2008-2009 Presidential Transition: National Security Considerations and Options
2008-2009 Presidential Transition:
National Security Considerations and Options
April 21, 2008
John Rollins
Specialist in Terrorism and National Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
National Security Considerations and Options
Summary
A presidential transition is a unique time in America and holds the promise of
opportunity, as well as a possible risk to the nation’s security interests. The 2008-
2009 election marks the first presidential transition in the post-9/11 era, and is of
concern to many national security observers. While changes in administration during
U.S. involvement in national security related activities are not unique to the 2008-
2009 election, many observers suggest that the current security climate and recent
acts of terrorism by individuals wishing to influence national elections and change
foreign policies portend a time of increased risk to the current presidential transition
period. Whether the enemies of the United States choose to undertake action that
may harm the nation’s security interests during the 2008-2009 election, or the new
President experiences a relatively peaceful period during the transition, many foreign
and domestic policy and security challenges will await the new Administration. How
the new President recognizes and responds to these challenges will depend heavily
on the planning and learning that occurs prior to the inauguration. Actions can be
taken by the outgoing President and President-elect that may ameliorate decision-
making activities in the new administration. Whether an incident of national security
significance occurs just before or soon after the presidential transition, the actions or
inactions of the outgoing Administration may have a long-lasting effect on the new
President’s ability to effectively safeguard U.S. interests and may affect the legacy
of the outgoing President.
This report discusses historical national-security related presidential transition
activities, provides a representative sampling of national security issues the next
administration may encounter, and offers considerations and options relevant to each
of the five phases of the presidential transition period. Each phase has distinct
challenges and opportunities for the incoming administration, the outgoing
administration, and Congress. This report will be updated as needed.
Contents
In troduction ......................................................1
National Security Issues the Next Administration Is Likely to Encounter......4
The Presidential Transition Period.....................................5
Considerations and Options that Span the Presidential Transition Period..6
Possible Actions by Entities Wishing to Disrupt the Presidential
Transition Period......................................6
Post 9/11 National Security-Focused Organizations...............7
COG and COOP Concerns...................................8
Planning for the Unforeseen and Communicating Transition
Related Information to the American Public.................8
Considerations and Options Unique to Each Phase of the Presidential
Transition Period.........................................11
Phase 1: Campaigning by Presidential Candidates...............12
Outgoing Administration Considerations and Options........12
Possible Role of National Security and Homeland Security
Councils ........................................14
Office of the Director of National Intelligence..............14
Incoming Administration Considerations and Options........15
Congressional Considerations and Options.................17
Possible Congressional Activity.....................18
Phase 2: Selection of party nominee..........................19
Outgoing Administration Considerations and Options........20
Incoming Administration Considerations and Options........20
Congressional Considerations and Options.................20
Support to Non-Federal Entities with Security
Responsibilities ..............................21
Phase 3: Election Day.....................................22
Outgoing Administration Considerations and Options........22
Incoming Administration Considerations and Options........22
Congressional Considerations and Options.................23
Phase 4: Post election day to Presidential Inauguration...........23
Unique Risks to Phase 4...............................23
Outgoing Administration Considerations and Options........24
Effective Use of Presidential Transition Funds..........25
Ensure the President-Elect is Aware of Issues that May
Affect National Security Interests................25
Establishment of a Presidential Transition National
Security Coordination Council..................26
Expedited Security Clearance Processing for
President-Elect Transition Team Members and
Nominated Members of the New Administration....27
Incoming Administration Considerations and Options........27
Congressional Considerations and Options.................30
Phase 5: Presidential Inauguration: Placement of New
Administration Officials and Formation of New Policies......31
Departed Administration Considerations and Options........32
New Administration Considerations and Options............33
Congressional Considerations and Options.................34
Prioritize Hearings for Nominated Senior Executive
Branch Leaders Who Have Significant National
Security Responsibilities.......................34
Conclusion ......................................................36
Appendix A. Recent Military Operations Occurring During United
States Presidential Transition Periods.............................37
Appendix B. Representative Examples of Incidents of National Security
Interest Occurring During Periods of Governmental Transition.........39
Appendix C. Congressional Legislation Addressing Various Aspects of
National Security Considerations During Presidential Transitions,
in Chronological Order (1963-2008)..............................47
2008-2009 Presidential Transition: National
Security Considerations and Options
Introduction
A presidential transition — the period from campaigning through placement of
new administration personnel — is a unique time in American politics and holds the1
promise of opportunity as well as a real or perceived vulnerability to our nation’s
security interests. On a given day the outgoing administration has the ability to
change the policies of a nation and possibly affect the international security
environment, yet the following day the President and the national security leadership
team are replaced by a new set of leaders who may have very different strategy and
policy goals.2 This political dynamic, coupled with the inherent uncertainty
accompanying a presidential transfer of power, may provide a target of opportunity
that may be too enticing to resist by those who wish to harm U.S. security interests.
Unlike other man-made incidents that may occur with little warning, the presidential
transition offers a broadly defined time frame in which an enemy of the United34
States may decide to undertake an incident of national security significance with the
1 Throughout this report, numerous references are made to the nation’s increased
“vulnerability” during times of presidential transition. Vulnerability is the manifestation of
a potential threat to inflict harm to an area that is not properly defended, cannot be
completely defended, or is indefensible. A better representation of the environment the U.S.
may face during the presidential transition is the degree to which the nation is at “Risk”(R).
(R) is the product of weighting and multiplying the Threat (T), Vulnerability (V), and
Consequences (C) of an incident (TVC=R). (T)’s directed at the electoral process may
become known by the federal intelligence community [or the federation of national
intelligence activities.] The nation’s (V) to a national security-related incident may be
increased or decreased based on the targets chosen by enemies of the United States. (C),
however, could range from minor to significant based on the severity of an incident and its
proximity to the five phases of the transition period.
2 The Law of Presidential Transitions, Boston School of Law Working Paper, William P.
Marshal and Jack M. Beerman, 2005. “The outgoing President retains all the formal legal
powers of the presidency, yet his last electoral success is four years removed and his
political capital is at low ebb. The outgoing President will want to protect his policies or
accomplishments from being reversed or undermined and may also want to create obstacles
to prevent his successor from too quickly achieving political and policy success. The
incoming President, on the other hand, will be focused on beginning her own initiatives and
may desire to expeditiously reverse the policies of the previous President.” When the
incoming and outgoing Presidents are from opposing political parties the conflicts during
the transition period may be even more acute.
3 Enemies that pose a risk to the United States may emanate domestically and internationally
and take the form of foreign and American citizens who are aligned with nation states,
(continued...)
hope of manipulating the electoral process or changing the nation’s foreign and
domestic policies.
Presidential transitions during times of U.S. involvement in military operations
and national security-related activities5 are not unique to the 2008-2009 presidential
transition period (see Appendix A).6 However, based on the current international
security environment and recent attempts to disrupt transfers of power in other
countries, many observers see the United States as lurching toward a period of
uncertainty and increased risk (see Appendix B). While the mere presence of a
upcoming presidential transition does not ensure an incident of national security
significance will occur, security experts argue that this window of potential risk is not
lost on the enemies of the United States. At present, the intelligence community
assesses that “Al-Qaida will increase the frequency, sophistication, timeliness and
Western targeting of its propaganda statements as the United States advances toward
the presidential election.”7 While many terrorism experts are concerned about the
internal and external threats to the United States during the presidential transition
period, the intelligence community is “uncertain what impact [terrorist propaganda]
statements will have on the Western Muslim community and other individuals who
are Al-Qaeda’s primary target audience.”8
According to a presidential transition-related report provided to the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) by the Homeland Security Advisory Committee
(HSAC), “briefings, research, and recent history have provided an appreciation of the
potential vulnerabilities during transition periods. Not only are we [United States]
3 (...continued)
groups, or individuals that pledge allegiance or undertake action adverse to U.S. interests.
4 While an incident of national security significance could entail a catastrophic natural
disaster, this term, for purposes of this paper, is used to describe foreign and domestic
security-related man-made acts, including a terrorist attack (in the United States, against
interests overseas, or against an Ally), significant offensive action against troops deployed
overseas, assassination of a U.S. or foreign leader, seizure of an embassy, a change in the
political environment where the U.S. is undertaking stabilization activities, significant
foreign power nuclear-related activity, or a foreign power or extremist group taking military
action against an ally of the U.S..
5 For purposes of this report, national security activities encompass all aspects of United
States foreign and domestic policy and operations responsible for safeguarding national
security interests.
6 For purposes of this report the presidential transition period is comprised of five phases
extending from presidential campaigning activities to the newly elected President’s
formation of a national security team and production of accompanying strategies and
policies. The five phases of the presidential transition period will be discussed later in this
report.
7 “Al-Qaida’s 2007 Media Campaign, DHS-FBI Joint Homeland Security Assessment,”
February 11, 2008, Congressional Quarterly-Homeland Security.
8 Ibid.
aware that vulnerabilities exist, but our enemies are as well.”9 As observed by
Frances Townsend, former Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Advisor to
President George W. Bush,10
I worry about the period of vulnerability between the time we have nominees for
each party through and just after the inauguration of a new President. I think
that’s a particular period of vulnerability, because of what we know about Al
Qaeda’s attempts to influence the elections in Spain. We’ve seen the attacks
after Gordon Brown took over as Prime Minister in the U.K. We see in the 2004
election where they were issuing videos days before the [United States] election,
including bin Laden talking about the streets in the United States running with
blood. We know from their history that Al Qaeda wants to influence elections
and have political influence.
The executive branch is not alone in attempting to ensure the country passes
power from one administration to the next in a safe and thoughtful manner.11
However, the outgoing and incoming administrations are viewed as primarily
responsible for addressing risks to the nation and taking actions to prevent and
respond to any incident that may affect the electoral process. Whether the enemies
of the United States choose to undertake action that may harm national security
interests during this period of transition or the new President experiences a relative
peaceful period shortly after entering office, many national security issues will be
awaiting the new Administration. How the newly elected president recognizes and
responds to these challenges will “depend heavily upon the planning and learning12
that takes place during the transition from one Administration to another.” During
recent presidential transitions,13 the current and incoming administrations and
9 Report of the Administration Transition Task Force, Homeland Security Advisory Council,
January, 2008. [http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac_ATTF_Report.pdf].
10 Frances Fragos Townsend, C-SPAN interview transcript, January 4, 2008.
[ ht t p: / / www.c-span.or g/ speci a l / T ownsend.asp] .
11 The U. S. Congress and state and local governments provide support to various aspects
of the presidential transition. Other government and non-governmental entities that offer
advice and assistance to presidential transition related activities include General Services
Administration, National Archives, Office of Government Ethics, Congressional Research
Service, Government Accountability Office, Center for the Study of the Presidency, Council
for Excellence in Government, Mandate for Leadership Project, Presidential Appointment
Initiative, Reason Public Policy Institute, and the Transition to Governing Project. The
United States Presidential Transition, Senate Homeland Government Affairs Committee, last
accessed 14 February, 2008. [http://www.senate.gov/~govt-aff/transitions/pta_page6.htm].
12 Perils of Presidential Transition, Glenn P. Hastedt and Anthony J. Eksterowicz, Seton Hall
Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Winter/Spring 2001 edition, pp 67.
13 President Harry S Truman is often credited with establishing the tradition of the outgoing
President offering Administration transition-related assistance to the incoming
Administration. He directed each agency leader to provide him a report on activities related
to transitioning the new Administration into power. Shortly after the election of Dwight
Eisenhower, President Truman invited him to a meeting at the White House to discuss,
among other concerns, national security-related issues. Prior to President Truman’s actions
and the subsequent enactment of the Presidential Transition Act of 1963, presidential
(continued...)
Congress have traditionally undertaken numerous activities to facilitate a smooth
transfer of executive branch power. Some of the actions often taken during
presidential transitions include
!consulting with government and private sector experts who have
presidential transition expertise,
!providing information to the President-elect after the election and
prior to the inauguration,
!offering operational briefings on ongoing national security matters
to prospective presidential nominees and their staff,
!preparing briefings books and policy memos detailing the issues of
most concern to the current administration, and
!expediting security clearances for president-elect transition team
members.
Other activities that the current and incoming administrations and Congress may
wish to consider undertaking during the presidential transition period include
!undertaking public outreach efforts to discuss possible risks to the
nation,
!involving the national security representatives of presidential
hopefuls in all transition-related discussions,
!establishing joint advisory councils responsible for addressing all
transition-related risks,
!requiring the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to undertake
efforts to support the nation’s awareness of risks,
!reflecting the national security priorities of the new Administration
in the 2009 budget,
!passing the FY2009 appropriations without undue delay;
!quickly assigning newly elected and existing Members of Congress
to committees focused on national security,
!holding hearings comprised of national security experts to gather
ideas on prospective U.S. national security policies and goals, and
!holding hearings soon after the inauguration of the new President to
determine the Administration’s national security-related priorities.
National Security Issues the Next Administration Is
Likely to Encounter
The next Administration is likely to face many national security challenges on
taking office. Some security experts suggest that the presidential transition period
of 2008-2009 may be unique given the quantity, diversity, and breadth of security
13 (...continued)
transition activities rarely focused on substantive issues. The Presidential Transition Act of
1963 (P.L. 88-277) was enacted on March 7, 1964, and codified at 3 U.S.C. 102. For a more
in-depth discussion of historical presidential transition processes and activities, see CRS
Report RL30736, Presidential Transitions, by Stephanie Smith.
risks confronting the nation. The incoming Administration is likely to face three
distinct types of national security challenges that could translate into short- and long-
term national security risks. For purposes of this report, the national security
challenges the next administration might face include the following:
!Current U.S. military engagements: Iraq, Afghanistan, and other
military support or training activities related to the global war on
terrorism and counter-proliferation efforts.
!Risks posed in countries and regions of concern: Iran, North
Korea, Russia, China, Republic of Serbia, Venezuela, Cuba, and the
Middle East; and
!Risks associated with contemporary issues: the role of U.S.
foreign policy in international security matters, the role of the
military in nation-building activities and diplomatic endeavors,
international terrorism, non-proliferation, and homeland security.
While the issues are not exhaustive and may not require the same level of
attention and priority based on the new Administration’s foreign and domestic
security objectives, time devoted to understanding these and other challenges prior
to the inauguration to may better prepare the newly elected President to make well-
reasoned decisions on assuming office.
The Presidential Transition Period
Many presidential historians argue that during the early days of the new
Administration the knowledge and decision-making activities will, in part, be based
on information provided by the outgoing Administration. With the presidential
transition period running from the formal announcement of candidates for the office
of the presidency to long past the inauguration,14 members of the current
Administration and potential incoming Administration may wish to initiate
substantive transition activities in an efficient and productive manner as soon as
possible.15 Specifically, some scholars state that “enhanced cooperation and
communication between the two Administrations is demanded by national security
and foreign policy concerns.”16 It is further observed that, “as the world becomes
14 Ibid. “After the inauguration, difficult situations can also arise when a new and untested
Administration faces a sudden crisis and emergency.”
15 The Law of Presidential Transitions, Boston School of Law Working Paper, William P.
Marshal and Jack M. Beerman, 2005. “For a number of reasons there is now a greater need
than any time in our Nation’s history for incoming and outgoing Administrations to work
cooperatively during transitions periods. To begin with, government is more complex and
an incoming Administration faces an inestimable learning curve in assuming office and
digesting the mounds of information necessary to be able to understand the powers at its
disposal and govern effectively.”
16 Todd J. Zywicki, The Law of Presidential Transitions and the 2000 Election, 2001
(continued...)
more dangerous and the risks to harm more immediate, the need for effective and
seamless transitions becomes correspondingly greater.”17 Thus, with respect to
national security issues in particular, the need for outgoing and incoming Presidents
to work together is no longer an option, but an unavoidable demand of the
contemporary world.18
Considerations and Options that Span the Presidential
Transition Period
Throughout the entire presidential transition period, a number of national
security-related concerns and opportunities may be presented to the incoming and
outgoing administrations. Even under the best of circumstances, the sitting President
and President-elect may encounter unexpected issues that can lead to decision-
making perils. However, many observers argue that the national security-related
collaborative efforts of the current administration and members of the potential new
administration coupled with oversight activities throughout the transition period offer
the nation the best hope of being prepared to recognize and respond to acts taken to
disrupt the transfer of power or change U.S. policies. Congress may wish to request
classified and unclassified hearings and reports regarding the Administration’s
knowledge and efforts related to the following issues.
Possible Actions by Entities Wishing to Disrupt the Presidential
Transition Period. Threats to the 2008-2009 presidential election may be
numerous with “dangers associated with the transition emanating both from within
the homeland and internationally.”19 Some national security observers are convinced
that a terrorist group will take action against United Stares interests during the
presidential transition period.20 It is argued that enemies of the U.S. may see the
nation as physically and politically vulnerable and that disseminating threatening
propaganda or undertaking an incident of national security significance during the
election period would likely result in a change in the election results or future
policies. Statements or incidents may be undertaken with the desire to demonstrate
a group’s ability to reestablish its status as an entity to be feared,21 intimidate the
16 (...continued)
B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1573 (2001).
17 Ibid.
18 “The Law of Presidential Transitions,” Boston School of Law Working Paper, William
P. Marshal and Jack M. Beerman, 2005.
19 Robert Landers, “Dangers in Presidential Transitions,” Editorial Research reports, pp.
20 “Osama bin Laden is Planning Something for the U.S. Election-Interview of Steve Coll,”
Speigel Online, Erich Follath, April 2, 2008. “I believe that he wants to influence America
this time. There is a threat of the terrorist attack on American soil that al-Qaida has long
warned of. Osama bin Laden is planning something for the U.S. election”
21 “New Report tracks Relationship Between Al Qaeda and Jihadist Media,” CQ Homeland
Security, Matt Korade, April 4, 2008. In response to a question about al-Qaeda’s troubles
(continued...)
voting public, suggest perceived weaknesses in a given candidate’s national security
position,22 change the results of the election, or change future U.S. policies.
Many national security observers speculate that, if an incident of national
security significance is to occur, enemies of the United States would prefer to take
action just prior to the presidential election date. However, such acts at anytime
during the presidential transition period could have desired and unintended effects
on the presidential election and resulting policies.23 Conversely, while many national
security experts speculate that Al Qaeda, other extremist groups, and some foreign
powers may see the presidential transition period as a desirable time to undertake
action against U.S. interests, the mere fact that such activity occurs may not
necessarily indicate that the act was committed with the desire to manipulate the
results of the election. The timing of such acts may be solely based on the
convergence of an entity attaining a desired capability with a perceived best
opportunity to successfully complete its objective.
Post 9/11 National Security-Focused Organizations. One factor
complicating the 2008-2009 transition is the recent establishment of numerous new
national security agencies with responsibilities for preventing future terrorist attacks
or harms to U.S. interests.24 These organizations have not undergone a presidential
transition and may see many political appointees depart federal government service
prior to the inauguration of the next President. Also, the organizations that existed
during the last presidential transition and the new agencies may have employed many
new personnel who are not well-versed in addressing matters of national security
during times of presidential transition. Additionally organizations that pre-date the
attacks of September 11, 2001, and that previously had national security
21 (...continued)
in maintaining support for it organization, panel members noted that the possible decline in
followers coupled with the upcoming presidential election could be a potent mix for a group
desperate to reassert its relevancy.
22 “Kerry Says Bin Laden Tape Gave Bush a Lift,” New York Times, Adam Nagourney,
January 31, 2005. “Senator John Kerry said on Sunday that the attacks of Sept. 11 were the
central deciding thing in his contest with President Bush and that the release of an Osama
bin Laden videotape the weekend before Election Day had effectively erased any hope he
had of victory.”
23 For example, while the terrorist attacks of March 2004 did appear to have an affect on the
election outcome and the Spanish government’s support of military actions in Iraq, the new
Prime Minister actually increased Spain’s commitment to counterterrorism military efforts
in Afghanistan. It is speculated that while the tactical operation may have been a success,
the long-term results of the attack were counter to the strategic desires of the terrorist group.
It may also be worth noting that an incident occurring during the transition period may have
a relatively short-term minor effect on a targeted country based in sound principle and
engendering resilient societal behavior. While the short-term affects of an attack may change
the outcome of an election or a current policies, the attack may have little long-term impact
on a country’s societal mores and desire for a customary transfer of national power.
24 Examples of federal government organizations with significant national security
responsibilities that were established post 9/11 include, the Homeland Security Council, the
DHS, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Counter
Terrorism Center.
responsibilities, may be asked to devote additional attention and resources to
presidential transition-related issues.25 Based on the length of time between the
previous presidential transition, the departure of senior political and career officials,
and the influx of new personnel addressing national security issues, it is possible that
some federal agencies may not be properly anticipating the attention required or
resources needed to support the incoming Administration’s preparation and policy
familiarization efforts.26 Some security observers contend that if proper planning has
not occurred efforts to support the incoming Administration may require personnel
and resources to be transferred. This reallocation could detract from ongoing national
security related activities and possibly place the nation at risk.
COG and COOP Concerns. In May 2007, President Bush signed
Presidential Directives focused on Continuity Of Government (COG) and Continuity
of Operations (COOP) procedures during times of crisis.27 Contained in these
Directives was a provision describing the national essential functions that are to be
continued to support the perseverance of the U.S. government during times of crisis.
In recognizing the importance to plan for unforeseeable events that may effect the
functioning of the nation, the Directives identified a need for a “cooperative effort
among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government to
preserve the constitutional framework under which the Nation is governed and to
execute constitutional responsibilities and provide for orderly succession, appropriate
transition of leadership, and interoperability and support of the national essential28
functions during a catastrophic emergency.” Some security observers contend that
the outgoing and incoming Administrations may wish to coordinate closely
throughout the presidential transition period on these two activities.
Planning for the Unforeseen and Communicating Transition
Related Information to the American Public. During previous presidential
elections, some officials in the federal government have seen the need to address and
plan for options that might be considered should the presidential election be delayed.
While noting federal election dates are set by law requiring congressional action to
change the current schedule, DeForest Soaries, former Chairperson of the United
25 “It’s a Busy and Costly Presidential Election Cycle for the Secret Service,” CQ Homeland
Security, Rob Margetta, April 3, 2008.
26 Examples of federal government organizations that could have current national security
activities adversely affected by the need to assist incoming Administration transition efforts
include the Department of Defense, the State Department, 16 intelligence community
organizations, and the U.S. Secret Service — an organization within the DHS.
27 The term Continuity Of Government is defined as “a coordinated effort within the federal
government’s executive branch to ensure that national essential functions continue to be
performed during a catastrophic emergency.” Continuity Of Operations is defined as “an
effort within individual executive departments and agencies to ensure that Primary Mission-
Essential Functions continue to be performed during a wide range of emergencies, including
localized acts of nature, accidents, and technological or attack-related emergencies.”
National Continuity Policy, jointly designated National Security Presidential Directive- 51
(NSPD-51) and Homeland Security Presidential Directive-20 (HSPD-20), May 9, 2007,
White House website.
28 Ibid.
States Election Assistance Commission, wrote to then-DHS Secretary Ridge on June
25, 2004, that the process and procedures are undertaken in very different manners
in the nation’s 8,000 voting jurisdictions. Chairperson Soaries stated that DHS and
the federal interagency structure provide assistance to federal, state, and local
government’s by collaborating on a plan to address voting options should a terrorist
attack occur around the time of the election.29 Many security experts argue that
federal, state, and local election-contingency planning and coordination should occur
during the early phases of the transition period. It is further suggested that, barring
such discussions, the issuance of general guidelines, or a genuine effort toward
collaboration, the prospects for electoral chaos might occur should an incident of
national security significance take place just before or on the date of election.
During all phases of the presidential transition process, many national security
experts suspect the federal government will receive information that heightens the
risks to U.S. national security interests that may be, in part, based on activities by
enemies of the United States attempting to influence the upcoming election.30 Should
such a heightened risk environment occur, some observers suggest that one of the
best ways to meet this challenge is by a showing of national unity among the
outgoing Administration and individuals vying for the presidency. To support a
collegial and collaborative environment, the Homeland Security Advisory Council
(HSAC) suggests the nominees issue a joint statement addressing potential threats
to the nation or in response to an incident of national significance.31 Some foreign
policy experts suggest joint statements and activities by the current President and the
prospective Presidents-elect take place with regularity to put forth a common voice
to both the American public and the enemies of the United States that security issues
will be addressed in a unified and coordinated manner.
Throughout the presidential transition period the federal government may wish
to undertake outreach and education efforts directed at the American public. A
public awareness campaign, led by the federal government, discussing a need for
citizens to be more-vigilant during the election period and providing insight into what
the federal government will do in the event of an incident prior to election day may
29 Jim Drinkard, “United States Has No Plan for Election Delay Due to Terrorism,” USA
Today, July 12, 2004. Chairperson Soaries, in an subsequent interview, further stated that
“each state must decide for itself what to do in the event of a disaster. When you have a
national election, that has serious implications, because we don’t have a real national
standard for what constitutes a disaster. What is a disaster in Alaska may not be a disaster
in Alabama. And I think this discussion on a federal level will have to also involve state
officials so that we have some national consensus and can offer national guidance on what
we mean by a disaster.” Countdown with Keith Olbermann, Interview transcript, July 13,
30 See generally, “McCain Says Al Qaeda Might Try to Tip United States Election,” Reuters,
Steve Holland, March 14 , 2008. When asked if he was concerned that anti-American
militants in Iraq might ratchet up their activities to increase casualties in September or
October and tip the November election against him, Senator McCain stated, “yes, I worry
about it and I know they pay attention (to the election period) because of the intercepts we
have of their communications.”
31 Report of the Administration Transition Task Force, Homeland Security Advisory
Council, January, 2008. [http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac_ATTF_Report.pdf].
provide confidence to a concerned voting public. Activities such as this may prove
useful in preparing the voting public to be aware of the possibility of an incident of
national security significance occurring during the presidential transition period and
also may lower the anxiety of citizens planning on participating in the electoral
process. With respect to security-related issues in the homeland, many observers
argue that awareness on the part of the citizenry offers the best opportunity to provide
indicators of anomalies that might be indicative of a group’s preparation to undertake
criminal activity to affect the presidential election process. To this degree, the DHS
HSAC contends that continuous interaction with the media32 and the public regarding
potential threats during this time period will maximize the chances of having a nation
prepared for harmful activities that may occur during any phase of the presidential
transition. The DHS HSAC specifically opined:
It is important that the American public become engaged in understanding the
unique vulnerabilities posed by this transition period. This will require public
education and media engagement during this critical period in our history.
Before, during, and after the transition, the public must learn about the choices
faced by the Nation, communities, families, and individuals. The public must
become a partner with their government, sharing the burden. In addition, DHS
should continue to engage the media as an ally in the timely dissemination of
accurate and actionable information. DHS must work with the multiple
messengers, trusted within diverse communities, to effectively communicate this33
information.
The DHS has the responsibility to notify the American public of current or
prospective threats to U.S. domestic security interests,34 and the Department of State
has the responsibility to alert U.S. citizens located overseas of security related
concerns. Both organizations have numerous communication mechanisms to inform
U.S. citizens and organizations regarding concerns related to the presidential
transition period and, when required, to share threat information. Communication
32 It should be noted that numerous reports have been written about the al-Qaeda’s use of the
media to bring attention to the organization. Similarly, while directly related to the
upcoming United States presidential transition, recently Major General John F. Kelly of thest
1 Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq stated that there are “indications that they (al-Qaeda
in Iraq) may change their tactics and do some bigger events that capture the attention of the
world through the media.” Sara A. Carter, “United States General Warns of Bigger Attacks
in Iraq,” Washington Times, March 11, 2008. Many security observers suggest that a
significant attack occurring on United States forces deployed overseas just before or after
the election may be undertaken to influence the results of the election or test a new
Administration’s policies and response.
33 Report of the Administration Transition Task Force, Homeland Security Advisory
Council, January, 2008. [http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac_ATTF_Report.pdf].
34 Section 203 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6. U.S.C. 124), as amended by sec.
501(c)(1) of the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11Commission Act of
2007(P.L. 110-53, 6 U.S.C. 124), assigns the Secretary of DHS has “primary responsibility
for providing warning regarding threats or risk from acts of terrorism in the homeland.”
However, it is common for the FBI or DHS and the FBI to make a statement or disseminate
a joint bulletin regarding security issues of concern.
mechanisms for conveying information about the presidential transition period
include:
!Department of Homeland Security: Official public announcements
to the media, public service announcements, changes to the
Homeland Security Advisory System, dissemination of information
to state and local fusion centers and to private sector organizations,
and posting information to DHS managed websites.
!Department of State: Official public announcements to the media,
warden system alerts,35 travel alerts, country specific warnings,
country background notes, and posting information to State
Department managed websites.
Considerations and Options Unique to Each Phase of the
Presidential Transition Period
Modern presidential transition activities are no longer constrained to the time
between the election and inauguration.36 Some presidential historians argue that,
“history tells us that any winning candidate who has not started (transition efforts)
at least six months before the election will be woefully behind come the day after the37
election day.” While the time period and phases of a presidential transition are not
statutorily derived, for purposes of this paper, the presidential transition period is
comprised of five phases extending from presidential campaigning activities to the
new President’s establishment of a national security team and accompanying
strategies and policies. Each phase identifies issues to consider by the outgoing and
incoming Administrations and the Congress.38 The phases of the presidential
transition are as follows:
Phase 1: Campaigning by presidential candidates
Phase 2: Selection of party nominees
Phase 3: Election day
35 The Warden System allows Americans overseas to receive security warnings and other
important notices as quickly as possible. Wardens are American citizens who will contact
other Americans with relevant information from the embassy or the Department of State.
36 “Perils of Presidential Transition”, Glenn P. Hastedt and Anthony J. Eksterowicz, Seton
Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Winter/Spring 2001 edition.
“Transition efforts in modern presidential campaigns begin well before election day.”
37 The IBM Center for The Business of Government Weblog, 2008 Presidential Transition
Initiative, November 6, 2007. [http://transition2008.wordpress.com/].
38 Transitions in American government power are not reserved for the executive branch.
Congressional elections and changes in state and local leadership are also occasions where
individuals wishing to harm U.S. national security interests could place the nation at risk.
While the focus of this paper is on security implications during a presidential transition, it
is acknowledged that planning, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities
could also be hampered should an incident of national security concern occur during a
congressional or non-federal government election period.
Phase 4: Post election day to prior to the inauguration
Phase 5: Presidential inauguration to formation of the new Administration’s
national security team and issuance of policy directives
Phase 1: Campaigning by Presidential Candidates. Phase 1 of the
presidential transition includes the time frame from campaigning by presidential
hopefuls to the national political conventions that officially select the party39
nominees. This period can last a few months to a year or longer depending on a
number of factors, including the current President’s desires and constitutional ability
to run for re-election, the plans of individuals from the same party as that of the
sitting President to challenge the President’s re-election bid, and the opposing party’s
time frame for launching unofficial or official presidential nomination activities.
Outgoing Administration Considerations and Options. A number of
activities can occur during the first phase of presidential transition activities that
would benefit the incoming President and may prove useful toward providing
continuity with respect to U.S. national security matters. As noted in the Homeland
Security Advisory Council Presidential Transition Report, “it is important that DHS
take action now to ensure a seamless and agile transition to new leadership and
optimize the new leadership’s ability to assume operational control of the
Department.”40 Recommendations offered by the Advisory Council that could be
undertaken during the first phase of the transition include
!clarifying the meaning of “heightened threat” during the transition
period by notifying all homeland security partners of historical
patterns;
!developing contingency plans around the homeland security themes
of prevent, prepare, respond, and recover;
!providing prospective presidential nominees information regarding
lessons learned from incidents occurring during previous leadership
transitions; and
!offering operational briefings on ongoing national security matters
to prospective presidential nominees and their staff.
The current Administration may wish to consider initiating information
exchanges and collaborative efforts with the major party candidates in this, the
earliest phase of the transition. Generally speaking, as the campaign for President
progresses through the spring and leading up to the presidential conventions,
relatively few leading candidates will emerge as viable contenders for gaining the
nomination of a given political party. The current Administration could bring this
39 The field of presidential hopefuls may be winnowed down during this process with
individuals emerging as the de facto party nominee prior to being officially acknowledged
as such by the represented political party. 26 USC section 9002 defines a major party as a
political party whose candidate for the office of President in the preceding presidential
election received 25 percent or more of the total number of popular votes received by all
candidates for such office.
40 Report of the Administration Transition Task Force, Homeland Security Advisory
Council, January, 2008. [http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac_ATTF_Report.pdf].
relatively few number of individuals, and their designated senior national security
staff, into briefings and discussions regarding national security issues that will likely
be of concern to incoming Administrations. As stated by the former Homeland
Security Advisor and Counterterrorism Advisor to President George W. Bush, “over
the next 12 months the current Administration has a special obligation to have a far
more robust transition plan in a post-9/11 world than we’ve ever seen before.”41
An issue of concern to some presidential transition observers is the turnover of
personnel occupying key positions in the federal government. There are over 7,000
federal government leadership, management, and support positions that are non-
competitively filled by political appointees.42 Some observers suggest that many of
the 7,000 positions have, as part of their primary function, national security
responsibilities. Should large numbers of political appointees depart in the months
preceding the inauguration, the federal government would likely rely on Senior
Executive Service personnel, career diplomats, senior military officers, and senior
general-schedule employees for continuity of operations, leadership, and
management of most national security related activities. While the occupation of
senior policy positions by career government employees may not necessarily be a
problem, a number of considerations arise in such an environment.
Appointing career civil servants to mid- to high-level positions in federal
departments and agencies has been offered by national security observers as a way
to provide continuity during presidential transitions.43 This action may allow
agencies to operate without interruption and provide the new congressionally
confirmed or presidentially appointed agency directors with in-house expertise and
historical context about the organization. As a proponent of converting some of the
federal government’s national security leadership positions to career civil servants,
DHS Acting Deputy Secretary Schneider noted “it’s important to realize that major
terrorist attacks, both here and abroad, are often launched shortly before or after
national elections or inaugurations. By promoting dedicated civil servants who’ve
proven their mettle, we’re not only building for the future, but are helping ensure that
during the transition, as the perceived weakness grows, our Department is
prepared.”44 While the promotion of civil servants into federal agency deputy
positions is welcomed by many national security observers, others are concerned with
41 Frances Fragos Townsend, C-SPAN interview transcript, January 4, 2008.
[ ht t p: / / www.c-span.or g/ speci a l / T ownsend.asp] .
42 Policy and Supporting Postings, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Congress, 2nd
Session, November 22, 2004. This report, popularly referred to as “The Plum Book,” lists
by title, type of appointment, level of position, and, if known, the name of the individual
occupying the position for all non-competitive appointees who are serving during a specific
Administration. The report is produced during the first year of a new Administration.
[http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/ 05j an20051520/www.gpoaccess.gov/ plumbook
/2004/2004_plum_book.pdf].
43 For example see, “Rossides Set to take TSA Into the Next Administration,” Rob
Margettta, Congressional Quarterly-Homeland Security, January 18, 2007.
44 “Transition: Heads We Win, Tails You Lose,” DHS Leadership Journal, January 19, 2008.
[http://www.dhs.gov/j ournal/leadership/2008/01/tr ansition-heads-we-win-t ails-you-lo se.h
tml].
the selection process that supports this activity. Some are concerned that the
individuals chosen for these positions are being selected by the current
Administration’s political leadership and that this may be a way for individuals with
like-minded political philosophies to maintain control over an agency and pursue
policies that are counter to a new Administration.45
Possible Role of National Security and Homeland Security
Councils. The National Security Council (NSC) is the President’s “principal forum
for considering national security and foreign policy matters with senior national
security advisors and cabinet officials,”46 whereas as the Homeland Security
Council’s (HSC) purpose is to “ensure coordination of all homeland security-related
activities among executive departments and agencies, and to promote the effective
development and implementation of all homeland security policies.”47 The current
Administration might consider establishing a joint advisory council that draws on the
expertise and experience of both the NSC and HSC to assist with transition issues.
This new body could be comprised of political and career staff from the NSC and
HSC, outside experts with transition expertise, and members of the prospective
president-elects national security team. Organizational responsibilities could include
coordinating the presidential transition policies of agencies having national security
missions. In assisting the transition process, the entity could attempt to ensure
presidential transition period activities are coordinated in an interagency manner and
are cognizant of the effects current efforts may have on a new Administration. If so
desired by the President-elect, this organization could continue for a period of time
into the next Administration. The council could have responsibility for advising the
outgoing and incoming Presidents on possible policy implications of national security
decisions made and actions taken during all phases of the presidential transition.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) is responsible for assessing and reporting
on risks to the Nation and has many organizations that directly or indirectly provide
analytical and operational support to the President and senior members of the
national security community. The following options are activities that the DNI could
undertake to facilitate the federal government’s understanding and ability to respond
to risks during the 2008-2009 presidential transition.
!Require the National Intelligence Council (NIC) to lead an analytic
effort to assess risk to U.S. interests during the presidential transition
period.48 This effort could result in the issuance of a classified and
45 Siobhan Gorman, “Homeland Security Handoff-Career Employees Move Into Portions
Once Held By Political Appointees,” Wall Street Journal, January 11, 2008.
46 White House website, National Security Council. [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/].
47 White House website, Homeland Security Council. [http://www.whitehouse.gov/hsc/].
48 The NIC is a “center of strategic thinking within the US Government, reporting to the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and providing the President and senior policymakers
with analyses of foreign policy issues that have been reviewed and coordinated throughout
the Intelligence Community. The work ranges from brief analyses of current issues to
(continued...)
unclassified National Intelligence Estimate discussing the
intelligence aspects of the upcoming transition.
!Establish a presidential transition Mission Manager to lead and
coordinate all federal intelligence and law enforcement analytic
efforts.49
!Enhance the National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC) ability to
receive and assess threat information.50
!Ensure the DHS’ Office of Intelligence and Analysis receives
relevant threat information in a timely manner to facilitate sharing
activities with domestic federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector
organiz ations.51
!Enhance the Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group’s
ability to coordinate and report federal and local threat information
that may be related to the presidential transition.52
! Provide the nation’s state fusion centers information and specific
indicators of suspicious activity that may portend possible risks
associated with the presidential transition.53
Incoming Administration Considerations and Options. During phase
1 of the transition, the presidential candidates and their assembled national security
teams may be attempting to ascertain the current Administration’s national security
policies and activities and collaborate with it on issues that may affect the prospective
presidency. To support these efforts, according to a senior Administration official,
since the summer of 2007, the DHS has been working on a plan to prepare for the54
presidential transition. While the details of this plan have not been made public,
news articles have reported that the former Deputy Secretary of the DHS spent a great
48 (...continued)
(strategic) estimates of broader trends at work in the world.” NIC website.
[http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_home.html ].
49 ODNI Mission Managers are responsible for identifying and coordinating intelligence
community expertise to address issues of national security interest. See generally, Kevin
Whitelaw, “DNI-Mission Manager to Track North Korea,” United States News and World
Report, November 3, 2006.
[http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/061103/3dni.web2.htm? s_cid=rss:site1].
50 The NCTC is responsible for combating the terrorist threats to the United States and
managing the Nation’s counterterrorism intelligence and strategic operational planning
activities. NCTC website. [http://www.nctc.gov/].
51 The Office of Intelligence and Analysis is responsible for using information and
intelligence from multiple sources to identify and assess current and future threats to the
United States. DHS website. [http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/#1].
52 The ITACG is a federal-state interagency organization with responsibility for “analyzing
and assisting with the dissemination of federally coordinated homeland security, terrorism,
and weapons of mass destruction information.” Implementing Recommendations of the
53 Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, John Rollins, Congressional Research
Service, January 18, 2008.
54 Conversation with senior administration official, December, 2007.
deal of time addressing transition-related issues.55 In consideration of some work
already being pursued at DHS, and in making new recommendations, the HSAC
Presidential Transition Report proposed that the following issue areas be addressed
during the Department’s transition: threat, leadership, congressional oversight,
policy, operations, succession, and training.56 While many national security
observers found the report to be a good effort at addressing transition related issues
that require the focus of DHS, others argue that the report fell short of meeting the
needs of all facets of the transition period.57 Specifically, some national security
observers argued that the options put forth were to narrow in scope and found the
report lacking in the following areas.
!Too much focus on outgoing Administration efforts, and too little
attention given to the activities related to preparing the incoming
Administration for the challenges it will likely face;
!Too much emphasis on the administrative process of transitioning
to a new Administration, rather than ensuring incoming
Administration employees are cognizant of current and projected
substantive homeland security issues likely to be faced during the
first year of the Presidency;
!No discussion of how state, local, tribal, and private sector leaders
with homeland security responsibilities should prepare for activities
related to the upcoming presidential Administration transition;
!Little detail provided on how training, education, and exercise
activities can be used to prepare incoming Administration officials
with national security responsibilities to be better prepared to meet
current and future challenges; and
!No discussion or apparent plans to use the members of the HSAC
task force to provide assistance or support to incoming
Administration homeland security leaders.58
What is unclear is whether the transition-related efforts pursued by DHS or
recommended by the HSAC are being undertaken by other federal agencies with
national security responsibilities. Also unclear is the role, if any, of non-federal
entities with security responsibilities and members of the prospective presidential
candidates national security teams, in participating in the current Administration’s
transition planning efforts. Current Administration officials responsible for
55 “Pressure Points for the Department of Homeland Security,” Congressional Quarterly -
Homeland Security Weekly Edition, October 22, 2007.
56 While the HSAC exclusively efforts focused on assisting DHS transition efforts, many of
the findings and recommendations are considered to be relevant to other organizations with
national security responsibilities.
57 It should be noted that the objective of the HSAC presidential transition report was to
provide recommendations to the current DHS Secretary on matters related to homeland
security. The report did not focus on issues of possible concern to the incoming
Administration’s nominee for Secretary of the DHS and does not address transition issues
that may be relevant to other federal departments or agencies.
58 Conversation with senior Administration official and members of the HSAC Task Force,
March 2008.
interagency coordination activities have stated that they have, and will continue to,
undertake a number of transition efforts designed for the next Administration’s
national security leaders.59 The stated focus of these efforts include meeting with
government and private sector experts who have presidential transition expertise,
preparing briefings books and policy memos detailing the issues of most concern to
the current Administration, and developing interagency policy coordination
reference manuals.60 Senior Administration officials also stated that, after election
day and prior to the inauguration, the current Administration plans to offer the
incoming Administration’s national security team the opportunity to attend exercises
focused on understanding and testing national security coordination capabilities.61
While this idea may have merit, some argue that, in order for such an activity to be
useful to the incoming Administration, early participation by members of the
prospective President-elects national security team should be included in initial
discussions of designing the parameters of these exercises. Some national security
observers are concerned about the selection of the issues that the current
Administration decides to use as the basis for the incoming Administrations exercise
activities. Some suggest that the exercises should focus on catastrophic issues;
nuclear terrorism (at home or abroad), major natural disaster, major offensive against
deployed military forces, or some other significant national security incident. Others
opine that the most likely non-catastrophic scenarios should be used as a basis of
these exercises: increased threat environment, detonation of an improvised explosive
device in the homeland, or some less significant incident. Regardless of the scenario,
it does not appear that the goals of the exercises are to convey a sense of subject-
matter expertise on a topic or design the perfect prevention or response plan for each
possible incident that might affect United States interests. Rather, the training
appears to be focused on assisting the incoming national security team members to
understand United States national security capabilities and limitations and how the
federal government’s interagency team might coordinate activities in a heightened
risk environment.
Congressional Considerations and Options. Some national security
observers see congressional interest in and support of presidential transitions as a
crucial aspect of orderly transfers of power in the executive branch. Others argue that
Congress should confine its activities to simply providing the funds necessary to
support the transfer of presidential authority and act quickly to confirm the President-
elect’s nominated senior leadership team. Regardless of the level of involvement in
the presidential transition desired by the incoming and outgoing Administrations,
congressional leaders have already voiced concern about the upcoming election
period, and noted a desire to provide oversight and resources to support the change
of Administrations.62 Some suggest that, without early and substantive congressional
59 Conversation with senior Administration officials, December, 2007.
60 Conversation with senior Administration officials, March, 2008.
61 Ibid.
62 Lieberman Calls on Senate Budget Committee to Adequately Fund FY2009 Homeland
Security Needs, website of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, February 22, 2008.
(continued...)
involvement in presidential transition activities, foreign and domestic security risks
may not be addressed in as full a manner as possible.63
Possible Congressional Activity. During phase 1, congressional support and
inquiry may include
!appropriating resources to support outgoing and incoming national
security collaboration efforts,
!holding classified and unclassified hearings and meetings with the
both the incoming and outgoing Administrations to ascertain current
transition activities,64
!submitting questions to the outgoing Administration to ascertain
transition planning activities and the known and projected risks
during the transition period, and
!providing a sense of the Congress resolution that notes the
importance of effective and collaborative activities between the
departing Administration and the incoming Administration.
Congress may also wish for the current Administration to provide
!the names of agency leaders responsible for making national security
related decisions during the presidential transition period,
!briefings on the possible risks to the presidential transition process,
!information about the significant national security operations that
will be ongoing during the transfer of power, and
!briefing about the Administration’s efforts to engage and collaborate
with prospective new Administration senior security officials.
Congress may also consider addressing the upcoming presidential transition
with legislation requiring the outgoing Administration to refrain from activities that
could commit the next administration to national security actions that would
unnecessarily bind the hands of the next president.
62 (...continued)
[http://hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Pr essRelea s e s . De t a i l & Af f i liation=C&Pr
essRelease_id=1626&Month=2&Year=2008].
63 For listing of congressional legislation addressing various aspects of national security
considerations during presidential transitions see Appendix C.
64 See letters, House Homeland Security Chairman Bennie Thompson requesting the DHS
to provide details regarding the Department’s presidential transition activities. Thompson
Questions Chertoff on Administration Transition Plans, House Homeland Security
Committee Website, February 7, 2008.
[http://hsc.house.gov/ SiteDocume nts/20080207172628-83729.pdf].
DHS Secretary Chertoff sent Chairman Thompson a letter in response where he answered
some of the questions asked in the Chairman’s letter, and claimed executive privilege
regarding specific Department transition related activities. Response to Chairman
Thompson, Congressional Quarterly Homeland Security, February 14 , 2008.
[http://homeland.cq.com/hs/flatfiles /temporaryItems /20080213-transition.pdf].
An area of apparent congressional interest is the near-term departure of
knowledgeable political appointees and career managers during a presidential
transition that may significantly hamper the federal government’s ability to prevent
and respond to issues of national security importance. Chairman Thompson of the
House Homeland Security Committee recently observed that vacancies at the DHS
are “an enormous security vulnerability should an attack occur during the upcoming
presidential transition.”65 Early in the presidential transition period, Congress may
choose to determine the executive branch departments and agencies with national
security responsibilities, review the projected leadership succession plan, and obtain
the names of the individuals who have the authority to undertake action in the event
an incident occurs during the transfer of power.66 In the months leading up to the
2008 presidential election, many national security observers expect that Members of
Congress will increase the number of questions posed to current national security
leaders about plans to support the presidential transition period and require more
specificity with respect to current and future planning efforts.67
Phase 2: Selection of party nominee. Phase 2 of the presidential
transition includes the time frame from the selection of individuals at the two major
political party presidential nominating conventions to the day of the presidential
election. This phase will last a few months as the political party conventions usually68
occur in the summer preceding the November election.
65 “Many Vacancies at Homeland Security,” International Herald Tribune, Brian Knowlton,
July 9, 2007. In February 2008, DHS provided to the House Homeland Security Committee
a letter regarding Departmental presidential transition related activities. The letter also
contained a chart noting the occupancy status of leadership billets. Response to Chairman
Thompson, Congressional Quarterly Homeland Security, 14 February, 2008. In response
DHS provided a letter to the Chairman delineating senior Department positions that were
filled, in the process of being filled, or currently vacant.
66 “Critical Leadership vacancies Impede the DHS,” House Homeland Security Committee,
July 2007. [http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070709112923-81091.pdf].
[http://homeland.cq.com/hs/flatfiles /temporaryItems /20080213-transition.pdf].
67 “I am interested to know if you are beginning to make plans as to how you convey a year
hence this department to a new Administration. What steps you might take to lay the
foundation to have, hopefully, a seamless transition.” Senate Armed Services Committee
Holds Hearing on the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal year 2009. February 6,
the issue of transition-related activities during the upcoming election was not further
addressed during this hearing.
68 The Democratic National Convention will take place in Denver, CO, from August, 25-28
2008 and the Republican National Convention will take place in Minneapolis, MN, from
September 1-4 , 2008. As with previous presidential party nominating conventions, these
events will most likely be designated National Special Security Events (NSSE). While
formal designation of an NSSE has yet to occur, many federal, state, and local planning
activities are currently underway in the host cities to facilitate security prior, during, and
after the conventions. National Special Security Events Fact Sheet, DHS website, August
[http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releas es/press_release_0207.shtm] .
Outgoing Administration Considerations and Options. Many national
security experts suggest that phase two may be the time when the specter of increased
risks to the nation is heightened. Officials at all levels of government may become
concerned about national security interests being affected during the time leading up
to election day. It is possible that the current administration may consider
undertaking military or law enforcement-related actions during this time to prevent
a group from disrupting the election or threatening national security interests. Such
actions, while possibly needed to safeguarded the nation’s security interest, are often
the source of frustration as some question the veracity of the threat information and
the need for related preventative actions. Some see these activities as pursued purely
for political purposes. Others argue that the current national security leaders are
placed in an unenviable position of trying to protect national security interests during69
times of heightened political skepticism.
With the field of potential presidential candidates likely reduced to two major
party candidates, the outgoing Administration may wish to consider continuing the
historical pattern of routinely providing presidential nominees and their senior staff
information and briefings on matters of national security. Scholars who follow
matters of national security note that, “in the pre-election period, it has proved
feasible and desirable to provide intelligence briefings to candidates from both or
even multiple political parties. For the most part this has been done and it should
certainly be continued.”70
Incoming Administration Considerations and Options. Section 7601
(c)(2) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA
(P.L. 108-458; 50 U.S.C. 435b)) allows each major party candidate for President to
submit, before the date of the general election, requests for security clearances of
prospective transition team members who will require access to classified
information to carry out their responsibilities as a member of the President-elect’s
transition team. The Act further states that, to the fullest extent practicable,
necessary background investigations and eligibility determinations of prospective
transition team members shall be completed by the day after the date of the general
election. During phase 2 of presidential transition activities, the prospective
Presidents and their staffs will likely undertake efforts to fully understand current
United States national security policies and related operational activities, and may
request meetings with current Administration security officials. Completion of
security clearance reviews for relevant personnel would greatly assist these efforts.
Congressional Considerations and Options. During phase 2 of the
federal transfer of executive branch power, Congress may desire to provide resources
to federal and non-federal security entities to facilitate the transition efforts,
69 “Could 9/11 Haven been Prevented,” Time, Michael Elliott, August 2, 2002. In response
to a question about why the Clinton Administration did not act on information that bin
Laden was most likely behind the October 12, 2000 attacks of the USS Cole (three months
prior to the end of the administration), a former senior aide stated, “If we had done anything,
say, two weeks before the election, we’d be accused of helping Al Gore.”
70 John Halgerson,Getting to Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates;
effectuate incident deterring activities, and shore up programs that may be required
to respond to an incident.
Support to Non-Federal Entities with Security Responsibilities. Some
national security observers are concerned that a lack of sufficient coordination and
planning between federal and state security entities could affect the presidential
electoral results should an incident of national security significance occur prior to or
on election day.71 In addition to providing funds to the incoming and outgoing
Administrations to support transition related activities, including national security-
related support provided by departments and agencies, Congress may wish to provide
resources to non-federal entities responsible for safeguarding the homeland during
the presidential transition. Just as all homeland security issues emanate from a local
community, an incident occurring in the United States will initially be managed by
local responders.72 Whether it’s a man-made incident or natural disaster, some
scholars state that all levels of government may wish to consider the constitutional73
and practical options74 that would facilitate a transfer of power in the event a
domestic security incident occurs prior to or on the day of election.75 With a
possibility of decision-making paralysis during phase two due to the departure of key
national security personnel prior to the election, and acting directors assigned to
positions of significant responsibility having uncertainty about agency roles and
capabilities, federal prevention, response, and recovery efforts could be delayed.
71 United States Has No Plan for Election Delay Due to Terrorism, USA Today, Jim
Drinkard, July 13, 2004.
72 National Response Framework, January, 2008. Department of Homeland Security.
[ h t t p : / / www.f e ma .gov/ pdf / e me r gency/ n r f / nr f -cor e .pdf ] .
73 Some security experts are concerned about state government’s ability to ensure federal
elections occur in the event of an incident of national security significance. Should such an
event occur on the day of the election, many options are available to allow the election to
continue, including, keeping polling places open for an extended period of time or
rescheduling the election on a different day. Some scholars suggest that, as “the United
States Constitution explicitly delegates the authority to conduct presidential elections to the
states,” it can be argued that “states could create a procedure in advance that would include
a provision for postponing an election, for designating particular officials to decide whether
or not an election has to be postponed, and for setting out procedures for rescheduling the
election.” States Should Develop Procedures Now to Deal with Potential Terrorist
Disruption of Presidential Election, University of Buffalo News Release, James Gardner,
July 29, 2004.
74 Depending on the location and nature of the incident, should a catastrophic event occur
just prior to, or on election day, multi-jurisdictional decisions would be required regarding
whether to reschedule the presidential election or allow for a rescheduling of the election
in those localities affected by the incident. In order to abide by the Constitution and allow
for the incoming Administration to have time to prepare for current and national security
challenges, decisions regarding the presidential election would need to be made in ath
relatively quick manner. The 20 Amendment of the United States Constitution states thatth
the terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20 day of January
following an election with the terms of their successors beginning thereafter.
75 “States Should Develop Procedures Now to Deal with Potential Terrorist Disruption of
Presidential Election,” University of Buffalo News Release, James Gardner, July 29, 2004.
Should such a dynamic occur, greater burden will be placed on local homeland
security entities to identify risks to local communities and respond to an incident or
set of incidents.76
Phase 3: Election Day. Phase 3 of the presidential transition is the actual
day of the presidential election.77
Outgoing Administration Considerations and Options. Consistent
with the opportunities for public outreach efforts noted in phase 2, senior federal
government leaders may wish address risks to the homeland on the day of election.
In addressing any known or possible threats, senior federal officials might offer that
citizen involvement in the democratic process is an effective way to demonstrate to
those who wish to harm the nation that acts of intimidation will not affect the
electoral process. Other actions the Administration might take to support the voting
public’s confidence in participating in the presidential elections include providing
relevant threat information to state homeland security fusion centers in a expedited
manner, working with state and local security officials to secure the nation’s polling
places, and increasing security for suspected targets in the United States to prevent
or mitigate damage from attacks meant to disrupt the voting activities.78
Incoming Administration Considerations and Options. Resolving the
presidential election in a timely manner is crucial to allowing the incoming
Administration the time necessary to prepare for current and future national security
challenges.79 The longer the presidential election results are delayed the less time the
current Administration has to assist the new Administration, President-elect
76 See generally, “Security Officials Gear Up for United States Elections,” Carol Eisenberg,
Newsday, March 8, 2008. When asked about the incoming and outgoing Administration’s
willingness to respect and listen to each other’s (national security) concerns and priorities
and the effect they may have on the ability to safeguard the nation, New York State’s
Deputy Public Safety Secretary Michael Balboni stated, “I would love to see a seamless
transition, but I don’t really have much confidence that’s going to be the case, given all the
partisan bickering.” He further went on to state that he has told his team to be prepared for
anything, and that “we have to continue operating no matter what happens at the federal
level.”
77 Normally, the presidential election is a single-day event when the election is held with the
results and determination of the President-elect to be ratified by the electoral college shortly
thereafter. There are instances, such as the presidential election of 2000, where the
determination of the winning candidate did not occur for approximately five weeks. “Given
that a presidential election brings wholesale change in personnel, loss of time hampers a
new Administration in identifying, recruiting, clearing, and obtaining Senate confirmation
of key appointees.” 9/11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004, p. 215.
78 It should be noted that any actions taken to safeguard and preserve the sanctity of the U.S.
electoral process should recognize the tension between undertaking actions in the name of
national security interests and acting in a manner that could be perceived as taking action
to disenfranchise certain voters, disrupt the voting process, or negatively affect individual
privacy and civil liberties.
79 See generally, “Clock is Running on Presidential Transition Effort,” CNN, Brooks
Jackson, November 27, 2000.
personnel decisions are delayed, and, some security observers would see the U.S. as
increasingly at risk due to the uncertainty in who will lead the country.
Congressional Considerations and Options. While the actual day of the
presidential election may be uneventful, some observers argue that legislative
oversight of transition activities of the current Administration taken to this point may
key to ensuring the incoming Administration is as well prepared as possible. In
enacting the Presidential Transition Act of 1963, Congress provided the current
Administration significant discretion in deciding the level of support to be given to
the incoming Administration. In recognizing the potential risks that may be
associated with a presidential transition, the Act noted the need for an orderly transfer
of executive power.
The national interest requires that such transitions in the Office of the President
be accomplished so as to assure continuity in the faithful execution of the laws
and in the conduct of the affairs of the Federal Government, both domestic and
foreign. Any disruption occasioned by the transfer of the executive power could
produce results detrimental to the safety and well-being of the United States and
it people. Accordingly it is the intent of Congress that appropriate actions be80
authorized and taken to avoid or minimize any disruption.
Phase 4: Post election day to Presidential Inauguration. Phase 4 of
the presidential transition includes the eleven-week time frame from the selection of
the winning candidate to the date the President-elect is sworn in to office:
inauguration day.
Unique Risks to Phase 4. National security considerations unique to this
phase of the transition period include incidents of national security significance that
are intended to take advantage of the perceived confusion in national leadership.
Such incidents may be undertaken with the idea of attempting to have the outgoing
and incoming Administrations at odds with one another with respect to presidential
decision-making desires and to try and take advantage of perceived interagency
coordination confusion.81 With many of the prior Administration’s political
appointees stepping down from their positions and the as of yet to be named or
confirmed new political appointees placed in their agencies, some are concerned
about the ability of the federal government’s ability to effectively recognize, prevent,
or respond to an incident of national security interest. Some security experts are
concerned that the remaining leadership in various departments and agencies, some
of whom are presumably career civil servants that are serving in an acting capacity,
80 The Presidential Transition Act of 1963, Sec. 2, March 7, 1964. 3 U.S.C. 102.
81 See also, DHS Secretary Chertoff’s January 10, 2008, remarks to the DHS Homeland
Security Advisory Committee: “We know that the period of transition is a period of
heightened vulnerability, not because we have any specific piece of intelligence but because
our observation over the last several years, including as recently as this summer when the
new British Administration came in and faced attacks within a matter of days, underscores
for us the fact that it is in the transition period, when people are doing the handoff, that there
is a natural degree of confusion which creates an invitation to people to carry out terrorist
attacks, or other damaging enterprises.”
could fall victim to receiving conflicting direction from both the outgoing and
incoming national security leaders.
Outgoing Administration Considerations and Options. While some
presidential observers argue that there is little motivation for the staff of the outgoing
Administration to cooperate with incoming Administration members, others suggest
that, when it comes to matters of national security, the desire to protect U.S. interests
and preserve the outgoing President’s legacy should supersede adverse actions or lack
of effort by those soon to depart the White House. It is often observed that the level
of animus shown by the outgoing President to the President-elect will have a great
deal to do with the cooperation the incoming Administration’s transition planning
team receives from individuals currently in positions of power. It has also been noted
that transitions between Administrations of the same party appear to go smoother.
The President’s statements and actions with respect to the ongoing transition,
specifically as it involves matters of national security, will set the tone and spirit of
efforts taken by current staff to assist members of the incoming Administration.82
Any actions or statements that are perceived to undermine the incoming
Administration’s policy views on national security matters could be seen as
attempting to frustrate the transition process, and have negative security
repercussions for the new Administration’s efforts to conduct foreign policy or83
address national security-related issues.
Some presidential historians see the primary role of the outgoing Administration
during the post-election day period as facilitating a transparent and productive
transition environment. The desire is that such actions will allow the incoming
Administration to be in the best possible position to identify and respond to any
significant national security issues that may arise soon after taking office. Such
security-related strategic, operational, and policy transition-related activities can be
offered in the form of briefings, written product, exercises to simulate day-to-day and
crisis environments, and other aspects of collaboration and coordination awareness84
activities. Activities that could facilitate an effective national security transition
82 “The chief impediment to establishing the proper links in the past has been the fact that
at the highest levels of the policy agencies virtually everyone empowered to put these
support arrangements in place has been a political appointee whose loyalties are to the
outgoing Administration. Hence they have little at stake in supporting the incoming
Administration.” John Halgerson, Getting to Know the President: CIA Briefings of
Presidential Candidates; 1952-1992, Central Intelligence Agency, May, 1996.
83 See generally, “concerns about the volume, timing, and content of (an outgoing
President’s) executive orders may be heightened during presidential transition periods,
particularly when the opposition party is posed to take control of the White House.” CRS
Report RS20731, Presidential Transitions and Executive Orders, by L. Elaine Halchin, pp.
1. See also, “some argue that outgoing Presidents should exercise restraint in the final
months of their terms, while others would support an incumbent Administration’s authority
to continue to issue regulations through the end of its term.” CRS Report RS20730,
Presidential Transitions and Administrative Actions, by L. Elaine Halchin, pp. 4.
84 See generally, DHS Secretary Chertoff references providing an exit memo to the next
Secretary to note homeland security related concerns. Author unknown, “Homeland Security
Cites Success,” United States News and World Report, February 28, 2008.
(continued...)
include the providing of timely and relevant national security information, the
formation of a council specifically focused on national security issues, and expediting
the security clearance process for incoming members of the President-elect’s national
security team.
Effective Use of Presidential Transition Funds. Prior to 1963, funds were
not allocated by Congress to support the presidential transition and coordination
between incoming and outgoing Administrations was generally limited to the
administrative issues. Since the enactment of the Presidential Transition Act of
1963, Congress has provided the General Services Administration (GSA) funds to
support the substantive aspects of the incoming and outgoing change of
Administration activities.85 For FY2009, GSA has requested $8.5 million to support
presidential transition efforts. The requested funds include $5.3 million for staffing
and training of incoming Administration employees; $2.2 million to provide
President Bush with accommodations, a pension, office space and basic staffing, and
$1 million to support executive branch briefing, training, and workshop activities for
members of the new Administration.86
Historically, funds allocated for presidential transition activities have also been
used for travel expenses, the hiring of consultants, and reimbursing federal agencies
for various types of support.87 As authorized by the Act, funds provided by GSA to
the incoming Administration can only be used from the time period of the day
following the general election to 30 days after the presidential inauguration. The
Presidential Transition Act of 1963, an amended by the Act of 2000,88 authorizes the
GSA to provide a greater level of support to the President-elect and prospective
senior leaders of the incoming Administration. The Act allows the GSA to
coordinate briefings for incoming Administration leaders, provide communication
devices to these individuals, and create a directory of legislative and administrative
materials that would be useful for new Administration leaders.
Ensure the President-Elect is Aware of Issues that May Affect National
Security Interests. During this phase of the transition, every effort should be taken
to apprise the incoming President and the senior national security staff of current and
84 (...continued)
[http://www.usnews .com/blogs /news-desk/2008/02/27/homeland-security-cites-successes
.html].
85 Note: Funds authorized by Congress are only to be used to support post election
presidential transition activities. All pre-election transition planning activities are privately
financed.
86 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009, Office of Management and
Budget, General Services Administration, Page 1065.
87 GSA, Media advisory: Presidential transition fact sheet, November 17, 2000.
[ h t t p : / / www.gs a.gov/ Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?pageT ypeId=8169&channelId=-1325
88 P.L. 106-293, October 13, 2000; 114 Stat. 1035
near-term threats that may affect United States interests.89 While the new
Administration may be aware of many strategic foreign policy and national security
issues, activities relating to tactical, operational, and near-term threats will be the
items most likely to surprise and negatively affect the new Administration soon after
the inauguration. Consistent with section 7601 of IRPTA of 2004 and a
recommendation contained in the 9/11 Commission report,90 Congress requires the
outgoing Administration to “prepare a detailed classified, compartmented summary
by the relevant outgoing executive branch officials of specific operational threats to
national security; major military or covert operations; and pending decisions on
possible uses of military force.” To assist with Administration national security-
related transition efforts, the Act also requires the aforementioned summaries to be
provided to the President-elect “as soon as possible after the date of the general
elections.”91
Establishment of a Presidential Transition National Security Coordination
Council. The outgoing President may wish to consider creating a Presidential
Transition Coordinating Council.92 However, unlike the make-up of previous
Councils, the current Administration may wish to involve members of the President-
elect’s national security team to participate interagency discussions and decision-
making activities. In light of the national security issues the next Administration is
likely to encounter and the possibility of increased risk to national security interests
during the transition period, the Presidential Transition National Security
Coordination Council could focus on current and projected issues that might affect93
policy formation and the short-term actions of the new Administration. A joint
Administration Presidential Transition National Security Coordinating Council could
89 See generally, “the CIA (now the responsibility of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence) must provide support not only to the incoming President but also to his senior
(national security) assistants as well.” John Halgerson, Getting to Know the President: CIA
Briefings of Presidential Candidates; 1952-1992, Central Intelligence Agency, May, 1996.
90 The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 13.4, of effort in Congress, pp. 422.
91 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Section 7601, P.L. 108-
92 Executive Order 13176, 5 U.S.C. 7301, Facilitation of a Presidential Transition,
November 27, 2000.
[http://nodis3. gs f c . n a s a . go v/ d i s p l a yE O . c fm?Internal_ID=EO_13176_&search_term=131
93 In possible support for such a proposal former Homeland Security Advisor and
Counterterrorism Advisor to President George W. Bush stated, “whoever the (incoming)
President is has to have a national security team that can receive information and can begin
to work together, literally from the time the election results are clear, through the
inauguration. There’s got to be a very seamless national security, homeland security
transition. I’ve suggested that there ought to be a joint meeting between the national
security officials of the current Administration and the incoming Administration and have
a table-top exercise. A new Administration will have their own way of doing things, but they
certainly deserve the benefit of understanding how we’ve gone about it during this
Administration.” Frances Fragos Townsend, C-SPAN interview transcript, January 4, 2008.
[ ht t p: / / www.c-span.or g/ speci a l / T ownsend.asp] .
!oversee the national security transition related activities of federal
departments and agencies;
!facilitate national security focused training and orientation activities
to prepare incoming appointees;
!discuss and collaborating on substantive national security issues that
are currently underway or pending decision; and
!offer lessons learned from past policy and operational national
security activities.
Expedited Security Clearance Processing for President-Elect Transition
Team Members and Nominated Members of the New Administration. If not
already occurring during an earlier phase of the transition period, soon after the
election, it is common for the President elect, Vice President elect, and senior
members of the incoming Administration’s transition security team to start receiving
classified intelligence briefings. For those individuals who do not already possess94
an active security clearance, the IRPTA of 2004 allows the President-elect to submit
to the FBI or other appropriate agency the names of candidates to be nominated for
high-level national security positions through the level of under secretary as soon as
possible after the date of the general elections. Prior to the inauguration, the FBI or
other appropriate agencies are responsible for undertaking the background
investigations necessary to provide appropriate security clearances to individuals who
have been designated by the President-elect as key administration officials. While the
adjudication of security clearances is often a concern for individuals who have
recently been hired into the federal government, it appears the FBI does have the
ability to put forth the resources necessary to ensure senior national security officials
are investigated and, where warranted, receive the approval to view classified
material in an expeditious manner.95
Incoming Administration Considerations and Options. From a
national security standpoint, phase 4 of the transition period is quite possibly the
most hectic and exciting. With eleven weeks between election day and the
inauguration ceremony, the outgoing and incoming Administrations have much work
to accomplish. As the presidential transition period continues and the window for
affecting the electoral process narrows, some see this phase as the most likely time
for an enemy of the United States to undertake an action to attempt to throw the
country into presidential decision-making chaos. With the campaigning and the
election no longer a concern, the President-elect will have little time for celebration
and reflecting on the past, as collaboration with the current Administration being
seen as an essential element of future success. In this regard the HSAC
Administration Task Force has proposed,
the incoming and outgoing Administrations work closely together toward a
shared commitment to ensuring a smooth transition of power. This is facilitated
by a positive attitude and open mind in both incoming and outgoing
Administrations, combined with the willingness to respect and listen to each
94 Section 7601 (f)(1).
95 Terry Frieden, “FBI to Speed Presidential Transition Background Checks,” CNN,
November 27, 2000.
other’s concerns and priorities. The same attitude must also characterize the
behaviors of the senior career personnel who remain with the Department and96
will be counted on to ensure a smooth transition between Administrations.
While numerous transition-related activities commence shortly after a
presidential election, some national security experts suggest that none is more
important than the efforts undertaken by the national security and intelligence
communities to assist in providing information and context to the incoming President
and the accompanying new national security team. Given current and projected
security challenges, “the transition can no longer be taken for granted as a
honeymoon [period] and significant attention needs to be provided to managing the
transition.”97 While the incoming Administration has eleven weeks to prepare for
assuming the presidency, many activities will need to occur.98 The President-elect
will formally announce leaders of the transition team; personnel will be interviewed
to possibly occupy positions in the new Administration; and interaction with the
outgoing Administration, Congress, and foreign leaders may occur. The incoming
Administration may also:
!Select cabinet members, with the desire to formally submit to
Congress, soon after the presidential inauguration (phase 5), a
prioritized list of names of those individuals selected to fill key
national security leadership positions.
!Select non-statutory members to be appointed to the National
Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and others to serve
as the President’s and Vice-President’s senior national security
advisors. Generally, other senior agency positions are left vacant
until the Senate has confirmed the President’s nominee and the
individual has joined the organization. While many senior leaders
of the national security community require Senate confirmation,99
96 Report of the Administration Transition Task Force, Homeland Security Advisory
Council, January, 2008. [http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac_ATTF_Report.pdf].
97 “Perils of Presidential Transition,” Glenn P. Hastedt and Anthony J. Eksterowicz, Seton
Hall Journal of Diplomacy and international Relations, Winter/Spring 2001 edition. The
authors further stated: “ The United States is the sole remaining superpower, and other
countries will look to it for leadership on many matters, whether the government is in a
transition period or not.”
98 “Perils of Presidential Transition,” Glenn P. Hastedt and Anthony J. Eksterowicz, Seton
Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Winter/Spring 2001 edition. The
authors further stated: “The time frame of eleven weeks is simply inadequate for extensive
planning in the policy or process areas. Presidential candidates need to do all they can to
ensure an orderly, organized, and politically profitable transition. If Presidential candidates
are successful (during the Phase for transition period), then their Presidencies can begin on
a confident note. If they are unsuccessful, foreign policy (and national security) issues may
overwhelm them and their presidency.”
99 Department leaders with significant national security responsibilities requiring Senate
confirmation include the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, Justice, Treasury, and
Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence and numerous intelligence
community agency chiefs, and the Director of the FBI.
other senior political staff with significant national security
responsibilities do not require Senate confirmation, including staff
of the NSC and HSC.100
!Create a presidential transition website to seek out individuals with
national security expertise who will be needed to meet the upcoming
challenges and opportunities101
!Request current Administration political appointees to remain in
their jobs through the inauguration and possibly the confirmation of
new national security leaders to allow for continuity and
collaboration.102 Overlap in key positions is allowed for limited
circumstances. While agencies cannot employ multiple individuals
in the same job billet (“dual incumbency”), options exist to
temporarily allow both outgoing and incoming Administration
personnel to be assigned to an organization.103
!Select career federal employees with significant national security
expertise to be detailed to the transition team.104 Specific focus
100 Of note, it should be recognized that, while the NSC does maintain a cadre of full-time
career employees that will presumably stay in place during a presidential transition. It
appears the HSC is primarily comprised of political appointees with few career detailees
from cabinet level agencies. The decision making ability and effectiveness of policy and
operational direction provided to departments and agencies by the HSC may be lessened due
to fewer numbers of permanent personnel and the possibility of a lack of expertise to
address the various aspects of homeland security related issues. Interestingly, security
experts are divided on whether future Administrations may see the need for a separate NSC
and HSC. Many national security experts think that homeland security is a subset of national
security. Future Administrations may only establish a NSC with an office responsible for
addressing the nexus of national security and homeland security issues contained therein.
101 “Bush Campaign Creates Website for Presidential Transition,” December 4, 2000, CNN.
102 While it is customary for the current Administration’s political appointees to resign prior
to the new President taking office, specifically if the incoming Administration is of a
different political party, “it is common for the incoming Administration to ask certain
persons to remain in their jobs during the transition to ensure needed continuity during the
initial period of staffing.” United States Office of Personnel Management, Transition to a
New Presidential Administration, OPM website.
[http://www.opm.gov/transition/trans20r-ch1.htm] .
103 To support national security continuity efforts and to allow incoming Administration
officials to have the benefit of the knowledge and experience of their departing counterpart,
OPM offers the following options: an agency can establish a different job billet to employ
the designated successor for a brief period of time, OPM may authorize the use of SES
limited appointment authorities for short periods of time for temporary executive positions,
and agencies may establish temporary transition Schedule C positions for non-executive
positions to help with transitions. United States Office of Personnel Management, Transition
to a New Presidential Administration, OPM website.
[http://www.opm.gov/transition/trans20r-ch1.htm] .
104 “Any employee of any agency of any branch of Government may be detailed to the office
of either the President-elect or the Vice-President-elect on a reimbursable basis and with the
consent of the lending agency head.” United States Office of Personnel Management,
Transition to a New Presidential Administration, OPM website.
(continued...)
given to members of the military, intelligence community, and
diplomatic corps with expertise in the policy priorities of the new
Administration.
!Request substantive briefings on policies and programs of concern
to assess historical challenges prior to deciding to revise or
eliminate current activities.
Some security observers are concerned about a perceived leadership void that
can occur during the transition period when the outgoing Administration has
constitutional authority, but diminished influence, and the President-elect has much
influence, but no authority.105 However, actions can be taken by the outgoing
President and President-elect to ameliorate any suspected appearance of presidential
decision-making ambiguity. Issues of foreign policy were hotly debated during the
presidential campaign of 1992. After the general election, in which Bill Clinton was
elected President, many wondered if the President-elect would attempt to initiate
foreign policy changes prior to the inauguration. During the transition period,
President-elect Clinton addressed these concerns by stating, “President Bush is to be
viewed as the sole voice of United States policy and that the greatest mistake any
adversary could make would be to doubt America’s resolve during this period of
transition.”106
Also during this phase of the transition period the incoming Administration may
wish to discuss prospective strategy and policy changes to national security
programmatic activities with Members of Congress. If the new Administration
desires to announce any new initiatives or changes to existing national security policy
or programs, much work will have to be done between the time of the inauguration
and the time in which the budget will need to be transmitted to Congress. After the
inauguration, the new Administration will have approximately two weeks to submit
to Congress a revision of the fiscal year budget proposal submitted by the previous
Administration.107
Congressional Considerations and Options. During phase 4, Congress
has required some agencies, such as DHS, to have a current senior departmental
official “develop a transition and succession plan to be presented to the incoming
Secretary and Under Secretary for Management to guide the transition of
management functions in a new Administration.”108 The deadline for submitting the
plan is the first of December of the year in which a presidential election occurs.
While this legislative requirement appears to provide agency transition guidance that
some security experts argue was lacking during previous transfers of power, others
104 (...continued)
[http://www.opm.gov/transition/trans20r-ch1.htm] .
105 CRS Report RL30736, Presidential Transitions, by Stephanie Smith.
106 Bill Nichols, “Clinton Sets New Sights.” USA Today, November 5, 1992, p. A1.
107 CRS Report RS20752, Submission of the President’s Budget in Transition Years, by
Robert Keith.
108 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, P.L. 110-53, Sec,
see potential problems in the manner in which it will be implemented. For the
current Administration’s transition plan to be of strategic substantive value, some
observers recommend that the individual responsible for drafting the plan should be
a career civil servant with a multi-year term appointment. This requirement would
allow the main author and proponent of the transition plan to remain with the agency
for a prescribed period of time and provide continuity and advice to a new
Administration.109
Traditionally, Congress is out of session during much of the phase 4 transition
period and may also be undergoing a change in membership. Thus congressional
oversight activities during this phase are uncommon. However, some security experts
contend that given the current risks to U.S. national security interests, a special
session of Congress may be beneficial to ensuring the two Administrations are
properly coordinating on national security-related issues. Once Congress returns to
session and the new members are sworn in, little time is available prior to the
presidential inauguration to inquire about past actions and recommend changes. A
special session of Congress might be considered soon after the election to ascertain
what the outgoing and incoming Administrations will do with respect to transition-
related activities. If still in session during the later stages of phase 4, Congress may
wish to hold additional hearings to assess the administration’s progress on stated
national security transition-related activities. Congressional concerns during this
phase might include the status of incoming and outgoing Administration
collaboration efforts, how resources are being expended and toward what purpose,
and to ascertain the incoming Administration’s national security foreign and
domestic policy goals. Congress may also wish to make itself available during phase
4 to address resource requests that emanate from the two Administrations should an
incident of national security significance occur.
Phase 5: Presidential Inauguration: Placement of New
Administration Officials and Formation of New Policies. Phase 5 of the
presidential transition includes the time frame from the presidential inauguration to
a period when the new Administration has its senior national security leaders
confirmed, designated other non-congressionally confirmed political appointees and
advisors in place, and established and implemented new national security policies.
This phase can last a few months to well into the first year of the presidency.
Unique Risks to Phase 5. National security considerations unique to this
phase of the transition period would include incidents of national security
significance that are intended to subject the new Administration to a crisis and test
the actions and policies of the new leaders.110 An incident of national security
significance could occur while the new Administration’s national security leadership
positions are vacant; personnel have been confirmed, but are new to their respective
109 Rob Margetta, “Better Management Key to Transformation at Homeland Security,”
Congressional Quarterly, December 14, 2007.
110 “As recent history has shown, the most vulnerable period is 30 days prior to the election
through six months after the change in Administrations.” Report of the Administration
Transition Task Force, Homeland Security Advisory Council, January, 2008.
[http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/asse ts/hsac_AT T F_Report.pdf].
positions; or national security policies are being developed.111 Entities that wish to
affect United States national security interests may see this time period as uniquely
vulnerable, with the President and newly assigned staff being perceived as ill-
equipped to handle a domestic or foreign national security crisis.
Departed Administration Considerations and Options. While the
outgoing Administration will no longer have constitutional responsibility or authority
for safeguarding the country, the actions that were or were not taken prior to the
presidential inauguration will be a part of the departing President’s legacy. The
“Protective Power”as referenced in the presidential oath “has been interpreted as
investing the President with expansive authority to take actions necessary to protect
the property and personnel of the United States from attack or other dangers.”112
Some scholars argue that the President’s duty to protect the country is not limited to
the time in which the office was occupied with responsibility extending into the next
President’s term to a point at which the new Administration has had reasonable
opportunity to organize itself and formulate national security policies. As such, any
“failure to alert and cooperate with the incoming President with respect to imminent
dangers facing the nation directly exposes the country to substantial risk,”113 and may
negatively affect the previous President’s legacy.
Similarly, the outgoing President should be cautious of any activity taken in the
last few days of the Administration or after the inauguration that could hamper the
incoming Administration’s transition efforts. Such actions might include
111 For example, less than five weeks after the first inauguration of President Clinton,
February 26, 1993, the first attack on the World Trade Center occurred. Whether the attacks
were coincidentally timed with the new presidency or the perpetrators perceived an
opportunity to test the new Administration is a debate among national security experts. Also,
less than eight months after President George W. Bush was sworn in as the nation’s forty-
third President Al-Qaeda launched a series of attacks on New York City and the Pentagon
in Arlington, VA, with a fourth hijacked plane crashing in Shanksville, PA. At the time of
the attacks, 227 of 508 (45%) of President Bush’s top political positions had been filled,
with 106 of the individuals in these positions on the job for less than eight weeks. Lowell
Feld, “The Intelligence Community Could Not Connect the Dots, Was the Lack of Political
Appointees On the Job a Reason Why?,” War Politics and Literature, 2002.
112 In re Neagle, 135 United States 1 (1890); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of
the Presidency, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1, p. 14-15 (1993).
113 “The Law of Presidential Transitions,” Boston School of Law Working Paper, William
P. Marshal and Jack M. Beerman, 2005. The authors went on further to state: “The new
Administration cannot be expected to sift through complex information, much of it classified
and much of it conflicting, regarding potential dangers to the United States upon taking
office and still be able to craft an effective response. Reliance on the advice and direction
of the previous Administration is absolutely necessary to protect the United States An
outgoing President’s refusal to provide that [national security related] information and warn
his successor as to potential dangers contradicts his protective duties. Accordingly, the
outgoing President’s decisions whether or not to brief his successor on domestic and
international threats to national security are not optional. “To preserve, protect, and defend”
means cooperating to the fullest degree to protect the United States against impending
danger.”
!establishing or revising national security organizations, policies, or
programs that are clearly counter to the positions of the incoming
President;
!interacting with foreign leaders that may have the perception of
attempting to portray future U.S. foreign policy desires;114 and
! undertaking any steps that would have a negative effect or produce
unintended national security consequences.
New Administration Considerations and Options. The newly elected
President, who will wish to quickly set an agenda and move toward implementing
goals stated during the campaign, may find the issuance of executive orders and other
presidential directives as a way to distinguish new policies from the outgoing
President. This may be particularly desirable when outgoing and new President are
from different parties, and such changes might offer the appearance of instituting115
change in the early days of the new Administration. Likewise, the new
Administration may wish to quickly promulgate new national security policies and
strategies for departments and agencies that have national security responsibilities.
While the issuance of new strategies and policies may not, in and of themselves,
make the country safer, they will convey the new Administration’s national security
priorities and provide the nation an opportunity to assess the new President’s
intentions. In undertaking efforts to memorialize the new President’s national
security policies, many national security observers suggest that the new President
may be well served to proceed cautiously and take the time to review and assess
current policies,116 and listen to the views of outgoing political officials and
remaining career government, military, and diplomatic personnel prior to
implementing significant changes in current strategies or operations.117 To support
continued transition efforts and to be afforded the opportunity to learn of the previous
114 Ibid. “The President must be aware and solicitous of the likely directions that the new
President may take on foreign affairs issues and not work in a manner that may undermine
the ability of the new President to achieve those goals.”
115 CRS Report RS20731, Presidential Transitions and Executive Orders, by L. Elaine
Halchin.
116 Regardless of the previous experience of the President and assuming best efforts are
expended to support the transition by outgoing Administration officials, the new President’s
thoughtful decision-making efforts could encounter the challenges of a “three-part
syndrome; (1) being caught by surprise by events in the domestic or foreign arena, (2)
attempting to demonstrate a capacity to lead resulting in the President making hasty
decisions, and (3) [perceiving] the need to demonstrate that the Administration is superior
to the previous by quickly reorganizing organizations and enacting new policy.” “Perils of
Presidential Transition,” Glenn P. Hastedt and Anthony J. Eksterowicz, Seton Hall Journal
of Diplomacy and International Relations, Winter/Spring 2001 edition.
117 Responding to a reporter’s questions about the upcoming presidential election and
possibly advice given to the candidates to not get “locked-in” to a plan for Iraq, Lt. General
Odierno stated that, “from a military perspective do an assessment and ask the military
leaders involved to give you the current assessment and then make a decision on where we
want to go in Iraq; what are their goals in Iraq, what is their policy, and what do they want
to achieve.” DoD Website News Transcript, DoD News Briefing with Lt. Gen. Odierno
from the Pentagon Briefing Room, Arlington, Va., March 4, 2008.
Administration’s national security policy and program successes and failures, the
new President may wish to have prior Administration officials maintain their security
clearances and routinely receive briefings regarding current and emerging threats to
United States interests.118
Congressional Considerations and Options. Some presidential
historians suggest that legislative inquiry and support during the incoming
Administration’s transition efforts is crucial if Congress’ is to provide effective
oversight during the new presidency. Professor Williams of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology argues that, “the coming transition to a new Administration
and Congress opens a window for reform of the organizational structures and
processes that surround planning and resource allocation for homeland (and national)119
security in the executive branch and Congress.” While the transition is an
opportunity for Members and staff to interact and have substantive discussions
regarding the national security policies and goals of the new Administration, some
presidential historians note that “transitions are hit-and-miss affairs that handicap the
new President in shifting from campaigning to governing and create problems for the
Congress.”120 Should the new Administration not make an effort to avail Congress
of its foreign and domestic security policy intentions and if Congress does not
undertake an active role in understanding the policies and direction of the new
Administration, both entities might encounter frustration as neither will feel it is
receiving the necessary support to fully uphold its responsibilities. As noted by Mr.
Ink, President Emeritus of the Institute of Public Administration, new appointees are
in danger of stumbling during the first crucial weeks and months of an
Administration, not so much from what they are striving to do, but from how they are
functioning and a lack of familiarity with the techniques that are most likely to get121
things done in a complex Washington environment.” In overseeing and supporting
the new Administration’s national security objectives, Congress has a number of
activities it can undertake.
Prioritize Hearings for Nominated Senior Executive Branch Leaders Who
Have Significant National Security Responsibilities. A congressional authority
that is often noted for making it possible for the incoming Administration to be in the
best position to address national security issues shortly after inauguration is to
quickly confirm qualified key political appointees.122 While Congress will also be
118 If desired, all former Presidents and Vice Presidents are afforded the opportunity to
receive classified briefings. Some suggest the new administration might benefit from other
senior national security officials retaining their security clearance and being granted
continued access to classified information.
119 Cindy Williams, “Strengthening Homeland Security: Reforming Planning and Resource
Allocation,” 2008 Presidential Transition Series, February, 2008 (IBM Center for the
Business of Government).
120 Dwight Ink, Committee Report, Statement to the Senate Committee on Government
Affairs Regarding the Presidential Transition Act of 2000, July 18, 2000.
121 Ibid.
122 While there is no proscriptive order in which the incoming President should nominate,
(continued...)
undergoing a transition having just been sworn in two weeks prior to the presidential
inauguration, some analysts see this as the ideal time for the new Congress to meet
with the incoming President’s national security leadership team and put in place a
foundation to allow for expedited confirmation hearings soon after the President
takes the oath of office. As noted by a recommendation of the 9/11 Commission
Report of 2004:123
Since a catastrophic attack could occur with little or no notice, the federal
government should minimize as much as possible the disruption of national
security policymaking during the change of Administrations by accelerating the
process for national security appointments. We (9/11 Commission) think the
process could be improved significantly so transitions can work more effectively
and allow new officials to assume their new responsibilities as quicky as
possible.
Consistent with recommendations contained in the 9/11 Commission report,
IRPTA of 2004124 provides a sense of the Congress regarding an expedited
consideration of individuals nominated by the President-elect to be confirmed by the
Senate. The Act further holds that the Senate committees to which these nominations
are referred and the full Senate should attempt to complete consideration of these
nominations within 30 days of submission by the newly elected President. In
undertaking this responsibility, many security observers see a healthy tension
between Congress’ desire to act quickly to hold confirmation hearings and the need
to ensure that individuals with the relevant national security background and
experience have been put forth by the President-elect. In many cases, highly
qualified career Senior Executive Service personnel will be in an acting capacity for
some of these Senate confirmed positions. Thus the perceived urgency to fill these
positions quickly may be negated while Congress ensures individuals capable of
meeting the demands of the position are selected and confirmed. Congress may also
!work with the new Administration to understand its national security
priorities and where applicable have the changes in policies and
programs reflected in the 2009 budget;
!pass FY2009 appropriations without undue delay;
!quickly assign new and existing Members of Congress to
committees focusing on national security issues to allow these
individuals to receive briefings and understand the issues for which
they have oversight;
!hold hearings comprised of national security experts to gather ideas
on prospective U.S. national security policies and goals; and
122 (...continued)
or Congress should hold hearings regarding, new senior Administration officials with
national security responsibilities, a review of the cabinet positions noted in the Presidential
Succession Act of 1947 (3 U.S.C. Section 19) and the previous administration’s National
Security Council and Homeland Security Councils may provide some assistance in
prioritizing personnel placement activities.
123 9/11 Commission Report, July, 2004, Chapter 13, p. 422.
124 Section 7601(b).
!hold hearings soon after the new Administration has produced its
national security strategies, policies, and presidential directives to
discuss objectives and determine presidential priorities.
Conclusion
While the first presidential transition in the post 9/11 era is of concern to many
national security observers, risks during the transition period may be minimized with
proactive executive branch and congressional actions. It is likely the new President
will face many national security-related challenges upon taking office. Whether the
enemies of the United States choose to undertake action counter to the nation’s
security interests or the new President experiences a relatively peaceful period during
the transition, the new Administration’s recognition and response to these challenges
will depend heavily on the preparation and education activities that have occurred
prior to the inauguration. While it may be impossible to stop an incident of national
security significance during the presidential election process, there are steps that can
be taken during all phases of the transition to lessen the risks to the nation. Such
actions may be helpful in preparing the nation for possible risks to the presidential
election period and mitigating the effects of acts taken by those that wish to cause
confusion during the transfer of presidential power. The transition-related actions or
inactions of the outgoing and incoming Administration may have a long-lasting affect
on new President’s ability to effectively safeguard United State’s interests and may
also effect the legacy of the outgoing President.
Appendix A. Recent Military Operations Occurring
During United States Presidential Transition
Periods 125
PresidentsMilitary Operations
Carter to ReaganIn the course of a secret operation to rescue the American
hostages held in Iran, a collision between a helicopter and a
transport aircraft caused the deaths of eight United States
servicemen on April 25, 1980.
Reagan reelectionUnited States forces invaded the Caribbean island of
Grenada in October 1983.
Bush to ClintonPresident Bush announced United States participation in
the enforcement of “no-fly” zones in Iraq on September 16,
Bush to ClintonUnited States armed forces were dispatched to Somalia to
participate in a United States-led United Nations response
to humanitarian crisis. President Bush reported the
deployment to Congress on December 10, 1992.
Clinton transitionPresident Clinton, on January 21, 1993, stated that his
administration would continue the Bush Administration’s
Iraq policy.
Clinton transitionIn response to an unsuccessful assassination attempt on
former President Bush by Iraqi agents, the United States
launched missiles targeting the Iraqi intelligence service
headquarters on June 26, 1993.
Clinton reelectionPresident Clinton, on December 21, 1995, notified
Congress that over 20,000 members of the United States
armed forces would be deployed in support of the NATO
forces implementing the Bosnian peace agreement.
Clinton reelectionUnited States armed forces were deployed in Liberia in
order to evacuate United States citizens and third-country
nationals who had taken refuge from the deteriorating
security conditions in the United States embassy, and to
defend the embassy. President Clinton notified Congress
of the deployment on April 11 and May 20, 1996, noting
that the deployment would continue until the security
situation improved.
Clinton reelectionUnited States military forces were dispatched to the Central
African Republic to provide enhanced security for the
United States embassy in the capital, Bangui, and
evacuations as necessary. The deployment was reported to
Congress on May 20, 1996.
125 Table prepared by George Mangan, Information Research Specialist, Knowledge Services
Group, CRS, March 13, 2008. This table is based on deployment information contained in
CRS Report RL32170, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2007,
by Richard F. Grimmett.
PresidentsMilitary Operations
Clinton to BushUnited States military operations against Iraqi air defense
forces continued in 1999 and 2000 in enforcement of the
declared “no-fly” zones.
Clinton to BushPresident Clinton notified Congress on January 19, 1999,
that United States forces continued to participate in the
NATO-led stabilization force in Bosnia, in numbers
reduced from the original deployment.
Clinton to BushPresident Clinton, on February 25, 1999, notified Congress
of the continued deployment of United States military
personnel in Kenya following the attack on the United
States embassy there in August 1998.
Clinton to BushUnited States and NATO forces began a campaign of air
strikes against Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999, in response
to Yugoslavia’s campaign of repression against ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo. Additional United States forces
provided humanitarian relief support from bases in Albania
and Macedonia.
Clinton to BushA limited deployment of United States forces was sent to
support the U.N. multinational force sent to restore peace
in East Timor. President Clinton notified Congress on
October 8, 1999.
Clinton to BushPresident Clinton notified Congress on October 14, 2000,
of the deployment of approximately 100 armed forces
personnel to provide assistance in Yemen in the wake of
the terrorist attack on the USS Cole.
Bush reelectionMilitary operations against Iraq began on March 19, 2003,st
President Bush reported to Congress on March 21. He
notified Congress on March 20 of the continuation of a
number of military operations in the war on terrorism,
including actions against al-Qaeda militants in
Afghanistan, cooperative operations with Pakistan in the
border areas, maritime antiterrorist operations, and training
in counterterrorism for other cooperating nations’ armed
forces. He also notified Congress on May 14, 2003 of
continued United States deployment in Kosovo andnd
adjoining countries, and on July 22 of continued
deployment in Bosnia.
Bush reelectionPresident Bush reported on February 25, 2004, that a
combat-equipped force had been sent to Haiti to augment
security forces at the United States embassy and to protect
United States citizens and property. Additional forces
were dispatched within two weeks, partly to make
preparations for the arrival of a U.N. multinational force.
Appendix B. Representative Examples of Incidents
of National Security Interest Occurring During
Periods of Governmental Transition126
Appendix B provides a representative listing of incidents of terrorism that have
occurred during times of transitions of heads of state. The criteria for inclusion in this
chart was based on the aggressor’s real or perceived intent to change the course of
an election or affect future policy of the country during a time of transfer of
presidential authority. It should be noted that, barring relatively few examples, there
is little evidence that incidents of national security significance were planned for a
specific date prior to an election. While varying levels of planning occur prior to an
incident, as with most criminal acts, the leader directs, or the individuals act, when
opportunity for the best possible outcome is presented. With respect to times of
presidential transition, the most optimal time for an attack, for a variety of reasons,
may not present the best opportunity for the aggressors to attempt an incident. As
such, the potential time frame for risk is present during any phase of the transition,
with the effects of an incident differing based on the location of the event, the
proximity to the election date, and the reaction and actions of the U.S. national
security enterprise.
Many security experts believe that some of the incidences noted below had a
significant impact on the outcome of the country’s national election or subsequent
policies. National security observers are fearful that terrorists groups may see some
of the incidences as successes and feel embolden to attempt to affect future national
transfers of power by launching attack just before the election. These groups may see
the timing of such an action as a viable strategic opportunity to further the goals of
their cause. However, it should be noted, other security experts suggest that
incidences of national significance taken prior to a national election could produce
a reaction that is counter to the long-term goals of the terrorist group.
126 Prepared by George Mangan, Information Research Specialist, Knowledge Services
Group, CRS, February 28, 2008.
Type of Incident and BriefDate(s); Pre-election or
DescriptionParties InvolvedTransition Phase
Iran Hostage CrisisUnited States, IslamicNovember 4, 1979- January
“Radical students” stormedRepublic of Iran.20, 1981. Pre- and post-
the United States embassyelection; hostages were
in Tehran and took hostagereleased as Ronald Reagan
diplomats, other staff, andwas sworn in as President.
Marine guards. The
incident did not initially
appear intended to affect the
upcoming United States
presidential elections, but,
ultimately, as the standoff
lengthened, was generally
agreed to have had a
significant influence on the
electoral contest between
President Jimmy Carter anda
Ronald Reagan.
Northern Ireland, 1982United Kingdom, Irish1982. Transition period
Violence in opposition toRepublican Army, militantfollowing elections to
October 20, 1982, electionsProtestant groups.Provincial Assembly.
to form a Provincial
Assembly caused more than
30 deaths by early
December, including those
of three Royal Ulster
Constabulary policemen
killed when their vehicle
drove over a remote-b
controlled bomb.
Bombing of MarineUnited States, Islamic Jihad.October 23, 1983. Pre-
Barracks, Beirut,election.
Lebanon
A truck bomb destroyed the
compound housing United
States Marines near Beirut
airport, killing 242
Americans. Islamic Jihad
claimed responsibility for
the attack. The Reagan
Administration’s Lebanon
policy quickly became a
campaign issue due to
questions raised by
Democratic presidentialc
candidates.
Type of Incident and BriefDate(s); Pre-election or
DescriptionParties InvolvedTransition Phase
Bioterrorism in the UnitedWasco County, Oregon,September 9, 1984. Pre-
Statesfollowers of Bhagwan Shreeelection.
Disciples of Bhagwan ShreeRajneesh.
Rajneesh deliberately
contaminated salad bars in
ten restaurants with
salmonella, causing over
The plot was designed to
put out of action enough
voters so that Rajneesh’s
followers could swamp the
polls and elect an all-
Rajneeshi slate of
candidates, thereby taking
over the county
government, with which thed
Rajneeshis had disputes.
Assassination of PresidentGovernment of Lebanon,November 22, 1989.
of Lebanonunknown parties.Transition period.
President Rene Moawad
was killed when a remote-
controlled bomb detonated
as his car passed over it.
Twenty-three other personse
were also killed. He had
held office for only 17 days.
Assassination of RajivCongress Party (India),May 22, 1991. During
GandhiLiberation Tigers of Tamilnational voting period.
Former Indian PrimeEelam (LTTE).
Minister Rajiv Gandhi,
campaigning for his
Congress Party in national
elections, was killed, along
with 14 others, when a
female suicide bomber
detonated herself next to
him at a campaignf
appearance.
Type of Incident and BriefDate(s); Pre-election or
DescriptionParties InvolvedTransition Phase
IRA Attacks in BritainUnited Kingdom, IrishMarch 1992. Pre-election.
The Irish Republican ArmyRepublican Army.
conducted a bombing
campaign in Britain
explicitly aimed at
influencing the upcoming
general election: “These
attacks signal our
determination and resolve to
focus the government’s
attention on their war in
Ireland. As they face into a
general election, our
volunteers will continue to
force their occupation of
part of our country onto theg
British political agenda.”
Omagh Bombing,United Kingdom, “RealAugust 15, 1998. Post-
Northern Ireland, 1998I.R.A.”referendum transition
News reports citeperiod.
speculation that a bomb
attack that killed at least 28
people and wounded over
200 was carried out by the
I.R.A. splinter group “Real
I.R.A.” in an attempt to
wreck the peace agreement
overwhelmingly approved
by referendum in both
Northern Ireland and theh
Irish Republic.
Russian ApartmentRussia, Islamic extremistsSeptember 1999.
Building Explosionsfrom the Caucasus area (asTransitional period leading
Massive explosions causedstated by Russianup to presidential election.
heavy casualties inauthorities).
nighttime attacks on
apartment buildings, one in
Dagestan, two in Moscow,
and another in Volgodonsk.
The four blasts over a 16
day period killedi
approximately 300 people.
Government officials
blamed Islamic extremists
for the attacks, which
occurred in the last year of
Boris Yeltsin’s presidency,
shortly after the
appointment of Vladimir
Putin as Prime Minister.
Type of Incident and BriefDate(s); Pre-election or
DescriptionParties InvolvedTransition Phase
Assassination of StateIndia, Save KashmirDecember 20, 2002. Pre-
Assembly Member,Movement.election and transition
Threats Against Electionsperiod.
A Pakistan-based group
claimed responsibility for
the assassination of a
member of the new Jammu
and Kashmir Assembly,
Abdul Aziz Mir. During the
elections for the Assembly,
which were held the
previous fall, the group had
threatened to kill anyone
participating in thej
campaign.
Suicide Bombing ofRussia, unknown partiesDecember 5, 2003. Pre-
Commuter Train, Russia(Chechen independenceelection.
A suicide bomber detonatedleader Aslan Maskhadov
over 20 pounds ofdenied responsibility).
explosives aboard a
commuter train in the
Stavropol region (near
Chechnya). Forty-seven
persons were killed and 155
injured, many seriously.
The attack took place two
days before nationalk
elections.
Bombings of CommuterSpain, al-Qaeda affiliates.March 11, 2004. Pre-
Trains, Madrid, Spainelection.
Ten backpack bombs set off
in crowded commuter trains
killed 191 people and
injured nearly 2,000.
Although the government
claimed that the Basque
separatist group ETA was
responsible, many
Spaniards believed that the
attack was in retaliation for
their government’s support
of the United States’ actions
in Iraq, and voted into
office the Socialist
Workers’ Party, whose
leader, Jose Luis Rodriguez
Zapatero, had promised to
withdraw all 1,300 Spanishl
troops from Iraq.
Type of Incident and BriefDate(s); Pre-election or
DescriptionParties InvolvedTransition Phase
Attempted Bombings ofUnited Kingdom, radicalJune 29-30, 2007.
London Nightclub DistrictIslamists, possibly Al QaedaGovernmental transition
and Glasgow Airportsympathizers.period.
Two men believed to be
hardline Islamists carried
out two bombing attempts
early in the transition period
between the governments of
Prime Ministers Tony Blair
and Gordon Brown. The
first was the attempted
bombing of an area of
nightclubs in London’s
West End, using fuel bomb
devices placed in two
Mercedes Benz
automobiles. The terrorists’
remote detonation attempts
failed and the bombs were
disarmed. In the second
incident, the attackers
rammed a blazing Jeep
Cherokee loaded with extra
fuel into the terminal at
Glasgow airport. The
driver, Kafeel Ahmed, an
engineer, later died of burns
in hospital. The passenger,
identified as Dr. Bilal
Abdulla, a British National
Health Service physician,m
was not seriously injured.
Type of Incident and BriefDate(s); Pre-election or
DescriptionParties InvolvedTransition Phase
Assassination of FormerPakistan, Islamist militantsDecember 27, 2007. Pre-
Prime Minister, Pakistanelection.
Former Pakistani Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto,
campaigning for
parliamentary elections to
be held January 8, 2008,
was killed along with over
20 other persons in an
attack attributed to militant
Islamists. A suicide
bomber, possibly
accompanied by an
accomplice firing pistol
shots, detonated next to her
car following a political
rally. Various reports
assigned responsibility for
the assassination to Al
Qaeda’s second-in-
command, Ayman Al-
Zawahiri, or to Baitullah
Mehsud, a top Taliban
commander in the South
Waziristan region of
Pakistan. The electionsn
were postponed.
Murder of Former LocalSpain, ETA.March 7, 2008. Pre-
Government Official,election.
Spain
A former city council
member in northern Spain
was shot to death in front of
his wife and child by a
suspected ETA gunman.
The principal Spanish
political parties condemned
the attack and suspended
campaigning for national
elections due to be held twoo
days later.
a. Mickolus, Edward F., Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979, Westport,
Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1980, as updated in subsequent editions. During the Presidency
of Jimmy Carter, Iranian militants stormed the United States Embassy and took 66 Americans
captive. While many national security experts suggest the taking of hostages in the United States
Embassy in Iran in November 1979 was in response to United States policies, it does not appear
that this activity was a direct attempt to affect the United States presidential election of 1980.
However, many national security observers suggest the hostage taking actions by the Iranian
militants, coupled with the duration that the hostages remained in captivity (444 days) and the
United States military’s failed rescue attempt in April of 1980, was a contributing factor to
President Carter not being reelected. On January 20, 1981, Ronald Reagan was inaugurated
President and the hostages were released later that day.
b. “A Vicious Tribalism’ Alarms Ulster,” New York Times, October 31, 1982; “Flight Of Talent
Called Peril To Ulster’s Future,” New York Times, December 13, 1982.
c. “Democrats Expect To Campaign On Lebanon Issue,” New York Times, October 25, 1983.
d. Source: Praeger Security International’s Terrorism, Homeland Security, Strategy database.
e. “Lebanese Lawmakers Meet To Plan Election Of Slain President’s Successor,” New York Times,
November 24, 1989, p. A3.
f. Mickolus, Edward F., Terrorism, 1988-1991, Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1993.
g. “I.R.A. Is Vowing Further Attacks In Effort To Disrupt British Election,” New York Times, March
2, 1992.
h. “The Day After In Ulster Town: Now ‘It’s Back,’” New York Times, August 17, 1998, p. A1.
i. “Russia’s War Hits Home,” Newsweek, September 27, 1999.
j. Source: Praeger Security International’s Terrorism, Homeland Security, Strategy database.
k. Source: Praeger Security International’s Terrorism, Homeland Security, Strategy database.
l. Source: Praeger Security International’s Terrorism, Homeland Security, Strategy database.
m. “Britain Under Attack As Bombers Strike At Airport,” July 1, 2007; “Five Under Guard As Police
Link London and Glasgow Attacks, July 2, 2007; “Airport Bomb Suspects ‘Left Behind Suicide
Note Detailing Their Motives,’” July 5, 2007; all from The Times (London).
n. Source: Terrorism Knowledge Base, Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
[ h t t p : / / www. t k b . o r g ] .
o. “Killing In Spain Curtails Campaign,” New York Times, March 8, 2008.
CRS-47
Appendix C. Congressional Legislation Addressing Various Aspects of National Security
Considerations During Presidential Transitions, in Chronological Order (1963-2008)
Public Law Time Until Next
Congress and(date becameTime Since LastScheduled
ssion IntroducedDate IntroducedBillTitlelaw)TransitionaTransitiona
th, 2nd SessionSept. 7, 2004S. 27749/11 Commission Report3 years, 8 months4 months
Implementation Act of 2004
th, 2nd SessionSept. 8, 2004H.R. 50249/11 Commission3 years, 8 months4 months
Recommendations
Implementation Act of 2004
th, 2nd SessionSept. 9, 2004H.R. 50409/11 Commission Report3 years, 8 months4 months
iki/CRS-RL34456Implementation Act of 2004thnd
g/w, 2 SessionSept. 14, 2004H.Res. 775Expressing the sense of the3 years, 8 months4 months
s.orHouse of Representatives with
leakrespect to the continuity of
Government and the smooth
://wikitransition of executive power
httpth, 2nd SessionSept. 23, 2004S. 2845Intelligence Reform andP.L. 108-4583 years, 8 months4 months
Terrorism Prevention Act of(Dec. 17, 2004)
2004
th, 2nd SessionSept. 24, 2004H.R. 109/11 Recommendations3 years, 8 months4 months
Implementation Act
th, 2nd SessionOct. 5, 2004H.R. 5223National Intelligence Reform3 years, 9 months3 months
Act of 2004
, 1st SessionApr. 24, 1963H.R. 4638Presidential Transition Act ofP.L. 88-2772 years, 3 months1 year, 9 months
Prepared by Ryan Granger, Information Research Specialist, Knowledge Services Group, CRS, February 28, 2008.
s of date introduced.