Laos: Background and U.S. Relations

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

2007 and is likely to decrease further in 2008. New aid program areas include public health,

economic development, judicial reform, and civil society.
The United States government remains concerned about the plight of former and remaining
Hmong insurgents and their families, with ties to the U.S.-backed Hmong guerilla army of the
Vietnam War period, who now number some 2,000-3,000 persons. Some Hmong-American and
international human rights groups claim that the “mountain Hmong” are virtually defenseless and
continue to be subject to Lao army campaigns and political persecution.
Approximately 8,000 Hmong wishing to emigrate to the United States currently reside in a camp
in Thailand’s Phetchaboun province. The United States has urged the Thai government not to
deport the Hmong unless they are interviewed for refugee status, and has encouraged the Lao
government to allow international monitoring and humanitarian access to resettlement efforts.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161, Section 691(b)) provides that, for the
purposes of Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Hmong and certain
other groups shall not be considered to be terrorist organizations and thus barred from entry into
the United States.
Social and economic conditions in Laos reportedly have improved in some areas. The country
was upgraded to Tier 2 on the U.S. State Department’s trafficking in persons list (2007) for
making significant efforts to curtail trafficking, although significant problems remain. Religious
freedom reportedly has improved, particularly in urban areas. Opium production and use have
dropped dramatically since 1998. The country reportedly has made progress in deepening
economic reforms as it prepares to apply for membership in the World Trade Organization
(WTO). This report will be updated as warranted.

U.S. Interests and Bilateral Cooperation.........................................................................................1
U.S. Assistance Programs.........................................................................................................1
Policy Options...........................................................................................................................2
Developments of the Past Year........................................................................................................2
Hmong-American Leader Vang Pao Arrested...........................................................................2
Congressional Act Removes Terrorist Label on Hmong...........................................................3
Political and Economic Situation in Laos........................................................................................3
Politics ....................................................................................................................... ................ 3
Foreign Relations................................................................................................................4
Economic Conditions, Trade, and Foreign Aid.........................................................................4
Laos-U.S. Trade..................................................................................................................5
Foreign Aid.........................................................................................................................6
Human Rights Issues.......................................................................................................................6
Religious Freedom....................................................................................................................7
The Hmong Minority................................................................................................................7
Hmong Refugees.................................................................................................................8
Figure 1. Map of Laos.....................................................................................................................3
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................9

The United States and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR) cooperate in important
areas despite disagreements regarding human rights policies in Laos and the LPDR’s strong ties
with China and Vietnam. Areas of U.S.-Laos cooperation include: the recovery of Americans ¹
missing in action (MIAs), counter-narcotics efforts, the removal of land mines, and avian flu.
Social and Economic conditions in Laos reportedly have improved in some areas. The country
was upgraded to Tier 2 on the U.S. State Department’s trafficking in persons list (2007) for ²
making significant efforts to curtail trafficking, although significant problems remain. Religious
freedom reportedly has improved, particularly in urban areas. Opium production and use have ³
dropped dramatically since 1998. The country reportedly has made progress in deepening
economic reforms as it prepares to apply for membership in the World Trade Organization
(WTO).
The United States provides relatively little foreign assistance to Laos. Total U.S. assistance to
Laos in FY2007 was estimated to be $4.8 million compared to $4.3 million in 2006. By
comparison, the United States provided neighboring Cambodia, a country at a similar level of
economic development, an estimated $55 million in 2007. Most U.S. aid to Laos has focused on
counter-narcotics and de-mining efforts. New program areas include public health, economic
development, judicial reform, and civil society. For FY2008, the Administration requested
$70,000 to establish an International Military Education and Training (IMET) program focused
on English language programs for Lao citizens involved in American MIA accounting efforts.

¹^Sⁱⁿ^{ce 19}⁸⁵^,^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^ed^S^t^at^{es Jo}ⁱⁿ^t^P^O^W^/^M^I^A^Acco^uⁿ^tⁱⁿ^{g C}^o^mman^d^(J^P^A^{C) reco}^ver^y^t^e^a^m^{s h}^a^ve^carri^ed^o^u^t¹⁰⁰
^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^sⁱⁿ^L^a^o^s^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e co}^op^eratⁱ^o^{n o}^f^t^h^{e L}^a^o^go^vern^m^eⁿ^t^.^“Rec^o^v^er^y^A^g^en^c^y^T^e^a^m^{s Co}^m^p^l^e^t^e¹⁰⁰^th^La^o^s
^Mis^sⁱ^on,”^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^{e D}^o^c^u^m^e^nts^,^A^u^g^u^s^t^10,²⁰^07.
²^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^,^Tr^af^fic^kⁱ^{ng i}ⁿ^Pe^r^s^o^ns^Re^por^t²⁰⁰⁷^{, J}^uⁿ^e^12,²⁰⁰⁷^.
³^T^h^{e l}^o^{ss o}^f^t^h^{e op}ⁱ^u^m^cro^p^re^p^o^r^t^e^d^l^y^h^a^{s resu}^l^t^e^dⁱⁿ^great^{er p}^o^v^ert^yⁱⁿ^so^{me areas,}^an^d^t^h^{e po}^ssi^bⁱ^lⁱ^t^y^o^f^far^m^er^s
^r^e^v^e^r^ting^{to op}^ium^pr^o^duc^ti^{on r}^e^m^a^ins^hig^h^.^Fur^t^he^r^m^or^e^,^us^e^of^s^m^ugg^le^d^m^e^tham^phe^tamⁱ^ne^r^e^por^te^dly^ha^s^rⁱ^s^eⁿ
^a^m^oⁿ^g^L^a^o^y^o^u^t^h^:^“Mo^r^{e W}^o^{rk Need}^edⁱⁿ^Opi^u^m^E^r^adⁱ^catⁱ^o^n,^”^O^r^ganiz^a^ti^on^{of As}ⁱ^a^-P^ac^ific^Ne^ws^Ageⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^{, O}^c^tobe^r
^18,²⁰⁰⁶^{; S}^ong^r^it^Ph^onN^g^e^rⁿ^{, “}^L^a^o^s^A^d^m^its^Iⁿ^c^r^e^a^s^e^{in U}^s^e^of^Metha^m^phe^tamⁱ^ne^A^m^ong^L^a^{o Y}^out^h,”^VOA^{, O}^c^t^obe^r
^{26, 20}⁰⁶^.

Despite the heavy toll that unexploded ordnance (UXO) Laos in Brief
from U.S. bombing continues to wreak on the Lao ^{Chief of State:}^{President Gen.}
countryside, funding for de-mining activities is likely to ^{Choummaly Sayasone (2}⁰⁰⁶⁾
decrease by 40% between 2006 and 2008. The LPDR
also receives assistance through the Leahy War Victims ^{Prime Minist}^er:^{Bouasone Bouphava}^nh⁽²⁰⁰⁶⁾
Fund ($1.5 million during the 2004-2009 period) to assist
victims of UXO. The United States dropped more than ^Population:^{6.5 million}

2.5 million tons of ordnance on Laos during the Vietnam ^{Per Capita Inco}^me:^$2,20^{0 (p}^urcha^sing

War, more than the total used against Germany and Japan ^{power parity)}
in World War II. Mines cause an average of 120 deaths ^{Life Expectancy:}^{58 y}^ears
per year (nearly 4,000 deaths, and over 13,000 casualties, ^Literacy:^68%
since 1975). UXO also takes a significant economic toll
on rural areas, affecting 25% of villages or one-third to ⁴^{Religious Affiliations:}^{Buddhist, 60%;}
one-half of the nation’s land area. ^{Animist, 30%; Ch}^{ristian, 1.5%.}
^{Ethnic Gr}^oups:^{Lao (lowland and upland),}
Laos has reported two confirmed cases of avian ^90%;^{Highland (Hmong a}^{nd Yao),}^9%;^{Vietnamese and Chine}^{se, 1%.}
influenza. In October 2005, the United States signed a
cooperation agreement with Lao officials in which it ^Sources:^{CIA World Factbook; Ec}^onomist
pledged $3.4 million to the LPDR for controlling ^{Intelligence Unit.}

outbreaks of avian flu. As of 2007, the United States has
donated more than $7 million to fight avian flu in Laos. Half a million birds reportedly have been
culled. On November 27, 2007, the United States government donated 6,000 sets of personal
protective equipment worth $75,000 for Lao health workers.
Policy options for Congress include: pressuring the Lao government to accept international
monitoring of the resettlement of former Hmong militia members and their communities;
increasing support for de-mining activities; supporting IMET English language programs;
appropriating Economic Support Funds (ESF) for economic reforms (building capacity to meet ⁵
WTO requirements); and granting trade preferences to Laos and other least developed countries.

In June 2007, U.S. prosecutors arrested Vang Pao and charged him and ten other Hmong-
Americans with conspiring to violently overthrow the government of Laos, after they allegedly
attempted to purchase weapons from a federal undercover agent. Vang pleaded “not guilty” to the
charge. French-trained General Vang Pao, chosen by the CIA during the Vietnam War to lead the
covert guerrilla war in Laos, helped many Hmong to emigrate to the United States after the

⁴^Uⁿ^ite^{d N}^a^ti^ons^D^e^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^t^P^r^o^g^r^am^{, Laos PDR E-U}^p^d^a^te⁽^A^ug^us^{t 20}⁰⁶⁾^;^P^a^ul^Wⁱ^s^e^m^a^{n, “}^30-^Y^e^a^r^-^O^{ld B}^o^m^b^s
^Still^V^e^ry^De^a^d^l^y^{in L}^a^os,”^US^{A T}^o^da^y^,^Decem^b^e^{r 1}²^,²⁰⁰³^.
⁵^Se^e^{S. 6}⁵²^,^T^a^rⁱ^f^f^R^e^lief^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^anc^e^f^o^r^D^e^v^e^loping^Ec^on^om^ie^s^A^c^{t of}²⁰⁰^7.

communist takeovers of Saigon and Vientiane, and became an anti-communist leader of the
Hmong in the United States.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2008 (P.L. 110-161, Section 691(b)) provides that, for
the purposes of Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Hmong and
certain other groups shall not be considered to be terrorist organizations and thus barred from
entry into the United States. The Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56) of 2001 amended the Immigration and
Nationality Act to bar terrorist and other armed organizations, and those who provided material
support to such groups, from entry into the United States. Some Hmong refugees were denied
entry into the United States or permanent residency status under Section 212(a)(3)(B) due to their ⁶
possible connections to insurgent activity in Laos. Approximately 8,000 Hmong wishing to
emigrate to the United States currently reside in a camp in Thailand’s Phetchaboun province. The
United States has urged Thailand not to deport them to Laos unless they are interviewed for
refugee status.
Figure 1. Map of Laos
^Source:^{Congressional Researc}^h^Service

The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) is a secretive, Leninist political organization that
has sole authority over the government and society of Laos. According to many experts, its hold

⁶^Unde^{r t}^h^e^ne^w^prov^isio^{n, Hm}^on^g^re^f^u^g^e^e^s^a^r^e^{not a}^u^t^o^m^a^tic^a^l^l^y^c^onside^r^e^d^a^s^“^t^e^rrorists,”^b^u^{t a}^r^e^s^{till su}^bje^c^t^to^U.S.
^im^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion s}^c^r^e^eⁿ^ing^a^{nd r}^e^f^u^g^e^e^quo^ta^s^.

on power remains firm. Despite the existence of factions, including reformist and conservative
groups, the Party appears to be united against fundamental political change or democratization.
Anti-government activities, such as public protests and bombings, have subsided since the 1999-
2004 period. During that time, university students and teachers staged two demonstrations for
democratic reforms. Rebel militias operating out of Thailand carried out several attacks on Lao
border posts. Anti-government groups detonated over a dozen small bombs in the capital,
Vientiane, and other cities, killing several people. Several ambushes of highway buses and other
vehicles, in which over 40 people were killed, were reported. These isolated attacks, which the
Lao government either downplayed or for which it blamed Hmong insurgents, did not spark
widespread anti-government activity.
According to some analysts, Vietnam and China are competing to exploit the LPDR’s strategic
and economic assets. Vietnam’s influence on Laos remains strong, particularly in political and
military affairs and among the Revolutionary Party’s old guard, although China’s economic
influence is growing. Laos’ northern provinces reportedly are becoming economically integrated ⁷
with China’s Yunnan province. China is considered by some analysts as the “primary economic ⁸
patron” of Burma, Cambodia, and Laos. Some observers believe that Hanoi has encouraged the
Lao government to improve relations with the United States in an effort to counteract Chinese
influence.
Although Laotians reportedly are sometimes resentful of Thailand’s historical political influence,
Laos shares cultural and religious traditions and maintains close economic ties with Thailand. The
two countries signed a joint communique in March 2007, the first in 20 years, covering
infrastructure development, border control, Hmong migration issues, and avian influenza. The
LPDR’s relations with neighbors Cambodia and Burma (Myanmar) are cordial. In a display of
growing maturity as a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (since 1997), ^th
Vientiane successfully hosted the 10 ASEAN Summit in November 2004 and the ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting in July 2005.
One of the poorest countries in Asia, with an annual per capita income of $2,200 (purchasing ^th
power parity), Laos ranks 130 on the United Nations Development Program’s Human ⁹
Development Index. The country’s road and communications systems are underdeveloped.
Subsistence agriculture accounts for about half of GDP and involves over 80% of the country’s
labor force. About 31% of GDP comes from manufacturing.
The Lao economy experienced a relatively brief period of collectivization (1975-1985). In 1986,
the LPDR government began a policy of economic reform—disbanding collective farms,

⁷^Ec^on^om^{ist Inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^{Unit, “}^C^o^untry^Re^port—L^a^os,”^Oc^tobe^{r 2}⁰^07.
⁸^Ca^the^r^{in E}^.^Da^lpiⁿ^o^,^“^C^onse^q^ue^nc^e^s^of^a^G^r^o^w^ing^Ch^ina^,^”^Sta^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t be}^f^o^re^the^Se^na^te^Com^m^itte^e^{on F}^o^re^igⁿ
^R^e^la^tions^S^ubc^om^m^itte^e^{on Ea}^s^t^A^s^ia^{n a}^{nd P}^a^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^A^f^f^a^ir^s^,^J^une^7,²⁰^05.
⁹^T^h^e^Hum^a^{n De}^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t Inde}^x^{is ba}^se^{d u}^p^oⁿ^m^e^a^s^ure^s^of^li^f^e^e^xpe^c^t^aⁿ^c^y^{, e}^duc^a^tion^,^lite^ra^c^y^{, a}^{nd g}^r^{oss dom}^e^s^tic
^pr^o^duc^{t (}^G^D^P⁾^.

legalizing private ownership of land, allowing market forces to determine prices, and encouraging
private enterprise in all but some key industries and sectors. Between 1988 and 2004, the
country’s economy grew by a healthy 6% per year, with the exception of 1997-1998 due to the
Asian financial crisis. GDP expanded by roughly 8% in 2006 and 7% in 2007, and is expected to ¹⁰
increase by 6.5% in 2008. Prime Minister Bouphavanh is known as an economic reformer. The
government has received praise from foreign donors for its policy initiatives and general
improvement in the investment climate. Tourism has become the country’s single biggest earner
of foreign exchange. Hydroelectric power and textiles account for over two-thirds of country’s
exports. Coffee is also a major export item.
Laos is becoming economically integrated with its neighbors. The LPDR’s principal trading
partners are Thailand, Vietnam, and China. Total Laos-Thailand trade was nearly $1.5 billion in ¹¹

2006 while total Laos-Vietnam trade was $260 million and Laos-China trade was $217 million.

The Lao government signed an agreement with Bangkok to triple Lao exports (mostly natural
resources and electricity) by 2010. Major investors in Laos are China, Thailand, Vietnam, and
Australia while South Korea has begun to invest in manufacturing and natural resources. Both
Chinese and Vietnamese companies have invested in hydroelectric power, rubber plantations, and
mining of minerals and precious metals. A Chinese company reportedly has plans to build an ¹²
industrial park in Vientiane. Vietnam has supported road and railway projects linking the two
countries.
The Lao government is building a road to link Thailand, northern Laos, and China. The five ¹³
countries of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) are developing a power trade agreement
based upon hydroelectric power. Laos is a member of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA),
implemented in 2003, and the ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA), which is to go into effect in 2010 ¹⁴
for most member states.
In 2006, Laos exported $8.7 million worth of goods to the United States, about 90% of which
were garments, and imported $6.9 million in mostly electronic goods and machinery. In the first

10 months of 2007, exports to the United States were up nearly 2.6 times while imports were up ¹⁵

87%. By contrast, the EU-15, the LPDR’s largest export market, imported $175 million worth
of Laotian merchandise in 2006—mostly apparel and accessories—while exporting $34.7 ¹⁶
million.
On November 19, 2004, Congress passed the Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act
of 2004, which extended nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of Laos (signed into law as

¹⁰^Ibid^.
¹¹^{EIU; G}^l^oba^{l T}^r^a^d^e^A^tla^s.
¹²^“^C^hina^’^s^S^u^z^h^o^u^Iⁿ^d^u^s^t^rⁱ^a^l^P^a^r^k^{to B}^u^ild^Ec^on^om^ic^Zoneⁱⁿ^L^a^os^,”^{Asia P}^u^lse^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^31,²⁰⁰⁷^.
¹³^T^h^e^G^M^{S c}^ountrⁱ^e^s^a^r^e^B^u^r^m^a^,^C^a^m^bodia^,^L^a^os^{, T}^h^a^ila^nd^{, a}ⁿ^d^Vⁱ^e^t^na^m^.
¹⁴^L^a^os^is^r^e^quir^e^{d t}^o^m^e^e^t^ta^rⁱ^f^f^r^e^duc^ti^{on g}^o^a^l^s^by²⁰⁰⁸^f^o^r^the^A^F^TA^a^{nd 20}^{15 f}^o^r^t^h^e^A^C^FTA^.^A^S^EA^N^’^s^new^e^s^t
^a^{nd le}^a^s^{t de}^v^e^lope^{d m}^e^m^b^e^r^s^—^C^a^m^bodia^,^L^a^os^{, My}^aⁿ^m^a^r⁽^B^ur^m^a⁾^,^a^nd^Vie^t^na^m^—^a^r^e^a^llo^w^e^{d a}^ddi^tiona^l^tim^eⁱⁿ
^w^h^ic^{h to r}^e^d^u^c^e^ta^rⁱ^f^f^s^.^A^S^EA^N^’^{s s}ⁱ^x^or^ig^ina^l^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^a^r^e^B^r^une^{i, I}ⁿ^d^one^sⁱ^a^,^Ma^la^y^s^ia^{, P}^hⁱ^lip^pine^s^,^Sing^a^por^e^,^a^nd
^T^h^a^ila^nd.
¹⁵^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es In}^t^e^rn^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^T^r^ad^e^Co^mmⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^.
¹⁶^G^l^oba^{l T}^r^a^d^e^A^tla^{s. T}^h^e^{EU-15 r}^e^fe^{rs to 15}^origⁱⁿ^a^l^c^o^uⁿ^trie^{s of}^th^e^Euro^pe^aⁿ^Uni^oⁿ^.

P.L. 108-429). For several years, U.S.-Laos relations were largely shaped by the U.S. debate over
whether to grant Laos normal trade relations (NTR) treatment. Since 1997, when the United
States and Laos concluded a bilateral trade agreement (BTA), legislation to extend NTR status to
Laos faced opposition from many Members of Congress concerned about human rights ¹⁷
conditions in Laos and the plight of the Hmong Lao minority. Some prominent Hmong-
American organizations strongly opposed enacting the trade agreement, although the Laotian-¹⁸
American community as a whole reportedly was split on the issue.
Laos receives approximately $250 million in foreign aid per year (20% of GDP), including loans
from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank worth $80 million and $40 ¹⁹
million, respectively. The top sources of official development assistance (ODA) to Laos, on an
average annual basis (2004-2005), are Japan ($65 million), France ($21 million), Sweden ($19 ²⁰
million), Germany ($15 million), and Australia ($12 million). According to one report, in 2001-²¹
2002, China was the second biggest aid donor to Laos. However, this estimate likely reflects a
much broader range of assistance than that normally counted as ODA provided by developed
countries. Since the late 1990s, Chinese aid has included grants (nearly $300 million), loans
worth $350 million, pledges of trade, and investments worth $876 million, technical assistance, ²²
and high profile public works projects, such as the National Cultural Hall in Vientiane.

Following the assumption of power by the Lao communists (the Pathet Lao political movement
which became the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party) in 1975, the Lao government dealt harshly
with its perceived political opponents, including Royal Lao Government and Army officials, the
royal family, and U.S.-trained Hmong guerrilla fighters, sending 30,000-50,000 of them to
“reeducation centers.” Nearly all remaining political prisoners reportedly were released by the
late 1980s. According to the U.S. Department of State, the LPDR’s human rights record, already ²³
considered “poor,” worsened in 2006. The State Department’s annual report on human rights
stated that the Lao government does not allow the independent organization of political, religious,
or labor groups, severely curtails free speech and association, controls the country’s judiciary, and
regularly denies due process. There are no domestic human rights non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). In addition to an unknown number of political detainees, there were three

¹⁷^B^e^f^o^r^e^La^os^w^a^s^g^r^aⁿ^te^{d N}^T^R^s^t^a^t^us^{in N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^2004,^the^L^P^D^R^w^a^s^one^of^only^thr^e^e^c^ountrⁱ^e^s⁽^C^uba^{, L}^a^os^{, a}ⁿ^d
^{North K}^o^re^a⁾^tha^t^did^no^{t ha}^v^eⁿ^o^r^m^a^{l tra}^d^e^re^la^{tions w}^{ith t}^h^e^Unit^e^d^Sta^t^e^s^.
¹⁸^V^a^udⁱⁿ^e^Eⁿ^gl^an^d,^“L^ao^tⁱ^aⁿ^s^A^r^e^Di^vi^d^e^d^o^v^{er U.}^S^.^T^r^ad^e,^”^W^a^{ll S}^t^r^e^e^t^J^our^nal^{, Se}^p^t^e^m^be^r^{1, 20}⁰⁴^;^D^a^nie^l
^L^o^v^e^ring^{, “}^F^orm^e^{r Ene}^m^ie^{s W}^a^ge^Ba^ttle^ov^e^r^{U.S. T}^r^a^d^e^w^{ith L}^a^os,”^A^sso^ci^a^t^ed^P^r^ess^{, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^12,²⁰⁰^4;^Fr^e^d^e^r^ic^J^.
^F^r^o^m^m^e^r,^“F^ree^T^r^ad^{e Deal}^f^o^{r L}^a^o^s^S^p^lⁱ^t^s^Hm^oⁿ^g^Co^mm^uⁿⁱ^t^y^,^”^A^sso^ci^a^t^ed^P^r^ess^{, Ma}^y^{6, 2}⁰⁰³^.
¹⁹^A^s^ia^&^P^a^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^R^e^vⁱ^ew^W^o^r^l^{d of}^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion, J}^u^ly^{30, 2}⁰⁰⁷^.
²⁰^O^E^CD^da^ta^.
²¹^Jo^sh^u^a^K^u^rl^an^t^zⁱ^c^k,^“Chⁱⁿ^a^{’s Char}^m^:^I^m^p^lⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^o^f^Chⁱⁿ^{ese S}^o^f^t^P^o^w^e^r,^”^Carne^g^ie^Eⁿ^d^o^wmeⁿ^{t P}^o^lic^y^Brie^{f n}^o^.⁴⁷
⁽^J^uⁿ^e²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.
²²^S^oⁿ^g^ri^t^P^h^oⁿ^N^gern^,^“C^hⁱⁿ^e^{se A}^s^si^st^an^{ce t}^o^L^a^o^s^S^t^eadⁱ^l^y^In^crease^s^,^”^NewsVOA.co^m^{, J}^u^ly^18,²⁰^07.
²³^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^,^B^u^r^e^a^u^of^D^e^m^o^c^r^a^c^y^,^H^u^m^a^{n R}ⁱ^g^h^ts^{, a}^nd^L^a^bor^,^C^o^un^t^r^{y R}^e^po^rt^{s on}^Hu^m^aⁿ^Rⁱ^g^h^t^s
^Pr^ac^tic^e^s^—20^06:^La^os⁽^M^a^r^c^h^{6, 200}⁷⁾^.

known political prisoners as of March 2007.²⁴ Prison conditions have been reported as generally
harsh and very difficult to monitor. The LPDR has signed but not ratified the U.N. International
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESC).
According to most experts, the LPDR does not engage in widespread persecution of religious
groups. Religious freedom reportedly has improved, particularly in urban areas. However, non-
mainstream religious activities, particularly among religious and ethnic minorities, often continue
to experience repression at the local level. Many conflicts reportedly have arisen as officials and
Christian groups have clashed over local resources. In some cases, officials have felt politically
threatened or overzealously applied communist orthodoxy. In 2002, the Lao government
promulgated Decree 92 on religious practice. Although this decree has contributed to greater
religious tolerance in many cases, Lao authorities also have used it to restrict some aspects of
religious practice. During the period covered by this report, some local officials reportedly
pressured minority Protestants to renounce their faith on threat of arrest or forceful eviction from ²⁵
their villages.
From 2000 through 2003, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
(USCIRF) recommended that the U.S. State Department designate Laos as a “country of ²⁶
particular concern” (CPC) for systematic and egregious violations of religious freedom. In
2004, the Lao government and the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane conducted a joint seminar on
religious freedom issues, and the USCIRF upgraded Laos to its “watch list.” In 2005, the
USCIRF removed Laos from the watch list, citing the re-opening of most of its closed churches,
release of almost all religious prisoners, and official denunciation of campaigns to force
renunciations of faith.
During the Vietnam War, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) trained and armed
an estimated 60,000 Hmong guerillas to fight the Vietcong. After the Lao communists took power ²⁷
in 1975, Lao and Vietnamese troops crushed most of the Hmong army. The Lao People’s Army
(LPA) then allegedly carried out a war of attrition in the northern mountains against remaining
Hmong militias and communities that resisted cooperation with the government. Some human
rights organizations claim that the Lao military has committed atrocities against the mountain

²⁴^Ibid^.
²⁵^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^,^B^u^r^e^a^u^of^D^e^m^o^c^r^acy^{, H}^u^m^a^{n R}ⁱ^g^h^ts^{, a}^{nd L}^a^bor^,^Iⁿ^te^rn^atio^na^{l Re}^lig^io^u^s^Fre^e^{dom Re}^port
²⁰⁰^6—^La^os⁽^S^e^p^te^m^b^e^r^14,²⁰⁰⁷⁾^{; U}^.^{S. C}^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on on}^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^o^na^{l R}^e^lig^ious^Fr^e^e^dom^,^Aⁿ^nu^al^Rep^o^r^t^(May²^,
²⁰⁰⁷⁾^.
²⁶^Sinc^e^t^h^e^U.S.^Sta^t^e^De^pa^rtm^e^{nt be}^g^a^{n subm}^itting^aⁿⁿ^u^a^l^re^p^o^{rts t}^o^Co^ng^re^{ss on re}^lig^io^{us f}^r^e^e^dom^pursuaⁿ^{t t}^o
^Se^c^tion¹⁰²⁽^b)^of^the^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tio^na^{l R}^e^lig^ious^Fr^e^e^d^om^A^c^{t of}¹⁹⁹⁸^,^{it ha}^s^hig^h^lig^hte^d^vⁱ^ola^tⁱ^ons^of^r^e^lig^ious^f^r^e^e^domⁱⁿ
^L^a^os^{but ha}^s^ne^v^e^r^de^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^t^e^d^the^L^P^D^R^a^s^a^C^P^C^.
²⁷^Ja^ne^Ha^m^ilton-Me^rritt^,^Tr^agic^M^oun^taiⁿ^s^:^T^h^e^H^m^oⁿ^g^{, t}^h^e^Am^e^r^ic^ans^,^an^{d t}^h^e^Se^c^r^e^t^W^a^r^s^for^L^aos^{, 19}⁴²^-¹⁹⁹²
^(Bloom^ing^t^on:^In^diaⁿ^a^Univ^e^r^sity^P^r^e^{ss, 19}⁹²⁾^{. Ha}^m^ilton-Me^{rritt s}^u^g^g^e^{sts tha}^t^a^s^m^aⁿ^y^a^s^30,00^{0 H}^m^ong^soldie^{rs a}^nd
^cⁱ^v^ilia^{ns die}^d^a^s^a^re^sult^of^theⁱ^{r i}ⁿ^v^o^lv^e^m^eⁿ^{t in t}^h^e^Vie^t^na^m^W^a^r.^A^c^c^o^rding^to^a^not^he^{r so}^urc^e^,^u^p^t^o¹^00,⁰⁰^{0 Hm}^ong^,
^{or o}ⁿ^e^-^fⁱ^f^t^{h of}^the^H^m^ong^po^pula^t^ion,^w^e^re^k^ille^{d during}^aⁿ^{d im}^m^e^dia^t^e^l^y^a^f^te^{r the}^Vⁱ^e^t^na^m^W^a^{r. St}^e^phe^{n Ma}^g^a^gⁿ^ini,
^“^H^m^ong^G^e^ne^r^a^{l C}^a^r^rⁱ^e^s^{on Fig}^h^t^f^o^r^Hⁱ^s^P^e^opleⁱⁿ^U^.^S^.,”^T^h^{e Sa}^cra^m^en^t^o^B^e^e^{, J}^u^ly^{2, 1}⁹⁹⁵^.

Hmong, who currently number an estimated several hundred to a few thousand (2,000-3,000) ²⁸
persons divided among about a dozen groups. U.S. officials in Laos have been unable to
independently verify allegations of LPA or Vietnamese troop movements, mass killings, or the
use of biological weapons against the Hmong. Reports of Lao military actions against Hmong
insurgents, who appear to be vastly out-powered by the Lao army, continue but with decreasing ²⁹
frequency.
LPDR officials state that they have begun a process of voluntary resettlement of former Hmong
insurgents and their families. Many observers contend that although societal discrimination likely
persists, the Lao government does not engage in systematic persecution of the Hmong minority
living among the general (lowland) population. In 2006, according to reports, from several
hundred to over one thousand lightly-armed Hmong, many of them malnourished, surrendered to
Lao authorities and registered for resettlement. However, some critics maintain that while the Lao
government has allowed some foreign assistance for Hmong resettlement, it has barred
international groups from monitoring the process to confirm that former militia members are not ³⁰
being mistreated. Amnesty International and the U.S.-based Fact Finding Commission claim
that on April 6, 2006, in Vientiane Province, Lao People’s Army (LPA) troops killed 26 unarmed
Hmong, 25 of them women and children, who were foraging for food. The government denied the ³¹
allegations and refused to investigate them.
Following the communist takeover, up to one-third of the Hmong minority, which totaled 350,000
in 1974 by some estimates, fled to Thailand. Between 1975 and 1998, nearly 130,000 Hmong ³²
refugees were admitted to the United States. In the early 1990s, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) began to close its camps in Thailand and offered the
remaining Hmong in the country a choice between resettling in third countries or returning to
Laos. Most Hmong (30,000 to 100,000) chose to stay in Thailand and assimilated into rural Thai
society. About 30,000 returned to Laos. In May 2005, Thailand closed its last camp for Hmong
refugees. About 15,000 Hmong took refuge at the Wat Tham Krabok Temple in central Thailand.
When the Thai government threatened to close the camp, which it claimed harbored illegal drug
activity, in 2003, the United States agreed to accept about 15,000 Hmong.
Approximately 8,000 Hmong from Laos wishing to emigrate to the United States currently reside
in a camp in Thailand’s Phetchaboun province. The Thai government has threatened to deport
them to Laos while Vientiane has offered to take the migrants back. The United States has urged
Thailand not to deport the Hmong unless they are interviewed for refugee status. Thailand is
reluctant to request UNHCR involvement for fear of encouraging an influx of refugees from Laos
and other countries. According to some experts, however, less than 25% of the migrants would

²⁸^Aⁿ^d^r^ew^P^e^rriⁿ^,^“W^el^co^{me t}^o^t^h^e^Juⁿ^g^l^e^,^”^Tim^e^Asⁱ^a^{, Ma}^y^{5, 2}⁰⁰³^;^A^m^ne^s^t^y^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tiona^l,^P^ubl^ic^St^ate^m^eⁿ^{t, N}^o^.
²²⁴^,^S^e^pt^em^b^e^r¹³^,²⁰⁰⁴^.
²⁹^T^hom^a^s^Fulle^{r, “}^C^IA^-B^a^c^k^e^d^So^ldie^{rs Stil}^{l o}ⁿ^Ru^n,”^{New Y}^o^{rk Ti}^mes^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^{24, 20}⁰⁷^.
³⁰^h^t^t^p^://w^ww^.^f^a^c^t^fⁱⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^.o^rg^/^m^issi^oⁿ^.^h^t^m^{l; “Hill T}^r^ib^{e Su}^rreⁿ^d^{ers to}^L^a^o^tian^G^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^a^f^{ter T}^h^ree^Decad^es,”^The
^Vanc^o^u^v^e^r^Suⁿ^,^J^une^{6, 20}^05.
³¹^“^U^{.S. Ca}^{lls o}ⁿ^L^a^{os to}^Inv^e^stig^a^t^e^A^lle^g^e^{d Ma}^ssa^c^r^e^o^f^H^m^ong^Civ^ilia^ns,”^{VOA Ne}^ws^,^J^une^{2, 20}⁰⁶^.
³²^A^c^c^o^r^d^ing^t^o^s^o^m^e^e^s^ti^m^a^te^s^,^the^U^.^{S. H}^m^ong^-^L^a^o^pop^ula^tio^{n t}^o^ta^ls^a^ppr^ox^im^a^t^e^l^y^250,0⁰⁰^to³^50,⁰⁰⁰^pe^r^s^oⁿ^s^aⁿ^d
^or^s^lig^htly^ov^e^r^ha^lf^of^the^U^.^{S. L}^a^otia^{n p}^o^p^u^la^ti^on.^Se^e^a^l^s^o^D^oⁿⁿ^a^K^e^nne^dy^{, “}^B^e^t^w^e^eⁿ^Tw^{o W}^o^r^l^ds^,”^T^h^{e P}^r^{ess -}
^En^terp^rise^(Riv^e^r^sⁱ^de^{, CA}^{), J}^u^ly^{9, 2}⁰⁰⁰^.

likely qualify as political refugees by the UNHCR (those determined to likely face persecution in
Laos), rather than economic migrants. The U.S. government has encouraged the Lao government
to allow international monitoring and humanitarian access to resettlement efforts, and has also
offered its assistance for these activities.
^Th^o^m^a^s^L^u^m
^Sp^ecialistⁱⁿ^A^s^iaⁿ^Af^f^a^ir^s
^t^l^u^m^@^crs^.^l^o^c.g^o^v^,^7-⁷⁶¹⁶