Resolving House Committee Jurisdictional Disputes: A Survey of Options

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

House committees sometimes clash over their respective jurisdictional prerogatives. Various
reasons account for inter-committee disagreements, such as issue overlap among different panels.
Any broad subject area (homeland security, energy, health, and so on) can involve the jurisdiction
of several panels. Shared policy interests can sometimes spark inter-committee controversies.
Although jurisdictional clashes might stymie action on legislation, there are many ways to
minimize or resolve committee disputes. This report discusses several common conflict-resolving
techniques that may be employed at different junctures of the lawmaking process, specifically the
drafting of legislation, the referral of legislation, the committee stage, and the Rules Committee’s
issuance of special rules. None of the techniques discussed in this report are guaranteed to
minimize or eliminate inter-committee jurisdictional disagreements. It is simply not feasible to
construct watertight jurisdictional compartments; too many issues affect the interests and
concerns of multiple panels. Moreover, jurisdictional competition between or among committees,
if not carried to extremes, can benefit policymaking as each relevant panel brings its expertise to
bear in resolving complex issues.
While committee cooperation is the norm on Capitol Hill, jurisdictional disagreements between
or among panels do occur. The role of the majority party leaders, especially the Speaker, can be
significant in resolving committee disputes and in promoting committee cooperation. They are
well-positioned to encourage cooperative behavior among committees at nearly every stage of the
lawmaking process.

Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Drafting Legislation..................................................................................................................3
Artful Phraseology..............................................................................................................3
Referral of Legislation..............................................................................................................3
Multiple Referral.................................................................................................................3
The Committee System.............................................................................................................5
Memoranda of Understanding............................................................................................5
Establish a Select Committee..............................................................................................5
Create a Standing Committee.............................................................................................6
Jurisdictional Transfers.......................................................................................................7
Task Forces.........................................................................................................................8
Committee Composition.....................................................................................................8
Joint Hearings.....................................................................................................................9
Informal Staff Consultation................................................................................................9
The Rules Committee................................................................................................................9
Waivers of Points of Order................................................................................................10
Structured Rules................................................................................................................10
Reconciling Rules..............................................................................................................11
Self-Executing Rules.........................................................................................................11
Bifurcated Rules...............................................................................................................12
Concluding Observations........................................................................................................12
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................13

There is an oft-repeated adage on Capitol Hill: “turf is power.” Turf refers to the jurisdictional
mandates of House committees as stated in House Rule X and in other relevant matter
(precedents, “memoranda of understanding” between or among committees, and the like). The
Rule X language is often specified in broad rather than programmatic terms, such as “national
energy policy generally.” Committees clash over their respective jurisdictional prerogatives, in
part because they are a “lawmaker’s legislative power base. It is no wonder that committee ¹
boundaries are hotly contested.”
Various other equally important reasons account for disputes over committee boundaries. For
example, one is the matter of issue overlap among committees. Any broad subject area (homeland
security, transportation, energy, health, and so on) can involve the jurisdiction of several panels.
Shared policy interests can sometimes spark inter-committee controversies. As one House
committee chairman stated, “Nobody in this institution gives up jurisdiction they believe is ²
rightfully theirs.”
Another factor that can trigger “turf wars” is that committees overlap issues. The Energy and
Commerce Committee has jurisdiction over “foreign commerce generally;” Foreign Affairs is
responsible for “international economic policy;” and Ways and Means is in charge of “reciprocal
trade agreements.” The lack of “bright lines” separating substantive areas may also trigger
disputes among committees. For instance, is the allocation of the radio spectrum to allow first
responders to communicate with each other during an emergency a matter for the Homeland
Security Committee or the Energy and Commerce Committee (which has jurisdiction under ³
House Rule X for the regulation of interstate communications)?
Further, as new policy topics come forward, it is not always clear which of several panels might
receive legislation dealing with these emerging or emergent issues. Given jurisdictionally
ambiguous issues, turf wars can be fomented by “policy entrepreneurs staking claims for their ⁴
committees.” To be sure, committee staff are alert both to repel “border poachers” and to search ⁵
for opportunities to expand their own panel’s substantive reach.

¹^David^C.^Kin^g^,^T^u^r^f^W^a^r^s^:^H^o^w^Congr^e^s^sⁱ^o^nal^Com^m^itte^e^s^Claⁱ^m^J^u^rⁱ^s^d^ic^tioⁿ^(C^hⁱ^cago^:^Unⁱ^v^ersi^t^y^o^f^Chⁱ^cago
^P^r^e^s^s^,¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^,^p.¹²^{. Se}^e^C^R^S^R^e^p^o^r^t⁹⁸^-¹⁷⁵^,^Ho^use^Committe^e^J^u^rⁱ^sdic^tio^{n a}ⁿ^d^Re^fe^{rral: R}^u^le^{s a}^nd^Prac^tic^e^{, by}^J^udy
^Sc^hne^ide^r^{; C}^R^{S R}^e^p^o^r^t^R^S²¹⁶⁴^3,^House^Committe^e^Sy^ste^m^{: J}^u^risd^ic^tion^an^{d Re}^fe^rral^Re^{form Opt}ⁱ^oⁿ^s^{, by}^J^udy
^Sc^hne^ide^r^a^nd^P^a^{ul S}^.^R^u^nd^qu^is^t;^a^{nd C}^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³²⁶⁶¹^,^H^o^us^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^s^:^{A Fr}^am^e^w^or^k^for^C^ons^ide^rⁱ^ng
^J^u^rⁱ^s^d^ic^tio^nal^Re^ali^gnm^eⁿ^t^,^b^y^Mi^ch^ael^L^.^Ko^em^p^e^l^.
²^P^a^tr^ic^k^Y^o^e^s^{t a}^{nd C}^o^lby^I^t^k^o^w^{itz, “}^J^ur^is^dic^tⁱ^ona^{l D}ⁱ^s^pute^s^C^oul^d^Hⁱ^nde^r^Q^u^ic^k^C^o^nf^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^A^c^tion^on^Se^pte^m^be^r¹¹
^M^easu^r^e,^”^{CQ To}^d^a^y^{, J}^u^ly^19,²⁰^07,^p.¹⁵^{. A}^l^s^o^s^e^e^,^f^o^r^e^x^am^ple^,^A^d^rⁱ^a^nne^K^r^oe^ps^c^h^{, “}^E^ne^r^g^y^L^e^gis^l^a^{tion L}^e^a^d^s^to
^T^u^rf^S^p^at^Bet^w^een^Ho^u^s^{e Co}^mmⁱ^t^t^ees,^”^{CQ To}^d^a^y^{, July}^12,²⁰⁰⁷^,^{p. 1}⁸^{, a}^{nd Ka}^te^A^c^k^l^e^y^{, “}^A^T^u^rf^Ba^ttle^Sta^r^{ts Ov}^e^r
^Ste^r^oids^,”^Roll^Call^,^Decem^b^e^{r 1}⁸^,²⁰⁰⁷^,^p^.¹^.^Aⁿ^examⁱⁿ^atⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^{a sp}^eci^fⁱ^{c p}^o^lⁱ^c^y^d^o^m^aⁱⁿ^—h^o^m^el^an^d^secu^ri^t^y^—an^d
^its^r^e^f^e^r^e^nce^am^ong^H^ous^e^c^o^m^m^itte^e^s^c^aⁿ^be^f^oun^{d in}^C^R^S^R^e^p^o^r^t^R^L³³⁰^61,^H^o^m^e^la^nd^Se^c^u^r^ity^a^{nd H}^ous^e^th
^C^o^m^m^itte^e^s^:^Analy^s^is^{of 10}⁹^C^o^ngr^e^s^s^J^u^rⁱ^s^d^ic^ti^{on C}^h^a^nge^s^an^d^Theⁱ^r^I^m^p^a^c^t^oⁿ^t^h^e^Re^fe^r^r^a^{l of}^L^e^gis^l^ati^oⁿ^{, b}^y
^Mic^h^a^e^l^L^.^K^o^e^m^pe^{l a}^{nd J}^udy^Sc^hne^ide^r^,^aⁿ^d^C^R^S^R^e^p^o^r^t^R^L³²⁷¹^1,^H^o^m^e^l^aⁿ^d^Se^c^u^r^ity^:^C^o^m^p^eⁿ^di^um^of^th
^Re^c^o^m^m^e^ndati^ons^Re^le^v^{ant t}^o^H^o^us^e^Com^m^itte^e^O^r^ga^niz^a^ti^on^a^nd^Analy^s^is^{of Co}^ns^ide^r^a^tio^ns^for^th^e^H^ous^e^,^aⁿ^d¹⁰⁹^th
^and¹¹⁰^C^o^ngr^e^s^s^e^s^Epilo^gue^,^by^Mⁱ^ch^ael^L^.^Ko^em^p^e^l^.
³^J^ona^thaⁿ^K^a^plaⁿ^{, “}^D^e^m^s^J^u^rⁱ^s^d^ic^tiona^l^Fig^h^ts^S^l^ow^9/1¹^-^R^e^l^a^t^e^d^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^tion,”^The^Hⁱ^l^l^,^Jul^y¹³^,²⁰⁰⁷^,^p.^3.
⁴^I^b^id^{., p. 13.}
⁵^T^h^{is re}^{port f}^o^c^u^se^{s o}ⁿ^t^h^e^“^l^e^g^isla^tiv^e^,^”^{or pol}^ic^y^,^juri^sdic^tio^{n of}^th^e^sta^nding^c^o^m^m^itte^e^s^{. (L}^e^g^isla^ti^v^e^a^u^thority
^mean^{s th}^{e rig}^h^{t o}^f^co^mm^{ittees to}^receiv^e^an^d^rep^o^r^{t b}^ills^an^d^reso^l^u^tioⁿ^s^.)^T^h^{ese p}^aⁿ^e^{ls also}^h^a^v^e^“o^v^e^rsig^h^t^”
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Jurisdictional clashes can sometimes stymie action on legislation. However, there are many ways
to minimize or resolve committee disputes. This report identifies several common conflict-
resolving techniques that have been employed at several junctures of the lawmaking process,
specifically the drafting of measures, the referral of legislation, the committee stage, and the
Rules Committee’s issuance of special rules. This is an illustrative and not an exhaustive list. For
example, the Speaker could name conferees from more than one committee to accommodate
another panel’s jurisdictional interests. Or potential jurisdictional conflicts on the floor might be
avoided by allowing two or more competing committees the opportunity to offer a jointly created
substitute amendment.
At each one of the aforementioned lawmaking stages, the Speaker and other top party leaders are
strategically positioned to intervene and mediate jurisdictional disagreements between or among
committees, especially on party-preferred legislation. The Rules Committee, informally known as
“the Speaker’s committee,” is similarly situated to be a major jurisdictional mediator in two main
ways: (1) its mandate over the rules of the House, and (2) its ability to structure the debate and
amendment process on the floor.
At the outset it is important to underscore that none of these techniques are guaranteed to
minimize or eliminate inter-committee jurisdictional disagreements. It is simply not feasible to
construct watertight jurisdictional compartments; too many issues affect the interests and
concerns of multiple panels. Other relevant points are worth brief mention. Disputes between
panels might reflect rivalries between chairs rather than true battles over turf. In the judgment of
one House committee chair, it is “not so much where the [jurisdictional] lines are drawn that
either creates or resolves jurisdictional disputes. What we really need are a greater spirit of ⁶
civility and cooperation between chairmen and their staffs.” Sometimes jurisdictional conflicts
between or among subcommittees of the same standing committee might require the full ⁷
committee chair to mediate an internal turf war. Lastly, jurisdictional competition between and
among committees, if not carried to extremes, can benefit policymaking as each relevant panel ⁸
brings its expertise to bear in resolving complex issues.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^jurisdic^ti^on—t^h^e^a^u^t^hori^t^y^{to re}^vⁱ^e^w^the^a^c^{tions a}^{nd a}^c^tiv^itie^{s of}^no^n-g^o^v^e^rnm^e^nta^l^eⁿ^titie^{s a}^{nd e}^x^e^c^u^tiv^e^braⁿ^c^h
^pr^og^r^a^m^s^a^{nd a}^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^unde^r^theⁱ^r^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e^pur^vⁱ^ew^{. O}^v^e^r^sⁱ^g^h^{t j}^u^rⁱ^s^d^ic^ti^on,^c^o^m^p^a^r^e^d^{to le}^gⁱ^s^l^a^tⁱ^v^e^jurⁱ^s^d^ic^tio^n,
^se^ldom^gⁱ^ve^{s rise}^{to inte}^r-c^om^m^itte^e^c^onf^lic^{ts. T}^h^e^r^e^a^r^e^si^m^p^l^y^m^o^re^ov^e^r^la^{ps in}^the^c^o^nd^uc^{t of}^ov^e^r^sig^h^{t, in}^pa^rt
^b^ecau^{se t}^h^{e ru}^l^e^{s o}^f^t^h^{e H}^o^u^s^{e p}^e^rmⁱ^t^t^h^e^m^t^o^o^ccu^r.^F^o^{r exam}^p^l^e,^Ho^u^s^{e ru}^l^e^{s gran}^t^wⁱ^d^e^-ran^gⁱⁿ^{g oversi}^g^h^t^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^t^y
^t^o^t^h^{e Oversi}^gh^t^an^d^G^o^vern^men^t^Ref^o^r^m^Co^mmⁱ^t^t^ee,^as^w^e^l^l^{as “}^s^p^eci^al^o^v^ersi^gh^t^”^(Ho^u^s^{e Ru}^l^e^X^,^cl^au^{se 3}⁾
^re^s^ponsⁱ^b^ility^{to a}ⁿ^u^m^b^e^r^of^pa^ne^ls^{. Spe}^cⁱ^a^l^ov^e^r^sⁱ^g^h^{t g}^r^aⁿ^ts^v^a^rio^u^s^c^o^m^m^itte^e^s^the^rig^h^{t to}^ov^e^r^s^e^e^s^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^law^s^,
^prog^ra^m^s^{, or a}^c^tiv^itie^s^e^v^eⁿ^if^the^y^a^r^e^w^{ithin a}ⁿ^othe^r^pa^ne^l’s^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e^re^s^pons^ibili^ty^.
⁶^Q^uote^dⁱⁿ^Co^mmi^t^t^{ee St}^ru^ct^u^r^e^,^H^e^a^r^ing^s^B^e^f^o^r^e^the^J^o^int^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on t}^h^e^O^r^g^a^niz^a^tion^of^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^{S. H}^r^g^.¹⁰^3-
^{74, 10}³^rd^C^o^ng^r^e^s^s^,^Fir^s^{t Se}^s^sⁱ^on^,⁽^W^a^s^hing^{ton: G}^P^O^,¹⁹⁹³⁾^,^p.⁶¹^6.
⁷^J^o^hⁿ^B^a^ug^hm^aⁿ^,^Common^Grou^{nd: C}^o^mmitte^e^Pol^itic^{s in}^the^U.^S^.^House^{of Re}^pre^s^eⁿ^t^a^tiv^e^s⁽^S^ta^nf^or^d,^C^a^lif^.:
^S^t^an^f^o^r^d^Unⁱ^v^er^si^t^y^P^r^ess,²⁰⁰⁶⁾^,^p^.²¹^3.
⁸^Co^mmi^t^t^{ee S}^t^ru^ct^u^r^e^,^p.⁶³^2.

During the pre-introductory phase of lawmaking, a Member and staff often devote considerable
time crafting a bill so it will be referred to a preferred committee. One goal is to avoid having
their measure sent to an unsympathetic panel or to two or more committees that might hold
opposite views of the bill. Accordingly, lawmakers and their staff may meet privately with the
House Parliamentarian (who refers nearly all measures on behalf of the Speaker) to discuss
various drafting issues. For example, will the bill be referred to only one committee? If it is
multiply-referred (see below), which committee might receive a primary referral and which
would receive a secondary referral? On most measures, it is plain where they will be referred.
Military measures will be sent to the Armed Services panel or bills dealing with small businesses
will go to the Small Business Committee. However, with so many policy interdependencies, the
referral of measures might not be self-evident.
Artful drafting not only can get a bill sent to a preferred committee, but it might also minimize
jurisdictional clashes. For example, lawmakers who prefer that a telecommunications bill be sent
to the Judiciary Committee could draft it as an amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act, which is
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee. Conversely, Members who want an Internet
bill referred to the Energy and Commerce Committee could draft it as an amendment to the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which is the purview of the Commerce panel. Committees
often prefer sole responsibility for a measure because it allows them to control the measure’s fate
through various lawmaking stages: committee hearings and markups, floor consideration, and
conference committee deliberations. A single referral may also enhance lawmakers’ opportunities
to better serve their constituents and mediate and win the support of outside groups interested in
the topic.
Various bill drafting techniques and practices provide some leeway to the Speaker (or the
Parliamentarian acting on the Speaker’s behalf) in referring bills to one committee rather than to
another. For example, the Agriculture Committee received a measure dealing with eminent
domain—the seizure of private property for public use—even though the issue is typically
handled by the Judiciary Committee. However, the bill connected eminent domain with rural
development. As the House Parliamentarian noted: “The bill involved the Committee on
Agriculture’s jurisdiction because of the way it defined the term ‘federal economic development ⁹
program’ .”
In 1975, on the opening day of the 94^th Congress, the House infused flexibility into the bill
referral process. A new House rule was adopted that permitted the multiple referral (joint,
sequential, or split) of legislation to two or more standing committees. Before that time, House

⁹^Mⁱ^ch^{ael San}^d^{ler, “No}^t^{a Jo}^b^f^o^{r Ju}^dⁱ^ciary^Co^mm^{ittee? Ho}^u^s^e^A^g^Han^d^l^{es Em}ⁱⁿ^en^{t Do}^m^aⁱⁿ^Bill,”^{CQ To}^d^a^y^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t
^8,²⁰⁰⁵^{, p. 7.}

precedents prohibited the reference of bills or resolutions to or among two or more committees.
The origin of the multiple referral rule, which has been modified over time, emanated from the
1973-1974 bipartisan House Select Committee on Committees, chaired by Rules member Richard
Bolling of Missouri. The vice chair of the panel was David Martin of Nebraska, also a member of ¹⁰
the Rules Committee.
One objective of multiple referrals is to accommodate the prerogatives of the various standing
committees that share jurisdiction over a subject matter. Thus, the legitimate jurisdictional claims
of committees can be recognized during the referral stage. On measures that are multi-referred
upon initial reference, the House Parliamentarian includes the following language: “in each case
[of multiple committee reference] for consideration of such provisions as fall within the
jurisdiction of the committee concerned.” This language can assist committee chairs during
markup sessions to rule out of order amendments that trespass on other committees’ turf.
Multiple referrals encourage more interactions between and among committees with overlapping
responsibilities for policy topics. Informal discussions or negotiations can promote cooperation
among panels having competing claims on legislation. One manifestation of the value of inter-
committee consultations—commonly undertaken by staff of the concerned committees—is the
use of so-called “waiver” letters, which are often published in the Congressional Record. For
example, the Foreign Affairs Committee reported a bill, the Iran Counter-Proliferation Act of
2007 (H.R. 1400), which was also referred to several other panels. The head of one of the panels
wrote to the Foreign Affairs chair and said:
^[I]n^orde^{r t}^o^ex^pedi^t^e^f^l^oor^con^sⁱ^d^eratⁱ^oⁿ^[of^H.R^.¹⁴⁰⁰^{], I ag}^{ree t}^o^f^o^reg^o^f^u^rt^h^e^r
^coⁿ^s^id^er^atioⁿ^b^y^th^{e Co}^m^m^itt^{ee o}ⁿ^Fin^aⁿ^c^{ial Ser}^v^{ices. I}^d^o^so^wⁱ^t^h^th^{e u}ⁿ^d^e^r^s^taⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^th^at
^th^{is d}^ecisioⁿ^w^{ill n}^o^{t p}^r^ej^u^d^ice^th^is^Co^m^m^ittee^wⁱ^th^r^e^sp^{ect to}^{its j}^u^rⁱ^sd^ictioⁿ^a^{l p}^r^er^o^g^ativ^e^s
^on^t^hⁱ^s^{or s}ⁱ^mⁱ^l^a^{r l}^e^gⁱ^s^l^atⁱ^oⁿ^.^{I requ}^es^t^y^o^u^r^su^pport^f^o^{r t}^h^{e appoi}ⁿ^t^m^e^nt^of^conf^erees^f^r^o^m¹¹
^th^is^C^o^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee s}^h^ou^{ld this}^bil^l^{be th}^{e s}^u^bj^{ect of}^{a Hou}^s^e^-^Seⁿ^a^{te conf}^eren^ce.
To be sure, multiple referrals may foment jurisdictional conflict as committees assert their right to
review provisions in bills that are only tangentially related to their responsibilities. Yet the device
gives committees the opportunity to negotiate away their differences. If not, the Speaker has
various ways to promote positive action, such as imposing time limits on committee consideration
or intervening personally to help forge an agreement among clashing committees. With multiple
referrals, “committee members can no longer be certain of maintaining exclusive authority over
the legislation referred to their committee, but they can be virtually certain of obtaining all the ¹²
legislation to which they have claims.” Of course a short or lengthy deadline for committee
consideration of multi-referred measures—which the Speaker has the authority to impose—can
influence whether panels have sufficient time to defend their jurisdictional prerogatives.

¹⁰^T^h^e^m^u^ltiple^re^f^e^rr^a^l^rule^ha^s^be^eⁿ^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^{d a}^num^be^{r of}^tim^es^sⁱ^nc^e^its^fⁱ^rs^{t a}^dopti^oⁿ^.^In¹⁹⁹⁵^{, f}^o^{r e}^x^am^ple^,^the^ne^w
^Re^public^aⁿ^m^a^jority^a^bolishe^d^joiⁿ^{t re}^f^e^rra^{ls (re}^ta^ining^se^que^ntia^{l a}^{nd s}^p^{lit re}^f^e^re^nc^e^s^{) a}^{nd a}^dde^d^to^House^rule^{s t}^h^e
^re^quire^m^e^{nt tha}^t^the^Spe^a^k^e^r^sha^{ll “}^d^e^s^ig^na^te^a^c^o^m^m^itte^e^of^prim^a^r^y^jurisdic^tion^up^on^theⁱⁿ^itia^{l re}^f^e^rra^{l of}^a^m^e^a^s^ure^th
^t^o^{a co}^mmⁱ^t^t^ee.^{” S}^ee^C^ongr^e^s^sⁱ^on^{al Re}^c^o^r^d^{, v}^o^l.¹⁴^{1, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^{4, 19}^95,^{p. H}³⁶^.^Eig^h^t^y^e^a^r^s^la^te^r^,^a^t^th^e^s^t^a^r^{t of}^the¹⁰⁸
^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^H^ous^e^r^u^le^s^w^e^r^e^am^eⁿ^de^{d t}^o^a^llow^joiⁿ^{t r}^e^f^e^r^r^a^ls^w^ithou^{t a}ⁿ^y^de^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^{tion of}^a^pr^im^a^r^y^c^o^m^m^itte^e^.^Se^e
^C^ongr^e^s^sⁱ^o^nal^Re^c^o^r^d^,^v^o^l.¹⁴^{9, J}^a^nua^r^y^{7, 20}^03,^p.^H¹¹^.
¹¹^Co^ng^ressioⁿ^a^l^Reco^rd^{, v}^o^l.¹⁵^3,^Se^pte^m^be^r^{25, 2}⁰⁰⁷^,^{p. H}¹⁰⁷⁷¹^.
¹²^Me^lissa^{P. Co}^llie^aⁿ^{d Jose}^p^h^Co^ope^{r, “}^M^ulti^ple^Re^f^e^rra^{l a}^{nd the}^‘^N^e^w^{’ Com}^m^itte^e^S^y^ste^m^{in the}^House^of
^Rep^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^v^es,^”ⁱⁿ^L^a^w^r^en^{ce C.}^Do^dd^and^Bru^{ce I.}^O^p^p^e^nh^ei^m^e^r,^ed^s.^,^Con^g^r^{ess R}^ecoⁿ^sⁱ^d^ered^{, 4}^th^ed^.^(W^ashⁱⁿ^g^t^o^n,
^DC^:^C^Q^P^r^ess,¹⁹⁸⁹⁾^,^p.²⁵^4.

There are a number of ways at the committee level that inter-committee disagreements might be
resolved satisfactorily among the contending parties. There is no guarantee that it will be the case,
but the following eight methods are among the practices utilized either to resolve jurisdictional
conflicts, promote committee coordination, or clarify committees’ policy focus. These methods
are: memoranda of understanding, select committees, standing committee creation, jurisdictional
transfers, task forces, committee composition, joint hearings, and informal staff consultations.
One approach for avoiding or muting jurisdictional disagreements over shared policy areas is for
paired committees to prepare a “memorandum of understanding” that clarifies how certain
overlapping issues are to be referred. These memoranda are negotiated by the relevant
committees, signed by the respective committee chairs, often publicized in the Congressional
Record, and kept on file and observed by the Parliamentarian in the reference of pertinent ^th
legislation. For example, on the opening day (January 4, 2007) of the 110 Congress, a
jurisdictional memorandum of understanding between the chairs of the Committees on
Transportation and Infrastructure and Homeland Security was published in the Congressional
Record. It stated in part:
^[^W^]ⁱ^t^h^r^e^ga^r^d^t^o^t^h^e^Fe^d^e^r^a^l^E^m^e^r^ge^nc^y^M^a^na^ge^me^nt^A^g^eⁿ^c^y^’^s^,^FE^M^A^,^e^m^e^r^ge^nc^y
^prepare^dⁿ^e^s^s^an^{d res}^pon^s^e^prog^ra^m^s^{, th}^{e C}^o^m^mⁱ^{ttee on}^Ho^m^e^lan^d^Secu^rit^y^h^a^s^j^u^ri^s^dⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ
^ov^{er t}^h^{e D}^e^part^m^e^nt^of^H^o^m^e^l^aⁿ^d^S^ecu^ri^t^y^’s^res^pon^sⁱ^bi^lⁱ^tⁱ^es^wⁱ^t^h^reg^a^{rd t}^o^e^m^erg^eⁿ^c^y
^prepare^dⁿ^e^s^s^an^{d collecti}^v^{e res}^pon^s^e^on^l^y^as^t^h^e^y^rela^t^e^t^o^t^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^.^H^o^w^e^v^e^r^,ⁱⁿ^lⁱ^g^h^t^of^t^h^e
^f^e^{deral e}^m^erg^eⁿ^c^y^m^aⁿ^a^g^e^m^eⁿ^t^ref^o^r^m^s^th^a^t^w^e^{re en}^{acted as}^{title VI of}^P^.^L^.^109-²⁹⁵^{, a bill}
^a^m^en^di^ng^FEM^A^’^s^all^-^h^azards^em^er^g^eⁿ^c^y^preparedn^e^s^s^p^r^o^g^r^a^m^s^t^h^atⁿ^eces^s^a^ril^y^addres^s^e^s
^F^E^M^A^’s^t^e^rrori^s^m^preparedⁿ^e^ss^prog^ra^m^s^w^o^u^l^{d be re}^f^e^{rred t}^o^t^h^e^C^o^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee on}
^T^r^an^sp^o^r^tatioⁿ^an^d^Iⁿ^f^r^astr^u^c^t^u^r^e^{; in}^ad^d^itioⁿ^,^th^{e Co}^m^mⁱ^t^t^e^e^oⁿ^Ho^m^e^laⁿ^d^Secu^rⁱ^t^y^w^o^u^l^d
^h^a^v^e^{a j}^u^rⁱ^sd^ictioⁿ^a^{l i}ⁿ^ter^e^s^tⁱⁿ^s^u^c^h^b^ill.^No^thⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^t^hⁱ^s^M^e^m^o^r^aⁿ^d^u^m^o^f^Uⁿ^d^e^r^s^taⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g
^af^f^e^c^t^{s t}^h^e^j^u^ri^s^dⁱ^c^tⁱ^{on of t}^h^e^Com^mⁱ^t^t^{ee o}ⁿ^T^r^an^s^port^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^{nd In}^f^r^ast^r^u^c^t^u^{re of t}^h^e^R^obert
^T^.^Staf^f^o^{rd Dis}^a^s^t^{er R}^e^lⁱ^ef^an^d^Em^er^g^eⁿ^c^y^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^ce^A^c^{t and th}^{e Federal Fire}^P^r^ev^en^tion¹³
^an^{d C}^oⁿ^t^rol^A^c^t^of^1974.
Select, or special, committees are temporary panels that typically go out of business after the two-
year life of the Congress in which they are created. (Some select panels have been recreated for
several consecutive Congresses.) Resolutions to establish such panels are introduced and
normally referred to the Rules Committee, which may report them to the floor for chamber

¹³^Co^ng^ressioⁿ^a^l^Reco^rd^{, v}^o^l.¹⁵^3,^J^a^nua^r^y^{4, 200}^7,^pp^{. H}¹^5-^H¹^{6. W}^o^r^t^{h m}^e^ntio^{n is}^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^R^u^le^s^c^h^aⁱ^r^r^e^a^f^fⁱ^r^m^e^d^the
^“^j^ur^is^dic^tⁱ^on^of^the^C^o^m^m^itte^e^on^Sm^a^{ll B}^u^sⁱ^ne^s^s^ov^e^r^the^Sm^a^{ll B}^u^sⁱ^ne^s^s^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^{tion a}ⁿ^d^its^pr^og^r^a^m^s^{, a}^s^w^e^{ll a}^s
^s^m^a^{ll busine}^{ss m}^a^tte^{rs re}^la^te^{d to t}^h^e^Re^g^u^la^tory^Fle^x^ibility^A^c^{t a}^{nd the}^P^a^pe^rw^ork^Re^duc^tio^{n A}^c^{t. Its jurisd}^ic^tio^{n u}^nde^r
^H^ous^e^R^u^le^{X, c}^l^a^u^s^e¹⁽^p)^a^l^s^oⁱⁿ^c^l^ude^s^ot^he^r^pr^og^r^a^m^s^a^{nd ini}^tia^ti^v^e^s^tha^t^a^ddr^e^s^s^s^m^a^{ll bus}^ine^s^s^e^s^outsⁱ^de^the
^c^onf^ine^s^of^thos^e^A^c^ts^.”^Se^e^C^ongr^e^s^sⁱ^onal^Re^c^o^r^d^,^v^o^l.¹⁵^{3, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^{4, 20}⁰⁷^{, p}^.^H⁹^{. T}^h^e^r^e^a^f^fⁱ^r^m^a^tion^of^the^pa^ne^l’^s
^au^th^o^r^ity^w^{ill allo}^w^{it, acco}^rdⁱⁿ^g^to^t^h^{e Sm}^{all Bu}^sin^e^{ss ch}^air,^“to^h^a^v^e^{a v}^o^{ice at th}^{e tab}^l^{e w}^h^en^legⁱ^slatioⁿ^is^b^eⁱⁿ^g
^de^ba^te^d^{or orig}ⁱⁿ^a^t^e^dⁱⁿ^aⁿ^y^othe^r^c^o^m^m^itte^e^tha^t^ha^{s a}ⁿ^im^pa^c^t^on^s^m^a^{ll busine}^sse^{s. W}^e^w^{ill se}^e^k^lim^ite^{d re}^f^e^rra^{l to be}
^a^b^le^to^do^this.”^Q^uote^dⁱⁿ^Bill^S^w^inde^{ll, “}^S^m^a^{ll Biz}^G^e^tting^Busy^,”^Na^tiona^{l Jo}^ur^na^l’s^Co^ng^ressDa^ilyPM^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^12,
²⁰⁰^{7, p. 13}^.

consideration.¹⁴ The House may decide to constitute select panels for various reasons, including
to coordinate consideration of issues that overlap the jurisdiction of several standing committees. ^th
A recent example occurred at the start of the 108 Congress (2003-2005) when the House set up a
Select Committee on Homeland Security with both legislative and oversight jurisdiction.
Scores of House standing committees then and today have jurisdiction over various aspects of
homeland security. For example, Agriculture has jurisdiction over animal and plant health;
Energy and Commerce over public health; Financial Services over terrorist financing; Judiciary
over the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Science over computer security; Transportation
and Infrastructure over the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); and Ways and
Means over the Customs Service. To strengthen supervision of the Department of Homeland
Security—formed in 2002 from the merger of 22 agencies with around 180,000 employees—the
Speaker and other lawmakers wanted “a single point of oversight for the massive new ¹⁵
department.” The select committee also had the responsibility under the terms of its authorizing
resolution to recommend to the Rules Committee by September 30, 2004, “possible changes in
committee jurisdiction with respect to homeland security.” Their recommendation contributed to
the next example.
To create a new standing committee in the House is no easy assignment Similarly, it is often
difficult to eliminate a standing committee. A compelling reason that helps to explain both cases
is that Members and staff of the various committees, and their allied outside groups and entities,
are reluctant to lose any of their jurisdictional responsibilities. Yet to create a new standing
committee inevitably means shifting some jurisdiction from existing committees to the proposed
new permanent panel.
Despite the many obstacles involved in revamping committee jurisdictions, these initiatives
sometimes occur to promote policy and oversight coherency for a subject area that is fragmented ^th
and divided among numerous standing committees. The House’s establishment in the 109
Congress (2005-2007) of a new standing Committee on Homeland Security—as recommended by
the aforementioned Select Homeland Security Committee—is a recent illustration of this
approach. On January 4, 2005, on the opening day of the new Congress, the House adopted a
package of rules changes that included formation of a new standing Committee on Homeland
Security. As the chair of the Rules Committee explained:
^[^T^]^h^{e Ho}^u^s^e^w^{ill d}^o^w^h^{at t}^h^e^S^p^eak^er^an^d^t^h^{e 9}^/¹¹^Co^m^mⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^as^w^e^{ll as}^th^e^P^r^esid^en^t^h^a^s
^ask^e^d^u^s^to^d^o^,^coⁿ^s^o^lid^{ate j}^u^rⁱ^sd^ictioⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e Ho}^u^s^{e i}ⁿ^to^oⁿ^e^co^m^m^{ittee. T}^h^{is co}^m^m^ittee
^wⁱ^l^l^b^e^d^e^dⁱ^c^a^t^e^d^t^o^se^t^tⁱ^{ng na}^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^ho^me^l^a^nd^s^e^c^u^rit^y^polic^y^an^{d to ef}^f^ecti^v^el^y^ov^ers^eei^ng¹⁶
^th^{at t}^h^{e Depart}^m^eⁿ^t^of^Ho^m^e^l^aⁿ^d^Secu^rit^y^carries^ou^{t it}^s^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^.

¹⁴^Ho^u^s^{e rul}^e^{s (Ru}^l^e^X^II,^cl^au^se²^c^{) al}^so^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^{ze t}^h^{e S}^p^{eaker t}^o^ref^e^{r a m}^a^t^t^e^{r “t}^o^{a sp}^eci^al^,^ad^h^o^c^commi^t^t^ee
^a^ppoi^nte^d^by^the^Spe^a^k^e^r^w^{ith the}^a^pprov^a^l^of^the^H^ous^e^,^a^{nd i}ⁿ^c^l^u^d^ing^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^of^the^c^o^m^m^itte^e^s^of^juris^d^ic^ti^on,^f^o^r
^t^h^{e sp}^eci^fⁱ^{c p}^u^r^po^{se o}^f^coⁿ^sⁱ^d^eri^{ng t}^h^at^m^a^t^t^e^{r an}^d^rep^o^r^tⁱⁿ^g^t^o^t^h^e^Ho^u^s^{e t}^h^ereon^.^{” Reso}^l^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^creatⁱⁿ^{g su}^ch^a^d^ho^c
^p^aⁿ^e^l^sⁿ^eedⁿ^o^t^b^e^ref^e^rred^t^o^t^h^e^Ru^l^e^{s Co}^mmⁱ^t^t^ee.^Ho^u^s^{e p}^r^eced^en^t^s^st^at^{e t}^h^at^reso^l^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^creatⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{ese sel}^ect^p^aⁿ^e^l^s
^{“are p}^rⁱ^vⁱ^l^e^ged^w^h^en^o^f^f^e^r^e^d^f^r^o^m^t^h^{e f}^l^o^o^r^at^t^h^{e S}^p^{eaker’s req}^u^e^st^.^”
¹⁵^M^a^rtⁱⁿ^Kad^y^,^“S^el^ect^Ho^m^e^l^aⁿ^d^S^ecu^ri^t^y^,^”^{CQ We}^ekl^y^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^{11, 2}⁰⁰³^,^p.⁹⁵^{. Se}^e^a^l^s^o^C^R^{S R}^e^p^o^r^t^R^S²¹²⁴^3,^Ad
^Ho^{c S}^e^l^ect^Co^mmi^t^t^{ees: Use i}ⁿ^t^h^{e Ho}^u^s^{e o}^f^R^e^p^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^ves^,^by^J^udy^Sc^hne^ide^r^.
¹⁶^Co^ng^ressioⁿ^a^l^Reco^rd^{, v}^o^l.¹⁵^1,^J^a^nua^r^y^{4, 200}^5,^{p. H}¹⁴^.^T^h^e^9/¹¹^C^o^m^mⁱ^ss^{ion r}^e^c^o^m^m^e^nde^{d tha}^t^“^C^ong^r^e^s^s
^s^houl^{d c}^r^e^a^t^e^a^sⁱ^ng^le^{, pr}ⁱⁿ^cⁱ^pa^l^p^o^int^of^ov^e^r^sⁱ^g^h^{t a}^{nd r}^e^vⁱ^e^w^f^o^r^hom^e^l^a^{nd s}^e^c^u^r^ity^{. C}^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l le}^a^d^e^r^s^a^r^e^be^s^t
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

This change to House Rule X created “a primary committee for homeland security while ¹⁷
recognizing the other legitimate oversight roles of existing committees.” Because homeland
security overlaps many committees and involves scores of federal agencies, the Rules chair
included in the Congressional Record a legislative history detailing and clarifying the continuing
jurisdictional authority of 10 other standing committees over parts of this policy area. For
example, the Committee on Financial Services “shall retain its jurisdiction over the anti-money
laundering, terrorist financing, and anti-counterfeiting activities within the Department of the ¹⁸
Treasury and the financial regulators.” An objective of this jurisdictional arrangement, said the
Rules chair, is to assure the American people that lawmakers are “working to prevent anything ¹⁹
from falling through the cracks.”
Sometimes specific jurisdictional changes will be made between or among committees both to
minimize inter-committee disagreements and promote integrated policymaking. These discrete
changes may also be employed creatively to avoid intra-party clashes. For example, two
influential GOP lawmakers wanted to head the Commerce Committee. Under the six-year term
limit provision stated in House rules, the chairmanship of that panel was vacant because the
former chair had reached the six-year limit. To avoid a potentially heated contest for the Energy
post that could produce hard feelings within the GOP Conference, the Speaker endorsed a plan to
rename Commerce the Energy and Commerce Committee, abolish the Banking Committee and
rename it the Financial Services Committee, and grant it jurisdiction over securities and insurance
previously in the old Commerce Committee. The jurisdictional shifts occurred, according to the
chairman of the Rules Committee, “to increase market confidence in the [House’s] ability to ²⁰
comprehend the increasingly integrated nature of the financial services market.”
The Speaker’s intervention prevented an intra-party battle and allowed each of the Members to
chair an important committee. The House supported the changes when it adopted a rules package ^th
on the opening day of the 107 Congress. The Energy and Financial Services chairs soon
disagreed over which panel had authority over certain financial issues involved in the
jurisdictional transfer. The Speaker mediated this conflict over turf, which ended with the two ²¹
chairs signing a memorandum of understanding to settle their differences over jurisdiction.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^a^b^le^{to j}^udg^e^w^h^a^t^c^o^m^m^itte^e^s^hould^ha^v^e^jurⁱ^s^d^ic^ti^on^ov^e^r^this^de^p^a^r^t^m^e^{nt a}^{nd its}^du^tie^s^.^B^u^t^w^e^be^lie^v^e^tha^t^C^ong^r^e^s^s
^d^o^e^{s h}^a^{ve t}^h^e^o^b^lⁱ^g^atⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^cho^o^s^{e o}ⁿ^eⁱⁿ^t^h^{e H}^o^u^s^{e and}^on^{e i}ⁿ^t^h^e^S^eⁿ^a^t^e^,^an^{d t}^h^at^t^hⁱ^s^co^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee s}^h^o^u^l^d^b^e^a
^p^e^rm^an^en^t^st^an^dⁱⁿ^g^co^mmⁱ^t^t^ee^wⁱ^t^h^{a no}^np^artⁱ^s^an^st^af^f^.^{” S}^{ee al}^so^The^9/^{11 C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^Re^p^o^r^t^{, Fi}^na^{l Re}^por^t^of^the
^Na^tion^a^l^Co^mmission^{On T}^e^rro^ri^st^A^t^t^a^{cks Upo}ⁿ^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^ed^St^a^t^es⁽^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^:^W^.^W^.^N^o^r^t^{on &}^C^o^m^p^aⁿ^y^,²⁰⁰⁴⁾^{, p}^.
⁴¹⁹^.
¹⁷^Ibid^.
¹⁸^Ibid^.,^{p. H}²^5.
¹⁹^Ibid^.,^{p. H}¹^4.
²⁰^Co^ng^ressioⁿ^a^l^Reco^rd^,^vo^l^.¹⁴⁷^,^Jan^u^a^ry³^,²⁰⁰¹^,^p^.^H⁹^.^T^h^{e Rul}^e^{s ch}^ai^rm^an^al^so^m^a^d^e^cl^{ear t}^h^at^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^su^ran^ce
^j^u^ri^sdⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^o^t^h^e^{r co}^mmⁱ^t^t^ees,^su^ch^{as t}^h^{e A}^g^ri^cu^l^t^u^{re Co}^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee’s au}^t^h^o^rⁱ^t^y^f^o^{r cro}^pⁱⁿ^su^ran^ce,^w^o^u^l^d^no^t^b^e
^affect^ed^b^y^t^h^{e t}^r^an^sf^{er o}^fⁱⁿ^su^{rance j}^u^ri^sdⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^t^h^{e F}ⁱⁿ^aⁿ^cⁱ^a^l^S^e^rvi^{ces Co}^mmⁱ^t^t^ee.
²¹^Co^ng^ressioⁿ^a^l^Reco^rd^{, v}^o^l.¹⁴^7,^J^a^nua^r^y^{30, 20}⁰¹^{, p}^.^H¹⁰³^.

Informal task forces have long been created by Democratic or Republican Speakers. They may be
either partisan or bipartisan in composition, with the membership commonly drawn from multiple
committees. Task forces are established for various reasons, including the drafting of legislation
that cuts across committees’ jurisdictional lines. Former Speaker Newt Gingrich, GA, formed a ^th
number of party task forces in the early days of the 104 Congress (1995-1997), so many that one ²²
newspaper article was titled “Government by Task Force: The Gingrich Model.” He formed
them, in part, because he determined their mandate and timetable, appointed the chair and
members, and assigned them a deadline for legislative action. Although some committee chairs
questioned whether the proliferation of the ad hoc groups undermined their jurisdictional
prerogatives, GOP leaders were not especially sympathetic at the time to the chairs’ point of view.
Leaders of the majority party wanted to avoid committee gridlock and get their party-preferred
legislation to the floor in a timely fashion. As a deputy Republican whip stated: “Some committee ²³
chairmen think theirs should be the only venue, but that’s turf wars.” Party leaders may also
establish informal working groups of Members and staff to assist in coordinating the development
of legislation that overlaps the jurisdiction of several standing committees.
House members serve, on average, on about a half-dozen committees and subcommittee. The
point is that Members who serve on two committees with shared policy interests are sometimes
able to smooth jurisdictional relations between the two. It is unclear whether the party assignment
panels consider the “jurisdictional liaison” role as a criterion in placing their Members on
committees. Yet overlapping committee memberships may at times promote inter-committee
cooperation over shared policy issues. As a senior staffer on the International Relations
Committee (now titled the Foreign Affairs Committee) said about having two long-time GOP
members—who each also chaired another standing committee—serve on the panel:
^T^h^{e ch}^air^m^an^of^t^h^{e J}^u^diciar^y^C^o^m^m^{ittee i}^s^Hen^r^y^H^y^{de [R}^-^I^L^]^{. H}^e^’^s^oⁿ^e^o^f^th^e^m^o^r^e^s^eⁿⁱ^o^r
^m^e^m^b^ers^o^f^ou^{r co}^m^m^{ittee. T}^h^{e ch}^air^m^aⁿ^of^t^h^{e B}^aⁿ^k^ing^C^o^m^mⁱ^{ttee is}^Jⁱ^m^L^eac^h^[R^-^I^A^]
^w^ho’s^on^{e of}^th^e^m^o^{re s}^eⁿⁱ^{or m}^e^m^b^ers^o^f^ou^{r com}^mⁱ^t^t^{ee. I th}^ink^t^h^{at on}^{e res}^u^{lt of}^t^h^a^tⁱ^s^th^a^t
^w^e^teⁿ^dⁿ^e^v^e^{r to}^h^a^v^e^p^r^o^b^l^em^s^wⁱ^t^h^th^o^s^{e co}^mm^ittee^s^b^ecau^{se th}^e^y^’v^{e al}^{l serv}^ed^to^g^e^th^er²⁴
^on^thⁱ^s^co^m^m^ittee^f^o^{r al}^m^o^s^t^t^w^{o decades}^.
There are also two committees—Budget and Permanent Select Intelligence—that by House rules
are required to have Members drawn from other standing committees. For example, the
Permanent Select Intelligence Committee is to have at least one Member selected from four
committees with pertinent intelligence jurisdiction. The four panels are Appropriations, Armed
Services, Foreign Affairs, and Judiciary.

²²^Deb^o^r^ah^Kal^b^,^“G^o^v^ern^m^en^t^b^y^T^a^s^k^F^o^rce:^T^h^{e G}ⁱⁿ^g^ri^ch^M^o^d^e^l^,^”^The^Hill^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{22, 19}⁹⁵^{, p}^.^3.
²³^Deb^o^r^ah^Kal^b^,^“T^{ask F}^o^rces^G^e^t^Mⁱ^xed^Revi^e^w^s,^”^The^Hill^{, J}^u^ne²¹^{, 1}⁹⁹⁵^,^p.¹²^.
²⁴^Q^uote^dⁱⁿ^J^o^hⁿ^B^a^ug^hm^aⁿ^,^Co^m^m^oⁿ^Grou^nd^{: Co}^mmi^t^t^{ee P}^o^lⁱ^tⁱ^c^{s i}ⁿ^t^h^{e U.}^S^.^Ho^u^s^e^o^f^R^e^p^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^ves⁽^S^ta^nf^or^d,
^C^A^{: Sta}ⁿ^f^o^r^d^Uⁿ^iv^e^r^s^ity^P^r^e^s^s^,²⁰⁰⁶⁾^,^p.¹³⁸^.

Another method that committees might use to accommodate their mutual jurisdictional interests is
to hold joint hearings. These types of hearings occur often on Capitol Hill and might be employed
to reduce or eliminate the potential for jurisdictional conflicts. For example, the House Armed
Services and Foreign Affairs Committees held a joint hearing on two reports (one issued by the
Government Accountability Office and the other by a commission of military experts) “assessing ²⁵
political and military conditions in Iraq.” Plainly, the reports addressed concerns in both panels,
and the joint hearing device protected the jurisdictional interests of the two committees and
avoided a battle over turf.
It is common for the staff of committees with shared policy mandates to communicate with each
other. Sometimes the discussion involves the staff aides of one panel informing their counterparts
on other committees that they may have a jurisdictional interest in pending legislation. Inter-
committee comity is promoted by this approach, which can lead to an amicable resolution of turf
issues. On other occasions, the staffs of two or more committees with overlapping jurisdiction
may work together in crafting legislation. In the case of an agriculture census bill, for instance,
the chair of the Government Reform Committee (now called Oversight and Government Reform)
“observed that prior negotiations between the staffs of his panel and the Agriculture Committee
helped draft the language of the bill, permitting him to waive jurisdiction shortly after Agriculture ²⁶
reported it.”
The Rules Committee reports special rules (procedural simple resolutions, H. Res.) that grant
“privilege” to measures that may lack a right-of-way to the floor. The panel sets the conditions for
debating legislation and determining whether amendments will be in order to various measures.
Special rules come in various versions, and they are called by different names. One easy-to-
understand typology is the following: open (germane amendments from the floor may be offered
to the pending measure); closed (floor amendments are not in order); modified or structured (a
limited and specified number of floor amendments are in order); and waivers (points of order are
set aside against all or specified parts of a bill or against specific amendments). Waivers may be
included in open, closed, or structured rules, as well as in the array of other special rules granted
by the panel—for example, structured, reconciling, self-executing, and bifurcated, which are
discussed below. The Rules Committee may also refuse to grant special rules to committees
bickering over jurisdictional issues unless and until they have resolved their differences.
Like its rule-granting authority, Rules’ jurisdiction over the formal rules of the House enables it to
play a large role in mediating jurisdictional disputes. The Rules Committee may also report
changes to House rules that are designed to minimize jurisdictional controversy and protect a
panel’s policy prerogatives. Tax or tariff measures or amendments, for example, are not in order
unless they have been reported by the Committee on Ways and Means (House Rule XII, clause

²⁵^K^a^r^e^{n D}^e^Y^oung^{, “}^H^o^u^s^e^{to H}^o^ld^H^e^a^r^ing^s^{on T}^w^{o N}^e^w^R^e^por^ts^oⁿ^I^r^a^q,”^Th^{e Wa}^shⁱⁿ^gt^on^Po^st^,^A^u^gu^st²⁸^,²⁰⁰⁷^,^p^.
^A8^.
²⁶^B^a^ug^hm^aⁿ^,^Co^mmoⁿ^Grou^nd^{, p. 141}^.

5). Below is a brief review of different types of procedural resolutions that might be employed to
minimize committee conflicts.
The Rules Committee commonly waives a wide range of House rules, such as the three-day
layover requirement for committee reports and conference reports. These two House rules provide
time to lawmakers to become familiar with committee-reported legislation or the legislative
compromise (the conference report) reached when the two chambers pass different versions of the
same bill. Or Rules might waive the germaneness requirement for certain amendments to smooth
relationships among committees that have a stake in the underlying bill.
Waivers can sometimes be useful in limiting conflicts between authorizing committees
(Agriculture, Financial Services, Small Business, and so on) and the Appropriations Committee.
Authorizing committees report legislation creating or continuing programs and agencies while the
Appropriations Committee recommends how much money (called budget authority) these
programs or agencies should receive. Under House rules, authorizations are expected to precede
appropriations; further, appropriations measures are not to include legislation (or policy
provisions). Violations of these rules are subject to points of order (parliamentary objections) on
the floor.
As might be expected, these two sets of committees commonly have disagreements, in part
because it may not be possible for the members of the authorization committees to win enactment
of bills to reauthorize programs or agencies. Bicameral clashes, for example, may prevent their
timely enactment. As a result, the Appropriations Committee may include reauthorizing language,
as well as new policy proposals, in their bills. These add-ons can arouse the ire of the authorizers.
To constrain the traditional rivalry between authorizers and appropriators—and preserve their
respective prerogatives—the Rules Committee may observe an informal protocol. As one Rules
chairman stated:
^Uⁿ^{der t}^hⁱ^s^prot^ocol^{, t}^h^{e C}^o^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee on}^R^u^l^e^s^w^o^u^l^{d prov}ⁱ^d^{e t}^h^{e n}^eces^s^a^r^y^w^aⁱ^v^ers^t^o^en^a^b^l^e
^th^{e b}^ill^to^co^m^e^to^t^h^e^f^l^o^o^r^if^t^h^{e a}^u^th^o^r^iziⁿ^g^co^m^mⁱ^{ttee c}^h^ai^r^m^en^dⁱ^dⁿ^o^{t o}^b^j^{ect to}^th^e^m^{. I}^f
^t^h^{e a}^u^t^h^ori^zⁱⁿ^g^ch^ai^r^m^eⁿ^obj^e^c^t^e^{d t}^o^t^h^e^w^aⁱ^v^ers^,^t^h^eⁿ^un^{der t}^h^{e l}^eadershⁱ^p^’s^prot^ocol^{, t}^h^e
^C^o^m^m^{ittee o}ⁿ^R^u^le^s^w^o^u^l^{d le}^av^{e th}^e^s^p^{ecific [polic}^y^]^langu^ag^{e i}ⁿ^qu^e^s^tioⁿ^ex^pos^{ed to a}²⁷
^poiⁿ^t^of^{order on}^t^h^{e f}^l^oor.
A minority member of the Rules Committee had earlier said: “We have generally been supportive
of the majority’s stated intention to provide open, unrestricted rules for as many of the
appropriations bills as possible, and for its policy of providing waivers of House rules only when ²⁸
the authorizing committees agree to those waivers.”
A structured rule limits the number of amendments that may be offered to a measure made in
order by the procedural resolution. On major bills that overlap the jurisdiction of several panels, it
is not unusual for the Rules Committee, perhaps in coordination with the majority leadership, to

²⁷^Co^ng^ressioⁿ^a^l^Reco^rd^{, v}^o^l.¹⁴^4,^J^u^ly^{10, 1}⁹⁹⁷^,^{p. H}⁵⁰^49.
²⁸^Co^ng^ressioⁿ^a^l^Reco^rd^{, v}^o^l.¹⁴^2,^J^u^ly^{21, 1}⁹⁹⁵^,^{p. H}⁷³^86.

craft a rule designed to prevent a bill’s unraveling on the floor through the adoption of so-called
“poison pill” amendments. For example, on a major energy bill—parts of which were considered
by five standing committees—the Rules Committee reported a rule, “that severely limited the
number and range of amendments that could be offered, which insured that debate could not drag
on..., that it would be structured, and that it would focus on the key features of the ²⁹
[administration’s] program and the major alternatives.” The energy package was agreed to by
the House, in part because of the design of the rule.
When measures are multiply referred to several committees, as noted above, it is not uncommon
for two or more committees to report conflicting recommendations to the same bill. It falls to the
Rules Committee to develop a special rule that identifies the base text to be made in order for
floor consideration and that also allows the House to choose between or among competing policy
alternatives. As two scholars wrote:
^Iⁿ^d^r^af^tiⁿ^g^t^h^{e r}^u^{le f}^o^r^a^m^u^lti^p^l^y^r^e^f^e^r^r^ed^b^{ill, th}^e^Ru^le^{s Co}^m^m^{ittee i}^s^m^o^r^e^li^k^e^l^y^t^h^anⁱⁿ
^oth^e^{r cas}^es^{to h}^a^v^e^pla^u^sⁱ^ble^al^tern^ati^v^{e arrang}^e^m^eⁿ^t^s^f^r^o^m^wh^{ich to c}^h^oos^{e as}ⁱ^t^s^e^lec^t^s^t^h^e
^t^e^x^t^t^o^{be a}^m^eⁿ^{ded on}^t^h^e^f^l^{oor, al}^l^o^cat^es^con^t^rol^of^t^h^{e t}ⁱ^m^e^{for g}^eⁿ^e^ral^debat^e^{, arran}^g^e^s^f^o^r
^v^o^t^e^s^on^t^h^{e co}^m^mⁱ^t^t^ees’^re^com^m^eⁿ^d^atⁱ^ons^{, an}^{d di}^s^pos^e^s^of^g^e^r^m^aⁿ^en^e^s^s^aⁿ^{d ot}^h^e^r³⁰
^procedu^r^{al pr}^oblem^s^t^h^at^m^u^lt^{iple ref}^e^rrals^can^prov^ok^e.
Relatedly, as a precondition for a special rule, the Rules Committee may urge several competing
committees to agree on the vehicle—one of the committee’s reported bills or a consensus product,
for example—for floor debate and amendment. This practice can limit floor fights among rival
committees and expedite floor decision making.
This type of rule embodies a two-for-one procedure—that is, when the House adopts a rule it also
automatically agrees to dispose of a separate matter, which is specified in the rule itself. Self-
executing language in a special rule often states something like the following: “The amendment
printed in [section 2 of this resolution or in part 1 of the report of the Committee on Rules
accompanying this resolution] shall be considered as adopted in the House and in the Committee
of the Whole.” Thus, a self-executing rule may stipulate that a discrete policy proposal is deemed
to have passed the House and been incorporated in the bill to be taken up. The effect is that
neither in the House nor in the Committee of the Whole will lawmakers have an opportunity to
amend or to vote separately on the self-executed provision. For example, a policy recommended
by one of two or more competing committees could automatically be incorporated in the text of
the bill made in order for floor consideration, thus avoiding the potential for inter-committee
disputes on the floor. Members who oppose the self-executed provision(s) may vote either to
amend or reject the rule.

²⁹^B^r^uc^e^I^.^O^p^pe^nhe^im^e^r^{, “}^P^olic^y^Ef^f^e^c^t^s^of^U^.^{S. H}^ous^e^R^e^f^o^r^m^{: D}^ece^ntr^a^liz^a^{tion a}^nd^the^C^a^pa^c^ity^T^o^R^e^s^o^lv^e^Ene^r^gy
^Issu^es,^”^Le^gis^l^ativ^e^S^t^u^d^ie^s^Q^uar^t^e^r^l^y^{, Fe}^br^ua^r^y¹⁹⁸⁰^{, p}^.²⁴^.
³⁰^S^t^an^l^e^y^Bach^an^d^S^t^even^S^.^S^mⁱ^t^h^,^M^a^na^gin^g^Uⁿ^c^e^r^taiⁿ^tyⁱⁿ^the^H^ous^e^of^Re^pr^e^s^eⁿ^tatⁱ^v^e^s^:^Ada^p^ta^ti^on^an^d
^Iⁿⁿ^o^v^a^ti^{on i}ⁿ^Spe^cⁱ^al^Ru^le^s^(W^a^s^hing^to^{n, D.C}^.^{: T}^h^e^Bro^o^kⁱ^ng^{s Ins}^tituti^on^{, 1}⁹⁸⁸^),^p.²²^.

Bifurcated rules make at least two separate bills in order for back-to-back consideration in the
chamber. Under a bifurcated rule, the House first debates, amends, and passes one bill, and then
proceeds to consider another related but different bill. These actions can occur on separate days.
Once the House agrees to the second measure, the rule provides that the two bills will be
combined into one measure and sent to the Senate. A separate vote is not taken on the combined
legislation. This form of special rule can help to mobilize winning majorities for party priorities,
in part by joining the work product of different, and sometimes competing, committees into one
legislative measure. Consultation and communication between the relevant panels is typically
necessary to ensure that the combined measure achieves its political and policy purposes. Party
leaders and Rules Committee members may be actively involved in facilitating substantive
coordination between the pertinent committees.
Jurisdictional claims and counterclaims for legislation are commonplace among committees.
Various factors account for this reality. For example, committees commonly share responsibility
for overseeing and legislating for the same agencies and departments, and their policy and
oversight preferences may diverge one from the other. Committee jurisdictions, too, cannot keep
pace with rapid social, economic, or technological developments. One result is that scores of
issues today involve the jurisdictional expertise of numerous committees. When multiple
committees bring their divergent perspectives to a topic, disagreements may emerge among them.
These disagreements, it is worth noting, may result more from serious policy differences than
from battles over “turf.” Although committee cooperation is the norm on Capitol Hill, disputes
among committees occur quite often. Various conflict-resolving techniques are utilized both to
reduce committee conflicts and promote cooperative relationships.
In today’s House, one technique merits emphasis and specific mention: the role of majority party
leaders, especially the Speaker. They are positioned to encourage cooperative behavior among
committees because of their special resources and responsibilities. As one congressional scholar
recounted:
^[H]ou^s^{e leaders}^are^w^e^ll^pos^iti^on^{ed to ex}^ert^f^o^r^m^{al a}ⁿ^{d i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^{al pres}^s^u^{re on co}^m^mⁱ^t^t^ees^at
ⁿ^ear^l^y^e^v^er^y^sta^g^{e o}^f^th^{e p}^r^o^{cess, f}^r^o^m^t^h^{e r}^e^f^e^r^r^{al o}^f^b^{ills th}^r^o^u^g^h^th^{e n}^a^mⁱⁿ^g^o^f^coⁿ^f^e^r^en^c^e
^com^mⁱ^ttees^{. T}^h^{e tools}^of^th^{e leaders}^h^{ip [h}^av^{e] th}^e^e^ffe^c^t^o^f^r^aⁱ^sⁱⁿ^{g th}^{e cos}^t^s^of^h^o^s^tⁱ^l^{e action}^,
^f^o^{r ex}^a^m^{ple i}ⁿ^t^h^{e s}^e^tt^ing^of^ti^m^e^li^mⁱ^t^s^on^ref^e^rrals^aⁿ^{d li}^mⁱ^ting^a^m^eⁿ^d^m^en^t^s^wⁱ^t^h^s^p^ecial
^r^u^l^e^s^.^T^h^e^y^c^o^ul^d^a^l^s^o^m^a^ke^a^c^c^o^mmo^d^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^m^o^r^e^a^t^tracti^v^{e, s}^u^c^h^as^b^y^acting^as^{a gu}^aran^to^r
^f^o^r^ag^r^e^e^m^eⁿ^{ts b}^e^t^w^eeⁿ^co^m^m^ittee^s^str^u^c^k^uⁿ^d^er^th^{e d}ⁱ^r^e^c^t^su^p^e^r^vⁱ^s^ioⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e [}^m^aj^o^r^it^y^]
^leaders^h^{ip .... [}^T^h^e^Speak^{er] ca}ⁿⁱ^m^ple^m^eⁿ^t^t^h^e^[ⁱⁿ^t^e^r^-^c^om^m^itt^e^e^]^a^g^r^e^em^eⁿ^t^s^dⁱ^r^e^c^t^lyⁱⁿⁿ^e^w
^legⁱ^s^l^ati^v^{e langu}^ag^e^vⁱ^a^hⁱ^s^f^l^{oor prer}^og^ativ^es^an^{d i}ⁿ^f^l^u^eⁿ^ce^ov^{er th}^e^R^u^les^C^o^m^m^{ittee. I}ⁿ³¹
^th^is^w^a^y^,^tu^r^f^w^a^r^s^ar^{e co}ⁿ^tⁱⁿ^g^eⁿ^t^oⁿ^th^e^p^a^tien^{ce o}^f^lead^er^{s a}ⁿ^d^oⁿ^t^h^{e lat}^itu^d^e^t^h^e^y^g^r^an^t.
In short, party leaders often act to facilitate committee cooperation across numerous policy
domains, and they have various ways to ensure productive committee action on priority
legislation. It is reasonable to suggest that many other factors beside leadership involvement are
important in promoting committee cooperation, such as regular staff contacts between and among

³¹^B^a^ug^hm^aⁿ^,^Co^mmoⁿ^Grou^nd^{: C}^o^mmi^t^t^{ee P}^o^lⁱ^tⁱ^c^{s i}ⁿ^t^h^{e U.}^S^.^{House o}^f^R^e^p^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^ves^{, p.}¹⁷^4.

committees, overlapping committee memberships, and recognition by committees that constant
jurisdictional bickering can be counter-productive to lawmaking. Committees have their own
incentives for cooperating—or fighting—with other panels. However, if jurisdictional fights
threaten chamber action on party-preferred legislation, then the central leadership seems certain
to intervene to resolve the differences among the contending committees.

^W^a^{lter J}^.^Oles^zek
^Senⁱ^o^r^Sp^{ecialist i}ⁿ^Am^er^icaⁿ^Natioⁿ^a^{l Go}^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t
^w^o^l^e^s^z^e^k^@^c^rs^.l^oc.g^o^v^{, 7-}⁷⁸⁵⁴