senate and one of its committees. Mr. Duane was ordered by Senate resolution to appear before
the bar of the Senate and “make any proper defense for his conduct in publishing the aforesaid ³²
false, defamatory, scandalous, and malicious assertions and pretended information.” At his
initial appearance before the Senate, Mr. Duane requested, and was granted, the assistance of ³³
counsel and ordered to appear again two days later. Instead of appearing before the Senate as
ordered, Mr. Duane submitted a letter indicating he did not believe he could receive a fair trial ³⁴
before the Senate. Mr. Duane was subsequently held in contempt of the Senate for his failure to ³⁵
appear, not for his alleged libelous and defamatory publications. As a result, he was held in the
custody of the Senate for several weeks before the Senate, by resolution, instructed that he be ³⁶
released and tried by the courts.
The Senate’s contempt of Mr. Duane generated considerably more debate concerning Congress’s
contempt authority. A majority of Senators argued that the Senate’s contempt power was an
inherent right of legislative bodies, derived not specifically from the Constitution, but rather from
“the principle of self-preservation, which results to every public body from necessity and from ³⁷
the nature of the case.” Moreover, Senators supportive of this position argued that their
reasoning was firmly supported by English and colonial practices, as well as the practice of the
state legislatures. Finally, the majority asserted that if Congress did not possess a contempt power ³⁸
it would be vulnerable to the disruption of its proceedings by outside intruders.
While the Senate’s exercise of its contempt power was not without precedent, many Senators
disputed these claims, arguing that all powers sought to be exercised by Congress must be
specifically derived from the Constitution; that because the contempt power is not among the
enumerated powers given to Congress, the power is reserved to the states and the people. In
addition, the minority argued that Congress, unlike the English Parliament or state legislatures,
was intentionally not granted the plenary powers of sovereignty by the Constitution and, thus, ³⁹
could not claim any inherent right to self-preservation. As an alternative, the minority proposed

³¹^C.S.^Potts^,^Pow^e^r^{of Le}^gⁱ^s^l^ativ^e^Bodie^s^t^o^P^unis^h^f^o^r^C^o^nte^m^pt^{, 7}⁴^U^.^P^EN^N^.^L.^R^EV^{. 6}^91,⁷^{20 (}¹⁹²⁶⁾^.
³²²^Hi^nd^s’^P^r^eced^en^t^s^,^s^upr^a^note²²^a^t^{§ 16}^04.
³³^Id^.
³⁴^Id^.
³⁵^Id^.^T^h^e^Se^na^te^v^o^te^{d 1}⁶^-¹^{1 t}^o^h^o^l^{d Mr}^.^D^u^aⁿ^eⁱⁿ^c^o^nte^m^pt.^Id^.
³⁶^Id^.^T^h^{e reco}^rd^sⁱⁿ^dⁱ^cat^{e t}^h^at^M^r^.^Du^an^{e w}^a^{s h}^e^l^dⁱⁿ^con^t^em^p^t^o^f^t^h^{e S}^eⁿ^a^t^e^oⁿ^M^a^rch²⁷^,¹⁸⁰⁰^,^and^rel^eased^b^y
^r^e^s^o^luti^{on a}^d^op^te^d^on^Ma^y^{14, 1}⁸^00,^the^la^s^t^da^y^of^the^s^e^s^sⁱ^{on, by}^a^v^o^te^of^13-⁴^.^Id^.
³⁷^S^eⁿ^a^t^e^P^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^s^{, 6}^th^C^ong^.¹⁷^99-¹⁸^{01 86 (}^M^a^r^c^h^{5, 180}⁰⁾^;^{see a}^l^so^C^ons^tit^uti^oⁿ^,^J^e^f^f^e^r^s^on’^s^Ma^nua^{l, a}^{nd t}^h^e
^R^u^le^s^of^the^H^o^us^e^of^R^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^{, H}^.^R^.^D^o^c^.¹^08-²⁴^1,¹⁰⁸^th^C^ong^.,^2d^Se^s^s^{., §}^§²⁹^7-²^{99 (}²⁰⁰⁵⁾^[^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r
^J^e^f^f^e^r^s^on’^s^Ma^nua^l^]
³⁸^S^{ee i}^d^.
³⁹^Id^.^a^t^{§ 29}⁸

that Congress, which has the power to “make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for ⁴⁰
carrying into execution the foregoing powers” had sufficient authority to enact a statute that ⁴¹
would protect the integrity of its proceedings. Moreover, the minority argued that disruptions of ⁴²
congressional proceedings would continue to be subject to the criminal laws.
After Mr. Duane’s contempt by the Senate, it appeared that the subject of the Congress’s inherent
contempt power was settled. The authority, however, was not used again for another 12 years. In
1812, the House issued a contempt resolution against Mr. Nathaniel Rounsavell, who had refused
to answer a select committee’s questions concerning which Representative had given him ⁴³
information regarding secret sessions. However, before Mr. Rounsavell was brought before the ⁴⁴
bar of the House a Member admitted his indiscretion and the matter was not pursued.
Congress’s inherent contempt power was not used again until 1818, where it eventually made its
way to the Supreme Court for adjudication.
In 1821, the Supreme Court was faced with interpreting the scope of Congress’s contempt ⁴⁵
power. The case arose when Representative Louis Williams of North Carolina introduced a
letter before the House from a John Anderson, which Representative Williams interpreted as an ⁴⁶
attempt to bribe him. Following its 1795 precedent, the House adopted a resolution ordering the
Sergeant-at-Arms to arrest Mr. Anderson bring him before the bar of the House. Upon Mr.
Anderson’s arrest, however, a debate erupted on the floor of the House as the motion for referral
to the Committee on Privileges to adopt procedures was considered. Several Members objected to
the House’s assertion of an inherent contempt power. They argued, as the minority Senators had
in Mr. Duane’s contempt, that neither the Constitution nor the general laws afforded the Congress ⁴⁷
such an inherent power to punish for actions that occurred elsewhere. Relying on the 1795
precedent and examples from the British Parliament and state legislatures, the Committee was
formed and it adopted a resolution requiring Mr. Anderson to be brought before the bar of the ⁴⁸
House for questioning by the Speaker. At his appearance, Mr. Anderson, like Mr. Randall and
Mr. Whitney before him, was afforded counsel and permitted to present the testimony of eleven
witnesses. Ultimately, Mr. Anderson was found in contempt of Congress and was ordered to be
reprimanded by the Speaker for the “outrage he committed” and discharged into the custody of ⁴⁹
the Sergeant-at-Arms.
Mr. Anderson subsequently filed suit against Mr. Thomas Dunn, the Sergeant-at-Arms of the
House, alleging assault, battery, and false imprisonment. Mr. Dunn responded by asserting that he

⁴⁰^U.^S^.^C^ONS^T^{. A}^r^{t. 1, §}^8,^c^l^.1^8.
⁴¹^J^e^f^f^e^r^s^on’^s^Ma^nua^l^,^sup^r^a^note³⁷^a^t^§²^98.
⁴²^S^{ee i}^d^.
⁴³^Se^e^Beck,^s^upr^a^note²¹^a^t¹^92.
⁴⁴^Id^.
⁴⁵^Ande^r^s^o^{n v}^.^D^uⁿⁿ^,^{19 U}^.^{S. (}⁶^W^h^e^a^t^.)²^{04 (}¹⁸²¹⁾^.
⁴⁶^S^{ee 2}^Hi^nd^s’^P^r^eced^en^t^,^sup^r^a^no^te^{22 a}^t^§¹⁶^06.^T^h^e^le^tte^{r of}^f^e^re^d^Re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^W^illiam^s^{$500 a}^s^“^p^a^r^{t pa}^y^f^o^r
^e^x^tr^a^tr^ouble^”^w^{ith r}^e^s^p^e^c^t^to^f^u^r^t^he^rⁱ^ng^the^c^l^aⁱ^m^s^of^Mr^{. A}^nde^r^s^{on w}^{ith r}^e^s^p^e^c^t^to^the^Rⁱ^v^e^r^R^a^is^in.^Id^.
⁴⁷^Id^.
⁴⁸^Id^.
⁴⁹^Id^.

was carrying out the lawful orders of the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court heard the
case in February of 1821 and concluded that the Congress possessed the inherent authority to ⁵⁰
punish for contempt and dismissed the charges against Mr. Dunn. The Court noted that while
the Constitution does not explicitly grant either House of Congress the authority to punish for
contempt, except in situations involving its own Members, such a power is necessary for
Congress to protect itself. The Court asserted that if the House of Representatives did not possess
the power of contempt it would “be exposed to every indignity and interruption, that rudeness, ⁵¹
caprice, or even conspiracy, may meditate against it.”
The Court’s decision in Anderson does not define the specific actions that would constitute
contempt; rather, it adopted a deferential posture, noting that
^{it is}^onl^yⁿ^eces^s^a^r^y^{to obs}^erv^e^th^{at t}^h^{ere is}ⁿ^o^t^h^ing^oⁿ^th^e^f^a^c^t^s^of^t^h^{e record f}^r^o^m^w^h^ic^h^it
^can^{appear on}^w^h^{at ev}^ideⁿ^{ce th}^e^w^a^rraⁿ^t^w^a^s^is^s^u^{ed an}^d^w^e^{do n}^o^{t p}^r^es^um^{e t}^h^{at th}^{e Hous}^e
^of^R^e^pres^eⁿ^t^a^tⁱ^v^e^s^w^o^u^l^d^h^a^{ve i}^s^su^{ed i}^t^wⁱ^t^h^ou^t^fu^l^l^y^e^s^t^a^blⁱ^s^hⁱ^ng^t^h^e^f^act^{s ch}^ar^g^e^{d on t}^h^e⁵²
ⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vⁱ^d^u^al.
The Anderson decision indicates that Congress’s contempt power is centered on those actions
committed in its presence that obstruct its deliberative proceedings. The Court noted that
Congress could supplement this power to punish for contempt committed in its presence by
enacting a statute, which would prohibit “all other insults which there is any necessity for ⁵³
providing.”
The Court in Anderson also endorsed the existing parliamentary practice that the contemnor could ⁵⁴
not be held beyond the end of the legislative session. According to the Court,
^[s^]in^{ce th}^{e ex}ⁱ^s^teⁿ^{ce of}^th^{e pow}^{er th}^{at i}^m^pris^ons^isⁱⁿ^dis^p^eⁿ^s^a^{ble to its}^con^tin^u^aⁿ^{ce, an}^d
^al^t^h^ough^t^h^{e l}^e^gⁱ^sl^atⁱ^v^{e po}^w^e^r^con^tⁱⁿ^u^e^s^perpet^u^a^l^,^t^h^{e l}^e^gⁱ^s^l^atⁱ^v^{e bod}^y^cea^s^e^s^t^o^e^xⁱ^s^t^,^on
^t^h^e^m^o^m^eⁿ^t^o^fⁱ^t^s^adj^o^u^r^nm^eⁿ^t^{or peri}^odi^cal^di^s^s^o^l^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^.^It^f^o^l^l^o^w^s^,^t^h^atⁱ^m^pri^s^onm^eⁿ^t^m^u^s^t⁵⁵
^ter^mⁱⁿ^ate^wⁱ^t^h^th^{at adj}^o^u^r^nm^eⁿ^t.
Since Anderson was decided there has been an unresolved question as to whether this rule would ⁵⁶
apply with equal force to a contempt by the Senate, since it is considered a “continuing body.”
The Senate, it appears, has only addressed this issue once, in 1871, regarding the contempt of two ⁵⁷
recalcitrant witnesses, Z.L. White and H.J. Ramsdell. During these contempt proceedings, the
Senate found itself near the end of a session and the question arose as to whether the Senate’s
acquiescence to the Anderson rule would provide adequate punishment. After vigorous debate,
the Senate instructed the Sergeant-at-Arms to release the prisoners immediately upon the final

⁵⁰^Ande^r^s^o^{n v}^.^D^uⁿⁿ^,^{19 U}^.^{S. (}⁶^W^h^e^a^t^.)²^{04 (}¹⁸²¹⁾^.
⁵¹^Id^.^a^t²²^8.
⁵²^Id^.^a^t²³^4.
⁵³^Id^.^a^t²²^8.
⁵⁴^Se^e²^Hiⁿ^d^s^’^P^r^eced^en^t^,^sup^r^a^no^te^{22 a}^t^§¹⁶^{04 (}ⁿ^o^ting^t^h^a^t^Mr^.^D^u^aⁿ^e^,^w^{ho ha}^{d be}^eⁿ^he^ldⁱⁿ^c^onte^m^{pt by}^the
^Se^na^te^{, w}^a^{s re}^le^a^s^e^d^f^r^o^m^c^u^stody^{on the}^la^{st da}^y^of^the^le^gⁱ^sla^tiv^e^se^ssion).
⁵⁵^Ande^r^s^oⁿ^,^{19 U}^.^{S. (}⁶^W^h^e^a^t^{.) a}^t²³¹^.
⁵⁶^Un^lⁱ^k^{e t}^h^{e Hou}^s^e,^w^h^o^s^{e en}^tⁱ^r^e^me^m^b^ershⁱ^p^st^an^d^s^f^o^{r el}^ectⁱ^oⁿ^e^v^er^y^t^w^o^y^ear^s,^oⁿ^l^y^oⁿ^e^-t^hⁱ^r^d^o^f^t^h^{e S}^eⁿ^a^t^eⁱ^s
^el^ect^ed^each^Coⁿ^g^ress.
⁵⁷^A^lle^{n B. More}^laⁿ^d^,^C^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^sⁱ^on^{al I}ⁿ^v^e^s^tig^ati^ons^an^{d Pr}^iv^a^t^e^Pe^r^s^ons^{, 40 S}^O^.^C^AL^.^L.^R^EV^{. 189,}¹⁹⁹^{, n}^.³¹⁽¹⁹⁶⁷⁾
^[h^ereiⁿ^a^f^t^{er M}^o^rel^aⁿ^d^]^.

adjournment of the Congress.⁵⁸ The House, however, has imprisoned a contemnor for a period
that extended beyond the adjournment of a Congress. Patrick Wood was sentenced by the House ⁵⁹
to a three-month term in jail for assaulting Representative Charles H. Porter. Although there is
no doubt that Mr. Woods’s period of incarceration extended beyond the date of adjournment, it
was not challenged and, therefore, there is no judicial opinion addressing the issue.
In 1876, the House established a select committee to investigate the collapse of Jay Cooke & ⁶⁰
Company, a real estate pool in which the United States had suffered losses as a creditor. The
committee was, by resolution, given the power to subpoena both persons and records pursuant to
its investigation. Acting under its authority, the committee issued a subpoena duces tecum to one
Hallet Kilbourn, the manager of the real estate pool. When Mr. Kilbourn refused to produce
certain papers or answer questions before the committee he was arrested and tried under the
House’s inherent contempt power. The House adjudged Mr. Kilbourn in contempt and ordered
him detained by the Sergeant-at-Arms until he purged himself of contempt by releasing the ⁶¹
requested documents and answering the committee’s questions.
Mr. Kilbourn filed a suit against the Speaker, the members of the committee, and the Sergeant-at-
Arms for false arrest. The lower court held in favor of the defendant dismissing the suit. Mr.
Kilbourn appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Congress did not have a general ⁶²
power to punish for contempt. While the Court appeared to recognize that Congress possessed
an inherent contempt power, it declined to follow Anderson v. Dunn’s expansive view of
Congress’s authority. Moreover, the Court rejected any reliance on the English and colonial
precedents establishing the source and extent of Congress’s contempt power. The Court stated
that
^[^w^{]e are of opin}ⁱ^{on t}^h^{at t}^h^{e ri}^gh^{t o}^f^t^h^{e Hous}^{e o}^f^R^e^pres^en^tatⁱ^v^e^s^{to pun}^is^h^t^h^{e c}^itizen^f^o^{r a}
^con^t^e^m^{pt o}^f^it^s^a^u^t^h^orit^y^or^{a breach}^of^its^pri^v^ile^g^e^s^ca^{n deriv}^eⁿ^o^su^{pport f}^r^o^m^t^h^e

⁵⁸^Id^.
⁵⁹^Se^e²^Hiⁿ^d^s^’^P^r^eced^en^t^s^,^sup^r^aⁿ^o^te²²^a^t^§^§¹⁶^28-⁶²^9.
⁶⁰^Se^e²^Hiⁿ^d^s^’^P^r^eced^en^t^s^,^sup^r^a^no^t^e²²^at^{§ 16}⁰⁹^.^It^sh^ou^l^d^al^so^b^eⁿ^o^t^e^d^t^h^at^t^h^e^S^p^{eaker al}^so^rep^o^r^t^e^d^M^r^.
^Ki^l^b^ou^rn^{’s con}^t^em^p^t^t^o^t^h^{e Di}^st^ri^ct^A^t^t^o^rn^e^y^f^o^{r t}^h^{e Di}^st^ri^ct^o^f^Co^l^u^m^bⁱ^a^p^u^r^su^an^t^t^o^t^h^e¹⁸⁵⁷^cri^mⁱⁿ^al^coⁿ^t^em^p^t
^st^at^u^t^e.^A^cco^rdⁱⁿ^{g t}^o^reco^r^d^s,^t^h^e^Di^st^ri^ct^A^t^t^o^rn^ey^p^r^esen^t^e^d^t^h^{e case t}^o^{a gran}^d^j^u^ry^an^d^recei^ved^anⁱⁿ^di^ct^m^eⁿ^t^f^o^r
^fⁱ^ve^c^ounts^of^c^onte^m^{pt. T}^h^e^Dⁱ^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^A^ttorⁿ^e^y^r^e^que^s^t^e^d^the^Mr^{. K}^ilbo^u^rⁿ^be^t^u^rⁿ^e^d^ov^e^r^to^his^c^u^s^t^ody^f^o^r^tr^ia^{l. T}^h^e
^Ho^u^s^e,^ho^w^e^ver,^a^f^t^e^{r co}ⁿ^sⁱ^d^erab^l^e^d^e^b^a^t^e^,^ado^p^t^{ed a reso}^l^u^tⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^st^ru^ctⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e S}^e^rgean^t^-^at^-A^r^m^{s n}^o^t^t^o^rel^{ease M}^r^.
^Kilbo^u^rn.^Se^e^{4 C}^ONG^.^R^EC^{. 2}⁴⁸³^-²⁵^00,²⁵¹³^-²⁵³^{2 (}^A^pr^{. 1}⁵^-¹^{6 1}⁸⁷⁶⁾^.^A^lthoug^h^the^S^upr^e^m^e^C^our^t^la^te^r^indⁱ^c^a^t^e^d^{, i}ⁿ
^t^h^{e case o}^f^In^{re Ch}^a^p^maⁿ^{, 1}⁶⁶^U^.^S.⁶⁶^1,⁶⁷^{2 (}¹⁸⁹⁷⁾^{, t}^h^a^t^t^h^e^d^o^u^b^l^e^je^opa^r^d^y^c^l^a^u^s^e^of^the^C^ons^tit^u^tion^w^ould^not
^pr^o^h^ibit^a^c^r^im^ina^l^pr^os^e^c^u^ti^on^of^a^w^itne^s^s^f^o^r^c^onte^m^{pt of}^C^ong^r^e^s^s^a^f^t^e^r^he^ha^d^be^eⁿ^tr^ie^d^a^t^the^ba^r^of^the^H^ous^e
^unde^r^theⁱ^nhe^r^e^nt^c^onte^m^{pt p}^o^w^e^r^,^s^ubs^e^q^ue^nt^de^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^ts^{in th}^e^inte^r^p^r^e^ta^tioⁿ^of^the^d^o^u^b^le^je^o^p^a^r^d^y^c^l^a^u^s^e
^su^ggest^t^h^at^t^hⁱ^s^asp^ect^o^f^t^h^e^C^h^apm^aⁿ^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^on^isⁿ^o^lo^ng^e^r^g^ood^la^w^.^Se^e^G^r^{afton v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^{, 20}^{6 U}^.^S.³³³
⁽¹⁹⁰⁷⁾^;^W^a^lle^{r v}^.^Fl^orid^a^,³⁹^{7 U}^.^{S. 3}⁸⁷⁽¹⁹⁷⁰⁾^;^Co^lu^mb^o^{v. New}^Y^o^rk^{, 4}^{05 U}^.^S.^{9 (}¹⁹⁷²⁾^{. H}^o^w^e^ve^r^,^{it a}^p^pe^a^r^s^tha^t
^w^h^e^r^e^the^s^a^nc^{tion im}^pos^e^d^p^u^r^s^u^a^{nt to}^theⁱ^nhe^r^e^nt^c^oⁿ^t^e^m^{pt pow}^er^is^inte^nde^d^to^be^p^u^r^e^ly^c^o^e^r^cⁱ^{ve a}^nd^not^p^unitⁱ^v^e^,
^a^s^ubs^e^queⁿ^t^c^r^im^ina^l^pr^os^e^c^u^ti^on^w^{ould be}^pe^r^m^is^sⁱ^ble^sⁱ^nc^e^the^d^oub^le^je^opa^r^d^y^c^l^a^u^s^e^ba^r^s^only^dua^{l c}^r^im^ina^l^th^st
^pr^os^e^c^u^ti^ons^.^Se^e^S.R^e^pt^{. N}^o^.⁹⁵^-¹⁷⁰^{, 9}⁵^Cong^.,¹^Se^ss.,⁸⁹⁽¹⁹⁷^{7) (sta}^ting^t^h^a^t^“^[^o^]^nc^e^a^c^o^m^m^itt^e^e^inv^e^stig^a^tion
^ha^{s te}^rm^ina^t^e^d^{, a}^c^r^im^ina^l^c^onte^m^{pt of}^Co^ng^re^{ss c}^ita^tion^un^de^{r 2 U.}^{S.C. §}¹^{92 m}ⁱ^g^h^{t still}^be^re^f^e^rre^{d to t}^h^e^Justic^e
^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt if}^the^C^ong^r^e^s^s^fⁱ^nds^this^a^p^pr^o^p^rⁱ^a^t^e^.^S^u^c^h^pr^os^e^c^u^ti^oⁿ^f^o^r^c^r^im^ina^l^c^onte^m^{pt w}^{ould pr}^e^s^eⁿ^{t no}^do^ub^le^th
^je^opa^r^d^y^pr^ob^le^m^.^”⁾^;^se^{e a}^l^so^H^e^a^r^ing^s^B^e^f^o^r^e^the^Se^na^te^C^o^m^m^itt^e^e^{on G}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nta^l^A^f^f^a^ir^s^{on S.}⁵⁵^5,⁹⁵^Co^ng^.,^st
¹^Se^s^s^{., 7}^98-⁸⁰^{0 (}¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^.
⁶¹^Se^e²^Hiⁿ^d^s^’^P^r^eced^en^t^s^,^sup^r^a^no^t^e²²^at^{§ 16}⁰⁹^.
⁶²^K^ilb^ourⁿ^v^.^T^hom^ps^on^,¹^{03 U}^.^S.¹⁶⁸^{, 1}⁸⁹^-⁹⁰⁽¹⁸⁸¹⁾^.

^preceden^ts^an^{d practices}^of^th^{e t}^w^{o Hous}^es^of^t^h^{e En}^glis^h^P^a^rlia^m^eⁿ^t^{, n}^o^r^f^r^om^t^h^e^a^d^ju^d^g^e^d
^c^a^s^e^sⁱⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^{h t}^h^e^Eⁿ^glⁱ^s^{h c}^o^ur^t^s^ha^ve^up^he^l^d^t^h^e^s^e^p^r^a^c^tⁱ^c^e^s^.^N^o^r^,^t^a^ki^ng^w^h^a^t^ha^s^fa^l^l^eⁿ
^f^r^o^m^t^h^{e Eng}^lis^h^j^u^dg^es^{, a}ⁿ^{d es}^peciall^y^t^h^{e later cas}^es^on^w^hⁱ^c^h^w^e^h^a^v^e^j^u^s^t^co^m^m^eⁿ^t^{ed, is}
^m^u^c^h^aid^gⁱ^v^eⁿ^to^th^{e d}^o^c^trⁱⁿ^e,^th^{at th}ⁱ^s^p^o^w^e^r^ex^is^{ts as o}ⁿ^{e n}^e^cessar^y^t^o^eⁿ^a^b^l^e^eⁱ^t^h^e^r^H^o^u^s^e⁶³
^of^C^ong^res^s^{to e}^x^ercis^e^s^u^cces^s^f^u^l^l^y^th^eⁱ^{r fu}ⁿ^c^tⁱ^on^of^le^gⁱ^s^l^at^ion^.
The Court held that the investigation into the real estate pool was not undertaken by the
committee pursuant to one of Congress’s constitutional responsibilities, but rather was an attempt
to pry into the personal finances of private individuals, a subject that could not conceivably result
in the enactment of valid legislation. According to the Court, because Congress was acting
beyond its constitutional responsibilities, Mr. Kilbourn was not legally required to answer the
questions asked of him. In short, the Court held that
ⁿ^o^pers^on^caⁿ^{be pun}ⁱ^s^h^e^d^{for con}^t^um^ac^y^as^a^wⁱ^tⁿ^es^s^b^e^f^o^{re eith}^er^Hou^s^e,^un^les^s^hⁱ^s
^testi^m^oⁿ^yⁱ^s^r^e^q^uⁱ^r^e^dⁱⁿ^a^m^a^tt^erⁱⁿ^to^w^h^ic^h^th^a^t^Ho^u^s^e^h^a^{s j}^u^rⁱ^sd^ictioⁿ^toⁱⁿ^q^uⁱ^r^e^{, an}^d^w^e
^f^eel^equ^a^l^l^y^su^{re t}^h^atⁿ^eⁱ^t^h^e^{r of t}^h^e^s^{e bodi}^es^pos^s^e^ss^es^t^h^e^g^e^neral^po^w^e^{r of}^m^a^kⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^q^uⁱ^r^y⁶⁴
ⁱⁿ^to^th^{e p}^r^iv^a^t^{e af}^f^a^ir^{s o}^f^t^h^{e c}^itizen^.
In addition, the Court indicated that the investigation violated the doctrine of separation of
powers because judicial bankruptcy proceedings were pending relating to the collapse of the real
estate pool and, therefore, it might be improper for Congress to conduct an investigation that ⁶⁵
could interfere with the judicial proceedings. The Court specifically challenged Congress’s
assertion that there were no other viable remedies available to the government to retrieve the lost ⁶⁶
funds. Thus, the Court concluded that
^th^{e r}^e^so^lu^tioⁿ^o^f^th^{e Ho}^u^s^{e o}^f^Rep^r^esen^tatⁱ^v^e^{s au}^t^h^o^r^izin^g^th^{e in}^v^e^sti^g^atioⁿ^w^a^{s i}ⁿ^e^x^c^e^s^s^o^f
^t^h^{e po}^w^e^{r conf}^{erred on}^t^h^at^bo^dy^b^y^t^h^e^C^ons^tⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^on;^t^h^at^t^h^e^com^mⁱ^t^t^{ee, t}^h^ere^f^{ore, h}^a^{d n}^o
^la^w^f^u^l^au^t^h^o^r^it^y^to^r^e^q^u^ir^{e Kil}^b^o^u^rⁿ^to^testif^y^a^s^a^wⁱ^tn^e^{ss b}^e^y^oⁿ^d^w^h^at^h^e^v^o^luⁿ^t^ar^il^y^c^h^o^s^e
^to^{tell; th}^{at t}^h^{e o}^r^d^e^r^s^an^d^r^e^s^o^lu^tioⁿ^s^o^f^t^h^{e Ho}^u^s^{e, an}^d^th^e^w^a^r^r^aⁿ^t^o^f^th^e^sp^eak^er^{, u}ⁿ^d^e^r
^w^h^ic^h^Ki^lb^o^u^rⁿ^w^a^{s i}^m^p^r^isoⁿ^ed^{, ar}^{e, in}^li^k^e^m^aⁿⁿ^e^r^,^v^o^id^f^o^r^w^aⁿ^t^o^f^j^u^rⁱ^sd^ictioⁿⁱⁿ^t^h^at⁶⁷
^body^{, an}^{d t}^h^at^hⁱ^sⁱ^m^pri^s^oⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^w^a^s^wⁱ^t^h^o^u^t^any^l^a^w^f^ul^au^t^h^ori^t^y^.
Finally, in dicta, the Court indicated that the contempt power might be upheld where Congress
was acting pursuant to certain specific constitutional prerogatives, such as disciplining its
Members, judging their elections, or conducting impeachment proceedings.
Although the precedential value of Kilbourn has been significantly limited by subsequent case
law, the case continues to be cited for the proposition that the House has no power to probe into
private affairs, such as the personal finances of an individual, on which legislation could not be
enacted. The doubts raised by Kilbourn about the scope of Congress’s contempt power have
essentially been removed by later cases sanctioning the use of the power in investigations ⁶⁸
conducted pursuant to Congress’s authority to discipline its Members, to judge the elections of

⁶³^Id^.^a^t¹⁸^9.
⁶⁴^Id^.
⁶⁵²⁷^{3 U}^.^S^.¹³⁵⁽¹⁹²⁷⁾^.
⁶⁶^Id^.^a^t¹⁹^{4 (}^que^s^tioⁿⁱ^ng^“^[^h^]^ow^c^ould^the^H^o^us^e^of^R^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^k^now^{, until}^it^ha^d^be^eⁿ^f^a^ir^l^y^tr^ie^{d, t}^h^a^t^the^c^our^ts
^w^e^r^e^pow^e^r^le^{ss to re}^dre^{ss the}^c^r^e^d^itors^of^Ja^y^Cook^e^&^Co.?^T^h^e^m^a^tte^{r wa}^{s still pe}^ndi^ng^{in a}^c^ourt^,^a^{nd w}^h^a^t^rig^h^t^ha^d
^the^Co^ng^re^{ss of}^the^Unite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^{to i}ⁿ^te^rf^e^r^e^w^{ith a}^{suit pe}^ndi^ngⁱⁿ^a^c^ourt^of^c^o^m^p^e^t^eⁿ^{t jurisdic}^ti^on?^”⁾^.
⁶⁷^Id^.^a^t¹⁹^6.
⁶⁸^In^{Re C}^h^a^p^maⁿ^{, 1}⁶⁶^U^.^S.⁶^{61 (}¹⁸⁹⁷⁾^.

its Members,⁶⁹ and, most importantly, to probe the business and conduct of individuals to the ⁷⁰
extent that the matters are subject to congressional regulation. For example, in McGrain v.
Daugherty, which involved a Senate investigation into the claimed failure of the Attorney General
to prosecute certain antitrust violations, a subpoena was issued to the brother of the Attorney
General, Mallie Daugherty, the president of an Ohio bank. When Daugherty refused to comply,
the Senate exercised its inherent contempt power and ordered its Sergeant-at-Arms to take him
into custody. The grant of a writ of habeas corpus was appealed to the Supreme Court. The
Court’s opinion in the case considered the investigatory and contempt powers of Congress to be ⁷¹
implicit in the grant of legislative power. The Court distinguished Kilbourn, which was an
investigation into purely personal affairs, from the instant case, which was a probe of the
operation of the Department of Justice. According to the Court, the subject was plainly “one on
which legislation could be had and would be materially aided by information the investigation ⁷²
was calculated to elicit.” The Court in McGrain was willing to presume that the investigation ⁷³
had been undertaken to assist the committee in its legislative efforts.
Congress’s inherent contempt power is not specifically granted by the Constitution, but is
considered necessary to investigate and legislate effectively. The validity of the inherent contempt
power was upheld in the early Supreme Court decision in Anderson v. Dunn and reiterated in
McGrain v. Daugherty. Under the inherent contempt power the individual is brought before the
House or Senate by the Sergeant-at-Arms, tried at the bar of the body, and can be imprisoned in ⁷⁴
the Capitol jail. The purpose of the imprisonment or other sanction may be either punitive or ⁷⁵
coercive. Thus, the witness can be imprisoned for a specified period of time as punishment, or
for an indefinite period (but not, at least by the House, beyond the end of a session of the
Congress) until he agrees to comply. One commentator has concluded that the procedure followed
by the House in the contempt citation that was at issue in Anderson v. Dunn is typical of that
employed in the inherent contempt cases.
^T^h^{ese tr}^ad^itioⁿ^a^l^m^e^th^o^d^s^m^a^y^b^e^ex^p^l^ain^e^d^b^y^u^sⁱⁿ^g^{as an}^ill^u^s^tr^atioⁿ^Ander^s^{on v. D}^uⁿⁿ^.^...
^In^{1818, a Mem}^b^{er of}^t^h^{e H}^ous^{e of}^R^e^pres^eⁿ^t^a^tⁱ^v^e^s^acc^u^s^ed^Aⁿ^ders^on^{, a n}^oⁿ^-^Me^m^b^{er, of}
^t^r^yⁱ^ng^t^o^bri^b^{e h}ⁱ^m^.^{... T}^h^{e Hou}^s^{e adopt}^{ed a res}^o^l^u^tⁱ^{on pu}^rsu^aⁿ^t^t^o^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^{e S}^p^ea^k^e^r
^ordere^{d t}^h^{e S}^e^rg^ean^t^-^at^-A^r^m^s^t^o^arres^t^Aⁿ^ders^on^an^{d bri}ⁿ^g^hⁱ^m^be^f^o^{re t}^h^{e bar of}^t^h^{e H}^o^u^s^e
^{(to an}^s^w^{er t}^h^{e ch}^arg^e^{). W}^h^en^An^ders^on^{appeared, th}^{e Speak}^{er in}^f^o^r^m^{ed h}ⁱ^m^w^h^y^h^e^h^a^d
^b^e^eⁿ^b^r^o^ught^b^e^fo^r^e^t^h^e^H^o^u^s^e^aⁿ^d^a^s^ke^dⁱ^f^he^ha^d^aⁿ^y^r^e^q^u^e^s^t^s^fo^r^a^ssi^st^aⁿ^c^eⁱⁿ^aⁿ^s^w^e^rⁱⁿ^g
^th^{e ch}^ar^g^e^.^Aⁿ^ders^on^s^t^{ated h}ⁱ^s^requ^es^ts^{, a}ⁿ^{d th}^{e Hous}^{e g}^r^aⁿ^{ted h}ⁱ^m^co^uⁿ^s^e^{l, co}^m^p^u^l^s^o^r^y
^proces^s^f^o^{r def}^e^ns^e^wⁱ^tⁿ^e^s^s^e^{s, an}^{d a copy}^{, o}^f^t^h^{e acc}^u^s^at^or^y^l^e^t^t^e^r.^Aⁿ^ders^on^cal^l^e^d^hⁱ^s

⁶⁹^Bar^r^y^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^e^x^r^e^{l C}^uⁿⁿⁱⁿ^gh^am^,²⁷^{9 U.}^S^.⁵⁹⁷⁽¹⁹²⁹⁾^.
⁷⁰^M^c^G^r^{ain v}^.^D^a^ug^he^r^y^{, 27}^{3 U}^.^S^.¹³⁵⁽¹⁹²⁷⁾^.
⁷¹^Id^.
⁷²^Id^.^a^t¹⁷^7.
⁷³^Id^.^a^t¹⁷^7-¹⁷⁸^;^{see a}^l^so^{ICC v. B}^r^imsoⁿ^,¹⁵^{4 U}^.^S.⁴^{47 (}¹⁸⁹⁴⁾^{. I}^t^h^a^s^be^eⁿ^s^a^{id t}^h^a^t^McGraⁱⁿ^“ver^y^cl^earl^y^re^m^o^v^e^d
^the^d^o^u^b^t^[^t^ha^{t ha}^{d e}^x^iste^{d a}^f^te^r^K^ilbo^u^rⁿ^v^.^Th^om^ps^oⁿ^]^a^s^t^o^w^h^e^t^h^e^r^C^ong^r^e^s^s^c^ould^f^o^r^c^e^te^s^tim^ony^{in a}ⁱ^{d of}
^le^gⁱ^sla^tion.”^M^o^re^la^nd,^s^upr^aⁿ^o^t^e^{57, a}^t²^22.^A^lthoug^h^McGraⁱⁿ^a^nd^Sinc^l^a^ir^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 2}⁷⁹^U^.^{S. 2}⁶³⁽¹⁹²⁹⁾^,
^inv^o^lv^e^dⁱⁿ^qu^ire^s^int^o^t^h^e^a^c^tiv^itie^s^of^priv^a^t^e^indivⁱ^d^u^a^l^s^,^the^r^e^w^a^s^a^c^onne^c^tio^{n t}^o^pro^p^e^r^ty^ow^ne^{d by}^the^Uⁿ^ite^d
^S^t^at^{es an}^d^,^t^h^eref^o^r^e,ⁱ^t^co^ul^dⁿ^o^t^b^e^sai^d^t^h^at^pu^rel^y^p^e^rsoⁿ^a^l^aff^aⁱ^r^{s w}^e^r^e^t^h^{e su}^b^j^ect^{s o}^f^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^vestⁱ^g^atⁱ^oⁿ^s^.
⁷⁴^Ju^rn^{ey v.}^Ma^cCra^cken^{, 2}^{94 U}^.^S.¹²⁵^{, 1}⁴⁷⁽¹⁹³⁵⁾^.
⁷⁵^M^c^G^r^{ain v}^.^D^a^ug^he^r^t^y^{, 27}^{3 U}^.^S.^a^t¹⁶^1.

^wⁱ^tⁿ^e^s^s^e^s;^t^h^{e H}^ous^{e h}^{eard and qu}^es^tⁱ^oⁿ^e^{d t}^h^e^m^aⁿ^{d h}ⁱ^m^.^It^t^h^en^pas^s^e^{d a res}^o^l^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^fⁱⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g
^hⁱ^m^g^uⁱ^l^t^y^of^cont^e^m^pt^aⁿ^{d di}^rectⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^e^S^p^eak^{er t}^o^repri^m^aⁿ^{d h}ⁱ^m^aⁿ^{d t}^h^{en t}^o^di^s^c^h^a^rg^e
^hⁱ^m^f^r^o^m^c^u^s^t^od^y^.^T^h^{e patter}ⁿ^w^a^s^th^ereb^y^es^tabli^s^h^e^{d o}^f^a^ttachm^e^{nt b}^y^t^h^e^Serg^eaⁿ^t^-^a^t^-
^A^r^m^s^{; appearan}^{ce bef}^o^{re th}^{e bar; prov}^is^ion^f^o^{r s}^p^ecifⁱ^catioⁿ^of^ch^arg^e^s^,^iden^ti^fⁱ^c^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^th^e
^accu^{ser, co}^m^p^u^l^so^r^y^p^r^o^cess,^co^uⁿ^s^e^l^{, a}ⁿ^d^a^h^earin^g^;^d^e^ter^mⁱⁿ^atioⁿ^o^f^g^uⁱ^{lt; i}^m^p^o^s^it^ioⁿ^o^f⁷⁶
^pen^a^l^t^y^.
When a witness is cited for contempt under the inherent contempt process, prompt judicial review ⁷⁷
appears to be available by means of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In such a habeas
proceeding, the issues decided by the court might be limited to (a) whether the House or Senate ⁷⁸
acted in a manner within its jurisdiction, and (b) whether the contempt proceedings complied ⁷⁹
with minimum due process standards. While Congress would not have to afford a contemnor the
whole panoply of procedural rights available to a defendant in criminal proceedings, notice and ⁸⁰
an opportunity to be heard would have to be granted. Also, some of the requirements imposed
by the courts under the statutory criminal contempt procedure (e.g., pertinency of the question
asked to the committee’s investigation) might be mandated by the due process clause in the case ⁸¹
of inherent contempt proceedings.
Although many of the inherent contempt precedents have involved incarceration of the
contemnor, there may be an argument for the imposition of monetary fines as an alternative. Such
a fine would potentially have the advantage of avoiding a court proceeding on habeas corpus
grounds, as the contemnor would never be jailed or detained. Drawing on the analogous authority ⁸²
that courts have to inherently impose fines for contemptuous behavior, it appears possible to
argue that Congress, in its exercise of a similar inherent function could impose fines as opposed
to incarceration. Additional support for this argument appears to be contained in dicta from the
1821 Supreme Court decision in Anderson v. Dunn. The Court questioned the “extent of the
punishing power which the deliberative assemblies of the Union may assume and exercise on the
principle of self preservation” and responded with the following:
^An^alogy^{, an}^{d th}^eⁿ^a^tu^{re of}^t^h^{e cas}^{e, f}^u^rⁿ^is^h^th^{e a}ⁿ^s^w^er–’th^e^le^a^s^t^p^o^s^sⁱ^b^l^e^p^o^w^e^r^a^d^e^q^u^a^t^e^t^o
^t^h^{e e}ⁿ^{d propos}^ed;^’^w^hⁱ^c^hⁱ^s^t^h^{e po}^w^e^{r of}ⁱ^m^pri^s^onm^eⁿ^t^.^It^ma^y^,^at^fⁱ^rs^t^vⁱ^e^w^{, a}ⁿ^d^f^r^o^m^t^h^e
^hⁱ^s^t^or^y^of^t^h^{e pract}ⁱ^{ce of}^o^u^{r l}^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^tⁱ^v^{e bodi}^es^{, be t}^h^oug^h^t^to^exten^d^to^o^t^h^e^{r in}^flictioⁿ^s^{. Bu}^t
^ev^er^y^o^t^h^e^r^w^{ill b}^e^f^o^uⁿ^d^to^b^e^m^e^r^e^co^m^m^u^tatⁱ^oⁿ^f^o^r^coⁿ^fⁱⁿ^e^m^en^{t; s}ⁱⁿ^c^e^c^o^m^mⁱ^tm^eⁿ^t^a^l^oⁿ^e⁸³
^is^th^{e alter}ⁿ^ati^v^e^w^h^{ere t}^h^{e indiv}ⁱ^du^{al prov}^es^con^t^um^acious^.

⁷⁶^T^hom^a^s^L^.^Shrⁱ^ne^r^,^J^r^.^,^Le^gis^l^ati^v^e^C^onte^m^pt^an^{d D}^u^e^Pr^oc^e^s^s^:^The^G^r^oppi^Ca^s^e^s^{, 4}⁶^I^ND^.^L.^J^.⁴⁸^{0, 4}⁹¹⁽¹⁹⁷¹⁾
^[h^ereiⁿ^a^f^t^{er S}^h^riⁿ^e^r^]^.
⁷⁷^Se^e^M^a^r^s^hall^v^.^G^o^r^d^on^{, 2}⁴³^U^.^S^.⁵²^{1 (}¹⁹¹⁷⁾^;^s^e^e^als^o^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^at^e^s^v^.^For^t^,⁴⁴^{3 F.}^2d⁶^70,⁶^{76 (}^D^.^C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁰⁾^;
^T^h^e^odor^e^Sk^y^,^Ju^dⁱ^ci^a^l^R^evi^{ew of}^Co^ng^ressi^oⁿ^a^l^In^vestⁱ^g^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^{: Is}^T^h^{ere a}ⁿ^A^l^t^e^rna^tⁱ^{ve t}^o^C^o^nt^emp^t^{, 31G}^EO^.^W^AS^H^.^L.
^R^EV^{. 399,}⁴^00,^n.^{3 (}¹⁹⁶²⁾^[^h^e^r^eⁱⁿ^a^f^t^e^r^Sky^]^.
⁷⁸^Ju^rn^{ey v.}^Ma^cCra^cken^{, 2}^{94 U}^.^S.¹²⁵^{, 1}⁴⁷⁽¹⁹³⁵⁾^;^s^e^e^als^o^Kⁱ^l^b^o^u^rⁿ^v^.^T^hom^ps^on^,¹⁰^{3 U.}^S^.¹⁶⁸^,¹^{96 (}¹⁸⁸⁰⁾^;^Ex
^Par^t^e^N^u^ge^nt^{, 18}^{F. 47}¹⁽^D^.D^.C^{. 184}⁸⁾^.
⁷⁹^Gropp^{i v}^.^Le^slie^,⁴⁰^{4 U}^.^S^.⁴⁹⁶⁽¹⁹⁷²⁾^.
⁸⁰^Id^.
⁸¹^For^a^dis^c^us^sⁱ^oⁿ^of^the^s^e^s^t^a^t^ut^or^y^li^m^ita^tions^on^the^c^o^nte^m^{pt po}^w^e^r^se^e^infra^at^no^t^e^{s 27}⁹^-³⁵¹^and^acco^m^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g
^te^x^t^.
⁸²^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^Unⁱ^t^ed^St^a^t^{es v.}^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^Miⁿ^e^Wo^rkers^{, 330 U}^.^S.²⁵^{8 (}¹⁹⁴⁷⁾⁽^u^ph^oldⁱ^ng^a^$⁷⁰⁰^,⁰⁰⁰^fⁱ^ne^a^g^ains^{t a}^la^b^o^r
^uni^{on a}^s^pu^nis^h^m^e^{nt f}^o^r^dis^o^be^di^eⁿ^c^e^of^a^pr^e^lim^ina^r^y^injunc^tioⁿ^p^r^e^v^eⁿ^ting^{it f}^r^om^c^ontinui^ng^a^w^o^r^k^e^r^s^t^rⁱ^k^e^a^nd
^a^pprov^ing^t^h^e^im^positioⁿ^of^a^$2.^{8 m}^{illion f}ⁱ^ne^if^the^uⁿⁱ^on^di^{d n}^o^t^e^{nd t}^h^e^strik^e^w^{ithin f}ⁱ^v^e^da^y^s^).
⁸³^Ande^r^s^o^{n v}^.^D^uⁿⁿ^,^{19 U}^.^{S. (}⁶^W^h^e^a^t^.)²^04,²^30-^{31 (}¹⁸²¹⁾⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d)^.

Finally, in Kilbourn v. Thompson, the Court suggested that in certain cases where the Congress
had authority to investigate, it may compel testimony in the same manner and by use of the same
means as a court of justice in like cases. Specifically, the Court noted that “[w]hether the power
of punishment in either House by fine or imprisonment goes beyond this or not, we are sure that
no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his testimony ⁸⁴
is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire ....” While the language
of these cases and the analogous power possessed by courts seem to suggest the possibility of
levying a fine as punishment for contempt of Congress, we are aware of, and could not locate,
any precedent for Congress imposing a fine in the contempt or any other context.
In comparison with the other types of contempt proceedings, inherent contempt has the
distinction of not requiring the cooperation or assistance of either the executive or judicial
branches. The House or Senate can, on its own, conduct summary proceedings and cite the
offender for contempt. Furthermore, although the contemnor can seek judicial review by means
of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the scope of such review may be relatively limited,
compared to the plenary review accorded by the courts in cases of conviction under the criminal
contempt statute.
There are also certain limitations on the inherent contempt process. Although the contemnor can
be incarcerated until he agrees to comply with the subpoena, imprisonment may not extend ⁸⁵
beyond the end of the current session of Congress. Moreover, inherent contempt has been
described as “unseemly,” cumbersome, time-consuming, and relatively ineffective, especially for
a modern Congress with a heavy legislative workload that would be interrupted by a trial at the ⁸⁶
bar. Because of these drawbacks, the inherent contempt process has not been used by either ⁸⁷
body since 1935. Proceedings under the inherent contempt power might be facilitated, however,
if the initial fact-finding and examination of witnesses were to be held before a special
committee–which could be directed to submit findings and recommendations to the full body–
with only the final decision as to guilt being made by the full House or Senate. Although
generally the proceedings in inherent contempt cases appear to have been conducted at the bar of ⁸⁸
the House of Congress involved, in at least a few instances proceedings were conducted initially
or primarily before a committee, but with the final decision as to whether to hold the person in ⁸⁹
contempt being made by the full body.

⁸⁴^K^ilb^ourⁿ^v^.^T^hom^ps^on^,¹^{03 U}^.^S.¹⁶⁸^{, 1}⁹⁰⁽¹⁸⁸¹⁾⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d⁾^.
⁸⁵^W^a^tk^{ins v}^.^Un^ite^d^St^at^es,³⁵⁴^U.S^.¹⁷^8,²⁰^7,^n.⁴⁵⁽¹⁹⁵⁷⁾^;^A^nde^r^s^o^{n v}^.^D^uⁿⁿ^{, 1}⁹^U^.^S^.⁽⁶^W^h^e^a^t^{.) 20}^{4, 2}³¹⁽¹⁸²^1).
⁸⁶^Se^e^S.R^e^pt^{. N}^o^.⁹⁵^-¹^70,⁹⁵^th^Con^g^{., 1}^st^S^e^ss.^,⁹⁷⁽¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^;^{see a}^l^so^R^e^{x E}^.^L^ee,^E^xecu^tⁱ^{ve P}^rⁱ^vⁱ^l^e^g^e^,^C^ongr^e^s^sⁱ^o^nal
^Sub^poe^na^Pow^e^r^,^an^{d J}^u^dicⁱ^al^Re^vⁱ^e^w^:^Thr^e^e^Br^anc^he^s^,^Thr^e^e^Pow^e^r^s^,^and^S^o^m^e^Re^lati^ons^hips^,¹⁹⁷⁸^B.^Y.^U.^L.^R^EV^.
²³¹^{, 2}⁵⁵^n.⁷¹⁽¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^[^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^L^e^e^]^.
⁸⁷^{4 D}^ESC^H^LER^’^S^P^RE^CE^DE^N^T^S^O^F^THE^U.^S^.^H^OUS^E^O^F^R^EP^RES^E^N^T^A^T^I^V^ES^{, c}^h^{. 1}⁵^,^{§ 1}⁷^,¹³⁹^n.7⁽¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^[^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r
^Desch^l^{er’s P}^r^eced^en^t^s^]^;^{see a}^l^s^o^L^ee,^s^upr^a^no^te⁸⁶^{, a}^t²⁵^5.
⁸⁸^Se^e^Beck,^s^upr^a^note²¹^{, a}^t⁴^;^E^NE^R^S^T^J.^E^BER^L^I^N^G^{, C}^ONGR^E^S^S^I^ON^A^L^I^N^V^ES^TI^G^A^TI^O^N^S^{289 (}¹⁹²⁸⁾^[^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r
^Ebe^r^ling^]^.
⁸⁹^{For e}^x^a^m^ple^,^{in 1}⁸⁶⁵^{, t}^h^e^H^o^us^e^a^ppoi^nte^d^a^s^e^le^c^t^c^o^m^m^itte^e^{to i}^nqu^iry^{into a}ⁿ^a^lle^g^e^d^br^each^o^f^pri^vⁱ^l^e^ge
^c^o^m^m^itte^{d b}^y^{Mr. A}^.^P^.^Fie^l^{d f}^o^r^a^ssa^ulting^a^Me^m^b^e^r^of^the^House^.⁷²^C^ONG^.^G^LO^B^E^{, 38}^th^C^ong^.,²^d^Se^s^s^.,³⁷^{1 (}¹⁸⁶⁵⁾^.
^A^f^te^r^takⁱ^ng^te^s^tⁱ^m^ony^{, the}^c^o^m^m^itte^e^r^e^c^o^m^m^e^nde^{d, a}ⁿ^{d the}^H^ous^e^a^dopte^d^{, a}^r^e^s^o^l^u^tioⁿ^dir^e^c^ting^t^h^e^Spe^a^k^e^r^to
^r^e^pr^im^a^{nd Fie}^l^{d a}^t^t^h^e^ba^r^of^the^H^ous^e^.^Id^.^at⁹⁷^1,⁹⁷^4.

As has been indicated, although the majority of the inherent contempts by both the House and the
Senate was conducted via trial at the bar of the full body, there is historical evidence to support
the notion that this is not the exclusive procedure by which such proceeding can occur. This
history, when combined with a 1993 Supreme Court decision addressing the power of Congress ⁹⁰
to make its own rules for the conduct of impeachment trials, strongly suggests that the inherent
contempt process can be supported and facilitated by the conduct of evidentiary proceedings and
the development of recommendations at the committee level.
Actually, the consideration of the use of committees to develop the more intricate details of an
inquiry into charges of contempt of Congress date back to the very first inherent contempt
proceedings of Messrs. Randall and Whitney in 1795. As discussed above, in these cases the
House appointed a Committee on Privileges to report a mode of procedure. The Committee
reported the following resolution, which was adopted by the full House of Representatives:
^Res^o^lved^{, T}^h^{at th}^{e said}^Ro^b^e^r^t^Ran^d^{all a}ⁿ^d^C^h^ar^{les W}^h^itⁿ^e^y^b^e^b^r^o^u^g^h^{t to}^th^{e b}^a^r^o^f^t^h^e
^H^o^use^aⁿ^dⁱⁿ^t^e^r^o^ga^t^e^d^b^y^t^h^e^Sp^e^a^k^e^r^t^o^uc^hⁱⁿ^g^t^h^eⁱⁿ^fo^r^m^a^tⁱ^o^{n gi}^ve^{n a}^g^aⁱⁿ^s^t^t^h^e^m^,^oⁿ
^w^r^itteⁿⁱⁿ^ter^r^o^g^a^to^rⁱ^es,^w^h^ich^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e an}^s^w^er^{s t}^h^er^eto^sh^al^{l b}^e^en^ter^e^dⁱⁿ^to^th^e^mⁱⁿ^u^te^{s o}^f
^t^h^{e H}^o^u^s^e.^Aⁿ^{d t}^h^at^ev^er^y^ques^tⁱ^oⁿ^propos^{ed by}^{a Me}^m^b^{er be re}^du^{ced t}^o^w^rⁱ^tⁱ^ng^an^{d a}
^m^o^tion^m^a^{de th}^{at t}^h^{e s}^a^m^e^{be pu}^{t by}^t^h^{e Spea}^k^e^{r. T}^h^at,^af^{ter s}^u^chⁱⁿ^terrog^atories^are
^an^s^w^ered,ⁱ^f^t^h^{e H}^ous^{e deem}ⁱ^t^neces^s^a^r^y^t^o^m^a^{ke any f}^u^r^t^herⁱ^nqui^r^y^{on t}^h^{e s}^ubj^ect^{, t}^h^e⁹¹
^s^a^m^e^{be cond}^uct^e^{d by}^{a com}^mⁱ^t^t^{ee t}^o^{be ap}^poi^nt^{ed f}^o^r^t^hat^p^u^r^pos^e^.
According to the Annals of Congress, the Committee’s language sparked a debate concerning the
proper procedures to be used, including a discussion regarding whether the use of such a select ⁹²
committee was proper. At least one Representative “was convinced that the select committee ⁹³
was alone competent to taking and arranging the evidence for the decision of the House.” While
others noted that “the investigation of facts is constantly performed by select committees. ... [The ⁹⁴
committee’s] report is not to be final, it is to be submitted to the House for final decision.” It
was recommended that, “the subject should be remanded to a committee, which would save a ⁹⁵
good deal of time.” Other Members, however, objected to the use of a select committee to hear
evidence of this magnitude on the grounds that it would be:
^hⁱ^gh^l^yⁱ^m^{proper f}^o^{r th}^e^wⁱ^tⁿ^e^s^s^{to be s}^w^orn^b^y^{a s}^e^lec^t^comm^{ittee, an}^{d t}^h^{at co}^m^m^{ittee t}^o
^s^eⁿ^d^f^o^{r th}^e^Me^m^b^er^s^aⁿ^{d h}^a^v^e^t^h^e^m^s^w^orⁿ^aⁿ^{d ex}^a^mⁱⁿ^edⁱⁿ^t^h^at^priv^ate^w^a^y^.^Ho^w^e^v^e^r
^trou^bles^o^m^{e an}^{d diff}^ic^u^{lt, t}^h^{e Hou}^s^e^m^u^s^t^m^{eet all t}^h^{e qu}^es^tⁱ^on^s^an^{d decide th}^e^m^on^t^hⁱ^s⁹⁶
^f^l^oor.
Ultimately, it appears that none of the proceedings in this case was conducted before a select
committee. That said, Congress’s interpretation of its own powers and prerogatives is significant.
It is clear that during the very first exercise of Congress’s power of inherent contempt, the House

⁹⁰^S^{ee Un}ⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^a^t^{es v.}^Ni^xon^{, 50}^{6 U}^.^S.²²⁴⁽¹⁹⁹²⁾^.
⁹¹^Se^e²^Hiⁿ^d^s^’^P^r^eced^en^t^,^sup^r^a^no^te^{22 a}^t^§¹⁵^{99 (}^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d⁾^.
⁹²^Se^e^{5 A}^NNAL^S^O^F^C^ON^G^{. 188}⁽¹⁷⁹²⁾^.
⁹³^S^{ee i}^d^.⁽^s^ta^te^m^e^{nt of}^R^e^{p. B}^a^ldwⁱⁿ⁾^.
⁹⁴^Id^.^a^t¹⁸^{9 (}^s^ta^te^m^e^{nt of}^R^e^{p. W}^.^Sm^ith)^.
⁹⁵^Id^.^a^t¹⁹^{0 (}^s^ta^te^m^e^{nt of}^R^e^{p. W}^.^Sm^ith)^.
⁹⁶^Id^.^a^t¹⁸^{8 (}^s^ta^te^m^e^{nt of}^R^e^{p. H}^ill^hous^e⁾^.

allowed for the possibility that at least some of the proceedings could occur before a committee,
rather than at the bar of the House.
This early precedent was finally invoked in 1836, when after the assault of reporter Robert Codd
by reporter Henry Wheeler on the House floor, the House committed the examination of a
contempt and breach of privilege to a select committee. The House adopted the following
resolution empowering the committee to conduct a contempt investigation:
^Res^o^lved^,^T^h^at^{a s}^e^l^ect^com^mⁱ^t^t^{ee be f}^o^rt^hwⁱ^t^h^appoiⁿ^t^ed,^w^hos^{e du}^t^yⁱ^t^s^h^a^l^l^b^e^f^o^r^t^h^wⁱ^t^h^t^o
ⁱⁿ^q^u^ir^yⁱⁿ^to^aⁿ^a^ssa^u^{lt co}^m^m^itted^wⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^t^h^{e Hal}^l^o^f^t^h^e^Ho^u^s^{e o}^f^Rep^r^esen^ta^tiv^e^s^t^hⁱ^s
^m^o^rⁿⁱⁿ^g^,^w^hⁱ^l^e^t^hⁱ^s^H^ous^e^w^a^sⁱⁿ^s^e^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^aⁿ^{d f}^o^{r a}ⁿ^{d on}^acc^ouⁿ^t^o^f^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^w^{o pers}^oⁿ^s^are
ⁿ^o^wⁱⁿ^c^u^s^t^od^y^of^t^h^{e Ser}^g^eant^-^at^-A^r^m^s^;^aⁿ^{d s}^a^{id co}^m^m^ittee^{are to m}^a^k^e^t^h^{eir report to th}^is
^Ho^u^s^{e; an}^d^t^h^{at said}^co^m^m^itte^{e b}^e^au^th^o^r^ized^to^a^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^e^r^o^a^t^h^s^an^d^t^o^c^a^u^s^e^t^h^e^a^t^t^eⁿ^d^an^ce⁹⁷
^o^f^w^itne^sse^s.
The Committee’s report noted that Mr. Wheeler admitted his offense and included a ⁹⁸
recommendation that the punishment not be vindictive. The report also contained three
resolutions that were considered by the full House. The first found Mr. Wheeler guilty of
contempt and breach of the privileges of the House, and was adopted. The second, which was
amended on the floor prior to adoption, excluded Mr. Wheeler from the floor of the House for the
remainder of the session. Finally, the third resolution, which called for Mr. Wheeler to be taken
into custody for the remainder of the session, was also amended on the floor prior to adoption to ⁹⁹
simply discharge Mr. Wheeler from custody.
Another example of the use of select committee to hear a contempt trial occurred in 1865, when it
was alleged that Mr. A.P. Field assaulted Congressman William Kelley. Similar to the contempt
proceedings of Mr. Wheeler, the House adopted the following resolution authorizing a select
committee to conduct an examination of the charges:
^{Be it Res}^o^lved^,^T^h^at^{a s}^e^l^ect^com^mⁱ^t^t^{ee of}^fⁱ^v^e^m^e^m^b^ers^{be appoi}ⁿ^t^ed^by^t^h^{e S}^p^ea^k^e^{r t}^o
ⁱⁿ^qu^{ire i}ⁿ^{to th}^{e s}^a^{id alle}^g^e^{d breach}^of^priv^ile^g^e^{; th}^a^t^th^{e s}^a^id^com^mⁱ^{ttee h}^a^v^e^po^w^e^{r to s}^eⁿ^d
^f^o^{r pers}^on^s^aⁿ^{d papers}^{, an}^{d t}^o^ex^a^mⁱⁿ^e^wⁱ^tⁿ^e^s^s^e^s^;^aⁿ^{d t}^h^at^t^h^{e co}^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee report}^as^s^oon^as
^pos^sⁱ^{ble all th}^{e f}^acts^an^{d circum}^s^t^aⁿ^ces^of^t^h^{e aff}^a^{ir, an}^d^w^h^{at order}^,^if^any^,^{it is}^proper^f^o^r
^th^is^Ho^u^s^{e to}^tak^e^f^o^r^t^h^e^vⁱⁿ^d^icatioⁿ^o^f^it^{s p}^r^iv^ileg^e^,^an^d^rⁱ^g^h^{t, a}ⁿ^d^d^u^t^y^o^f^f^r^{ee le}^gⁱ^slatioⁿ¹⁰⁰
^an^{d j}^u^dgm^eⁿ^t^.
During the debate on the resolution it was observed that proceeding in this manner would avoid a
trial by the full House, which, in the words of one Member, “would consume a great amount of
the public time which there is a pressing need to apply to the business of the Government, it is ¹⁰¹
better that the course should be adopted which is contemplated by the resolution ....”

⁹⁷²^Hi^nd^s’^P^r^eced^en^t^,^sup^r^aⁿ^o^t^e²²^at^{§ 16}³⁰^.
⁹⁸^S^{ee i}^d^.^;^{see a}^l^so^H^.^R^e^{pt. 79}^{2, 24}^th^C^ong^{. 1}^st^Se^s^s^{., (1}⁸³^6).
⁹⁹^Id^.^;^{see al}^so^Grop^pⁱ^v.^L^e^slⁱ^e^,⁴⁰^{4 U}^.^S.⁴^96,⁵⁰¹^n.^{4 (}¹⁹⁷²⁾⁽^c^iti^ng^the^W^h^e^e^l^e^r^c^o^m^m^itte^e^pr^oc^e^dur^e^a^s^aⁿ^e^x^am^ple
^of^pr^oc^e^dur^e^s^f^o^llow^e^{d by}^C^ong^r^e^s^s^{in c}^onte^m^{pt c}^a^s^e^s⁾^.
¹⁰⁰^C^ONG^.^G^LO^B^E^{, 38}^th^Cong^.,²^nd^Se^s^s^{., 37}^{1 (}¹⁸⁶⁵⁾^.
¹⁰¹^Id^.⁽^s^ta^te^m^e^{nt of}^R^e^{p. T}^h^ay^e^r⁾^.

The select committee, in its report to the full House, noted that it had heard the testimony of ¹⁰²
several witnesses concerning the incident, including the voluntary statement of Mr. Field. Also
according to the Committee, Mr. Field was present for each of the witnesses and, in fact, several
of them were heard from at his request. Moreover, all of the witnesses were subject to ¹⁰³
examination or cross-examination by Mr. Field. At the committee’s recommendation, a
resolution directing the Speaker to issue a warrant for Mr. Field’s arrest by the Sergeant-at-Arms ¹⁰⁴
for the purpose of bringing him before the Speaker for a reprimand was adopted. It does not
appear that Mr. Field or his counsel was permitted to be present during the House’s consideration
of the committee’s report, nor does it appear that he was afforded an opportunity to address the
House prior to his formal reprimand. In fact, during the course of the reprimand, the Speaker
expressly referred to Mr. Field having “been tried before a committee of their members, and ¹⁰⁵
ordered to be reprimanded at the bar of the House by their Presiding Officer,” which may be
interpreted as indicating that the committee’s proceedings were deemed to be sufficient in the
eyes of the House.
Although there is ample historical evidence of the presumed propriety of contempt proceedings
before committees of Congress, there has been no judicial ruling directly confirming the
Congress’s interpretation of its own contempt powers. In 1993, however, the Supreme Court ¹⁰⁶
decided United States v. Nixon, which, while not a contempt case, involved an analogous
delegation of authority by the Senate to a select committee for the purposes of hearing evidence
regarding the impeachment of two federal judges. Specifically, the impeached judges challenged
the Senate’s procedure under Rule XI of the “Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate when
Sitting on Impeachment Trials,” which provides:
^T^h^{at in}^t^h^{e tr}^{ial o}^f^aⁿ^yⁱ^m^p^e^a^c^h^m^eⁿ^t^th^e^P^r^esidⁱⁿ^g^O^f^fⁱ^cer^o^f^th^e^Seⁿ^a^{te, i}^f^t^h^{e Se}ⁿ^a^te^so
^orders^,^s^hall^ap^point^{a committ}^{ee of Se}^nator^s^{to r}^{eceive evide}^nce^an^{d take}^tes^{timony at s}^u^c^h
^times^{and places}^as^{the comm}^{ittee may deter}^m^ine^{, an}^d^f^o^{r s}^u^{ch pu}^rpos^{e t}^h^{e co}^m^mⁱ^ttee^s^o
^appoin^t^{ed an}^{d th}^{e ch}^air^m^an^t^h^ereof^,^{to be}^el^ected^by^th^{e co}^m^m^{ittee, s}^h^{all (un}^l^es^s^oth^e^r^w^is^e
^ordere^{d by}^t^h^{e Sen}^a^{te) ex}^ercis^e^{all th}^{e po}^w^e^r^s^an^d^f^uⁿ^c^tioⁿ^s^con^f^{erred u}^pon^t^h^{e Se}ⁿ^a^{te an}^d
^th^{e P}^r^es^idin^g^O^f^fⁱ^{cer of}^th^{e Se}ⁿ^a^{te, res}^p^ectiv^el^y^,^un^{der th}^{e rules}^of^procedu^r^e^aⁿ^d^p^r^a^c^tⁱ^c^eⁱⁿ
^th^{e Se}ⁿ^a^te^w^h^eⁿ^s^ittiⁿ^g^oⁿⁱ^m^p^each^m^eⁿ^t^trials.
^Uⁿ^l^e^ss^ot^h^e^r^wⁱ^s^e^{ordered by}^t^h^{e S}^eⁿ^a^t^e^,^t^h^e^ru^l^e^s^{of procedu}^r^{e an}^d^practⁱ^{ce i}ⁿ^t^h^{e S}^eⁿ^a^t^e
^w^h^eⁿ^sittiⁿ^g^oⁿⁱ^m^p^each^m^eⁿ^t^t^r^{ials sh}^al^{l g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^th^{e p}^r^o^ced^u^r^{e an}^d^p^r^ac^tⁱ^c^e^o^f^t^h^e^c^o^m^m^ittee
^s^o^appoin^t^{ed. T}^h^{e co}^m^m^ittee^s^o^appoin^t^{ed s}^h^{all report to t}^h^{e Sen}^a^{te i}ⁿ^w^r^iti^ng^a^certified
^co^p^y^o^f^th^{e tra}ⁿ^scrip^t^o^f^th^{e p}^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^s^aⁿ^d^testi^m^oⁿ^y^h^a^d^an^d^gⁱ^v^eⁿ^b^e^f^o^{re th}^{e co}^m^m^ittee^,
^an^{d s}^u^c^h^{report s}^h^{all be rece}^iv^{ed b}^y^th^{e Se}ⁿ^a^{te an}^{d t}^h^{e ev}^iden^{ce s}^o^receiv^e^{d an}^{d the}
^testi^m^oⁿ^y^so^tak^eⁿ^s^h^{all b}^e^coⁿ^s^id^er^ed^to^{all in}^ten^t^{s a}ⁿ^d^p^u^r^p^o^s^{es, su}^b^j^{ect to}^th^{e r}ⁱ^g^h^t^o^f^th^e
^Sen^a^{te to deter}^mⁱⁿ^{e co}^m^p^eteⁿ^c^y^{, relev}^aⁿ^c^y^,^aⁿ^d^m^a^terial^it^y^,^as^h^a^vⁱ^ng^recei^v^e^{d an}^{d tak}^eⁿ
^b^e^f^o^r^e^th^{e Se}ⁿ^a^{te, b}^u^tⁿ^o^t^hⁱⁿ^g^h^e^r^eⁱⁿ^sh^a^{ll p}^r^ev^eⁿ^{t t}^h^{e Se}ⁿ^a^te^f^r^o^m^sen^dⁱⁿ^g^f^o^r^an^y^wⁱ^tn^e^s^s

¹⁰²^Id^.^a^t⁹⁷^1.
¹⁰³^Id^.
¹⁰⁴^Id^.^a^t⁹⁷^2-⁷⁴^.
¹⁰⁵^Id^.^a^t⁹⁹^{1 (}^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d)^.
¹⁰⁶⁵⁰^{6 U}^.^S^.²²⁴⁽¹⁹⁹³⁾^.

^an^d^h^earⁱⁿ^g^hⁱ^s^testi^m^oⁿ^yⁱⁿ^o^p^eⁿ^Seⁿ^a^{te, o}^r^b^y^o^r^d^e^r^o^f^th^e^Sen^a^te^h^a^vⁱⁿ^g^th^e^en^tir^{e tr}^ialⁱⁿ¹⁰⁷
^o^p^e^{n Se}^na^t^e^.
Judge Nixon argued that the use of a select committee to hear the evidence and witness testimony
of his impeachment violated the Senate’s constitutional duty to “try” all impeachments.
According to Judge Nixon, anything short of a trial before the full Senate was unconstitutional
and, therefore, required reversal and a reinstatement of his judicial salary. The Court held the
issue to be a non-justiciable political question. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court,
based this conclusion upon the fact that the impeachment proceedings were textually committed
in the Constitution to the Legislative Branch. In addition, the Court found the “lack of finality and ¹⁰⁸
the difficulty in fashioning relief counsel[led] against justiciability.” According to the majority,
to open “the door of judicial review to the procedures used by the Senate in trying impeachments ¹⁰⁹
would ‘expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos.’” The
Court found that the word “try” in the Impeachment Clause did not “provide an identifiable ¹¹⁰
textual limit on the authority which is committed to the Senate.” Justice Souter’s concurring
opinion noted that “[i]t seems fair to conclude that the [Impeachment] Clause contemplates that
the Senate may determine, within broad boundaries, such subsidiary issues as the procedures for ¹¹¹
receipt and consideration of evidence necessary to satisfy its duty to ‘try’ impeachments.”
The Court’s affirmation of the Senate’s procedures with respect to the appointment of select
committees for impeachment trials, clearly indicates that the use of committees for contempt
proceedings–whether they be standing legislative committees, or select committees created by
resolution for a specific purpose–is a permissible exercise of each House’s Article I, section 5
rulemaking power. As such, it would appear that one of the suggested reasons for the apparent
abandonment of the use of Congress’s inherent contempt power, namely, that it became to
cumbersome and time consuming to try contemptuous behavior on the floor of the body, is no
longer compelling. The ability to utilize the committee structure for trials, evidentiary hearings,
and other procedural determinations appears to be supported not only by the historical records of
previous contempt proceedings, but also by the Court’s decision in Nixon.
While the Court in Nixon addressed the permissibility of using select committees in impeachment
trials, it says nothing about the rights or privileges that would be required to be afforded to the
accused. Similarly, in any contempt proceedings before a congressional committee, the question
of rights and privileges remains one that has not yet been directly addressed by the courts.
According to the Supreme Court in Groppi v. Leslie:
^[t^]h^{e pas}^t^deci^sⁱ^on^s^of^t^hⁱ^s^C^ourt^s^t^ron^g^l^yⁱⁿ^di^cat^{e t}^h^a^t^t^h^{e panopl}^y^of^procedu^r^al^ri^g^h^t^s^t^h^at
^{are accorde}^d^{a def}^eⁿ^d^an^{t i}ⁿ^{a cri}^mⁱⁿ^{al trial h}^a^sⁿ^e^v^e^{r been}^t^h^oug^{ht n}^ece^s^s^a^r^yⁱⁿ^le^gⁱ^s^l^ati^v^e
^con^t^e^m^{pt proceedin}^gs^{. T}^h^{e cu}^s^t^o^m^ar^y^practi^{ce i}ⁿ^C^ong^r^e^s^s^h^a^s^been^{to prov}^{ide th}^e
^con^t^e^mⁿ^o^r^wⁱ^t^h^an^opport^uⁿⁱ^t^y^t^o^ap^pear^bef^o^{re t}^h^{e bar}^of^t^h^{e H}^o^u^s^{e, or bef}^o^{re a c}^o^m^m^ittee,¹¹²
^an^{d g}ⁱ^v^e^answ^{er t}^o^t^h^e^mⁱ^s^c^ondu^ct^ch^arg^e^{d a}^g^ai^ns^t^hi^m^.

¹⁰⁷^Id^.^a^t²²^{7, n. 1}⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d)^.
¹⁰⁸^Id^.^a^t⁷³^9.
¹⁰⁹^Id^.^(q^u^o^tⁱⁿ^g^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Nⁱ^x^oⁿ^{, 93}^{8 F.2}^d²³⁹^,²⁴⁶⁽^D^.C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹¹⁾⁾^.
¹¹⁰^Id^.^a^t⁷⁴^0.
¹¹¹^Id^.^a^t⁷⁴^{8 (}^S^ou^te^r^,^J^{., c}^onc^ur^rⁱ^ng⁾^.
¹¹²^Se^e^G^r^op^{pi v}^.^Le^s^lie^,⁴⁰^{4 U}^.^S.⁴⁹^{6, 5}⁰⁰^-⁰¹⁽¹⁹⁷²⁾⁽^c^iti^ng^Ju^rn^{ey v.}^Ma^cCra^cken^{, 29}^{4 U}^.^S^.¹²⁵^,¹^43-¹⁴⁴⁽¹⁹³⁵⁾^;
^K^ilbo^u^rⁿ^v^.^Th^om^ps^oⁿ^,¹⁰^{3 U}^.^S.¹⁶⁸^{, 1}⁷³^-¹⁷^{4 (}¹⁸⁸⁰⁾^;^An^de^r^s^{on v}^.^D^uⁿⁿ^,^{19 U}^.^S.(^{6 W}^h^e^a^t^.)²^04,²^09-²¹^{1 (}¹⁸²¹⁾^;
^Ma^rsh^a^{ll v.}^G^o^rdoⁿ^,²^{43 U}^.^S.⁵²^{1, 5}³²⁽¹⁹¹⁷⁾⁾^.

The Court also suggested that “the length and nature of the [right to be heard] would traditionally ¹¹³
be left largely to the legislative body....” This deference to Congress in establishing its own
rules and procedures is consistent with the more recent decision in Nixon. Thus, it would appear
that while there is no definitive answer to the question of what rights the committee hearing a ¹¹⁴
contempt proceeding would be required to afford, so long as the minimum protections of notice
and opportunity to be heard are provided, the courts, it seems, will not interfere with Congress’s
decisions regarding proper procedure.
Congressional precedent would also appear to be a useful guide to the question of what process is
due. A review of early exercises of inherent contempt, discussed above, indicates that the
following procedures have been established: attachment by the Sergeant-at-Arms; appearance
before the bar; provision for specification of charges; identification of the accuser; compulsory
process; provision of counsel; a hearing; determination of guilt; and imposition of a penalty.
According to one commentator, “[t]his traditional procedure was followed by both houses of ¹¹⁵
Congress until they abandoned it for a more convenient statutory device.” Since these
procedures appear to be in excess of what the Court instructed was required in Groppi, it would
seem reasonable to conclude that any inherent contempt proceeding that conforms with these
traditions would likely satisfy judicial review.
Between 1795 and 1857, 14 inherent contempt actions were initiated by the House and Senate,
eight of which can be considered successful in that the contemnor was meted out punishment,
agreed to testify or produce documents. Such inherent contempt proceedings, however, involved a
trial at the bar of the chamber concerned and, therefore, were seen by some as time-consuming,
cumbersome, and in some instances ineffective–because punishment could not be extended ¹¹⁶
beyond a House’s adjournment date. In 1857, a statutory criminal contempt procedure was ¹¹⁷
enacted, largely as a result of a particular proceeding brought in the House of Representatives
that year. The statute provides for judicial trial of the contemnor by a United States Attorney
rather than a trial at the bar of the House or Senate. It is clear from the floor debates and the
subsequent practice of both Houses that the legislation was intended as an alternative to the
inherent contempt procedure, not as a substitute for it. A criminal contempt referral was made in
the case of John W. Wolcott in 1858, but in the ensuing two decades after its enactment most
contempt proceedings continued to be handled at the bar of the House, rather than by the criminal
contempt method, apparently because Members felt that they would not be able to obtain the ¹¹⁸
desired information from the witness after the criminal proceedings had been instituted. With

¹¹³^Id^.^a^t⁵⁰^3.
¹¹⁴^W^h^ile^the^S^upre^m^e^{Court i}ⁿ^G^r^o^ppi^lim^ite^{d its h}^o^ldiⁿ^g^to^re^quirⁱⁿ^g^only^notic^e^aⁿ^d^the^op^port^uⁿ^ity^{to be}^he^a^r^{d, t}^h^e
^low^e^r^c^our^{t in}^the^s^a^m^e^c^a^s^e^s^u^g^g^e^s^te^{d tha}^t^t^h^e^f^o^llowⁱ^ng^rⁱ^g^h^ts^w^e^r^e^a^l^s^o^ne^c^e^s^s^a^r^y^{: r}^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tion^by^c^ouns^e^{l; the}
^ab^ility^to^co^m^p^{el th}^{e atten}^d^aⁿ^{ce o}^f^w^itn^{esses; an}^o^p^p^o^r^tuⁿ^ity^to^coⁿ^f^roⁿ^t^an^y^accu^ser^s^{; an}^d^th^{e r}ⁱ^g^h^{t t}^o^p^r^esen^{t a}^th
^d^e^f^eⁿ^s^{e t}^o^t^h^{e ch}^arges.^S^{ee Gro}^p^pⁱ^v.^L^e^slⁱ^e^{, 3}¹¹^F.^Su^pp.⁷⁷^2,⁷⁷^{4 (}^W^.D^{. W}ⁱ^s^c^{. 1970)}^,^rev’d^,⁴³^{6 F}^.^2d³²⁶⁽⁷^Cir.
¹⁹⁷⁰⁾^,^rev’d^.^,⁴⁰^{4 U.}^S^.⁴⁹⁶⁽¹⁹⁷²⁾^.
¹¹⁵^Sh^riⁿ^e^r,^sup^r^a^note⁷⁶^a^t⁴⁹¹^.
¹¹⁶^Se^e^Ebe^r^li^ng^,^s^upr^aⁿ^o^te^{88 a}^t³⁰^2-¹⁶^.
¹¹⁷^A^c^{t of}^Ja^{n. 24}^{, 1}⁸⁵⁷^{, c}^.¹⁹^§^3,¹¹^Sta^t^.¹^{56 (}¹⁸⁵⁷⁾⁽^c^odifⁱ^e^d^a^s^a^m^e^nde^{d a}^t^{2 U}^.^S^.^C^.^§§¹⁹^2,¹⁹^{4 (}²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁾^.^T^h^e
^c^onstitu^tio^na^lity^of^the^sta^t^ute^w^a^{s up}^he^ld^by^the^Supre^m^e^{Court i}ⁿ¹⁸^97.^S^{ee In re Ch}^ap^man^{, 16}⁶^U^.^{S. 66}¹⁽¹⁸⁹⁷⁾^.
¹¹⁸^Beck,^s^upr^aⁿ^o^te^{21 a}^t¹⁹^1-²¹⁴^.^Iⁿ^the^a^ppeⁿ^d^ix^to^B^e^c^k^’^s^s^t^udy^{, he}^pr^ovⁱ^d^e^s^a^c^o^m^p^r^e^he^ns^iv^e^lis^{t of}^pe^r^s^ons^f^r^om
¹⁷⁹^3-¹⁹^{43 w}^{ho w}^e^r^e^he^{ld i}ⁿ^c^o^nt^em^{pt of}^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^a^{nd t}^h^e^cⁱ^r^c^um^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^s^s^u^r^r^oun^di^ng^theⁱ^r^c^a^s^e^s^{. A}^r^e^vⁱ^ew^of^B^e^ck^’^s
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

only minor amendments, those statutory provisions are codified today as 2 U.S.C. §§ 192 and

194, which state:

^Ev^er^y^pers^on^w^h^o^h^a^ving^beeⁿ^s^u^mm^oⁿ^{ed as}^a^wⁱ^tn^e^s^s^b^y^t^h^{e auth}^orit^y^of^ei^th^{er Ho}^u^s^{e o}^f
^C^ong^res^s^t^o^gⁱ^v^e^t^e^s^tⁱ^m^ony^{or t}^o^pr^odu^{ce pape}^rs^u^pon^any^m^a^t^t^{er u}ⁿ^d^{er i}ⁿ^q^uⁱ^r^y^b^e^f^o^r^e^eⁱ^t^h^e^r
^Ho^u^s^{e, o}^r^an^y^j^oⁱⁿ^{t co}^m^mⁱ^tte^{e estab}^lish^e^d^b^y^{a j}^oⁱⁿ^{t o}^r^coⁿ^c^u^r^r^eⁿ^t^r^e^so^lu^tioⁿ^o^f^th^{e t}^w^o
^Hou^s^es^of^C^ong^res^s^,^{or any}^comm^{ittee of}^eit^h^{er Hou}^s^{e of}^C^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^,^w^ill^f^u^ll^y^m^a^k^e^s^d^e^f^a^u^l^t,
^or^w^h^{o, h}^a^vⁱⁿ^g^{appeared, ref}^u^s^e^s^t^o^answ^{er a}ⁿ^y^qu^estⁱ^{on pert}ⁱⁿ^ent^t^o^t^h^{e q}^u^es^tⁱ^on^un^der
ⁱⁿ^q^u^ir^y^,^sh^a^{ll b}^e^d^eem^ed^g^u^il^t^y^o^f^a^mⁱ^sd^e^m^eaⁿ^o^r^,^p^uⁿⁱ^s^h^ab^{le b}^y^{a f}ⁱⁿ^e^o^fⁿ^o^t^m^o^r^e^th^aⁿ
^[$10^0,00^{0] n}^o^{r l}^e^s^s^t^h^aⁿ^{$100 an}^{d i}^m^pri^s^onm^eⁿ^tⁱⁿ^a^co^m^m^oⁿ^j^aⁱ^l^f^o^rⁿ^o^t^l^e^ss^t^h^aⁿ^on^e¹¹⁹
^m^o^nt^{h no}^r^m^o^r^e^t^h^aⁿ^t^w^e^l^ve^m^o^nt^hs.
^W^h^en^e^v^er^{a w}^itn^e^s^s^s^u^mm^oⁿ^e^d^as^m^e^ntion^e^dⁱⁿ^s^ection^{192 of}^thⁱ^s^title^f^a^ils^{to appear to}
^t^e^s^tⁱ^f^y^{or f}^aⁱ^l^s^t^o^produ^{ce any}^book^s^,^papers^{, rec}^o^rds^,^or^docu^m^eⁿ^t^s^,^a^s^r^e^q^uⁱ^r^e^d^,^o^r^w^h^eⁿ^ev^er
^any^wⁱ^tn^e^s^s^s^o^s^u^mm^oⁿ^{ed refu}^s^e^s^{to an}^s^w^{er a}ⁿ^y^qu^e^s^tion^pertin^en^{t to t}^h^{e s}^u^bj^{ect un}^der
ⁱⁿ^q^u^ir^y^b^e^f^o^r^e^eith^er^Ho^u^s^e,^o^r^an^y^j^oⁱⁿ^{t co}^m^m^{ittee es}^tab^lⁱ^s^h^e^d^b^y^{a j}^oⁱⁿ^{t o}^r^c^oⁿ^c^u^r^r^eⁿ^t
^res^o^l^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e t}^w^{o H}^ous^{es of}^C^ong^res^s^,^{or any}^co^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee or s}^u^bcom^mⁱ^t^t^{ee of}^ei^t^h^er
^Ho^u^s^{e o}^f^Coⁿ^g^r^e^ss,^an^d^th^e^f^a^{ct o}^f^s^u^ch^f^a^ilu^r^e^o^r^f^a^il^u^r^es^is^r^e^p^o^r^ted^to^eith^er^Ho^u^s^e^w^h^ile
^Coⁿ^g^r^e^ss^isⁱⁿ^se^ssioⁿ^o^r^w^h^eⁿ^Coⁿ^g^r^e^ss^is^no^tⁱⁿ^se^ssioⁿ^,^a^sta^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t o}^f^fa^c^t^c^o^nstit^utiⁿ^g
^su^c^h^f^a^il^u^r^{e is r}^e^p^o^r^ted^to^an^d^f^iled^wⁱ^th^th^e^P^r^esid^en^{t o}^f^th^e^Sen^a^te^o^r^th^e^Sp^eak^er^o^f^th^e
^Hou^s^{e, it}^s^h^all^{be th}^e^du^t^y^o^f^t^h^{e s}^a^{id P}^r^es^iden^t^of^t^h^e^Sen^a^{te o}^r^Speak^{er of t}^h^{e Hous}^{e, as}^t^h^e
^cas^e^m^a^y^{be, to certify}^,^aⁿ^{d h}^e^s^h^all^s^o^certify^,^t^h^{e s}^t^ate^m^eⁿ^{t of}^f^act^s^af^ores^{aid un}^{der th}^{e s}^eal
^o^f^th^{e Se}ⁿ^a^{te o}^r^Ho^u^s^{e, as th}^{e c}^a^se^m^a^y^b^e^{, to}^th^{e ap}^p^r^o^p^r^iate^Un^ited^State^s^atto^rⁿ^e^y^,^w^h^o^s^e¹²⁰
^d^u^t^y^it^sh^al^{l b}^e^to^b^rⁱⁿ^g^th^e^m^a^tter^b^e^f^o^r^e^th^{e g}^r^an^d^j^u^r^y^f^o^r^{its actio}ⁿ^.
The legislative debate over the criminal contempt statute reveals that it was prompted by the
obstruction of a House select committee’s investigation into allegations of misconduct that had
been made against several Members of the House of Representatives. According to reports, the
investigation was hindered by the refusal of a newspaper reporter, James W. Simonton, to provide ¹²¹
answers to certain questions posed by the committee. The select committee responded by ¹²²
reporting a resolution citing Mr. Simonton for contempt, as well as introducing a bill that was
intended “to more effectually ... enforce the attendance of witnesses on the summons of either ¹²³
House of Congress, and to compel them to discover testimony.” It appears that there were no
printed House or Senate committee reports on the measure, though it was considered in the House ¹²⁴
by the select committee and in the Senate by the Judiciary Committee.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^c^h^r^oⁿ^o^log^y^indic^a^t^e^s^tha^t^f^r^om¹⁸^57-¹⁹^{34 C}^ong^r^e^s^s^r^e^lie^{d o}ⁿ^itsⁱⁿ^he^r^e^{nt c}^o^nte^m^{pt pow}^e^r^a^l^m^o^s^t^e^x^c^l^us^iv^e^l^y^,^de^s^p^ite
^the^a^v^a^ila^bility^of^the^c^rⁱ^m^ina^l^sta^t^ute^.^S^{ee i}^d^.^M^o^reo^v^er,^{Beck’s d}^e^t^aⁱ^l^e^d^hⁱ^st^o^r^yⁱⁿ^dⁱ^cat^{es t}^h^atⁱⁿ^at^l^e^ast²⁸ⁱⁿ^st^an^ces,
^w^itne^s^s^e^s^w^{ho w}^e^r^e^e^ithe^r^thr^e^a^t^eⁿ^e^d^w^ith,^or^a^c^t^ua^lly^c^h^a^r^g^e^d^w^{ith, c}^o^nte^m^{pt of}^C^ong^r^e^s^s^pur^g^e^{d t}^h^eⁱ^r^c^ita^tio^ns^by
^e^ithe^r^te^stifyⁱ^ng^{or prov}^id^ing^d^o^c^u^m^e^{nts to the}ⁱⁿ^q^u^iriⁿ^g^c^ong^re^ssiona^{l c}^o^m^m^itte^e^s^.^S^{ee i}^d^.
¹¹⁹^{2 U}^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 1}⁹²⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^{. A}^s^a^r^e^s^u^{lt of}^c^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l c}^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^{tion o}^f^of^f^e^ns^es^{, the}^pe^na^lty^f^o^r^c^onte^m^{pt of}^C^o^ng^r^e^s^s
^is^a^C^l^a^s^s^A^mⁱ^s^d^em^e^a^nor^{; thus}^{, t}^h^e^$1^,0^{00 m}^a^xⁱ^m^u^m^fⁱ^ne^unde^r^§¹⁹²^ha^s^be^eⁿ^inc^r^e^a^s^e^d^to^$¹⁰⁰^,0^00.^Se^e¹⁸^U.^S.^C^.
^§§³⁵^59,³⁵⁷¹⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
¹²⁰^{2 U}^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 1}⁹⁴⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
¹²¹^Se^e^Ebe^r^li^ng^,^s^upr^aⁿ^o^te^{88 a}^t³⁰^2-⁰⁴^.
¹²²^H.^R^.⁷⁵^7,³⁴^th^C^ong^.,^3d^Se^s^s^.⁽¹⁸⁵⁷⁾^.
¹²³⁴²^C^ONG^.^G^LO^B^E^{. 34}^th^C^ong^.,^3d^Se^s^s^{., 40}^3-⁰⁴⁽¹⁸⁵⁷⁾⁽^d^is^c^u^s^sⁱ^ng^H^.^R^.⁷⁵⁷⁾^.
¹²⁴^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t⁴^25-^26.

According to the legislative debate records and commentators, there was opposition to the bill on
several fronts. Some Members proposed an amendment expressly codifying Congress’s contempt
power for failure to comply with requests for documents or testimony, thereby resurrecting the ¹²⁵
view that Congress did not possess any inherent power to punish for contempt. Others argued ¹²⁶
that Congress’s inherent contempt powers rendered the proposed bill unnecessary. Still other
Members opposed the bill on the grounds that it violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the
Constitution, because it sanctioned unreasonable searches and seizures, compelled persons to
incriminate themselves, and violated the prohibition on persons being punished twice for the ¹²⁷
same offense (double jeopardy).
In response to arguments that such a statute was unnecessary given Congress’s inherent authority
to hold individuals in contempt, supporters made clear that the proposed bill was not intended in ¹²⁸
any way to diminish Congress’s inherent contempt authority. Rather, supporters of the bill saw
it as designed to give Congress “additional authority, and to impose additional penalties on a
witness who fails to appear before an investigating committee of either House, or who, appearing, ¹²⁹
fails to answer any question.” The main concern of proponents seems to have been Congress’s
ability to impose adequate punishments for contempts that occur near the end of a session,
especially in the House, where the prevailing view was that the Court’s opinion in Anderson v. ¹³⁰¹³¹
Dunn prohibited terms of incarceration that extended beyond the adjournment of a session.
With respect to the arguments surrounding the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, supporters asserted
that the bill provided the protection of the judiciary, via a judicial trial, for the potential
contumacious witnesses. Moreover, supporters argued that the bill removed such witnesses “from
the passions and excitement of the Hall–where partisans may frequently, in political questions, ¹³²
carry into the measures of punishment their party hostilities.”
The bill was ultimately passed by both the House¹³³ and the Senate.¹³⁴ According to one
commentator, the bill was adopted for three reasons:
^[F]irs^{t, to in}^creas^{e th}^{e po}^w^e^{r of}^eith^{er Hous}^{e of}^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^s^{to pu}ⁿⁱ^s^h^f^o^{r con}^t^e^m^{pt i}ⁿ^cas^es^of
^con^t^um^ac^y^of^wⁱ^tⁿ^es^s^e^s^,^{... s}^econ^d^{, to co}^m^p^{el cri}^mⁱⁿ^a^ting^te^s^tⁱ^m^oⁿ^y^.^A^t^h^{ird reas}^oⁿ^,
^al^t^h^ough^un^dou^bt^edl^y^a^mⁱⁿ^o^r^on^e,^w^a^s^t^h^at^t^h^{e e}^f^f^ect^of^t^h^e^en^act^m^eⁿ^t^of^t^hⁱ^s^l^e^gⁱ^s^l^atⁱ^on
^w^o^u^l^{d be to re}^m^o^v^e^th^e^{trial o}^f^cas^e^s^{of con}^t^e^m^{pt of eit}^h^{er Hou}^s^{e o}^f^C^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^f^r^o^m^th^eir
^r^e^sp^ectiv^{e b}^a^r^s^to^th^{e co}^u^r^ts,^w^h^er^{e p}^a^ssioⁿ^aⁿ^d^p^a^r^tisan^s^h^ip^w^o^u^l^dⁿ^o^{t in}^f^l^u^eⁿ^{ce th}^e

¹²⁵^S^{ee E}^b^erlⁱⁿ^g,^s^upr^a^no^t^e⁸⁸^at³⁰⁹^;^s^e^e^als^o^s^upr^a^no^t^e^{s 84}^-89^and^acco^m^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g^t^e^xt^.
¹²⁶^Id^.^a^t³¹^1.
¹²⁷^Id^.^a^t³⁰^9.
¹²⁸⁴²^C^ONG^.^G^LO^B^E^{, 34}^th^Coⁿ^g^.,³^d^{Sess., 4}⁰⁴⁽¹⁸⁵⁷⁾^(sta^tem^eⁿ^t^o^f^{Mr. Orr) (p}^r^o^vⁱ^dⁱⁿ^g^th^{at “ S}^o^m^e^g^eⁿ^tlem^eⁿ^sa^y^th^at
^t^h^{e ver}^y^fact^o^f^p^r^esen^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^hⁱ^s^bi^l^lⁱ^s^an^ad^mⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^t^h^at^t^h^{e Ho}^u^s^e^{has n}^o^p^o^w^{er u}^p^oⁿ^t^hⁱ^s^sub^j^ect^,^and^t^h^atⁱ^tⁿ^e^gatⁱ^v^es
^the^r^e^s^o^lutⁱ^oⁿ^w^h^ic^{h w}^e^ha^v^e^a^l^r^e^a^d^y^a^dopte^d^{, t}^h^a^t^is^{, t}^o^ta^k^e^[^M^r^.^]^Sim^onton^int^o^c^u^s^t^ody^a^{nd br}^ing^him^be^f^o^r^e^the
^H^ous^e^to^aⁿ^s^w^e^r^f^o^{r his}^c^o^nte^m^{pt. N}^o^s^u^c^h^th^ing^.^T^h^e^p^o^w^e^{r of}^this^H^ous^e^{I be}^lie^v^e^is^c^o^nc^e^d^e^d^by^a^{ll ....”}⁾
¹²⁹^Ebe^r^ling^,^s^upr^a^no^t^e⁸⁸^at³⁰⁶^;^s^{ee a}^l^so⁴²^C^ONG^.^G^LO^B^E^{, 34}^th^Cong^{., 3}^d^S^e^ss.^,⁴⁰⁵⁽¹⁸⁵⁷⁾^(statem^eⁿ^t^o^f^Mr.^Orr).
¹³⁰^Se^e^s^upr^a^no^t^e^{s 45}^-59^and^accom^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g^t^e^xt^.
¹³¹⁴²^C^ONG^.^G^LO^B^E^{, 34}^th^Coⁿ^g^.,³^d^{Sess., 4}⁰⁴⁽¹⁸⁵⁷⁾^(s^tatem^eⁿ^t^o^f^{Mr. Orr)}^(statin^g^“^[^s^]^u^p^p^o^s^{e t}^h^{at tw}^o^d^a^y^s^b^e^f^o^re
^the^a^d^jo^urnm^eⁿ^{t of}^{this C}^ong^re^{ss the}^r^e^{is a}^g^r^{oss a}^tte^m^p^t^{on t}^h^e^prⁱ^v^ile^g^e^s^o^f^this^H^ous^e^by^c^o^r^r^upt^m^e^aⁿ^s^of^aⁿ^y
^de^s^c^rⁱ^ptio^{n; t}^h^eⁿ^t^h^e^p^o^w^e^r^of^this^H^ous^e^e^x^te^nds^oⁿ^ly^{to th}^os^e^tw^{o da}^y^s^{. I}^s^tha^t^aⁿ^a^d^e^q^ua^te^p^unis^h^m^e^nt?^O^u^g^h^{t w}^e
^not^theⁿ^{, to}^pa^{ss a}^la^w^w^h^ic^{h w}^{ill m}^a^k^e^the^a^u^thority^of^the^House^r^e^spe^c^t^e^d^{; ....”}^).
¹³²^Ebe^r^ling^,^s^upr^aⁿ^o^te⁸⁸^a^t³¹^{3 (c}^iting⁴²^C^ONG^.^G^LO^B^E^{, 34}^th^C^ong^{. 3d}^Se^s^s^{., 4}²⁷⁽¹⁸⁵⁷⁾⁽^s^ta^te^m^e^{nt of}^Mr^{. D}^a^vⁱ^s⁾^.
¹³³⁴²^C^ONG^.^G^LO^B^E^{, 34}^th^C^ong^.,^3d^Se^s^s^{., 43}^{3 (}¹⁸⁵⁷⁾^.
¹³⁴^Id^.^a^t⁴⁴^5.

^decisⁱ^on^ag^ai^ns^{t th}^{e pris}^oⁿ^{er an}^d^w^h^{ere h}^e^w^o^u^l^{d h}^a^v^e^{a t}^r^{ial by}^j^u^r^y^aⁿ^{d all th}^{e ot}^h^e^r¹³⁵
^con^s^tit^u^tioⁿ^a^{l s}^a^f^e^gu^ards^of^co^u^r^{t proceedin}^g^s^.
Under 2 U.S.C. § 192, a person who has been “summoned as a witness” by either House or a
committee thereof to testify or to produce documents and who fails to do so, or who appears but
refuses to respond to questions, is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of up to
$100,000 and imprisonment for up to one year. 2 U.S.C. § 194 establishes the procedure to be
followed by the House or Senate if it chooses to refer a recalcitrant witness to the courts for
criminal prosecution rather than try him at the bar of the House or Senate. Under the procedure ¹³⁶
outlined in section 194, “the following steps precede judicial proceedings under [the statute]: ¹³⁷
(1) approval by committee; (2) calling up and reading the committee report on the floor; (3)
either (if Congress is in session) House approval of a resolution authorizing the Speaker to certify
the report to the U.S. Attorney for prosecution, or (if Congress is not in session) an independent ¹³⁸
determination by the Speaker to certify the report; [and] (4) certification by the Speaker to the ¹³⁹
appropriate U.S. Attorney for prosecution.
The criminal contempt statute and corresponding procedure are punitive in nature. It is used when
the House or Senate wants to punish a recalcitrant witness and, by doing so, to deter others from ¹⁴⁰
similar contumacious conduct. The criminal sanction is not coercive because the witness
generally will not be able to purge himself by testifying or supplying subpoenaed documents after
he has been voted in contempt by the committee and the House or Senate. Consequently, once a
witness has been voted in contempt, he lacks an incentive for cooperating with the committee. ¹⁴¹
However, although the courts have rejected arguments that defendants had purged themselves,
in a few instances the House has certified to the U.S. Attorney that further proceedings
concerning contempts were not necessary where compliance with subpoenas occurred after ¹⁴²
contempt citations had been voted but before referral of the cases to grand juries.
Under the statute, after a contempt has been certified by the President of the Senate or the
Speaker, it is the “duty” of the United States Attorney “to bring the matter before the grand jury

¹³⁵^Ebe^r^ling^,^s^upr^a^no^t^e⁸⁸^at³¹⁶^.
¹³⁶^T^h^e^la^ng^ua^g^e^of^{§ 194}^d^o^e^s^no^{t p}^r^ov^ide^a^c^o^m^p^le^te^pic^t^ur^e^of^the^p^r^oc^e^s^s^.^For^a^m^o^r^e^de^ta^ile^{d e}^x^plaⁿ^a^tio^{n of}^the
^w^o^r^k^ing^s^of^the^pr^oc^e^dur^e^,^r^e^f^e^r^e^nc^e^s^hou^ld^be^m^a^de^{to the}^a^c^t^ua^l^pr^a^c^tic^e^{in the}^H^ous^e^aⁿ^{d Se}^na^te^.^Se^e^{4 D}^e^s^c^hle^r^’^s
^P^r^eced^en^t^s^,^s^upr^a^no^t^e⁸⁷^,^at^§§¹⁷^-²²^.
¹³⁷^{In c}^a^s^e^of^a^de^fⁱ^aⁿ^c^e^of^a^s^ubc^om^m^itte^e^s^ubpoe^na^{, s}^u^bc^om^m^itte^e^appr^ov^a^l^of^the^c^onte^m^{pt c}^ita^tio^{n p}^r^eced^es
^c^o^m^m^itte^e^a^c^{tion o}ⁿ^t^h^e^m^a^tte^r.
¹³⁸^Se^e^W^ils^{on v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^,³⁶⁹^F^.^2d¹⁹^{8 (}^D^.^C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁶⁶⁾^.
¹³⁹⁴^Desch^l^er’s^P^r^eced^en^t^s^,^sup^r^aⁿ^o^te⁸⁷^{, a}^t^p.¹⁴^{1. W}^h^ile^t^h^e^q^uote^d^de^s^c^rⁱ^pti^oⁿ^is^f^r^om^the^c^o^m^p^ila^tion^of^H^ous^e
^p^r^eced^en^t^s^,^t^h^{e sam}^e^p^r^o^ced^u^r^{e i}^s^em^p^l^o^y^edⁱⁿ^t^h^e^S^eⁿ^a^t^e^,^bu^t^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^e^P^r^esi^d^eⁿ^t^o^f^t^h^e^S^eⁿ^a^t^e^p^e^rf^o^r^mⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e f}^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^s
^tha^t^a^r^e^the^re^sp^onsi^b^ility^of^the^S^p^e^a^k^e^r^{in c}^a^s^e^s^of^c^onte^m^{pt of}^th^e^House^.
¹⁴⁰^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^S.R^e^{pt. N}^o^.^95-¹⁷^0,⁹⁵^th^Cong^{., 1}^st^Se^s^s^.,^{97 (}¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^.
¹⁴¹^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^C^o^s^t^e^l^l^o^,¹⁹^{8 F.}^2d²⁰^{0 (}^{2d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁵²⁾^,^c^e^r^{t. de}^nie^d^,³⁴^{4 U.}^S^.⁸⁷⁴⁽¹⁹⁵²⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^v^.
^B^r^ewest^e^r^{, 154 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.¹²^{6 (}^D^.^D^.C^{. 1}⁹⁵⁷⁾^,^r^e^v^’^{d on othe}^r^gr^o^uⁿ^d^s^{, 2}⁵⁵^F.^2d⁸⁹^{9 (}^D^.C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁵⁸⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,³⁵⁸
^U.^S^.⁸⁴^{2 (19}⁵⁸⁾^.^Ho^w^e^ver,^t^h^{e d}^e^f^eⁿ^d^aⁿ^t^{’s sen}^t^en^{ce m}^a^{y b}^e^su^sp^end^e^d^w^h^{ere h}^e^co^m^p^lⁱ^e^{s w}ⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e co}^mmⁱ^t^t^ee’s
^de^m^a^{nd f}^o^llowⁱ^ng^his^c^onv^ic^tion^.^Se^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^T^obiⁿ^,¹⁹^{5 F}^.^Su^pp^{. 5}⁸⁸^,⁶¹⁷⁽^D^.D^.C^.¹⁹⁶¹⁾^.
¹⁴²^Se^e⁴^Desch^l^er’s^P^r^eced^en^t^s^,^su^p^r^aⁿ^o^te⁸⁷^{, c}^h^{. 1}⁵^,⁵²^{1 (}^w^itne^s^s^b^e^f^o^r^e^the^H^ous^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on U}ⁿ^-^A^m^e^rⁱ^caⁿ
^A^c^ti^v^itie^{s v}^o^lunta^r^ily^purg^e^{d him}^s^e^l^f^o^f^{his c}^onte^m^pt);^{see a}^l^so^H^.^Re^s^.¹⁸⁰^{, 9}⁸^th^Cong^{. (re}^so^luti^on^sta^ting^tha^t
^pr^os^e^c^u^ti^on^of^A^nne^G^o^r^s^uc^{h B}^u^r^f^or^{d, A}^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tor^of^the^Envⁱ^r^o^nm^eⁿ^ta^{l P}^r^o^t^e^c^tion^A^g^eⁿ^cy^,^w^a^s^{not r}^e^quir^e^d
^f^o^l^l^o^wⁱⁿ^gⁱ^m^p^l^e^m^en^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^an^agree^m^en^t^gran^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e Hou}^s^{e access t}^o^do^cu^m^eⁿ^t^{s w}^hⁱ^c^h^h^a^d^b^een^wⁱ^t^h^h^e^l^d^un^d^e^{r a}
^cl^ai^m^o^f^ex^ecu^tⁱ^v^{e p}^rⁱ^vⁱ^l^e^ge).

for its action.”¹⁴³ It remains unclear whether the “duty” of the U.S. Attorney to present the
contempt to the grand jury is mandatory or discretionary. The case law that is most relevant to the ¹⁴⁴
question provides conflicting guidance. In Ex parte Frankfeld, the District Court for the
District of Columbia granted petitions for writs of habeas corpus sought by two witnesses before
the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The witnesses were charged with violating 2
U.S.C. § 192, and were being held on a warrant based on the affidavit of a committee staff ¹⁴⁵
member. The court ordered the witnesses released since the procedure, described as ¹⁴⁶
“mandatory” by the court, had not been followed. The court, in dicta, not central to the holding
of the case, observed that Congress prescribed that
^w^h^eⁿ^{a co}^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee su}^c^h^as^t^hⁱ^s^w^a^s^coⁿ^f^roⁿ^t^ed^wⁱ^t^h^aⁿ^obdu^rat^e^wⁱ^tⁿ^e^s^s^,^a^wⁱ^l^l^fu^l^wⁱ^tⁿ^ess^,
^perh^aps^,^th^{e co}^m^m^ittee^w^o^u^l^{d report th}^{e f}^{act to}^th^{e Ho}^u^s^{e, if}^{it b}^e^a^Hou^s^{e com}^m^{ittee, or to}
^th^{e Sen}^a^{te, i}^f^{it b}^e^{a Sen}^a^{te co}^m^m^{ittee, an}^d^th^at^t^h^{e Speak}^{er of}^th^{e Hou}^s^{e or th}^{e P}^r^es^iden^{t o}^f
^th^{e Se}ⁿ^a^{te s}^h^o^u^ld^t^h^en^cer^ti^f^y^th^{e f}^a^c^t^{s to}^th^{e d}ⁱ^s^t^rⁱ^{ct atto}^rⁿ^e^y^.
^{It s}^e^e^m^s^qu^{ite apparen}^t^th^a^t^C^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^inten^d^{ed to leav}^{e n}^o^m^e^as^u^r^{e of}^dis^c^r^e^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^eⁱ^t^h^e^r^t^h^e
^Speak^{er of}^th^{e Hou}^s^{e or th}^{e P}^r^es^iden^{t of}^t^h^{e Sen}^a^{te, un}^{der s}^u^ch^circum^s^t^aⁿ^ces^{, bu}^t^m^a^d^e^t^h^e
^certif^icatioⁿ^of^f^act^s^{to th}^e^dis^t^{rict attorn}^e^y^a^m^aⁿ^d^ator^y^proceedin^g^,^aⁿ^d^{it left}ⁿ^o^dⁱ^scretioⁿ
^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e di}^s^t^rⁱ^ct^at^t^o^rⁿ^{ey as}^t^o^w^hat^{he s}^houl^{d do}^abo^utⁱ^t^.^H^eⁱ^s^r^e^qui^r^e^{d, under}^t^h^e¹⁴⁷
^l^angua^{ge of}^t^h^{e s}^t^at^ut^{e, t}^o^s^u^b^mⁱ^t^t^h^{e f}^a^ct^s^t^o^t^h^{e gr}^and^j^u^r^y^.
Similarly, in United States v. United States House of Representatives,¹⁴⁸ a case that involved the
applicability of the section 192 contempt procedure to an executive branch official, the same
district court observed, again in dicta, that after the contempt citation is delivered to the U.S. ¹⁴⁹
Attorney, he “is then required to bring the matter before the grand jury.”
Conversely, in Wilson v. United States,¹⁵⁰ the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit concluded, based in part on the legislative history of the contempt statute and
congressional practice under the law, that the “duty” of the Speaker when certifying contempt
citations to the United States Attorney during adjournments is a discretionary, not a mandatory, ¹⁵¹
one. The court reasoned that despite its mandatory language, the statute had been implemented
in a manner that made clear Congress’s view that, when it is in session, a committee’s contempt
resolution can be referred to the U.S. Attorney only after approval by the parent body. When
Congress is not in session, review of a committee’s contempt citation is provided by the Speaker ¹⁵²
or President of the Senate, rather than by the full House or Senate. This review of a
committee’s contempt citation, according to the court, may be inherently discretionary in nature,

¹⁴³^{2 U}^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 1}⁹⁴⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
¹⁴⁴^{32 F.S}^u^p^p⁹¹⁵⁽^D^.D^.C^{. 19}⁴⁰⁾^.
¹⁴⁵^Id^.^a^t⁹¹^6.
¹⁴⁶^Id^.
¹⁴⁷^Id^.⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d)^.
¹⁴⁸^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^H^o^us^e^{of Re}^pr^e^s^eⁿ^tativ^e^s^{, 5}⁵⁶^F.^Su^pp.¹⁵^0,¹⁵^{1 (}^D^.D^.C^{. 1}⁹⁸³⁾^.
¹⁴⁹^{But se}^e^Ans^a^{ra v}^.^Eastl^aⁿ^d^,⁴⁴²^F^.^2d⁷⁵^1,⁷⁵^4,ⁿ^.⁶⁽^D^.^C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷¹⁾⁽^s^u^ggestⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^“t^h^e^E^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^{e B}^r^an^ch^.^.^.^m^a^y
^de^cⁱ^deⁿ^o^{t t}^o^pre^s^eⁿ^t^...^[^a^c^onte^m^{pt c}^ita^tioⁿ^]^t^o^t^h^e^g^r^a^{nd j}^u^ry^...”^{). T}^h^e^c^{ourt in}^Ans^a^ra^dⁱ^{d no}^t^exp^r^essl^y^coⁿ^sⁱ^d^{er t}^h^e
^na^tur^e^of^the^pr^os^e^c^u^t^o^r^’^s^d^u^ty^un^de^r^{2 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁹^4,^nor^did^it^pr^o^vⁱ^de^aⁿ^y^ba^sⁱ^s^f^o^r^its^s^t^a^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t to}^the^e^f^f^e^c^t^tha^t^the
^p^r^o^s^ecu^t^o^r^m^a^y^exer^ci^{se d}ⁱ^scretⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^d^e^t^e^rmⁱⁿⁱⁿ^{g w}^h^et^h^e^{r t}^o^{seek an}ⁱⁿ^dⁱ^ct^m^eⁿ^t^.
¹⁵⁰³⁶⁹^F.^2d¹⁹^{8 (}^D^.^C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁶⁶⁾^.
¹⁵¹^Id^.^a^t²⁰^1-⁰³^.
¹⁵²^Id^.^a^t²⁰^3-⁰⁴^.

whereas the prosecutor is simply carrying out Congress’s directions in seeking a grand jury ¹⁵³
indictment. In Wilson, the defendants’ convictions were reversed because the Speaker had ¹⁵⁴
certified the contempt citations without exercising his discretion. From this holding it may be
possible to argue that because the statute uses similar language when discussing the Speaker’s
“duty” and the “duty” of the U.S. Attorney, that the U.S. Attorney’s function is discretionary as
well, and not mandatory as other courts have concluded.
Alternatively, despite the similarity in the statutory language, there is an argument that the
functions of the Speaker and the President of the Senate are so different in nature under the
statutory scheme from those of the U.S. Attorney that to conclude that the function of the
prosecutor was intended to be discretionary simply because that is the interpretation given to the
function of the presiding officers is contrary to the understanding and intent of the 1857 Congress ¹⁵⁵
that drafted the language. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the courts have generally
afforded United States Attorneys broad prosecutorial discretion, even where a statute uses ¹⁵⁶
mandatory language. Moreover, prosecutorial discretion was the basis of the decision of the
U.S. Attorney not to present to the grand jury the contempt citation of Environmental Protection ¹⁵⁷
Agency Administration Anne Gorsuch Burford.
While upholding the validity of 2 U.S.C. §§ 192 and 194, the courts have recognized that they are
criminal provisions and have reversed convictions for contempt where limitations dictated by the ¹⁵⁸
language of the statute itself or the Constitution have been exceeded.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has taken the position that Congress cannot, as a matter of
statutory or constitutional law, invoke either its inherent contempt authority or the criminal ¹⁵⁹
contempt of Congress procedures against an executive branch official acting on instructions by

¹⁵³^S^{ee i}^d^.
¹⁵⁴^Id^.^a^t²⁰^5.
¹⁵⁵^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t²^01-^02.
¹⁵⁶^Se^e^Con^fisc^a^ti^{on C}^a^se^s^{, 7}⁴^U^.^S.⁽⁷^W^a^ll.)⁴^{54 (}¹⁸⁶⁸⁾^;^{see a}^l^so^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^Nⁱ^x^oⁿ^,⁴¹^{8 U}^.^S.⁶⁸³^{, 69}^{4 (}¹⁹⁷⁴⁾^;
^In^ma^{tes o}^f^Attic^a^Co^rrectioⁿ^a^l^Fa^{cility v. Ro}^ckefeller^{, 4}⁷⁷^F.2^d³⁷⁶⁽²^d^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷³⁾^;^Mo^{ses v.}^Kenⁿ^e^dy^{, 21}^{9 F.}^S^u^p^p^.
⁷⁶²^{, 7}⁶⁵^(D^.D^.C.¹⁹⁶³⁾^,^a^{ff ‘d}^su^{b. n}^o^m.^,^Mo^{ses v .}^Ka^tzenb^a^c^h^{, 3}⁴²^F.2^d⁹³^{1 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁶⁵⁾^.
¹⁵⁷^Se^e^E^x^a^mⁱⁿⁱⁿ^{g an}^d^R^evi^ewiⁿ^g^t^h^{e P}^r^o^ced^u^r^{es T}^h^a^t^{Were T}^a^ken^b^y^t^h^{e 0f}^fⁱ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e U.}^S^.^A^t^t^o^rn^{ey f}^o^r^t^h^{e Di}^st^ri^ct^of
^C^o^lum^b^iaⁱⁿ^Theⁱ^r^I^m^ple^m^eⁿ^t^a^ti^oⁿ^of^{a C}^oⁿ^t^e^m^{pt C}ⁱ^t^a^ti^{on t}^h^a^t^W^a^s^Vote^d^by^the^Full^H^o^us^e^{of Re}^pr^e^s^eⁿ^tativ^e^s^ag^ains^t
^the^Theⁿ^-^A^dmⁱⁿ^is^tr^at^or^o^f^t^h^e^En^vⁱ^r^onm^eⁿ^ta^{l Pr}^ote^c^tⁱ^on^Ageⁿ^c^y^,^A^nne^G^o^r^s^u^c^h^B^u^r^f^or^d^,^Heariⁿ^{g b}^e^f^o^{re t}^h^{e Ho}^u^s^e^th^st
^Com^m^itte^e^{on Pub}^lic^W^o^rk^{s a}^nd^T^r^aⁿ^sporta^tlon^,⁹⁸^Cong^.,¹^Se^s^s^{., 30}⁽¹⁹⁸³⁾^[^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^B^u^r^f^or^{d C}^o^nte^m^pt
^P^r^ose^c^u^tio^{n He}^a^r^ing^]^{. T}^h^e^U.S.^Attorne^y^a^l^{so sug}^g^e^ste^d^tha^t^{it w}^o^u^l^{d ha}^v^e^be^eⁿⁱⁿ^a^p^pro^p^ria^t^e^f^o^{r hi}^m^{to institute}^a
^c^r^im^ina^l^{suit a}^g^aⁱ^{nst Burf}^{ord w}^h^ile^a^re^la^te^{d c}ⁱ^v^{il a}^c^tion^br^o^u^g^h^{t by}^the^J^u^s^tic^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt a}^g^aⁱ^ns^{t th}^e^H^ous^e^w^a^s
^pe^ndi^ng⁾^.^Se^e^L^e^tte^{r, f}^r^om^{U.S. Attorne}^y^Staⁿ^le^y^Ha^{rris to Spe}^a^k^e^r^T^hom^a^s^P^.^O’Ne^ill^of^De^c^.^27,¹⁹^82,^re^printe^dⁱⁿ^,^th^st
^H^.^R^e^{pt. 9}⁸^-³²³^{, 9}⁸^Cong^.,¹^S^e^ss.^,⁴⁸^-⁴⁹⁽¹⁹⁸³⁾^.^Of^co^u^r^se,^{as a}^p^r^actⁱ^cal^mat^t^e^r,^evenⁱ^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es A}^t^t^o^rn^ey
^is^r^e^quir^e^d^to^r^e^f^e^r^a^c^ontem^{pt un}^de^r^{2 U}^.^S.C^.^§§¹^92,¹^{94 t}^o^t^h^e^g^r^a^{nd j}^u^r^y^{, the}^r^e^is^{no a}^ppa^r^e^nt^r^e^q^u^ir^e^m^eⁿ^{t tha}^t^the
^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^A^ttorⁿ^e^y^c^onc^urⁱⁿ^the^pr^os^e^c^u^tio^{n of}^aⁿ^y^s^ubs^e^que^nt^indⁱ^c^t^m^e^nt.^Se^e^F^ED^.^R.^C^RI^M^.^P^RO^.⁷⁽^c⁾^;^{see a}^l^s^o^th
^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^v^.^C^o^x^,³⁴^{2 F.}^2d¹⁶⁷⁽⁵^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁶⁵⁾^.
¹⁵⁸^Se^e^infr^a^no^t^e^{s 27}⁹^-³²⁵^and^accom^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g^t^e^xt^.
¹⁵⁹²^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§§ 19}^{2, 19}⁴⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.

the President to assert executive privilege in response to a congressional subpoena. This view is
most fully articulated in two opinions by the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) from the mid-¹⁶⁰

1980s, and has been the basis of several recent claims with respect to pending congressional ¹⁶¹

investigations.
The position of the DOJ was prompted by the outcome of an investigation by two House
committees into the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) implementation of provisions of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(Superfund). Subpoenas were issued by both committees seeking documents contained in EPA’s ¹⁶²
litigation files. At the direction of President Reagan, EPA Administrator Burford claimed
executive privilege over the documents and refused to disclose them to the committees on the ¹⁶³
grounds that they were “enforcement sensitive.” A subcommittee and ultimately the full House
Committee on Public Works and Transportation, approved a criminal contempt of Congress ¹⁶⁴
citation and forwarded it to the full House for its consideration. On December 16, 1982, the full ¹⁶⁵
House of Representatives voted, 259-105, to adopt the contempt citation. Before the Speaker of
the House could transmit the citation to the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia
for presentation to a grand jury, the DOJ filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin the transmission of the
citation and to have the House’s action declared unconstitutional as an intrusion into the
President’s authority to withhold such information from the Congress. According to the DOJ, the
House’s action imposed an “unwarranted burden on executive privilege” and “interferes with the ¹⁶⁶
executive’s ability to carry out the laws.”
The District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the DOJ’s suit on the grounds that
judicial intervention in executive-legislative disputes “should be delayed until all possibilities for ¹⁶⁷
settlement have been exhausted.” In addition, the court noted that ultimate judicial resolution of
the validity of the President’s claim of executive privilege could only occur during the course of ¹⁶⁸
the trial for contempt of Congress. The DOJ did not appeal the court’s ruling, opting instead to
resume negotiations, which resulted in full disclosure and release of the all the subpoenaed ¹⁶⁹
documents to the Congress. Throughout the litigation and subsequent negotiations, however,

¹⁶⁰^S^{ee Pro}^s^ecu^tioⁿ^f^o^{r t}^h^{e Co}ⁿ^t^emp^t^o^f^C^oⁿ^g^{ress o}^f^aⁿ^Execu^{tive Bra}ⁿ^ch^Offici^a^{l W}^h^o^Ha^{s Asserted}^a^Claⁱ^{m o}^f
^E^xecu^tⁱ^{ve P}^rⁱ^vⁱ^l^e^g^e^{, 8 U}^.^{S. O}^p^{. O}^f^f^.^Le^g^a^{l C}^ouns^e^l¹⁰^{1 (}¹⁹⁸⁴⁾^[^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^O^l^s^{on Me}^m^o^]^;^s^e^e^als^o^R^e^s^pons^e^to
^C^ongr^e^s^sⁱ^o^nal^Re^q^u^e^s^ts^for^Iⁿ^for^m^atio^{n Re}^g^a^r^dⁱ^{ng D}^e^cⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^M^a^d^e^U^nde^r^the^I^nde^pe^nde^nt^C^o^uns^e^l^Ac^t^{, 1}⁰^U^.^S^.^O^p^.
^O^f^f^.^Le^ga^{l C}^ouns^e^l⁶⁸⁽¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^[^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^C^oope^r^Me^m^o^]^.
¹⁶¹^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^Me^m^o^r^a^ndum^f^o^r^the^C^ouns^e^l^{to t}^h^e^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^t,^Fr^e^d^.^{F. F}ⁱ^e^l^ding^{, f}^r^om^Ste^phe^{n G}^.^B^r^a^d^b^u^r^y^{, P}^r^incⁱ^pa^l
^D^e^puty^A^ttorⁿ^e^y^G^e^ne^r^a^l,^Of^fⁱ^c^e^of^L^e^g^a^l^C^ouns^e^l^,^I^m^m^u^nity^o^f^Fo^r^m^e^r^C^ouns^e^l^to^the^Pr^e^s^ideⁿ^{t fr}^o^m^C^o^m^p^e^lle^d
^C^ongr^e^s^sⁱ^o^nal^Te^s^tim^oⁿ^y^{, J}^u^ly¹⁰^{, 20}⁰⁷^{; L}^e^tte^{r to G}^e^org^e^T^.^Ma^nning^{, Cou}ⁿ^s^e^{l f}^o^{r Ms}^{. H}^a^rrie^t^Mⁱ^e^r^s^,^f^r^om^Fre^d^F.
^Fⁱ^el^dⁱⁿ^g^,^C^o^un^sel^t^o^t^h^e^P^r^esi^d^en^t^,^Ju^l^y¹⁰^,²⁰⁰⁷⁽^dⁱ^r^ectⁱⁿ^{g M}^s^.^Mⁱ^{ers n}^o^t^t^o^app^{ear b}^e^f^o^{re t}^h^{e Hou}^s^{e Ju}^dⁱ^ci^ary
^Com^m^itte^e^{in re}^s^pons^e^to^a^s^u^b^p^o^e^na^{); L}^e^tte^{r to H}^ous^e^J^u^dicⁱ^a^r^y^C^o^m^m^itte^e^Chaⁱ^r^m^aⁿ^J^{ohn Co}^ny^e^r^s^,^J^r^{. f}^r^om^G^e^orge
^T^.^Ma^nning^{, C}^o^uⁿ^s^e^{l f}^o^{r Ms}^{. H}^a^r^r^ie^{t Mie}^r^s^,^J^u^ly^17,²⁰⁰⁷^(e^x^p^laⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^le^g^a^{l ba}^{sis f}^o^{r Ms.}^{Miers’s refu}^{sal to}^a^p^p^ear).
¹⁶²^Se^e^ge^ne^r^a^lly^,^Con^g^ressi^oⁿ^a^l^P^r^oceedⁱⁿ^{gs Agai}ⁿ^s^t^Aⁿⁿ^e^M^.^G^o^rsu^c^h^,^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^rat^o^r,^U.^S^.^Eⁿ^vi^ron^m^en^t^a^l^P^r^o^t^ectⁱ^oⁿ
^A^g^eⁿ^cy^,^f^o^r^W^ithhol^ding^S^u^b^poe^na^e^d^D^o^c^u^m^e^nts^R^e^la^ting^{to t}^h^e^C^o^m^p^r^e^he^ns^iv^e^Envⁱ^r^onm^eⁿ^ta^{l R}^e^s^pons^e^,^th
^Com^p^eⁿ^s^a^{tion a}ⁿ^{d L}ⁱ^a^b^ility^A^c^{t of}¹⁹⁸⁰^{, H}^.^Re^pt.⁹⁷^-9^68,⁹⁷^C^oⁿ^g^.⁽¹⁹⁸²⁾^[^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^G^o^r^s^uc^{h C}^onte^m^{pt R}^e^por^t^]^.
¹⁶³^Id^.^a^t^42-⁴³^.
¹⁶⁴^Id^.^a^t⁵⁷^{, 7}⁰^.
¹⁶⁵¹²^{8 C}^ONG^.^R^EC^{. 31,}⁷⁷⁶⁽¹⁹⁸²⁾^.
¹⁶⁶^Se^e^ge^ne^r^a^lly^,^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^H^ous^e^o^f^Re^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tⁱ^v^e^s^{, 556}^F.^Su^pp.¹^{50 (}^D^.D^.C^.¹⁹⁸³⁾^.
¹⁶⁷^Id^.^a^t¹⁵^2.
¹⁶⁸^Id^.^(sta^ti^ng^tha^t^“^[^c^]^oⁿ^stit^utio^na^l^c^l^aⁱ^m^s^a^{nd ot}^he^{r o}^b^je^c^tions^{to c}^o^ng^re^ssiona^{l inv}^e^stig^a^tions^m^a^y^be^r^a^is^e^d^a^s
^d^e^f^eⁿ^s^{es i}ⁿ^{a cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^p^r^o^s^ecu^tⁱ^on^”).
¹⁶⁹^Se^e^L^OUI^S^F^IS^H^E^R^,^T^HE^P^O^L^IT^IC^{S O}^F^E^XE^CUT^I^V^E^P^RI^VI^L^E^G^E^{, 126-}¹³^{0 (}^C^a^r^oliⁿ^a^A^c^a^d^em^ic^P^r^e^s^s^{., 20}⁰⁴⁾^[^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

the U.S. Attorney refused to present the contempt citation to a grand jury for its consideration on ¹⁷⁰
the grounds that, notwithstanding the mandatory language of the criminal contempt statute, he
had discretion with respect to whether to make the presentation. The issue was never resolved
because the ultimate settlement agreement included a withdrawal of the House’s contempt
citation.
In its initial 1984 opinion, OLC revisited the statutory, legal, and constitutional issues that were
not judicially resolved by the Superfund dispute. The opinion concluded that, as a function of
prosecutorial discretion, a U.S. Attorney is not required to refer a contempt citation to a grand
jury or otherwise to prosecute an executive branch official who is carrying out the President’s ¹⁷¹
direction to assert executive privilege. Next, the OLC opinion determined that a review of the
legislative history of the 1857 enactment of the criminal contempt statute and its subsequent
implementation demonstrates that Congress did not intend the statute to apply to executive ¹⁷²
officials who carry out a presidential directive to assert executive privilege. Finally, as a matter
of constitutional law, the opinion concludes that simply the threat of criminal contempt would
unduly chill the President’s ability to effectively protect presumptively privileged executive ¹⁷³
branch deliberations. According to the OLC opinion:
^T^h^{e P}^r^esid^en^t’^{s e}^x^er^{cise o}^f^t^h^{is p}^r^iv^ile^g^e^{, p}^a^r^ticu^l^ar^l^y^w^h^eⁿ^b^a^sed^u^p^oⁿ^th^e^w^r^it^ten^le^g^a^l
^a^d^vi^c^e^o^f^t^h^e^At^t^o^rⁿ^e^y^G^e^ne^r^a^l^,ⁱ^s^p^r^e^s^u^m^p^tⁱ^v^e^l^y^va^lⁱ^d^.^B^ecau^s^e^m^a^ny^of^t^h^e^docum^eⁿ^ts^ov^er
^w^h^ic^h^th^{e P}^r^es^ident^m^a^y^wⁱ^s^h^t^o^as^s^e^{rt a priv}^ile^g^e^{are in}^t^h^{e c}^u^s^t^od^y^o^f^{a depart}^m^e^{nt h}^{ead, a}
^clai^m^of^pri^v^ile^g^e^ov^{er th}^os^e^docum^ents^caⁿ^{be perf}^{ected on}^l^y^wⁱ^t^h^th^{e a}^s^sⁱ^s^t^an^{ce o}^f^th^a^t
^of^fⁱ^cia^l^{. If}^oⁿ^{e Hous}^{e of C}^o^ng^res^s^co^u^l^d^m^a^k^e^{it a cri}^m^e^sⁱ^m^p^l^y^{to as}^s^e^rt^th^e^P^r^es^iden^t’s
^pres^um^pti^v^el^y^v^a^{lid clai}^m^,^ev^eⁿ^if^{a cou}^r^{t s}^u^b^s^equ^eⁿ^t^l^y^w^e^re^to^a^g^r^e^e^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^p^rⁱ^vⁱ^l^e^g^e^c^l^aⁱ^m
^w^e^{re v}^a^{lid, th}^{e e}^x^ercis^e^of^t^h^e^priv^ileg^e^w^o^u^l^d^{be s}^o^bu^rden^{ed as}^{to be n}^u^lli^fⁱ^{ed. B}^ecau^s^e
^Coⁿ^g^r^e^ss^h^a^{s o}^t^h^e^r^m^e^th^o^d^s^a^v^ailab^l^{e to}^test^th^e^v^a^lid^it^y^o^f^{a p}^r^iv^ile^g^e^clai^m^an^d^to^o^b^t^ain
^th^{e docum}^eⁿ^ts^t^h^{at it s}^eeks^,^even^th^{e th}^{reat of}^{a cri}^mⁱⁿ^{al pros}^ecu^tion^f^o^{r as}^s^e^rting^th^{e clai}^m
^is^aⁿ^uⁿ^r^eas^oⁿ^{able, unw}^arrant^{ed, an}^{d th}^ere^f^ore^{intolerable bu}^rden^on^th^e^ex^erci^s^e^b^y^th^e¹⁷⁴
^P^r^esid^en^{t o}^f^hⁱ^{s f}^uⁿ^c^tioⁿ^s^uⁿ^d^e^r^th^{e Co}ⁿ^s^tit^u^tioⁿ^.
The 1984 opinion focuses almost exclusively on the criminal contempt statute, as that was the
authority invoked by Congress in the Superfund dispute. In a brief footnote, however, the opinion
contains a discussion of Congress’s inherent contempt power, summarily concluding that the
same rationale that makes the criminal contempt statute inapplicable and unconstitutional as
applied to executive branch officials apply to the inherent contempt authority:
^W^e^b^e^liev^e^t^h^at^t^h^is^sa^m^e^coⁿ^c^lu^sioⁿ^w^o^u^l^d^ap^p^l^y^to^aⁿ^y^att^e^m^p^{t b}^y^Coⁿ^g^r^e^ss^to^u^tilize^its
ⁱⁿ^h^e^r^eⁿ^t^“^c^iv^{il” co}ⁿ^t^e^m^p^t^p^o^wer^s^to^ar^r^e^st,^b^rⁱⁿ^g^{to trial, an}^{d pu}ⁿⁱ^s^h^an^ex^ec^u^tⁱ^v^{e of}^ficial
^w^{ho as}^s^e^{rted a P}^r^es^iden^{tial clai}^m^of^e^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^e^priv^ile^g^e^.^T^h^{e leg}ⁱ^s^l^ati^v^{e h}ⁱ^s^t^or^y^of^t^h^e

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^Fis^h^e^r^]^.
¹⁷⁰^{2 U}^.^S^.^C.^{§ 1}⁹⁴⁽¹⁹⁸^{2) (s}^ta^ting^t^h^a^t^“^[^t^h^e^Spe^a^k^e^r^of^the^H^ous^e^or^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^t^of^the^Se^na^te^]^s^h^a^{ll s}^o^c^e^rtify^,^{... to t}^h^e
^ap^p^r^op^ri^at^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es at}^t^o^rⁿ^e^y^,^w^h^o^s^{e d}^u^t^yⁱ^t^sh^a^l^l^be^to^briⁿ^g^the^m^a^tte^{r be}^f^o^re^the^g^r^a^{nd jury}^{for its a}^c^tio^n.”⁾
⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d)^.
¹⁷¹^Se^e^O^l^s^on^Me^m^o^,^s^upr^a^no^te¹⁶⁰^a^t¹⁰^2,¹¹^4-¹⁵^{, &}¹¹^8-²⁸^.
¹⁷²^Id^.^at¹²⁹^-¹³^{4 (st}^a^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^“[t^]^h^e^E^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^{e’s ex}^cl^u^sⁱ^v^{e au}^t^h^o^r^ity^{to pr}^ose^c^u^te^vⁱ^ola^tio^ns^of^the^la^w^gⁱ^v^e^{s rise}^{to the}
^co^ro^l^l^a^ry^t^h^atⁿ^eⁱ^t^h^{er t}^h^{e Jud}ⁱ^ci^alⁿ^o^r^L^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^v^{e Bran}^ch^es^m^a^y^dⁱ^r^ect^l^yⁱⁿ^t^e^rf^er^{e w}ⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e p}^r^o^s^ecu^t^o^rⁱ^al^dⁱ^scretⁱ^oⁿ^o^f
^t^h^{e E}^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^{e b}^y^dⁱ^rectⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e E}^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^{e Bran}^ch^t^o^p^r^o^s^ecu^t^e^p^a^rtⁱ^c^u^l^{ar i}ⁿ^dⁱ^vi^d^u^a^l^s^.^”^).
¹⁷³^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t¹^02,¹^35-¹⁴^2.
¹⁷⁴^Id^.^a^t¹⁰^2.

^cri^mⁱⁿ^{al con}^t^e^m^p^t^s^t^at^u^t^{e indicates}^th^{at t}^h^{e reach}^of^t^h^e^s^t^atu^t^e^w^a^sⁱⁿ^teⁿ^d^{ed to be}
^coex^tens^iv^e^wⁱ^t^h^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^s^’ⁱⁿ^h^e^reⁿ^t^ci^v^{il conte}^m^{pt po}^w^e^r^s^(ex^cept^wⁱ^t^h^res^p^{ect to t}^h^e
^p^eⁿ^a^{lties i}^m^p^o^sed⁾^.^T^h^er^ef^o^r^{e, th}^{e sa}^m^e^r^easoⁿⁱⁿ^g^th^{at s}^u^g^g^{ests th}^a^t^th^{e stat}^u^t^{e co}^u^l^dⁿ^o^t
^coⁿ^s^tit^u^tioⁿ^a^ll^y^b^e^ap^p^lied^ag^aⁱⁿ^s^t^{a P}^r^esid^en^tia^{l as}^ser^tioⁿ^o^f^p^r^iv^ileg^e^ap^p^{lies to}^Coⁿ^g^r^e^ss^’¹⁷⁵
ⁱ^nhe^r^e^nt^c^o^nt^e^m^p^t^p^o^w^e^r^s^a^s^w^e^l^l^.
The 1986 OLC opinion reiterates the 1984 reasoning adding the observation that the power had
not been used since 1935 (at that time over 50 years), and that “it seems unlikely that Congress
would dispatch the Sergeant-at-Arms to arrest and imprison an executive branch official who ¹⁷⁶
claimed executive privilege.” The 1986 OLC opinion also suggests that then current Supreme
Court opinions indicated that it was “more wary of Congress exercising judicial authority” and,
therefore, might revisit the question of the continued constitutional validity of the inherent ¹⁷⁷
contempt power.
Factual, legal, and constitutional aspects of these OLC opinions are open to question and
potentially limitations. For example, with respect to the argument that a U.S. Attorney cannot be
statutorily required to submit a contempt citation to a grand jury, despite the plain language of the
law, such a statement appears to be analogous to a grant of so-called “pocket immunity” by the ¹⁷⁸
President to anyone who asserts executive privilege on his behalf. The courts have concluded
that the government, or in this case the President, may informally grant immunity from
prosecution, which is in the nature of a contract and, therefore, its effect is strongly influenced by ¹⁷⁹
contract law principles. Moreover, principles of due process require that the government adhere ¹⁸⁰
to the terms of any immunity agreement it makes. It appears that a President has implicitly
immunized executive branch officials from violations of congressional enactments at least once–
in 1996, during a dispute over the constitutionality of a statute that made it a requirement for all ¹⁸¹
public printing to be done by the Government Printing Office. At the time, the DOJ, in an
opinion from OLC, argued that the requirement was unconstitutional on its face, directed the
executive branch departments not to comply with the statute as passed by Congress, and noted
that executive branch officials who are involved in making decisions that violate the statute face
little to no litigation risk, including, it appears, no risk of prosecution under the Anti-Deficiency ¹⁸²¹⁸³
Act, for which the DOJ is solely responsible. Such a claim of immunization in the contempt

¹⁷⁵^Id^.^a^t¹⁴^0,^n.⁴²^(inte^r^na^{l c}^ita^tioⁿ^om^itte^d).
¹⁷⁶^Coo^p^e^r^Me^m^o^,^s^upr^a^no^t^e¹⁶^{0 at}⁸⁶^.
¹⁷⁷^Id^.^(c^iti^ng^I^N^{S v}^.^C^h^ad^ha^,⁴^{62 U}^.^{S. 9}¹⁹^,⁹^62-⁶⁶⁽¹⁹⁸³⁾^;^B^u^ckel^{y v.}^V^a^l^e^o^,⁴²^{4 U.}^S^.¹⁽¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^{es v.}
^Brown^{, 38}¹^U^.^{S. 43}⁷⁽¹⁹⁶⁵⁾^;^Uⁿⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^L^evet^t^,³²^{8 U}^.^S.³^03,³¹^{7 (}¹⁹⁴⁰⁾⁾^.^I^t^is^im^por^taⁿ^t^toⁿ^o^t^e^tha^t^t^h^e¹⁹⁸⁴
^O^L^C^opini^on^pr^e^-^da^te^s^the^Su^pr^e^m^e^C^our^t’^s^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^sⁱⁿ^Mo^rriso^{n v.}^Olsoⁿ^{, 4}^{87 U}^.^S.⁶⁵^{4 (}¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^aⁿ^d^Mistretta^v.
^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^,⁴⁸^{8 U}^.^S.³⁶^{1 (}¹⁹⁸⁹⁾^,^bot^{h of}^w^h^ic^{h a}^ppe^a^r^t^o^u^nde^r^c^{ut p}^o^r^tio^ns^of^the^O^L^C^’^s^r^e^a^s^oning^.
¹⁷⁸^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^Unⁱ^t^ed^St^a^t^{es v.}^H^o^gaⁿ^{, 8}⁶²^F.^2d³⁸^6,³⁸⁸⁽¹^st^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Br^owⁿ^,⁸⁰^{1 F.}^2d³⁵^2,³⁵^{4 (}⁸^th
^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^e^d^St^a^t^{es v.}^H^a^rvey^{, 79}^{1 F.}^2d²^94,³^00-^{01 (}⁴^th^Cir.1⁹⁸⁶^);^Unⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^Irviⁿ^e^,⁷⁵⁶^F^.^2d⁷⁰^8,⁷¹⁰^-¹¹^th
⁽⁹^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁵⁾^.
¹⁷⁹^Id^.
¹⁸⁰^S^{ee Ma}^b^r^{y v.}^Johⁿ^s^on^,⁴⁶^{7 U}^.^S.⁵⁰⁴^{, 5}⁰⁹⁽¹⁹⁸⁴⁾^;^Sa^nto^b^e^llo^v^.^N^e^w^Yor^k^,⁴⁰^{4 U}^.^S.²^57,²^{62 (}¹⁹⁷¹⁾⁽^“^w^h^eⁿ^a^ple^a
^rest^{s i}ⁿ^an^y^si^gnⁱ^fⁱ^c^an^t^d^e^{gree o}ⁿ^{a p}^r^o^mⁱ^s^{e o}^r^agree^m^en^t^o^f^t^h^{e p}^r^osecu^t^o^r,^so^t^h^atⁱ^t^can^b^e^sai^d^t^o^{be p}^a^rt^o^f^t^h^e
^ind^u^c^e^m^eⁿ^{t or c}^o^nside^r^a^tⁱ^on,^suc^h^pr^om^ise^m^u^{st be}^f^u^lf^ille^d”^);^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.⁽^J^e^r^r^y⁾^H^a^r^v^ey^{, 869}^F.2^d¹⁴³⁹^,¹⁴^43-^th
^{44 (}¹¹^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁹⁾^;^I^nne^{s v}^.^D^a^lsh^e^im^{, 86}^{4 F.}^2d⁹^74,⁹^{78 (}²^d^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^{, 4}⁹³^U^.^S.⁸^{09 (}¹⁹⁸⁹⁾^;^In^re^Arne^tt,^th
⁸⁰⁴^F^.²^d¹²⁰⁰^,¹²⁰²^-⁰³⁽¹¹^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^.
¹⁸¹^Se^e^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^tⁱ^v^e^B^r^aⁿ^c^h^A^ppr^oprⁱ^a^tions^A^c^{t of}¹⁹⁹^3,^P.L^.¹⁰^2-³⁹²^{§ 2}⁰⁷⁽^a⁾^,¹⁰⁶^Sta^t^.¹⁷^03,¹⁷¹⁹⁽¹⁹⁹²⁾⁽^c^od^if^ie^{d a}^t
⁴⁴^U^.^S.C^.^{§ 50}¹ⁿ^o^te⁾^;^{see a}^l^s^o^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e^B^r^aⁿ^c^h^A^ppr^opr^ia^tio^ns^A^c^{t o}^f¹⁹⁹^5,^P.L^.¹⁰^3-²⁸³^§²⁰⁷⁽²⁾^,¹⁰^{8 Sta}^t^.¹⁴²³^,
¹⁴⁴^{0 (}¹⁹⁹⁴⁾⁽^a^m^e^nding^s^e^c^{tion 2}⁰⁷⁽^a⁾^of^the¹⁹⁹³^A^c^t)^.
¹⁸²^Se^e³¹^U^.^S.C^.^§¹³⁴¹⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.

context, whether express or implicit, would raise significant constitutional questions. While it is
true that the President can immunize persons from criminal prosecution, it does not appear that he
has authority to immunize a witness from a congressional inherent contempt proceeding.
Arguably, an inherent contempt proceeding takes place wholly outside the criminal code, is not
subject to executive execution of the laws and prosecutorial discretion, and thus, appears
completely beyond the reach of the executive branch. Furthermore, as previously indicated,
inherent contempt, unlike criminal contempt, is not intended to punish, but rather to coerce ¹⁸⁴
compliance with a congressional directive. Thus, a finding of inherent contempt against an ¹⁸⁵
executive branch officials, does not appear to be subject to the President’s Pardon power–as an
inherent contempt arguably is not an “offense against the United States,” but rather is an offense
against a House of Congress. Likewise, it appears that the same arguments would be applicable to
a potential civil contempt by Congress.
The assertion that the legislative history of the 1857 statute establishing the criminal contempt
process demonstrates that it was not intended to be used against executive branch official is not
supported by the historical record. The floor debates leading to the enactment of the statute make
it clear that the legislation was intended as an alternative to, not a substitute for, the inherent ¹⁸⁶
contempt authority. This understanding has been reflected in numerous Supreme Court ¹⁸⁷
opinions upholding the use of the criminal contempt statute. A close review of the floor debate
indicates that Representative H. Marshall expressly pointed out that the broad language of the bill
“proposes to punish equally the Cabinet officer and the culprit who may have insulted the dignity ¹⁸⁸
of this House by an attempt to corrupt a Representative of the people.”
Moreover, language from the floor debate indicates that Congress was aware of the effect that this
language would have on the ability of persons to claim privileges before Congress. Specifically,
the sponsor of the bill, Representative Orr, was asked about the potential instances in which the
proposed legislation might interfere with recognized common law and other governmental ¹⁸⁹
privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, to support an investigation such as one that
probed “the propriety of a secret service fund to be used upon the discretion of the executive ¹⁹⁰¹⁹¹
department,” or to support inquires about “diplomatic matters.” Representative Orr
responded that the House has and would continue to follow the practice of the British Parliament,
which “does not exempt a witness from testifying upon any such ground. He is not excused from

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
¹⁸³^Se^e^Me^m^o^ra^ndum^f^o^{r E}^m^il^y^{C. H}^e^w^{itt, G}^e^ne^ra^{l Couns}^e^l^{, G}^S^A^,^Iⁿ^vo^l^vemen^t^o^f^t^h^{e G}^o^vern^m^en^t^P^rⁱⁿ^tⁱⁿ^g^Of^fⁱ^{ce i}ⁿ
^E^xecu^tⁱ^{ve B}^r^aⁿ^c^h^P^rⁱⁿ^tⁱⁿ^g^aⁿ^d^D^u^p^lⁱ^c^a^tⁱⁿ^g^,^Ma^y^{31, 1}⁹⁹⁶^.
¹⁸⁴^Se^e^s^upr^a^at¹²^-14^.
¹⁸⁵^U.^S^.^C^ONS^T^{. A}^r^{t. I}^I^,^§^{2 (}^s^ta^ting^t^h^a^t^the^Pr^e^s^ideⁿ^{t “}^s^ha^ll^ha^v^e^the^Pow^e^r^{to g}^r^aⁿ^{t R}^e^pr^ie^v^e^s^a^nd^P^a^r^dons^f^o^r
^Off^eⁿ^s^e^s^A^g^aiⁿ^s^t^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es.^”^).
¹⁸⁶^Se^e^s^upr^a^at¹⁹^-22^.
¹⁸⁷^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^Jou^rⁿ^{ey v.}^McCra^cken^{, 29}^{4 U}^.^S^.¹²⁵⁽¹⁹³⁵⁾^;^M^c^G^r^{ain v}^.^D^a^u^ghe^r^t^y^,²⁷^{3 U.}^S^.¹³⁵⁽¹⁹²⁷⁾^;^In^re
^C^hapm^an^{, 1}⁶⁶^U^.^S.⁶⁶^{1 (}¹⁸⁹⁷⁾^.
¹⁸⁸^{42 C}^ONG^.^G^LO^B^E^{429 (}¹⁸⁵⁷⁾^.
¹⁸⁹^Id^.^at⁴³¹^(st^a^t^e^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^Rep^.^Duⁿⁿ^{) (aski}ⁿ^{g t}^h^at^“i^f^t^h^{e co}^mmⁱ^t^t^ee^coⁿ^sⁱ^d^ered^,^an^{d i}^f^t^h^ey^dⁱ^d^so^consi^d^er,^w^h^atⁱ^s
^theⁱ^{r ju}^dg^m^e^{nt in re}^f^e^re^nc^e^{to the}^e^ffe^c^t^of^{this bill}^up^on^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^by^th^e^univ^e^rsa^l^la^w^re^g^a^rde^d^a^s^priv^ile^g^e^d,
^{to a}^ttorⁿ^e^y^s^a^{nd c}^ouns^e^l^or^s^a^t^la^w^?^A^r^e^they^r^e^quir^e^{d to}^div^u^lg^e^thiⁿ^g^s^c^o^m^m^unic^a^t^e^d^{to the}^m^{in c}^oⁿ^f^ideⁿ^c^e^,^a^{nd f}^o^r
^wⁱ^s^e^a^{nd hig}^h^p^u^r^p^os^e^s^of^pub^lic^pur^pos^e^by^theⁱ^r^c^lie^nts^?^”⁾^.
¹⁹⁰^Id^.
¹⁹¹^Id^.

testifying there. That is the common law of Parliament.”¹⁹² Later in the same debate, a proposed
amendment to expressly recognize the attorney-client privilege in the statute was overwhelmingly ¹⁹³
defeated.
With respect to the secret service fund, Representative Orr explained “that this House has already
exercised the power and authority of forcing a disclosure as to what disposition had been made
for the secret-service fund. And it is right and proper that is should be so. Under our
Government–under our system of laws–under our Constitution–I should protest against the use of
any money by an executive authority, where the House had not the right to know how every ¹⁹⁴
dollar had been expended, and for what purpose.” Representative Orr’s reference was to a
contentious investigation in 1846, regarding charges that Daniel Webster, while Secretary of
State, had improperly disbursed monies from a secret contingency fund used by the President for
clandestine foreign operations. The charges led the committee to issue subpoenas to former
Presidents John Quincy Adams and John Tyler. President Polk sent the House a list of the
amounts in the contingent fund for the relevant period, which was prior to his term, but refused to
furnish documentation of the uses that had been made of the expenditures on the grounds that a ¹⁹⁵
sitting President should not publically reveal the confidences of his predecessors. President
Polk’s refusal to provide the information was mooted by the actions of the two investigatory ¹⁹⁶
committees established by the House. Former President Tyler testified and former President ¹⁹⁷
Adams filed a deposition detailing the uses of the fund during their Administrations. In ¹⁹⁸
addition, President Polk’s Secretary of State, James Buchanan, was subpoenaed and testified.
Ultimately, Mr. Webster was found innocent of any wrongdoing. From these references, it appears
that the House was, in 1857, sensitive to and cognizant about its oversight and investigative
prerogatives vis-a-vis the executive branch. It therefore appears arguable that in the context of the
debate, the contempt statute was not intended to preclude the House’s ability to engage in
oversight of the executive branch.
Finally, OLC’s contention that the criminal contempt statute has only been used once, in the
Burford/Superfund dispute, appears to be based on the fact that the contempt of Anne Burford
was the only contempt voted on by the full House of Representatives. Significantly, prior to the ¹⁹⁹
Superfund dispute, committees and subcommittees of the House of Representatives had voted
contempt citations against Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (1975); Secretary of Commerce
Rogers C. B. Morton (1975); Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
(1978); Secretary of Energy Charles Duncan (1980); Secretary of Energy James B. Edwards
(1981); Secretary of the Interior James Watt (1982), and Attorney General William French Smith
(1983). Since the Superfund dispute, contempt citations have been voted against White House
Counsel John M. Quinn (1996), Attorney General Janet Reno (1998), and White House Chief of

¹⁹²^Id^.^(statem^eⁿ^t^o^f^Rep^.^Orr).
¹⁹³^Id^.^a^t⁴⁴^1-⁴³^.
¹⁹⁴^Id^.^a^t⁴³^1.
¹⁹⁵^Se^e^R^ONAL^D^D.^R^OT^UND^A^&^J^O^HN^E.^N^OWA^K^,^T^RE^AT^I^S^E^ON^C^O^N^S^T^I^T^UT^I^ONA^L^L^AW^:^S^UB^S^T^A^N^C^E^A^ND^P^ROCE^DURE^{, 94}⁹
⁽⁴^th^e^d^{. 2}⁰⁰⁷^{) (c}^iti^ng¹⁶^C^ONG^.^G^LO^BE^{698 (}^A^pr^{il 2}⁰^,¹⁸⁴⁶⁾⁾^.
¹⁹⁶^Id^.⁽^c^iti^ng^H^.^R^e^pt.⁶^84,²⁹^th^Con^g^{., 1}^st^Se^s^s^{., 8}^-¹¹⁽¹⁸⁴^6)).
¹⁹⁷^Id^.⁽^c^iti^ng^H^.^R^e^pt.⁶^86,²⁹^th^Con^g^{., 1}^st^Se^s^s^{., 2}²^-^{25 (}¹⁸⁴⁶⁾⁾^.
¹⁹⁸^Id^.⁽^c^iti^ng^H^.^R^e^pt.⁶^86,²⁹^th^Con^g^{., 1}^st^Se^s^s^{., 4}^-^{7 (}¹⁸⁴⁶⁾⁾^.
¹⁹⁹^W^e^ha^v^e^be^eⁿ^una^ble^t^o^l^o^c^a^t^e^aⁿ^y^re^c^o^{rd of}^a^v^o^te^by^a^Se^na^te^c^o^m^m^itte^e^{or subc}^om^m^itte^e^of^a^c^onte^m^{pt c}^ita^tion
^agaiⁿ^s^t^an^execu^tⁱ^v^{e b}^r^an^ch^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^.

Staff Joshua Bolten (2007).²⁰⁰ In every instance, save for John M. Quinn,²⁰¹ a claim of executive
privilege was asserted, and in each instance there was either full or substantial compliance with ²⁰²
the demands of the committee that had issued the subpoena.
As an alternative to both the inherent contempt power of each House and the criminal contempt ²⁰³²⁰⁴
statutes, in 1978 Congress enacted a civil contempt procedure, which is applicable only to ²⁰⁵
the Senate. The statute gives the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia jurisdiction
over a civil action to enforce, secure a declaratory judgment concerning the validity of, or to
prevent a threatened failure or refusal to comply with, any subpoena or order issued by the Senate
or a committee or subcommittee. Generally such a suit will be brought by the Senate Legal ²⁰⁶
Counsel, on behalf of the Senate or a Senate committee or subcommittee.
Pursuant to the statute, the Senate may “ask a court to directly order compliance with [a]
subpoena or order, or they may merely seek a declaration concerning the validity of [the]
subpoena or order. By first seeking a declaration, [the Senate would give] the party an ²⁰⁷
opportunity to comply before actually [being] ordered to do so by a court.” It is solely within ²⁰⁸
the discretion of the Senate whether or not to use such a two-step enforcement process.

²⁰⁰^In²⁰⁰⁷^,^t^h^{e Hou}^s^{e Jud}ⁱ^ci^ary^Co^mmi^t^t^{ee al}^so^h^e^l^d^f^o^rm^er^W^hⁱ^t^e^Ho^u^s^{e Cou}ⁿ^s^el^Harri^et^Mⁱ^{ers i}ⁿ^c^oⁿ^t^em^p^t^m^a^r^kⁱⁿ^g
^t^h^{e f}ⁱ^rst^tⁱ^m^{e t}^h^at^{a f}^o^r^m^{er E}^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^{e Bran}^ch^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^h^a^{s e}^v^{er b}^een^so^h^e^l^d^.
²⁰¹^M^r^.^Quiⁿⁿ^w^a^{s d}ⁱ^rect^ed^b^y^P^r^esi^d^en^t^Clⁱⁿ^t^oⁿ^t^o^assert^{a “p}^rot^ectⁱ^v^{e cl}^ai^m^o^f^p^rⁱ^vⁱ^l^e^ge,^”^w^hⁱ^c^h^{was ab}^an^d^oⁿ^e^d^aⁿ^d
ⁿ^e^{ver “}^f^o^r^malⁱ^zed^”^w^h^en^{a f}^l^o^o^r^vo^t^e^f^o^{r co}ⁿ^t^em^p^t^w^a^{s sch}^e^d^u^l^ed^an^d^t^h^{e do}^cu^m^eⁿ^t^{s i}ⁿ^qu^estⁱ^oⁿ^w^e^{re rel}^eased^.
²⁰²^Se^e^Fis^h^e^r^,^s^upr^a^no^t^e¹⁶^{9 at}¹¹^1-³⁴^.
²⁰³^T^h^{e i}ⁿ^ad^eq^u^aci^{es o}^f^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^h^e^ren^t^an^d^cri^mⁱⁿ^al^coⁿ^t^em^p^t^p^r^o^cedu^r^{es h}^a^d^b^een^reco^gnⁱ^zed^b^y^t^h^{e Co}ⁿ^g^{ress i}^t^s^el^f^,^t^h^e
^c^our^ts^{, a}ⁿ^d^by^s^t^ude^nts^of^the^s^u^bj^e^c^t^.^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^Re^pr^e^s^eⁿ^tatⁱ^oⁿ^of^C^ongr^e^s^s^aⁿ^d^C^o^ngr^e^s^sⁱ^on^{al I}ⁿ^te^r^e^s^t^s^Iⁿ^C^o^ur^t^,^th
^H^e^a^r^ing^s^be^f^o^r^e^the^Se^na^te^J^udicⁱ^a^r^y^Subc^om^m^itte^e^{on Se}^pa^r^a^tioⁿ^of^Pow^e^r^s^{, 94}^C^ong^{, 2}^d^S^e^ss.^,⁵^56-^{68 (}¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^;
^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^v^.^For^t^{, 44}³^F^.^2d⁶⁷⁰^,⁶⁷^7-⁷⁸⁽^D^.^C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁰⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁴^{03 U}^.^S.⁹³^{2 (}¹⁹⁷¹⁾^;^To^bⁱ^{n v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^,
³⁰⁶^F.^2d²^70,²⁷^5-^{76 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁶²⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,³⁷^{1 U.}^S^.⁹⁰²⁽¹⁹⁶²⁾^;^S^k^y^,^s^upr^a^no^t^e⁷⁷^.
²⁰⁴^Ethic^sⁱⁿ^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt A}^c^{t of}^1978,^P.L^.^95-⁵²^1,^§§⁷⁰^3,⁷⁰^5,⁹²^St^a^t^{. 18}^77-⁸⁰⁽¹⁹⁷⁸⁾⁽^c^o^d^if^ie^{d a}^s^a^m^e^nde^{d a}^t²
^U^.^S.C^.^{§§ 28}^8b(^b)²⁸^8d,^aⁿ^d²⁸^U^.^S.C^.^§¹³⁶⁴⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁾^.
²⁰⁵^T^h^{e co}ⁿ^f^eren^{ce rep}^o^r^t^acco^m^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e l}^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^oⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^h^est^a^b^lⁱ^s^h^e^d^t^h^{e p}^r^o^ced^u^r^{e exp}^l^aiⁿ^e^{d t}^h^at^t^h^{e rel}^e^van^t
^H^ous^e^c^oⁿ^nui^tte^e^s^ha^d^not^y^e^{t c}^o^ns^ide^r^e^d^t^h^e^pr^op^os^a^l^f^o^r^ju^dicⁱ^a^l^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^{t of}^H^ous^e^s^ubp^oe^na^s^.^H^.^R^e^pt.^95-¹⁷^56,^th
⁹⁵^Cong^.,²^d^Se^s^s^.,^{80 (}¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^.
²⁰⁶^A^lthoug^{h t}^h^e^Se^na^te^{or the}^c^o^m^m^itte^e^m^a^y^be^re^pre^s^eⁿ^te^{d by}^aⁿ^y^a^ttorne^y^de^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^t^e^d^by^the^Se^na^te^{, in m}^o^s^t^c^a^s^e^s
^s^u^c^h^aⁿ^a^c^tio^{n w}^{ill be}^bro^u^g^h^t^by^the^Se^na^te^L^e^g^a^{l Couns}^e^l^a^f^te^{r a}ⁿ^a^u^th^oriz^ing^re^s^o^l^u^tioⁿ^ha^s^be^eⁿ^a^dop^te^d^by^the
^Se^na^te^{. 2 U}^.^S.C^.^§²⁸^8b(^b)⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.^Se^e²⁸^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 1}³⁶⁴⁽^d⁾⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^{. A}^r^e^s^o^lutio^{n di}^r^e^c^ting^the^Se^na^te^L^e^g^a^{l C}^ouns^e^l^t^o
^br^ing^aⁿ^a^c^tⁱ^on^{to e}ⁿ^f^o^r^c^e^a^c^o^m^m^itte^e^or^s^ubc^om^m^itte^e^s^ubpoe^na^m^u^s^t^be^r^e^por^te^d^by^a^m^a^jor^ity^o^f^the^m^e^m^b^e^r^s
^vo^tⁱⁿ^g,^{a m}^a^j^o^ri^t^y^b^eⁱⁿ^{g p}^r^esen^t^,^o^f^t^h^{e f}^u^l^l^co^mmⁱ^t^t^ee.^T^h^{e rep}^o^r^t^fⁱ^l^e^d^b^y^t^h^{e co}^mmi^t^t^ee^m^u^st^coⁿ^t^aiⁿ^{a st}^at^em^en^t^o^f
⁽^a⁾^the^pr^oc^e^dur^e^e^m^ploy^e^d^{in is}^s^u^ing^t^h^e^s^u^b^poe^na^{; (}^b⁾^aⁿ^y^pr^iv^ile^g^e^s^or^obje^c^tio^ns^r^a^is^e^d^by^the^r^e^cipieⁿ^t^of^the
^su^b^p^o^eⁿ^a^;^{(c) t}^h^{e ext}^eⁿ^t^t^o^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^{e p}^a^rt^y^h^a^{s al}^read^y^co^m^p^lⁱ^e^d^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e su}^bp^o^eⁿ^a^;^an^{d (d}⁾^t^h^{e co}^m^p^aratⁱ^v^e
^effectⁱ^v^en^{ess o}^f^t^h^{e cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^an^d^ci^vi^l^st^at^u^t^o^r^y^coⁿ^t^em^p^t^p^r^o^ced^u^r^{es an}^d^{a t}^rⁱ^a^l^at^t^h^{e b}^a^r^o^f^t^h^{e S}^e^nat^e^.²^U.^S^.^C^.^§
²⁸⁸⁽^c⁾⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
²⁰⁷^S.R^e^pt.^N^o^.^95-¹⁷^0,⁹⁵^th^Co^ng^.,¹^st^Se^s^s^{., 8}⁹⁽¹⁹^77).
²⁰⁸^Id^.^a^t⁹⁰^.

Regardless of whether the Senate seeks the enforcement of, or a declaratory judgement ²⁰⁹
concerning a subpoena, the court will first review the subpoena’s validity. If the court finds that
the subpoena “does not meet applicable legal standards for enforcement,” it does not have
jurisdiction to enjoin the congressional proceeding. Because of the limited scope of the
jurisdictional statute and because of Speech or Debate Clause immunity for congressional ²¹⁰
investigations, “when the court is petitioned solely to enforce a congressional subpoena, the
court’s jurisdiction is limited to the matter Congress brings before it, that is whether or not to aid ²¹¹
Congress in enforcing the subpoena. If the individual still refuses to comply, he may be tried by ²¹²
the court in summary proceedings for contempt of court, with sanctions being imposed to ²¹³
coerce their compliance.
Without affecting the right of the Senate to institute criminal contempt proceedings or to try an ²¹⁴
individua1 for contempt at the bar of the Senate, this procedure gives the Senate the option of a ²¹⁵
civil action to enforce a subpoena. Civil contempt might be employed when the Senate is more
concerned with securing compliance with the subpoena or with clarifying legal issues than with
punishing the contemnor. Unlike criminal contempt, in a civil contempt, sanctions (imprisonment
and/or a fine) can be imposed until the subpoenaed party agrees to comply thereby creating an

²⁰⁹^Id^.^at⁴^.
²¹⁰^Se^e^U.^S^.^C^ONS^T^{. A}^r^{t. 1, § 6}^,^c^l^.^3.
²¹¹^S.R^e^pt.^N^o^.^95-¹⁷^0,⁹⁵^th^Co^ng^.,¹^st^Se^s^s^{., 9}⁴⁽¹⁹^77).
²¹²^A^s^the^sta^t^ute^m^a^k^e^{s c}^l^e^a^r^{, a}^pa^rty^r^e^f^u^sing^to^obe^y^the^c^ourt’s^ord^e^{r w}^{ill be}^{in c}^o^nte^m^{pt of}^the^c^ourt^,^no^{t of}
^C^ong^r^e^s^s^its^e^l^f^.^{28 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹³⁶⁴⁽^b)⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^;^{see a}^l^s^o^S.Re^{pt. N}^o^.⁹⁵^-1^70,⁹⁵^th^Cong^.,¹^st^Se^s^s^{., 4}¹^,⁹²^{. It}^is^a^l^s^o^w^o^rth
^notiⁿ^g^tha^t^t^h^e^Se^na^te^ha^sⁱⁿ^pla^c^e^a^s^t^a^nding^o^r^de^r^,^a^d^op^te^{d i}ⁿ¹⁹²⁸^{, t}^h^a^t^a^ppe^a^r^s^t^o^pr^ov^ide^t^h^e^a^u^th^or^ity^{, inde}^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^t
^o^f^t^h^{e ci}^vi^l^coⁿ^t^em^p^t^st^at^u^t^e,^f^o^{r a}^co^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee t}^o^{seek a}^co^u^r^t^o^r^d^e^{r t}^o^en^f^o^{rce i}^t^s^su^bp^o^eⁿ^a^s.^T^h^{e st}^an^dⁱⁿ^g^o^r^d^e^{r st}^at^es
^tha^t
^Re^solv^e^d^{, T}^h^a^t^he^re^a^f^te^{r a}ⁿ^y^c^o^m^m^itte^e^o^f^the^Se^na^te^{is he}^re^by^a^u^thoriz^e^d^to^bring^su^it^on^be^ha^lf
^o^f^an^dⁱⁿ^t^h^eⁿ^a^m^e^o^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es i}ⁿ^an^y^c^ourt^of^c^o^m^p^e^t^eⁿ^{t jurisdic}^ti^on^if^the^c^o^m^m^itte^e^{is of}
^t^h^{e op}ⁱⁿⁱ^o^{n t}^h^at^t^h^{e sui}^tⁱ^sⁿ^ecess^a^r^y^t^o^t^h^{e ad}^equ^a^t^e^p^e^rf^o^r^m^aⁿ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e p}^o^w^{ers vest}^edⁱⁿⁱ^t^o^r^t^h^e
^dutie^{s im}^pose^d^up^on^{it by}^the^Co^nstitutⁱ^oⁿ^{, re}^sol^u^ti^on^of^the^Se^na^t^e^{, or o}^t^he^{r la}^w^.^Suc^h^{suit m}^a^y^be
^br^o^u^g^h^{t a}ⁿ^{d pr}^os^e^c^u^te^{d t}^o^fⁱ^na^{l d}^e^te^r^m^ina^{tion ir}^r^e^s^p^e^c^tiv^e^of^w^h^e^t^he^r^or^not^the^Se^na^te^isⁱⁿ^s^e^s^sⁱ^on
^at^t^h^{e t}ⁱ^m^{e t}^h^{e su}ⁱ^tⁱ^s^b^r^ou^gh^t^o^r^t^h^ereaf^t^e^r.^T^h^{e co}^mmi^t^t^ee^m^a^{y b}^e^rep^r^esen^t^e^dⁱⁿ^t^h^{e sui}^t^ei^t^h^{er b}^y
^su^ch^at^t^o^rⁿ^ey^{s as i}^t^m^a^y^d^e^si^gn^at^e^o^r^b^y^su^ch^o^f^fⁱ^{cers o}^f^t^h^{e Dep}^a^rt^men^t^o^f^Ju^stⁱ^{ce as t}^h^{e A}^t^t^o^rn^ey
^G^e^ne^r^a^{l m}^a^y^de^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^t^e^{upon t}^h^e^r^e^que^s^t^of^the^c^o^m^m^ittee^.^N^o^e^x^pe^ndit^u^re^s^s^h^a^ll^be^m^a^deⁱⁿ
^c^onne^c^tio^{n w}^{ith a}ⁿ^y^s^u^c^h^s^u^itⁱⁿ^e^x^c^e^s^s^o^f^the^a^m^{ount of}^f^unds^a^v^a^ila^ble^to^the^s^a^{id c}^o^m^m^itte^e^.^A^s
^use^dⁱⁿ^this^re^solutⁱ^oⁿ^{, t}^h^e^te^rm^“^c^om^m^itte^e^’’^m^e^aⁿ^{s a}ⁿ^y^sta^nding^{or spe}^cⁱ^a^l^c^o^m^m^itte^e^of^the
^Se^na^te^{, or}^aⁿ^y^duly^a^u^thor^iz^e^d^s^u^bc^om^m^itte^e^the^r^e^o^f^,^or^the^Se^na^te^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^of^aⁿ^y^joint
^c^o^m^m^itte^e^.
^Se^e^{S. J}^o^ur^.⁵⁷^2,^70-^1,^Ma^y^{28, 1}⁹²⁸^{. I}^t^is^uⁿ^c^l^e^a^r^w^h^a^t^ef^f^e^c^t^{, if}^any^,^the^pa^s^s^a^g^e^of^the^cⁱ^v^{il c}^onte^m^{pt pr}^oc^e^dur^eⁱⁿ
¹⁹⁷⁸^ha^s^ha^d^on^th^is^Staⁿ^ding^O^r^de^r^.^T^h^e^Staⁿ^ding^O^r^de^r^a^p^pe^a^r^s^t^o^ha^v^e^ne^v^e^r^be^eⁿ^inv^o^k^e^{d a}^nd,^t^h^e^r^e^f^or^e^,^its
^v^a^lidity^re^m^a^{ins a}ⁿ^ope^{n q}^u^e^s^tioⁿ^.
²¹³^{28 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹³⁶⁴⁽^b)⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
²¹⁴^No^t^on^l^y^d^o^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^h^e^ren^t^and^cri^mⁱⁿ^al^coⁿ^t^em^p^t^p^r^o^ced^u^r^{es rem}^aⁱⁿ^avai^l^a^b^l^{e as an}^al^t^e^rn^atⁱ^v^{e t}^o^t^h^e^ci^vi^l^coⁿ^t^em^p^t
^mech^anⁱ^s^m^,^b^u^t^t^h^{e l}^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^v^{e h}ⁱ^st^o^r^yⁱⁿ^dⁱ^cat^{es t}^h^at^t^h^{e ci}^vi^l^an^d^crⁱ^mⁱⁿ^al^st^at^u^t^{es co}^u^l^d^b^o^t^h^b^e^em^p^l^o^y^edⁱⁿ^t^h^{e sam}^e
^case.^“On^{ce a co}^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee i}ⁿ^ve^stⁱ^g^atⁱ^oⁿ^h^a^{s t}^e^rmⁱⁿ^at^ed^,^{a cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^c^oⁿ^t^em^p^t^o^f^Coⁿ^g^{ress ci}^t^a^tⁱ^o^{n un}^{der 2}^U.^S^.^C^.^{§ 19}²
^mⁱ^g^h^{t still be}^re^f^e^rre^{d to t}^h^e^Justi^c^e^De^pa^rt^m^e^{nt if}^the^C^ong^re^{ss f}ⁱ^{nds this a}^ppr^opria^te^.^Suc^h^pr^ose^c^u^tⁱ^{on f}^o^{r c}^r^im^ina^l^th^st
^c^onte^m^{pt w}^{ould pr}^e^s^eⁿ^tⁿ^o^d^o^u^b^l^e^je^opa^r^d^y^pr^oble^m^.”^S.R^e^{pt. N}^o^.^95-¹⁷^0,⁹⁵^Cong^.,¹^Se^ss.,⁹⁵⁽^c^ita^tions^om^itte^d);^th^st
^{see a}^l^so^He^a^r^ing^s^Be^f^o^re^the^Se^na^te^Com^m^itte^e^{on G}^o^v^e^rn^m^e^nta^l^Aff^a^{irs on S. 5}⁵⁵^,⁹⁵^Cong^.,¹^Se^s^s^.,⁷⁹^8-⁸⁰⁰
⁽¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^[h^ereiⁿ^a^f^t^{er Ci}^vi^l^Coⁿ^t^emp^t^Heariⁿ^g].
²¹⁵^For^a^m^o^r^e^de^ta^ile^{d a}ⁿ^a^l^y^s^is^of^the^cⁱ^v^{il c}^onte^m^{pt pr}^oc^e^dur^e^a^{nd a}^c^o^m^p^a^r^is^{on w}^{ith the}^ot^he^r^o^p^ti^on^s^a^v^a^ila^ble^{to the}
^Se^na^te^w^h^eⁿ^f^a^ce^{d w}^{ith a}^c^onte^m^pt,^Se^e^S.R^e^pt.^N^o^.⁹⁵^-¹^70,⁹⁵^th^Cong^.,¹^st^Se^s^s^{., 1}⁶^-^21,⁴⁰^-⁴^1,^88-⁹⁷^;^{see a}^l^so^Civ^il
^C^onte^m^{pt H}^e^a^r^ing^,^s^upr^a^no^t^e²¹²^,^at⁵⁹^-⁶²^,⁶⁹^et^seq^.⁽^s^ta^te^m^e^{nt of}^Se^na^tor^A^bour^e^z^k^a^{nd a}^tta^c^h^m^e^nts⁾^{; 1}^{23 C}^ONG^.
^R^EC^{. 20,}⁹⁵^6-²¹^,0¹⁹⁽^J^une²⁷^{, 1}⁹⁷⁷⁾^.

incentive for compliance; namely, the termination of punishment.²¹⁶ Since the statute’s enactment
in 1979, the Senate has authorized the Office of Senate Legal Counsel to seek civil enforcement
of a subpoena for documents or testimony at least 6 times, the last in 1995. None has been against
executive branch officials.
The civil contempt process is arguably more expeditious than a criminal proceeding, where a
court may more closely scrutinize congressional procedures and give greater weight to the
defendant’s constitutional rights. The civil contempt procedure also provides an element of
flexibility, allowing the subpoenaed party to raise possible constitutional and other defenses (e.g.,
the privilege against self-incrimination, lack of compliance with congressional procedures, or an ²¹⁷
inability to comply with the subpoena) without risking a criminal prosecution.
Civil contempt, however, has limitations. Most notable is that the statute granting jurisdiction to
the courts to hear such cases is, by its terms, inapplicable in the case of a subpoena issued to an ²¹⁸
officer or employee of the federal government acting in their official capacity. Enacted as part
of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, early drafts of the civil contempt statute did not include
an exception for federal government officers and employees acting within the scope of their
duties. It appears that the section was drafted primarily in response to the District Court’s
dismissal, for lack of jurisdiction, of an Ervin Committee’s request for a declaratory judgment ²¹⁹
regarding the lawfulness of its subpoena of President Nixon’s tape recordings. Thus, one of the
purposes of the statute was to expressly confer jurisdiction upon courts to determine the validity
of congressional requests for information.
During the course of the debates regarding this legislation, the executive branch strongly opposed
conferring jurisdiction upon the federal courts to decide such sensitive issues between Congress
and the executive branch. Testifying before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Governmental Operations, then-Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia argued that weighing
the legislature’s need for information against the executive’s need for confidentiality is “the very ²²⁰
type of ‘political question’ from which ... the courts [should] abstain.” In response, Congress

²¹⁶^T^h^{e act sp}^ecifⁱ^{es th}^{at “an}^actioⁿ^,^coⁿ^t^em^p^t^p^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^,^o^r^san^c^ti^oⁿ^{.... s}^h^{all n}^o^{t ab}^ate^u^p^oⁿ^ad^jo^u^rⁿ^m^en^{t sin}^e^dⁱ^{e b}^y
^the^Se^na^te^a^t^t^h^e^eⁿ^d^of^a^Cong^re^{ss if}^the^Se^na^te^{or t}^h^e^c^o^m^m^itte^e^{or subc}^om^m^itte^e^{... c}^e^r^tif^ie^{s to the}^c^{ourt t}^h^a^t^it
^m^a^inta^{ins its i}ⁿ^te^re^{st in se}^c^u^ri^ng^t^h^e^doc^um^eⁿ^{ts, a}ⁿ^sw^e^r^s,^or^te^s^tim^ony^dur^ing^s^u^c^h^a^d^j^our^nm^eⁿ^t.”²⁸^U^.^S.C^.^§¹³⁶⁴⁽^b⁾
⁽²⁰^00).^{In t}^h^e^fⁱ^{rst c}^a^s^e^broug^ht^u^nde^r^t^h^e^ne^w^proc^e^dure^,^the^w^itne^{ss unsuc}^c^e^ssf^ull^y^a^r^g^u^e^d^tha^t^the^possibi^lity^of
^“ⁱ^nde^fⁱ^nite^inc^a^r^c^e^r^a^tion”^vⁱ^ola^t^e^d^the^due^pr^oc^e^s^s^aⁿ^d^e^qua^l^pr^o^t^e^c^tion^pr^ov^is^io^ns^of^the^C^ons^ti^tuti^{on, a}^{nd a}^l^l^o^w^e^{d f}^o^r
^c^r^ue^l^a^{nd un}^us^ua^{l pu}^nis^h^m^e^nt.^Ap^plic^ati^oⁿ^of^the^U^.^S.^Se^na^te^Pe^r^m^ane^nt^S^ubc^om^m^itte^e^{on I}ⁿ^v^e^s^tiga^t^ions^{, 65}⁵^F^.²^d
¹²³²^(D.C^{. Cir.),}^c^e^r^{t. de}^nie^d^,⁴⁵^{4 U}^.^S.¹⁰⁸⁴⁽¹⁹⁸¹⁾^.
²¹⁷^S.R^e^pt.^N^o^.^95-¹⁷^0,⁹⁵^th^Co^ng^.,¹^st^Se^s^s^.,⁹³^.
²¹⁸^{28 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹³⁶⁴⁽^a⁾⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^{. T}^h^e^s^t^a^t^utor^y^e^x^ce^{ption w}^a^s^e^x^plaⁱ^ne^{d in t}^h^e^Se^na^te^’^s^R^e^p^o^r^t^a^s^f^o^llow^s^:
^T^h^{is jurisdic}^ti^ona^{l sta}^t^ute^a^p^plie^s^{to a}^su^bp^oe^na^di^re^c^t^e^d^{to a}ⁿ^y^na^tura^{l pe}^rsoⁿ^or^eⁿ^tity^a^c^ting^un^de^r
^co^l^o^r^o^f^st^at^{e o}^r^l^o^cal^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^t^y^.^By^t^h^{e sp}^eci^fⁱ^{c t}^e^r^m^{s o}^f^t^h^{e j}^u^ri^sdⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^st^at^u^t^e,ⁱ^t^do^{es n}^o^t^app^l^y
^{to a}^s^u^bp^oe^na^di^r^e^c^t^e^d^{to a}ⁿ^of^fⁱ^ce^r^or^e^m^ploy^e^e^of^the^Fe^de^r^a^{l G}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt a}^c^ting^w^{ithin his}
^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^cap^aci^t^y^.^In^t^h^{e l}^a^st^Con^g^{ress t}^h^{ere was p}^eⁿ^dⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^t^h^{e Commi}^t^t^{ee o}ⁿ^G^o^vern^m^eⁿ^t
^O^p^e^r^a^tions^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^tio^{n d}ⁱ^r^e^c^tly^a^d^dr^e^s^sⁱ^ng^the^pr^ob^le^m^s^as^s^o^cⁱ^a^t^e^d^w^{ith obta}ⁱⁿⁱ^ng^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^om
^t^h^{e execu}^tⁱ^v^{e b}^r^an^ch^.⁽^Se^e^S^.²¹⁷⁰^{, “}^T^he^C^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l R}ⁱ^g^h^{t t}^o^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion A}^c^t”⁾^.^T^h^is^e^x^c^e^p^tion
^{in t}^h^e^s^t^a^t^ute^is^not^inte^nde^d^to^be^a^c^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l f}ⁱ^ndi^ng^tha^t^the^f^e^de^r^a^{l c}^our^ts^d^o^notⁿ^o^w^ha^v^e
^t^h^{e au}^t^h^o^rⁱ^t^y^t^o^h^{ear a ci}^vi^l^actⁱ^{on t}^o^en^f^o^{rce a su}^bp^o^eⁿ^a^agaiⁿ^s^t^an^o^f^fⁱ^{cer o}^r^em^p^l^o^y^{ee o}^f^t^h^e
^f^e^de^r^a^{l g}^ove^rⁿ^m^e^{nt. H}^o^w^e^ve^r^,^if^the^f^e^de^r^a^{l c}^our^ts^doⁿ^o^t^now^ha^v^e^this^a^u^t^h^o^r^ity^{, this}^s^t^a^t^ute^doe^s
^{not c}^onf^e^r^it.
^S.R^e^pt.^N^o^{. 95-}¹⁷^{0, 95}^th^Co^ng^{., 1}^st^Se^s^s^.,^91-⁹²
²¹⁹^Se^e^Seⁿ^a^te^Se^le^c^t^Commit^t^e^e^on^Pre^s^ideⁿ^tial^Camp^ai^{gn Ac}^tⁱ^v^itie^{s v}^.^Nix^oⁿ^,³⁶⁶^{F. S}^u^p^p^.⁵¹⁽^D^.D^.C^.¹⁹⁷³⁾^.
²²⁰^E^xecu^tⁱ^{ve P}^rⁱ^vⁱ^l^e^g^e^-S^{ecrecy i}ⁿ^Go^vern^m^en^t^:^Hea^rⁱⁿ^g^s^B^e^f^o^{re t}^h^e^Subc^om^m^.^oⁿ^Iⁿ^te^r^gov^e^r^nm^eⁿ^t^a^l^Re^latio^ns^o^f^the
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

amended the proposed legislation excluding from its scope federal officers and employees acting
in their official capacity. However, as noted in a report from the House Judiciary Committee in

1988, the exclusion was to apply only in cases in which the President had directed the recipient of ²²¹

the subpoena not to comply with its terms.
While the House of Representatives cannot pursue actions under the Senate’s civil contempt
statute discussed above, there are numerous examples of the House, by resolution, affording
special investigatory committees authority not ordinarily available to its standing committees.
Such special panels have often been vested with staff deposition authority, and given the
particular circumstances, special panels have also been vested with the authority to obtain tax
information, as well as the authority to seek international assistance in information gathering ²²²
efforts abroad. In addition, several special panels have been specifically granted the authority ²²³
to seek judicial orders and participate in judicial proceedings.
For example, in 1987, the House authorized the creation of a select committee to investigate the
covert arms transactions with Iran (Iran-Contra). As part of this resolution, the House provided
the following authorization:
⁽³⁾^T^h^{e s}^e^l^ect^com^mⁱ^t^t^{ee i}^s^a^u^t^h^ori^{zed ... t}^o^requⁱ^r^e^by^su^bpoen^a^{or ot}^h^e^r^wⁱ^s^{e t}^h^{e at}^t^eⁿ^d^an^c^e
^an^{d tes}^tⁱ^m^oⁿ^y^o^f^s^u^c^h^wⁱ^tⁿ^es^s^e^s^{... as}^{it deem}^sⁿ^ece^s^s^a^r^y^{, i}ⁿ^cl^u^d^ing^{all i}ⁿ^t^e^llig^eⁿ^{ce m}^a^terⁱ^als
^h^o^w^e^v^e^{r cla}^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^{ed, White Ho}^u^s^e^m^a^terial^s^,^{... an}^{d to obtai}^{n ev}^iden^ce^{in oth}^e^{r appropriate}
^couⁿ^t^ries^wⁱ^t^h^th^{e cooperation of}^th^eir^g^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^s^.^{... (8) T}^h^{e s}^e^{lect co}^m^m^{ittee s}^h^{all be}
^au^t^h^ori^{zed t}^o^res^pon^{d t}^o^an^y^j^udi^ci^al^or^ot^h^e^{r proces}^s^,^or^t^o^m^a^k^e^{any ap}^plⁱ^c^atⁱ^ons^t^o^cour^t^,²²⁴
^u^pon^con^s^u^ltatⁱ^on^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e Speak}^{er con}^sⁱ^s^tent^wⁱ^t^h^[Hou^s^e^]^ru^{le L}^.
The combination of broad subpoena authority, that expressly encompassed the White House, and
the ability to make “any applications to court,” arguably suggests that the House contemplated the
possibility that a civil suit seeking enforcement of a subpoena against a White House official was
possible. By virtue of the resolution’s language, it appears reasonable to conclude that the House
decided to leave the decision in the hands of the select committee, consistent with House Rule L ²²⁵
(now House Rule VIII governing subpoenas). It may be noted, then, that while the House select
committee did not attempt to seek judicial enforcement of any of its subpoenas, the authorization
resolution did not preclude the possibility.
Among the more prominent attempts at utilizing the authority to make applications in court
granted by a House of Congress to a select committee occurred during the investigation into the

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^Se^nate^C^o^m^m^.^oⁿ^G^o^v^e^r^nm^eⁿ^{t O}^p^e^r^atio^ns^{, 94}^th^Cong^.,¹^st^Se^s^s^.,¹^{17 (}¹⁹⁷⁵⁾^.
²²¹^C^l^ar^ifyⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^e^Iⁿ^v^e^s^tig^ator^y^P^o^w^e^r^s^{of the}^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^C^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^,^H^.^R^e^{pt. 10}^0-¹⁰⁴⁰^{, 10}⁰^th^Cong^{. 2}^d^Se^s^s^.,²
⁽¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^.
²²²^Se^e^s^upr^a^no^t^e¹⁹^;^{see a}^l^s^oⁱⁿ^f^r^aⁿ^o^t^{es 22}⁸^-²³²^and^acco^m^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g^t^e^xt^.
²²³^Id^.
²²⁴^Se^e^H^.^Re^s^.¹²^{, 1}⁰⁰^th^Co^ng^.,¹^st^S^e^s^s^{., §§}^3,^{8 (}¹⁹⁸⁷⁾⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^d^d^e^d)^.
²²⁵^T^h^{is re}^soluti^{on w}^a^{s initia}^lly^a^dde^{d to}^the^H^ouse^Rule^{s a}^s^Ru^le^L^b^y^the⁹⁷^th^Con^g^ress.^Se^e^H^.^R^e^s^.^5,⁹⁷^th^Co^ng^.
⁽¹⁹⁸¹⁾^.^T^h^e¹⁰⁶^th^Coⁿ^g^{ress re-co}^dⁱ^fⁱ^ed^th^{e rules an}^d^t^h^is^p^r^o^v^ision^b^{ecame Ho}^u^s^{e Ru}^le^V^III,^w^h^ich^{is w}^h^{ere it re}^m^aⁱⁿ^s^th
^toda^y^a^s^am^e^nde^d.^Se^e^H^.^R^e^s^.^5,¹⁰⁶^C^o^ng^{. (}¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^.

Iran-Contra affair. In 1987, the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and
the Nicaraguan Opposition issued an order requiring that former Major Richard V. Secord execute
a consent directive authorizing the release of his offshore bank records and accounts to the ²²⁶
Committee. When Mr. Secord refused to sign the consent directive, the Committee sought to ²²⁷
obtain a court order directing him to comply. While the Committee did not prevail in the
Secord litigation, the matter was not disposed of on jurisdictional grounds. Specifically, the
district court noted its jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1364, as Mr. Secord was a private
citizen. Moreover, there is no mention or indication of any challenge to the Committee’s ability to
seek such an order. Rather, the case was decided on Fifth Amendment grounds, with the court ²²⁸
holding that there was a testimonial aspect to requiring the signing of the consent directive.
Thus, the court concluded that the Committee’s order was a violation of Mr. Secord’s Fifth ²²⁹
Amendment right against self-incrimination.
A review of modern House precedents indicates at least 5 other special or select committees that
have been granted, via House resolution, both subpoena authority as well as the ability to seek ²³⁰
and participate in judicial actions. These include The October Surprise Investigation; The ²³¹²³²
White House Travel Office Inquiry; The House Campaign Finance Investigation; The Select ²³³
Committee on National Security Commercial Concerns; and The Teamsters Election ²³⁴
Investigation. Again, while there is no record to indicate that any of these committees utilized
their authority to participate in judicial proceedings to bring a civil subpoena enforcement action,
the resolution language appears to indicate that such a suit was authorized by the full House.
A potential hurdle to a resolution by the House of Representatives authorizing the pursuit of a
civil court order is the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Such jurisdiction, specifically federal
district court jurisdiction, where a civil action for enforcement of a congressional subpoena would
be brought, is derived from both Article III of the Constitution and federal statute. Article III of
the Constitution states, in relevant part, that “[t]he Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in ²³⁵
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States ....” The
Supreme Court has interpreted the language “arising under” broadly, essentially permitting
federal jurisdiction to be found whenever federal law “is a potentially important ingredient of a ²³⁶²³⁷
case.” Conversely, the federal-question jurisdiction statute, first enacted in 1875, while

²²⁶^Se^na^te^Se^le^c^t^Committe^e^on^Se^c^r^e^t^M^ilitary^Assistanc^e^t^o^Iraⁿ^an^d^the^Nic^a^r^a^g^uan^Op^positi^on^v^.^Se^c^o^rd^{, 66}⁴
^F.Su^pp^{. 5}⁶²^,⁵⁶³^(D^.D^.C.¹⁹^87).
²²⁷^Id^.
²²⁸^Id^.^a^t⁵⁶^4-⁶⁵^.
²²⁹^Id^.^at⁵⁶⁶^.^T^h^{e r}^u^lⁱⁿ^{g w}^a^{s n}^o^t^app^eal^ed^b^ecau^{se o}^f^t^h^{e t}ⁱ^m^{e st}^ri^ct^u^r^{es i}^m^p^o^s^ed^oⁿ^t^h^{e Hou}^s^{e an}^d^S^eⁿ^a^t^e^S^e^l^ect
^C^o^m^m^itte^e^’^s^inquir^y^{. I}^t^m^a^y^be^note^d^t^h^a^tⁱⁿ¹⁹⁸⁸^t^h^e^Su^pr^e^m^e^C^our^{t a}^d^opte^d^the^Se^na^te^’^s^a^r^g^u^m^eⁿ^t^{in a}^dif^f^e^r^e^nt
^case,^h^o^l^dⁱⁿ^g^t^h^at^s^u^ch^{a di}^rectⁱ^v^{e i}^sⁿ^o^t^t^e^stⁱ^m^oⁿⁱ^alⁱⁿⁿ^a^t^u^re.^Se^e^Do^{e v.}^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^a^t^es^,⁴⁸^{7 U.}^S^.²⁰¹⁽¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^.
²³⁰^Se^e^H^.^R^e^s^.²⁵^8,¹⁰^2d^C^o^ng^{., 1}^st^Se^s^s^.,⁽¹⁹⁹¹⁾^.
²³¹^Se^e^H^.^R^e^s^.³⁶^9,¹⁰⁴^th^Cong^.,²^d^Se^s^s^{., (19}⁹⁶⁾^.
²³²^Se^e^H^.^R^e^s^.¹⁶^7,¹⁰⁵^th^Cong^.,¹^st^Se^s^s^.,⁽¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^.
²³³^Se^e^H^.^R^e^s^.⁴⁶^3,¹⁰⁵^th^Cong^.,²^d^Se^s^s^{., (19}⁹⁸⁾^.
²³⁴^Se^e^H^.^R^e^s^.⁵⁰^7,¹⁰⁵^th^Cong^.,²^d^Se^s^s^{., (19}⁹⁸⁾^.
²³⁵^U.^S^.^C^ONS^T^{., A}^r^{t. III, §}²^,^cl^{. 1}^.
²³⁶^Se^e^E^RWI^N^C^HE^M^E^R^I^N^S^KY^,^F^ED^ER^A^L^J^URI^S^DI^C^T^I^O^N^{, 264 (}^{3d E}^d^.¹⁹⁹⁹^{) (c}^iting^O^s^b^o^rⁿ^v^.^Ba^nk^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^{, 22}
^U^.^{S. (}⁹^W^h^e^a^t^.)⁷³^{8 (}¹⁸²⁴⁾⁾^.
²³⁷^Se^e^A^c^{t of}^Ma^r^.^{3, 1}⁸⁷⁵^{, c}^h^{. 1}³⁷^,¹⁸^Sta^t^.⁴⁷^{0 (}^c^o^d^if^ie^{d a}^s^a^m^e^nde^{d a}^t²⁸^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 1}³³¹⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁽^s^ta^tⁱ^ng^tha^t^“^[^t^]^he
^distric^t^c^o^{urts sha}^ll^ha^v^e^orig^ina^l^j^u^risdic^ti^on^of^a^{ll c}ⁱ^v^il^a^c^tions^a^r^is^ing^un^de^r^t^h^e^C^ons^t^itu^tⁱ^oⁿ^{, la}^w^s^{, or tre}^a^tie^{s of}^the
^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es.^”^).

containing almost identical language to Article III, has been interpreted by the Court to be much
narrower in scope. As the Court explained in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria:
^A^l^t^h^o^u^gh^t^h^{e l}^a^ngu^ag^{e o}^f¹³³^{1 paral}^l^e^l^s^t^h^at^of^t^h^e^“A^ri^sⁱ^ng^Uⁿ^{der” C}^l^a^u^s^e^of^A^r^t^.^{III, t}^hⁱ^s
^Co^ur^t^ne^ve^r^ha^s^he^l^d^t^h^a^t^st^a^t^ut^o^r^y^“a^rⁱ^siⁿ^g^und^e^r^”^j^u^rⁱ^sdⁱ^c^tⁱ^o^{n i}^sⁱ^d^eⁿ^tⁱ^c^a^l^t^o^A^r^t^.^III^“^a^ri^sⁱ^ng
^uⁿ^d^{er” j}^u^ris^d^iction^.^{Quite th}^e^con^t^rar^y^is^tru^e^{. ... [T]h}^{e m}^a^ny^li^m^itations^w^h^ich^h^a^v^e^been
^{placed on}^j^u^ris^d^iction^un^{der 13}^{31 are}ⁿ^o^{t li}^m^itatioⁿ^s^on^th^{e c}^oⁿ^s^tⁱ^t^u^ti^oⁿ^a^l^p^o^w^e^r^o^f^C^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s
^{to con}^f^{er j}^u^ris^d^iction^on^t^h^e^f^e^{deral cou}^r^ts^...^A^r^{t. III “}^a^risⁱⁿ^g^uⁿ^d^{er” j}^u^ris^d^ictionⁱ^s^broader²³⁸
^th^an^f^e^deral-^q^u^es^tioⁿ^j^u^ris^d^icti^on^un^{der 133}^{1 ....”}
The fact that the statutory jurisdiction provided by Congress is narrower than the Constitution’s
grant of judicial power may give rise to an argument that the statutory grant of jurisdiction cannot
be used by the House should it merely adopt a resolution authorizing a subpoena enforcement
proceeding to be brought in court. Following this argument to its conclusion might suggest that
both Houses of Congress must pass a law, signed by the President, which authorizes a civil
enforcement action to be brought in federal district court because a mere one-House resolution
will not suffice to provide such jurisdiction.
We have found no court or commentator that has expressly adopted this argument. It therefore
remains unclear whether the existing statutory language for jurisdiction can be definitively said to
be inadequate. Rather, the limited Supreme Court and other federal court precedent that exists
may be read to suggest that the current statutory basis is sufficient to establish jurisdiction for a
civil action of the type contemplated here if the representative of the congressional committee is
specifically authorized by a House of Congress to act.
In 1928, the Supreme Court decided Reed v. The County Commissioners of Delaware County, ²³⁹
Pennsylvania, which involved a special committee of the United States Senate charged, by
Senate resolution, with investigating the means used to influence the nomination of candidates for ²⁴⁰
the Senate. The special committee was authorized to “require by subpoena or otherwise the
attendance of witnesses, the production of books, papers, and documents, and to do such other ²⁴¹
acts as may be necessary in the matter of said investigation.” During the course of its
investigation into the disputed election of William B. Wilson of Pennsylvania to the Senate, the
committee sought to obtain the “boxes, ballots, and other things used in connection with the ²⁴²
election.” The County Commissioners, who were the legal custodians of said materials, refused
to provide them to the committee, thus necessitating the lawsuit. The Supreme Court, after
affirming the powers of the Senate to “obtain evidence related to matter committed to it by the ²⁴³²⁴⁴
Constitution” and having “passed laws calculated to facilitate such investigations,”
nevertheless held that it was without jurisdiction to decide the case. The Senate had relied on the
resolution’s phrase “such other acts as may be necessary” to justify its authority to bring such a
suit. According to the Court, however, that phrase “may not be taken to include everything that

²³⁸^Ve^r^lindeⁿ^B.V^.^v^.^C^e^ntr^a^{l B}^ank^o^f^Nⁱ^ge^rⁱ^a^,⁴^{61 U}^.^S.⁴⁸^0,⁴⁹^4-⁹⁵⁽¹⁹⁸³⁾⁽ⁱ^nte^r^na^l^qu^ota^tⁱ^{on m}^a^r^k^s^{and c}^ita^ti^ons
^om^itte^d).
²³⁹²⁷^{7 U}^.^S^.³⁷⁶⁽¹⁹²⁸⁾^.
²⁴⁰^Id^.^a^t³⁷^{8 (}^c^iti^ng^{S. R}^e^s¹⁹^5,⁶⁹^th^Cong^.,¹^st^{Sess. (1}⁹²⁶^)).
²⁴¹^Id^.^a^t³⁷^8-⁷⁹^.
²⁴²^Id^.^a^t³⁸^7.
²⁴³^Id^.^a^t³⁸^{8 (}^c^iti^ng^M^c^G^r^{ain v}^.^D^a^ughe^r^t^y^,²⁷^{3 U}^.^S^.¹³⁵^,¹^60-¹⁷^{4 (}¹⁹²⁷⁾⁾^.
²⁴⁴^Id^.⁽^c^iti^ng^R^.^S.^§^§¹^01-¹⁰^{4, (}^c^odi^fⁱ^e^d^a^s^am^e^nde^{d a}^t^{2 U}^.^S.C^.^§^§¹^92,¹⁹^{4 (}²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁾⁾^.

under any circumstances might be covered by its words.”²⁴⁵ As a result, the Court held that “the
Senate did not intend to authorize the committee, or anticipate that there might be need, to invoke ²⁴⁶
the power of the Judicial Department. Petitioners are not ‘authorized by law to sue.’” The
Court in Reed made no mention of the jurisdictional statute that existed at the time. Rather, the
Court appears to have relied on the fact that the Senate did not specifically authorize the
committee to sue; therefore, absent particular language granting the power to sue in court, there ²⁴⁷
can be no basis for judicial jurisdiction over such a suit. Read in this manner, Reed appears to
suggest that had the Senate resolution specifically mentioned the power to sue, the Court may
have accepted jurisdiction and decided the case on its merits. Such a reading of Reed is supported
by a recent district court ruling involving the question of whether Congress authorized judicial
enforcement of Member demands for information from executive branch agencies.
In Waxman v. Thompson, a 2006 opinion of the District Court for the Central District of ²⁴⁸
California, the plaintiffs, all minority members of the House Government Reform Committee,
sought a court order pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 2954 and 7211–often times referred to as the “rule of
seven”–granting them access to Department of Health and Human Services records related to the
anticipated costs of the Medicare Prescription Drug Implementation and Modernization Act of ²⁴⁹
2003. The court, in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, addressed the argument made
by the plaintiffs that 5 U.S.C. § 2954, which requires that “[a]n Executive agency, on request of
the Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives, or of any seven
members thereof ... shall submit any information requested of it relating to any matter within the ²⁵⁰
jurisdiction of the committee,” implicitly delegated to Members to right to sue to enforce their ²⁵¹
informational demands. The court, in rejecting this argument, relied on the Supreme Court’s ²⁵²
holding in Reed v. County Commissioners. Specifically, the court noted that Reed’s holding
“put Congress on notice that it was necessary to make authorization to sue to enforce ²⁵³
investigatory demands explicit if it wished to ensure that such power existed.” According to the
court, like the Senate resolution at issue in Reed, because § 2954 is silent with respect to civil
enforcement it stands to reason that the Congress never intended to provide the Members with the
power to seek civil judicial orders to enforce their document demands.
The argument that a mere one-house resolution is not sufficient to provide jurisdiction also
derives support from the ruling in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. ²⁵⁴
Nixon, a 1973 decision by the District Court for the District of Columbia. In Senate Select
Committee, the court held that there was no jurisdictional statute available that authorizes the
court to hear and decide the merits of the Committee’s request for a declaratory judgment,
mandatory injunction, and writ of mandamus arising from President Nixon’s refusal to produce
tape recording and other documents sought by the Committee pursuant to a subpoena duces

²⁴⁵^Id^.^a^t³⁸^9.
²⁴⁶^Id^.
²⁴⁷^It^ap^p^{ears t}^h^at^t^h^{e C}^o^u^r^t^’^s^d^eci^si^oⁿⁱⁿ^R^eed^pr^om^pte^d^the^Se^na^te^t^o^a^d^o^p^t^its^Staⁿ^di^ng^O^r^de^r^.^S^{ee sup}^r^a^note²⁰^9.
²⁴⁸^W^a^x^m^{an v}^.^Th^om^ps^oⁿ^{, N}^o^{. 0}⁴^-³⁴⁶⁷^{, s}^lⁱ^p^o^p^{. (C}^.D^{. Ca}^{l. J}^u^ly^{24, 2}⁰⁰⁶^).
²⁴⁹^Id^.^at²^.
²⁵⁰^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 2}⁹⁵⁴⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d)^.
²⁵¹^W^a^x^m^{an v}^.^Th^om^ps^oⁿ^{, N}^o^{. 0}⁴^-³⁴⁶⁷^{, s}^lⁱ^p^o^p^{. a}^t²¹^(C.D^{. Ca}^l.^J^u^ly^24,²⁰⁰⁶^).
²⁵²^Id^.^a^t²¹^{, n}^.⁴²^.
²⁵³^Id^.
²⁵⁴³⁶^{6 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.^{51 (D}^.D^.C^{. 1}⁹⁷³^).

tecum.²⁵⁵ In reaching its conclusion, the court addressed several potential bases for jurisdiction:
28 U.S.C. § 1345, United States as a Plaintiff; 28 U.S.C. § 1361, Action to Compel an Officer of
the United States to Perform His Duty; 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, the Administrative Procedure Act; ²⁵⁶
and, of particular relevance here, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the federal question jurisdiction statute.
Focusing on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the court noted that the statute at the time contained a minimum ²⁵⁷
“amount in controversy” requirement of “$10,000 exclusive of interest and costs.” The court
stated that “[t]he satisfaction of a minimum amount-in-controversy is not a technicality; it is a ²⁵⁸
requirement imposed by Congress which the courts may not dispense with at their pleasure.”
Because the Select Committee could not establish a theory under which the amount in
controversy requirement was satisfied, the court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter ²⁵⁹
jurisdiction.
Senate Select Committee may still be cited for the proposition that, absent a specific
congressional enactment, Congress may not seek to enforce a subpoena in federal court. It is
important to note, however, that not only have subsequent cases held that “[w]here fundamental
constitutional rights are involved, this court has been willing to find satisfaction of the ²⁶⁰
jurisdictional amount requirement for federal question jurisdiction,” but also that Congress
specifically removed the amount in controversy requirement for federal question jurisdiction in ²⁶¹
1980. Given these developments, combined with the reading of Reed v. County Commissioners
suggested above, it appears possible to argue that a specifically authorized congressional
committee may bring a civil action to enforce a subpoena using 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as a basis for
federal question jurisdiction. Such an argument has been suggested by the district court in
Waxman v. Thompson, the “rule-of-seven” case discussed above. According to the court in ²⁶²
Waxman, the holdings of Reed, Senate Select Committee and United States v. AT&T–a case
involving the intervention by a House committee chairman into a lawsuit by the Department of
Justice, which was attempting to enjoin compliance with a committee subpoena by AT&T–
suggest that “legislative branch suits to enforce requests for information from the executive ²⁶³
branch are justiciable if authorized by one or both Houses of Congress.” While we have found
no instance where a committee of either the House or Senate has attempted to use this argument
to enforce a subpoena, it appears to be consistent with both the plain meaning of the statute and a
reasonable interpretation of the existing case law.
Although, as indicated, prior to the 110^th Congress, there have been no previous attempts by a
House of Congress to seek civil enforcement of subpoenas in federal court authorized solely by

²⁵⁵^Id^.^a^t⁶¹^.
²⁵⁶^Id^.^a^t^55-⁶¹^.
²⁵⁷^{28 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹³³¹⁽¹⁹⁷⁰⁾^.
²⁵⁸^Se^na^te^Se^le^c^t^Committe^e^{, 36}⁶^F^.^Sup^p^.^a^t⁵⁹^(c^iting^H^o^{lt v}^.^I^ndi^an^{a M}^f^{g. C}^o^.^,¹^{76 U}^.^S.⁶⁸⁽¹⁹⁰⁰⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^v^.
^Say^w^a^r^d^{, 1}⁶⁰^U^.^S.⁴^{93 (}¹⁸⁹⁵⁾⁾⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^{in or}^ig^ina^l⁾^.
²⁵⁹^Id^.^a^t⁶¹^(s^ta^ting^t^h^a^t^“^[^e^]^a^c^h^of^p^l^aⁱ^ntif^f^s^{’ as}^s^e^rtions^{... re}^g^a^rdiⁿ^g^the^a^m^ount-in-c^o^ntr^o^v^e^rs^y^a^r^e^lega^lly^ina^d^e^qua^te^,
^a^{nd f}ⁱ^ndi^ngⁿ^o^p^o^s^sⁱ^ble^v^a^lua^tⁱ^on^of^the^m^a^tte^r^w^h^ic^{h s}^a^tis^fⁱ^es^the^$^10,⁰⁰^{0 m}ⁱ^nim^u^m^,^the^C^our^{t c}^aⁿⁿ^o^{t a}^s^s^e^r^t
^jurⁱ^s^d^ic^ti^on^by^vⁱ^r^t^ue^of^{§ 1}³³¹^.”⁾^.
²⁶⁰^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Am^e^r^ic^an^Te^le^p^hone^&^Te^le^gr^{aph C}^o^.^,⁵⁵¹^F^.^2d³⁸⁴^,³⁸^{9 (}^D^.^C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁶⁾⁽^cⁱ^tⁱⁿ^g^Committe^e^{for GI}
^Rights^v^.^C^a^l^l^aw^ay^{, 5}¹⁸^F.2^d⁴⁶^6,⁴⁷^2-⁷³⁽¹⁹⁷⁵⁾⁾^;^{see al}^so^{Greer v.}^S^p^o^c^k^{, 4}^{24 U}^.^S.⁸²^{8 (}¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.
²⁶¹^Se^e^P^.^L^.⁹⁶^-⁴⁸⁶^§²⁽^a⁾^{, 9}⁴^S^t^a^t^{. 2}³⁶⁹⁽¹⁹⁸⁰⁾^.
²⁶²⁵⁶^{7 F}^.²^d¹²¹
²⁶³^W^a^x^m^{an v}^.^Th^om^ps^oⁿ^{, N}^o^{. 0}⁴^-³⁴⁶⁷^{, s}^lⁱ^p^o^p^{. a}^t²⁹^(C.D^{. Ca}^l.^J^u^ly^24,²⁰⁰⁶^{) (e}^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d).

resolution of a single House,²⁶⁴ there have been situations that appear to be closely analogous. On
several occasions the House of Representatives has authorized, via House Resolution, the
intervention by counsel representing a House Committee into civil litigation involving
congressional subpoenas.
In June of 1976, subpoenas were issued to the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
(AT&T) by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce. The Subcommittee was seeking copies of “all national security
request letters sent to AT&T and its subsidiaries by the FBI as well as records of such taps prior to ²⁶⁵
the time when the practice of sending such letters was initiated.” Before AT&T could comply
with the request, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Subcommittee’s chairman,
Representative John Moss, entered into negotiations seeking to reach an alternate agreement ²⁶⁶
which would prevent AT&T from having to turn over all its records. When these negotiations
broke down, the DOJ sought an injunction in the District Court for the District of Columbia
prohibiting AT&T from complying with the Subcommittee’s subpoenas.
The House of Representatives responded to the litigation by authorizing Representative Moss to
intervene in the suit on behalf of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and the ²⁶⁷
House of Representatives. Specifically, the authorization for intervention was accomplished by
House Resolution, which provided that Chairman Moss was to represent the Committee and the
full House “to secure information relating to the privacy of telephone communications now in the ²⁶⁸
possession of [AT&T] for the use of the Committee and the full House.” In addition, the
resolution authorized Chairman Moss to hire a special counsel, use not more than $50,000 from
the contingent fund of the Committee to cover expenses, and to report to the full House on ²⁶⁹
matters related as soon as practicable. The resolution was adopted by the House by a vote of ²⁷⁰

180-108 on August 26, 1976.

Chairman Moss’s intervention into the proceedings was noted by the district court, and does not ²⁷¹
appear to have been contested by either AT&T or the DOJ. Chairman Moss remained an
intervener pursuant to the House Resolution through the district court proceeding and two appeals
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit until an agreement was reached with
respect to the disclosure of the documents sought.
A second intervention authorization, involving litigation between Ashland Oil and the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), also occurred in 1976. This case arose when Ashland Oil sought to

²⁶⁴^T^h^{e recen}^{t litig}^atioⁿ^f^iled^d^u^rⁱⁿ^g^th^{e 1}¹⁰^th^Coⁿ^g^{ress b}^y^t^h^{e Ho}^u^s^{e J}^u^dⁱ^ci^ary^Co^mmi^t^t^{ee rep}^r^esen^t^s^t^h^{e f}ⁱ^rst^su^ch
^a^tte^m^p^{t a}^t^cⁱ^v^{il e}ⁿ^f^o^rc^e^m^eⁿ^t.^Se^e^infraⁿ^o^t^e^{s 4}⁰⁵^-⁴¹^{6 an}^{d acco}^m^p^aⁿ^yⁱⁿ^g^t^e^xt^.
²⁶⁵^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Am^e^r^ic^an^Te^le^p^hone^&^Te^le^gr^aph^,⁵⁵¹^F.2^d³⁸^4,³⁸⁵⁽^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.
²⁶⁶^Id^.^a^t³⁸^{6. T}^h^e^pr^e^cⁱ^s^e^de^ta^ils^of^the^de^lic^a^t^e^ne^g^o^tia^ti^ons^be^tw^e^eⁿ^the^D^O^J^a^{nd t}^h^e^S^ubc^om^m^itte^e^a^r^e^e^x^plaⁱ^ne^{d by}
^the^c^our^t,^{see i}^d^.^a^t³^86-⁸⁸^{, a}ⁿ^d^,^t^h^e^r^e^f^ore^,^w^{ill not be}^re^c^o^unte^d^he^re^.
²⁶⁷^Se^e^H^.^R^e^s^.¹⁴²⁰^{, 9}⁴^th^C^ong^.^2d^S^e^s^s^.⁽¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^;^{see a}^l^s^o^H^.^R^e^pt^{. 9}⁴^-¹⁴²²^{, 9}⁴^th^C^ong^.^2d^Se^s^s^.⁽¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.
²⁶⁸^Id^.
²⁶⁹^Id^.
²⁷⁰^Se^e¹²^{2 C}^ONG^.^R^EC^{. 27}^,8^65-⁸⁶^{6 (}^A^ug^.^26,¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.
²⁷¹^Se^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Am^e^r^ic^an^Te^le^pho^ne^&^Te^le^gr^aph^,⁴¹^{9 F}^.^Su^pp^.⁴⁵^4,⁴⁵^{8 (}^s^t^a^tⁱⁿ^{g th}^at^“[^t]^h^e^ef^f^ect^o^f^an^y
^inju^nc^tio^{n e}ⁿ^te^re^d^by^{this Co}^{urt e}ⁿ^joiⁿ^ing^t^h^e^re^le^a^s^e^of^m^a^te^rⁱ^a^l^s^by^A^T^&^T^{to the}^Su^bc^om^m^itte^e^w^ould^ha^v^e^the^s^a^m^e
^e^f^f^e^c^t^a^s^if^this^C^our^{t w}^e^r^e^{to qua}^s^h^the^S^ubc^om^m^itte^e^’^s^s^ubpoe^na^.^Iⁿ^th^is^s^e^ns^e^the^a^c^tio^{n is}^one^a^g^aⁱ^ns^{t the}^pow^e^r^of
^t^h^{e S}^u^b^c^o^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee an}^d^sh^ou^l^d^b^e^t^r^eat^ed^{as su}^ch^,^assu^mⁱⁿ^g^t^h^at^Represen^t^a^tⁱ^v^{e M}^o^{ss h}^a^{s au}^t^h^o^rⁱ^t^y^t^o^sp^eak^f^o^{r t}^h^e
^S^u^b^c^o^m^mⁱ^t^t^ee.^”).

enjoin the FTC from transferring its information to the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce at the request of
Subcommittee Chairman Moss. When Ashland Oil obtained a temporary restraining order, the
subcommittee promptly authorized a subpoena for the documents and Chairman Moss filed a
resolution for authorization from the House to allow him to intervene with special counsel in the
suit that Ashland Oil had filed seeking to enjoin the FTC from transferring the documents to the ²⁷²
subcommittee. The district court granted Chairman Moss’s motion to intervene and ultimately ²⁷³
refused to grant the injunction. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the grounds that “no
substantial showing was made that the materials in the possession of the FTC will necessarily be ²⁷⁴
‘made public’ if turned over to Congress.”
While AT&T and Ashland Oil represent affirmative authorizations for intervention by a house of ²⁷⁵
Congress, In Re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, provides an example of what may occur
should a house of Congress not provide express authorization to be represented in court. In In Re ²⁷⁶
Beef, the chairmen of two subcommittees of the House of Representatives sought to intervene
in a pending antitrust dispute for the purpose of obtaining access to documents subpoenaed by
subcommittees from a party to the litigation. The subpoenaed documents had been obtained
through litigation discovery and were thus subject to a standing court protective order. The
district court refused to modify its protective order allowing the party to comply with the ²⁷⁷
subpoena. The subcommittee chairmen appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit entertained a motion to dismiss by one of the plaintiffs on the
grounds that the chairmen had not obtained authorization from the full House of Representatives
before filing their initial motion before the district court. The plaintiffs relied on what was then
Rule XI, cl. 2(m)(2)(B) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, which provided that
“[c]ompliance with any subpoena [sic] issued by a committee or subcommittee ... may be ²⁷⁸
enforced only as authorized or directed by the House.” The committee chairmen responded by
arguing that the rule was not applicable as they were not seeking to enforce their subpoenas, but ²⁷⁹
rather were seeking a modification of the district court’s protective order. Therefore, according
to the chairmen, they did not require authorization from the full House of Representatives to ²⁸⁰
appear in court.

²⁷²^Se^e^ge^ne^r^a^lly^,^As^hl^an^{d O}^il,^Iⁿ^c^.^v^.^FTC^,⁵⁴^{8 F.}^2d⁹^{77 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^;^{see a}^l^so^H^.^R^e^s^.⁸^99,⁹⁴^th^Cong^.,¹^st^S^e^ss.
⁽¹⁹⁷⁵⁾^{; 12}¹^C^ONG^.^R^EC^{. 41}^,7⁰⁷⁽¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.
²⁷³^A^s^h^l^an^{d Oi}^l^,^Iⁿ^c.^v.^FT^C^{, 40}⁹^F.^Sup^p^{. 29}^{7, 30}¹⁽^D^.D^.C^.¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.
²⁷⁴^A^s^h^l^an^{d Oi}^l^,⁵⁴⁸^F.^2d^at⁹⁷^9.
²⁷⁵⁵⁸⁹^F.^2d⁷⁸^{6 (}⁵^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁹⁾^.
²⁷⁶^T^h^e^Subc^om^m^itte^e^{on O}^v^e^r^sⁱ^g^h^{t a}^{nd I}ⁿ^v^e^s^tig^a^tions^of^the^C^o^m^mⁱ^t^t^e^e^{on I}ⁿ^te^r^s^ta^te^a^nd^For^e^ig^{n C}^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^,^a^{nd the}
^Subc^om^m^itte^e^{on SB}^A^a^{nd SB}^I^C^A^u^thor^ity^a^{nd G}^e^ne^r^a^{l S}^m^a^{ll B}^u^sⁱ^ne^s^s^P^r^o^b^le^m^s^of^the^C^o^m^m^itte^e^on^Sm^a^ll
^Bu^sin^e^ss.^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t⁷⁸^8.
²⁷⁷^Se^e^{In re}^Be^e^f^In^dustry^Aⁿ^titr^ust^Litig^ati^oⁿ^,⁴⁵⁷^F.S^u^p^p^.²¹^0,²¹^{2 (}^C^.D^{. T}^e^x^.¹⁹⁷⁸⁾⁽^s^ta^ting^t^h^a^t^“^t^he^pe^r^s^ons^w^hom
^the^Su^bc^om^m^itte^e^s^ha^v^e^s^ubpoeⁿ^a^e^d^w^{ould n}^o^t^ha^v^e^pos^s^e^s^sⁱ^on^of^the^s^u^bp^oe^na^e^d^doc^um^eⁿ^ts^but^f^o^r^the^dⁱ^s^c^ov^e^r^y
^r^u^le^s^of^the^Fe^de^r^a^{l C}^our^ts^.^C^o^ng^r^e^s^s^by^s^ubpoe^na^ing^t^h^e^s^e^doc^um^eⁿ^ts^is^inte^r^f^e^r^ing^w^{ith the}^pr^oc^e^s^s^e^s^of^a^Fe^de^r^a^l
^Co^u^r^tⁱⁿ^aⁿⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vi^du^al^case.^”).
²⁷⁸^{In Re}^Be^e^f^,⁵⁸^{9 F}^.²^d^a^t⁷⁸^9.
²⁷⁹^Id^.
²⁸⁰^Id^.

The Fifth Circuit rejected the chairmen’s arguments, noting specifically that the House Rules
“require[] House authorization not only for direct enforcement of a subpoena but also in any
instance when a House committee seeks to institute or to intervene in litigation and, of course, to
appeal from a court decision, particularly when the purpose is, as here, to obtain the effectuation ²⁸¹
of a subpoena.” The court also extensively relied on the Ashland Oil precedent noting that
similar to this case, the chairman in Ashland Oil was not seeking to enforce a subpoena, rather ²⁸²
merely attempting to prevent an injunction from being issued. The failure of the chairmen to
obtain an authorization resolution from the full House in this case necessitated the dismissal of ²⁸³
their appeal without any decision on the merits.
As neither AT&T, Ashland Oil, nor In Re Beef raised any questions regarding the jurisdiction of
the federal courts, it appears possible to argue that all that is legally required for committees, the
House General Counsel, or a House-retained private counsel to seek civil enforcement of
subpoenas or other orders is that authorization be granted by resolution of the full House. Absent
such authorization, it appears that the courts will not entertain civil motions of any kind on behalf
of Congress or its committees. While some may still argue that a law passed by both Houses and
signed by the President conferring jurisdiction is required, it may be plausibly argued that taken
together, the combination of Reed’s requirement that congressional authorization to sue be by
express language, the willingness of federal courts to accept properly authorized interventions,
and the fact that the federal question jurisdiction statute no longer contains an amount in
controversy requirement, suggest that if an authorization resolution by the House can be obtained
there is a likelihood that a reviewing court will find no legal impediment to seeking civil ²⁸⁴
enforcement of subpoenas or other committee orders.
Although the courts have upheld the authority of Congress to investigate and to cite a witness for
contempt, they have also established limits, rooted both in the language of the criminal contempt
statute and in the Constitution, on the investigatory and contempt powers. Recognizing that 2
U.S.C. § 192 is a criminal statute, the courts have accorded defendants the same safeguards as ²⁸⁵
defendants in other criminal proceedings.

²⁸¹^Id^.^a^t⁷⁹^0-⁹¹^.
²⁸²^Id^.^a^t⁷⁹^0.
²⁸³^Id^.^a^t⁷⁹^1.
²⁸⁴^Rel^a^t^e^d^l^y^,^t^h^{e Dep}^a^rt^men^t^o^f^Ju^stⁱ^{ce h}^a^s,^oⁿ^nu^m^e^ro^u^s^o^ccasi^oⁿ^s^,ⁱⁿ^cl^u^dⁱⁿ^{g m}^o^st^recen^t^l^yⁱⁿ¹⁹⁹⁶^,^s^u^ggest^ed^t^h^at
^co^mm^itte^{es o}^f^Coⁿ^g^{ress reso}^lv^{e i}ⁿ^ter-b^ran^c^h^dⁱ^s^p^u^t^{es i}ⁿ^v^o^lvⁱⁿ^g^th^{e en}^f^o^rce^m^en^{t o}^f^su^b^p^o^eⁿ^a^{s b}^y^civ^{il p}^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^th
^f^e^de^r^a^{l c}^our^t.^S^ee,^e.^g.^{, H}^.^R^e^pt^{. 1}^04-⁵⁹^8,¹⁰⁴^Co^ng^.,^2d^Se^{ss., 6}³⁽¹⁹^{96) (a}^dditi^ona^l^vⁱ^e^w^{s o}^f^Hon.^W^illia^m^F.
^Clⁱⁿ^ger,^Jr.⁾^(st^a^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^{“I am}^as^t^oⁿⁱ^s^h^ed^at^h^eariⁿ^{g t}^hⁱ^s^reco^m^m^eⁿ^d^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^b^y^{a De}^m^o^crat^P^r^esi^d^en^t^w^h^en^t^h^e
^coⁿ^t^emⁿ^o^rⁱ^s^{a Dem}^o^crat^a^f^t^e^{r kn}^o^wⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^t^h^{e con}^cep^t^o^f^{a ci}^vi^l^re^m^e^d^y^h^a^{s b}^een^so^reso^un^dⁱⁿ^g^l^y^r^e^j^ect^ed^b^y
^pr^e^v^ious^D^e^m^o^c^r^a^t^C^ong^r^e^s^s^e^s^w^h^eⁿ^t^h^e^c^onte^m^nor^w^a^s^a^R^e^publi^c^aⁿ^.”⁾^;¹⁰^O^p^{. O}^f^f^.^L^e^g^a^{l C}^ouns^e^l^{, 68}^{, 8}⁷^-^{89 (}¹⁹⁸⁶⁾
^(sug^g^e^sting^tha^t^“^t^he^c^ourts^m^a^y^be^w^illing^{to e}ⁿ^te^rtaⁱ^{n a}^cⁱ^v^{il suit}^bro^u^g^h^{t by}^the^Ho^use^{to a}^v^oi^{d a}ⁿ^y^que^{stion a}^b^out
^the^p^o^s^sⁱ^ble^a^p^plic^a^b^ili^ty^of^the^c^r^im^ina^l^c^onte^m^{pt pr}^ov^is^ions^of^[²^U^.^S.C^.^]^§§¹⁹^{2 a}ⁿ^d¹⁹^4.”⁾^{; 8}^O^p^.^O^f^f^.^Le^ga^l
^C^ouns^e^l^,¹^01,¹^39,^n.⁴⁰⁽¹⁹⁸^{4) (s}^ta^ting^tha^t^“^[^t^]^he^us^e^of^c^r^im^ina^l^c^onte^m^{pt is}^e^s^pe^cⁱ^a^lly^ina^ppropr^ia^te^{... b}^ecau^se
^Coⁿ^g^{ress h}^a^{s t}^h^{e cl}^earl^y^a^v^ai^l^a^b^l^e^al^t^e^rn^atⁱ^v^{e o}^f^ci^vi^l^en^f^o^rce^m^en^t^pro^ceedⁱⁿ^gs.^”^).
²⁸⁵^Russe^{ll v}^.^Un^ite^d^State^s^,³⁶^{9 U}^.^S^.⁷⁴^{9 (}¹⁹⁶²⁾^;^{see a}^l^so^Si^nc^lair^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^,²⁷^{9 U}^.^S.²⁶^{3 (}¹⁹²⁹⁾^{. W}^h^ile^m^o^s^t^of
^the^c^a^s^e^la^w^{in this}^s^e^c^tion^of^the^r^e^por^{t i}ⁿ^v^o^lv^e^s^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^ons^un^de^r^th^e^s^t^a^t^utor^y^c^rⁱ^m^ina^l^c^onte^m^{pt pr}^o^c^e^dur^e^,^m^aⁿ^y^of
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

The criminal contempt statute is applicable to contempts committed by a person “summoned as a ²⁸⁶
witness by the authority of either House of Congress ... .” The statute applies regardless of ²⁸⁷
whether a subpoena has been issued by a committee or by the full House or Senate. Although
the statute specifically makes the contempt sanction applicable to a witness who has been
“summoned,” the law applies whether the individual is subpoenaed or appears voluntarily and ²⁸⁸
then refuses to testify.
A contempt conviction will not be upheld if the committee’s investigation has not been clearly ²⁸⁹
authorized by the full House or Senate. The investigation, and the questions posed, must be ²⁹⁰
within the scope of the committee’s jurisdiction. A committee cannot issue a subpoena for a
subject outside the scope of its jurisdiction. Authorization from the parent body may take the form ²⁹¹²⁹²²⁹³
of a statute, a resolution, or a standing rule of the House or Senate. In the case of a
subcommittee investigation, the subject matter must fall within the scope of authority granted to ²⁹⁴
the subcommittee by the full committee. Investigations may be conducted, and subpoenas ²⁹⁵
issued, pursuant to a committee’s legislative or oversight jurisdiction.
In construing the scope of a committee’s authorizing rule or resolution, the Supreme Court has
adopted a mode of analysis not unlike that ordinarily followed in determining the meaning of a
statute: it looks first to the words of the resolution itself, and then, if necessary, to the usual
sources of legislative history, including floor statements, reports, and past committee practice. As

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^t^h^{e ho}^l^dⁱⁿ^{gs w}^o^u^l^d^b^e^ap^plⁱ^cab^l^e^t^o^exerci^{ses o}^f^t^h^{e n}^e^w^cⁱ^v^{il c}^onte^m^{pt s}^t^a^t^ute^a^{nd t}^h^eⁱⁿ^he^r^e^{nt c}^o^nte^m^{pt pow}^e^r^.^Se^e^th^st
^S.R^e^pt.^N^o^{. 95-}¹⁷^{0, 95}^Co^ng^{., 1}^Se^s^s^.,⁴¹^{, 9}⁴^.
²⁸⁶^{2 U}^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 1}⁹²⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d)^.
²⁸⁷^M^c^G^r^{ain v}^.^D^a^ug^hte^r^y^{, 2}^{73 U}^.^S^.¹³^{5 (}¹⁹²⁷⁾^;^{see a}^l^so^Si^nc^lair^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^{, 27}⁹^U^.^{S. 26}^{3, 29}^{6 (}¹⁹²⁹⁾^.
²⁸⁸^Sinc^l^a^ir^,²⁷^{9 U}^.^S^.^a^t²⁹⁶^.
²⁸⁹^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Rum^e^ly^,³⁴^{3 U}^.^S^.⁴¹⁽¹⁹⁵³⁾^;^T^o^bⁱ^{n v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^{, 30}^{6 F}^.²^d²⁷⁰^(D^{.C. Cir}^.^),^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,³⁷¹
^U.^S^.⁹⁰^{2 (}¹⁹⁶²⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^v^.^Patte^r^s^oⁿ^,²⁰^{6 F}^.²^d⁴³³⁽^D^.^C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁵³⁾^.
²⁹⁰^Se^e^Unite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Rume^ly^{, 34}³^U^.^{S. 41}⁽¹⁹⁵³⁾^;^{see a}^l^so^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^{d St}^a^t^{es v.}^P^a^t^t^e^rsoⁿ^,²⁰⁶^F.2^d⁴³^{3 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁵³⁾^.
²⁹¹^{26 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁸⁰²¹^{, 8}⁰²²⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁽^J^oint^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on T}^a^x^a^tion)^.
²⁹²^Reso^l^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^{are gen}^e^ral^l^y^u^s^ed^t^o^est^a^b^lⁱ^s^h^sel^ect^o^r^s^p^eci^al^co^mmⁱ^t^t^{ees an}^d^t^o^d^e^lⁱⁿ^eat^{e t}^h^ei^{r au}^t^h^o^rⁱ^t^y^.^an^d
^jurisdic^ti^on^.^Se^e^{4 Desch}^l^er’s^P^r^eced^en^t^s^,^s^upr^aⁿ^o^te^87,^c^h^.^17,⁵⁶^;^{see a}^l^so^e.^g^.^,^S.Re^s^.²³^{, 10}⁰^th^Coⁿ^g^{. (Iran}^-^C^oⁿ^t^ra);^th
^S.R^e^s^.⁴^95,⁹⁶^Cong^{. (Billy}^Ca^rte^r^/L^ib^y^a^).
²⁹³^T^h^{is m}^ode^{is the}^m^o^{st c}^o^m^m^{on toda}^y^.^{Both t}^h^e^Ho^use^a^{nd t}^h^e^Seⁿ^a^te^a^u^thoriz^e^staⁿ^ding^c^o^m^m^itte^e^s^{to m}^a^k^e
^inv^e^stig^a^{tions w}^{ithin t}^h^eⁱ^{r j}^u^risdi^c^tion,^a^nd^pe^rm^{it suc}^h^c^o^m^m^itte^e^s^a^{nd t}^h^eⁱ^{r su}^bc^om^m^itte^e^s^{to issue}^subp^oe^na^s.^Se^e^th
^H^ous^e^R^u^le^s^Ma^nua^{l, H}^.^R^.^D^o^c^.^N^o^{. 1}^08-²⁴^1,¹⁰⁸^C^ong^.^2d^Se^s^s^{., R}^u^le^XI^{, c}^l^{. l}⁽^b⁾^a^{nd c}^l^{. 2}⁽^m⁾⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾^;^Se^na^te^th
^M^aⁿ^u^a^l^,^S^.^D^o^c^.^N^o^{. 98}^-¹^{, 98}^Cong^.,^2d^Se^s^s^{., Rule}^X^X^V^{I, c}^l^{. 1}⁽¹⁹⁸^4).
²⁹⁴^Go^j^a^{ck v.}^Uni^t^e^d^S^t^at^es^{, 3}^{84 U}^.^S^.⁷⁰^2,⁷⁰^{6 (}¹⁹⁶⁶⁾^{. T}^h^e^c^a^s^e^inv^o^lv^e^d^a^r^u^le^of^the^f^o^r^m^e^r^H^ous^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on U}ⁿ^-
^Am^e^r^ic^aⁿ^A^c^tiv^itie^s,^w^h^ic^{h sta}^t^e^d^tha^t^“ⁿ^{o m}^a^{jor inv}^e^stig^a^tions^sha^{ll be}ⁱⁿ^itia^te^{d w}^ith^out^the^a^p^prov^a^l^of^a^m^a^jorit^y^of
^t^h^{e co}^mmⁱ^t^t^ee.^”^T^h^{e co}^u^r^t^reverse^d^t^h^{e c}^oⁿ^t^em^p^t^coⁿ^vⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^Goj^a^ck^b^ecau^{se th}^{e su}^b^c^o^m^m^{ittee’s i}ⁿ^v^e^stig^atioⁿ^,
^w^h^ic^{h r}^e^s^u^lte^{d in}^the^c^o^nte^m^{pt c}^ita^tion,^ha^d^no^{t be}^eⁿ^a^ppr^ov^e^d^by^the^c^o^m^m^itte^e^a^s^its^r^u^le^s^r^e^quir^e^d^.
^D^e^s^p^ite^the^pr^ov^is^ion^of^Se^na^te^R^u^le^X^X^V^I^,^c^l^.1,^a^u^t^hor^izⁱⁿ^g^s^ubc^o^m^m^itte^e^s^ubpoe^na^s^,^the^r^u^le^s^of^a^t^le^a^s^{t one}
^c^o^m^m^ittee^e^x^pre^s^s^l^y^{prohibit s}^u^b^c^om^m^ittee^s^ubpoe^na^s^(Com^m^ittee^{on Sm}^a^{ll Bus}ⁱ^ne^s^s^,^R^u^le^3(c^)),^w^h^ile^a^nothe^r
^c^o^m^m^ittee^re^quire^s^a^ppr^ov^a^l^by^the^f^u^{ll c}^o^m^m^itte^e^of^aⁿ^y^s^ubc^om^m^itte^e^s^ubpoe^na^s^(Com^m^itte^e^on^L^a^{bor a}^{nd H}^u^m^aⁿ
^Reso^u^r^{ces, Ru}^{le 1}⁷^).
²⁹⁵^A^le^a^d^ing^study^of^Se^na^te^c^o^m^mⁱ^tte^e^jurisdic^ti^onⁿ^o^te^{d t}^h^a^t^“^o^v^e^rsig^{ht juris}^d^ic^tio^{n ne}^c^e^ssa^rily^f^l^{ows f}^r^o^m^spe^cⁱ^fⁱ^c
^l^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^v^{e en}^act^men^t^s,^b^u^tⁱ^t^al^so^e^m^an^at^es^f^r^o^m^b^r^o^a^d^e^{r and}^m^o^{re vagu}^el^y^d^e^fⁱⁿ^e^d^j^u^ri^sdⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^h^co^mmⁱ^t^t^ees^m^a^y
^exerci^s^eⁱⁿ^p^a^rtⁱ^c^u^l^{ar s}^u^b^j^ect^m^a^t^t^e^{r areas.}^”^Fir^s^t^{Staff Re}^por^t^{to t}^h^e^Te^m^por^ar^y^Se^le^c^t^C^o^m^m^itte^e^to^Stu^d^y^the^Se^na^te^th
^Co^mmi^t^t^{ee S}^y^st^em^{, 94}^C^o^ng^.,^2d^Se^s^s^{., 1}^{04 (}¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^;^s^e^e^als^o^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^K^a^mⁱⁿ^{, 13}^{6 F.}^S^u^p^p^{. 7}^{91, 80}¹⁽^D^.^Ma^s^s^.
¹⁹⁵⁶⁾⁽^p^r^o^vⁱ^dⁱ^ng^a^ju^dicⁱ^a^l^a^p^plic^a^tion^of^ov^e^r^sⁱ^g^h^{t jur}ⁱ^s^d^ic^ti^onⁱⁿ^t^h^e^inv^e^s^tig^a^t^or^y^c^onte^x^t)^.

explained by the Court in Barenblatt v. United States,²⁹⁶ “[j]ust as legislation is often given
meaning by the gloss of legislative reports, administrative interpretation, and long usage, so the
proper meaning of an authorization to a congressional committee is not to be derived alone from
its abstract terms unrelated to the definite content furnished them by the course of congressional ²⁹⁷
actions.” It appears that the clear articulation of committee jurisdiction in both the House and
Senate rules combined with the express authorization of special committees by resolution has
effectively eliminated the use of jurisdiction as a defense to contempt proceedings.
A committee’s investigation must have a legislative purpose or be conducted pursuant to some
other constitutional power of the Congress, such as the authority of each House to discipline its
own Members, judge the returns of the their elections, and to conduct impeachment ²⁹⁸²⁹⁹
proceedings. Although the early case of Kilbourn v. Thompson held that the investigation in
that case was an improper probe into the private affairs of individuals, the courts today generally
will presume that there is a legislative purpose for an investigation, and the House or Senate rule
or resolution authorizing the investigation does not have to specifically state the committee’s ³⁰⁰³⁰¹
legislative purpose. In In re Chapman, the Court upheld the validity of a resolution
authorizing an inquiry into charges of corruption against certain Senators despite the fact that it
was silent as to what might be done when the investigation was completed. The Court stated:
^T^h^{e q}^u^estioⁿ^s^w^e^r^e^uⁿ^d^o^u^b^t^ed^ly^p^e^r^tⁱⁿ^en^{t to}^th^{e s}^u^b^j^ect^m^a^tter^o^f^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^q^u^ir^y^.^T^h^e
^r^e^so^lu^tioⁿ^s^dⁱ^r^ected^t^h^{e co}^m^m^ittee^toⁱⁿ^q^u^ir^e^“w^h^e^t^h^er^aⁿ^y^Seⁿ^a^to^r^h^a^{s b}^een^,^o^r^is,
^sp^ecu^latiⁿ^gⁱⁿ^w^h^at^ar^{e k}ⁿ^o^wⁿ^{as s}^u^g^a^r^sto^c^k^s^d^u^rⁱⁿ^g^th^e^coⁿ^s^id^er^atioⁿ^o^f^th^e^tarⁱ^f^f^b^illⁿ^o^w
^bef^o^{re th}^{e Sen}^a^{te.” W}^h^{at t}^h^{e S}^eⁿ^a^te^mⁱ^gh^{t or}^mⁱ^g^h^tⁿ^o^{t do u}^pon^th^{e f}^a^c^t^s^w^h^en^as^certaiⁿ^ed,
^w^e^caⁿⁿ^o^t^sa^yⁿ^o^r^ar^e^w^e^calle^d^u^p^oⁿ^toⁱⁿ^q^u^ir^e^w^h^eth^e^r^su^c^h^v^eⁿ^t^u^r^es^mⁱ^g^h^{t b}^e^d^e^f^eⁿ^s^ib^le,
^as^con^t^eⁿ^{ded i}ⁿ^argum^eⁿ^t^,^butⁱ^tⁱ^s^pl^aiⁿ^t^h^atⁿ^e^g^a^tiv^{e a}ⁿ^s^w^ers^w^o^u^l^{d h}^a^v^e^{cleared th}^{at bod}^y
^o^f^w^h^{at th}^{e Se}ⁿ^a^{te r}^e^g^a^r^d^ed^{as o}^f^f^eⁿ^sⁱ^v^{e i}^m^p^u^tatioⁿ^s^,^w^h^{ile af}^fⁱ^r^m^a^tiv^{e a}ⁿ^s^w^er^s^mⁱ^g^h^{t h}^a^v^e
^led^to^f^u^r^t^h^e^r^actioⁿ^oⁿ^th^{e p}^a^r^t^o^f^th^{e Se}ⁿ^a^te^wⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^{its co}ⁿ^s^t^itu^tioⁿ^a^{l p}^o^w^e^r^s^.
^No^r^w^ill^{it d}^o^to^h^o^ld^th^at^th^e^Sen^a^te^h^a^dⁿ^o^j^u^rⁱ^sd^ictioⁿ^to^p^u^r^s^u^e^t^h^{e p}^a^r^tic^u^l^arⁱⁿ^q^u^ir^y
^becau^s^e^th^{e prea}^m^b^{le an}^{d res}^o^lu^tions^{did n}^o^{t s}^p^ecify^t^h^{at th}^{e p}^r^oceedin^g^s^w^e^{re tak}^eⁿ^f^o^r^t^h^e
^pu^rpos^{e of}^cen^su^{re or ex}^pu^l^sⁱ^oⁿ^,ⁱ^f^cert^aⁱⁿ^f^act^s^w^e^{re di}^s^c^l^o^s^e^{d by}^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^atⁱ^oⁿ^.^T^h^e
^m^a^tter^w^a^s^wⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^t^h^{e r}^aⁿ^g^e^o^f^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^s^tit^u^tioⁿ^a^{l p}^o^w^e^r^s^o^f^t^h^{e Se}ⁿ^a^te.^T^h^{e r}^e^so^lu^tⁱ^oⁿ^s
^adequ^a^tel^yⁱⁿ^{dicated t}^h^{at t}^h^{e tran}^s^actioⁿ^s^re^f^e^{rred t}^o^w^e^{re dee}^m^{ed b}^y^t^h^{e S}^eⁿ^a^t^e
^repreh^en^sⁱ^{ble an}^{d des}^e^rvⁱⁿ^g^o^f^con^d^emⁿ^a^tioⁿ^an^{d pu}ⁿⁱ^s^h^m^e^{nt. T}^h^{e rig}^h^t^{to ex}^{pel ex}^ten^d^s^t^o
^{all cas}^es^w^h^{ere t}^h^{e of}^f^eⁿ^s^{e i}^s^s^u^ch^asⁱⁿ^th^{e j}^u^dgm^eⁿ^{t of}^th^e^Sen^a^{te is}ⁱⁿ^cons^is^teⁿ^t^wⁱ^t^h^th^e
^tr^u^s^{t a}ⁿ^d^d^u^t^y^o^f^a^m^e^m^b^er^.

²⁹⁶³⁶⁰^U.^S.¹⁰^9,¹¹^{7 (}¹⁹⁵⁹⁾^.
²⁹⁷^Se^e^W^a^tk^{ins v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^,³⁵⁴^U^.^S.¹^78,²^09-²¹^{5 (}¹⁹⁵⁷⁾^.
²⁹⁸^Se^e^,^e^.^g.^{, M}^c^G^r^{ain v}^.^D^a^u^ghe^r^t^y^,²⁷^{3 U}^.^S^.¹³⁵⁽¹⁹²⁷⁾^;^{see a}^l^{so In}^R^e^Ch^ap^maⁿ^,¹⁶^{6 U.}^S^.⁶⁶¹⁽¹⁸⁹⁷⁾^.
²⁹⁹¹⁰^{3 U}^.^S^.¹⁶⁸⁽¹⁸⁸¹⁾^.
³⁰⁰^M^c^G^r^{ain v}^.^D^a^ug^he^r^t^y^{, 27}^{3 U}^.^S.¹³^{5 (}¹⁹²⁷⁾^;^{see al}^so^T^o^wn^send^v.^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^a^t^es^{, 9}⁵^F.^2d³^{52 (D}^.C.^{Cir. 1}⁹³⁸^);
^L^E^ADI^NG^C^AS^E^S^ON^C^ONGRE^S^S^I^ON^AL^I^N^V^ES^TI^G^A^T^O^RY^P^OWE^R^,⁷^(C^omm^.^P^rⁱⁿ^t¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^[h^ereiⁿ^a^f^t^{er ci}^t^e^d^{as L}^eadⁱⁿ^g
^Cases]^.^F^o^r^{a d}ⁱ^f^f^e^ren^t^asse^ss^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^recen^t^{case l}^a^w^coⁿ^cernⁱⁿ^g^t^h^e^req^uⁱ^rem^eⁿ^t^o^f^{a l}^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^v^{e p}^u^r^p^o^s^e,^Se^e
^More^la^nd^,^sup^r^a^note⁵⁷^,^a^t²³²^.
³⁰¹¹⁶⁶^U.^S.⁶⁶^1,⁶⁶^{9 (}¹⁸⁹⁷⁾^.

^W^e^canⁿ^o^{t a}^s^s^u^m^e^oⁿ^t^h^is^r^eco^r^d^th^{at th}^{e act}^ioⁿ^o^f^th^e^Seⁿ^a^te^w^a^s^wⁱ^t^h^o^u^t^{a leg}^iti^m^a^te
^ob^j^{ect, an}^{d s}^o^eⁿ^croach^u^pon^th^{e prov}ⁱⁿ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{at bod}^y^.^Iⁿ^deed,^w^e^thⁱⁿ^k^it^a^f^fⁱ^r^m^ati^v^el^y
^appears^th^{at th}^{e Sen}^a^te^w^a^s^actin^g^wⁱ^thⁱⁿ^its^ri^g^h^{t, an}^{d it}^w^a^s^c^e^rtain^l^yⁿ^o^{t n}^eces^s^a^r^y^t^h^{at th}^e
^res^o^lu^tions^s^h^ou^{ld declare in}^adv^aⁿ^ce^w^h^{at t}^h^{e Sen}^a^te^m^e^{ditated doin}^g^w^h^en^t^h^e³⁰²
ⁱ^nve^stⁱ^g^a^tⁱ^o^{n w}^a^s^c^o^nc^l^u^d^e^d^.
In McGrain v. Daugherty,³⁰³ the original resolution that authorized the Senate investigation into
the Teapot Dome Affair made no mention of a legislative purpose. A subsequent resolution for the
attachment of a contumacious witness declared that his testimony was sought for the purpose of
obtaining “information necessary as a basis for such legislative and other action as the Senate
may deem necessary and proper.” The Court found that the investigation was ordered for a
legitimate object. It wrote:
^T^h^{e o}ⁿ^ly^le^g^iti^m^a^{te o}^b^j^{ect th}^{e Sen}^a^{te co}^u^l^d^h^a^v^eⁱⁿ^o^r^d^e^rⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e in}^v^e^st^ig^atioⁿ^w^a^s^t^o^aⁱ^dⁱ^tⁱⁿ
^legⁱ^s^l^atiⁿ^g^,^aⁿ^d^w^e^t^hⁱⁿ^k^t^h^e^su^b^j^ect^m^a^tter^w^a^{s s}^u^c^h^th^a^t^th^{e p}^r^esu^m^p^tioⁿ^sh^o^u^ld^b^e
ⁱⁿ^du^l^g^{ed t}^h^{at t}^h^is^w^a^s^t^h^{e rea}^l^obj^{ect. A}ⁿ^e^x^pres^s^a^v^o^w^a^l^of^t^h^{e obj}^ect^w^o^u^l^d^h^a^v^e^been
^b^e^t^t^e^r^;^b^u^tⁱⁿ^vⁱ^e^w^o^f^t^h^e^p^a^r^tⁱ^c^ul^a^r^sub^j^e^c^t^-^m^a^t^t^e^r^w^a^{s no}^tⁱⁿ^dⁱ^sp^eⁿ^sa^b^l^e^.^***
^T^h^{e s}^econ^d^res^o^lu^tion^–^th^{e on}^e^directin^g^t^h^e^w^itn^e^s^s^{be attached–declar}^e^s^t^h^a^t^t^hⁱ^s^t^e^s^t^im^on^y
ⁱ^s^s^oug^h^t^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e pu}^rpos^{e of}^obt^aiⁿⁱ^ng^“ⁱⁿ^f^or^m^a^tⁱ^oⁿⁿ^eces^s^a^r^y^a^s^{a bas}ⁱ^s^f^o^{r s}^u^ch^l^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^tⁱ^v^e
^an^{d oth}^e^{r action}^as^t^h^{e Se}ⁿ^a^te^m^a^y^dee^mⁿ^ece^s^s^a^r^y^aⁿ^{d proper.”}^T^h^is^av^o^w^{al o}^f
^con^t^e^m^{plated le}^gⁱ^s^l^at^ion^isⁱⁿ^{accord w}ⁱ^t^h^w^h^at^w^e^t^h^inkⁱ^s^th^{e righ}^{t i}ⁿ^terpretation^of^t^h^e
^ear^lier^r^e^so^lu^tioⁿ^dⁱ^r^ectin^g^t^h^eⁱⁿ^v^e^sti^g^atioⁿ^.^T^h^{e s}^u^g^g^e^s^ted^p^o^ssib^ilit^y^o^f^“^o^th^er^actioⁿ^”ⁱ^f
^d^eem^ed^“ⁿ^ece^ssar^y^o^r^p^r^o^p^e^r^”^{is o}^f^co^u^r^{se o}^p^eⁿ^to^cr^iticis^mⁱⁿ^th^{at th}^er^{e is n}^o^o^t^h^e^r^actioⁿⁱⁿ
^th^e^m^a^t^t^er^w^h^ic^h^w^o^u^l^d^b^e^wⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^t^h^{e p}^o^w^e^r^o^f^th^{e Se}ⁿ^a^{te. B}^u^t^w^e^d^oⁿ^o^{t assen}^t^to^th^{e v}ⁱ^e^w
^th^{at th}^{is in}^d^e^fⁱⁿ^{ite an}^d^uⁿ^teⁿ^a^b^l^{e su}^g^g^e^stioⁿⁱⁿ^v^a^lⁱ^d^a^t^e^s^t^h^e^en^tⁱ^r^e^p^r^o^c^e^e^dⁱⁿ^g^.^Th^e^rⁱ^g^h^t^vⁱ^e^w
ⁱⁿ^ou^{r opi}ⁿⁱ^onⁱ^s^t^h^atⁱ^t^t^a^k^e^{s not}^hⁱ^ng^f^r^o^m^t^h^{e l}^a^w^f^u^l^obj^ect^av^o^w^{ed i}ⁿ^t^h^e^s^a^m^e^res^o^l^u^tⁱ^on
^an^d^{is r}ⁱ^g^h^tl^yⁱⁿ^f^e^r^a^b^l^{e f}^r^o^m^t^h^{e ear}^lier^oⁿ^{e. I}^t^{is n}^o^{t as if}^anⁱⁿ^ad^mⁱ^s^s^ib^{le o}^r^uⁿ^l^a^w^f^u^{l o}^b^j^ect³⁰⁴
^w^e^{re aff}ⁱ^r^m^ati^v^el^y^an^{d def}ⁱⁿⁱ^t^e^l^y^av^o^w^ed.
Moreover, when the purpose asserted is supported by reference to specific problems which in the
past have been, or in the future may be, the subject of appropriate legislation, it has been held that
a court cannot say that a committee of the Congress exceeds its power when it seeks information ³⁰⁵
in such areas. In the past, the types of legislative activity which have justified the exercise of ³⁰⁶
the power to investigate have included the primary functions of legislating and appropriating; ³⁰⁷
the function of deciding whether or not legislation is appropriate; oversight of the ³⁰⁸
administration of the laws by the executive branch; and the essential congressional function of ³⁰⁹
informing itself in matters of national concern. In addition, Congress’s power to investigate ³¹⁰³¹¹
such diverse matters as foreign and domestic subversive activities, labor union corruption,

³⁰²^Iⁿ^r^e^C^h^apm^an^,¹^{66 U}^.^{S. a}^t⁶⁹^9.
³⁰³²⁷^{3 U}^.^S^.¹³⁵⁽¹⁹²⁷⁾^.
³⁰⁴^Id^.^a^t¹⁷^9-¹⁸⁰^.
³⁰⁵^She^lt^on^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^,⁴⁰⁴^F^.^2d¹²⁹²^,¹²⁹⁷⁽^D^.^C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁶⁸⁾^,^c^e^r^t^de^nie^d^,³⁹³^U^.^S.¹⁰²⁴⁽¹⁹⁶⁹⁾^.
³⁰⁶^B^a^ren^b^l^a^t^t^v.^Unⁱ^t^ed^St^a^t^es,³⁶^{0 U}^.^S.¹⁰⁹⁽¹⁹⁵⁹⁾^.
³⁰⁷^Q^uⁱⁿ^{n v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^,³^{49 U}^.^S.¹⁵⁵^{, 1}⁶¹⁽¹⁹⁵⁵⁾^.
³⁰⁸^McGraⁱⁿ^,²⁷^{3 U.}^S^.^at²⁹⁵^.
³⁰⁹^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Rum^e^ly^,³⁴^{5 U}^.^S^.^4,⁴³^-⁴^{5 (}¹⁹⁵³⁾^;^se^e^als^o^W^a^tkⁱⁿ^s^{, 35}^{4 U}^.^S^.^a^t²⁰^{0 n}^.³^.
³¹⁰^Se^e^,^e^.^g.^{, B}^a^r^r^e^nbl^{att v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^S^t^ate^s^{, 3}⁶⁰^U^.^S.¹⁰^{9 (}¹⁹⁵⁹⁾^;^W^a^tkⁱⁿ^{s v}^.^Unite^{d S}^t^ate^s^,³⁵^{4 U}^.^S^.¹⁷⁸⁽¹⁹⁵⁷⁾^;
^M^c^{Phaul v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^,³⁶^{4 U.S}^.³⁷^{2 (}¹⁹⁶⁰⁾^.
³¹¹^H^u^tc^he^s^oⁿ^v^.^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^State^s^{, 36}^{9 U}^.^S.⁵⁹⁹⁽¹⁹⁶²⁾^.

and organizations that violate the civil rights of others³¹²—have all been upheld by the Supreme ³¹³
Court.
Despite the Court’s broad interpretation of legislative purpose, Congress’s authority is not
unlimited. Courts have held that a committee lacks legislative purpose if it appears to be
conducting a legislative trial rather than an investigation to assist in performing its legislative ³¹⁴
function. Furthermore, although “there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of ³¹⁵
exposure,” “so long as Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional power, the Judiciary
lacks authority to intervene on the basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of that ³¹⁶
power.”
Two different issues of pertinency arise in regard to a contempt prosecution.³¹⁷ First, a witness’s
refusal to answer questions or provide subpoenaed documents will be punished as a contempt
only if the questions posed (or documents requested) by the committee are, in the language of the ³¹⁸
statute, “pertinent to the question under inquiry.” In determining general questions of the
pertinency of inquiries, the courts have required only that the specific inquiries be reasonably ³¹⁹
related to the subject matter under investigation. Given the breadth of congressional
investigations, the courts have long recognized that pertinency in the legislative context is broader
than in the judicial context, which relies primarily on the law of evidence’s standard of relevance.
For example, the D.C. Circuit has stated that
^A^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^{e i}ⁿ^qu^ir^y^m^a^y^{be as}^broad,^as^s^earch^ing^,^an^{d as}^ex^h^a^u^s^ti^v^e^as^isⁿ^eces^s^a^r^y^to
^m^a^k^e^eff^ecti^v^{e t}^h^{e cons}^tit^u^tio^{nal po}^w^e^rs^{of C}^ong^res^s^{. ... A j}^u^{dicial in}^quir^y^relate^s^to^{a cas}^e^,
^an^{d th}^{e ev}^ideⁿ^{ce to be adm}ⁱ^s^sⁱ^b^{le m}^u^s^t^{be m}^e^a^s^u^r^{ed b}^y^th^{e n}^a^rrow^li^mⁱ^t^s^of^th^{e ple}^a^dⁱⁿ^g^s^.^A
^legⁱ^s^l^ati^v^{e in}^q^u^ir^y^an^tic^ip^ates^al^l^pos^sⁱ^bl^{e cas}^e^s^w^h^ich^m^a^y^a^r^is^{e th}^ereun^d^{er an}^{d th}^{e ev}^iden^c^e³²⁰
^admⁱ^ssⁱ^b^l^e^m^u^s^t^{be res}^pon^si^v^e^t^o^t^h^e^s^c^{ope of}^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^quⁱ^r^y^w^hⁱ^c^h^g^eⁿ^e^ral^l^yⁱ^s^v^e^r^y^broad.
The second pertinency issue concerns the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. According to
the Supreme Court in Deutch v. United States, the pertinency of a “committee’s inquiry must be ³²¹
brought home to the witness at the time the questions are put to him.” The Court in Watkins
stated that

³¹²^She^lt^on^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^,⁴⁰^{4 F.}²^d¹²⁹²⁽^D^.C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁶⁸⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^{, 3}⁹³^U^.^S.¹⁰²⁴⁽¹⁹⁶⁹⁾^.
³¹³^{For a}ⁿⁱⁿ^dic^a^tioⁿ^of^the^lik^e^l^y^br^e^a^d^{th of}^Co^ng^re^{ss’s pow}^e^r^{to inv}^e^stig^a^t^e^,^see^s^upr^aⁿ^o^t^e⁵^-¹⁹^and^acco^m^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g
^te^x^t^.
³¹⁴^Se^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^I^c^ar^dⁱ^{, 1}⁴⁰^{F. S}^u^p^p^.³⁸^{3 (D}^.D^.C.¹⁹⁵⁶⁾^;^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^C^r^os^s^,¹⁷^{0 F.}^Su^pp^{. 3}^{03 (D}^.D^.C^.
¹⁹⁵⁹⁾^.
³¹⁵^W^a^tk^{ins v}^.^Un^ite^d^State^s^,³⁵^{4 U.}^{S. 1}⁷⁸^,²⁰⁰⁽¹⁹⁵^{7). How}^e^v^e^{r, Chie}^f^Justic^e^W^a^rre^n,^w^r^iting^f^o^r^the^m^a^jority^{, m}^a^de
^{it c}^l^e^a^r^tha^t^he^w^a^s^{not r}^e^f^e^r^rⁱ^ng^{to the}^“^pow^e^r^of^the^C^ong^r^e^s^s^{to i}^nqu^ir^e^int^o^aⁿ^d^pu^blic^iz^e^c^o^r^r^u^pti^{on, m}^a^l-
^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^ratⁱ^oⁿ^o^rⁱⁿ^ef^fⁱ^ci^en^c^yⁱⁿ^a^g^en^ci^{es o}^f^t^h^{e G}^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^.^”^Id^.
³¹⁶^Bare^nb^latt^,³⁶^{0 U.}^S^.^at¹³²^.
³¹⁷^D^e^utc^h^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 3}^{67 U}^.^S^.⁴⁵^6,⁴⁶^7-⁶⁸⁽¹⁹⁶¹⁾^.
³¹⁸^{2 U}^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 1}⁹²⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^;^s^e^e^als^o^Bar^e^nbl^att^,³^{60 U}^.^{S. a}^t¹²^3;^W^a^tk^ins^,³⁵^{4 U.}^S^.^at²⁰⁸
³¹⁹^Sinc^l^a^ir^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^,²⁷⁹^U.S^.²⁶^3,²⁷^{9 (}¹⁹²⁹⁾^;^A^s^hl^an^d^Oi^l^,^Iⁿ^c.^v.^F^T^C^,⁴⁰^{9 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.²⁸⁷^,³⁰^{5 (}^D^.^D^.^C^.¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.
³²⁰^Towⁿ^s^e^{nd v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^,⁹⁵^F^.^2d³⁵^2,³⁶^{1 (}^D^.C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹³⁸⁾^,^c^e^r^{t. de}^nie^d^,³⁰^{3 U}^.^S.⁶^{64 (}¹⁹³⁸⁾⁽ⁱⁿ^t^e^r^na^{l c}^ita^tion
^om^itte^{d) (e}^m^pha^{sis in orig}^ina^l^).
³²¹^Deu^t^ch^,³⁶^{7 U}^.^S^.^a^t⁴^67-⁶⁸^.

^[^u^]ⁿ^les^s^th^{e s}^u^b^j^{ect m}^a^tter^h^a^s^b^een^m^a^d^e^to^ap^p^ear^w^ith^uⁿ^dⁱ^s^p^u^tab^l^e^c^l^a^rⁱ^t^y^,ⁱ^tⁱ^s^th^e^d^u^ty^o^f
^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^atⁱ^v^{e body}^,^u^pon^obj^ectⁱ^oⁿ^of^t^h^e^wⁱ^tⁿ^es^s^oⁿ^g^r^o^uⁿ^d^s^o^f^pertⁱⁿ^eⁿ^c^y^{, t}^o^s^t^a^t^{e f}^o^r
^th^{e record th}^{e s}^u^bj^{ect u}ⁿ^d^{er i}^nqu^ir^y^{at t}^h^at^ti^m^e^an^{d t}^h^e^m^aⁿⁿ^{er in}^w^h^ic^h^th^{e propou}ⁿ^d^ed
^qu^es^tⁱ^ons^{are pert}ⁱⁿ^eⁿ^t^t^h^eret^o^.^T^o^{be m}^e^aⁿⁱⁿ^gfu^l^{, t}^h^e^ex^pl^aⁿ^atⁱ^on^m^u^s^t^des^c^ri^be^w^h^at^t^h^e
^{topic u}ⁿ^d^{er in}^quir^y^is^aⁿ^{d t}^h^{e con}ⁿ^ecti^v^{e reas}^onⁱⁿ^g^w^h^ereby^th^{e precis}^e^q^u^es^tioⁿ^s^as^k^e^d³²²
^r^e^{late to}^it.
In addition, according to commentators, a witness is entitled “to understand the specific aspect of
the committee’s jurisdiction under its authorizing resolution [or House or Senate rule] to which ³²³
the question relates.” Finally, it appears that the committee must specifically rule on a
pertinency objection and, if the objection is overruled, inform the witness of that fact before again
directing him to answer the question.
The Court has also observed that a witness might resort to several sources in determining the
subject matter of an investigation. These include, but are likely not limited to: (a) the House or
Senate resolution authorizing the committee inquiry; (b) the committee’s resolution authorizing
the subcommittee investigation; (c) the introductory statement of the chairman or other committee
Members; (d) the nature of the proceedings; and (e) the chairman’s response to a witness’s ³²⁴
objections on the grounds of lack of pertinency.
A conviction for statutory criminal contempt cannot be sustained unless the failure to appear
before the committee, to produce documents, or to respond to questions is a willful, intentional ³²⁵³²⁶
act. However, an evil motive does not have to be established. Because of the willfulness
requirement, and to satisfy constitutional due process standards, when a witness objects to a
question or otherwise refuses to answer, the chairman or presiding member should rule on any ³²⁷
objection and, if the objection is overruled, the witness should be clearly directed to answer. It
has been observed that “there is no talismanic formula which [a] committee must use in directing
[a] witness to answer,” but he should be clearly informed “and not left to the risk of guessing
upon pain of criminal penalties, whether the grounds for his objection to answering [are] accepted ³²⁸
or rejected,” and “if they are rejected, he should be given another chance to answer.” The
procedure to be followed in responding to a witness’s objections to questions has been described
as follows:

³²²^W^a^tk^ins^,³⁵^{4 U}^.^S.^a^t²^14-¹⁵^.
³²³^Se^e^{James Ha}^m^iltoⁿ^,^T^HE^P^OWE^R^T^O^P^ROB^E^:^A^S^T^{UDY O}^F^C^ONGR^E^S^S^I^ON^AL^I^NVE^S^T^I^G^AT^I^O^N^S^{, 241 (}¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^[^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r
^Ha^m^ilton^]^.
³²⁴^W^a^tk^ins^,³⁵^{4 U}^.^S.^a^t²^09-¹⁴^.
³²⁵^Q^uⁱⁿ^{n v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 3}^{49 U}^.^S.¹⁵⁵^{, 1}⁶⁵⁽¹⁹⁵⁵⁾^;^{see a}^l^s^o^Unⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^B^r^yan^{, 33}⁹^U^.^{S. 32}³⁽¹⁹⁵⁰⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d
^State^s^v^.^J^o^s^e^phs^oⁿ^,¹⁶⁵^F.^2d⁸²⁽²^d^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁴⁸⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^{, 3}³³^U^.^S.⁸³^{8 (}¹⁹⁴⁸⁾^;^D^e^utc^h^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^{, 23}⁵^F^.²^d
⁸⁵³^(D^{.C. Cir}^.¹⁹⁵⁶^),^r^e^v^’^d^on^ot^he^r^gr^o^uⁿ^d^s^{, 3}⁶⁷^U^.^S.⁴⁵^{6 (}¹⁹⁶¹⁾^.
³²⁶^Se^e^ge^ne^r^a^lly^,^A^lle^{n B. M}^o^re^laⁿ^d^,^C^o^ngr^e^s^sⁱ^o^nal^Iⁿ^v^e^s^tig^ati^ons^a^{nd Pr}^iv^ate^Pe^r^s^ons^{, 40}^S^O^.^C^AL^.^L.^R^EV^{. 189,}²^39-
^{42 (}¹⁹⁶⁷⁾^.
³²⁷^Se^e^,^e^.^g.^{, D}^e^utc^h^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^{, 36}^{7 U}^.^S.⁴⁵^{6 (}¹⁹⁶¹⁾^;^W^a^tkⁱⁿ^s^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^{, 3}^{54 U}^.^S.¹⁷^{8 (}¹⁹⁵⁷⁾^;^Quⁱⁿ^{n v.}
^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^{, 34}⁹^U^.^{S. 15}⁵⁽¹⁹⁵⁵⁾^;^Em^s^p^ak^v^.^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^State^s^{, 34}^{9 U}^.^S.¹⁹⁰⁽¹⁹⁵⁵⁾^;^B^a^r^t^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^S^t^ate^s^,³⁴^{9 U.}^S^.²¹⁹^th
⁽¹⁹⁵⁵⁾^;^Br^ade^{n v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^,²⁷²^F.^2d⁶^53,⁶⁶^{1 (}⁵^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁵⁹⁾^,^aff’^d^,³⁶^{5 U}^.^S.⁹^{61 (}¹⁹⁶¹⁾^.
³²⁸^Q^uⁱⁿ^{n v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 2}⁰³^F.2^d^30,³³⁽^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁵²⁾^,^aff’^d^,³⁴^{9 U}^.^S.¹^{55 (}¹⁹⁵⁵⁾^.

^If^a^wⁱ^tⁿ^es^s^refu^s^e^s^{to ans}^w^er^{a qu}^es^tion^,^th^{e co}^mm^ittee^m^u^s^t^as^certain^th^e^g^r^oun^ds^relied
^u^pon^b^y^t^h^e^wⁱ^tⁿ^e^s^s^.^It^m^u^s^t^c^l^earl^y^ru^{le o}ⁿ^t^h^e^wⁱ^tⁿ^es^s^’^s^obj^ection^,^an^{d if}^{it o}^v^erru^les^th^e
^wⁱ^tⁿ^e^s^s^’^s^obj^ection^an^{d requ}^ir^es^t^h^e^wⁱ^tⁿ^e^s^s^{to ans}^w^{er, it}^m^u^s^tⁱⁿ^s^t^r^u^{ct t}^h^e^wⁱ^tⁿ^es^s^t^h^at^hⁱ^s
^coⁿ^tin^u^e^d^r^e^f^u^{sal to}^an^s^w^er^wⁱ^ll^m^a^k^e^hⁱ^m^liab^l^{e to}^p^r^o^s^ecu^ti^oⁿ^f^o^r^coⁿ^t^e^m^p^t^o^f^Coⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^.
^B^y^f^a^iliⁿ^g^ad^eq^u^a^tel^y^to^ap^p^r^{ise th}^e^wⁱ^tn^e^{ss t}^h^{at a}ⁿ^aⁿ^s^w^erⁱ^s^r^e^q^u^ir^edⁿ^o^t^w^it^h^s^taⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^hⁱ^s
^ob^j^ection^th^e^ele^m^eⁿ^t^of^deliberaten^es^sⁿ^eces^s^a^r^y^f^o^r^c^oⁿ^vⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^f^o^r^c^oⁿ^t^em^p^t^uⁿ^d^e^r²^U^.^S^.^C^.³²⁹
^{§ 192}^is^lack^ing^,^an^{d s}^u^c^h^{a con}^vⁱ^c^tion^caⁿⁿ^o^{t s}^t^an^d.
A contempt conviction can be reversed on other non-constitutional grounds. The cases make clear
that committees must closely follow their own rules and the rules of their parent body in ³³⁰³³¹
authorizing subpoenas and conducting investigations and hearings. It appears that a witness ³³²
can be convicted of criminal contempt, but not of perjury, where a quorum of the committee ³³³
was not present.
In practice, the exercise of committee discretion whether to accept a claim of attorney-client
privilege has turned on a “weighing [of] the legislative need for disclosure against any possible ³³⁴
resulting injury.” More particularly, the process of committee resolution of claims of attorney-
client privilege has traditionally been informed by weighing considerations of legislative need,
public policy, and the statutory duty of congressional committees to engage in continuous
oversight of the application, administration, and execution of laws that fall within their ³³⁵
jurisdiction, against any possible injury to the witness. In the particular circumstances of any
situation, a committee may consider and evaluate the strength of a claimant’s assertion in light of
the pertinency of the documents or information sought to the subject of the investigation, the
practical unavailability of the documents or information from any other source, the possible
unavailability of the privilege to the claimant if it were to be raised in a judicial forum, and the
committee’s assessment of the cooperation of the witness in the matter, among other
considerations. A valid claim of attorney-client privilege, free of any taint of waiver, exception or
other mitigating circumstance, would merit substantial weight. Any serious doubt, however, as to

³²⁹^Se^e^L^eadⁱⁿ^{g Cases,}^s^upr^aⁿ^o^te²^{97 a}^t⁶⁹^.
³³⁰^She^lt^on^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^,³²^{7 F.}²^d⁶⁰¹^(D^{.C. Cir.}¹⁹⁶³^);^{see a}^l^s^o^Lⁱ^veri^g^h^t^v.^Uni^t^e^d^S^t^at^es^{, 3}⁴⁷^F.2^d⁴⁷³^(D^{.C. Cir.}
¹⁹⁶⁵⁾^.
³³¹^Ye^{llin v}^.^Unite^{d St}^ate^s^{, 37}⁴^U^.^S.¹⁰⁹⁽¹⁹⁶³⁾^;^G^o^j^a^{ck v.}^Uni^t^e^d^S^t^a^t^es^{, 38}^{4 U}^.^S.⁷^{02 (}¹⁹⁶⁶⁾^.
³³²^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Br^y^aⁿ^{, 3}³⁹^U^.^S.³²³⁽¹⁹⁵⁰⁾^.
³³³^T^h^e^Court^he^ldⁱⁿ^C^h^rⁱ^s^t^of^fe^l^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^,³³^{8 U}^.^S.^{84 (}¹⁹⁴⁹⁾^{, tha}^t^a^qu^or^um^of^the^c^o^m^m^itte^e^m^u^s^t^be^pr^e^s^eⁿ^t
^at^t^h^{e t}ⁱ^m^{e t}^h^at^t^h^e^p^e^rj^u^rⁱ^o^u^s^t^e^stⁱ^m^oⁿ^yⁱ^s^gi^ven^.^Itⁱ^sⁿ^o^t^su^f^fⁱ^ci^en^t^t^h^at^{a qu}^o^r^u^mⁱ^s^p^r^esen^t^at^t^h^{e st}^art^o^f^t^h^{e h}^eariⁿ^g.
^T^h^e^dif^f^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^{in r}^e^g^a^r^d^{to the}^qu^or^um^r^e^quir^e^m^e^{nt be}^tw^ee^{n the}^c^o^nte^m^{pt s}^t^a^t^ute⁽²^U^.^S.C^.^{§ 1}⁹²⁾^a^{nd t}^h^e^pe^r^j^ur^y
^st^at^u^t^{e (1}^{8 U.}^S^.^C^.^{§ 16}²¹^{) i}^s^t^h^{e pro}^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^t^h^{e l}^a^t^t^e^{r t}^h^at^t^h^{e st}^at^emen^t^m^u^st^h^a^{ve b}^een^mad^e^b^e^f^o^{re a “co}^m^p^et^en^t
^t^rⁱ^b^un^al^,^”^and^{a qu}^o^r^u^m^h^a^{s b}^een^coⁿ^sⁱ^d^eredⁿ^ecessar^y^f^o^{r t}^h^{e t}^rⁱ^bun^al^t^o^b^e^co^m^p^et^en^t^.^T^h^{e Cou}^r^tⁱⁿ^Ch^risto^ffel
^reco^gⁿ^ized^th^{e co}ⁿ^s^titu^tioⁿ^a^{l p}^o^w^e^{r o}^f^each^Ho^u^s^{e t o}^d^e^termⁱⁿ^{e th}^{e ru}^{les o}^f^{its p}^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^s^an^d^p^u^r^su^an^{t t}^o^t^h^{i s}
^pow^e^r^{, the}^Se^na^te^ha^s^a^u^th^or^iz^e^d^its^c^o^m^m^itte^e^s^{to a}^{dopt r}^u^le^s^uⁿ^d^e^r^w^h^ic^{h one}^m^e^m^b^e^r^of^a^c^o^m^mⁱ^tte^e^c^aⁿ^c^ons^tit^ute
^a^quor^um^f^o^r^the^r^ecei^p^t^o^f^sw^o^rⁿ^t^e^stⁱ^m^oⁿ^y^.^Se^e^S^eⁿ^a^t^e^Ru^l^e^XX^{VI ,}^cl^.⁷⁽^a)(2^).^T^h^{e Hou}^s^{e al}^l^o^w^s^co^mmⁱ^t^t^{ees t}^o
^a^dopt^r^u^le^s^pr^ov^idiⁿ^g^f^o^r^r^ecei^p^t^o^f^t^e^stⁱ^m^oⁿ^y^b^y^as^f^e^w^{as t}^w^o^m^e^m^b^ers.^Se^e^H^ous^e^Rule^X^{I , c}^l.²⁽^h).
³³⁴^H^e^a^r^ing^s^{, “}^I^nte^r^na^tio^na^{l U}^r^aⁿ^iu^m^C^a^r^t^e^l^”^,^Subc^om^m^.^{on O}^v^e^r^sⁱ^{ght a}ⁿ^{d I}ⁿ^v^e^s^tig^a^tions^,^H^ous^e^C^o^m^m^{. on I}ⁿ^te^r^s^ta^te
^a^{nd F}^o^r^e^ig^{n C}^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^,⁹⁵^th^Coⁿ^g^{., 1}^st^Se^s^s^.,^V^o^l^.¹^,¹²³⁽¹⁹⁷^7).
³³⁵^Se^e^{2 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁹^0d⁽¹⁹⁹⁴⁾^.

the validity of the asserted claim would diminish its compelling character.³³⁶ Moreover, the
conclusion that recognition of non-constitutionally based privileges, such as attorney-client
privilege, is a matter of congressional discretion is consistent with both traditional British ³³⁷
parliamentary and the Congress’s historical practice.
Although there is limited case law with respect to attorney-client privilege claims before ³³⁸
congressional committees, appellate court rulings on the privilege in cases involving other
investigative contexts (e.g., grand jury) have raised questions as to whether executive branch
officials may claim attorney-client, work product, or deliberative process privileges in the face of ³³⁹
investigative demands. These rulings may lead to additional arguments in support of the long-
standing congressional practice.
The legal basis for Congress’s practice in this area is based upon its inherent constitutional
prerogative to investigate which has been long recognized by the Supreme Court as extremely
broad and encompassing, and which is at its peak when the subject is fraud, abuse, or ³⁴⁰
maladministration within a government department. The attorney-client privilege is, on the
other hand, not a constitutionally based privilege, rather it is a judge-made exception to the

³³⁶^Se^e^,^e^.^g.^{, C}^o^nte^m^pt^{of C}^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^Agai^ns^{t Fr}^ank^li^{n L.}^H^ane^y^{, H}^.^R^e^pt.¹⁰^5-⁷^92,¹⁰⁵^th^Cong^.,²^d^S^e^ss.^,¹¹^-¹^{5 (}¹⁹⁹⁸⁾^;
^P^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^s^A^g^aⁱⁿ^s^t^J^o^hn^M.^Quⁱⁿⁿ^,^D^a^vi^d^Wat^kⁱⁿ^s,^aⁿ^d^Ma^t^t^h^e^w^Mo^o^r^{e (}^P^u^rs^uant^to^Title^{2, U}ⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^Co^de^,^th
^Se^c^tions¹⁹^{2 an}^d¹⁹⁴⁾^{, H}^.^R^e^pt.¹^04-⁵⁹^8,¹⁰⁴^C^o^ng^.,^2d^S^e^ss.^,⁴⁰^-^{54 (}¹⁹⁹⁶⁾^;^Re^fu^s^a^{l o}^f^W^illi^a^m^H.^Keⁿⁿ^e^d^y^{, III,}^To
^P^r^o^d^u^{ce N}^o^t^e^{s Su}^bp^o^e^na^ed^b^y^t^h^{e S}^p^eci^a^l^C^o^mmi^t^t^{ee t}^o^In^vestⁱ^g^a^t^{e Wh}ⁱ^t^e^wa^t^e^{r Devel}^o^p^m^en^t^Co^r^p^ora^tⁱ^oⁿ^an^{d R}^e^l^a^t^e^d^th^st
^M^a^tte^rs^{, S.R}^e^pt.¹^04-¹⁹^1,¹⁰⁴^C^ong^{. 1}^S^e^ss.^,^9-¹⁹⁽¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^;^P^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^s^A^g^aⁱⁿ^s^t^R^a^l^p^h^B^e^rn^st^eiⁿ^an^d^Jo^seph^th
^Bern^stein^{, H}^.^Re^pt^{. 9}⁹^-4⁶²^{, 9}⁹^C^ong^{. 2}^d^S^e^ss.^,¹³^,¹⁴⁽¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^;^H^e^a^r^ings^{, I}ⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tio^nal^U^r^ani^um^C^oⁿ^t^r^o^l,^be^for^e^the^th^st
^Subc^om^m^itte^e^oⁿ^O^v^e^r^sⁱ^ght^an^{d I}ⁿ^v^e^s^tigati^ons^,^H^ous^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on I}ⁿ^te^r^s^t^ate^an^{d For}^eⁱ^{gn C}^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^{, 95}^Cong^.,¹
^S^e^ss.^,⁶⁰^,¹²^{3 (}¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^.
³³⁷^Se^e^{, C}^R^S^R^e^p^o^r^t^95-⁴⁶^4,^Iⁿ^v^e^s^tigativ^e^O^v^e^r^sⁱ^ght:^{An I}ⁿ^tr^o^duc^ti^on^{to t}^h^e^L^a^w^,^Pr^ac^tic^e^an^{d Pr}^oc^e^d^ur^e^of
^C^ongr^e^s^sⁱ^o^nal^Iⁿ^quir^y^,^pp^{. 4}³^-⁵⁵⁽^A^pr^{il 7, 1}⁹⁹⁵⁾^;^{see a}^l^s^o^{, G}^l^eⁿⁿ^A^.^B^e^a^r^d,^C^ongr^e^s^s^v^.^the^Attorⁿ^e^y^-^C^lie^{nt Pr}^iv^ile^ge^:
^A^“^F^ul^l^an^{d F}^r^an^{k Di}^scu^ssi^oⁿ^”^{, 35}^A^m^e^r^.^C^RI^M^.^L.^R^EV^{. 11}^{9 1}^22-¹²⁷⁽¹⁹⁹⁷⁾⁽^“^[^C^]^o^ng^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l w}^itne^s^s^e^s^a^r^e^not
^le^g^a^ll^y^eⁿ^title^{d to}^the^pr^ote^c^tioⁿ^o^f^the^a^ttorne^y^-c^lie^nt^priv^ile^g^e^{, a}^{nd inv}^e^stig^a^ting^c^o^m^m^itte^e^s^the^r^e^f^o^r^e^ha^v^e
^disc^re^tiona^ry^a^u^thority^{to re}^spe^c^t^{or ov}^e^rrule^su^c^h^c^l^aⁱ^m^s^a^s^the^y^se^e^f^it.”⁾^{; T}^hom^a^s^Mille^tt,^The^Ap^pl^ic^abili^ty^of
^Ev^ideⁿ^ti^ary^Priv^ile^ge^{s for C}^onf^id^eⁿ^{tial C}^o^mmu^nic^a^ti^{ons Be}^f^o^re^Co^ngre^s^s^{, 2}¹^J^OH^N^M^A^R^S^HAL^L^L.^R^EV^{. 30}^{9 (}¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^.
³³⁸^Se^e^Iⁿ^t^h^e^M^a^tte^r^o^f^Pr^ovⁱ^d^eⁿ^t^Li^fe^an^{d Ac}^cⁱ^de^nt^C^o^.^{, E.D}^.^T^e^nn.,^S.D^{., C}^I^V-^1-^90-²¹^{9, J}^une^13,¹⁹⁹⁰⁽ⁿ^otiⁿ^g^tha^t
^the^c^our^t’^s^e^a^r^lie^r^r^u^li^ng^on^aⁿ^a^t^t^o^rⁿ^e^y^-^c^lie^{nt pr}^iv^ile^g^e^c^l^aⁱ^m^w^a^s^“not^of^c^ons^tit^utio^na^l^dim^e^ns^ions^,^a^{nd is}^c^e^r^ta^inly^not
^bin^d^ing^{on t}^h^e^C^o^ng^r^e^s^s^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^.”⁾^.
³³⁹^Iⁿ^r^e^G^r^an^{d J}^u^r^y^Su^bp^oe^na^D^u^c^e^s^Te^c^u^m^,¹^{12 F. 3d 91}⁰⁽⁸^th^{Cir. 1}⁹⁹⁷^),^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^s^u^b^.^no^m.^,^Of^fⁱ^{ce o}^f^t^h^e
^P^r^esi^d^en^t^v.^Of^fⁱ^{ce of}^t^h^{e Ind}^e^p^e^nd^en^t^C^o^un^sel^{, 5}^{21 U}^.^S.¹¹⁰⁵⁽¹⁹⁹⁷⁾⁽^r^e^je^c^ting^c^l^aⁱ^m^s^b^y^the^Fir^s^{t L}^a^dy^o^f^a^ttorⁿ^e^y^-
^c^lie^{nt a}ⁿ^d^w^o^r^k^-^p^r^oduc^t^pr^iv^ile^g^e^w^{ith r}^e^s^p^e^c^t^note^s^ta^k^e^{n by}^W^h^ite^H^ous^e^C^o^uns^e^l^O^f^fⁱ^ce^a^ttorⁿ^e^y^s)^;^In^{re B}^r^u^{ce R}^.
^Linds^e^y⁽^G^r^{and J}^u^r^y^Te^s^tim^ony⁾^,¹⁵⁸^F.³^d¹²⁶³^(D^.C.^Cir.¹⁹^98),^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁵²^{5 U}^.^S.⁹⁹^{6 (}¹⁹⁹⁸⁾⁽^hol^di^ng^tha^t^a
^W^h^ite^H^ous^e^a^ttorⁿ^e^y^m^a^y^{not in}^v^o^k^e^a^ttorⁿ^e^y^-^c^lie^{nt pr}^iv^ile^g^e^{in r}^e^s^pons^e^to^g^r^a^{nd j}^u^r^y^s^ubpoe^na^s^e^e^k^ing^inf^o^r^m^a^tion
^on^pos^sⁱ^ble^c^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on of}^f^e^de^r^a^{l c}^r^im^es⁾^;^In^{re S}^e^a^l^e^d^Ca^{se (}^E^spy)^{, 12}^{1 F}^.^3d⁷²⁹⁽^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁷⁾⁽^d^e^cⁱ^di^ng^tha^t^t^h^e
^d^e^lⁱ^b^eratⁱ^v^{e p}^r^o^{cess p}^rⁱ^vⁱ^l^e^{ge i}^s^{a co}^mm^oⁿ^l^a^w^agen^c^y^p^rⁱ^vⁱ^l^e^ge^w^hⁱ^c^h^can^b^e^o^v^erco^m^e^b^y^{a sh}^o^wⁱⁿ^{g o}^fⁿ^eed^b^y^an^th
^inv^e^s^tig^a^ting^body⁾^;^In^{re: A Wit}ⁿ^{ess Befo}^{re th}^{e Sp}^ecia^l^Gran^d^J^u^ry^{, 28}^{8 F.}^3d²^{89 (}⁷^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰²⁾⁽^h^oldi^ng^tha^t^t^h^e
^a^ttorⁿ^e^y^-^c^lie^{nt pr}^iv^ile^g^e^is^{not a}^p^plic^a^b^le^t^o^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^be^tw^e^eⁿ^s^t^a^t^e^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt c}^ouns^e^l^aⁿ^d^s^t^a^t^e^of^fⁱ^c^e
^hol^de^r⁾^;^B^u^t^{see In}^{re Gran}^d^J^u^{ry In}^vestⁱ^g^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^{, 3}⁹⁹^F.^3d⁵²^{7 (}^{2d C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^u^ph^ol^ding^a^c^l^aⁱ^m^of^a^t^t^o^rⁿ^e^y^-^c^lie^nt
^pr^iv^ile^g^e^w^{ith r}^e^s^p^e^c^t^{to c}^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^be^tw^e^eⁿ^a^f^o^r^m^e^r^c^h^ie^f^leg^a^{l c}^ouns^e^l^to^the^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^o^r^of^C^o^nne^c^tic^{ut w}^{ho w}^a^s
^unde^r^g^r^aⁿ^{d j}^u^r^y^inv^e^s^tig^a^{tion. I}^t^is^w^o^r^t^{h no}^ting^t^h^a^t^the^Se^c^oⁿ^d^Cⁱ^r^c^{uit r}^e^c^o^gⁿ^iz^e^dⁱ^t^s^a^ppa^r^e^nt^c^oⁿ^f^lic^t^w^{ith the}^a^f^or^e^-
^ci^t^e^d^cases,^h^o^w^ev^er,^t^h^{e ru}^lⁱⁿ^gⁱ^s^argu^ab^l^y^dⁱ^stⁱⁿ^guⁱ^s^h^a^b^l^e^oⁿⁱ^t^s^f^act^s.^Se^e^Kerri^R.^Bl^u^m^en^au^er,^Prⁱ^v^ile^ge^{d or}^N^o^t?
^Ho^{w t}^h^{e C}^u^rren^t^A^p^p^lⁱ^c^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e Go}^vern^m^en^t^A^t^t^o^rn^ey-Clⁱ^eⁿ^t^P^rⁱ^vⁱ^l^e^g^e^L^e^a^{ves t}^h^{e Go}^vern^m^en^t^F^eelⁱⁿ^g
^Unpriv^ile^ge^d^{, 75}^F^ORDH^A^M^L.^R^EV^{. 75}⁽²⁰⁰⁶⁾⁾^.
³⁴⁰^M^c^G^r^{ain v}^.^D^a^ug^he^r^t^y^,²⁷^{2 U}^.^S.¹³^5,¹⁷^{7 (}¹⁹²⁶⁾^;^W^a^tk^{ins v}^.^Uⁿ^it^e^d^St^ate^s^,³⁵⁴^U^.^S.¹⁷^8,¹⁸^{7 (}¹⁹⁵⁷⁾^;^E^a^stla^{nd v}^.
^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^Se^r^v^ic^e^m^eⁿ^’^s^Fund^,⁴²^{1 U}^.^S^.⁴⁹¹^,⁵⁰⁴^n.¹⁵⁽¹⁹⁷⁵⁾^.

normal principle of full disclosure in the adversary process which is to be narrowly construed and ³⁴¹
has been confined to the judicial forum.
While no court has recognized the inapplicability of the attorney-client privilege in congressional ³⁴²
proceedings in a decision directly addressing the issue, an opinion issued by the Legal Ethics
Committee of the District of Columbia Bar in February 1999, clearly acknowledges the ³⁴³
longstanding congressional practice. The occasion for the ruling arose as a result of an
investigation of a Subcommittee of the House Commerce Committee into the circumstances
surrounding the planned relocation of the Federal Communications Commission to the Portals ³⁴⁴
office complex. During the course of the inquiry, the Subcommittee sought certain documents
from the Portals developer, Mr. Franklin L. Haney. Mr. Haney’s refusal to comply resulted in
subpoenas for those documents to him and the law firm representing him during the relocation
efforts. Both Mr. Haney and the law firm asserted attorney-client privilege in their continued
refusal to comply. In addition, the law firm sought an opinion from the D.C. Bar’s Ethics
Committee as to its obligations in the face of the subpoena and a possible contempt citation. The
Bar Committee notified the firm that the question was novel and that no advice could be given ³⁴⁵
until the matter was considered in a plenary session of the Committee. The firm continued its
refusal to comply until the Subcommittee cited it for contempt, at which time the firm proposed
to turn over the documents if the contempt citation was withdrawn. The Subcommittee agreed to ³⁴⁶
the proposal.
Subsequently, on February 16, 1999, the D.C. Bar’s Ethics Committee issued an opinion
vindicating the action taken by the firm. The Ethics Committee, interpreting D.C. Bar Rule of ³⁴⁷
Professional conduct 1.6(d)(2)(A), held that an attorney faced with a congressional subpoena
that would reveal client confidences or secrets
^h^a^s^{a prof}^es^sⁱ^oⁿ^al^res^pon^sⁱ^bi^lⁱ^t^y^t^o^s^eek^t^o^qu^ash^{or l}ⁱ^mⁱ^t^t^h^{e s}^u^bpoen^a^on^al^l^av^aⁱ^l^a^bl^e,
^leg^iti^m^a^te^g^r^o^uⁿ^d^{s to}^p^r^o^t^{ect co}ⁿ^f^id^eⁿ^{tial d}^o^c^u^m^en^t^s^an^{d cl}^ien^t^s^ecrets^.^If^{, t}^h^{ereafter, th}^e
^C^ong^res^sⁱ^oⁿ^al^su^bco^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee ov}^erru^l^e^s^t^h^es^{e obj}^ectⁱ^oⁿ^s^{, orde}^r^s^p^r^o^d^u^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^e^d^o^c^u^m^eⁿ^t^s
^an^{d t}^h^reat^eⁿ^s^t^o^h^o^l^d^t^h^{e l}^a^w^y^{er i}ⁿ^con^t^e^m^p^t^abs^eⁿ^t^co^m^p^lⁱ^aⁿ^ce^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^e^s^u^bpoen^a^{, t}^h^en^{, i}ⁿ
^t^h^{e abs}^eⁿ^{ce of}^{a j}^u^di^ci^al^orde^r^f^o^rbi^ddiⁿ^g^t^h^{e produ}^ctⁱ^oⁿ^,^t^h^{e l}^a^w^y^{er i}^s^permⁱ^t^t^e^{d, bu}^tⁿ^o^t
^requⁱ^r^{ed, by}^t^h^e^D^.^C^.^R^u^l^e^s^o^f^Prof^es^sⁱ^on^al^C^oⁿ^d^u^c^t^t^o^produ^{ce t}^h^e^s^u^bpoen^{aed docum}^ent^s^.

³⁴¹^W^e^s^tingh^ous^e^Ele^c^t^rⁱ^c^C^o^r^p^or^atⁱ^{on v}^.^Re^pu^blic^{of t}^h^e^Phi^lip^pine^s^,⁹⁵¹^F^.²^d¹⁴¹⁴^,¹⁴²³⁽³^{d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹¹⁾^.
³⁴²^T^h^e^Supr^e^m^e^C^our^{t ha}^s^r^e^c^o^gⁿ^iz^e^d^tha^t^“^o^nly^inf^r^e^que^ntly^ha^v^e^w^itne^s^s^e^s^{. . .}^[ⁱ^{n c}^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^l^he^a^r^ing^s^]^be^eⁿ
^aff^o^rd^ed^t^h^{e p}^r^o^ced^u^r^al^rⁱ^gh^t^s^no^r^m^al^l^y^asso^ci^at^ed^wⁱ^t^h^an^ad^j^u^dⁱ^ca^tⁱ^v^{e p}^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g.^”^H^aⁿⁿ^ah^v.^Lar^c^he^{, 3}^{63 U}^.^S.⁴²^0,
⁴²⁵⁽¹⁹⁶⁰⁾^{; s}^e^e^a^l^s^o^,^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v.^Fort^,⁴⁴^{3 F.}²^d⁶⁷⁰^(D^{.C. Cir}^.¹⁹⁷⁰^),^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁴⁰^{3 U}^.^S.⁹³^{2 (}¹⁹⁷¹⁾⁽^r^e^je^c^ting
^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^t^eⁿ^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^at^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^s^tⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^on^al^ri^gh^t^t^o^cro^ss-ex^a^m^ine^w^itne^s^se^{s a}^pplie^{d t}^o^a^c^o^ng^re^ssiona^{l inv}^e^stig^a^tion);^In^th^e
^M^a^tte^r^{of Pr}^ov^ideⁿ^t^Life^an^{d Ac}^cⁱ^de^{nt C}^o^.^,^E.D^.^T^e^nn.,^S.D^.^{, C}^I^V-¹^-^90-²¹^{9, J}^u^ne¹³^,¹⁹⁹⁰⁽ⁿ^oting^t^h^a^t^the^c^our^t’^s
^e^a^r^lie^{r ruling}^oⁿ^aⁿ^a^ttorⁿ^e^y^-c^lieⁿ^t^priv^ile^g^e^c^l^aⁱ^m^wa^{s “}^not^of^c^ons^tituti^ona^l^dim^e^nsions,^aⁿ^{d is c}^e^r^ta^inly^{not b}ⁱⁿ^d^ing
^{on t}^h^e^C^o^ng^r^e^s^s^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^.”⁾^.
³⁴³^Opⁱⁿⁱ^o^{n No}^.²⁸⁸^,^C^o^m^p^lⁱ^aⁿ^c^e^W^ith^Su^bp^oe^na^fr^om^C^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^sⁱ^onal^Com^m^itte^e^to^Pr^od^uc^e^Lawy^e^r^s^’^File^s
^C^ont^aini^ng^C^lie^nt^C^o^nfideⁿ^c^e^s^or^Se^c^r^e^t^s^{, L}^e^ga^{l Ethic}^s^C^o^m^m^itte^e^,^Dⁱ^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^of^C^o^lum^b^ia^B^a^r^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{16, 19}^99.⁽^D^.C
^Ethic^s^Com^m^itte^e^Opinio^n).
³⁴⁴^Se^e^H^.^R^e^{p. N}^o^.¹⁰^5-⁷^92,¹⁰⁵^th^C^ong^{., 1}^st^Se^s^s^{., 1-}^6,^7-⁸^,¹⁵^-^{16 (}¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^.
³⁴⁵^Se^e^M^e^e^{ting o}ⁿ^P^o^r^t^al^Iⁿ^v^e^s^tig^at^{ion (}^A^ut^hor^iz^atioⁿ^of^Su^bpoe^nas^;^R^ecei^p^t^o^f^S^u^b^p^o^eⁿ^a^e^d^Do^cu^meⁿ^t^{s a}ⁿ^d
^Coⁿ^sⁱ^d^eratⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^Ob^j^ectⁱ^oⁿ^s^);^aⁿ^d^Con^t^emp^t^o^f^C^o^ng^{ress P}^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^s^A^g^aⁱⁿ^s^t^F^r^aⁿ^k^lⁱⁿ^L^.^Haⁿ^e^y^{, H}^.^Com^m^{. O}ⁿ^th
^Co^mmerce,¹⁰⁵^C^ong^.,^2d^Se^s^s^.^,^48-⁵⁰⁽¹⁹⁹⁸⁾^.
³⁴⁶^Id^{. a}^t¹⁰^1-¹⁰⁵^.
³⁴⁷^Unde^{r R}^u^le^1.^6(d)(²^)(A^{) a}^la^wy^e^r^m^a^y^re^ve^a^l^c^lie^{nt c}^onf^ideⁿ^c^e^s^or^se^c^r^e^t^{s only}^w^h^eⁿ^e^x^pre^ssl^y^pe^r^m^itte^{d by}^the
^D^.^C^.^B^a^r^r^u^le^s^or^w^h^eⁿ^“^r^e^quir^e^d^by^law^or^c^our^t^or^de^r^.^”

^{A directiv}^{e o}^f^a^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^oⁿ^al^s^u^bco^m^mⁱ^{ttee acco}^m^p^aⁿⁱ^e^{d by}^{a t}^h^{reat o}^f^fⁱⁿ^e^s^aⁿ^d
ⁱ^m^pri^s^onm^eⁿ^t^pu^r^s^u^aⁿ^t^t^o^f^e^de^ral^cri^mⁱⁿ^al^l^a^w^s^a^tⁱ^s^fⁱ^e^s^t^h^{e s}^t^an^{dard of}^“^r^equi^{red by}^l^a^w^”^as
^t^h^at^ph^ras^eⁱ^s^us^{ed i}ⁿ^D^.^C^.^R^u^l^e^of^Prof^es^sⁱ^on^al^con^d^u^c^t^1.6(d)(2)⁽^A⁾^.
The D.C. Bar opinion urges attorneys to press every appropriate objection to the subpoena until
no further avenues of appeal are available, and even suggests that clients might be advised to ³⁴⁸
retain other counsel to institute a third-party action to enjoin compliance, but allows the
attorney to relent at the earliest point when he is put in legal jeopardy. The opinion represents the
first, and thus far the only, bar in the nation to directly and definitively address the merits of the
issue.
In the end, of course, it is the congressional committee alone that determines whether to accept a
claim of attorney-client privilege.
Common law rules of evidence as well as statutory enactments recognize a testimonial privilege
for witnesses in a judicial proceeding so that they need not reveal confidential communications ³⁴⁹
between doctor and patient, husband and wife, or clergyman and parishioner. Although there is
no court case directly on point, it appears that, like the privilege between attorney and client,
congressional committees are not legally required to allow a witness to decline to testify on the ³⁵⁰
basis of other similar testimonial privileges. It should be noted, however, that the courts have
denied claims by the White House Counsel’s office of attorney work product immunity in the face
of grand jury subpoenas that have been grounded on the assertion that the materials sought were ³⁵¹
prepared in anticipation of possible congressional hearings. In addition, court decisions indicate
that various rules of procedure generally applicable to judicial proceedings, such as the right to
cross-examine and call other witnesses, need not be accorded to a witness in a congressional ³⁵²
hearing. The basis for these determinations is rooted in Congress’s Article I section 5 ³⁵³
rulemaking powers, under which each House is the exclusive determiner of the rules of its own
proceedings. This rulemaking authority, as well as general separation of powers considerations,

³⁴⁸^A^dⁱ^rect^suⁱ^t^t^o^en^j^oⁱⁿ^{a c}^o^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee f}^r^o^m^en^f^o^rciⁿ^{g a su}^b^p^o^eⁿ^a^h^a^s^b^een^f^o^recl^o^s^ed^b^y^t^h^{e S}^u^p^r^em^e^Co^u^r^t^’^s^d^eci^si^oⁿ
ⁱⁿ^E^a^stla^nd^v.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^Se^r^vⁱ^c^e^m^eⁿ^’^s^Fund^,⁴^{21 U}^.^S.⁴⁹^1,⁵⁰¹⁽¹⁹⁷⁵⁾^{, b}^u^{t t}^h^a^t^r^u^ling^doe^sⁿ^o^{t a}^ppe^a^r^to^f^o^r^e^c^l^os^e
^an^actⁱ^oⁿ^agaiⁿ^s^t^{a “t}^hⁱ^rd^p^a^rt^y^,^{” s}^u^ch^{as t}^h^{e cl}ⁱ^eⁿ^t^{’s at}^t^o^rⁿ^ey^,^t^o^t^e^st^t^h^{e val}ⁱ^dⁱ^t^y^o^f^t^h^{e su}^bp^o^eⁿ^a^o^r^t^h^{e p}^o^w^{er o}^f^a
^c^o^m^m^itte^e^{to re}^f^u^se^{to re}^c^o^gⁿ^iz^e^the^priv^ile^g^e^.^S^ee,^e^.^g.^{, U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^d^Stat^e^s^v.^AT^&^T^,^{567 F. 2d 12}¹⁽^D^.C^.^C^ir^.¹⁹⁷⁷⁾
⁽^e^nte^r^ta^ining^aⁿ^a^c^tion^by^the^J^u^s^t^ic^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt to e}ⁿ^j^oⁱⁿ^A^T^&^T^f^r^o^m^c^o^m^p^l^y^ing^w^{ith a}^s^ubp^oe^na^t^o^pr^ov^ide
^te^le^pho^ne^re^c^o^{rds t}^h^a^t^mⁱ^g^h^{t c}^o^m^p^romⁱ^se^na^tiona^{l se}^c^u^rity^m^a^tte^rs)^.
³⁴⁹^Se^e^ge^ne^r^a^lly^,^{8 W}ⁱ^g^m^or^e^,^E^VI^D^E^NCE^{§ 228}^{5 (}^M^c^N^a^u^g^h^t^oⁿ^e^d^.¹⁹⁶¹⁾^;^{see al}^so^F^ED^.^R.^E^VI^D^.⁵⁰^1.^F^o^{r an}^an^al^y^sⁱ^s^o^f
^the^a^ttorⁿ^e^y^c^lie^{nt priv}^ile^g^e^,^Se^e^infraⁿ^o^t^es³³¹^-³⁴⁴^aⁿ^d^acco^m^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g^t^e^xt^.
³⁵⁰^Co^mp^a^r^e^Attorⁿ^e^y^-^C^lie^{nt Pr}^iv^ile^ge^:^M^e^m^o^r^and^{a O}^pⁱⁿⁱ^ons^{of t}^h^e^Am^e^r^ic^{an Law}^Dⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^on^{, Li}^br^ar^y^{of C}^o^ngr^e^s^s^,
^C^o^m^m^.^Pr^int^of^the^Su^bc^om^m^itte^e^{on O}^v^e^r^sⁱ^g^h^{t a}ⁿ^d^Iⁿ^v^e^s^tig^ati^ons^{of t}^h^e^H^ous^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^on^Ene^r^g^y^and^C^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^,^th^st
⁹⁸^Cong^.,¹^S^e^ss.^,⁹²⁶⁽¹⁹⁸³⁾^[h^ereiⁿ^a^f^t^er^A^t^t^o^rn^ey^-Clⁱ^eⁿ^t^P^rⁱ^vⁱ^l^{ege Co}^mm^.^P^rⁱⁿ^t^]^,^wit^h^Id^.^a^t⁴¹^{, 44}^et^.^seq^;^{see a}^l^so
^ge^ne^r^a^lly^{, More}^laⁿ^d^,^sup^r^a^no^te^{5 a}^t²^65-⁶⁷^.
³⁵¹^S^{ee e.}^g^.^,^In^{re Gran}^{d Ju}^{ry S}^u^b^poen^a^Du^{ces T}^ecu^m^,¹¹^{2 F}^.³^d⁹⁰⁷^,⁹²⁴^-²^{5 (}⁸^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^;^In^{re Grand}^Ju^ry
^P^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^s^,^{5 F.S}^u^p^p^.2^{d 21,}³⁹^(D^.D^.C.¹⁹⁹⁸^).
³⁵²^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^For^t^{, 4}⁴³^F.^2d⁶^{70 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁰⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁴⁰³^U^.^S.⁹^{32 (}¹⁹⁷¹⁾^{, (}^c^iti^ng^H^aⁿ^nah^v^.^L^a^r^c^he^,
³⁶³^U^.^S.⁴^{20 (}¹⁹⁶⁰⁾⁾^.
³⁵³^U.^S^.^C^ONS^T^{. A}^r^{t. 1, §}^5,^c^l^.²

suggest that Congress and its committees are not obliged to abide by rules established by the ³⁵⁴
courts to govern their own proceedings.
Though congressional committees may not be legally obligated to recognize the privilege for
confidential communications, they may do so at their discretion. Historical precedent suggests ³⁵⁵
that committees often have recognized such privileges. The decision as to whether or not to
allow such claims of privilege turns on a “weighing [of] the legislative need for disclosure against ³⁵⁶
any possible resulting injury.”
The Supreme Court has observed that “Congress, in common with all branches of the
Government, must exercise its powers subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on
governmental action, more particularly in the context of this case, the relevant limitations of the ³⁵⁷
Bill of Rights.” There are constitutional limits not only on Congress’s legislative powers, but
also on its investigative powers.
Although the First Amendment, by its terms, is expressly applicable only to legislation that
abridges freedom of speech, press, or assembly, the Court has held that the amendment also ³⁵⁸
restricts Congress in conducting investigations. In the leading case involving the application of ³⁵⁹
First Amendment rights in a congressional investigation, Barenblatt v. United States, the Court
held that “where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar government interrogation resolution
of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public
interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown.” Thus, unlike the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, the First Amendment does not give a witness an absolute ³⁶⁰
right to refuse to respond to congressional demands for information.
The Court has held that in balancing the personal interest in privacy against the congressional
need for information, “the critical element is the existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the ³⁶¹
interest of the Congress in demanding disclosure from an unwilling witness.” To protect the

³⁵⁴^Se^e^ge^ne^r^a^lly^,^T^e^lf^or^{d T}^a^y^l^or^,^G^RA^ND^I^NQU^E^S^T^:^T^HE^S^TO^R^Y^O^F^C^O^NGRE^S^S^I^ON^AL^I^NV^E^S^T^I^G^A^T^I^ONS^227-²⁸⁽¹⁹⁷⁴⁾^.
³⁵⁵^Se^e^Ha^m^ilton,^s^upr^aⁿ^o^te³²^{0, a}^t²⁴⁴^;^{see a}^l^so^S.Re^pt^{. N}^o^{. 2}^,⁸⁴^th^Cong^.,¹^st^Se^{ss., (1}⁹⁵^{5). Ha}^m^ilton^note^s^t^h^a^t^Jo^hn
^D^e^aⁿ^{, the}^f^o^rm^e^r^c^ouns^e^l^{to t}^h^e^Pre^s^ideⁿ^{t, te}^s^tif^ie^{d be}^f^o^re^the^Se^na^te^W^a^te^r^g^a^t^e^Co^m^m^itte^e^af^te^{r N}ⁱ^xon^ha^{d “}^w^aⁱ^v^e^d
^an^y^at^t^o^rn^e^y^-clⁱ^eⁿ^t^p^rⁱ^vⁱ^l^e^{ge h}^e^mi^gh^t^h^a^{ve h}^a^d^b^ecau^{se o}^f^t^h^ei^{r rel}^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^hⁱ^p^.^”^Id^.
³⁵⁶^A^ttorne^y^-Clie^{nt P}^r^iv^ile^g^e^Com^m^.^P^rⁱⁿ^t,^sup^r^a^no^te³^46,^a^t²⁷⁽^c^iti^ng^H^e^ar^ings^on^aⁿ^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^ati^oⁿ^a^l^U^r^anium^C^a^r^t^e^l
^be^for^e^the^Su^bc^om^m^itte^e^oⁿ^O^v^e^r^sⁱ^ght^an^{d I}ⁿ^v^e^s^tigatⁱ^ons^{, H}^o^us^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^on^Iⁿ^te^r^s^t^ate^an^{d F}^o^r^e^{ign C}^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^{, 95}^th^st
^C^ong^{., 1}^S^e^ss.^,^60,¹^{23 (}¹⁹⁷⁷⁾⁾^.
³⁵⁷^B^a^ren^b^l^a^t^t^v.^Unⁱ^t^ed^St^a^t^es^,³⁶⁰^{U.S. 1}⁰⁹^,¹¹²⁽¹⁹⁵^{9). No}^{t a}^ll^of^the^prov^isi^ons^of^the^Bill^of^Rig^h^{ts a}^r^e^a^pplic^a^b^le
^t^o^con^g^ressi^oⁿ^a^l^h^eariⁿ^gs.^F^o^{r exa}^m^p^l^e,^t^h^{e si}^xt^h^am^en^d^m^en^t^ri^gh^t^o^f^{a cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^d^e^fen^d^aⁿ^t^t^o^cro^ss-^exa^mⁱⁿ^e^wⁱ^tⁿ^esses
^a^{nd t}^o^c^a^{ll w}^itne^s^s^e^s^{in his}^be^ha^lf^ha^s^be^eⁿ^he^ld^not^a^p^p^lic^a^b^le^to^a^c^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l he}^a^r^ing^.^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^{es v.}^F^o^rt^{, 44}³
^F^.^2d⁶⁷^{0 (}^D^.^C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁰⁾^,^cert^.^denⁱ^ed^,⁴⁰^{3 U}^.^S.⁹^{32 (}¹⁹⁷¹⁾^.
³⁵⁸^W^a^tk^{ins v}^.^Un^ite^d^State^s^,³⁵⁴^U.S^.¹⁷^8,¹⁹^{7 (}¹⁹⁵⁷⁾^.
³⁵⁹³⁶⁰^U.^S.¹⁰^9,¹²^{6 (}¹⁹⁵⁹⁾^.
³⁶⁰^Id^.
³⁶¹^W^a^tk^ins^,³⁵^{4 U}^.^S.^a^t¹⁹⁸^.^A^ba^la^nc^ing^te^s^t^w^a^s^a^l^s^o^us^e^dⁱⁿ^Br^anz^bur^g^v^.^H^a^y^e^s^{, w}^h^ic^{h inv}^o^l^v^e^{d th}^e^issue^of^the
^c^l^aⁱ^m^e^{d pr}^iv^ile^g^e^of^new^s^m^e^{n not}^{t o r}^e^s^p^on^{d t}^o^de^m^a^nds^of^a^g^r^aⁿ^{d jur}^y^f^o^r^inf^o^r^m^a^tion.^Se^e⁴⁰^{8 U}^.^{S. 6}⁶⁵⁽¹⁹⁷²⁾^{. I}ⁿ
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

rights of witnesses, in cases involving the First Amendment, the courts have emphasized the
requirements discussed above concerning authorization for the investigation, delegation of power ³⁶²
to investigate to the committee involved, and the existence of a legislative purpose.
While the Court has recognized the application of the First Amendment to congressional
investigations, and although the amendment has frequently been asserted by witnesses as grounds
for not complying with congressional demands f or information, the Court has never relied on the ³⁶³
First Amendment as grounds for reversing a criminal contempt of Congress conviction.
However, the Court has narrowly construed the scope of a committee’s authority so as to avoid ³⁶⁴
reaching a First Amendment issue. In addition, the Court has ruled in favor of a witness who ³⁶⁵
invoked his First Amendment rights in response to questioning by a state legislative committee.
In a 1976 investigation of the unauthorized publication in the press of the report of the House
Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct subpoenaed ³⁶⁶
four news media representatives, including Daniel Schorr. The Standards of Official Conduct
Committee concluded that Mr. Schorr had obtained a copy of the Select Committee’s report and
had made it available for publication. Although the ethics committee found that “Mr Schorr’s role
in publishing the report was a defiant act in disregard of the expressed will of the House of
Representatives to preclude publication of highly classified national security information,” it ³⁶⁷
declined to cite him for contempt for his refusal to disclose his source. The desire to avoid a

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^its^5-⁴^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^{, t}^h^e^C^o^ur^{t c}^o^nc^lu^de^{d t}^h^a^t^the^ne^e^d^of^the^g^r^a^{nd j}^u^r^y^f^o^r^the^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion outw}^e^ig^he^d^Fir^s^{t A}^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^t
^c^ons^ide^r^a^tio^ns^,^but^the^r^e^a^r^eⁱⁿ^dic^a^tionsⁱⁿ^t^h^e^o^pⁱⁿⁱ^oⁿ^tha^t^“^t^he^inf^r^ing^e^m^e^{nt of}^pr^ote^c^t^e^d^Fⁱ^r^s^{t A}^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t r}ⁱ^g^h^ts^m^u^s^t
^be^no^br^oa^de^r^t^h^aⁿ^ne^c^e^s^s^a^r^y^{to ac}^hie^v^e^a^pe^r^m^is^sⁱ^ble^g^o^vern^m^eⁿ^t^a^l^p^u^r^p^o^s^e,^{” and}^t^h^at^{“a S}^t^at^{e’s i}ⁿ^t^e^rest^m^u^st^b^e
^‘c^om^pe^lling^’^{or ‘pa}^r^a^m^{ount’ t}^o^j^u^s^tify^ev^eⁿ^aⁿ^indire^c^t^bur^deⁿ^on^Fⁱ^rs^{t A}^m^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^{t rig}^h^ts^.”^Id^.^a^t⁶⁹^9-⁷^00;^{see al}^so
^Gibson^v^.^Fl^orid^{a Le}^gisl^a^tiv^e^Inv^e^stigati^{on C}^o^mmitte^e^{, 3}⁷²^U.S.⁵^{39 (}¹⁹⁶³⁾^(a^pplyⁱ^ng^the^c^o^m^p^e^lling^inte^re^{st te}^{st in}^a
^le^gⁱ^sla^tiv^e^inv^e^sti^g^a^tion).
³⁶²^Se^e^,^e^.^g.^{, B}^a^r^e^nbl^{att v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^{, 3}^{60 U}^.^S.¹⁰^{9 (}¹⁹⁵⁹⁾^;^W^a^tkⁱⁿ^{s v}^.^Unite^{d S}^t^ate^s^,³⁵^{4 U}^.^S^.¹⁷⁸⁽¹⁹⁵⁷⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d
^State^s^v^.^R^u^m^e^ly^,³⁴^{5 U.}^S^.⁴¹⁽¹⁹⁵³⁾^;^{see al}^so⁴^Desch^l^{er’s P}^r^eced^en^t^s^,^s^upr^a^note^87,^c^h^.¹⁵^{, §}¹⁰^,^{n. 1}⁵^aⁿ^d
^acco^m^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g^t^e^xt^.
³⁶³^L^eadⁱⁿ^{g Cases,}^s^upr^aⁿ^o^te²^97,^a^t⁴²^{; H}^a^m^ilton,^sup^r^a^no^te³²^{0, a}^t²³^{4. A}^ltho^u^g^h^it^w^a^{s not in}^the^c^r^im^ina^l
^coⁿ^t^em^p^t^coⁿ^t^ext^,^on^{e cou}^r^t^o^f^app^eal^{s h}^a^{s u}^p^h^e^l^d^{a w}ⁱ^tⁿ^{ess’s F}ⁱ^rst^Amen^d^m^en^t^cl^ai^m^.^In^Stamle^{r v}^.^W^illis^,^t^h^{e S}^e^ven^t^h
^Circ^{uit Co}^urt^of^A^ppe^a^l^{s orde}^re^d^{to tria}^{l a}^w^itne^ss’s^suⁱ^t^f^o^r^d^ecl^arat^o^r^y^relⁱ^e^f^ag^aiⁿ^s^t^t^h^{e Hou}^s^{e Un}^-^A^meri^can
^A^c^ti^v^itie^{s Com}^m^itte^e^{in w}^h^ic^{h it}^w^a^{s a}^lle^g^e^{d tha}^t^the^c^o^m^m^itte^e^’^s^a^u^thor^iz^ing^re^solu^tio^{n ha}^{d a}^“^c^h^il^ling^e^f^f^e^c^t^”^on^th
^plaⁱ^ntif^f^’^{s First Am}^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t rig}^h^ts.^Se^e⁴¹⁵^F.^2d¹³⁶⁵⁽⁷^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁶⁹⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,³⁹^{9 U}^.^S.⁹²^{9 (}¹⁹⁷⁰⁾^.^Iⁿ^othe^r^c^a^s^e^s
^f^o^r^de^c^l^a^r^a^t^or^y^a^{nd in}^junc^tⁱ^v^e^r^e^lie^f^br^oug^{ht a}^g^aⁱ^ns^{t c}^o^m^m^itte^e^s^{on Fir}^s^{t A}^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t g}^r^oun^ds^{, r}^e^lie^f^ha^s^be^eⁿ^de^nie^d
^a^ltho^u^g^h^the^c^{ourts i}ⁿ^dⁱ^c^a^t^e^d^tha^t^re^lie^f^c^{ould be}^g^r^aⁿ^te^d^if^the^cⁱ^rc^u^m^staⁿ^c^e^s^w^e^re^m^o^re^c^o^m^p^e^lling^.^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^Sa^nd^ers
^v.^McCl^el^l^aⁿ^,⁴⁶^{3 F.}^2d⁸^{94 (}^D^.C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷²⁾^;^D^a^vi^{s v.}^Cho^r^d^,⁴⁴²^{F. 2}^d¹²^{07 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁰⁾^;^Aⁿ^sa^ra^v.^E^a^stl^a^nd^{, 44}²
^F^.^2d⁷⁵^{1 (}^D^.^C^.^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷¹⁾^.^H^o^w^e^ver^,ⁱⁿ^Eas^t^l^aⁿ^d^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^Se^r^v^ic^e^m^eⁿ^’^s^Fund^,^t^h^{e S}^u^prem^e^Co^u^r^t^h^e^l^d^t^h^at^t^h^e
^Coⁿ^s^tⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^’^{s S}^p^eech^o^r^Deb^a^t^e^Cl^au^{se (A}^rt^.^I,^sec.⁶^,^cl^.¹⁾^gen^e^ral^l^y^b^a^{rs su}ⁱ^t^s^ch^al^l^eⁿ^gⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e val}ⁱ^dⁱ^t^y^o^f
^c^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l s}^u^bp^oe^na^s^oⁿ^Fir^s^t^A^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t or}^othe^r^g^r^o^uⁿ^d^s^.^T^h^us^{, a}^w^itne^s^s^g^e^ne^r^a^ll^y^c^a^{nnot r}^a^is^e^his
^c^onstitu^tio^na^{l de}^f^e^nse^s^until^a^sub^s^e^que^nt^c^r^im^ina^l^prose^c^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^f^o^r^c^onte^m^{pt unle}^{ss, i}ⁿ^t^h^e^c^a^s^e^of^a^Se^na^te^c^o^m^m^itte^e^,
^the^s^t^a^t^ut^or^y^cⁱ^v^{il c}^onte^m^{pt pr}^oc^e^dur^e^is^e^m^ploy^e^d^{. 421}^U^.^S.⁴^{91 (}¹⁹⁷⁵⁾^{; see a}^l^s^o^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^State^s^v^.^H^ous^e^of
^R^e^p^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^ves^{, 5}⁵⁶^{F. S}^u^p^p^.¹⁵^{0 (D}^.D^.C.¹⁹⁸³⁾^.
³⁶⁴^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Rum^e^ly^,³⁴^{5 U}^.^S^.⁴¹⁽¹⁹⁵³⁾^.
³⁶⁵^Gibsoⁿ^v^.^Fl^orid^{a Le}^gisl^ativ^e^Iⁿ^v^e^s^tigati^{on C}^o^mmitte^e^{, 3}⁷²^U^.^S.⁵^{39 (}¹⁹⁶³⁾^{. I}ⁿ^the^m^a^jor^ity^opini^oⁿ^{, J}^u^s^tic^e
^G^o^ldbe^rg^obse^r^v^e^{d tha}^t^“^aⁿ^e^sseⁿ^tia^{l pre}^r^e^q^uⁱ^site^to^the^v^a^lidi^t^y^of^aⁿ^inv^e^stig^a^{tion w}^h^ic^{h i}ⁿ^tr^ude^{s in}^{to t}^h^e^a^r^e^a^of
^coⁿ^s^titu^tioⁿ^a^lly^p^r^o^t^ected^rig^h^ts^o^f^sp^eech^{, p}^r^{ess, asso}^cia^tioⁿ^an^d^p^e^titioⁿ^[ⁱ^s^]^t^h^{at th}^e^{State co}ⁿ^vⁱⁿ^ciⁿ^g^ly^sh^o^w^a
^substa^ntia^{l re}^la^ti^on^[^o^r^ne^x^u^{s] be}^t^w^e^e^{n the}^inf^o^rm^a^{tion so}^ug^ht^aⁿ^d^a^subje^c^t^of^ov^e^rridi^ng^a^{nd c}^o^m^p^e^lling^sta^t^e^inte^re^st.
^Id^.^a^t⁵⁴^6.
³⁶⁶^H^.^R^e^pt.^94-¹⁷^54,⁹⁴^th^C^ong^{. 2}^d^Se^s^s^{., 6 (}¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.
³⁶⁷^Id^.^a^t^42-⁴³^.

clash over First Amendment rights apparently was a major factor in the committee’s decision on ³⁶⁸
the contempt matter.
In another First Amendment dispute, the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, in the course of its probe of allegations that
deceptive editing practices were employed in the production of the television news documentary
program The Selling of the Pentagon, subpoenaed Frank Stanton the president of CBS, directing ³⁶⁹
him to deliver to the subcommittee the “outtakes” relating to the program. When, on First
Amendment grounds, Stanton declined to provide the subpoenaed materials, the subcommittee
unanimously voted a contempt citation, and the full committee by a vote of 25-13 recommended ³⁷⁰
to the House that Stanton be held in contempt. After extensive debate, the House failed to adopt ³⁷¹
the committee report, voting instead to recommit the matter to the committee. During the
debate, several Members expressed concern that approval of the contempt citation would have a
“chilling effect” on the press and would unconstitutionally involve the government in the ³⁷²
regulation of the press.
Several opinions of the Supreme Court indicate that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable to congressional committees; however, there has ³⁷³
not been an opinion directly addressing the issue. It appears that there must be a legitimate ³⁷⁴
legislative or oversight-related basis for the issuance of a congressional subpoena. The Fourth
Amendment protects a congressional witness against a subpoena which is unreasonably broad or ³⁷⁵
burdensome. The Court has outlined the standard to be used in judging the reasonableness of a
congressional subpoena:
^P^e^tition^e^{r con}^t^en^ds^th^a^t^th^{e s}^ubpoen^a^w^a^s^s^o^{broad as}^to^con^s^tit^u^t^{e an}^un^reas^oⁿ^{able s}^earch
^an^{d s}^e^izu^r^{e i}ⁿ^vⁱ^olat^ion^of^t^h^e^Fou^r^th^Am^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^{t .... ‘A}^dequ^ac^y^{or ex}^ces^sⁱⁿ^th^{e breath}^of
^t^h^e^s^u^bpoen^a^are^m^a^t^t^e^{rs v}^a^ri^abl^eⁱⁿ^rel^a^tⁱ^{on t}^o^t^h^eⁿ^a^t^u^{re, pu}^rpos^es^{, a}ⁿ^{d s}^c^{ope o}^f^t^h^e
ⁱⁿ^qu^ir^y^’^{.... T}^h^{e s}^u^bcom^mⁱ^tte^e’^sⁱⁿ^q^u^ir^y^h^e^re^w^a^s^{a relat}ⁱ^v^e¹^y^{broad on}^{e ...}^an^{d th}^e
^permⁱ^s^sⁱ^bl^e^s^c^{ope of}^m^a^t^e^ri^al^s^t^h^at^coul^{d reas}^on^abl^y^be^s^o^u^g^h^t^w^a^{s n}^ece^s^s^a^ri^l^y^equ^a^l^l^y
^{broad. It}^w^a^sⁿ^o^t^reas^on^abl^e^t^o^s^u^ppos^{e t}^h^at^t^h^{e su}^bco^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee kn}^e^w^preci^s^e^l^y^w^h^at^book^s

³⁶⁸^Id^.^a^t^47-⁴⁸^(a^dd^itio^na^{l v}ⁱ^e^w^{s of}^Re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^Speⁿ^c^e^,^T^e^a^g^ue^{, Hutc}^hins^on,^aⁿ^d^Flyⁿ^t).
³⁶⁹^T^h^e^outta^k^e^s^w^e^r^e^por^ti^ons^of^th^e^C^B^S^fⁱ^l^m^c^lips^tha^t^w^e^r^e^{not a}^c^t^ua^lly^br^oa^dc^a^s^{t. T}^h^e^s^ubc^om^m^itte^e^w^a^nte^d^to
^c^o^m^p^a^r^e^the^outta^k^e^{s w}^{ith the}^ta^p^e^of^the^broa^dc^a^s^{t to}^de^te^rm^ine^if^im^prope^{r e}^d^iting^te^c^h^niq^u^e^s^ha^d^be^eⁿ^use^d^.
³⁷⁰^H^.^R^e^{pt. 92-}³⁴^{9, 92}^d^C^o^ng^{., 1}^st^S^e^s^s^.⁽¹⁹⁷¹⁾^{. T}^h^e^le^g^a^{l a}^r^g^u^m^e^{nt of}^C^B^S^w^a^s^ba^s^e^{d in pa}^r^t^on^the^c^l^aⁱ^m^tha^t
^Coⁿ^g^{ress co}^u^l^{d no}^t^con^s^tⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^l^y^l^e^gi^sl^at^{e o}ⁿ^t^h^{e sub}^j^ect^o^f^edⁱ^tⁱⁿ^g^t^echⁿⁱ^qu^{es an}^d,^t^h^eref^o^r^e,^t^h^{e su}^b^c^o^m^mⁱ^t^t^ee
^la^c^k^e^d^a^v^a^{lid le}^gⁱ^sla^tive^purp^o^se^f^o^{r the}^inv^e^stig^a^tion.^Id^.^at⁹^.
³⁷¹^Se^e¹¹^{7 C}^ONG^.^R^EC^{. 23}⁹²^2-⁹²⁶^,²⁴⁶⁰³^-⁵^9,²⁴⁷²⁰^-⁵³⁽¹⁹⁷¹⁾^.
³⁷²^Id^.^a^t²⁴⁷³^1-⁷³²^.
³⁷³^W^a^tk^{ins v}^.^Un^ite^d^State^s^,³⁵⁴^U.S^.¹⁷^8,¹⁸^{8 (}¹⁹⁵⁷⁾^;^s^e^e^als^o^M^c^Phau^{l v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 3}^{64 U}^.^S.³⁷^{2 (}¹⁹⁶⁰⁾^.
³⁷⁴^A^c^ong^re^ssiona^{l subp}^oe^na^m^a^y^{not be}^use^dⁱⁿ^a^m^e^re^“^f^ishing^e^x^pe^ditio^n.”^Se^e^Hea^{rst v.}^Bla^c^k^,⁸⁷^F^.^2d⁶⁸^{, 7}¹⁽^D
^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹³⁶⁾⁽^q^uotiⁿ^g^,^Fe^de^r^a^{l T}^r^ade^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^v^.^Am^e^r^ic^aⁿ^T^o^bac^c^o^C^o^.^,²⁶⁴^U.^S.²⁹^8,³⁰^{6 (}¹⁹²⁴⁾⁽^s^t^a^tⁱⁿ^g^t^h^at
^“^[ⁱ^]^{t is}^c^ontra^ry^{to the}^fⁱ^{rst pr}^incⁱ^p^l^e^s^of^justic^e^{to a}^l^l^o^w^a^search^t^h^ro^u^g^h^al^l^t^h^{e reco}^r^d^s,^rel^e^van^t^o^rⁱ^r^rel^e^van^t^,ⁱⁿ^t^h^e
^hope^tha^t^s^o^m^e^thing^w^{ill turn u}^p^.^”^)));^{see a}^l^so^Unⁱ^t^ed^St^a^t^{es v.}^Groves^{, 188}^F.^Su^pp.³^{14 (}^W^.D^.^P^a^.¹⁹³⁷⁾⁽^d^ic^ta⁾^;^But
^see^E^a^st^l^a^nd^v.^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es S}^e^rvi^cemen^{’s F}^uⁿ^d^,⁴^{21 U}^.^S.⁴⁹^1,⁵⁰^{9 (}¹⁹⁷⁵⁾^{, (}^r^e^c^o^gⁿ^izⁱⁿ^g^tha^t^aⁿ^inv^e^s^tig^a^{tion m}^a^y
^le^a^d^“^{up s}^o^m^e^‘^b^{lind a}^lle^y^s^’^a^{nd i}ⁿ^to^no^npr^od^uc^tiv^e^eⁿ^te^r^p^rⁱ^se^{s. T}^o^be^a^v^a^{lid le}^gⁱ^sla^tiv^e^inq^u^iry^the^r^e^ne^e^d^be^no
^p^r^edⁱ^c^t^a^b^l^{e end}^resu^l^t^.^”^).
³⁷⁵^M^c^Phaul^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^{, 36}⁴^U^.^{S. 37}²⁽¹⁹⁶⁰⁾^;^s^e^e^als^o^S^h^e^lto^{n v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^{, 4}⁰⁴^F.2^d¹²^{92 (}^D^.^C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁶⁸⁾^,
^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^{, 39}³^U^.^{S. 10}²⁴⁽¹⁹⁶⁹⁾^.

^an^{d records}^w^e^{re k}^e^pt^b^y^t^h^{e Ci}^vⁱ^l^Ri^gh^t^s^C^ong^res^s^,^an^{d t}^h^eref^{ore t}^h^{e s}^u^bpoen^a^cou^l^{d on}^l^y^‘
^s^p^ecify^...^wⁱ^t^h^reas^on^{able particu}^l^arit^y^,^t^h^{e s}^u^bj^ects^t^o^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^e^d^o^c^u^m^en^t^s^{... relate .... ‘}^T^h^e
^cal^l^of^t^h^{e su}^bpoen^a^f^o^{r ‘}^a^l^l^re^cords^,^corres^p^oⁿ^d^en^{ce an}^d^m^e^m^o^raⁿ^d^a’^o^f^t^h^{e C}ⁱ^vⁱ^l^Rⁱ^gh^t^s
^Coⁿ^g^r^e^{ss r}^e^la^tin^g^to^th^e^sp^eci^fⁱ^ed^s^u^b^j^{ect d}^e^scrⁱ^b^e^{s th}^e^m^‘^w^it^h^a^{ll o}^f^t^h^{e p}^a^r^ticu^l^ar^it^y^th^e
ⁿ^a^tu^{re o}^f^th^{e i}ⁿ^qu^ir^y^an^{d t}^h^{e [s}^u^b^co^m^mⁱ^t^t^ee’s^]^sⁱ^t^u^ation^w^o^u^l^{d per}^m^{it .... ‘}^T^h^e^des^c^ription
^con^t^ain^e^{d i}ⁿ^t^h^e^s^u^bpoen^a^w^a^s^s^u^ff^ic^ien^t^{to en}^{able [petitio}ⁿ^e^{r] to kn}^o^w^w^h^{at particu}^l^ar³⁷⁶
^docum^ents^w^e^{re requ}^{ired an}^{d to s}^e^{lect th}^e^m^adequ^a^tel^y^.
If a witness has a legal objection to a subpoena duces tecum or is for some reason unable to
comply with a demand for documents, he must give the grounds for his noncompliance upon the
return of the subpoena. As the D.C. Circuit stated:
^I^f^[^t^he^w^itne^ss]^f^e^{lt he co}^uld^r^e^f^u^{se co}^m^p^liaⁿ^ce^b^ecause^he^co^nsⁱ^d^e^r^e^d^t^h^e^s^u^bpoeⁿ^a^s^o^br^oa^d
^{as to}^coⁿ^s^tit^u^t^{e a}ⁿ^uⁿ^r^easoⁿ^a^b^{le sear}^ch^aⁿ^d^se^izu^r^e^wⁱ^thⁱⁿ^th^{e p}^r^o^h^ib^it^ioⁿ^o^f^t^h^e^f^o^u^r^t^h
^a^m^en^d^m^eⁿ^t^,^t^h^{en t}^o^av^oi^{d c}^oⁿ^t^e^m^pt^f^o^{r co}^m^p^l^e^t^eⁿ^oⁿ^c^om^p^lⁱ^aⁿ^c^e^h^e^w^a^{s un}^{der [an}^]
^o^b^lig^atioⁿ^toⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^th^e^su^b^c^o^m^m^{ittee o}^f^hⁱ^{s p}^o^s^itioⁿ^.^T^h^{e s}^u^b^c^o^m^m^ittee^w^o^u^l^d^th^eⁿ^h^a^v^e
^h^a^{d t}^h^{e ch}^oi^{ce of}^adh^e^ri^ng^t^o^t^h^{e s}^u^bpoen^a^as^f^o^r^m^ul^at^{ed or o}^f^m^eetⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e obj}^ectⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^lⁱ^g^h^t³⁷⁷
^of^any^pertⁱⁿ^ent^repres^en^t^a^tⁱ^o^ns^m^a^{de b}^y^[t^h^e^wⁱ^tⁿ^e^s^s^]^.
Similarly, if a subpoenaed party is in doubt as to what records are required by a subpoena or
believes that it calls for documents not related to the investigation, he must inform the committee.
Where a witness is unable to produce documents he will not be held in contempt “unless he is
responsible for their unavailability ... or is impeding justice by not explaining what happened to ³⁷⁸
them.”
The application of the exclusionary rule to congressional committee investigation is in some
doubt and appears to depend on the precise facts of the situation. It seems that documents which
were unlawfully seized at the direction of a congressional investigating committee may not be
admitted into evidence in a subsequent unrelated criminal prosecution because of the command of ³⁷⁹
the exclusionary rule. In the absence of a Supreme Court ruling, it remains unclear whether the
exclusionary rule bars the admission into evidence in a contempt prosecution of a congressional
subpoena which was issued on the basis of documents obtained by the committee following their ³⁸⁰
unlawful seizure by another investigating body (such as a state prosecutor).

³⁷⁶^M^c^Phaul^,³⁶^{4 U.}^S^.^{at 83}²^.
³⁷⁷^She^lt^on^{, 4}⁰⁴^F.^{2d a}^t¹²^99-¹³⁰⁰^;^{see a}^l^so^L^eadⁱⁿ^{g Cases,}^s^upr^a^not^e²⁹⁷^{, a}^t^49.
³⁷⁸^M^c^Phaul^,³⁶^{4 U.}^S^.^{at 38}²^.
³⁷⁹^N^e^ls^{on v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^{, 2}⁰⁸^F.^2d⁵⁰^{5 (}^D^.C^.^Cⁱ^r^.⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^{, 3}⁴⁶^U^.^S.⁸²^{7 (}¹⁹⁵³⁾^.
³⁸⁰^In^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^v^.^M^c^S^u^r^e^ly^{, 4}⁷³^F.^2d¹¹⁷⁸^,¹¹⁹^{4 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷²⁾^,^t^h^e^c^our^{t of}^a^ppe^a^l^s^r^e^v^e^r^s^e^d^c^onte^m^pt
^c^onv^ic^tions^w^h^e^r^e^the^s^u^bc^om^m^itte^e^s^ubp^oe^na^s^w^e^r^e^ba^s^e^{d on inf}^o^r^m^a^{tion “}^d^e^r^iv^e^d^by^the^s^ubc^om^m^itte^e^thr^oug^{h a}
^pre^v^{ious u}ⁿ^c^o^nstitu^tio^na^{l se}^a^r^c^h^a^{nd se}^iz^ure^by^[^s^ta^te^]^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s a}^nd^the^subc^om^m^itte^e^’^{s o}^w^{n inv}^e^stig^a^t^or.”^T^h^e
^d^eci^si^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e co}^u^r^t^o^f^ap^p^eal^{s i}ⁿ^t^h^{e con}^t^em^p^t^case^w^a^{s ren}^d^e^redⁱⁿ^Dece^m^b^er,¹⁹⁷²^.^In^{a ci}^vi^l^{case b}^r^ou^gh^t^b^y^t^h^e
^c^r^im^ina^l^de^fe^nda^{nts, A}^l^aⁿ^a^nd^Ma^rg^a^r^e^t^Mc^Sure^ly^{, a}^g^aⁱ^{nst Se}^na^tor^Mc^Cle^lla^{n a}ⁿ^d^the^s^ubc^om^m^itte^e^sta^f^f^f^o^{r a}^lle^g^e^d
^vⁱ^ola^tions^of^theⁱ^{r c}^o^nstitu^tio^na^{l r}ⁱ^g^h^ts^by^the^traⁿ^spor^ta^tio^{n a}ⁿ^{d us}^e^of^the^seⁱ^z^e^d^doc^um^eⁿ^{ts, the}^f^e^d^e^ra^{l distric}^t^c^o^u^r^t
^{in J}^u^ne^{, 1}⁹⁷³^,^de^nie^d^the^m^o^tioⁿ^of^the^de^f^e^nda^nts^f^o^r^s^u^m^m^a^r^y^ju^dg^m^e^{nt. W}^h^ile^the^a^p^pe^a^l^f^r^om^the^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^on^of^the
^dⁱ^st^ri^ct^cou^r^tⁱⁿ^t^h^{e ci}^vi^l^{case was}^p^eⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^b^e^f^o^{re t}^h^{e cou}^r^t^o^f^ap^p^eal^s,^t^h^{e S}^u^p^r^em^{e Co}^u^r^t^h^e^l^d^,ⁱⁿ^C^a^lan^d^{ra v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d
^State^s^,⁴¹^{4 U}^.^S^.³³⁸⁽¹⁹⁷⁴⁾^{, t}^h^a^t^a^g^r^a^{nd jur}^y^is^not^pr^e^c^l^u^d^e^d^by^t^h^e^Fo^ur^th^A^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^t’^s^e^x^c^l^us^iona^r^y^r^u^le^f^r^o^m
^que^s^tio^ning^a^w^itne^s^s^on^the^ba^sⁱ^s^of^e^v^ideⁿ^c^e^tha^t^ha^d^be^eⁿ^il^le^g^a^lly^se^iz^e^d^{. A}^divⁱ^de^{d c}^our^t^of^a^ppe^a^l^s^s^ubs^e^queⁿ^tly
^he^{ld i}ⁿ^McS^u^r^el^{y v.}^McCl^el^l^aⁿ^{, 5}²¹^F.2^d¹⁰^24,¹⁰⁴⁷⁽^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁵⁾^,^tha^t^un^de^r^Ca^l^aⁿ^d^ra^{“a con}^g^ressi^oⁿ^a^l^co^mmⁱ^t^t^ee
^ha^s^the^rⁱ^g^h^tⁱⁿ^its^inv^e^s^tig^a^t^or^y^ca^pa^cⁱ^t^y^{to us}^e^t^h^e^pr^o^duc^t^of^a^pa^s^t^un^la^w^f^{ul s}^e^a^r^c^h^a^{nd s}^e^iz^ur^e^.^”
^T^h^{e d}^eci^si^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e t}^h^ree-j^u^d^g^{e pan}^e^lⁱⁿ^t^h^{e ci}^vi^l^{case w}^a^{s va}^cat^ed^an^d^on^reh^eariⁿ^{g b}^y^t^h^{e f}^u^l^l^Di^st^ri^ct^o^f^Co^l^u^m^bⁱ^a
^Ci^rcuⁱ^t^,^fⁱ^{ve j}^u^d^g^{es w}^e^{re o}^f^t^h^{e vi}^ew^t^h^at^Cal^aⁿ^d^r^{a w}^a^{s ap}^p^lⁱ^cab^l^e^t^o^t^h^e^l^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^v^{e sp}^h^e^{re an}^d^an^ot^{her f}ⁱ^v^e^j^u^d^g^es
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Although it has never been necessary for the Supreme Court to decide the issue, in dicta it has
been indicated that the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by the Fifth Amendment is ³⁸¹³⁸²
available to a witness in a congressional investigation. The privilege is personal in nature, ³⁸³³⁸⁴³⁸⁵
and may not be invoked on behalf of a corporation, small partnership, labor union, or other ³⁸⁶
“artificial” organizations. The privilege protects a witness against being compelled to testify ³⁸⁷
but generally not against a subpoena for existing documentary evidence. However, where
compliance with a subpoena duces tecum would constitute implicit testimonial authentication of ³⁸⁸
the documents produced, the privilege may apply.
There is no required verbal formula for invoking the privilege, nor does there appear to be ³⁸⁹
necessary a warning by the committee. A committee should recognize any reasonable ³⁹⁰
indication, such as “the fifth amendment,” that the witness is asserting his privilege. Where a
committee is uncertain whether the witness is in fact invoking the privilege against self-
incrimination or is claiming some other basis for declining to answer, the committee should direct ³⁹¹
the witness to specify his privilege or objection.
The committee can review the assertion of the privilege by a witness to determine its validity, but
the witness is not required to articulate the precise hazard that he fears. In regard to the assertion
of the privilege in judicial proceedings, the Supreme Court has advised:

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^f^{ound i}^t^uⁿⁿ^ecessar^y^t^o^d^eci^d^e^w^h^et^h^e^r^C^a^la^ndr^a^app^lⁱ^e^{s t}^o^co^mmⁱ^t^t^{ees b}^u^tⁱⁿ^dⁱ^cat^ed^t^h^at^,^evenⁱ^fⁱ^t^do^{es n}^o^t^ap^pl^y^t^o
^t^h^{e l}^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^v^{e b}^r^an^ch^,^t^h^{e excl}^u^sⁱ^oⁿ^a^ry^ru^l^e^ma^y^rest^ri^ct^{a co}^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee’s u}^s^{e o}^f^uⁿ^l^awf^u^l^l^y^s^eⁱ^zed^d^o^c^u^m^en^t^sⁱ^fⁱ^t^d^o^e^s
^{not m}^a^k^e^m^e^r^e^“^d^e^r^iv^a^tive^us^e^”^of^them^{but c}^o^m^m^its^aⁿ^inde^pe^nde^{nt f}^our^t^h^a^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t v}ⁱ^ola^tio^{n in}^obtaⁱ^ning^t^h^e^m^.
^McS^u^r^el^{y v.}^McCl^el^l^aⁿ^{, 5}⁵³^F.^2d¹²⁷^7,¹²^93-⁹⁴^{, 1}³¹⁷^-²^{5 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁶⁾⁽^eⁿ^ba^nc⁾^.^T^h^e^S^upr^e^m^e^C^our^{t g}^r^aⁿ^te^d
^c^e^r^tior^a^rⁱ^{in t}^h^e^c^a^s^e^,⁴³^{4 U}^.^S^.⁸⁸⁸⁽¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^,^but^s^ubs^e^que^nt^ly^dism^iss^e^{d c}^e^r^tior^a^rⁱ^a^s^im^pr^ov^ideⁿ^tly^g^r^aⁿ^te^{d, w}^{ith n}^o
^e^x^plaⁿ^a^{tion f}^o^r^t^h^is^dis^posⁱ^tioⁿ^of^the^c^a^s^e^.^Se^e^M^c^Adam^s^v^.^M^c^Sur^e^l^y^{, 43}^{8 U}^.^S.¹^{89 (}¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^{. J}^u^r^y^v^e^r^d^ic^ts^w^e^r^e
^e^v^eⁿ^tua^lly^re^turne^d^a^g^aⁱ^{nst the}^Se^na^te^de^f^e^nda^{nts, b}^u^{t w}^e^re^re^v^e^rs^e^dⁱⁿ^pa^rt^on^a^ppe^a^l^.^Se^e⁷⁵^{3 F}^.²^d^{88 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.
¹⁹⁸⁵⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^{, 5}⁴^U^.^S.L^.^W^.³³⁷^{2 (}^D^e^e^.^{3, 1}⁹⁸⁵⁾^.
³⁸¹^W^a^tk^{ins v}^.^Un^ite^d^State^s^,³⁵^{4 U}^.^{S. 1}⁷⁸⁽¹⁹⁵⁷⁾^;^Quⁱⁿ^{n v.}^Unⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^es^{, 3}^{49 U}^.^S.¹⁵^{5 (}¹⁹⁵⁵⁾^.
³⁸²^Se^e^M^c^Phaul^v^.^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^State^s^,³⁶^{4 U}^.^S.³^{72 (}¹⁹⁶⁰⁾^;^{see a}^l^so^Mc^Corm^ic^k^,^E^VI^D^E^NC^E^{§ 12}^{0 (}^C^le^a^r^y^e^d^{. 1}⁹⁸⁴⁾
^[h^ereiⁿ^a^f^t^{er M}^c^Co^rmⁱ^c^k]^.
³⁸³^Ha^l^e^{v .}^Hen^kel^,²⁰^{1 U}^.^S^.⁴³⁽¹⁹⁰⁶⁾^.
³⁸⁴^Be^{llis v}^.^Uni^t^e^d^S^t^ate^s^{, 41}⁷^U^.^S^.⁸⁵⁽¹⁹⁷⁴⁾^.
³⁸⁵^Se^e^Unite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^W^h^ite^{, 32}^{2 U}^.^S.⁶⁹⁴⁽¹⁹⁴⁴⁾^.
³⁸⁶^Be^llis^,⁴¹^{7 U.}^S^.^at⁹⁰^;^s^e^e^als^o^R^oge^r^s^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^,³⁴^{0 U}^.^S^.³^{67 (}¹⁹⁵¹⁾⁽^C^om^m^unis^t^P^a^r^t^y⁾^.
³⁸⁷^Fⁱ^sh^{er v.}^Unⁱ^t^ed^St^a^t^es^,⁴²^{5 U}^.^S^.³⁹^1,⁴⁰^{9 (}¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^;^Aⁿ^d^r^esen^v.^Maryl^aⁿ^d^,⁴^{27 U}^.^S.⁴⁶^{3 (}¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.^T^h^e^c^a^s^e^s
^c^onc^e^r^ne^d^busⁱⁿ^e^s^s^r^e^c^o^r^d^s^aⁿ^d^t^h^e^r^e^m^a^y^be^s^o^m^e^pr^ote^c^tio^{n a}^v^a^ila^bleⁱⁿ^the^c^a^s^e^of^a^s^ubp^oe^na^f^o^r^pe^r^s^ona^l^pa^pe^r^s^.
^Se^e^Mc^Corm^ic^k^,^s^upr^aⁿ^o^te³⁷^{8 a}^t^§§¹^26,¹^27.
³⁸⁸^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^C^o^e^,⁴⁶^{5 U}^.^S^.⁶^{05 (}¹⁹⁸⁴⁾^;^Fis^h^e^r^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^{, 42}^{5 U}^.^S.³⁹^{1 (}¹⁹⁷⁶⁾^.^{see al}^so^C^u^rc^{io v}^.^Un^ite^d
^State^s^,³⁵^{4 U}^.^S^.¹¹⁸⁽¹⁹⁵⁷⁾^{; Mc}^C^o^r^m^ic^k^,^s^upr^a^no^te³^{78 a}^t^§¹²^6.
³⁸⁹^A^lthoug^{h t}^h^e^r^e^isⁿ^o^c^a^s^e^la^w^{on poi}^{nt, i}^t^s^e^e^m^s^unlik^e^l^y^tha^t^Mⁱ^r^anda^w^a^rⁿ^ing^s^a^r^e^r^e^quir^e^{d. T}^h^a^t^r^e^quir^e^m^e^nt
^f^l^o^w^{s f}^r^o^m^j^u^dⁱ^ci^al^coⁿ^cern^{as t}^o^t^h^{e val}ⁱ^dⁱ^t^y^o^f^coⁿ^f^essi^oⁿ^s^evo^k^e^dⁱⁿ^an^en^vi^ron^m^en^t^o^f^{a p}^o^lⁱ^{ce st}^atⁱ^oⁿ^,ⁱ^s^o^l^at^ed^f^r^o^m
^pub^lic^s^c^r^u^ti^ny^,^w^{ith the}^pos^sⁱ^b^l^e^thr^e^a^t^of^phy^sⁱ^c^a^l^a^{nd pr}^os^e^c^u^torⁱ^a^l^je^opa^r^d^y^;^aⁿ^eⁿ^vⁱ^r^onm^eⁿ^{t c}^l^e^a^r^ly^dis^ting^u^is^ha^ble
^f^r^o^m^a^c^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l c}^onte^x^t.^Se^e^Mⁱ^r^and^{a v}^.^Ar^iz^on^a^,³⁸^{4 U}^.^S.⁴³⁶⁽¹⁹⁶⁶⁾^.
³⁹⁰^Q^uⁱⁿ^{n v}^.^Uⁿ^lte^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 3}^{49 U}^.^S.¹⁵⁵⁽¹⁹⁵⁵⁾^.
³⁹¹^Em^s^pak^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 3}^{49 U}^.^{S. 1}⁹⁰⁽¹⁹⁵⁵⁾^;^{see a}^l^so^L^eadⁱⁿ^{g Cases,}^s^upr^aⁿ^o^te²⁹^{7 a}^t⁶³^.

^T^o^su^staiⁿ^th^{e p}^r^iv^ile^g^e^{, it n}^e^e^d^oⁿ^ly^b^e^ev^id^eⁿ^{t, f}^r^o^m^t^h^{e i}^m^p^licatioⁿ^s^o^f^t^h^{e q}^u^estⁱ^oⁿ^{, i}ⁿ^th^e
^settiⁿ^gⁱⁿ^w^h^ic^h^{it is as}^k^e^d^,^th^at^{a r}^e^sp^oⁿ^siv^e^an^s^w^er^to^th^{e q}^u^estioⁿ^o^r^aⁿ^e^x^p^l^aⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^w^h^y
^{it cann}^o^{t be a}ⁿ^s^w^ered^mⁱ^gh^{t b}^e^dan^g^e^ro^u^s^beca^u^s^eⁱⁿ^j^u^rious^dis^c^los^u^{re cou}^l^{d re}^s^u^l^t^{.... T}^o
^rej^{ect a claim}^,^{it s}^h^o^u^{ld be ‘}^p^erf^ectl^y^c^l^{ear, f}^r^o^m^{a caref}^{ul con}^s^ideration^of^al^{l th}^e
^circum^s^t^aⁿ^ces^of^t^h^{e cas}^{e, t}^h^at^th^e^wⁱ^tⁿ^es^s^is^mⁱ^s^t^ak^eⁿ^{, a}ⁿ^{d that th}^{e ans}^w^ers^caⁿⁿ^{ot pos}^sⁱ^bl^y³⁹²
^h^a^v^e^{a te}ⁿ^d^en^c^y^’^toⁱⁿ^crⁱ^mⁱⁿ^a^t^e.
The basis for asserting the privilege was elaborated upon in a lower court decision:
^T^h^{e pri}^vⁱ^l^e^g^e^m^a^y^oⁿ^l^y^{be a}^s^s^e^rt^ed^w^h^eⁿ^t^h^{ere i}^s^reas^on^abl^e^a^ppreh^en^sⁱ^{on on t}^h^e^part^{of t}^h^e
^wⁱ^tⁿ^e^{ss t}^h^a^t^hi^{s a}ⁿ^s^w^e^r^w^o^ul^d^f^u^rⁿⁱ^s^{h so}^me^e^vⁱ^d^eⁿ^c^e^up^oⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^{h he}^c^o^ul^d^b^e^c^o^nvi^c^t^e^d^o^f^a
^cri^mⁱⁿ^{al of}^f^e^ns^{e ... or}^w^h^ic^h^wou^l^{d rev}^{eal s}^o^u^r^ces^f^r^o^m^w^h^ic^h^ev^iden^{ce cou}^l^{d be obtain}^e^d
^t^h^at^w^o^u^l^{d l}^{ead t}^o^s^u^c^h^convi^ctⁱ^oⁿ^{or t}^o^pros^ecu^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^ere^f^{ore ... .On}^{ce i}^t^h^a^s^beco^m^e
^apparen^t^th^{at th}^{e ans}^w^ers^{to a q}^u^e^s^tioⁿ^w^o^u^l^{d ex}^pos^{e a}^wⁱ^tn^e^s^s^{to t}^h^e^d^aⁿ^g^e^r^o^f^c^oⁿ^vⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^r³⁹³
^p^r^o^s^ecu^tioⁿ^,^wⁱ^d^e^r^la^tit^u^d^{e is}^p^e^r^m^itted^t^h^e^wⁱ^tⁿ^essⁱⁿ^r^e^f^u^sin^g^to^aⁿ^s^w^er^o^t^h^e^r^q^u^estⁱ^oⁿ^s.
The privilege against self-incrimination may be waived by declining to assert it, specifically
disclaiming it, or testifying on the same matters as to which the privilege is later asserted.
However, because of the importance of the privilege, a court will not construe an ambiguous ³⁹⁴
statement of a witness before a committee as a waiver.
Where a witness asserts the privilege, the full House or the committee conducting the
investigation may seek a court order which (a) directs the witness to testify and (b) grants him
immunity against the use of his testimony, or other evidence derived from his testimony, in a ³⁹⁵
subsequent criminal prosecution. The immunity that is granted is “use” immunity, not
“transactional” immunity. Neither the immunized testimony that the witness gives, nor evidence
derived therefrom, may be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, except one for
perjury or contempt relating to his testimony. However, he may be convicted of the crime (the ³⁹⁶
“transaction”) on the basis of other evidence.
The application for the judicial immunity order must be approved by a majority of the House or ³⁹⁷
Senate or by a two-thirds vote of the full committee seeking the order. The Attorney General
must be notified at least ten days prior to the request for the order, and he can request a delay of ³⁹⁸
twenty days in issuing the order. Although the order to testify may be issued before the

³⁹²^Hoffmaⁿ^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 3}^{41 U}^.^{S. 4}⁷⁹^,⁴^86-⁸⁷⁽¹⁹⁵¹⁾^.
³⁹³^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^J^a^ffe^e^,⁹⁸^{F. S}^u^p^p^{. 1}⁹¹^,¹^93-⁹⁴^(D^.D^.C.¹⁹⁵¹⁾^;^{see a}^l^so^Sim^p^s^o^{n v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^,²^{41 F.2}^d²²²⁽⁹^th
^{Cir. 1}⁹⁵⁷^{) (pr}ⁱ^v^ile^g^e^ina^pplic^a^b^le^to^qu^estⁱ^oⁿ^s^seekiⁿ^{g b}^a^si^{c i}^d^en^tⁱ^f^yⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^s^u^ch^{as t}^h^{e w}ⁱ^tⁿ^{ess’s n}^a^{me an}^d
^a^ddr^e^s^s⁾^.
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³⁹⁵^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§^§⁶⁰⁰²^,⁶⁰⁰⁵⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
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^Ka^stⁱ^g^a^r^v.^Unⁱ^t^ed^St^a^t^es^,⁴⁰^{6 U}^.^{S. 4}⁴¹⁽¹⁹⁷²⁾^{. I}ⁿ^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^v^.^Rom^a^no^,⁵⁸^{3 F.2}^d¹⁽¹^st^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^,^t^h^e^de^f^e^nda^nt
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^de^riv^e^{d, in}^pa^{rt, f}^r^om^im^m^uniz^e^d^te^stim^on^y^tha^t^he^ha^d^gⁱ^v^e^{n be}^f^o^re^a^Se^na^te^subc^om^m^itte^e^.^A^lthou^g^h^the^c^o^nv^ic^tion
^w^a^{s a}^f^fⁱ^r^m^e^d^{, the}^c^a^s^e^illustra^te^{s the}^dif^fⁱ^c^u^lt^y^tha^t^the^p^r^ose^c^u^tor^m^a^y^ha^v^eⁱⁿ^e^s^ta^blishing^t^h^a^t^{its e}^v^ideⁿ^c^e^w^a^{s not}
^“^t^aⁱ^nte^d^,”^b^u^{t r}^a^t^h^e^r^w^a^s^de^rⁱ^v^e^{d f}^r^o^m^inde^pe^nde^{nt s}^o^ur^c^e^s^{, e}^s^pe^cⁱ^a^lly^{in a}^c^a^s^e^w^h^e^r^e^the^r^e^w^a^s^s^o^m^e^c^oope^r^a^tio^{n i}ⁿ
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^c^o^m^m^itte^e^.^Se^e^Kastig^ar^{, 4}⁰⁶^U^.^S^.^a^t⁴^61-⁶²^1.
³⁹⁷^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁶⁰⁰⁵⁽^a⁾⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
³⁹⁸^Ho^w^e^v^e^r,^t^h^{e Ju}^stⁱ^{ce Dep}^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^m^a^y^w^aⁱ^v^{e t}^h^{e n}^o^tⁱ^{ce requ}ⁱ^r^em^en^t^.^Ap^plic^a^tio^{n o}^f^the^Seⁿ^a^te^Pe^rme^ant
^Subc^om^m^itte^e^oⁿ^Inv^e^s^tig^ati^ons^,⁶⁵⁵^F.^2d¹²³²^{, 1}²³⁶^(D^.C^{. Cir.}¹⁹⁸⁰^),^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^{, 45}⁴^U^.^{S. 10}^{84 (}¹⁹⁸¹⁾^.

witness’s appearance,³⁹⁹ it does not become legally effective until the witness has been asked the ⁴⁰⁰
question, invoked his privilege, and been presented with the court order. The role of the court
in issuing the order has been held to be ministerial and, thus, if the procedural requirements under
the immunity statute have been met, the court may not refuse to issue the order or impose ⁴⁰¹
conditions on the grant of immunity.
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that “the pertinency of the interrogation
to the topic under the ... committee’s inquiry must be brought home to the witness at the time the ⁴⁰²
questions are put to him.” “Unless the subject matter has been made to appear with
undisputable clarity, it is the duty of the investigative body, upon objection of the witness on
grounds of pertinency, to state for the record the subject under inquiry at that time and the manner ⁴⁰³
in which the propounded questions are pertinent thereto.” Additionally, to satisfy both the
requirement of due process as well as the statutory requirement that a refusal to answer be
“willful,” a witness should be informed of the committee’s ruling on any objections he raises or ⁴⁰⁴
privileges which he asserts.
An investigation into the resignations of nine United States Attorneys by the House Judiciary
Committee and its Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law (“the Committee”) has
resulted in the first legal confrontation over Congress’s contempt authority since the early 1980s
and the first civil lawsuit filed by a House of Congress in an attempt to enforce its prerogatives.
After an extensive investigation, which involved numerous witness interviews and several
congressional hearings, the Committee ultimately sought information relating to the resignations ⁴⁰⁵
directly from the White House. After several attempts to obtain the information sought
informally, on June 13, 2007, the Committee issued and served subpoenas on Ms. Harriet Miers,
the former White House Counsel and Mr. Joshua Bolten, the White House Chief of Staff and ⁴⁰⁶
custodian of White House records. Ms. Miers’s subpoena was for both documents and
testimony about her role, if any, in the resignations; while Mr. Bolten’s subpoena was only for
White House records and documents related to the resignations.

³⁹⁹^App^lic^ati^oⁿ^{of the}^Se^nate^Pe^r^m^e^{ant Su}^bc^om^m^itte^e^oⁿ^Iⁿ^v^e^s^tigat^io^ns^{, 6}⁵⁵^F.^{2d a}^t¹²⁵⁷
⁴⁰⁰^Se^e^In^{re McElrea}^t^h^,²⁴⁸^F.2^d⁶¹^{2 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁵⁷⁾⁽^eⁿ^ba^nc⁾^.
⁴⁰¹^App^lic^ati^oⁿ^{of the}^U.^{S. Se}^nate^Se^le^c^t^Co^mmitte^e^on^Pre^s^ideⁿ^ti^{al C}^a^mpai^gn^Ac^tiv^itie^s^,³⁶^{1 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.¹²⁷^{0 (D}^.D^.C^.
¹⁹⁷³⁾^.^Iⁿ^dic^t^a^{, h}^o^w^e^v^e^r^,^the^c^our^{t r}^e^f^e^r^r^e^{d to the}^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e^his^t^or^y^of^the^s^t^a^t^ut^or^y^pr^oc^e^dur^e^,^w^h^ic^h^s^u^g^g^e^s^t^s^tha^t
^a^ltho^u^g^h^a^c^our^{t la}^c^k^{s pow}^e^r^{to re}^vⁱ^e^w^the^a^d^vⁱ^sa^bility^of^g^r^aⁿ^tingⁱ^m^m^unit^y^{, a}^c^{ourt m}^a^y^c^onside^r^th^e^jurisdic^ti^on^of
^Coⁿ^g^{ress an}^d^t^h^{e co}^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee o}^v^er^t^h^{e su}^bj^ect^{area an}^d^t^h^{e rel}^e^van^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^atⁱ^s^sou^g^h^t^t^o^t^h^{e c}^o^mmⁱ^t^t^ee’s
^inq^u^iry^.^Se^e^id.^a^t¹²^78-⁷⁹^.
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^s^t^a^t^utor^y^r^e^quir^e^m^e^{nt of}^pe^r^tineⁿ^c^y^.
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⁴⁰⁵^Se^e^ge^ne^r^a^lly^,^H^.^R^e^pt.¹^10-⁴²^{3 (}²⁰⁰⁷⁾^,^av^ai^la^ble^at^{, ht}^tp:/^/ju^dicⁱ^a^r^y^.^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^Me^dia^/^P^D^FS/
^C^onte^m^ptR^e^por^t⁰⁷¹¹⁰^5.^pdf^;^{see a}^l^so^H^.^J^u^d^.^Com^m^.^{Mot. Sum}^m^.^J^.^a^t¹¹^(c^opy^{on f}^ile^w^{ith a}^u^th^ors⁾^.
⁴⁰⁶^H^.^J^u^d^.^Com^m^.^{Mot. Sum}^m^.^J^.^a^t^12.

In response to the Committee’s action, the White House, via its Counsel Fred F. Fielding, notified
the Committee that it did not intend to comply with the subpoena to Mr. Bolten on the grounds of
executive privilege. As a result, the White House has not produced any documents in response to
Mr. Bolten’s subpoena and has also not yet provided a privilege log or any information describing
the contents of the documents being withheld.
With respect to the subpoena to Ms. Miers, Mr. Fielding first sent a letter to Ms. Miers’s private
attorney containing notice of the President’s assertion of executive privilege over information
related to this investigation, and suggested that Ms. Miers refrain from producing any documents ⁴⁰⁷
pursuant to her subpoena. Several days later Mr. Fielding sent a second letter to Ms Miers’s
attorney that indicated that she was “not to provide ... testimony” pursuant to the subpoena, on the
grounds that any such testimony would also be covered by the President’s assertion of executive ⁴⁰⁸
privilege. Subsequently, Ms. Miers’s attorney notified the Committee that, as a result of the ⁴⁰⁹
President’s claim of executive privilege, Ms. Miers would not appear at the scheduled hearing.
On July 25, 2007, the Committee voted to hold Ms. Miers and Mr. Bolten in contempt of ⁴¹⁰
Congress for failure to comply with the duly issued subpoenas. The full House of
Representatives voted to hold Ms. Miers and Mr. Bolten in criminal contempt of Congress on ⁴¹¹
February 14, 2008, for their failure to comply with the Committee’s subpoenas. In addition to
invoking the criminal contempt statutes, the resolutions adopted by the House of Representatives
expressly authorized the filing of a civil lawsuit in the event that the Department of Justice would ⁴¹²
not pursue the criminal contempt actions. On February 28, 2008, pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 194,
the Speaker of the House certified the report to the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia for ⁴¹³
presentation to the grand jury. The next day, the Attorney General sent a letter to the Speaker,
stating that the Department of Justice “will not bring the congressional contempt citations before ⁴¹⁴
a grand jury or take any other action to prosecute Mr. Bolten or Ms. Miers.” On March 10,
2008, pursuant to the resolution adopted by the House of Representatives, a civil suit was filed in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia “seek[ing] [a] declaratory
judgment[]” and other “appropriate relief, including injunctive relief” to enforce the Committee’s ⁴¹⁵
subpoenas.
Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on April 10, 2008, the Committee requested
partial summary judgment on the grounds that there are no genuine issues regarding any material ⁴¹⁶
facts and, therefore, the Committee argued that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
Department of Justice’s opposition and any cross-motions are due no later than May 9, 2008, and
a hearing on the Committee’s motion is currently scheduled for June 23, 2008.

⁴⁰⁷^S^{ee Id}^.
⁴⁰⁸^Id^.
⁴⁰⁹^Id^.
⁴¹⁰^Se^e^H^.^R^e^pt.¹¹^0-⁴²³^,⁶⁰⁽²⁰⁰⁷⁾^.
⁴¹¹^Se^e^H^.^R^e^s^.⁹⁷^{9, H}^.^R^e^s^.⁹^80,^H^.^R^e^s^.⁹⁸^2,¹¹⁰^th^C^o^ng^{. (}²⁰⁰⁸⁾^.
⁴¹²^Se^e^H^.^R^e^s^.⁹⁸^2,¹¹⁰^th^C^ong^{. (}²⁰⁰⁸⁾^.
⁴¹³^H^.^J^u^d^.^Com^m^.^{Mot. Sum}^m^.^J^.^a^t^13.
⁴¹⁴^Id^.^a^t^13-¹⁴^.
⁴¹⁵^Id^.
⁴¹⁶^Se^e^F^ED^.^R.^C^IV^.^{P. 56}^.

^M^o^r^t^oⁿ^Ro^se^nb^e^r^g ^To^d^d^B^.^Ta^t^e^l^m^an
^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e A}^t^torn^e^y
^t^t^a^t^e^l^m^aⁿ^@^c^rs^.l^oc.g^o^v^{, 7-}⁴⁶⁹⁷