Homeland Security: Roles and Missions for United States Northern Command
Homeland Security: Roles and Missions for
United States Northern Command
Updated June 3, 2008
William Knight
National Defense Fellow
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Homeland Security: Roles and Missions for
United States Northern Command
Summary
In 2002, President Bush signed a new Unified Command Plan (UCP)
establishing United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to provide command
and control of the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) homeland defense efforts and
to coordinate military support to civil authorities. As a geographical combatant
command, NORTHCOM has an area of responsibility that includes the continental
United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and surrounding waters out to approximately
500 nautical miles, including the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida. The
NORTHCOM Commander also commands North American Aerospace Defense
Command.
NORTHCOM, headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, employs
approximately 1,200 DOD civilians, contractors, and service members from each
service component. The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps have service
components assigned to NORTHCOM, while Navy Fleet Forces Command is a
supporting component. Additionally, NORTHCOM maintains five subordinate joint
headquarters to carry out assigned missions.
One of NORTHCOM’s key charters is to build ongoing relationships with
government agencies that play a role in homeland security and defense. To ensure
integration of homeland security and defense efforts, NORTHCOM participates in
the Joint Interagency Coordination Group while also working closely with both the
Department of Homeland Security and the National Guard Bureau. To exercise these
important relationships, NORTHCOM participates in the National Exercise Program.
Further, as a geographical combatant command, NORTHCOM also plays a key role
in facilitating military cooperation with both Canada and Mexico.
During deliberations for the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act, some
issues for Congress involving NORTHCOM may include DOD reorganization and
the Unified Command Plan, improving interagency relationships, NORTHCOM’s
increased reliance on reserve component service members, the ongoing Cheyenne
Mountain Operations Center realignment, and the allocation of resources necessary
for NORTHCOM to successfully plan for and execute its assigned missions.
This report will be updated as conditions require.
Contents
In troduction ......................................................1
Background ......................................................1
Organization ..................................................1
Army North (ARNORTH)...................................2
Air Force North (AFNORTH)................................2
Marine Forces North (MARFORNORTH)......................3
Joint Task Force North (JTF-N)..............................3
Standing Joint Forces Headquarters North (SJFHQ-N).............3
Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-AK)............................4
Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS).......................4
Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR).....4
Interagency Relationships.......................................4
Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)..................4
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).......................5
National Guard Bureau (NGB)...............................5
National Level Exercises (NLE)..............................5
International Security Cooperation................................6
Canada ..................................................6
Mexico ..................................................7
Issues for Congress................................................7
Unified Command Plan (UCP)...................................7
Interagency Relationships.......................................8
Increased Reliance on Reserve Components........................11
Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center............................12
Resource Availability..........................................12
Homeland Security: Roles and Missions for
United States Northern Command
Introduction
This report outlines the organizational structure of United States Northern
Command (NORTHCOM), explains how NORTHCOM contributes to homeland
security through the interagency process, and summarizes NORTHCOM’s
international relationships with Canada and Mexico. Some issues for Congress
involving NORTHCOM include DOD reorganization and the Unified Command
Plan, improving interagency relationships, NORTHCOM’s increased reliance on
reserve component service members, the ongoing Cheyenne Mountain Operations
Center realignment, and the allocation of resources necessary for NORTHCOM to
successfully plan for and execute its assigned missions.
Background
In 2002, President Bush signed a new Unified Command Plan (UCP)1
establishing NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM is a regional combatant command with
an area of responsibility (AOR) that includes the continental United States, Alaska,
Canada, Mexico, and surrounding waters out to approximately 500 nautical miles,
including the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida.2 NORTHCOM’s mission is
to “anticipate and conduct Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within
the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States3
and its interests.” The NORTHCOM Commander also commands North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a bi-national U.S. and Canadian4
organization charged with air and maritime warning and airspace control.
Organization
NORTHCOM, headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, employs
approximately 1,200 DOD civilians, contractors, and service members from each
service component. Most U.S. military personnel also serve in NORAD positions,
1 See Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-26, “Homeland Security,” August
2 Hawaii and Pacific territories and possessions are in U.S. Pacific Command AOR, while
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are in U.S. Southern Command’s AOR.
3 “About NORTHCOM,” online at [http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html].
4 NORAD and NORTHCOM are separate entities. NORAD was established by treaty, and
in May 2006, NORAD’s maritime warning mission was added.
except in the operations directorate. Like other combatant commands, NORTHCOM
has relatively few permanently assigned personnel to manage routine operations.
Rather, when tasked by the National Command Authority to conduct specific
homeland defense or civil support operations, NORTHCOM would be assigned
forces from U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).5
NORTHCOM has several subordinate commands to execute its mission. Army,
Air Force, and Marine Corps components are assigned to NORTHCOM, while Navy
Fleet Forces Command is a supporting component. These service component
commands provide an administrative framework to command service forces gained
from JFCOM for specific contingency operations. Additionally, five Joint Task
Forces (JTF) have been established to provide operational organizational skeletons
to oversee forces to be assigned for actual operations. The following summarizes
direct-reporting NORTHCOM components:
Army North (ARNORTH). Based at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 5th Army
assumed responsibility for its NORTHCOM mission in October 2005. Commanded
by an active duty three-star general, this organization shed its traditional role of
training reservists to focus on supporting civil authorities. It assigns Defense
Coordinating Officers (DCO) to all 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) regional offices to streamline DOD coordination. During crisis response,
DCOs are augmented by additional personnel to facilitate NORTHCOM support.6
Air Force North (AFNORTH). First Air Force is headquartered at Tyndall
Air Force Base, Florida, and in February 2006, it was designated as NORTHCOM’s
air component or AFNORTH. The organization is commanded by an Air National
Guard two-star general who also serves as commander of the Continental NORAD
Region — one of three NORAD regions.7 Key subordinate units to AFNORTH
include the following:
!601st Air and Space Air Operations Center, Tyndall Air Force Base,
Florida.
!Northeast Air Defense Sector, Rome, New York.
!Western Air Defense Sector, McChord Air Force Base, Washington.
In addition, AFNORTH includes nine aligned Air National Guard fighter wings
that fly aircraft such as the F-22 Raptor, F-15 Eagle, F-16 Fighting Falcon, and the
E-3 Sentry.8 In addition to using aircraft on alert, the AFNORTH is expanding the
5 Testimony of Commander, U.S. Northern Command, Admiral Timothy J. Keating, before
the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 14, 2006.
6 “Theater-level Command Expands Homeland Security Mission,” Homeland Defense
Watch, October 25, 2005.
7 NORAD maintains three regions — Alaskan NORAD Region, Canadian NORAD Region,
and Continental NORAD Region, For more on NORAD’s structure, see
[http://www.norad.mil/about/index.html ].
8 USAF Fact Sheet: AFNORTH Mission, April 2008, AFNORTH Public Affairs, online at
(continued...)
use of mobile ground-based air defense systems and unmanned aerial vehicles. It
also maintains a joint air surveillance system with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA).9
Since September 11, 2001, First Air Force has been the lead agency for
Operation Noble Eagle — the continuing mission to protect the United States from
terrorist air attack. AFNORTH accomplishes this task by providing surveillance and
command and control for air defense forces 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.10 As of
May 1, 2008, AFNORTH had executed 48,950 sorties and logged 188,553 flying
hours during Operation Noble Eagle over the continental United States.11
Marine Forces North (MARFORNORTH). In the fall of 2004, DOD
designated Marine Forces Reserve Command in New Orleans, Louisiana, as a
NORTHCOM component. The reserve three-star Marine commander is responsible
for force-protection of Marine installations and coordinating Marine forces assigned
to NORTHCOM. Additionally, to assist NORTHCOM civil support planning, the
command has 32 Marine Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers focused on
specific FEMA regions. During the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 20 of the 32
liaison officers worked in various FEMA, DOD, and state operations centers to
coordinate Marine support.12
Joint Task Force North (JTF-N). Established in September 2004, JTF-N
aids law enforcement agencies protecting U.S. borders. The Fort Bliss, Texas-based
unit inherited 15 years of interagency experience from its predecessor JTF-6.
Whereas JTF-6 assisted with counter-drug operations on the southern border, JTF-N
now has a broader homeland defense focus as it integrates military capabilities with
federal, state and local law enforcement. In addition to exercises and planning, JTF-
N operations include reconnaissance, surveillance, detection, and infrastructure
construction missions that often leverage military units training for deployment to
Iraq or Afghanistan.13
Standing Joint Forces Headquarters North (SJFHQ-N). Headquartered
at Peterson AFB, Colorado, SJFHQ-N began operations in January 2004. Its mission
is to maintain situational awareness across NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility.
8 (...continued)
[http://www.1af.acc.af.mil/library/fact sheets/factsheet.asp?id=4107].
9 Carlos Munoz, “AFNORTH Will Rely More on Ground Based Mobile Defense Systems,”
Inside the Air Force, July 7, 2006, vol. 7, no. 27.
10 USAF Fact Sheet: AFNORTH Mission, April 2008, AFNORTH Public Affairs, online at
[http://www.1af.acc.af.mil/library/fact sheets/factsheet.asp?id=4107].
11 “Never-ending Vigil: Operation Noble Eagle Sorties and Flying Hourse,” Air Force
Magazine.com Datapoints, May 19, 2008, online at
[ ht t p: / / www.ai r f or ce-ma ga zi ne.com/ dat apoi nt s/ 2008/ Page s/ dp052008one.aspx] .
12 Statement of Commander, Marine Forces North, Lt General Jack W. Bergman, before the
Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, July 19, 2006.
13 Statement of Director of Operations, Joint Task Force North, Col. Paul R. Disney, to the
House Armed Services Committee, August 1, 2006.
SJFHQ-N is designed to provide command and control for contingency situations,
and has the ability to forward deploy elements when required.14
Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-AK). JTF-AK is headquartered at
Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, and is tasked to coordinate land defense and
DOD support to civil authorities in Alaska.15
Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS). Headquartered at Fort Monroe
in Hampton, Virginia, this JTF assists the lead federal agency managing the
consequences of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive
incident in the United States or its territories and possessions. It was established in
1999 under U.S. Joint Forces Command, and its coordination with agencies like
FEMA is more mature. The JTF is also working with state National Guard civil
support teams as they become operational.16
Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR).
Activated in June 2003, this JTF is located at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington,
D.C. It facilitates planning, training, and exercising among four local service
components. Additionally, it coordinates with Coast Guard District 5, the DHS
Office of National Capitol Region, and other federal, state, and local agencies to
ensure unity of effort in the event of manmade or natural catastrophes.17
Interagency Relationships
NORTHCOM’s linkage to homeland security is through Defense Support to
Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission. As such, NORTHCOM participates in the Joint
Interagency Coordination Group and maintains strong relationships with the
Department of Homeland Security and the National Guard. Finally, NORTHCOM
is and active participant in National Level Exercises (NLE) and, along with the rest
of DOD, has synchronized its exercise schedule with the National Exercise Plan.
Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). To facilitate
interagency relationships, NORTHCOM has liaisons from more than 60 federal and
non-federal agencies at Peterson AFB, Colorado. Liaisons provide subject matter
expertise and direct lines of communication with their parent organizations. Some
non-DOD agencies represented include the Central Intelligence Agency, FAA,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Environmental Protection Agency, and U.S.
Geological Survey, as well as several Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
organizations such as Customs and Border Patrol, FEMA, Immigration and Customs
14 Online at [http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html#SJFHQN].
15 Ibid.
16 “NORTHCOM Agency Helps Civil Authorities Prepare for WMD Events,” US Fed
News, January, 10, 2007.
17 Testimony of Commander, Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region, Major
General Guy C. Swan III, before the House Committee on Government Reform, July 21,
Enforcement, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).18 The JIACG
also does focused planning on specific issues with potential nationwide impact. For
example, in August 2006, representatives from the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) met with members
of the JIACG to ensure a mutually supporting effort and eliminate redundancy in
responding to potential pandemic flu.19
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DOD has 65 personnel
working in the DHS, and senior officials from both organizations meet daily at the
principal and deputy level.20 There are also NORTHCOM personnel assigned to
DHS components such as the Defense Coordinating Officers in FEMA regions.
Through a memorandum of understanding, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has 20
personnel serving on the NORTHCOM headquarters staff facilitating regular
discussions for maritime homeland defense roles and responsibilities.21
National Guard Bureau (NGB). Although the NGB is a DOD organization,
most national guard forces report to their state leadership unless federalized. In the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, NORTHCOM and the NGB took steps to improve
coordination with and oversight of National Guard forces serving in state and federal
roles. These steps include a formal policy on command, control, and
communications; an advisory board to expedite solutions for improving information
sharing; and more than 87 NORTHCOM mobile training team visits to demonstrate
collaborative tools to the NGB joint operations center and state-level guard
headquarters.22
National Level Exercises (NLE). DOD participation in NLEs include
exercises that evaluate DOD linkages to homeland security through Defense Support
to Civil Authorities (DSCA) and homeland defense. NORTHCOM, DOD’s
combatant command that has primary responsibility for DSCA, conducts exercises
to train and evaluate its DSCA capabilities at the direction of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).
In 2007, for example, exercise Ardent Sentry consisted of scenarios that
involved the detonation of a 10-kiloton improvised nuclear device, a hurricane, and
several events in Alaska in exercise Northern Edge.23 For NLE 1-08, NORTHCOM
18 Testimony of Commander, U.S. Northern Command, Admiral Timothy J. Keating, before
the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 14, 2006.
19 “USNORTHCOM Hosts Work Group for Pandemic Influenza Planning,” US Fed News,
August 25, 2006.
20 Interview with Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul McHale, in
Joint Forces Quarterly, issue 40, 1st Quarter 2006, p. 11.
21 Testimony of Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, Admiral Thad Allen, before the
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security on September 7, 2006.
22 Testimony of Commander, U.S. Northern Command, Admiral Timothy J. Keating, before
the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves on May 3, 2006.
23 Fact Sheet, Exercise Ardent Sentry - Northern Edge 2007, online at
(continued...)
and NORAD conducted Vigilant Shield 08 (VS 08) to test the ability of the military
to provide DSCA in response to a scenario whose main event was the explosion of
radiological dispersion devices in Guam, Oregon, and Arizona.24 As part of NLE 2-
08, Ardent Sentry 08 tested DOD’s ability to provide DSCA in response to terrorist
attacks in the Pacific Northwest and a hurricane striking the mid-Atlantic states.25
International Security Cooperation
In addition to its homeland defense and civil support missions, the
NORTHCOM area of responsibility includes both Canada and Mexico. As such,
NORTHCOM facilitates security cooperation with both nations.
Canada. In December 2002, Canada and the United States established a Bi-
national Planning Group at NORAD/NORTHCOM headquarters to review theater
cooperation in the post 9/11 security environment. The 50-person military team26
dissolved in May 2006 after submitting a final report with 62 recommendations.
Some recommendations, like authority for WMD teams to cross the border, will
require legislative action to be effective. However, most, like protocols for
information sharing between NORAD, NORTHCOM, and Canada Command,2728
could be orchestrated under existing laws or within NORAD agreement.
In February 2008, military leaders from NORTHCOM and Canada Command
agreed to a Civil Assistance Plan. The Civil Assistance Plan “allows the military
from one nation to support the armed forces of the other nation during a civil
emergency” and is expected to “facilitate military-to-military support of civil29
authorities once government authorities have agreed on an appropriate response.”
NORTHCOM and Canada Command leaders view the agreement as an opportunity
to collaboratively synchronize each nation’s military operational plans to support
23 (...continued)
[http://www.northcom.mil/News/2007/ AS-07_fact_sheet.pdf].
24 Exercise Summary Report: National Level Exercise 1-08 (Vigilant Shield 08), North
American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command, January 25,
25 Fact Sheet, USNORTHCOM Portion of NLE 2-08, March7, 2008, provided to CRS by
USNORTHCOM Public Affairs Office.
26 Bi-National Planning Group, “The Final Report on Canada and the United States
(CANUS) Enhanced Military Cooperation,” March 13, 2006 at [http://canada.usembassy.
gov/ content/can_usa/ bpg_finalreport_040606.pdf].
27 Canada Command was established by the Canadian government on February 1, 2006, to
focus on Canadian domestic operations and to offer a single military point of contact for all
Canadian domestic and continental defense issues and Canadian security partners.
28 “Canadian-US Planning Group calls for C4 cooperation,” Aerospace Daily & Defense
Report, April 26, 2006, vol. 218, no. 18.
29 U.S. Northern Command Press Release, “U.S. Northern Command, Canada Command
Establish New Bilateral Civil Assistance Plan,” February 14, 2008, online at
[http://www.northcom.mil/News/2008/021408.html ].
each countries lead federal agencies — the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
and Public Safety Canada — following events such as “floods, forest fires,
hurricanes, earthquakes and effects of a terrorist attack.”30
In addition to coordinating operational plans, the commanders of NORTHCOM
and Canada Command and their staffs meet regularly, collaborate on contingency
planning, and participate in related annual exercises. Further, Canada has linked
some of its exercises with the U.S. National Level Exercise (NLE) schedule. For
example, during NLE 2-08, Canadian forces, led by Canada Command, participated
in exercise Staunch Maple where they were faced with a mass casualty scenario
associated with a simulated explosion and a pandemic flu outbreak aboard a
Canadian ship in a Canadian port.31
Mexico. Theater security cooperation with Mexico is limited to anti-drug
trafficking operations and senior officer visits with Mexican counterparts. The
former is a continuation of JTF-6 interactions, while the latter has proven difficult
because the Mexican defense establishment lacks a natural entry point for combatant
command level engagement. Mexican defense leaders have historically interacted
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense because Mexico was not assigned to a
combatant command’s AOR.32
Issues for Congress
During deliberations on the FY2009 defense authorization legislation, some
NORTHCOM issues for Congress may include DOD reorganization and the Unified
Command Plan (UCP), NORTHCOM’s interagency relationships, NORTHCOM’s
reliance on reserve component forces, the ongoing Cheyenne Mountain Operations
Center realignment, and the allocation of resources necessary for NORTHCOM to
successfully plan for and execute its assigned missions.
Unified Command Plan (UCP)
Congress approved DOD’s request for a 10th assistant secretary of defense to
facilitate the reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy (OUSD [P]). The conference report for the 2007 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) (P.L. 109-364) expressed several concerns about the
reorganization, including the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense inheriting33
a Western Hemisphere focus. DOD intended for the reorganization to streamline
30 Ibid.
31 U.S. Northern Command Press Release, “NORAD, USNORTHCOM Wrap up
Participation in NLE 2-08,” May 9, 2008, online at
[http://www.northcom.mil/news/2008/050908.html ].
32 John A. Cope, “A Prescription for Protecting the Southern Approach,” Joint Forces
Quarterly, issue 42, 3rd quarter 2006, p. 19.
33 Conference Report on H.R. 5122, “John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for
(continued...)
combatant command interactions with OUSD (P). However, the proposed
reorganization appears to create more rather than fewer entry points to navigate. For
example, the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense and Americas Affairs, as
well as the new Assistant Secretary for Global Security Policy, both appear to have
NORTHCOM interests. Likewise, DOD has currently filled only three of five
Assistant Secretary billets within OUSD (P). As DOD reorganizes its policy staff,
some may call for major changes to the UCP. After only five years in existence,
NORTHCOM’s geographic AOR continues to be refined. A May 2006 revision of
the UCP shifted the Aleutian Islands from PACOM to NORTHCOM while moving
Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands from NORTHCOM to
SOUTHCOM.34 There may be merit to further examining combatant command
boundaries, particularly between NORTHCOM and U.S. Southern and Pacific
Commands.
Interagency Relationships
Based on Hurricane Katrina lessons learned, DOD and DHS have taken several
steps to improve coordination. Several NORTHCOM components have been
assigned missions that focus on military assistance to civil authorities. Likewise,
NORTHCOM continues to make tangible efforts to improve cooperation and
coordination with National Guard forces, as well as key partners like FEMA.
Reportedly, NORTHCOM, NGB, and FEMA partnered to purchase 22 identical
deployable cellular communication systems to improve coordinated emergency
response capability.35
A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study concluded in April 2008
examined ongoing coordination efforts between NORTHCOM, the NGB, and states,
while identifying gaps in NORTHCOM’s efforts.36 The GAO found a number of
ongoing efforts designed to improve NORTHCOM’s civil support capacity to include
the following:37
!State participation in NORTHCOM exercises enhances
coordination.
!Including the NGB in the development of NORTHCOM plans
provides National Guard perspective.
33 (...continued)
Fiscal Year 2007,” p. H8426.
34 “Bush Approves Update to Unified Command Plan, Assigns New Missions,” Inside
Missile Defense, vol. 12, June 7, 2006.
35 Bob Brewin, “Northcom Beefs up Emergency Response: New Organization Structure
Brings NGOs & Private Sector into Command Center,” Federal Computer Week, December
36 GAO-08-252, “Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern
Command’s Coordination with States and the National Guard Bureau, but Gaps Remain,”
April 2008, pp. 3-4.
37 Ibid, pp. 17-21.
!NORTHCOM’s Joint Force Orientation Program for state Adjutants
General and their respective staffs provides information on
NORTHCOM’s civil support role to states.
!NORTHCOM’s hurricane and wildfire conferences are beginning to
build effective relationships between participants.
!NORTHCOM has improved relationships with state and local
officials by locating Defense Coordinating Officers in FEMA
regional offices.
However, the GAO also identified three remaining gaps in the coordination between
NORTHCOM, states, and the NGB:38
!NORTHCOM only minimally involves states in the development of
homeland defense and civil support plans.
!NORTHCOM was not familiar with state emergency response plans
and has no process for obtaining this information.
!The roles and responsibilities between NORTHCOM and the NGB
for planning for homeland defense and civil support are not clearly
defined.
As such, the GAO recommended the Secretary of Defense:39
!Direct NORTHCOM to develop a thorough process to guide
coordination with states to include provisions that (1) involve states
in NORTHCOM’s planning process, and (2) obtains and
incorporates information on state emergency response plans and
capabilities into the development and execution of NORTHCOM
plans.
!Direct NORTHCOM and the NGB to formally develop an
agreement that clearly defines roles and responsibilities for
NORTHCOM, the NGB, and the NORTHCOM National Guard
Office.
In response to the GAO recommendations, DOD stated that a revised
Memorandum of Agreement between NORTHCOM and the NGB was in
coordination. However, DOD only partially concurred with the first
recommendation. While DOD agreed with the need for a more thorough planning
process, DOD believes the process must include U.S. Pacific and Southern
Commands in addition to NORTHCOM. Further, DOD stated that Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1, requires DHS to produce and Integrated
Planning System (IPS). DOD added that NORTHCOM, the NGB, the Joint Staff,
and Office of Secretary of Defense staffs are coordinating with DHS to develop an
IPS.40
38 Ibid, pp. 23-33.
39 Ibid, p. 34.
40 Ibid, p. 47.
A separate GAO report completed in April 2008 also examined NORTHCOM’s
interagency relationships. The report found that NORTHCOM had taken a number
of steps to improve interagency coordination and concluded that
NORTHCOM’s federal interagency coordination efforts have helped address
some of the uncertainty in the homeland defense and civil support planning
process and have improved NORTHCOM’s ability to coordinate in the event of41
actual incidents.
However, the GAO found that NORTHCOM lacks formal procedures to ensure that42
integrated planning will be fully adopted. As such, the GAO recommended that
DOD and NORTHCOM in coordination with other appropriate federal agencies
develop clear guidance for interagency planning efforts and document agreements for
interagency planning groups within the construct of the Integrated Planning System.43
DOD concurred with this GAO recommendation.
Seeking to continue to strengthen relationships between DHS and DOD, the
2008 NDAA directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of
Homeland Security, to determine what military-unique capabilities DOD provides
that are necessary to support civil authorities during national catastrophic incidents.
Additionally, the 2008 NDAA (P.L. 110-181) directs DOD to budget for additional
requirements deemed necessary to conduct civil support missions.44
With the focus on interagency coordination, some are calling for legislation to
codify processes with something similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act that
reorganized DOD. The 2007 NDAA directed the President to provide Congress a45
report on improving interagency support. While the report focused on better DOD
and civilian executive branch integration, homeland security also requires46
cooperation across the full spectrum of federal, state, and local agencies. Likewise,
some question the advisability of creating additional layers at the federal level, as it
may make it more complicated for state and local authorities to interact with federal
agencies.
41 GAO-08-251, “Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but
Needs Force Allocations, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues,” April 2008, pp.35,
42 Ibid, pp. 40-42.
43 Ibid, p. 57.
44 H.Rept. 110-477, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1585, Section 1815, “National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2008,” pp. 500-501.
45 P.L. 106-364, Sec. 1035.
46 “Report on Improving Interagency Support for United States 21st Century National
Security Missions and Interagency Operations in Support of Stability, Security, Transition,
and Reconstruction Operations: Report to Congress Submitted Consistent with Section
Increased Reliance on Reserve Components
Nearly 150 reserve and national guard members staff NORTHCOM
headquarters, including five general officers. Its Air Force and Marine Components
are reserve commands that have full-time missions; JTF-CS is primarily a reserve
organization, and JTF-N relies on reserve component units to conduct operations.
Likewise, the National Command Region’s Integrated Air Defense System is
operated by National Guard forces in Title 10 status, and since 9/11 over 70% of the
nation’s air defense sorties have been flown by reserve component forces.47 Recent
trends indicate NORTHCOM will increase reliance on reserve component forces to
support civil authorities. Reserve component forces are also deploying overseas in
large numbers for other combatant commanders. As mobilizations continue and
homeland security missions increase, more reserve component forces are serving in
full-time status.
Some are concerned homeland defense may create near- and long-term resource
issues for the reserve components prompting many governors to question whether
they will have sufficient National Guard forces available to accomplish state
missions. As such, the 2008 NDAA (P.L. 110-181) requires DOD in consultation
with DHS, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, NORTHCOM, and the NGB
to prepare and submit a plan to Congress for coordinating the use of National Guard
and members of the Armed Forces in response to natural and man-made disasters by
June 1, 2008.48 Additionally, the 2008 NDAA (P.L. 110-181) requires the President
to establish a bipartisan Council of Governors to advise DOD, DHS, and the White
House Homeland Security Council regarding the use of the National Guard and civil
support missions.49
Some believe that because of the National Guard’s unique dual status, the
NORTHCOM deputy commander should be a National Guard officer. This issue
was initially deferred to the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. The
Commission recommended that either the commander or deputy commander of
NORTHCOM be filled by a reserve component officer, but it recommended against
adding a second deputy commander billet to allow both active duty and reserve
component representation at the deputy level.50 The 2008 NDAA (P.L. 110-181)
requires that either the commander or at least one deputy commander billet at
NORTHCOM be filled with a National Guard officer.51
47 Testimony of Commander, U.S. Northern Command, Admiral Timothy J. Keating, before
the Commission on National Guard and Reserves on May 3, 2006.
48 H.Rept. 110-477, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1585, Section 1814, “National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2008,” pp. 499-500.
49 H.Rept. 110-477, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1585, Section 1822, “National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2008,” p. 501.
50 Commission on National Guard and Reserves, Second Report to Congress, March 1, 2007,
pp. xv-xvi.
51 H.Rept. 110-477, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1585, Section 1824, “National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2008,” p. 502.
Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center
In July 2006, NORTHCOM announced the Cheyenne Mountain Operations
Center (CMOC) was undergoing an 18-month transition with day-to-day operations
moving from the underground complex 15 miles west of Peterson to a combined
NORAD/NORTHCOM Command Center at Peterson. The Cold War vintage facility
will remain in a “standby” status and be used for exercises or contingencies.
NORTHCOM believes the combined command center will increase unity of effort
and operational effectiveness, enabling an effective response to a full spectrum of
threats.52 However, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has voiced
concern over costs, as well as incomplete analyses of security implications and
operational effects of the proposed moves.53
To address the concerns, the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
110-181) stipulates funding for the CMOC realignment upon the DOD submitting
a report to Congress that compares the cost of relocation with anticipated operational
benefits, details functions that will remain at CMOC and maintain connectivity with
functions that transfer out of CMOC, outlines plans for the relocation of NORAD,
and explains the results of and independent security and vulnerability assessment of
the new command center at Peterson AFB, Colorado, along with DOD plans, costs,
and schedules for mitigating identified risks. The report is due to Congress on March
1, 2008. After the report is submitted, GAO has 120 days to submit to Congress a
review of DOD’s report. Finally, by March 16, 2008, the Secretary of the Air Force
must submit a master recapitalization plan for Cheyenne Mountain Air Station.54
Resource Availability
An April 2008 GAO study examined availability of personnel available to
NORTHCOM to both plan for and execute assigned missions. The GAO found that
NORTHCOM planning positions are staffed at relatively high levels in comparison
with other geographic combatant commands, and that NORTHCOM officials55
believed they possessed adequate numbers of planning personnel. On the other
hand, the GAO questioned whether DOD has assigned adequate numbers of forces
to NORTHCOM to execute assigned missions.
The GAO found that unlike other geographic combatant commands within
DOD, DOD has only routinely assigned air defense and supporting forces to
NORTHCOM. As a result, the GAO asserted that
52 Armed Forces Press Service, “NORAD, NORTHCOM Personnel to Move,” July 31, 2006.
53 GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Full Costs and Security Implications of Cheyenne
Mountain Realignment Have Not Been Determined, GAO-07-803R, Washington DC, May
54 H.Rept. 110-477, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1585, Section 361, “National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2008,” pp. 77-78.
55 GAO-08-251, “Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but
Needs Force Allocations, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues,” April 2008, pp.35,
The lack of units specifically identified to execute NORTHCOM’s plans
may increase the level of risk to homeland defense or civil support
operations in terms of the availability of a sufficient number of personnel
with the appropriate level of training and equipment for conducting the56
domestic mission.
In addition, the GAO found that NORTHCOM’s ability to monitor the readiness of
forces to respond to civil support missions is hampered because few units have been
identified for this mission.57 As such, the GAO recommended that DOD assign
forces to NORTHCOM and require NORTHCOM to develop deployment timelines
for each of its major operational plans.58 In response, DOD agreed that certain
specialized forces, such as those trained to respond to chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive attacks, should be regularly assigned
to NORTHCOM. However, DOD believes that readiness for civil support missions
can be improved by developing civil support readiness metrics for general purpose
forces.59
56 Ibid, p. 27.
57 Ibid, pp. 27-30.
58 Ibid, p. 44.
59 Ibid, pp. 45-46.