Gender Identity Discrimination in Employment: Analysis of H.R. 3686 in the 110th Congress

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

H.R. 3686, a bill to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of actual or perceived gender ^th
identity, was introduced in the 110 Congress and appears to represent half of an earlier bill that
dealt with both gender identity and sexual orientation discrimination. Gender identity appears to
include, but likely is not limited to, trans-gender status. Like the earlier bill, H.R. 3686 would also
prohibit employment discrimination against an individual based upon the gender identity of
persons associated with that individual, and does not permit disparate impact claims of gender
identity discrimination. A minority of states have enacted their own prohibitions against gender
identity employment discrimination. Additionally, some types of gender identity employment
discrimination may already be prohibited by existing prohibitions against sex stereotypes and
harassment in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, despite the fact that Title VII’s definition
of sex generally has not been interpreted to encompass trans-gender status. H.R. 3686 does not
appear to apply to religious organizations as defined under Title VII. However, even if H.R. 3686
were enacted, religious organizations may still be prohibited from engaging in those types of
gender identity discrimination that are currently prohibited by Title VII. Alternatively, despite the
fact that H.R. 3686 does not claim to limit the provisions of any other federal or state
discrimination law, the bill could be read to implicitly repeal judicial interpretations of sex
stereotype discrimination under Title VII.

Histor y ....................................................................................................................................... 1
Anatomical Sex vs. Gender Identity.........................................................................................1
Sex stereotypes...................................................................................................................1
Sexual harassment...............................................................................................................2
Effect of H.R. 3686 on existing law....................................................................................3
Employment Practices Prohibited by H.R. 3686.......................................................................4
Perceived gender identity discrimination is prohibited.......................................................5
Associational rights are protected.......................................................................................5
Disparate gender identity impact claims are disallowed.....................................................5
Religious Organizations Under H.R. 3686................................................................................6
Definitions of religious organizations................................................................................6
The ministerial exception....................................................................................................7
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................8

On September 27, 2007, Representative Barney Frank of Massachusetts introduced two bills that
separately prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender ¹
identity, respectively. The bills appear to separate the issues of sexual orientation and gender
identity discrimination that had been conjoined in an earlier bill, also introduced by ²
Representative Frank. H.R. 3686, which appears to represent the half of the earlier bill that dealt
with employment discrimination on the basis of gender identity, would be the first federal ³
prohibition on gender identity discrimination, if enacted. However, predicting how its provisions
would be applied is complicated by existing judicial interpretations of “sex” under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 that may also incorporate instances of gender identity discrimination.
Although Title VII’s prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of sex generally have not ⁴
been interpreted to include discrimination on the basis of gender identity, in Schroer v.
Billington, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia recently held that Title ⁵
VII may in fact encompass trans-gender discrimination. According to that court, the “factual
complexities that underlie human sexual identity” warranted a more developed record, including ⁶
“the scientific basis of sexual identity, and gender dysphoria in particular.” Other courts, while
not adopting the reasoning of the court in Schroer, have held that, under some circumstances,
victims of treatment that would arguably also qualify as gender identity discrimination may be
able to successfully assert that they were victims of sex stereotypes or sexual harassment under
Title VII.
Victims of gender identity discrimination may prevail under Title VII where the facts also
indicate the presence of discrimination for failure to conform to “sex stereotypes,” as defined by ⁷
the United States Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. In that case, a female
employee was denied partnership in an accounting firm despite the fact that she was regarded as a

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⁵^Sc^hroe^{r v}^.^B^illi^ngt^on^{, 42}⁴^F^.^S^upp^.^2d²⁰³⁽^D^.^D^.^C^{. 20}⁰⁶⁾^.
⁶^Id^{. a}^t²¹^2-²¹³^.^Iⁿ^s^o^hol^di^ng^{, the}^c^our^{t s}^u^g^g^e^s^t^e^d^r^e^e^x^am^ining^the^Se^v^e^{nth C}ⁱ^r^c^uit’^s^ho^ldiⁿ^gⁱⁿ^Ul^aⁿ^{e v.}^E^a^st^ern
^Airline^s^,⁷⁴^{2 F}^.²^d¹⁰⁸¹⁽⁷^th^Cir.¹⁹⁸⁴^).
⁷^Pr^ic^e^W^a^te^r^hous^e^v^.^H^opk^ins^,⁴⁹⁰^U^.^S.²^{28 (}¹⁹⁸⁹⁾^.

high performer. Tellingly, partners in the firm had instructed her to act more femininely in order ⁸
to be considered for a partnership in the future. The Court held that Price Waterhouse was
applying standards for partnership in a prohibited sexually disparate manner, in that Title VII did
not permit an employer to evaluate female employees based upon their conformity with the ⁹
employer’s stereotypical view of femininity.
The sex stereotype theory may also be viable in cases involving trans-gender individuals. In
Smith v. Salem, a male firefighter who was undergoing gender transition to female argued that he ¹⁰
had been suspended because of his feminine appearance. The Sixth Circuit held that, to the
extent that the firefighter asserted that she experienced discriminatory treatment due to the fact
that she did not conform to what her employer believed males should look and act like, she had ¹¹
sufficiently plead a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Similarly, in Barnes v. Cincinnati, a
male police officer undergoing gender transition to female was denied a promotion because she ¹²
acted too femininely in her supervisors’ opinions. Coverage under the sex stereotype theory,
however, only goes so far. The Ninth Circuit has held that it does not violate Title VII for covered
employers to require female employees to wear makeup and long, styled hair so long as these
requirements do not impose an “unequal burden” when compared to grooming requirements for ¹³
male employees. In addition, the Tenth Circuit has held that employers may require employees ¹⁴
undergoing gender transition to use the bathrooms designated for their current anatomical sex.
In the context of sexual harassment, recent court decisions have been guided by the Supreme ¹⁵
Court’s decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services. In that case, the Court held that the ¹⁶
critical question is whether the harassment occurred “because of sex.” Furthermore, relying on
Price Waterhouse, the Third Circuit held, in Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Comapny,
that harassment of an individual for failure to conform to sex stereotypes could constitute ¹⁷
harassment “because of sex” consistent with Oncale.

⁸^Id^.^at²³³^-²³^5.^P^a^rtⁿ^e^{rs al}^so^ob^j^e^ct^ed^t^o^h^e^{r u}^s^{e o}^f^vu^l^g^{ar l}^aⁿ^g^u^a^{ge an}^d^repo^rt^{ed t}^h^at^s^h^{e act}^ed^t^o^o^“^m^ach^o^.^”
⁹^Id^.^a^t²⁵^0-2⁵¹^.^In^te^re^sting^l^y^,^the^c^{ourt i}ⁿ^Sc^hr^oe^r^ref^u^sed^t^o^app^l^y^{a sex st}^ereo^t^y^p^e^t^h^eo^ry^,^rea^s^oⁿⁱⁿ^g^t^h^at^t^r^an^s-gen^d^e^r
ⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vi^du^al^{s are no}^t^at^t^e^m^p^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^o^d^e^vi^at^{e f}^r^o^m^se^xu^al^st^ereo^t^y^p^e^s,^b^u^t^{are em}^b^r^aciⁿ^g^t^h^e^m^{as p}^a^rt^o^f^t^h^ei^{r gen}^d^e^r
^traⁿ^sitio^n.^Sc^hroe^{r v}^.^B^illin^gt^on^,⁴²⁴^{F. S}^u^p^p^.^2d^a^t²^11.
¹⁰^Smith^v^.^S^a^le^m^,³⁷^{8 F.}^3d⁵^{66 (}⁶^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁴⁾^.
¹¹^Id^.^a^t⁵⁷^5.
¹²^Barⁿ^e^s^v^.^Cⁱ^ncⁱⁿ^natⁱ^,⁴⁰^{1 F.}^3d⁷^{29 (}⁶^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.
¹³^J^e^s^pe^r^s^e^{n v}^.^H^a^r^r^ah’^s^O^p^e^r^atⁱⁿ^g^C^o^.^,⁴⁴⁴^F.^3d¹¹⁰⁴⁽⁹^th^{Cir. 2}⁰⁰⁶⁾^{. H.R.}³⁶^{86 e}^x^plic^it^ly^a^{llows e}ⁿ^forc^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}
^“^r^e^a^s^ona^ble^”^g^r^oom^ing^c^ode^s^.^H^.^R^.³⁶⁸⁶^§⁷⁽^a⁾⁽⁵⁾^.
¹⁴^Etsitty^v^.^Ut^ah^Transi^t^Au^th.^,^__^{_ F}^.^3d^_^_^_^_⁽¹⁰^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾^{. H}^.^R^.³⁶⁸^{6 c}^o^ntaⁱ^ns^pr^ov^is^ions^e^x^plic^itl^y^a^llowⁱ^ng
^se^g^r^e^g^a^t^e^d^c^h^aⁿ^gⁱ^ng^a^{nd sh}^ow^e^r^fa^c^ilitie^{s. Note}^{, h}^o^w^e^v^e^{r, tha}^t^ba^th^room^{s a}^r^e^{not liste}^d^e^x^plic^itly^{. H.R. 36}⁸⁶^§^7(a^)(3).
^{H.R. 3}⁶⁸⁶^a^l^{so e}^x^plic^itly^w^{ould n}^o^{t re}^q^u^ire^a^d^d^itio^na^{l f}^a^c^ilitie^{s to}^b^e^built^to^c^o^m^p^ly^w^{ith the}^bill^{. H.}^{R. 36}⁸⁶^§^7(a^)(4).
¹⁵^Oⁿ^c^a^le^v^.^Su^nd^ow^ne^r^O^ffs^h^o^r^e^S^e^r^v^ic^e^s^{, 523 U}^.^S.⁷⁵⁽¹⁹⁹⁸⁾^.
¹⁶^Id^.^at⁸¹^.^T^h^{e Co}^urt^al^so^reco^gnⁱ^zed^t^h^at^anⁱⁿ^f^e^ren^{ce t}^h^at^h^a^rassmen^tⁱ^s^“b^ecau^{se o}^f^{sex” i}^sⁿ^o^t^ob^vi^o^u^s^w^h^{ere t}^h^e
^ha^r^a^s^s^e^r^a^{nd the}^vⁱ^c^tim^a^r^e^of^the^s^a^m^e^s^e^x^,^but^pr^ov^ide^d^thr^e^e^e^x^a^m^ple^s^of^how^s^u^c^h^aⁿ^inf^e^r^e^nc^e^coul^{d be}^e^s^ta^bl^is^he^d:
^{(1) if}^the^ha^ra^sse^{r se}^x^u^a^l^l^y^de^sire^{d the}^vⁱ^c^tim^{; (2) if}^the^ha^ra^sse^{r wa}^{s hostile}^t^o^t^h^e^pre^s^eⁿ^c^e^of^one^s^e^x^{in the}
^w^o^rkp^l^ace;^o^r⁽³^{) i}^f^co^m^p^aratⁱ^v^{e d}^a^t^a^sh^o^w^ed^t^h^at^t^h^{e h}^a^{rasser t}^a^rget^ed^oⁿ^l^y^m^e^m^b^{ers o}^f^oⁿ^e^sex.^Id^.^a^t^80-⁸¹^{. T}^h^is
^dis^c^us^sⁱ^on^of^On^ca^le^is^not^m^e^aⁿ^t^{to im}^ply^tha^t^g^e^nde^r^ideⁿ^t^ity^ha^r^a^s^s^m^e^{nt is}^only^pe^r^p^e^t^r^a^te^{d by}^pe^r^s^ons^of^the^s^a^m^e
^{sex as t}^h^{e vi}^ctⁱ^m^,^b^u^t^m^e^rel^y^t^o^su^ggest^t^h^at^an^em^p^l^o^y^{er’s assert}ⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^at^h^a^rassmen^t^o^ccu^rred^s^o^l^e^l^y^b^ecau^{se o}^f^t^r^an^s-
^g^e^nde^r^s^t^a^t^us^{, a}ⁿ^{d n}^o^{t s}^e^x^,^m^a^y^b^e^r^e^f^u^te^{d by}^the^m^e^thods^of^pr^oof^of^f^e^r^e^{d in}^On^ca^le^.
¹⁷^Bib^b^y^v^.^Ph^ila.^Coc^a^Col^a^B^o^ttli^{ng C}^o^.^,²⁶⁰^F.^3d²⁵^7,²⁶^{4 (}³^rd^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾^.

The Ninth Circuit has further held, in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, that harassment “which
targeted body parts clearly linked to [a person’s] sexuality” constituted sexual discrimination
prohibited by Title VII, and that “whatever else those attacks may, or may not, have been ¹⁸
‘because of’ has no legal consequence.” Although the plaintiff in Rene prevailed, the holding of
the Ninth Circuit may contradict the Supreme Court’s earlier holding in Oncale. As the dissent in
Rene noted, the Ninth Circuit relied in large part on Doe v. City of Belleville, in which the Seventh
Circuit argued that evidence of physical abuse of a sexual nature alone could lead to an inference ¹⁹
that the victim was targeted because of his gender. That judgment, however, was vacated and ²⁰
remanded to the Seventh Circuit after the Court’s decision in Oncale. The text of the opinion in
Oncale also seems to require more than conduct of a sexual nature in order to give rise to an ²¹
inference that it was “because of sex.”
H.R. 3686
H.R. 3686 would define gender identity as “the gender-related identity, appearance, or
mannerisms or other gender-related characteristics of an individual, with or without regard to the ²²
individual’s designated sex at birth.” Given this definition, a reasonable court could conclude
that the definition of “gender identity” includes the kind of employer behavior evidenced by the
facts in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, Smith v. Salem, and Bibby v. Coca Cola. If H.R. 3686 were
enacted, it is unclear whether facts similar to these cases would be governed by H.R. 3686 or
existing protections of Title VII. Section 14 of H.R. 3686 states that
^th^e^A^c^{t s}^h^allⁿ^o^{t in}^v^a^lid^{ate o}^r^li^m^{it t}^h^{e r}ⁱ^g^h^{ts, r}^e^m^e^dⁱ^e^s^{, o}^r^p^r^o^c^e^d^u^r^{es av}^ailab^l^{e to}^an²³
ⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vi^d^u^a^l^c^l^aⁱ^mi^{ng d}ⁱ^sc^rⁱ^mi^na^tⁱ^o^{n u}ⁿ^d^e^r^aⁿ^y^o^t^he^r^Fe^d^e^r^a^l^l^a^w^o^r^r^e^gu^l^a^tⁱ^o^n.
Therefore, H.R. 3686 might be interpreted to leave Price Waterhouse’s judicially created
protections in place. The Supreme Court has held that “repeals by implication are strongly ²⁴
disfavored.” However, in United States v. Fausto, the Supreme Court also held that the normal
presumption against implicit repeals is not present when dealing with “repeal by implication of a ²⁵
legal disposition implied by a statutory text.” Therefore, in that case, the Court held that the
Civil Service Reform Act had implicitly repealed a prior judicial interpretation of the Back Pay ²⁶
Act.

¹⁸^Re^ne^v^.^M^G^M^G^r^{and H}^o^te^l^,³⁰⁵^F^.^3d¹⁰⁶¹^,¹⁰⁶⁴^,¹⁰⁶⁶⁽⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰²⁾^.^Iⁿ^th^is^c^a^s^e^,^the^plaⁱ^ntif^f^be^lie^v^e^{d he}^w^a^s
^h^a^rassed^b^ecau^{se o}^f^hⁱ^{s sexu}^al^o^rⁱ^eⁿ^t^atⁱ^o^n,^bu^t^t^h^{e cou}^r^t^’^{s ho}^l^dⁱⁿ^g^ma^y^h^a^{ve b}^r^o^a^d^e^{r i}^m^p^lⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^b^e^y^{ond this}^ty^pe^of
^ha^r^a^s^s^m^e^nt.
¹⁹^Id^{. a}^t¹⁰⁶⁶^(c^iting^Doe^v^.^City^of^Be^lle^v^ille^,¹¹⁹^F.^3d⁵⁶^3,⁵⁸^{0 (}⁷^th^{Cir. 1}⁹⁹⁷^)).
²⁰^City^of^Be^lle^v^ille^v^.^Doe^,⁵²^{3 U}^.^S^.¹⁰⁰¹⁽¹⁹⁹⁸⁾^{. T}^h^e^C^o^ur^{t r}^e^m^a^nde^{d a}^nd^ins^t^r^u^c^t^e^d^t^h^e^c^our^t^be^low^{to de}^te^r^m^ine
^w^h^eth^e^{r h}^a^rass^m^eⁿ^t^h^a^d^o^ccu^rred^“b^ecau^{se o}^f^sex^.^{” Ho}^w^e^v^e^r,^th^{e case settled}^b^e^f^o^{re th}^{e Sev}^eⁿ^t^h^Cir^c^u^{it co}^u^l^d^re^h^ear
^t^h^{e case.}
²¹^“[^T^h^{e p}^l^aiⁿ^tⁱ^f^f^]^m^u^st^al^w^a^{ys p}^r^{ove t}^h^at^t^h^{e con}^d^u^c^t^atⁱ^ssu^{e w}^a^{s n}^o^t^m^e^rel^y^tⁱⁿ^ged^wⁱ^t^h^o^f^f^eⁿ^sⁱ^v^{e s}^e^xu^al
^c^onn^ota^tio^ns^.”^On^cale^,⁵²^{3 U.}^S^.^at⁸¹^.
²²^H.^R^.³⁶⁸⁶^§²⁽^a)⁽⁶⁾^.
²³^H^.^R^.³⁶⁸⁶^{§ 1}⁴^{. T}^h^is^s^e^c^tio^{n a}^l^s^o^dis^a^v^o^w^s^pr^e^e^m^p^{tion of}^aⁿ^y^s^t^a^t^{e dis}^c^rⁱ^mⁱ^na^{tion la}^w^.
²⁴^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Fa^us^to^{, 4}⁸⁴^U^.^S.⁴³^9,⁴⁵^2-⁴⁵³⁽¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^.
²⁵^Id^.^a^t⁴⁵^{3 (e}^m^pha^{sis a}^dde^d).^Just^ic^e^Sc^a^lia^{, w}^r^iting^f^o^{r the}^m^a^jority^,^f^u^rthe^{r sta}^t^e^d^“^[^R^]^e^c^o^nc^iling^m^a^ny^la^{ws e}ⁿ^a^c^t^e^d
^o^v^{er tim}^{e, an}^d^g^e^ttin^g^th^em^to^‘mak^{e sen}^s^{e’ in}^co^m^bⁱⁿ^atioⁿ^,ⁿ^ecessarily^a^ssu^m^e^{s th}^{at th}^{e im}^p^licatioⁿ^s^o^f^{a statu}^t^{e m}^a^y
^be^a^lte^re^{d by}^the^im^plic^a^{tions of}^a^la^te^{r sta}^t^ute^.^”^Id^.
²⁶^Id^.^a^t⁴⁵^3-⁴⁵⁴^.

In H.R. 3686, there are several facts that might argue for implicit repeal of Price Waterhouse.
First, the bill’s stated purpose is “to provide a comprehensive Federal prohibition of employment ²⁷
discrimination on the basis of gender identity.” Second, the bill explicitly does not allow ²⁸
disparate impact claims of gender identity discrimination, while Title VII appears to. Third,
Price Waterhouse sex stereotypes brought under Title VII would apply to religious institutions
generally, while H.R. 3686 explicitly appears not to apply to religious organizations and ²⁹
schools. If the intent of H.R. 3686 is to leave Price Waterhouse as it stands, the purpose of the
drafters’ inclusion of these last two limits is substantially less clear. Therefore, a court might
conclude that H.R. 3686, if enacted, was meant to supplant the Price Waterhouse sex stereotype
theory currently viable under Title VII.
However, one should not take this to mean that H.R. 3686 is exactly coterminous with Price
Waterhouse under Title VII. For example, if an employer refused to hire any applicant that had
undergone gender transition, regardless of the applicants’ sex, that act likely would not violate ³⁰
Title VII, but appears to be prohibited by a plain reading of H.R. 3686. Other cases of gender
identity discrimination may not be so clear cut. Were an employer to refuse to promote or hire
any applicant that was simply too “aggressive,” regardless of sex, it is likely that this adverse
employment action would pass muster under Title VII, but it is not totally clear whether H.R.
3686 would prohibit it. Courts have not yet determined what appearances or mannerisms are
“gender related” as would be required by these bills. Given the etymology of a gender-loaded
word such as “macho,” its classification as “gender related” seems reasonable. However,
characteristics such as “aggressive,” “vulgar,” or “demure,” may be more difficult as they
arguably bear no relationship to gender beyond crude stereotypes. Nevertheless, such
characteristics could easily be used to mask discrimination on the basis of gender identity. In
these cases, it remains to be seen how far beyond existing law H.R. 3686 would extend.
Interestingly, with respect to sex stereotyping under Title VII, courts have been careful to refrain
from explicitly defining what the traditional masculine or feminine stereotypes are. Instead,
courts have generally looked to the intent of the employer, finding sex discrimination where the ³¹
employer’s words or actions indicated reliance upon stereotypical attributes of men or women.
It is possible that courts would continue to use this methodology to determine when employment
decisions are made on the basis of “gender related characteristics” under H.R. 3686.
For the most part, the types of employment actions prohibited by H.R. 3686 dovetail with Title
VII’s prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, and ³²
religion. Notwithstanding this overall similarity, the provisions of the bill do go beyond Title

²⁷^H^.^R^.³⁶⁸⁶^{§ 1(}¹⁾⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d)^.^C^f^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^F^aus^t^o^,⁴⁸^{4 U}^.^S.^a^t⁴^{54 (}^h^o^l^di^ng^tha^t^t^h^e^c^o^m^p^r^e^he^ns^iv^e
^na^ture^of^the^Civ^il^Se^rv^ic^e^Re^f^o^rm^Ac^{t supp}^orte^{d im}^plic^it^re^pe^a^l^o^f^the^Ba^c^k^P^a^y^Ac^{t’s pre}^v^{ious int}^e^rpre^ta^tion).
²⁸^Se^e^,^infr^aⁿ^o^t^{es 37}^-38^and^acco^mp^an^yⁱⁿ^g^t^e^xt^f^o^{r a d}ⁱ^scu^ssi^on^o^f^H.^R.³⁶⁸⁶^{’s p}^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^regardⁱⁿ^{g di}^sp^arat^{e i}^m^p^act^.
²⁹^Se^e^,^infr^a^tex^t^acco^m^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g^f^o^o^tⁿ^o^t^e⁴⁶^f^o^{r a d}ⁱ^scu^ssioⁿ^o^f^relig^io^u^s^ex^em^p^tioⁿ^s^uⁿ^d^e^{r T}^{itle V}^I^I^an^d^H.R^.³⁶⁸⁶^.
³⁰^O^t^he^r^s^e^c^tions^of^H^.^R^.³⁶⁸⁶^r^e^f^e^r^{to e}^m^ploy^e^e^s^tha^t^a^r^e^un^de^r^g^oing^or^ha^v^e^unde^r^g^one^g^eⁿ^d^e^r^tr^aⁿ^sⁱ^tⁱ^on.^T^h^e^r^e^f^or^e^,
^“^g^e^nde^{r ide}ⁿ^tity^”^a^ppe^a^r^{s to inc}^l^u^d^e^,^a^t^a^mⁱ^nim^u^m^,^traⁿ^s-g^e^nde^{r in}^divⁱ^dua^ls.^H^.^{R. 36}^{86 § 7(a}^{)(3, 4).}
³¹^Pr^ic^e^W^a^te^r^hous^e^v^.^H^opk^ins^,⁴⁹⁰^U^.^S.^a^t²^36;^Sm^it^{h v}^.^Sale^m^,³⁷^{8 F.}^3d^a^t⁵^72;^Barⁿ^e^s^v^.^Cⁱ^ncⁱ^nna^ti^,⁴⁰^{1 F}^.³^d^at
⁷³⁵^,⁷³^7;^J^e^s^pe^r^s^e^{n v}^.^H^a^r^r^a^h’^s^O^p^e^r^atin^{g C}^o^.^,⁴⁴^{4 F.}^3d^a^t¹¹¹²^;^Etsitty^v^.^Uta^h^Tr^ansit^Aut^h^.^,^_^__^F.3^d^a^t^*^17-¹⁸^.
³²^Co^mp^a^r^e^H^.^R^.³⁶⁸⁶^{§ 3(}^a^-^d)^wit^h^Civ^{il Rig}^h^{ts A}^c^{t of}¹⁹^64,^P.L^.⁸⁸^-3^52,^{tit. v}ⁱⁱ^,^§⁷^03(a^-^d)^(c^odifⁱ^e^d^a^t⁴²^U.S^.^C.^§
²⁰⁰^0e^-2(a^-d)⁾^{. H.R.}³⁶⁸⁶^w^ould^a^l^{so lim}^{it a}^pplic^a^bⁱ^lity^{to th}^ose^e^m^ploy^e^r^s^w^{ith f}ⁱ^f^t^e^eⁿ^{or m}^o^re^e^m^ploy^e^e^{s, a}^s^doe^{s the}
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

VII’s provisions in two main ways: (1) prohibiting discrimination on perceived characteristics;
and (2) textually creating associational rights under the act. That is not to say, however, that the
protections of H.R. 3686 appear uniformly at least as extensive as Title VII’s protections, as the
bill explicitly disallows victims of gender identity discrimination from pursuing a disparate
impact claim. Each of these differences is discussed in detail below.
H.R. 3686 would prohibit discrimination on the basis of actual or perceived gender identity.³³ The
text of Title VII contains no comparable prohibition against discrimination on the basis of the
perceived race, color, sex, national origin, or religion of a person. The Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), however, does include in its definition of disability “being regarded as having a ³⁴
[physical or mental impairment].” The semantic similarity between “perceived” and “regarded”
suggests that existing judicial interpretation of that language in the ADA may be instructive for
courts, agencies, or employers attempting to interpret what is meant by “perceived gender
identity.” In other words, to the extent that “being regarded” as disabled under the ADA has been
held to require an examination of an employer’s subjectively held beliefs, courts may read H.R.

3686 to require the same.

H.R. 3686 would additionally prohibit adverse employment actions taken against an individual on
the basis of the actual or perceived gender identity of a person who associates with that ³⁵
individual. Although Title VII contains no analogous text, associational rights under Title VII ³⁶
have been recognized by federal courts in the context of interracial marriage.
H.R. 3686 would disallow disparate impact claims on the basis of gender identity.³⁷ Therefore,
whereas a Title VII claim could proceed where the plaintiff showed that a particular job
requirement disproportionately impacted one racial or religious group, it does not appear that this
bill would allow a plaintiff to show that a particular job requirement disproportionately impacts ³⁸
one gender identity over another. H.R. 3686 would also explicitly allow employers to enforce

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^c^u^rre^{nt v}^e^rsion^of^T^itle^V^II.^C^o^m^par^e^H^.^R^.³⁶⁸⁶^§³⁽^a⁾⁽⁴⁾⁽^A⁾^with⁴²^U^.^S.C^.^{§ 20}^00e⁽^b⁾^.
³³^H.^R^.³⁶⁸⁶^§³⁽^a-^f⁾^.
³⁴^{42 U}^.^S.C.^§¹²¹⁰^2(2)(C)^.^F^o^{r f}^u^rthe^{r dis}^c^us^sⁱ^on^of^the^de^fⁱ^niti^on^o^f^dis^a^bility^unde^{r the}^A^D^A^,^see^{, CRS}^Rep^o^r^t
^R^L³³³⁰^4,^T^h^e^Ame^r^ic^{ans wi}^{th Di}^sabilit^ie^{s Ac}^t⁽^A^{DA): The}^De^fini^tⁱ^on^{of Disa}^bili^ty^{, by}^N^a^ncy^Le^e^J^one^s^.
³⁵^H.^R^.³⁶⁸⁶^§³⁽^e)^.
³⁶^E.^g^.^,^P^a^{rr v.}^Wo^od^men^{of t}^h^{e World}^L^{ife I}ⁿ^s.^C^o^.^,⁷⁹^{1 F}^.²^d⁸⁸⁸^,⁸^91-⁸⁹^{2 (}¹¹^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^.
³⁷^H^.^R^.³⁶⁸⁶^{§ 3(}^g⁾^.^Som^e^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^of^C^ong^r^e^s^s^note^dⁱⁿ^te^s^tim^ony^be^f^o^r^e^the^H^ous^e^S^ubc^om^m^itte^e^oⁿ^H^e^a^lth,
^Em^plo^y^m^e^{nt, L}^a^{bor a}^nd^P^e^nsio^{ns tha}^t^a^l^l^o^wⁱ^ng^dispa^r^a^t^e^im^pa^c^t^c^l^aⁱ^m^s^{in this c}^onte^x^{t w}^ould^re^quire^litig^aⁿ^{ts to}
^intru^d^e^u^p^oⁿ^t^h^e^priv^a^c^y^of^fe^llow^a^pplic^aⁿ^{ts a}^{nd e}^m^pl^oy^e^e^{s in or}^de^{r to}^inv^e^stig^a^t^e^theⁱ^{r g}^e^nde^{r ide}ⁿ^titie^s.
³⁸^{For a}ⁿ^e^x^a^m^ple^of^how^a^dispa^r^a^t^e^im^pa^c^t^c^l^aⁱ^m^o^f^r^a^cⁱ^a^l^disc^ri^mⁱ^na^{tion is e}^s^ta^b^lishe^d^un^de^{r T}^itle^V^I^{I, se}^e^G^r^iggs^v^.
^Du^{ke Po}^{wer Co}^.^,⁴^{01 U.}^S.⁴²^{4 (1}⁹⁷¹^{). Dispa}^r^a^t^e^im^pa^c^t^c^l^aⁱ^m^s^a^v^a^ila^ble^u^nde^{r T}^itle^V^{II lik}^e^l^y^w^{ould n}^o^t^be^a^f^f^e^c^t^e^d
^by^H^.^R^.³⁶⁸^6.

segregated changing and shower facilities and gender specific grooming codes.³⁹ In both
circumstances, the employer would be required to assign the employee to the appropriate facility
or grooming code based upon the self identified gender identity of the individual (1) at the time of
hire, or (2) upon notifying the employer that the employee is undergoing, or has completed, ⁴⁰
gender transition.
In all likelihood, H.R. 3686 would not impose new requirements on “religious organizations” as
the term is defined under Title VII. Additionally, religious organizations would likely remain free
from defending claims of any type of discrimination with respect to their selection of clergy and
certain other positions related to worship.
Section 5 of H.R. 3686 states that the bill would not apply to religious organizations. Further,
Section 2 of the bill defines religious organizations in a manner that appears similar to the
statutory religious exemption clauses of Title VII. H.R. 3686 defines religious organizations
generally as
^(A^{) a reli}^gⁱ^o^u^s^corporation^,^as^s^o^ciation^,^{or s}^o^ciet^y^;^{or (B}^{) a}^s^c^h^{ool, colleg}^e^,^unⁱ^v^ersⁱ^t^y^{, or}
^o^t^h^e^r^ed^u^catioⁿ^a^{l i}ⁿ^sti^t^u^t^ioⁿ^o^rⁱⁿ^st^itu^tioⁿ^o^f^learⁿⁱⁿ^g^{, i}^f^—(ⁱ⁾^th^{e i}ⁿ^s^tit^u^tioⁿ^isⁱⁿ^w^h^o^l^{e o}^r
^s^u^bs^t^aⁿ^tⁱ^a^l^part^cont^rol^l^e^d,^m^aⁿ^a^g^e^{d, o}^w^{ned, or}^su^pport^e^{d by}^{a part}ⁱ^c^ul^{ar rel}ⁱ^gⁱ^oⁿ^,^relⁱ^gⁱ^o^u^s
^corpor^ation^,^as^s^o^ciation^,^{or s}^o^ciet^y^;^o^r⁽ⁱⁱ⁾^t^h^e^c^u^r^rⁱ^c^u^l^u^m^o^f^t^h^eⁱⁿ^stit^u^tioⁿⁱ^s^dⁱ^r^ected^to^w^a^r^d⁴¹
^th^{e p}^r^o^p^a^g^a^tioⁿ^o^f^{a p}^a^r^ticu^l^ar^r^e^lig^ioⁿ^.
This definition appears comparable with language in Title VII that exempts any “religious ⁴²
corporation, association, educational institution, or society” as well as educational institutions
^if^s^u^c^h^sc^h^o^o^l^{, co}^lleg^e^,^uⁿ^iv^er^sit^y^{, o}^r^o^t^h^e^r^ed^u^catioⁿ^a^lⁱⁿ^stit^u^tioⁿ^o^rⁱⁿ^st^itu^tioⁿ^o^f^learⁿⁱⁿ^g
ⁱ^s^{, i}ⁿ^w^h^ol^{e or i}ⁿ^su^bs^t^aⁿ^tⁱ^a^l^pa^rt^{, o}^wⁿ^e^{d, su}^pport^e^{d, con}^t^rol^l^e^{d, or m}^aⁿ^a^g^e^{d b}^y^{a part}ⁱ^c^u^l^ar
^r^e^lig^ioⁿ^o^r^b^y^{a p}^a^r^ticu^l^ar^r^e^lig^io^u^s^co^r^p^o^r^atioⁿ^,^asso^ciatioⁿ^,^o^r^so^ciety^,^o^r^if^th^{e c}^u^r^r^icu^l^u^m
^o^f^s^u^c^h^s^c^h^o^o^l^,^c^o^l^l^e^g^e^,^uⁿⁱ^v^e^r^sⁱ^t^y^,^o^r^o^t^h^e^r^e^d^u^c^a^t^ioⁿ^a^lⁱⁿ^stit^u^tioⁿ^o^rⁱⁿ^st^itu^tioⁿ^o^f^learⁿⁱⁿ^gⁱ^s⁴³
^dⁱ^r^ected^to^w^a^r^d^th^{e p}^r^o^p^a^g^a^tioⁿ^o^f^{a p}^a^r^ticu^l^ar^r^e^lig^ioⁿ^.
Neither H.R. 3686 or Title VII further explain which entities qualify as religious. Federal courts
have held that the question requires inquiry into whether an entity’s “purpose and character are ⁴⁴
primarily religious.” The Third Circuit, in LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Community Center,

³⁹^T^h^{ere are si}^mⁱ^l^a^r,^b^u^t^no^tⁱ^d^en^tⁱ^c^al^,^lⁱ^mⁱ^t^s^oⁿ^t^h^{e p}^r^o^t^ectⁱ^oⁿ^s^avai^l^a^b^l^{e un}^d^e^{r a sex st}^ereo^t^y^p^e^cl^ai^m^wⁱ^t^h^resp^ect^t^o
^f^a^c^ilitie^s.^Se^e^,^s^upr^aⁿ^o^t^e¹³^-¹⁴^aⁿ^d^acco^m^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g^t^e^xt^.
⁴⁰^H^.^R^.³⁶⁸⁶^{§ 7(}^a⁾⁽³^,⁵⁾^.
⁴¹^H.^R^.³⁶⁸⁶^§²⁽^a)⁽⁸⁾^.
⁴²^{42 U}^.^S.C^.^§²⁰^00e^-¹⁽^a⁾^.
⁴³⁴²^U^.^S.C.^§²⁰⁰⁰^e^-²^(e⁾⁽²^).^Fo^{r a}^m^o^re^d^e^ta^ile^d^dⁱ^sc^u^ssioⁿ^o^f^T^itle^V^{II’s d}^e^fⁱⁿ^iti^oⁿ^o^f^re^lig^io^u^s^sc^h^o^o^{ls, se}^e^Ja^mⁱ^e
^Darin^P^r^en^k^e^rt,^Li^be^rty^,^Div^e^rsity^{, Ac}^ade^mic^Fre^e^dom^{, a}ⁿ^d^S^u^rv^iv^al^{: Pre}^f^e^r^eⁿ^{tial Hiri}^ng^Amon^{g Re}^li^gio^u^sly^-^Affili^ate^d
^Institutⁱ^oⁿ^{s of}^Hig^h^e^r^Ed^uc^ati^oⁿ^,^{22 H}^o^f^s^tr^a^La^{b. &}^Em^{p. L}^.^J^.^{1 (}²⁰⁰⁴⁾^.
⁴⁴^EEO^C^v^.^T^o^wⁿ^le^y^E^ng’^{g &}^M^f^{g. C}^o^.^,⁸⁵^{9 F.}^2d⁶^10,⁶^{18 (}⁹^th^{Cir. 1}⁹⁸⁸^).^Se^e^als^o^EEO^C^v^.^K^a^m^e^ha^m^e^{ha Sc}^h^o^o^l^s^,
⁹⁹⁰^F.^2d⁴^58,⁴⁶^{1 (}⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹³⁾^.

identified nine factors other courts have considered when determining if an institution is religious,
none of which are determinative:
⁽¹⁾^w^h^e^t^h^e^r^t^h^e^entⁱ^t^y^operat^e^s^f^o^{r a prof}ⁱ^t^,⁽²⁾^w^h^et^h^e^{r i}^t^produ^ces^a^s^ecu^l^a^r^produ^ct^{, (3)}
^w^h^et^h^e^r^th^e^en^ti^t^y^’^s^ar^{ticles o}^fⁱⁿ^co^r^p^o^r^atioⁿ^o^r^o^t^h^e^r^p^e^r^tin^eⁿ^{t d}^o^c^u^m^en^ts^{state a r}^e^li^gⁱ^o^u^s
^pu^rpos^{e, (4)}^w^h^e^t^h^e^{r i}^tⁱ^s^o^wⁿ^e^{d, aff}^ilia^ted^wⁱ^t^h^or^fⁱⁿ^aⁿ^cⁱ^a^ll^y^s^u^{pported b}^y^a^f^o^r^m^al^l^y
^relig^ious^en^tⁱ^t^y^s^u^c^h^as^{a c}^hurch^{or s}^yⁿ^a^g^ogu^{e, (5)}^w^h^et^h^e^{r a f}^o^r^m^all^y^relig^io^u^s^eⁿ^tit^y
^p^a^r^ticip^{ates in}^th^e^m^aⁿ^a^g^e^m^eⁿ^t^{, f}^o^rⁱⁿ^staⁿ^{ce b}^y^h^a^vⁱⁿ^g^r^e^p^r^esen^tati^v^e^{s o}ⁿ^th^{e b}^o^a^r^d^o^f
^tr^u^s^tee^s^{, (}⁶⁾^w^h^e^t^h^e^r^t^h^{e en}^tit^y^h^o^ld^{s i}^t^sel^f^o^u^t^to^th^{e p}^u^b^lⁱ^c^{as secu}^lar^o^r^sectar^ian^,⁽⁷⁾
^w^h^et^h^e^r^t^h^{e e}ⁿ^tit^y^r^e^g^u^l^ar^l^yⁱⁿ^clu^d^{es p}^r^a^y^er^o^r^o^t^h^e^r^f^o^r^m^s^o^f^w^o^r^s^hⁱ^pⁱⁿⁱ^t^{s ac}^tiv^{ities, (}⁸⁾
^w^h^et^h^e^r^{it i}ⁿ^clu^d^e^s^r^e^lig^io^u^sⁱⁿ^str^u^ctioⁿⁱⁿⁱ^t^{s c}^u^r^r^icu^l^u^m^{, to}^th^{e e}^x^ten^t^{it i}^s^an^ed^u^catioⁿ^a^l⁴⁵
ⁱⁿ^st^itu^tioⁿ^,^an^d⁽⁹⁾^w^h^et^h^e^r^its^m^e^m^b^er^s^h^ip^is^m^a^d^e^u^p^b^y^co^r^e^lig^ioⁿⁱ^sts.
Although, as discussed above, H.R. 3686 would not apply to religious organizations, neither it
nor Title VII exempt qualifying religious entities from defending claims of sex discrimination.
Therefore, gender identity claims brought under a sex stereotype theory may still be viable
against a religious entity, insofar as H.R. 3686 does not supersede Price Waterhouse and its ⁴⁶
progeny.
At a minimum, claims of gender identity discrimination, whether brought under H.R. 3686 or
Title VII, would likely not be applicable to religious organizations’ selection of certain positions
involved in worship or ritual. Discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or religion
has been held to be permissible, in these positions, under the judicially created “ministerial
exception” to Title VII. This exception was created to reconcile some of Title VII’s prohibitions
with the Free Exercise Clause of the federal Constitution. It has been adopted in eight federal
circuits and applies to employees whose “primary duties include teaching, spreading the faith,
church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision of participation in religious ⁴⁷
ritual and worship.” This exception to Title VII allows discrimination on the basis of any
characteristic, including race and sex, but only with respect to “a religious institution’s choice as ⁴⁸
to who will perform spiritual functions.” Because the rationale for this exception is derived from
the federal Constitution, and not the text of Title VII, it would likely be wholly applicable to H.R.

3686 as well.

⁴⁵^Le^Booⁿ^v^.^La^nc^as^te^r^J^e^w^is^{h C}^o^m^m^.^C^t^r^.^As^s^’^n.^{, 20}⁰⁷^U.^S.^A^p^p^.^LE^X^I^S²²³²⁸^,¹⁹^-²⁰⁽³^rd^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾⁽^d^e^cⁱ^de^{d Se}^pt^.
^{19, 20}⁰⁷⁾^.^S^{ee a}^l^so^,^{CRS Rep}^o^rt^RS2²⁷⁴⁵^,^Re^li^gi^on^an^{d t}^h^e^W^o^rk^plac^e^:^Le^g^a^{l A}ⁿ^a^l^y^s^{is of}^Title^VII^{of t}^h^e^Civ^{il Ri}^ghts
^Ac^{t of}¹⁹⁶⁴^as^I^t^Ap^plie^s^to^Re^ligi^ous^O^r^g^aniz^a^tio^ns^,^by^C^y^nthia^B^r^oug^he^r^.
⁴⁶^S^{ee a}^l^so^,^sup^r^a^tex^t^acco^m^p^an^yⁱⁿ^gⁿ^o^t^es²³^-²⁹^f^o^{r a}^dⁱ^scu^ssioⁿ^o^f^th^{e ef}^{fect o}^f^{H.R. 3}⁶⁸⁶^oⁿ^ex^istin^g^T^{itle V}^II
^pr^ote^c^tio^ns^.
⁴⁷^Pe^tr^us^k^a^v^.^G^aⁿⁿ^on^Uⁿ^iv^.^,⁴^{62 F}^.^{3d 29}^{4, 30}⁴⁽³^rd^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾⁽^cⁱ^tⁱ^{ng f}^a^vo^r^a^b^l^{e o}^pⁱⁿⁱ^on^{s i}ⁿ^t^h^e⁴^th^{, 5}^th^{, 7}^th^{, 8}^th^{, 9}^th^{, 1}¹^th^,
^an^d^D.C.^Circu^its).
⁴⁸^Pe^tr^us^k^a^v^.^G^aⁿⁿ^on^{, 4}⁶²^F.^{3d a}^t³⁰⁵^.

^Ed^w^a^{rd C}^.^Lⁱ^u
^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e A}^t^torn^e^y
^elⁱ^u^@^c^rs^.l^oc.g^ov^{, 7-}⁹¹⁶⁶