Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA): Using Prior Juvenile Adjudications for Sentence Enhancements

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

With recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the role of judges and juries in making
factual determinations upon which sentences are made, there has been increased congressional
interest in federal sentencing. One aspect of federal sentencing includes recidivism statutes that
provide longer sentences for repeat offenders. One such statute, the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA), requires imposition of a 15-year prison sentence for an individual with prior serious
drug or violent felony convictions. Under the ACCA, non-jury juvenile adjudications qualify as
prior convictions. The use of these non-jury juvenile adjudications raises several constitutional
due process questions and continues to spark debate among courts at the federal and state levels.
Opinions vary, in part, because of conflicting interpretations of the U.S. Supreme Court’s jury
trial jurisprudence stressing the constitutional requirement of juries, rather than judges, making
factual determinations upon which sentences are based. This report summarizes the competing
views on the constitutionality of the use of non-jury juvenile adjudications in subsequent criminal
proceedings.

he Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) requires imposition of a minimum 15-year term of
imprisonment for unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) by ¹
an individual with three prior serious drug or violent felony convictions. The ACCA T

defines “conviction” to include “a finding that a person has committed an act of juvenile ²
delinquency involving a violent felony.” Defendants have begun to challenge, with mixed
results, the courts’ ability to use non-jury juvenile adjudications as a prior conviction under the
ACCA. Opinions vary, in part, because of conflicting interpretations of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
recent jury trial jurisprudence, as well as the the nature of juvenile court proceedings.
In a series of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that given the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury, judges cannot impose sentences beyond the prescribed statutory maximum unless the ³
facts supporting such an increase are found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In Jones v. ⁴
United States, the Court struck down the federal carjacking statute that enhanced the maximum
prison sentence that Nathaniel Jones could receive depending upon the amount of bodily injury
that accompanied the carjacking. In Jones, it was the sentencing judge, not a jury, who found the
victims incurred serious bodily injury and imposed a prison sentence of 25 years. The Jones
majority held that
^uⁿ^d^{er th}^{e D}^u^{e P}^r^oces^s^C^l^aus^e^of^th^{e Fi}^f^t^h^Am^en^d^m^eⁿ^{t an}^{d th}^{e n}^o^{tice a}ⁿ^{d j}^u^ry^trial
^g^u^a^raⁿ^t^ees^of^t^h^{e Sixth}^Am^endm^eⁿ^{t, any}^f^{act (o}^th^er^th^aⁿ^{a p}^r^io^r^coⁿ^vⁱ^ctioⁿ⁾^th^{at in}^cr^ea^ses
^th^e^m^a^xⁱ^m^u^m^p^eⁿ^a^lt^y^f^o^r^{a cr}^im^e^m^u^{st b}^e^c^h^ar^g^e^dⁱⁿ^aⁿⁱⁿ^dⁱ^c^t^m^eⁿ^t^{, s}^u^b^m^itted^to^{a j}^u^r^y^,^an^d⁵
^prov^en^be^y^oⁿ^d^{a reas}^on^abl^e^dou^bt^.
Apprendi v. New Jersey (Apprendi)⁶ reaffirmed Jones by holding that “other than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory ⁷
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” In Apprendi, the
Court struck down New Jersey’s hate crime law, which allowed a judge to increase a sentence to
double the statutory maximum if he or she found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendant acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of
race. In reversing the lower court’s decision, the Court declared that the jury trial and notification
clauses of the Sixth Amendment and the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments embody a principle that insists that, except in the case of recidivists, a judge could
not on his own findings sentence a criminal defendant to a term of imprisonment greater than the
statutory maximum assigned for which he had been convicted by the jury. The Apprendi Court ⁸
specifically held that its “prior conviction” exception was a narrow one.

¹^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁹²⁴⁽^e⁾^.
²^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁹²⁴⁽^e⁾⁽²⁾⁽^C⁾^.
³^S^ee^Joⁿ^e^{s v.}^Unⁱ^t^ed^St^a^t^es,⁵²^{6 U}^.^S.²²⁷⁽¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^;^A^p^p^r^endⁱ^v.^Ne^{w Jersey,}^{520 U}^.^S^.⁴⁶⁶⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^;^Ri^{ng v}^.^Ar^iz^on^a^{, 53}⁶
^U.^S^.⁵⁸^{4 (20}⁰²^)(ho^l^dⁱⁿ^g^t^h^at^aⁿ^a^ggra^v^atⁱⁿ^{g ci}^rcu^m^st^an^{ce t}^h^at^mak^e^{s a d}^e^f^eⁿ^d^aⁿ^t^elⁱ^gⁱ^b^l^e^f^o^{r a d}^eat^{h sen}^t^en^{ce i}^s^t^h^e
^f^unc^tiona^{l e}^q^uiv^a^le^nt^of^aⁿ^e^l^em^{ent of}^aⁿ^of^f^e^ns^e^f^o^r^pur^pos^e^s^of^the^Six^t^{h A}^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t r}ⁱ^g^h^{t t}^o^jur^y^tr^ia^{l a}^{nd t}^h^e^r^e^f^or^e
^m^u^s^t^be^f^ound^by^a^jur^y⁾^;^B^l^a^kel^{y v.}^Wa^shⁱⁿ^g^t^on^,⁵⁴^{2 U}^.^S^.²⁹⁶⁽²⁰⁰⁴⁾⁽^f^inding^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^“^s^ta^tutor^y^m^a^xim^u^m^”^f^o^r
^Appr^eⁿ^di^p^u^r^p^o^s^{es i}^s^t^h^{e m}^a^xi^m^u^m^s^eⁿ^t^en^{ce a j}^u^d^g^{e m}^a^yⁱ^m^p^o^s^{e s}^o^l^e^l^y^oⁿ^t^h^e^b^a^si^{s o}^f^f^act^{s re}^f^l^ect^e^dⁱⁿ^t^h^{e j}^u^ry
^v^e^rdic^{t or a}^d^m^itte^{d by}^the^de^f^e^nda^nt);^Unⁱ^t^e^d^St^a^t^{es v.}^B^o^o^ker^,⁵⁴³^U^.^S.²²^{0 (}²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^f^indi^ng^tha^t^t^h^e^m^a^nda^tor^y^na^tur^e
^o^f^t^h^{e F}^e^d^e^ral^S^eⁿ^t^eⁿ^ciⁿ^g^G^uⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^{es vi}^o^l^at^{es t}^h^{e S}ⁱ^xt^{h Am}^en^d^m^en^t^ri^gh^t^t^o^j^u^ry^).
⁴⁵²^{6 U}^.^S^.²²⁷⁽¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^.
⁵^Id^.^a^t²⁴^3.
⁶⁵²^{0 U}^.^S^.⁴⁶⁶⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
⁷^Id^.^a^t⁴⁹^0.
⁸^Id^.

The narrow “prior conviction” exception from the general rule that all facts going to punishment
must be found by a jury is based on assumptions regarding the reliability and fairness of the ⁹
procedures available to the defendant at the time his or her prior convictions were entered. The
U.S. Supreme Court first addressed sentence enhancement based upon recidivism as a jury trial ¹⁰
issue in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, where, in a 5-4 decision, it held that a judge, rather
than a jury, may decide the fact of a defendant’s prior conviction for purposes of determining ¹¹
whether a sentence should be imposed in excess of the statutory maximum. The Court set forth
three principal reasons for reaching its conclusion. First, recidivism has been a traditional basis ¹²
for a sentencing court’s increase in an offender’s sentence. Second, recidivism should be treated
differently from other sentencing enhancement factors because “the introduction of evidence of a ¹³
defendant’s prior crimes risks significant prejudice.” Third, although a factor may trigger an
increase in the maximum permissive sentence, as opposed to an increase in the mandatory ¹⁴
minimum sentence as seen in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, that factor should not automatically
require a greater burden of proof, as it “does not systematically, or normally, work to the ¹⁵
disadvantage of a criminal defendant.” As such, the Court held that the factor of recidivism need
not be included in the indictment, nor proved beyond a reasonable doubt, even if that factor ¹⁶
increases the criminal sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.
There is doubt concerning the continued viability of Almendarez-Torres. The four Almendarez-
Torres dissenters and Justice Thomas have all expressed belief that Almendarez-Torres was
decided in error. Justice Thomas, the only member of the Almendarez-Torres majority to join the
Apprendi majority, renounced his vote with the majority in Almendarez-Torres and declared that ¹⁷¹⁸
the decision was in error. Moreover, the Court’s decision in Shepard v. United States appears

⁹^F^o^{r exam}^p^l^e,^t^h^{e d}^e^f^eⁿ^d^aⁿ^t^recei^ved^{a j}^u^ry^t^rⁱ^a^l^o^r^valⁱ^d^l^y^w^aⁱ^v^ed^t^hⁱ^s^ri^gh^t^aⁿ^d^f^act^{s u}^p^oⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^{e sen}^t^en^{ce w}^a^s
^ba^s^e^{d w}^e^r^e^f^ound^be^y^{ond r}^e^a^s^ona^ble^d^o^u^b^t.^S^{ee Jo}ⁿ^e^s^a^t²⁴^{9 (e}^x^p^la^ining^t^h^a^t^usiⁿ^g^the^f^a^c^t^of^a^prior^c^onv^ic^tio^{n t}^o
^e^nha^nc^e^a^se^nteⁿ^c^e^{is c}^o^nstitutⁱ^oⁿ^a^lly^distin^c^t^f^r^o^m^the^use^of^othe^r^f^a^c^t^{s a}^{nd d}^o^e^s^no^{t ra}^ise^the^sa^m^e^due^pr^oc^e^{ss a}^nd
^Sⁱ^xt^h^Am^en^d^m^en^t^coⁿ^cern^s^b^ecau^{se “a p}^rⁱ^o^{r c}^oⁿ^vⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^m^u^stⁱ^t^s^el^{f h}^a^{ve b}^een^est^a^b^lⁱ^s^h^e^{d t}^h^r^o^u^g^h^p^r^o^ced^u^r^{es sat}ⁱ^s^fyⁱⁿ^g
^t^h^{e f}^aⁱ^rⁿ^o^tⁱ^ce,^reasoⁿ^a^bl^{e do}^ub^t^,^an^d^j^u^ry^t^rⁱ^a^l^gu^aran^t^ees.^”^).
¹⁰⁵²^{3 U}^.^S^.²²⁴⁽¹⁹⁹⁸⁾^{. I}ⁿ^t^h^is^c^a^s^e^,^the^C^our^t^c^onsⁱ^d^e^r^e^d^a^f^e^de^r^a^{l s}^t^a^t^ute^a^u^th^or^iz^ing^a^tw^o-^y^e^a^r^pr^is^{on te}^r^m^f^o^r
^de^por^te^e^s^w^{ho r}^e^turⁿ^e^d^t^o^t^h^e^U^.^{S. w}^ithou^{t pe}^r^m^is^sⁱ^on,^but^a^u^th^orⁱ^z^ing^a^pr^is^oⁿ^te^r^m^of^{up to}²⁰^y^e^ar^s^f^o^r^a^lie^ns^w^hos^e
^de^por^ta^ti^on^w^a^s^s^ubs^e^que^{nt t}^o^a^f^e^lony^c^onv^ic^{tion. T}^h^e^que^s^tioⁿ^be^f^o^r^e^the^C^our^t^w^a^s^w^h^e^t^he^r^the^s^t^a^t^ute^de^fⁱ^ne^{d tw}^o
^s^e^pa^r^a^te^c^rⁱ^m^e^s^{, in w}^h^ic^{h c}^a^s^e^the^pr^ior^c^onv^ic^ti^{on m}^u^s^t^be^m^e^ntion^e^{d in}^theⁱ^ndic^t^m^e^{nt, or}^sⁱ^m^p^ly^a^u^thor^iz^e^d^aⁿ
^en^h^aⁿ^ced^p^eⁿ^a^l^t^y^,ⁱⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^h^{case t}^h^{e p}^rⁱ^o^{r con}^vⁱ^c^tⁱ^o^{n i}^s^no^t^{an el}^emen^t^t^h^at^m^u^st^b^e^ch^arged^.
¹¹^Id^.^a^t²²^5-²⁷^.
¹²^Id^.^a^t²³^1.
¹³^Id^.^a^t²³^5.
¹⁴⁴⁷^{7 U}^.^S^.⁷⁹⁽¹⁹⁸⁶⁾⁽^u^p^hol^ding^P^e^nns^y^l^v^a^nia^’^s^Ma^nda^tor^y^Minim^u^m^Se^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^A^c^{t, w}^h^ic^{h pr}^e^s^c^r^ibe^d^a^m^a^nda^tor^y
^mⁱⁿⁱ^m^u^m^sen^t^en^{ce o}^f^fⁱ^ve^{years u}^p^oⁿ^{a j}^u^d^g^{e’s f}ⁱⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^b^y^{a p}^r^ep^ond^eran^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e evi}^d^en^{ce t}^h^at^t^h^{e defen}^d^aⁿ^t^“vi^sⁱ^b^l^y
^p^o^ssessed^{a f}ⁱ^rear^{m” d}^u^rⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e co}^mmⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^o^f^cert^aⁱⁿ^en^u^m^erat^ed^o^f^fen^s^es).
¹⁵^Alm^e^nd^ar^e^z^-^T^or^r^e^s^{, 52}^{3 U}^.^{S. a}^t²⁴⁴^.
¹⁶^Id^.^a^t²²^7.
¹⁷^Iⁿ^his^c^onc^ur^r^e^nc^eⁱⁿ^Ap^pr^e^ndi^{, (}^I^{d. a}^t⁵²^0-²¹⁾^J^u^s^tic^e^T^hom^a^s^w^r^ote^:
^[^O^]ⁿ^e^o^f^t^h^{e ch}ⁱ^e^f^erro^{rs o}^f^A^l^m^eⁿ^d^a^rez-T^o^rres—an^erro^{r t}^o^w^hⁱ^c^{h I su}^ccu^m^b^ed^—w^a^s^t^o^at^t^e^m^p^t^t^o
^disc^e^r^{n w}^h^e^t^he^{r a}^pa^rtic^ula^r^f^a^c^t^{is tra}^d^itio^na^lly^{(or ty}^pic^a^l^l^y^{) a}^ba^si^{s f}^o^{r a}^se^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^c^ourt^to
ⁱⁿ^{crease an}^o^f^fen^d^e^{r’s sen}^t^en^ce.^F^o^{r t}^h^{e reason}^{s I h}^a^{ve gi}^ven^,ⁱ^t^shou^l^d^b^e^cl^{ear t}^h^at^t^hⁱ^s^app^r^o^ach
^j^u^st^d^e^fⁱⁿ^e^{s aw}^a^y^t^h^{e real}ⁱ^ssu^e.^W^h^at^m^a^t^t^e^{rs i}^s^t^h^{e w}^a^{y b}^y^w^hⁱ^c^h^{a f}^act^en^t^e^{rs i}ⁿ^t^o^t^h^{e sent}^en^ce.^If
^{a f}^a^ctⁱ^s^b^y^l^a^w^t^h^{e b}^a^si^{s f}^o^{r i}^m^p^o^sⁱⁿ^{g o}^rⁱⁿ^creas^ing^pun^ishm^eⁿ^{t—for e}^s^ta^blishi^ng^or^inc^r^e^a^s^ing^the
^prose^c^u^ti^{on’s e}ⁿ^title^m^e^{nt—it is a}ⁿ^e^l^e^m^eⁿ^{t. (T}^o^{put t}^h^e^p^oⁱⁿ^{t d}ⁱ^f^f^e^r^eⁿ^tly^{, I a}^m^a^w^a^r^e^of^no
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

to further question the continued viability of Almendarez-Torres. In Shepard, the Court addressed
whether a sentencing court, acting pursuant to the ACCA, can examine police reports or
complaints to determine whether a prior guilty plea to burglary counts as a prior conviction of a ¹⁹
“violent felony.” In reading the “prior conviction” exception narrowly, the Court concluded that
the judicial inquiry under the ACCA, as to whether a guilty plea to burglary is a “violent felony,”
“is limited to the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of
colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by ²⁰
the defendant, or some comparable judicial record of this information.” It would appear that
requiring that recidivism in the Shepard context be proved beyond a reasonable doubt calls into
question the distinction between “traditional sentencing factors” such as recidivism and “elements
of the offense.” However, it should be noted that Shepard was decided on statutory grounds,
invoking the doctrine of avoiding constitutional doubt.
The scope of the “prior conviction” exception and its applicability to prior juvenile adjudications
have been the focus of debate. Following the Almendarez-Torres and Apprendi decisions, two
conflicting views have arisen as to whether a juvenile adjudication constitutes a “prior
conviction” for the purpose of enhancing an adult’s sentence. The legal issue with using juvenile
adjudications as sentence enhancers is not the constitutional validity of the adjudication itself, but
instead the constitutional validity of the adjudication’s subsequent use in an adult criminal court.
Historically, prior juvenile criminality was not used as a sentencing factor because records of ²¹
juvenile adjudications were confidential and often expunged. The Ninth Circuit was the first to ²²
publish an opinion on the matter in United States v. Tighe. The defendant pled guilty to bank
robbery, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle.
The government argued that the defendant’s sentence could be enhanced because of a prior
adjudication as a juvenile of reckless endangerment, first-degree robbery, and unauthorized use of ²³
a motor vehicle. However, the Court found that the juvenile adjudication could not be used for

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^hⁱ^st^o^rⁱ^cal^b^a^si^{s f}^o^{r t}^r^eatⁱⁿ^{g as a no}ⁿ^e^l^e^m^eⁿ^t^{a f}^a^ct^t^h^at^b^y^l^a^w^set^s^o^rⁱⁿ^{creases p}^uⁿⁱ^sh^m^eⁿ^t^.⁾^W^h^en
^one^c^o^nside^r^{s t}^h^e^q^u^e^s^tion^f^r^om^t^h^{is pe}^rspe^c^tiv^e^,^it^{is e}^v^ideⁿ^{t w}^h^y^t^h^e^f^a^c^t^of^a^{prior c}^onv^ic^tio^{n is}
^an^el^emen^t^uⁿ^d^e^{r a reci}^dⁱ^vi^sm^st^a^t^u^t^e.^Iⁿ^d^eed^,^{cases ad}^d^r^essiⁿ^g^su^c^h^st^at^u^t^es^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^{e so}^m^e^o^f^t^h^e
^be^s^t^dis^c^us^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^of^w^h^a^t^c^ons^tit^ut^e^s^aⁿ^e^l^em^eⁿ^{t of}^a^c^rⁱ^m^e^.^Oⁿ^e^r^e^as^{on f}^r^e^que^ntly^of^f^e^r^e^{d f}^o^r
^t^r^eatⁱⁿ^{g reci}^dⁱ^vi^sm^dⁱ^f^f^eren^t^l^y^,^{a reaso}ⁿ^oⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^{h w}^e^r^e^lie^{d in A}^l^m^e^nda^r^e^z^-^T^o^r^r^e^s^is^a^c^onc^e^r^{n f}^o^r
^pre^j^ud^ic^ing^the^j^u^ry^by^inf^o^r^m^ing^{it of}^the^pr^{ior c}^onv^ic^tio^{n. B}^u^{t t}^h^is^c^onc^e^r^n,^of^w^h^ic^{h e}^a^r^lie^r^c^our^ts
^w^e^r^e^w^e^{ll aw}^a^r^e^,^doe^s^{not m}^a^k^e^t^h^e^tr^a^d^iti^ona^l^un^de^r^s^ta^ndi^ng^of^w^h^a^t^aⁿ^e^l^e^m^eⁿ^{t is}^aⁿ^y^le^s^s
^ap^p^lⁱ^cab^l^e^t^o^t^h^{e f}^act^o^f^{a p}^rⁱ^o^{r con}^vⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^.
¹⁸⁵⁴^{4 U}^.^S^.¹³⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.
¹⁹^Id^.^T^h^e^A^CCA^m^a^nda^te^{s a}^15-y^e^a^r^mⁱⁿⁱ^m^u^m^se^nteⁿ^c^e^f^o^{r a}ⁿ^y^pe^rs^{on f}^o^uⁿ^d^to^ha^v^e^c^o^m^m^itte^{d c}^e^r^ta^{in f}^e^de^ra^l
^fⁱ^r^e^a^r^m^s^vⁱ^ola^tions^if^tha^t^pe^r^s^on^ha^s^thr^e^e^prⁱ^o^r^c^o^nv^ic^tions^f^o^r^“^v^iole^{nt f}^e^lonie^s^.”^T^h^e^te^r^m^“^v^iole^{nt f}^e^lony^”^inc^l^ude^s
^“^bur^g^l^a^r^y^,^”^a^{nd the}^C^our^{t in}^Tay^l^or^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s⁽⁴⁹⁵^U^.^S.⁵^75,⁵⁹^8-⁹⁹⁽¹⁹⁹⁰⁾⁾^he^ld^tha^t^t^h^e^A^C^C^A^’^s^us^e^of^the
^t^e^rm^“b^u^r^gl^ar^{y” en}^co^m^p^{asses o}ⁿ^l^y^“gen^eri^c^b^u^r^gl^ar^y^.^”
²⁰^Id^.^a^t¹²⁶³^.
²¹^D^a^vⁱ^{d S. T}^a^ne^nha^us^,^T^h^e^Ev^oluti^on^of^J^u^v^e^nile^C^our^tsⁱⁿ^the^Ea^r^l^y^Tw^eⁿ^tie^{th C}^e^ntur^y^:^B^e^y^{ond t}^h^e^My^{th of}
^I^m^m^a^c^u^la^te^C^ons^tr^uc^tio^{n, i}ⁿ^A^C^e^ntur^y^of^J^u^v^e^nile^J^u^s^tic^e^42,^69-^{70 (}^M^a^r^g^a^r^e^{t K}^.^R^o^s^e^nhe^m^e^t^a^l^{., Eds}^.,²⁰⁰²⁾^.
²²²⁶⁶^F.^3d¹¹⁸⁷⁽²⁰⁰¹⁾^.
²³^Id^.^a^t¹¹⁹⁰^.

enhancement purposes pursuant to the ACCA because his juvenile adjudication was not tried by a
jury trial, thus evidencing “significant constitutional differences between adult convictions and ²⁴
juvenile adjudications.” The Court held that “the ‘prior conviction’ exception to Apprendi’s
general rule must be limited to prior convictions that were themselves obtained through ²⁵
proceedings that included the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”
In United States v. Smalley,²⁶ the Eighth Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Tighe.
The court, in employing a broader interpretation than the Ninth Circuit, found that the question of
whether juvenile adjudications should be exempt from Apprendi’s general rule should not turn on
the narrow parsing of words, but on an examination of whether juvenile adjudications, like adult ²⁷
convictions, are so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such an exemption. The
court reasoned that as juvenile courts apply a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, the juvenile ²⁸
bench trial was procedurally adequate to constitute a “prior conviction.”
States have also adopted different approaches for allowing the use of juvenile adjudications as
sentence enhancers. One approach used by some states (e.g., Indiana and Kansas) allows courts to ²⁹
consider a prior juvenile adjudication as part of a defendant’s criminal history. The majority of
states that have addressed the constitutionality of such provisions have found that as long as
juveniles receive all the process they are constitutionally due in the juvenile system, an adult ³⁰
court can treat a juvenile adjudication as a sentence enhancer.
However, in State v. Brown,³¹ the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the minority view and held ³²
that courts cannot use a juvenile adjudication to enhance a sentence. The defendant pleaded
guilty to one count of robbery, and a jury found him guilty under a separate count of armed
robbery. After his conviction, the state charged the defender under its habitual offender law and ³³
enhanced his sentence based on a prior juvenile adjudication. He challenged the sentence and
argued that the trial court’s use of his juvenile adjudication for sentence enhancement violated
Apprendi. The Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished civil adjudications from criminal
convictions, noting that juvenile courts afford juveniles less due process, which results in a ³⁴
proceeding that is more civil in nature than criminal. The court decided that although juvenile

²⁴^Id^.^a^t¹¹^92-⁹³^.
²⁵^Id^.^a^t¹¹⁹⁴^.
²⁶²⁹⁴^F.^3d¹⁰³⁰⁽²⁰⁰²⁾^.
²⁷^Id^{. a}^t¹⁰^32-¹⁰³³^.
²⁸^T^h^{e T}^hⁱ^r^d^an^d^E^l^even^t^h^Ci^rcui^t^s^h^a^{ve h}^eard^f^act^u^a^l^l^y^si^mⁱ^l^a^{r ca}^sesⁱⁿ^vo^l^vⁱⁿ^{g a cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^d^e^f^eⁿ^d^aⁿ^t^’s^sen^t^en^ce
^e^nha^nc^e^m^eⁿ^{t unde}^r^t^h^e^A^C^C^A^a^{nd f}^o^llow^e^{d the}^s^a^m^e^r^a^tiona^le^a^s^the^Eig^h^th^Cⁱ^r^c^uit^.^Unⁱ^t^ed^St^a^t^{es v}^.^Joⁿ^e^s^{, 33}²^F.^3d^th
⁶⁸⁸⁽³^d^Cir.²⁰⁰³^),^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁵⁴⁰^U^.^S.¹¹⁵⁰⁽²⁰⁰⁴⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^a^t^e^s^v^.^Bur^g^e^,⁴⁰⁷^F.^3d¹¹⁸³⁽¹¹^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.^A
^sim^ila^{r split e}^x^ists^w^{ith re}^spe^c^t^to^the^use^of^prior^de^lin^que^nc^y^a^d^judic^a^{tions f}^o^{r t}^h^e^p^u^rp^ose^of^a^de^f^e^nda^{nt’s se}^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^th
^guⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^{e cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^hⁱ^st^o^r^y^sco^r^e.^Co^m^p^are,^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^W^a^s^hⁱ^ngt^on^,⁴^{62 F.3}^d¹¹²⁴⁽⁹^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾^,^w^ith^Unite^d^th^rd
^State^s^v^.^W^illi^ams^,⁴¹^{0 F.}^3d³^{97 (}⁷^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾^,^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^v^.^M^c^K^o^y^,⁴⁵²^F.^3d²³^{4 (}³^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.
²⁹^Se^e^J^o^s^e^{ph B}^.^Saⁿ^bor^{n, J}^r^.^,^Strⁱ^kⁱ^ng^O^u^{t o}ⁿ^t^h^e^Fir^s^t^P^itc^h^{in C}^r^imⁱⁿ^a^l^C^o^ur^t,^{1 B}^a^r^r^y^L^.^R^e^v^.^{7, 1}⁷⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
³⁰^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^P^e^op^l^e^v.^B^o^wd^en^{, 1}²⁵^C^a^{l. R}^p^tr^.^2d⁵^13,⁵^{18 (}^C^a^l^{. C}^t^{. A}^pp.²⁰⁰²⁾^;^Ry^le^v^.^Stat^e^,⁸^{19 N}^.^E.^2d¹¹^9,¹²³
⁽^I^nd.^C^t^{. A}^pp.²⁰⁰⁴⁾^;^St^a^t^{e v.}^Hi^t^t^{, 42}^P^.^3d⁷^32,⁷⁴^{0 (}^K^aⁿ^{. 2}⁰⁰²⁾^,^c^e^r^t^{. de}^nie^d^,⁵^{37 U}^.^S.¹¹⁰⁴⁽²⁰⁰³⁾^.
³¹⁸⁷^{9 S}^o^.^2d¹²⁷⁶⁽^L^a^.²⁰⁰⁴⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^{, 5}⁴³^U^.^S.⁸²^{6 (}²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.
³²^Id^.^a^t¹²⁸⁰^.
³³^Id^.^L^o^uⁱ^sⁱ^aⁿ^a^’^s^ha^bi^tua^l^of^f^e^nde^r^la^w^pr^ov^ide^s^tha^t^aⁿ^y^pe^r^s^{on w}^h^o^ha^s^pr^e^v^ious^ly^be^eⁿ^c^onv^ic^te^d^of^a^f^e^lony^or
^a^d^judⁱ^c^a^t^e^d^a^s^a^juv^e^nile^of^a^s^e^rious^drug^or^vⁱ^oleⁿ^t^of^f^e^ns^e^w^{ill rec}^eⁱ^v^e^aⁿ^e^nha^nc^e^d^s^e^nteⁿ^c^e^if^c^oⁿ^vⁱ^c^t^e^d^of^a^s^e^c^ond
^fe^l^oⁿ^y^.^Id^.^a^t¹²^79.
³⁴^Id^.^a^t¹²⁸⁹^.

adjudications are sufficiently reliable for use in the juvenile court system, the absence of the right ³⁵
to a jury trial makes juvenile adjudications too unreliable for use as an adult sentence enhancer.
The future of the “prior conviction” exception and its applicability to juvenile adjudications
remain unclear, as the U.S. Supreme Court has denied petitions for writ of certiorari in the cases ³⁶
that have adopted the majority view and in cases that have adopted the minority view.
^Alⁱ^s^oⁿ^M^.^S^mⁱ^t^h
^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e A}^t^torn^e^y
^a^m^smⁱ^t^h@^crs^.^l^o^c.g^o^v^,⁷^-⁶⁰⁵⁴

³⁵^Id^.^a^t¹²⁹⁰^.
³⁶^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^J^one^s^,³³^{2 F}^.³^d⁶⁸⁸⁽³^{d C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰³⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁵⁴⁰^U^.^S.¹¹⁵⁰⁽²⁰⁰⁴⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^a^t^e^s^v^.^Sm^alle^y^,
²⁹⁴^F.^3d¹⁰³⁰⁽⁸^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰²⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁵³^{7 U}^.^S^.¹¹¹⁴⁽²⁰⁰³⁾^;^State^v^.^Hⁱ^tt^{, 42}^P^.^{3d 73}²⁽^K^aⁿ^.²⁰⁰²⁾^,^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,
⁵³⁷^U^.^S.¹¹⁰⁴⁽²⁰⁰³⁾^;^S^t^at^{e v.}^B^r^o^wⁿ^,⁸⁷^{9 S}^o^.^2d²⁷^{6 (}^L^a^.²⁰⁰⁴⁾^,^c^e^r^t^{. de}^nie^d^,⁵^{34 U}^.^S.⁸²^{6 (}²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.