Proposed Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues

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This report examines three labor issues and arguments related to the pending U.S.-Colombia free
trade agreement (CFTA, H.R. 5724): violence against trade unionists; impunity (accountability
for or punishment of the perpetrators); and worker rights protections for Colombians. For general
issues relating to the CFTA, see CRS Report RL34470, A U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement:
Economic and Political Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal. For background on Colombia and
its political situation and context for the agreement, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues
for Congress, by Colleen W. Cook and Clare Ribando Seelke.
Opponents of the pending U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement (CFTA) argue against it on three
points: (1) the high rate of violence against trade unionists in Colombia; (2) the lack of adequate
punishment for the perpetrators of that violence; and (3) weak Colombian enforcement of
International Labor Organization (ILO) core labor standards and labor laws.
Proponents of the agreement argue primarily for the proposed Colombia FTA on the basis of
economic and national security benefits. Accordingly, they argue, the CFTA would: support
increased exports, expand economic growth, create jobs, and open up investment opportunities
for the United States. They also argue that it would reinforce the rule of law and spread values of
capitalism in Colombia, and anchor hemispheric stability.
Proponents specifically respond to labor complaints of the opponents, that (1) violence against
trade unionists has declined dramatically since President Álvaro Uribe took office in 2002; (2)
substantial progress is being made on the impunity issue as the government has undertaken great
efforts to find perpetrators and bring them to justice; and (3) the Colombian government is taking
steps to improve conditions for workers.
If Congress were to approve the Colombia FTA, it would be the second FTA (after Peru) to have
some labor enforcement “teeth.” Labor provisions including the four basic ILO core labor
standards would be enforceable through the same dispute settlement procedures as for all other
provisions (i.e., primarily those for commercial interests.) Opponents argue that under CFTA,
only the concepts of core labor standards, and not the details of the ILO conventions behind them,
would be enforceable.
Proponents point to recent Colombian progress in protecting workers on many fronts. They argue
that approval of the FTA and the economic growth in Colombia that would result is the best way
to protect Colombia’s trade unionists. They also argue that not passing the agreement would not
resolve Colombia’s labor issues.
Opponents argue that delaying approval of the proposed CFTA further would give Colombia
more time to keep improving protections for its workers. This report will be updated as events
warrant.

Backgr ound ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Political Context........................................................................................................................1
Trade/Economic Context...........................................................................................................2
Labor Context............................................................................................................................2
Violence Against Trade Unionists...................................................................................................3
Long-Term Trends in Murders of Trade Unionists...................................................................3
Long-Term Trends in Three Measures of Violence Against Trade Unionists...........................5
Impunity .......................................................................................................................................... 5
Labor Laws, Protections, and Enforcement.....................................................................................6
Possible Implications.......................................................................................................................7
Figure 1. Historic Data on Murders of Trade Unionists, 1997-2008 (Projected)............................4
Figure 2. Assassinations, Death Threats and Arbitrary Detentions of Trade Unionists,
1999-2007..................................................................................................................................... 5
Table A-1. Data for Figure 1, p. 4....................................................................................................9
Table A-2. Data for Figure 2: Assassinations, Death Threats, and Arbitrary Detentions, p.
5 .................................................................................................................................................. 10
Appendix. Data for Figures 1 and 2................................................................................................9
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................10

he purpose of this report is to examine three labor issues and arguments related to the
pending U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement (CFTA, H.R. 5724): violence against trade
unionists; impunity (accountability for or punishment of the perpetrators); and worker ¹T

rights protections for Colombians. For general issues relating to the CFTA, see CRS Report
RL34470, A U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Economic and Political Implications, by M.
Angeles Villarreal. For background on Colombia and its political situation and context for the
agreement, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress, by Colleen W. Cook and
Clare Ribando Seelke.
Opponents of the pending U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement (CFTA) argue against it on three
points: (1) the high rate of violence (murders, arbitrary detentions/kidnappings, and death threats)
against trade unionists in Colombia; (2) the lack of adequate punishment for the perpetrators of
that violence; and (3) weak Colombian enforcement of International Labor Organization (ILO)
core labor standards and labor laws.
Proponents of the agreement argue primarily for the proposed Colombia FTA on the basis of
economic and national security benefits. Trade typically benefits all parties to a trade agreement,
as each country tends to specialize in exporting those goods which it can produce relatively more
efficiently, and to import those which it produces relatively less efficiently. Accordingly,
proponents argue, the CFTA would: support increased exports, expand economic growth, create
jobs, offer consumers a greater variety of goods and services at lower prices, and encourage
economic development by attracting foreign investment and expanding output. They also argue
that it would reinforce the rule of law, spread values of capitalism in Colombia, and anchor
hemispheric stability.
Proponents specifically respond to the above labor complaints that (1) murders and kidnappings
against trade unionists have declined dramatically since President Álvaro Uribe took office in
2002; (2) substantial progress is being made on the impunity issue as the government has
undertaken great efforts to find perpetrators and bring them to justice; and (3) the Colombian
government is taking steps to improve conditions for workers.

Colombia is one of the oldest democracies in Latin America, and has a bicameral legislature. Yet
it has been plagued by an ongoing armed conflict for over 40 years. This violence has been

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aggravated by a lack of state control over much of Colombian territory– rugged terrain that has
been hard to govern. In addition, a long history of poverty and inequality has left Colombia open
to other influences, among them drug trafficking. Leftist guerrilla groups inspired by the Cuban
Revolution formed in the 1960s as a response to state neglect and poverty. Right-wing
paramilitaries formed in the 1980s to defend landowners, many of whom were drug traffickers,
against guerrillas. The shift of coca production from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia in the 1980s
increased drug violence and provided a new source of revenue for both guerrillas and
paramilitaries. In 2002 Colombians elected an independent, Álvaro Uribe, as President, largely
because of his aggressive plan to reduce violence in Colombia.
Colombia is the United States’ fourth largest trading partner in Latin America, and its 33^rd largest ^th
import source and 26 largest export destination world-wide. Machinery, organic chemicals, and
cereals constitute half of total exports to Colombia, and petroleum accounts for 41% of all
imports from Colombia. Given the relatively small level of trade between the United States and
Colombia, the CFTA would, according to a U.S. International Trade Commission report, likely ³
have minimal to no effect on output or employment for most sectors of the U.S. economy.
U.S. proponents argue that the proposed CFTA would provide a number of economic benefits,
including market access for U.S. consumer and industrial products; cooperation in the production ⁴
of textiles and apparel; and new opportunities for U.S. farmers and ranchers. However, the trade
effect overall is expected to be very small. The largest changes in U.S. output are projected for the
cereal grains production sector (0.3%) and the sugar sector (-0.3%); the largest changes in U.S. ⁵
employment are projected to be in cereal grains (0.3%), sugar cane (-0.3%), and textiles (-0.3%.)
Colombia’s exports to the United States already enter the United States mostly duty-free under
the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). However, new U.S. investment in Colombia as a result
of the agreement could support increased economic growth and employment and additional
exports to the United States.
Colombian proponents argue that the only Western Hemisphere “Pacific Rim” countries with
which the United States does not have a free trade agreement are Colombia, Ecuador, and
Panama. The United States has FTAs with all others: Canada, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Peru, and Chile. The investment that goes into these other
countries from the United States as a result, the Colombian Embassy argues, means that new
exports from Latin America to the United States are increasingly coming from non-Colombian ⁶
countries, putting Colombia at an economic disadvantage relative to its neighbors.
Colombia’s official labor force is about 18.2 million, as compared with 138 million for the United
States. Roughly 23% of Colombia’s labor force is involved in the agricultural sector, 19% is

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involved in the manufacturing/industry sector, and 58% is employed in the service sector. Almost

60% of the workforce in Colombia is employed in the (largely unregulated, undocumented)

informal sector. The unemployment rate in Colombia is roughly 11.8% in 2008. During most of
the more than 40 years that Colombia has experienced internal armed conflict, membership and
participation in labor unions has waned. Between 1959 and 1965, the unionization rate grew from
5.5% to 13.5%. Since 1966, the unionization rate has declined to 4% or 742,000 of the 18.2
million workforce. Of these, fewer than 150,000, or 0.8% of the labor force are working under a ⁷
labor contract.

A key issue in the debate on the CFTA is the long-term trend in murders of Colombia’s trade
unionists as they try to express rights that are in concept protected in Colombia’s laws.
Three organizations track data on the number of trade unionists murdered each year: the
Colombian government; the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), successor to the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU); and the Escuela Nacional Sindical
(ENS) or National Labor School, a non-governmental organization founded in 1982 in Colombia
to provide “non-partisan and independent” information on human rights, labor, and the dynamics
of association and collective bargaining. Figure 1 below tracks each of their data on the number
of murders of trade unionists in Colombia and world-wide between 1997 and 2008 (projected). It
shows a wide year-to-year variation in the number of trade unionists murdered, but a distinct
downward trend since 2001.
Inconsistency among the three trend lines for Colombia reflects the fact that the three data
sources do not always agree on which murders should be counted as “trade unionist.” Those
murders that may not be counted by all sources include non-affiliated advisors to unions, retired ⁸
and inactive union members, rural and community organization members, and teachers. The
large bump in the murder trend line from 1999-2003 coincides with a large bulge in the
cultivation of coca produced in Colombia and a simultaneous decline in coca production in
Bolivia and Peru, according to Department of State data. The fact that the three lines for
Colombia’s murders of trade unionists closely track and crowd the line depicting such murders
world-wide shows the extent to which Colombia accounts for most such world-wide murders.
Colombia’s share ranges from a low of 49% in 1999 to a high of 86% in 2002, and then declines
to 54% in 2006.

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Proponents argue that other countries may not document the murders of their trade unionists as
carefully as Colombia does.
Figure 1. Historic Data on Murders of Trade Unionists, 1997-2008 (Projected)
350
Murders of Trade Unionists:

30 0 W or l d-w i de : Col om bi a :

250
ICFTU / ITUC
!!200
!
150
!
!!!100ICFTU / ITUC
!!!ENS
Colombian
!!50Government
0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
^Source:^{ICFTU/ITUC, ENS, and Colombian Government. See A}^p^{pendix for data}^{behind t}^{his grap}^h.
^Note^{: The Col}^{ombian Governm}^{ent has}^{released two different}^{figures for}²⁰^08.
Opponents of the proposed Colombia FTA tend to focus on the entire 10 year trend in murders
and the close relationship between Colombia’s murders and world-wide murders of trade
unionists. Proponents, including the Bush Administration and the Colombian government, focus
on the steady decline in such murders since Uribe became president in 2002, and on actions taken
recently by the Colombian government to reduce these fatalities. Such actions include bringing to
Colombia a permanent ILO representative, passing new labor laws, stepping up enforcement of
labor laws, implementing a new judicial system, and setting up a trade unionist protection
program. Under this program, as of March 7, 2008, roughly 1,983 trade unionists were receiving
protection – 21% of all persons receiving protection, but 30% of the total protection budget of ⁹
$13.1 million. Opponents of the Colombia FTA also point out other reasons for the decline in
murders, including the decline in targets: Unions in Colombia have dwindled from 13% of the
formal labor force in 1965 to 4% currently. They and their efforts have been eroded primarily
through such means as violence and employer-mandated union-substitution devices such as ¹⁰
government-sanctioned collective pacts and cooperative associations.
Proponents of the proposed CFTA point out that the number of trade unionists murdered as a
share of all trade unionists is considerably smaller than the total number of murders as a share of

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the general population. The AFL-CIO counters that “It is simply not meaningful to compare ¹¹
random crime statistics to targeted assassinations.”
A companion issue to trade unionist murders is long-term trends in three separate measures of
trade union violence: murders/assassinations, kidnappings/arbitrary detentions, and death threats.
Proponents of the CFTA note reductions in assassinations and arbitrary detentions since 2004.
Opponents, examining the data longer term, focus on a third means of intimidation: death threats.
They argue that in recent years perpetrators have switched their focus from murders to death
threats, because this more subtle form of intimidation can achieve the same results of ¹²
discouraging union activity with less public notice. These three methods of intimidation are
tracked individually in the left graph in Figure 2 and cumulatively in the right graph. The right
graph shows that assassinations were about equal to death threats in 2001-2002 when murders
were at their peak, but averaged less than one-quarter the number of death threats between 2003
and 2007, when murders were lower.
Figure 2. Assassinations, Death Threats and Arbitrary Detentions of
Trade Unionists, 1999-2007
¹⁰⁰⁰⁸⁰⁰
⁷⁰⁰
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²⁰⁰
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^Source:^Es^{cuela Nacional Sindical (ENS, 200}^{8). See Appe}^{ndix for}^{data behind t}^{hese gra}^ph^s.

The second main issue of opponents in debating CFTA is impunity – accountability for and
punishment of the perpetrators of assassinations, arbitrary detentions, and death threats.

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Perpetrators of the violence typically fall into three main groups: paramilitaries, guerrillas, and ¹³
the Colombian military. The human rights advocates group Amnesty International USA reports
on the difficulty in identifying the perpetrators in cases of trade union violence. However, it
reports that, among “cases in which clear evidence of responsibility is available” in 2005, of all
human rights abuses against trade unionists: paramilitaries committed 49%; security forces ¹⁴
committed 43%; guerrilla forces committed 2%; and criminals committed 4%.
Proponents of the agreement cite data showing progress in bringing perpetrators of the violence to
justice: As the result of a tripartite agreement with the ILO (among the government, trade
confederations, and business groups), the Office of the Colombian Prosecutor General, in October

2006, created a special sub-unit to investigate and prosecute 1,272 criminal cases of violence ¹⁵

against trade union members. These included 187 priority cases as determined by the unions.
As of October 20, 2008, there have been a total of 147 convictions in cases involving violence
against trade union members between 2001 and 2008, with 97 (66%) of them handed down in ¹⁶
2007-2008. Luciano Vasquez, Director General of the ENS views convictions over a longer
period of time and points out that since 1986, in about 97% of the cases of murders of trade
unionists, the perpetrators have never been identified and brought to justice. He argues further
that while in some cases the perpetrators of labor killings are found guilty, in zero cases has the ¹⁷
mastermind behind the crime been convicted.

A third main issue in the CFTA is adequacy of enforcement of Colombia’s labor laws, and
Colombia’s ability to protect workers. Many observers point out that enforcement of labor laws
and standards generally is an issue for Colombia as well as throughout Latin America and other
developing countries.
Proponents point to Colombia’s system of labor laws and protections, which include ratification
of all four ILO core labor standards. They argue that “Colombia’s laws provide for fundamental ¹⁸
labor rights and more.” These ILO standards (1) protect the right of workers to organize and
bargain collectively, (2) prohibit forced labor, (3) prohibit child labor, and (4) provide for non-
discrimination in employment.

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^Unionⁱ^{sm in C}^o^l^o^mbi^a^{, I}ⁿ^tr^o^duc^ti^on.²⁰⁰⁷^{. EN}^S^da^ta^.
¹⁵^{On Ju}^ne¹²^,²⁰^08,^thre^e^uⁿⁱ^{on c}^o^nf^e^d^e^r^a^{tions, CUT}^,^CGT^,^a^nd^CT^{C, subm}^itte^{d t}^o^the^IL^{O a}^list^of^2,66^{9 h}^o^mⁱ^cⁱ^de^s
^an^d^f^o^rced^dⁱ^sapp^earan^{ce cases as}^p^a^rt^o^f^{case 1}⁷⁸⁷^.^A^cco^rdⁱⁿ^{g t}^o^t^h^{e go}^vern^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^Co^l^o^m^bⁱ^a^,^t^h^{e M}ⁱⁿⁱ^st^ry^o^f^S^o^ci^al
^P^r^ote^c^tio^{n is}^now^c^r^oss-re^f^e^r^e^nc^ing^this^ne^w^c^a^s^e^{list w}^{ith its e}^x^isting^c^a^s^e^list.
¹⁶^Em^ba^ss^y^o^f^Colom^b^ia^.^C^o^lom^b^ia^:^{An U}^p^d^a^te^oⁿ^Ac^ti^ons^t^o^Str^e^ngt^he^{n t}^h^e^Rig^h^ts^an^{d Pr}^o^t^e^c^tions^f^o^r^Tr^ade^Uⁿ^io^ns^,
^Ma^y^{2008, p. 14;}^R^ecen^t^P^r^og^{ress i}ⁿ^L^a^bo^{r i}ⁿ^Co^l^o^mbⁱ^a^{, J}^une²⁰⁰⁸^{; a}ⁿ^{d C}^o^l^o^m^b^ia^{n Em}^ba^s^s^y^le^tte^r^{to t}^h^e^H^oⁿ^o^r^a^ble
^G^e^o^r^g^e^M^{iller, No}^v^e^m^b^{er 5}^,²⁰⁰⁸^{, attach}^m^eⁿ^t⁵^,^p^.⁴^.^It^sh^o^u^l^d^b^eⁿ^o^t^ed^th^at,^acco^rdⁱⁿ^g^t^o^g^o^v^e^rn^men^t^o^f^Co^l^o^m^b^ia
^st^atⁱ^s^tⁱ^c^s,ⁱⁿ^app^r^o^xⁱ^m^at^el^y³⁴^%^o^f^t^h^{e cases,}^t^h^{e d}^e^f^eⁿ^d^aⁿ^t^w^a^{s c}^onv^ic^te^{d in a}^b^se^ntia^a^nd^{is n}^o^{t c}^u^rre^ntly^{in c}^u^sto^d^y^.
^T^h^e^r^ef^or^e^,^a^ppr^ox^im^a^t^e^l^y^66%^of^thos^e^c^o^nv^ic^te^{d a}^r^e^s^e^r^v^ing^tim^e^{in pr}^is^on.
¹⁷^S^p^eech^b^y^L^u^ci^an^o^V^a^squ^ez,^op^.^ci^t^.
¹⁸^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^o^f^the^U^S^T^R^{. C}^o^lom^b^ia^F^T^A^Fa^c^t^s^.^C^o^lom^b^ia^’^s^L^a^bor^L^a^w^s^a^{nd L}^a^bor^P^r^ote^c^tio^ns^{. Ma}^r^c^h²⁰⁰⁸^.

After long-standing criticisms by the ILO that Colombia was not adhering to its labor code, in
January 2007, a “permanent” ILO representative opened an office in Colombia pursuant to a June
2006 tripartite agreement. In October, 2007, it received $4.0 million in funding from the
Colombian government. Subsequently, the ILO removed Colombia from discussion in its
Committee for the Application of Standards (which examines significant problems in specific ¹⁹
countries) for the first time in 21 years. The ILO has no enforcement authority. Its main tools
are technical assistance and moral suasion. However, the government and the ILO are working to
improve cooperation among national, regional and municipal governments to eradicate child
labor and protect working youth – issues addressed in the paragraph below.
Opponents argue that the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2007
notes numerous shortcomings in Colombian law and its enforcement, of which the following are
examples: Right to organize and bargain collectively: The right to organize and bargain
collectively in Colombia is limited because of high unemployment, a large informal economic
sector, traditional anti-union attitudes, and violence against trade union leaders. Prohibitions
against forced labor: Forced labor is a problem in prostitution and in new illegal guerrilla
groups which practice forced conscription, including the conscription of children. Prohibitions
against child labor: Child labor remains a significant problem, particularly in the informal
sector, as well, in the sex industry, in mining, and in coca picking. Colombia’s 276 labor
inspectors for enforcing child labor laws in the formal sector (covering about 20% of the child
labor force) are seen as inadequate for effective enforcement.
Finally, the State Department’s Country Reports, 2007 also points to the inadequacy of some of
Colombia’s labor laws. For example, the monthly minimum wage in Colombia, about $205, does
not provide sufficient income to purchase a basic market basket of goods for a family of four. In
addition, it is difficult to enforce the minimum wage in the informal sector.

If Congress were to approve the proposed Colombia FTA, it would be the second FTA (after
Peru) to have some labor enforcement “teeth.” Labor provisions including the four basic ILO core
labor standards (enumerated in the previous section) would be enforceable through the same
dispute settlement procedures as for all other provisions, such a those for commercial interests.
Opponents argue that under CFTA, only the concepts of core labor standards, and not the details
of the ILO conventions behind them, would be enforceable.
Proponents point to recent Colombian progress in protecting workers on many fronts. First the
personal protection program for union members has been a success in that since 2002, not a
single trade union member enrolled in the program has been killed, according to the Colombian
Embassy. Second, funding for investigating and prosecuting perpetrators of crimes against trade
unionists has increased. Third the government has engaged in greater social dialogue with the
ILO and other international union organizations, which are having an impact on national labor
policy. Fourth, there are a number of new legislative proposals pending to further protect basic ²⁰
core labor rights.

¹⁹^C^o^un^t^r^{y R}^e^po^rt^{s on}^Hu^man^Ri^ght^{s P}^r^a^c^tⁱ^ces^,²⁰⁰⁷^.
²⁰^Aⁿ^O^p^eⁿ^L^e^tte^r^{to C}^o^ng^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^l^D^e^m^o^c^r^a^t^s^{on H}^e^mⁱ^s^phe^rⁱ^c^T^r^a^d^e^Ex^pa^ns^ion^.^Sigⁿ^e^d^by^s^e^v^eⁿ^f^o^r^m^e^r^Mem^b^e^r^s^of
^Coⁿ^g^{ress an}^d^t^h^{e S}^eⁿ^a^t^e^and^at^l^e^ast³⁰^f^o^rm^{er cab}ⁱⁿ^et^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s,^am^b^a^s^s^ad^o^r^s,^an^d^f^o^rei^gⁿ^and^t^r^{ade p}^o^lⁱ^c^y^ad^vi^so^rs.
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

On national security issues, proponents acknowledge the continuing violence in Colombia as well
as recent corruption and wiretapping scandals. They assert that the level of reported violence has
steadily and significantly declined under President Uribe. They argue further that rather than
hiding the scandals or minimizing them, Colombia is taking steps to root them out and cleanse the
political system, recognizing that more must be done, including bringing to justice those who
have committed crimes against unionists. However, they argue, walking away from the proposed
CFTA or postponing it until conditions are perfect would send an unambiguous signal to friends
and opponents alike that the United States is an unreliable partner without a vision for
cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. They argue that this would make Colombia, Panama,
Peru and others who are making political decisions to enhance relations with the United States
despite strong domestic and external political pressure, re-evaluate their relationship with the ²¹
United States.
Opponents argue that delaying the vote on the proposed CFTA further would give Colombia more
time to keep improving protections for its workers. They assert that Colombia is still the most
dangerous place in the world to be a trade unionist, since it still accounts for the majority of
murders of trade unionists world-wide. They also argue that the progress made in bringing to
justice perpetrators of violence against union workers is limited, and point to the fact that a
significant percentage of those convicted in these cases (34% as of October 20, 2008 according to
the Colombian government) are convicted in absentia and remain at large. They also argue that
members of the Uribe government continue to inaccurately denounce union members as
guerrillas. Finally they argue that passing the CFTA could very well halt the “meager” progress ²²
by the Colombian government on worker rights protections achieved to date.
Proponents argue that approval of the proposed FTA and the economic growth in Colombia that
would result is the best way to protect Colombia’s trade unionists. They also argue that not
passing the agreement would not resolve Colombia’s labor issues.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^Av^a^ila^ble^a^t^http:/^/www^.c^ha^m^b^e^r^post.c^o^m^/^f^ile^s/^Colo^m^b^ia^_L^e^tte^r_from^_^Form^e^r^_De^m^oc^ra^tic^_O^ff^ic^ia^ls.pdf^.
²¹^Ibid^.
²²^V^a^ri^ou^{s sou}^r^{ces al}^read^yⁱ^d^en^tⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^p^l^u^s^US^L^E^A^P^.^Vi^oleⁿ^c^e^A^gai^ns^{t C}^o^l^o^m^bⁱ^a^Tr^a^d^e^Uⁿⁱ^onis^t^s^an^{d I}^m^puni^ty^:^H^o^w
^Mu^ch^P^r^o^g^r^{ess Ha}^s^T^h^{ere B}^een^Un^d^e^{r Uri}^b^e?^A^p^r^il²⁰⁰⁸^.

Table A-1. Data for Figure 1, p. 4
^{Year World-}^Wide^Colombia
^{ICFTU/ITUC ICFTU/ITUC ENS}^Colombian
^Governme^nt
¹⁹⁹^{7 299}¹⁷⁰
¹⁹⁹^{8 157}⁹⁷
¹⁹⁹⁹^{140 69 82}
²⁰⁰⁰^{210 153 134}¹⁰⁵
²⁰⁰¹^{223 185 194}²⁰⁵
²⁰⁰²^{213 154 192}¹⁹⁶
²⁰⁰^{3 129}⁹⁰^{102 101}
²⁰⁰⁴^{145 99 94}⁸⁹
²⁰⁰⁵^{115 70 72}⁴⁰
²⁰⁰⁶^{144 78 76}⁶⁰
²⁰⁰⁷³⁹²⁶
²⁰⁰⁸^{46 41}^(th^rough
^{October, as}
^{reported by}^Fiscalia,
^{from the Colombian}
^{Attorney Ge}^neral’s
^office);
^{21 (th}^rough
^{October, as}
^{reported by}^{the U.S.}
^Department^{of State}
^{in Charting}
^Colombia^’s
^Progress.)
^Source:^ICFTU/ITUC:^{Annual S}^u^{rvey of Violations of Trade Union Rights}^{, various years; E}^{NS: Esc}^{uela Nacional}
^Sindical^{. Informe de Violaciones a la Vida}^{, Libertad e Integ}^{ridad de Sindical}^{istas en Colombia, Perio}^{do 1 de Ene}^ro
^{a Diciembre de 20}^{08; Colombian}^Governm^{ent: Fiscalia,,}^GE^N^E^R^A^L^DE^L^A^N^A^C^I^O^N^,^{2008 homicides}^{(assassinations}
^{against trade u}^{nion leaders and u}^{nion membe}^{rs); and U.S. Department of State,}^{Charting Colombia’s Progress}^,
^11/1^2/0^8.

Table A-2. Data for Figure 2: Assassinations, Death Threats, and Arbitrary
Detentions, p. 5
^Year^{Assassinations}^{Arbitrary Detentions}^{Death Threats}
¹⁹⁹^{9 80 29}⁶⁷⁹
²⁰⁰^{0 137}³⁸¹⁸⁰
²⁰⁰^{1 197}¹²²³⁵
²⁰⁰^{2 186}¹³¹⁹⁸
²⁰⁰^{3 94 50}³⁰¹
²⁰⁰^{4 96 79}⁴⁵⁵
²⁰⁰^{5 70 56}²⁶⁰
²⁰⁰^{6 72 16}²⁴⁴
²⁰⁰^{7 39 19}²²⁴
^Source:^Es^{cuela Nacional Sindical,}^{2,515 or that sinister ease to forget,}²⁰⁰^{8, p. 69}^{Updated for}²⁰^{07 with data}
^{from La Coyuntur}^{a Laboral Y Si}^ndic^{al Hechos Y Cifras Mas Relevantes}^{, 200}^7-2⁰⁰^8.
^Mar^y^J^aⁿ^e^B^o^lle
^Specialis^{t i}ⁿ^In^terⁿ^ation^a^{l T}^r^{ade an}^{d Fin}^aⁿ^ce
^m^j^bol^l^e^@^c^r^s^.l^oc.g^ov^{, 7-}⁷⁷⁵³